SINDH CONFERENCE 1932

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1932

REPORT

BY

THE HON'BLE MR. A. F. L. BRAYNE, C.I.E., I.C.S.,
CHAIRMAN, SINDH CONFERENCE.

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Professor H. L. Chablani.

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Mr. H. Dow, C.I.E., I.C.S.

Diwan Bahadur Murlidhar Jeramdas Panjabi.

Mr. E. L. Price, C.I.E., O.B.E.

Qazi Abdur Rahman.

Terms of Reference.

The purpose of the Conference is to try to overcome the difficulties disclosed by the report of the expert financial investigation made by the Irving Committee in 1931 .

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Report by the Chairman.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

1. The origin of the Sindh Conference lies in the report of Sub-Committee No. IX (Sindh) of the Indian Round Table Conference which recommended that an expert Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sindh and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage and that, if the investigation showed that separation would leave the new Province with a deficit, the representatives of Sindh should be asked to show satisfactorily how the deficit would be met before the new Province is set up. The first stage was completed when the Sindh Financial Enquiry Committee signed their report in September 1931 after an enquiry lasting from July 13th.

This report sought to show that a separated Sindh would enter upon its new career with an initial deficit of Rs. 110.42 lakhs. On the 1st of December 1931 in his statement made at the close of the second session of the Round Table Conference the Prime Minister said—

> "His Majesty's Government also accept in principle the proposition, which was endorsed at the last Conference, that Sindh should be constituted a separate province, if satisfactory means of financing it can be found. We therefore intend to ask the Government of India to arrange for a conference with the representatives of Sindh for the purpose of trying to overcome the difficulties disclosed by the report of the expert financial investigation which has just been completed. "

The second stage was entered upon when the present Conference was constituted by the Government of India in orders which set forth the purpose and scope of the enquiry The Sindh Conference is being set up in accordance with the undertaking given by the Prime Minister in the course of his statement to the Round Table Conference at the close of its second session on the 1st December of last year. His Majesty's Government have accepted in principle the proposition that Sindh should be constituted a separate province if satisfactory means of financing it can be found. The purpose of the Conference is to try to overcome the difficulties disclosed by the report of the expert financial investigation made by the Irving Committee last summer. The Chairman, having met the representatives of Sindh, will report the results of the Conference to the Government of India.

2. The Conference opened at Karachi on 25th April 1932 and carried on an intensive study of its subject until the 17th May. At the outset the question arose whether the amount of the deficit as disclosed by the expert enquiry would be open to investigation or whether the Conference must accept the figures there given and proceed at once to the examination of measures for overcoming the difficulty of the deficit. As the task of the Conference was to deal with conclusions which were based upon inferences from certain data and upon certain methods of distribution and allocation, as to the correctness of which some considerable doubts evidently existed, it was clearly right that it should be open to the representatives of Sindh to examine the figures and express their opinions without necessarily going over in detail the whole ground already traversed by the expert Committee. Thus the first few days were devoted to a full and frank discussion of the conclusions of and the methods adopted by the expert Committee in arriving at the deficit. This discussion not only enabled the Conference to realize clearly and comprehensively the difficulties of its task but also served a most useful purpose in removing some misapprehensions on points of detail.

3. The Conference was faced with certain difficulties at the outset. The first was that Sindh had no separate budget and accounts of its own and, as the expert Committee made clear, the figures of actual revenue and expenditure have had to be built up by an elaborate and intricate process mainly from the transactions of Hind treasuries. The Accountant General, Bombay, furnished the Conference with a further year's figures of actual expenditure and revenue (Appendix A) which supplemented the figures for the three years 1927-28 to 1929-30 adopted by the Committee. The same methods, however, could not be applied to evolve revised estimates for Sindh for 1931-32 and a budget for 1932-33 which would have been of great use during the enquiry, particularly in view of the present abnormal conditions. The Conference has therefore had to depend upon such incomplete information as was available. The second difficulty is one common to all whose lot it is to attempt to frame financial estimates in the present time of severe economic crisis when all ordinary methods are thrown out of gear and there exists but little certain guidance for the future. This difficulty is particularly felt when an attempt is made to estimate the future position of an immense scheme such as the Lloyd Barrage, the financial results of which have so important a bearing on the future of Hind. The third difficulty was perhaps inherent in the constitution of the Conference. The majority of the twelve non-official representative's of Sindh were definitely anxious for separation, a minority were strongly opposed to any change and two members expressed neutrality. The Hindu members, who were opposed to the principle of separation, expressed the view that a decision on that principle had been reached at the Round Table Conference in the absence of any Hindu representative of Sindh and that the real meaning of the conclusion of the Sindh Hub-Committee lay in the statement of its Chairman that if Sindh cannot show that it can stand successfully on its own legs, the separation does not take place.[1] The Prime Minister's statement, they feared, would be

[1] Page 87 Volume IX of proceedings of Sub-Committee of the Indian Round Table Conference.

interpreted as going beyond this. It was perhaps only natural that, in regard to financial questions into which a considerable range of estimate and conjecture enters, contrary points of approach should lead to differences of opinion, which, however amicably expressed, are difficult to reconcile. I therefore regard it as incumbent upon me to set out briefly and impartially the more important questions on which differences of opinion have been disclosed and to endeavor to indicate where, in my humble opinion, a possible solution may lie. A first, draft of this report was discussed by the Conference but it was made clear that it would be subject to amplification and revision.

CHAPTER II.

Revised Estimates of Deficit.

4. The results of the discussion on the deficit will be set out in the order adopted by the expert Committee in arriving at their basic figures.

Estimates of Revenue.

The expert Committee have adopted in paragraph 36 of their report a total of Rs. 182.42 lakhs as the basic figure for the first year of separation which is taken as from 1st April 1933. Land Revenue accounts for Rs, 102 lakhs out of this total and, together with revenue from Excise, Stamps and Forests, makes up nearly Rs. 162 lakhs, the balance of Rs. 20½ lakhs being spread over the 17 remaining heads.

(a) Land Revenue, — In respect of Land Revenue it was contended by the Moslem representatives that the expert Committee had worked on an average of three 3 years two of which were, as they admitted, years of floods with heavy remissions and suspensions. The later years are affected by heavy remissions on account of the fall in prices which amount to as much as Rs. 39 lakhs in the revenue year 1930-31 (August — July). It was unfair in their opinion to base the estimate for 1933-34 on such abnormal conditions as it is a reasonable assumption that general conditions and prices will improve and, having regard to the increasing land revenue demand and the growth of cultivation, the average of the ten years from 1921-22 would be a safe and moderate figure. They therefore contended that the basic figure should be raised to at least Rs. 109 lakhs. On the other hand, the view was expressed that prices showed no sign, as yet, of any improvement and that the expert Committee themselves had held that, on the basis of prices as they stood then, it would not be safe to budget for more than Rs, 90 lakhs for 1933-34. Reference was made to the heavy remissions of land revenue which had been recently given on account of the severe fall in the price of agricultural commodities. Opinion varied from adherence to the Committee's figure of Rs. 102 lakhs to a minimum estimate of Rs. 92 lakhs given by Professor Chablani.

(b) Excise, — The Moslem representatives consider that the average of the three years taken by the Committee, *i.e*, Rs. 37.5 lakhs, should be adopted and they base their conclusion on their expectation of an early improvement in prices and general social conditions. They contend that the effect of the prohibition policy is dying down and that the recent abnormal condition of unrest and its resultant

picketing should now be discounted. A majority of the Conference were prepared to maintain and develop excise revenue, as far as this could be done without injury to the cause of temperance, and were not in favor of the recent policy which, they considered, resulted only in useless sacrifice of revenue and an increase of illicit distillation. Of the remainder, some supported the figure of Bs. 33 lakhs adapted by the expert Committee but Professor Chablani bases his estimate of Rs. 25 lakhs for 1933-34 on the more recent figures which give collections of Rs. 25 -6 lakhs for 1930-31, Rs. 25 lakhs for the revised estimates of 1931-32 Rs. 28 lakhs for the budget of 1932-33. His estimate, here as in the case of Land Revenue, assumes that there will be no early recovery from the present slump which has severely diminished the purchasing power of the people, particularly in respect of non-essentials.

(c) Stamps.— The majority accept the Committee's basic figure of Rs. 20-30 lakhs with the addition of some amount for recent taxation, Sindh's share of which is not yet estimated. Professor Chablani would adopt Rs. 17-5 lakhs including Sindh's share (Rs. 1-4 lakhs) of the assignment to Bombay on account of postage stamps used for revenue purposes. He points out that the average of the three years, including the budget of 1932-33, amounts to about Rs. 18 lakhs.

(d) Forests.— The Conference adopted the expert Committee's figure of Rs. 6.6 lakhs. Professor Chablani however contended that the actual receipts of 1930-31, Rs. 5-6 lakhs, should be taken for 1933-34.

(e) Under other heads of revenue amounting in total to about Rs. 20½ lakhs the majority were in favor of the basic figures. The actuals for 1930-31 indicate a worseness of Rs. 2 lakhs which, in Professor Chablani's opinion, will be maintained in 1933-34. The total improvement on the basic figures for revenue of 1933-34 anticipated by the Moslem representatives amounts to 11-5 lakhs at least. In this estimate they would appear to follow the assumption of the Federal Finance Committee in paragraph 6 of their Report as regards the general economic situation that the present depression will come to an end and that there will follow a period of reviving trade accompanied by a gradual increase of prices which, if they do not reach the pre-slump level, will rise appreciably higher than the level now prevailing ". They however assume a material recovery at a date two years earlier than the Committee whose words have been quoted. The most pessimistic estimate is that framed by Professor Chablani who expects the slump to be maintained for a considerable time to come and whose estimate of revenue amounts to Rs. 24 lakhs less than that adopted by the expert Committee.

5. *Estimates of expenditure.* — The Conference accepted the suggestion that it was incorrect to take the average of expenditure over three years as a guide because

expenditure of which a large part is on account of establishments tends to grow under an incremental system of pay. They would generally adopt for present purposes the actuals of 1930-31 which amount to Rs. 2.3 lakhs more than the corresponding figure assumed by the expert Committee. To the figure thus obtained must be added the additions amounting to Rs. 10.8 lakhs shown on page 6 of the expert Report *i.e.,* expenditure in England, etc., except that certain members question the need for provision of more than about Rs. 8 lakhs on this account. Provision for pensions, Rs. 16.6 lakh, and Interest and reduction of debt, Rs. 31.1 lakhs, is also included by the Committee in their total estimate of Rs. 279.8 lakhs. In regard to pensions the estimate of the Committee is for an annual charge of Rs. 16-5 lakhs rising to about Rs. 23 lakhs after the thirtieth year. This is based on elaborate calculations detailed on pages 74 to 79 of the expert Committee's report, and includes repayment of debt to Bombay on account of pensions paid elsewhere than in Sindh to be disbursed in the first instance by the Government of Bombay. Certain data examined by me indicate that the proposed charge is probably much higher than Sindh would bear if she were to assume responsibility for all pension charges debit able to her, including a share of pensions partly earned by service in Sindh. For example the present total pension bill for India as a whole for civil establishment is Rs. 7 crores. The corresponding pensionable pay bill is Rs. 57 crores *i.e.,* the present pension bill is about l/8th of the present pay bill. On this analogy, as the present pensionable establishment in Sindh has been calculated by the expert Committee to cost less than Rs. 80 lakhs, the pension bill should not exceed about Rs. 10 lakhs. Again pensions to be paid from Sindh treasuries in 1933-34 may be taken at about Rs. 9 lakhs on the basis of the expert Committee's calculations. There are no separate figures for Sindh pensions payable outside Sindh. It is found however that the cost of pensionary charges paid in England for the Bombay Presidency as a whole is about one-fourth of the pensionary charges paid in India. On this proportion the Sindh share of English pensions should be about Rs. 2¼ lakhs and the total pension bill about Rs. 11¼ lakhs. Therefore the pension liability of Sindh should not exceed Rs. 10 — 11 lakhs on these two analogies instead of Rs. 16-5 lakhs as proposed. The system proposed by the expert Committee evidently requires further actuarial examination. The majority of the Conference is however of opinion that it would be a fair allocation of the liability that Sindh on separation, should bear only the cost of pensions paid in Sindh and her share of pensions sanctioned thereafter for services rendered wholly or partly in Sindh, in the same manner as at present adopted for sharing pensions between the Central and Provincial Governments. This method of allocation would follow that recommended by the North-West Frontier Province Committee, and is analogous to that adopted on the introduction of the reforms in 1921. Bombay would bear the full but diminishing liability for pensions already paid outside Sindh. The relief to Sindh would, it is estimated, actually be about Rs. 2¼ lakhs annually at the beginning and would gradually disappear. The justification is that Bombay could afford some return for her relief from the present burden of a deficit Sindh. Compared with the expert Committee's charge of Rs. 16.5 lakhs for pensions, the charges to Sindh on separation, would on this basis be reduced to about Rs. 9 lakhs.

6. As regards the proposals of the Irving Committee for allocation of the existing debt between Bombay and Sindh, a majority of representatives favored the proposal that the accumulated interest on the Barrage Debt during the period of construction, amounting to about Rs. 4 crores net, should not be added in full to the total Barrage Debt on the date of separation but should be divided between Bombay and Sindh in the proportion of 85 and 15 percent which is the proportion in which, according to the expert Committee, they at present contribute to the revenues of the partnership and the proportion proposed by that Committee for the division of the debt incurred during the last and current years to finance the annual deficit. The justification for this adjustment, which would give considerable relief to Sindh, is that, in the case of the Barrage, a departure has been made from ordinary procedure in allowing the accumulated interest to be added to the capital debt. Under the normal procedure the interest would have been met annually from the joint purse of Sindh and Bombay to which they may be assumed to have contributed in the proportion indicated above. The interest on some irrigation schemes and on the Bombay Development scheme has been met in this way so that Sindh has borne her share of these payments. It seemed therefore only equitable that Sindh should not find herself burdened at the outset of separation with the whole amount of accumulated interest on the Barrage merely because a special procedure was adopted. Had the interest been met in the ordinary way from current revenues as it fell due, then the transactions would have been closed for the reasons given in paragraph 32 of the Irving Committee's Report, As an alternative it was proposed that the whole debt, including that on the Barrage should be distributed between Sindh and Bombay on the basis of their contributions to the common revenues though the assets should be distributed on a geographical basis. It seems unnecessary to repeat the objections to this course which have been fully set forth in the Irving Committee's report. If a division of debt on this basis were adopted it would only be fair that Bombay should share proportionately in any net returns from the Barrage and, in that case, real separation would be impossible. Further the proposal would result in the imposition upon Bombay of an interest charge of more than a crore and this would merely mean a subvention in a particular form. Another proposal was to the effect that Sindh should be relieved of the interest on pre-reform irrigation debt and on all unproductive debt which would mean a relief to the extent of some Rs. 20 lakhs. It was recognized by the Conference that all these alternatives to a purely geographical distribution of the assets and liabilities would ultimately amount to subvention in a particular form, and would affect the ultimate arrangement of federal finances, but the majority considered that the arrangement proposed as regards distribution of the accumulated interest on the Barrage Debt during construction was justified on its merits, and should be adopted for purposes of working out the general results of the Conference's deliberations. It also appears that with a repayment scheme based on 50 years from the date of separation, the charges in respect of the non-barrage debt of Rs. 554.41 lakhs adopted by the Irvin Committee would be reduced from Rs. 31.09 to Rs. 27 lakhs.

7. The general result of the examination of the basic figures adopted by the Irving Committee for the purpose of arriving at the figure of initial deficit is as follows:—

Highest Estimate of Deficit

(a) Expenditure to be increased by Ra. 2.3 lakhs owing to adoption of 1930-31 actuals,

(b) Revenue to be reduced by Rs. 24 lakhs	26.3
Expert Committee's estimate.	97.4
	123.7

Lowest Estimate of Deficit

(a) Expenditure to be reduced by Rs. 7.5 lakhs under pension charges.

(The increase of Rs. 2.3 lakhs owing to adoption of 1930-31 actuals being practically counterbalanced by a proposed decrease in the special addition of Rs. 10.80 lakhs vide paragraph 5.)

(b) Revenue to be increased by Rs. 11.5 lakhs	19
Expert Committee's figure	97.4

The comparison would then he as follows: —

	Irving Committee	Highest estimate.	Lowest estimate.
Deficit	279.82	282.12	272.32
Additional Revenue	182.42	158.42	193.92
Retrenchments	97.4	123.7	78.4

My suggestions are as follows:—

As we are dealing with the figures of probable revenue and expenditure on 1st April 1933, we cannot adopt the optimistic expectation of the Federal Finance Committee of a very considerable improvement in the position, for that Committee had in view a date two years later. One alternative estimate shown above improves the revenue position by Rs. 11.5 lakhs but this is probably more than can be expected a few months hence, when it is remembered that the actual receipts in 1930-31 amounted to Rs. 167 lakhs only as against a basic figure of Rs. 182.42 lakhs assumed by the Irving Committee. The other estimate of revenue appears however to be unduly pessimistic. On a review of the figures and allowing for some improvement in the revenue position of 1930-31, particularly under Land Revenue and Excise, I would suggest the following as a reasonable figure: — (Vide Appendix A.)

Expenditure (including additions of Rs. 10.8 lakhs) based on 1930-31

On all heads except the following	232.50
Famine Relief	2.05
Pensions	9.00
Interest and Reduction of debt	27.00
	270-56
Revenue	177.00
Deficit	93.55

8. We have, however, to take account of new revenue arising from recent Finance Acts and of the results of retrenchment in expenditure carried into effect since 1930-31. The Conference were informed that Sindh's share of the former might be put at about Rs. 2 lakhs and a list of retrenchments, so far as available in the Commissioner's office, amounted to Rs. 12.5 lakhs permanent, and about Rs. 6.43 lakhs from the temporary 10 percent, cut in pay which obviously cannot be taken into account here (See Appendix B.)

Some representatives held that the existing cuts in beneficent services could not be regarded as permanent and that only about Rs. 7 lakhs should be taken into account from retrenchment. On this basis the initial deficit at this stage may be taken to be as follows: —

	Irving Report	Highest estimate.	Lowest estimate.	Chairman's estimate.
Deficit	97.4	123.7	78.4	93.55
Additional Revenue	2	2	2	2
Retrenchments	12	7	12	12
Net deficit	83.4	114.7	64.4	79.55

These figures will be further affected by the addition of the cost of separation and the deduction of further retrenchments and increased revenue proposed in paragraphs 30 and 33 where the final results are given.

9. *Cost of separation.* — (1) The immediate additional expenditure due directly to the separation of Sindh is put by the Irving Committee at Rs. 11.05 lakhs distributed as follows:—

Head Province	3.13
Secretariat, etc	0.95
Legislative Bodies	1.10
	5.18
Under other heads	5.87
	11.05

(2) The necessity for additional expenditure on a Governor, a Cabinet, Secretaries and staff, and a Legislative Council is obvious. Additional expenditure under other heads is due to the fact that a separated Sindh will require to provide for independent direction of Departments now supervised from Bombay and will also have to pay charges for services rendered, such as for maintenance of prisoners in Jails outside Sindh.

(3) The estimate given above provides for the following new appointments of superior grade together with staff.

	Rs.
Governor	1,83.000 (includes staff and household).
3 Ministers	1,30,000
1 President, Legislative Council	40,000 (includes staff)
Revenue Commissioner	37,000
3 Secretaries	92,000
2 Undersecretaries	18,000
Inspector-General of Prisons and Civil Hospitals	87,000 (includes staff).
Inspector of Education	14,000
Sanitary Engineer	30,000 (includes staff).
Agricultural Engineer	20,000
Electrical Engineer	66,000 (includes

In addition the status of the present Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Inspector of Education, Assistant Director of Public Health and Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, should, it is proposed, be raised so as to give these departments independent heads, at a total additional cost of about Rs. 22,000. On this question much diversity of opinion was expressed in the Conference, some holding that the extra cost was pitched too high for a small province, the administration of which already costs more per head of the population than any other suggesting various reductions such as in the pay and numbers of Ministers and Secretaries, in the cost of new buildings by utilization of existing accommodation, and in the number of new appointments for direction of various activities. It was also held that Sindh must, at the outset, do without additional expenditure under various heads such as Education, Police, Agriculture etc., until her improving finances permit of such expenditure being incurred. On the other hand it was contended that a separated Sindh cannot accept a lower standard of superior administration than prevails in other small Provinces, such as the North-West Frontier Province and Assam, and that the estimates for new buildings, etc., omit various essential items. The broad result of the discussion is that those who are anxious for separation are prepared to do with a minimum of additional expenditure at the outset and the lowest estimate made amounts to Rs. 4.6 lakhs. On the other side, the highest estimate of additional expenditure which a separated Sindh would involve is put at about Rs. 20 lakhs on the basis of the standards adopted in Assam and other small provinces. During the discussion the fact emerged that no provision had been made for a separate accounts office required by a separated Sindh, which would cost about Rs. 1¾ lakhs excluding Barrage construction establishment, or for any separate office staff for the new Revenue Commissioner which might cost about Rs. 1 lakh though some consider that the cost of the new Secretariat and of any staff required by the new Revenue Commissioner should be so arranged as to obviate this additional charge as far as possible. On this basis the highest estimate of additional cost of separation amounts to about Rs. 23 lakhs while the lowest estimate amounts to about Rs. 6½ lakhs including the cost of an accounts office.

My own conclusion is that the Irving Committee's figure is generally reasonable but that some economy should be possible in the cost of the Cabinet and in the Secretariat in view of the financial position of Sindh and the present high cost of the administration. The analogy of Assam cannot be followed at the outset and Sindh should be prepared to accept a more economical standard until she is in a position to indulge in more elaborate schemes. Three Ministers seem on practical grounds to be excessive for so small a Province and two should suffice. The necessity for three Secretaries in addition to a Revenue Commissioner is also doubtful. Two should suffice. With these and consequential changes in the cost of the staff, an endeavor should be made to keep the cost of separation, including an accounts office, within a total figure of Rs. 12 lakhs. In this respect I would quote from the Federal Finance Committee's Report (Paragraph 59). "We hope the cost of introducing the new reforms will be reduced to a minimum both at the center and in the provinces. The opinion is widely held in India that the cost of Government already exceeds what can properly be borne by a predominantly agricultural country and it would be deplorable if the first result of the reforms were a large addition to the overhead charges of Government." It may be added that it was brought out in the discussions that a separated Sindh would be unable to maintain a sufficient cadre of her own superior officers and that she would have to depend upon neighboring provinces for assistance. This would probably mean additional expenditure on pay and allowances to render service in Sindh attractive to outside officers. There is some force in this contention, which should be noted, but the probable additional cost is not susceptible of estimate.

10. The Irving Committee have devoted a chapter to the difficult problem of the expansion of revenue and expenditure during 30 years after separation and have

arrived at a rough estimate of net additional expenditure of about Rs. 2 lakhs in the first year amounting to Rs. 35¾ lakhs in the year 1962-63, As they say, any such forecast must be highly conjectural, and they have confined their estimate to items in respect of which increase seems inevitable, either owing to construction of new works or to the increased demands which will arise from the development of cultivation and increase of population as the Barrage develops. They admit that it is impossible to give any forecast either of the pace or cost of development under certain heads and made the general assumption that the total increase of revenue and expenditure will roughly balance under the heads affected. The Conference devoted some time to the consideration of this problem and various opinions were expressed but the general view was, that, if Sindh is to reap the fullest advantage from the development of the Barrage scheme and attain to the prosperity which lies in the future, considerable expenditure will be necessary on the improvement of communications, in which respect Sindh is markedly deficient, on agricultural research and demonstration and on medical, public health and educational facilities. Opinions varied as to the source from which such expenditure should be met. It was pointed out by some members that special provision for road development was not required as this could be financed from a fund built up by the imposition of a special cess of one *anna* in the rupee levied on all sums paid for land sold under the Barrage scheme. The expert criticism of this suggestion was, that, in practice, it was not feasible because those who bid for land would take into account the proposed cess and adjust their offers accordingly. Thus, in the end, the proposed fund could only come out of the revenue from land sales intended for reduction of the capital debt. Another scheme (Appendix H) for road development laid before the Conference indicated that the capital expenditure on new roads would be served by the increase in the revenue from petrol duty owing to the certain development of motor transport. Others maintained that the additional expenditure required for the development of beneficent services such as education, medical relief, etc., should be a charge upon the revenues of local bodies which should be compelled to levy taxation which they are at present empowered to but do not impose. Further, these revenues, must increase appreciably with the development of the Barrage area. Local bodies must therefore be called upon to shoulder a larger measure of responsibility for such expenditure in relief of expenditure from public revenues. While it is reasonable that local bodies should be called on to assist to the utmost of their resources, I think it is clear that considerable expenditure on development must fall on the State. The publication "*Sindh and the Lloyd Barrage Fourth Edition 1931*" devotes considerable space to the subject of development of communications and agriculture. As regards the former, a report in 1928 gave preliminary estimates for the construction of Provincial and Local Board roads at a total cost of Rs. 4½ crores. A Committee, which examined this report, was of opinion that a programme of this magnitude was not a practical proposition in these days of financial stringency. It was therefore proposed to call for further proposals for urgent works to the extent of Rs. 50 lakhs only to be provided from provincial revenues and spread over 10 years. The Conference had it in evidence that this provision would be inadequate for the purpose and that the construction of communications on a larger scale would undoubtedly result in better prices for land and more rapid development of the cultivated area. In regard to Agriculture, the publication referred to stresses the immense importance of regular agricultural development to the success of the Barrage scheme and states that the provision of additional funds for the extension of agricultural research and propaganda in Sindh is of vital importance. A new phase of rural development in Sindh has been entered upon and the next few years will constitute a critical period in the agricultural history of the Province .... the main matter for consideration is the adequate financing of the requirements consequent upon these all important developments but the extreme financial stringency does not admit of any large amounts being made available for such requirements An estimate of these requirements amounted to Rs. 17.3 lakhs capital and Rs. 13 lakhs recurring of which some portion has already been incurred. After a full discussion of the problem, the conclusion of the Conference was that any estimates, based on information before them, of the future expansion of expenditure and revenue must be highly conjectural and that it would be of little avail to attempt any forecast over a period of years. If a separated Sindh desires as she must desire to develop public services and amenities steps must be taken to raise the funds required. The need for development cannot be ignored and it is probable that the solution lies in a development loan in the earlier years until the Barrage is in a position to contribute from its surplus revenues. It will be necessary to revert to this question at a later stage.

The one important commitment is the remodeling of the Karachi and Fuleli canal systems. The Government of Bombay gave an undertaking in 1923 that these systems would be improved in order to remove apprehensions as to the possible deleterious effect of the withdrawal from the Indus of large volumes of water required for the Barrage system. The liability thus accepted amounted to over one crore of rupees. The Fuleli and Kalri remodeling schemes are already in progress. The probable capital expenditure to the end of the last financial year on these projects is put at Rs. 33 lakhs and about Rs. 9 lakhs annually will be required for capital expenditure till their completion in 1934-35. The commencement of the remaining projects depends on the financial situation.

CHAPTER III.

Reduction in Expenditure.

11. The Conference have carefully examined the possibility of retrenchment in the existing scale of expenditure. In this examination they confined themselves to an enquiry on general lines and to consideration of particular issues raised by several members. It was not possible for the Conference to perform the full functions of a retrenchment committee in the time at their disposal as this would have necessitated an investigation into detail and the examination of many witnesses which would have occupied a lengthy period of time. In this enquiry the Conference had before them the following considerations: —

(1) As a result of the efforts of the Bombay Government to reduce expenditure, considerable economy had already been effected in Sindh. The Conference were informed by the Financial Secretary, Bombay that the deficit shown by the Irving Committee might be reduced by Rs. 20 lakhs, provided account was taken of the facts that Rs. 9 lakhs was due to the emergency cut in pay and that the remaining Rs. 11 lakhs included some retrenchment of an emergency nature. Later figures in detail supplied by the Commissioner in Sindh (Appendix B), though not complete under every head, indicate that the permanent saving due to retrenchment since 1st April 1931 might be taken to be about Rs. 12 lakhs, excluding cuts in pay, which figure has been adopted for the purposes of this report.

(2) The Bombay Government have themselves embarked upon a fresh investigation into their expenditure and Sindh may expect to share in the result.

(3) As Sindh is entering upon a new phase of development owing to the opening of the Sukkur Barrage, the need for additional expansion in the near future in certain departments cannot be ignored.

12. A statement (Appendix C) was placed before the Conference which showed that the cost per head of population under most of the expenditure heads was frequently much in excess of the corresponding figures for other provinces such as Assam, Bihar and Orissa or the Central Provinces. For example, expenditure on police in Sindh is Rs. 1-1-0 per head while in Assam it is 0-6-7, in the Central Provinces 0-6-5, and in Bihar and Orissa 0-3-8. *Prima facie* this would indicate that the standards in Sindh are unduly expensive. On the other hand, if expenditure per square mile is taken, a contrary conclusion might be drawn, if not in the case of the police, at least under most other heads. The reason is that Sindh is very thinly populated and it is therefore necessary to use such comparisons with caution. It is stated in paragraph 260 of the Report of Indian

Statutory Commission, Volume II:- "It costs more to run a province with a scattered population than one which is densely populated; more teachers and policemen must be maintained per head of population; the cost of roads and of medical and sanitary services must be higher per head .... We should not therefore in any case expect to find anything like equality in the expenditure of various Provinces either in proportion to the area served or to population At the same time, as more than one member of the Conference observed, the cost per head of the administration of Sindh is remarkably high even allowing for these considerations. It amounts to about Rs. 7 per head of population compared with Rs. 1.8 for Bihar and Orissa, Rs. 3.8 for the Central Provinces and Rs. 4 for Assam and the general impression remains that the administration of Sindh is particularly expensive.

13. The Conference first considered the question of pay of the provincial and subordinate services which was admittedly higher in Bombay, (and still higher in Sindh) than elsewhere. A large majority considered that Sindh could not afford to continue to pay the present rates and that the scales of pay for future recruits to the provincial and subordinate services should be revised in such a way that the new rates would be at least 10% below existing rates for the lowest grades and at least 25% less in the case of the higher grades. It was the opinion of some members that pay below Rs. 40 per mensem should not be reduced in any future revision, but that the maximum of the highest grades was capable of still further reduction than that proposed. As regards existing incumbents, the majority considered that it might be necessary in relief of the financial position of Sindh to continue the temporary cut of 10% in pay in the provincial and subordinate services at least until the proposed temporary settlement of land revenue at reduced rates had expired, that is probably for a further five years, at an annual saving of about Rs. 5 lakhs.

14. The Conference then examined the expenditure under each of the main heads and the following is the result, in brief, of their discussion: —

(Figures in thousands of rupees.)

	Expenditure, 1930-31.	Retrenchment since effected.
(1) Land Revenue	14.19	1.13

The proposal was advanced that considerable savings could be effected by the reduction of the number of supervisory Tapedars and other village establishment and that at least Rs. 2 lakhs could be saved in this way. On the contrary it was pointed out that considerable reductions in numbers had already been made. Owing to the development of the Barrage area, proposals had been made for extra establishment of nearly 300 Tapedars but it had been possible by reorganization of the existing staff to dispense with additions.

This fact had to be taken into account. Any further reductions would be certain to lead to inefficiency and were therefore undesirable. Opinion remained divided on this question. Mr. Price contended that an aerial survey would provide an efficient check of the cultivated area and would prevent many of the fraudulent practices which are now said to be prevalent.

	Expenditure.	Retrenchment effected.
(2) Excise	2.32	13

The general opinion was that no further specific reduction could safely be made without loss of revenue, though some members expressed the view that a moderate further cut might be effected under this head.

	Expenditure.	Retrenchment.
(3) Forests	3.57	4

The forests of Sindh afford an average net revenue of about Rs. 3 lakhs and are capable of further development. The majority were therefore of opinion that expenditure might well be increased with a view to improved revenue and to the general benefit which would accrue from further development. Some members thought that the present ratio of expenditure was high and that under present conditions, some economy should be possible — though no definite scheme was advanced.

	Expenditure.	Retrenchment.
(4) General Administration	21.46	2.01

It was suggested that economy could be effected by the abolition of the three remaining posts of Huzur Deputy Collectors and of seven Huzur Muthtyarkars; also that the new Dadu district should be abolished, at a saving of Rs. 1.3 lakhs. After considerable discussion, it appeared that opinion was against the abolition of Huzur Mukhtyarkars and that the saving on Deputy Collectors would be secured in any case. As regards the Dadu district, it was pointed out that the creation of a new district had, after long consideration, been found to be essential and that a reversal of this decision would be a most retrograde step in the face of Barrage development. Opinion was equally divided on this point but a general conclusion was reached that by redistribution of districts, talukas and subdivisions material economy could be effected and it was recommended that this question be further examined.

	Expenditure.	Retrenchment.
(5) Administration of Justice	11.55	44

It was observed that the economy effected here was much less than under General Administration and that further reductions should be possible. Concrete suggestions were made for the abolition of one Additional Judicial Commissioner, three resident Magistrates and the employment of officers of lower status as City Magistrates. The additional saving suggested was Rs. 70,000. Against this it was held that the incidence of crime in Sindh was exceptionally high and that economies had already been effected by the reduction of the number of resident Magistrates. The abolition of the Additional Judicial Commissioner would be a retrograde step in view of the recent improvement in the disposal of work. It was understood that the Bombay Government was against the proposal but had suggested economy in other ways. The majority were against the specific changes proposed but it was thought that some economy should be effected by a lump cut.

	Expenditure.	Retrenchment.
(6) Jails	6.45	Not stated

It was pointed out that the Bombay budget for 1932-33 under this head showed a considerable reduction and it was generally agreed that a proportionate reduction (exclusive of reduction in pay) could be taken for Sindh, yielding Rs. 30,000 owing to the fall in prices.

	Expenditure.	Retrenchment.
(7) Police	36.78	89

Considerable discussion took place on the proposal that a further reduction of about Rs. 4 lakhs should be made, as the expenditure on police was much higher in Sindh than elsewhere. The Moslem representatives contended that the recent additions to the force should be abolished but, in the end, they yielded to the pressure of the minority, who experienced grave apprehension at the proposal, and they agreed that no reduction should be made, despite their view that there was much room for economy under this head.

		Expenditure.	Retrenchment.
(8)	Education	29.52	3.66
	Medical	6.60	...
	Public Health	3.12	4
	Agriculture	5.39	59

The Conference were generally agreed that further reductions were undesirable in these beneficent services particularly in view of the necessity for early expansion owing to the Barrage development.

(9) *Civil Works.* — The view was expressed that a percentage reduction could be effected in view of the fall in the cost of labor and material and that about Rs. 1.8 lakhs

could thus be saved. While it was generally agreed that further economy should be possible, it is doubtful if anything like the saving proposed can be obtained.

15. The specific proposals made by those who held that the deficit must be reduced by further retrenchments would realise a saving of about Rs. 6.5 lakhs but the discussions indicated that some of the measures were undesirable on various grounds. In the case of revenue-collecting and beneficent services the scope for retrenchment is generally limited, and in Sindh the problem is complicated by the development of the area under the Sukkur Barrage. The actual retrenchments of Rs. 12 lakhs already effected, however, represent less than 6 percent of the total reducible expenditure. I would point out in this connection that in the recent retrenchment campaign of the Government of India, the expenditure on some of the minor administrations under that authority has been reduced to the following extent (exclusive of cuts in pay): —

	Percent of total expenditure.
North West Frontier Province	7.3
Baluchistan	11
Ajmer-Merwara	17
Delhi	11

I therefore share the view of those who maintain that still further pruning of expenditure in Sindh could be effected, though without a very detailed examination, it is not possible to indicate specific items. The Police expenditure, however, is undoubtedly high and requires special examination. The enquiry now being undertaken by the Bombay Government may serve to indicate fresh sources of retrenchment but, in the meantime, for purposes of this report a rough figure of a further Rs. 6 lakhs might be assumed. I have suggested at a later stage that savings from retrenchment should be made available for necessary development.

CHAPTER IV.

New Sources of Revenue.

16. The Conference considered at length several proposals for increasing the revenues of Sindh in order to reduce the deficit. The main proposals were: —

(a) a special levy of one anna per rupee on the assessment of land revenue,

(b) an income-tax on agricultural incomes,

(c) a duty of 8 annas or one rupee per bale of cotton exported from Sindh,

(d) a license fee for the sale of tobacco,

(e) a tax on registered trades and professions and on domestic servants. The number of registrable classes should be increased to include money-lenders, etc.,

(f) development of fisheries, Government to grant a monopoly for deep sea trawling in return for a stipulated payment.

The results of the discussion on these proposals are summarized below.

17. (a) In answer to a question as to what definite proposals the supporters of separation could make for the reduction of the deficit by the increase of the revenue of Sindh, the Moslem representatives unanimously declared that they were prepared to agree, in order to cover part of the deficit, to a special additional charge of one anna per rupee of land revenue assessment (including water rates) on whatever rates were in force at any time in the future throughout Sindh and without prejudice to the question of revision of the existing system. They further agreed that Jahagir lands, which at present received specially favorable treatment, should pay a reasonable increase on existing rates for additional water advantages. Assuming that this additional cess were levied on the assessments now under consideration which may be taken to amount to about Rs. 170 lakhs for the first year, the additional revenue expected from this proposal and that regarding Jahagir lands would be about Rs. 10 to 12 lakhs in 1933-34 and would increase as the revenue under the Barrage scheme developed. Those, who supported this proposal contended that, though they had commented adversely upon certain features of the incidence of land assessments, they felt that an additional cess of this nature could fairly be imposed as one means of meeting the deficit of a separated Sindh. A minority were strongly opposed to any such measure as they held that there was ample evidence that the small land holder was already overburdened and could

not stand any further increase. It was pointed out that 40 percent of the land revenue assessment was paid by Hindus, who were opposed to the principle of separation, and that Moslem cultivators also were expressing their grievances against the present assessments which they find it difficult to pay. They argued that the proposed revision settlements already involved an increase and that any further addition was out of tie question. The opponents of this measure were however in favor of an income-tax upon agricultural incomes which would fall only upon the more affluent Zamindar.

(6) The proposal to levy an income-tax for provincial purposes on agricultural incomes over a certain limit (Rs. 2,000 of income from land or Rs. 500 of assessment paid was suggested) had the support of five representatives but was opposed by those who had already suggested the special levy of one anna per rupee. They claimed that their alternative would yield a larger revenue, would fall upon all classes in proportion to their holdings and would he more easily collected than an income-tax. An attempt was made to estimate the probable yield of such a tax on the assumption that 500 acres was the minimum estate which could be made liable for agricultural income-tax in addition to payment of land revenue, the total number of such estates being over 2000, totaling 2½ million acres. It would appear that, with land revenue at Rs. 4 per acre on the average and with a tax assumed at 6 percent of income from the area actually under cultivation, the initial revenue would not exceed Rs. 3½ lakhs rising to Rs. 7 lakhs as cultivation increased — an amount much below that anticipated from the special cess already proposed.

(c) A duty of 8 annas or Re. 1 per bale of cotton exported from Sindh by sea or rail was strongly supported by a small majority on the grounds that a similar duty was imposed in Bombay city to yield revenue for development purposes and that such a duty would produce a substantial return estimated at Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 lakhs. It was further contended that the Federal Finance Committee had stated that they did not rule out the possibility of terminal taxes in the province of Assam and elsewhere as a temporary expedient though they were not prepared to regard terminal taxes as a normal source of revenue. Such a duty would, it was considered, be justifiable as a temporary expedient in the case of Sindh also. The proposal was very strongly opposed by the two representatives of commercial interests and by others on the following grounds: —

(1) The great bulk of the cotton exported from Sindh came from the Punjab, Over a million bales were exported from Karachi, but the exported outturn of Sindh itself was estimated at only about 1,50,000 bales. The proposed duty would therefore be, in the main, a transit duty which was a most objectionable form of taxation.

(2) The duty could only result in the diversion of the cotton traffic from Karachi to other ports, particularly those in Kathiawar, with disastrous results to the trade of Sindh.

(3) The analogy of Bombay was not relevant as a large volume of cotton on which the tax fell was not exported but was consumed locally. The tax was therefore in part a consumption tax. In regard to this point the Taxation Enquiry Committee had noted that the town duty on cotton had been imposed on half the export trade of the port.

(4) A terminal tax which really amounted to an export duty was already imposed by the Karachi Port Trust with the justification that the tax represented a payment for services rendered for the housing of labor etc., in the port.

(5) The proposed tax would ultimately fall on the producer and react unfavorably on the cultivation of cotton in Sindh which already paid heavily in land assessment.

(6) An export duty of this kind was the concern of the central or federal Government and could not be a provincial source of revenue.

(d) The Conference by a large majority approved of the proposal to levy license fees for the sale of tobacco, though they recognized that there might be administrative difficulties and that it might be necessary to impose some form of control, such as licensing, over the cultivation of tobacco. At first the license fees would probably have to be restricted to town areas and the revenue would, from rough estimates, probably not exceed one lakh of rupees but it was capable of expansion eventually when the right to sell tobacco might be auctioned in the same way as opium and liquor shops were now sold. The Taxation Enquiry Committee's report shows that this form of taxation is in force in several Indian States and there is no reason why it should not be developed in Sindh and ultimately bring in considerable revenue.

(e) As regards taxation on certain professions and trades, some members considered that annual taxes might be levied on such professions as legal and medical practice, money-lending, etc., at rates varying from Rs. 50 to Rs. 10 and that the number of registrable callings should be increased to include regular money lenders. A small tax might also be put on the employers of domestic servants. One estimate put the receipts at about Rs. 2 lakhs though this is probably a high figure. Other members opposed the proposition on the ground that, in the case of money lenders, the scope of the tax would be difficult to define and that, in any case, as the Taxation Enquiry showed, the tax is more appropriate for local bodies than for a provincial Government. Against this it was urged that, where local bodies do not levy the tax, it would be suitable for provincial purposes.

(f) As regards revenue from development of fisheries by granting a monopoly for deep sea trawling and for canning of fish, which would not interfere with the local fishermen,

it was agreed that there was much to be said for the proposal which deserved investigation as the sea on the coast of Sindh was peculiarly rich in edible varieties. It was thought however that the benefit to the revenues would not be very appreciable.

18. More than once during the discussions, it was asserted that local bodies — municipalities and local boards — do not levy taxation to the extent to which they should under their powers. House tax, for example, is only levied in one or two places. The majority considered that pressure should be brought to bear upon local bodies to compel them to assume larger responsibilities in this respect and to relieve public revenues of the necessity for giving grants-in-aid for education or medical relief. Grants-in-aid might be refused where a local body did not levy a suitable form of taxation for such purposes.

19. Some members raised the question of the allocation of income-tax to Sindh with reference to the recommendations of the Federal Finance Committee on this subject. They held that the deficit could be substantially reduced if Sindh were given Rs. 21 lakhs of income-tax, which that Committee calculated as Sindh's share, and were relieved by special treatment, as recommended in the case of some other deficit provinces, from the necessity of a contribution to federal revenues. It was, however, held that consideration of this question lay outside the scope of the Conference and raised questions as to the nature or source of a subvention with which it was not competent to deal. The point raised was merely noted.

20. It will be evident that the majority of members, particularly those who favor separation, have been at pains to initiate proposals for new taxation which would help to overcome the difficulty of the deficit. The proposal for a special surcharge on the land revenue gave a definite lead and indicates a very satisfactory attitude on the part of the majority of the representatives. The proposal, though attacked by the minority (who, however, proposed additional taxation in the form of an income-tax on agricultural incomes), would appear to be feasible in view of the low incidence of land assessment in Sindh to which the Irving Committee has drawn attention and which was also brought out in evidence before the Conference. It will be necessary to refer to this question when dealing with the Lloyd Barrage, but for the present it will suffice to note that the possibility of additional revenue of this kind should be taken into account in calculating the deficit for the earlier years of a separated Sindh. As regards other forms of taxation, there is much that is applicable in the statement made by the Federal Finance Committee in paragraph 41 of their Report: —

> "We have found that such provincial taxes as appear to be within the sphere of practical politics in the immediate future cannot be relied on to yield any substantial early additions to provincial revenues. In using the phrase "practical politics" we are not, of course, expressing an opinion as to whether this or that tax ought or ought not to be imposed, or even as to whether it is or is not likely to

be imposed by the legislatures of autonomous provinces when these are constituted. We are only noting the fact that opposition to certain forms of taxation, or the difficulty of their imposition, is still so great that they are not likely to be adopted soon enough to influence the financial situation at the time when the Federation comes into being."

Additional revenue from licenses for tobacco and other articles of luxury, from some form of professional tax or house tax and even perhaps from a small cess on export of cotton, (if this would not damage trade and if the proceeds were earmarked for agricultural development), and from other sources, e.g., increase of stamp duties, appears to be not impossible in the future, but obviously any proposals of the kind require fuller examination than the Conference could give and must finally be implemented by the legislative authority of the future. In the circumstances it seems preferable to assume that such possibilities should not be taken into account in reduction of the initial deficit of a separated Sindh, but should remain in reserve as means of obtaining the funds which will be required for future developments.

CHAPTER V.

Lloyd Barrage and connected questions.

21. The Conference devoted three days to an examination of Chapter VI and Appendices 7 and 8 of the Irving Report and in their discussions had the advantage of the expert advice of Sir Charlton Harrison, the Chief Engineer and of Mr. Dow, the Revenue Officer. At the outset it is necessary to reiterate the words of the expert Committee that it is never an easy matter to forecast with confidence the financial prospects of a new irrigation scheme and to do so during the period of a serious economic crisis, the duration and ultimate effect of which are at present and will for some time to come remain unknown, is clearly an impossibility 'h The Conference, however, regarded it as part of its duty to examine the provisional forecasts of the expert Committee in the light of the latest knowledge available and on the basis of certain necessary assumptions.

22. The main subjects for consideration were—

(a) capital expenditure,
(b) sales of land,
(c) revenue from the Barrage area,
(d) working expenses.

As regards capital expenditure, the expert Committee calculated that the total capital charge, including interest charged to capital by a special arrangement during construction, would amount to Rs. 23-2 crores at the end of March 1933. As already stated, the Conference, by a substantial majority, held that Sindh should not be debited with the full amount of interest on the capital prior to separation, but only with 15% of that interest, on the ground that, under normal circumstances, this interest would not have been added to capital but would have been met from the joint revenues of the Presidency as a whole to which Sindh contributed in the proportion of 15 %. On this assumption the assumed debt of Rs. 23.2 crores should be reduced by an amount representing 85% of the interest of Rs. 403½ lakhs approximately calculated as having been added to capital up to March 1933. The resultant figure of Rs. 1977½ lakhs should be taken as the basis on which the financial forecast should be calculated. The Conference was further informed that the saving in the estimate of Rs. 50 lakhs shown in Appendices 7 and 8 of the expert report should now be raised to Rs, 1 crore. It was also decided to take into account only the capital at charge due from the Government of India and the Khairpur State and to exclude the interest thereon for present purposes, as the allocation of interest on these amounts would be a matter for further consideration, if the proposal as regards accumulated interest referred to above were accepted. A further proposal accepted by the majority was that the balance of debt, remaining after the estimated recovery of some Rs. 14 crores from land sales, should be funded and that no account should be taken of further payments in reduction of capital at charge.

23. *Sales of land*, — It is estimated that the amount of Government land available for sale is roughly 15 lakhs of acres. Against this, there exist various commitments, the most important of which is the promise of Government to grant 3½ lakhs of acres on almost nominal terms to existing zamindars. The Conference was informed that the schedule of land sales, on which the Irving Committee worked, assumed that an average rate of Rs. 100 per acre would be obtained from lands available for sale at full rates, and that, during the last season, despite the slump in prices, no difficulty had been experienced in realizing this rate, while large areas were also being leased at rentals of Rs. 4 to Rs. 6 per acre in addition to the assessment. The expert view was that the estimate of recoveries given in Appendix 7 and repeated in Appendix 8 of the Irving report might still be taken as approximately correct in the total, though variations would occur from year to year. The estimated sum total of recoveries available for reduction of capital amounted to about Rs. 14 crores inclusive of interest charged under the installment system. Some members expressed apprehension that this amount of land could not be absorbed or that the prices expected could not be realized during the continuance of the present economic distress, but to this the reply of the revenue expert was that the economic situation had not, in fact, affected the estimated price as this had originally been pitched at a low figure and further that there was no difficulty in obtaining as many purchasers as the policy of gradual sales required. In regard to the suggestion that the standard price was very low compared with prices which had been obtained on the Punjab canals, the answer was that the policy is to discourage fancy prices which would leave purchasers with no funds to develop their land. The main object is to secure prices which the Zamindar can reasonably pay and to develop land revenue as quickly as possible. In fact the prices now obtained for land compare favorably with the prices which acquisition officers had to pay for land acquired for Barrage purposes, which is a valid test. A proposal, which found favor with the majority, was that a more intensive programme of land sales should be devised in order to ensure that all land was disposed of within a period of 6 to 10 years so that, with recoveries operating in reduction of the capital debt, as proposed by the expert Committee, more rapid disposal would result in reduction of the compound interest charged to the account. While, in principle, this appeared to be a reasonable proposition, the expert view was in favor of caution in this respect, holding that it was inadvisable to adopt an arbitrary limit of time which would result in a flooding of the market and an inevitable fall in the price obtained for the land. The preferable course was to proceed with circumspection and with due regard to the demand and the probable improvement of economic conditions. In the end the Conference was generally disposed to endorse the views of the experts and only desired to emphasize the point that operations should be conducted with the sole object of obtaining the best results, considering all the circumstances.

24. *Revenue from the Barrage.* — regards revenue, attention is invited to the remarks of the Irving Report on certain disadvantages inherent in the present method of land assessment in Sindh which has imposed on an irrigation system certain limitations applicable to lands cultivated under entirely different conditions. The theory is that the assessment should not exceed 40% of the net assets (though in practice it appears that under normal conditions it actually approximates to about 25%) and that it should be fixed for a period of years. In the Punjab a more rational system is generally followed under which there is a land assessment based on a proportion of net assets and toed for the period of the settlement, and in addition a charge for water determined, at least in theory, by the principle that the fixing of the price for water is of the nature of a commercial transaction and should be regulated solely by the price the cultivator is willing to pay for the advantage and should be liable to alteration from time to time. A comparison of the two systems indicates that cultivation is generally much more highly assessed in the Punjab than in Sindh. A note written by Mr. Dow states that settlement officers in Sindh in the past have had little reliable data to go on in the matter of appraising outturns and have generally selected them on the low side Similarly the result of a long guess as to the probable course of prices is usually an under-estimate Again he says the whole pitch of assessments in Sindh has become very low whether they are compared with those levied on similar canal lands in the Punjab or with those levied in the rainfall irrigated lands of the Deccan and Gujerat.

The following table compares the Punjab water rates and land revenue (Lower Bari Doab) with combined revised rates for areas under the Lloyd Barrage.

	Punjab.									**Lloyd Barrage.**					
Crop.	Water rate.			Land revenue.			Total.			Combined rate.					
										First			Final.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
Rice	7	8	0	2	0	0	9	8	0	7	8	0	10	8	0
Cotton	6	4	0	2	0	0	8	4	0	4	0	0	5	8	0
Wheat	5	4	0	2	0	0	7	4	0	3	8	0	4	0	0
Oil Seeds	4	4	0	2	0	0	6	4	0	2	8	0	3	0	0

In the new Nili Bar Colony (Sutlej Valley Project) in the Punjab, it is understood that the land revenue rate is as much as Rs. 3-8-0 per acre in addition to the same water rates as above. In other areas the land revenue varies, considerably but Es, 2 to Rs. 3 appears to be a fair average.

With reference to this question the Conference were informed that the Bombay Government had carefully considered the possibility of introducing a system of separated land revenue and irrigation rates in Sindh. That Government are of the opinion that the practicability and advisability of this course could not be decided until a carefully worked out soil classification has been completed and experience gained of the working of the new system of irrigation under the settlements shortly to be introduced. They, however, propose to take up as soon as possible an investigation into the possibility of introducing, after the, period of the forthcoming settlements has expired, a system of land revenue and irrigation rates in order to improve the financial position of Sindh.

The importance of this question was recognized by the majority of the Conference, who were not averse from a reasonable increase in the revenue from land assessments and who, as earnest of their intention, have agreed to an extra cess of one anna in the rupee on whatever land assessments and water rates may be in force in future throughout Sindh. It is clear that, as the greater proportion of the revenues of a separated Sindh will be derived from the land, it is from that source that the major contribution to improved revenues must be expected if Sindh is eventually to attain financial independence and to develop her resources adequately. It would therefore appear desirable that the proposed enquiry should be held as early as possible in order that some improvement may be effected in the earlier and more difficult years, if separation is finally decided upon, and that, in the meantime, the imposition of the new temporary settlements should be so effected as not to prejudice an early improvement in the revenue from the land, should economic conditions permit.

25. As regards the actual growth of cultivation and expansion of revenue during the next few years as assumed in the Expert Committee's estimate, the Conference was informed that the statistics had been drawn up with the greatest care. Much time and attention of officers with the widest experience of Sindh conditions had been expended on these estimates and there is no reason to doubt that, under normal conditions they will prove approximately correct. In one respect no apprehension need be felt. The estimates of cultivable area were arrived at after a soil survey had been made and before proceeding with construction of the Barrage. There is no danger that the experience of Bahawalpur will be repeated.

26. *Wording expenses,* — The Conference discussed with Sir Charlton Harrison the possibility of reduction in the estimate of working expenses in the Barrage area which are put at about Rs. 63 lakhs. They were informed that every effort had already been made to reduce establishment and other charges and these efforts would continue, but that any arbitrary reduction in working expenses would have a disastrous effect upon the efficient management of the scheme at the outset. It also appeared that in preparing this estimate, reduction in pay of future establishment and in the cost of material and labor had already been taken into account. Allowing for the higher cost of salaries and wages in Sindh, owing to the higher standard of living prevalent there, the estimated working expenses in the Barrage area compared favorably with those in the Punjab and elsewhere. Further reductions might be possible and, if they were feasible, they would

certainly be effected, but for the present it was necessary to assume that the working expenses would remain at the figure estimated.

27. After a lengthy discussion the Conference agreed that it would assist consideration of the financial position if Appendix 8 of the Expert Committee's report, which is based , throughout on slump rates, were recast on the following lines: —

(1) Capital at charge should only include 15 percent of the accumulated interest during construction;

(2) the savings on the estimate should be taken at Rs. 100 lakhs;

(3) the rates of assessment for the first five years should be those now under consideration for the temporary revision of the settlements and thereafter full revised rates should be adopted for purposes of the statement.

While the Conference cannot feel assured that conditions will so improve after five years that the imposition of higher rates will be possible, they consider that a statement on these fines should be added to those already prepared by the Expert Committee in order to show clearly the effect of the proposed temporary rates. Such a statement is given as Appendix D to this report. It gives the following results: —

	Increase in net revenue. Rs. (lakhs).	Balance available for general purposes after payment of interest. Rs. (lakhs).
1933-34	32-35	Nil
1939-40	111-9.	12-9
1944-45	160-9	85-24
1949-50	187-9	130-8
1954-55	197-6	156-2

These figures take no account of the additional one anna cess proposed by a majority of the Conference which would improve the position by about Rs. 10 lakhs in the first year; the improvement has been taken elsewhere in redaction of the initial deficit.

Chapter VI.

Conclusions.

28. The task before the Conference was to try to overcome the difficulties disclosed by the report of the expert financial investigation. The main difficulties were the bridging, in whole or in part, of the initial gap between revenue and expenditure at the time of separation and the devising of means to meet both the additional expenditure due to separation and the unavoidable future expansion of net expenditure so far as this could be foreseen. The revenue estimated by the Committee amounted to Rs. 182.42 lakhs and the expenditure to Rs. 279.82 lakhs, the difference being Rs. 97.4 lakhs. These figures exclude the Sukkur Barrage which is treated separately. The estimate of expenditure included a provision of Rs. 31 lakhs for interest and avoidance of debt and Rs. 16.5 lakhs calculated to be the initial pensionary liability of Sindh, these two items to be transferred from Bombay on the date of separation. Excluding these items, the administrative expenditure in Sindh, amounts to Rs. 232 lakhs which is still in excess of the estimated revenue by about Rs. 50 lakhs. At the outset, it was evident that over so limited a field of revenue and reducible expenditure, amounting in combination to Rs. 415 lakhs, it would be no easy task to find funds by retrenchment or increase of revenue to the extent of about one crore of rupees. In the first place, drastic retrenchment was likely to prove difficult in expenditure which is mainly incurred on administrative and beneficent services, particularly in view of the new phase of development' in the Barrage area upon which Sindh has entered. In the second place, it seemed unlikely that there would prove to be much scope for substantial increase of revenue in a province so thinly populated, the revenue of which is mainly derived from assessment on land, any increase of which is confined to a limited field under the settlement system. In this connection it is relevant to note that the income-tax and super-tax derived from Sindh amounted in 1930-31 to Rs. 17½ lakhs only of which amount Rs. 12.3 lakhs were contributed by Karachi, leaving Rs. 5.2 lakhs for the rest of Sindh, which gives some indication of the low degree of industrial development.

29. The Hindu members of the Conference, approaching the problem from the standpoint of opposition to the principle of separation, have made little contribution to the solution of the task. Their protagonist has endeavored to prove that the basic figure of deficit given by the Irving Committee was unduly optimistic and that it should be increased by about Rs. 26 lakhs. The cost of separation, if Sindh is to have at least the ordinary standards of administration of a small province, must, he holds, be at least double the figure of Rs. 11 lakhs estimated by the Expert Committee. The expansion of expenditure during the next two or three decades must be far in advance of the expert estimate, while additional revenue to cover the cost of expansion is not likely to be forthcoming, No substantial retrenchment in existing expenditure is possible and even

the economy of Rs. 12 lakhs already secured ought to be reduced by about half at an early date by restoration of the cuts made in expenditure on education and other beneficent services. Of new sources of revenue they see no hope, save perhaps an income-tax on agricultural incomes over a certain limit which would fall upon the larger Moslem zamindars. The basic deficit, including the cost of separation and allowing for additional taxation already imposed and the retrenchment which they accept as permanent, would thus be Rs. 138 lakhs compared with Rs. 94 lakhs, the comparative revised figure of the expert report. In the consideration of the financial estimates of the Lloyd Barrage Scheme they adopt an attitude of pessimism. It is, in their view, unlikely that the estimate of receipts from sales of land, by which amount the Barrage debt will be reduced, will be reached and one opinion is that it should be reduced by 25 percent and the period of recovery extended to at least 30 years. Even the recovery of the assessment at slump rates shown in Appendix 8 of the expert report is, in their view, not certain and it is out of the question to expect that any improvement in the land revenue by imposition of higher rates could be effected.

30. On the other hand the majority, who favor the principle of separation, have made a determined effort to show that at least part of the difficulty can be overcome. Individual members have expressed different views on points of detail but the following scheme may be taken to represent broadly the effect of their suggestions.

	Rs. lakhs.
Irving Committee's estimate of basic deficit and cost of separation	108.45
(1) Increase in basic figures of revenue	-11.5
(2) Decrease in basic figure of expenditure	-7.5
(3) Decrease due to retrenchments already made and to additional taxation already imposed	-14
(4) Decrease in the estimate of the cost of separation	-4.5
(5) Reduction of deficit by imposing a special cess on land revenue	-11
(6) Other new measures of taxation (excluding suggestion for a State lottery which appears impracticable)	-18.5
(7) Continuation of temporary cut in pay of provincial and subordinate services	-5
(8) Additional retrenchments	-6.5
Net deficit (roundly).	30

Even this net deficit of Rs. 30 lakhs they seek to turn into a surplus by other proposals such as relieving Sindh of interest on pre-reform irrigation and unproductive debt to the extent of some Rs. 20 lakhs and claiming for Sindh the Rs. 21 lakhs of income-tax allotted by the Federal Finance Committee, without the debit of a contribution to the federal revenues. These expedients were however ruled out of order as not being within the purview of the enquiry. The estimated deficit of Rs. 30 lakhs however makes no allowance for expansion of expenditure due to normal reasons and to the needs of the Barrage area, as the advocates of this scheme claim that there is no need for such special provision, because any expenditure required can, until the Barrage begins to assist, be met from normal increase of revenue, from a special cess on land sales or from increased resources of local bodies.

31. Various reasons have already been given in the preceding chapters to show that this scheme is over optimistic, at least in regard to the earlier years of separation, and it is not necessary to do more, at this stage, than indicate the main objections. An improvement over the expert estimate of revenue to the extent of Rs. 11.5 lakhs may not be impossible when the present economic depression diminishes, but is most unlikely, as early as 1933-34, to which year the estimate pertains. The cost of separation is probably pitched too low, as a separated Sindh must provide for supervision of departments now regulated from Bombay, for payment for services rendered and for additional accommodation for the reformed administration of the new province. Further: retrenchments to the amount proposed should not prove impossible, if the new administration makes a whole-hearted effort to secure economy in an already costly administration, but new measures of taxation, save the cess on land revenue which is so strongly advocated, probably cannot be relied upon to reduce the deficit at the outset. At the same time, it is the most satisfactory feature of the Conference that the majority have assumed the responsibility of asserting that part of the difficulty can be overcome by retrenchment and new taxation.

32. As regards the Barrage financial scheme, the same body of opinion seeks to improve the position by the proposal to debit Bombay with 85% of the accumulated interest and by measures designed to speed up the recoveries from land sales. The relief under the first measure would be in the neighborhood of Rs. 20 lakhs a year on interest charges, under the Barrage Scheme and will be taken into account later.

33. A careful appreciation of the Irving Committee's report and of the record of the discussions in this Conference will, I think, lead to the conclusion that of the two estimates of the financial position of a separated Sindh, one is unduly pessimistic and the other somewhat optimistic on many aspects of the problem and that the correct view lies somewhere between these extremes. I have ventured in the course of the report on the discussions of the Conference to make, at the appropriate places, some suggestions on various points which arose, and I will now recapitulate those opinions for further consideration, on the lines adopted in paragraph 30 above.

	Rs. lakhs.
Basic deficit of the Irving Committee including cost of separation	108.45
(1) Increase of basic expenditure on actuals of 1930-31	+2.3
(2) Anticipated decrease in basic revenue	+5.4
(3) Decrease in deficit owing to new taxation and retrenchments already in effect	-14
(4) Reduction in estimate of pension liability 7.5	-14
(5) Reduction in provision for reduction of debt and for interest	-4
(6) Improvement due to proposal for a cess on land revenue	-11
(7) Increase in estimate of cost of separation owing to provision for accounts office counterbalanced by economy in other directions	+1
Net deficit	80.65
or (roundly.)	80.5

This, in my opinion, is a reasonable estimate of the probable initial deficit; of Sindh on a date assumed for present purposes to be 1st April 1933. It will be seen that allowance is made for some increase in expenditure over the expert estimate, due to later information of the progress of actuals. The revenue estimate has for the same reason been reduced by 5 lakhs with allowance for improvement on 1930-31 figures under land revenue, excise and other heads. It is further assumed that the proposals to charge Sindh at the outset of separation with only those pensionary charges which are paid in Sindh and to treat the repayment of the non-barrage pre-separation debt of Sindh on a 60 years basis will be found acceptable. I have further taken into account an improvement under land revenue (including additional Barrage revenue) of Rs. 11 lakhs which appears justifiable in view of the insistence of those who represent the majority under a new dispensation that they accept responsibility for an increase on the lines they propose.

34. As regards the financial position of the Barrage Scheme, I have taken into account the proposal of the majority that Sindh should be charged with only 15% of the accumulated interest on the Barrage debt during construction, as it appears to be a very reasonable contention. The deficit now estimated and the net revenue from the Barrage Scheme (Appendix D) available for general purposes are brought together in a table appended hereto (Appendix E). It has been necessary to make certain assumptions in order to prepare any estimate of this kind, but it is obviously impossible to claim any certainty that the assumptions will prove to be correct though they are mainly based on expert opinion as to the probable course of events. These assumptions are —

(a) acceptance of the proposal as regards allocation of the accumulated interest;

(b) recoveries from land sales at the prices and more or less according to the programme anticipated. The same applies to recoveries on account of water courses;

(c) acceptance during the -first five years of the proposed revised settlement rates based on recent prices and, thereafter, a revision according to the higher rates proposed in the settlement reports on pre-slump prices. There seems every reason to hope that, given some improvement in prices of agricultural produce during the period of the temporary settlement, it will be possible to impose at least these higher rates of assessment, in view of the general opinion of those who are conversant with all the facts, that assessments in Sindh are unduly low;

(d) expansion and intensity of cultivation according to the expert estimates;

(e) no diminution of present efficiency in the control of the Barrage, the distribution of water and the system of estimation and collection of the revenue.

On these assumptions the deficit will continue in full for 6 years during which the additional revenue from the Barrage will be absorbed by the interest charges. Thereafter there will be an increasing balance, after payment of interest charges, which will be available for general purposes and may be devoted to reduction of any subvention, or to development purposes or to reduction of the Barrage debt as may seem most expedient. The surplus so available is indicated below in lakhs of rupees at intervals of three years.

	Basic deficit including cost of separation.	Available revenue after payment of interest.	Balance of debt.
1933-34	80-5	Nil	1982-6
1936-37	80-5	Nil	1834-9
1939-40	80-5	12.9	1552.4
1942-43	80-5	70	1325-6
1945-46	80-5	92	1137-5
1948-49	80-5	124	951-5
1951-52	80-5	143-8	768-8
1954-55	80-5	156	667
1957-58	80-5	162-9	651-8
1960-61	80-5	167-8	647-3

The basic deficit would, on this estimate, be covered by available barrage surplus from 1944-46 onwards.

35. It will be seen that no allowance has been made for normal growth of expenditure and revenue under non-barrage heads or for the considerable expenditure which must be incurred upon communications, agricultural and other beneficent services if Sindh is to reap the full advantages of her resources in the new era of development upon which she has entered. It is assumed that the ordinary growth of revenue and of expenditure will balance out and that as regards new expenditure, funds will have to be found from further retrenchment in the cost of the administration, and from possible new sources of taxation which have not been taken into account in estimating the deficit, as they are not likely to come into operation at the very outset of separation. Later on the surplus revenues of the Barrage may be available in whole or in part. The administration of a separated Sindh will have to assume responsibility for finding funds for further development and for commitments such as on the Lower Sindh Canals, and it will probably be necessary to take a further loan for these purposes m the earlier years as it is certain that capital expenditure under the Barrage scheme

will not cease with completion of the construction of the canals and water courses. This was the considered opinion of those who press for separation.

36. At the outset and for some years to come Sindh would require assistance to the full extent of Rs. 80 lakhs if a separate province is constituted. If the Barrage area produces the surplus revenue now estimated, it will be possible to devote some part at least of this surplus to a reduction of this assistance. It is, of course, outside the scope of this enquiry to discuss the nature, source or conditions of any assistance afforded. Indeed a charge may be made that the Conference has already transgressed its powers m two respects, first in proposing a particular allocation of the accumulated interest on the Barrage debt and secondly in reducing the pensionary liability, by which measures part of the burden of a separated Sindh would be left with the remainder of the Presidency which would, in effect, be making a subvention to Sindh to this extent. But it is maintained that these proposals are justified for the special reasons which have been set forth, having regard to normal procedure and to former precedent. The question of justification for a subvention to Sindh fell, I consider, within the range of discussion and it was indeed raised at the close of the Conference. It proved difficult to avoid reference to the source of such assistance and some members very strongly urged that the subject should not be discussed in the Conference as it might lead to misunderstanding. Therefore those who wished to express an opinion were allowed an opportunity of placing their views in brief on the record of the Conference but the subject was not discussed in all its bearings and, therefore, I refrain from recording an expression of opinion in this report.

37. There is one important point to which reference must be made. It is certain that Sindh cannot stand security for the Barrage debt and that it is from the Barrage itself that the security must be sought. The Barrage is indeed the heart of Sindh, providing the means of renewed life for the province, the prosperity and ultimate financial independence of which must be derived from this source. A great future undoubtedly lies before Sindh but that future and the security of the debt depend upon preservation of the Barrage and its connected canal systems intact, and upon the maintenance of the highest standards of efficiency in the distribution of water, the assessment and collection of revenue, the encouragement of cultivation and the improvement of agricultural methods. It is not the business of this report to deal with arrangements under a new dispensation, but the considerations just mentioned will doubtless be taken into account in any future developments.

38. I have appended to the report, in addition to various statistical appendices, some notes by members of the Conference which will amplify the record in the body of the report.

(1) Note by Khan Bahadur Khuhro which may be taken as summarizing broadly the view of the representatives of his community at the Conference, though individual members have proposed variations in detail. (Appendix F).

(2) A general note by three Hindu Members. (Appendix G).

(3) A note by Mr. Price on the development of communications. (Appendix H).

(4) A note by Mr. Dow, Revenue Officer, Lloyd Barrage, on the system of land revenue assessment. (Appendix I).

39. In conclusion, I should like to bear testimony to the harmony and good feeling which prevailed during the Conference, despite frequent differences of opinion on controversial subjects, and to refer, in particular, to the high appreciation which the Conference expressed of the services rendered by Mr. Dow, the Revenue Officer, whose unrivalled knowledge and experience of Sindh conditions, were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the Conference and proved invaluable throughout its discussions. In addition. Professor Chablani, Professor Batheja and Khan Bahadur Khuhto had made a specially intensive study of the finance and economy of Sindh which proved of the greatest value to the Conference and to myself. Finally I desire to acknowledge gratefully the unfailing assistance rendered by the Secretary, Mr. A. K. Chakravarti of the Finance Department of the Government of India and his staff; the promptitude and the efficiency of the three reporters (whose services were kindly lent by the Legislative Assembly Department) who had a particularly difficult task; and the skilful work on financial estimates and on statistical statements performed by Mr. N. Vira Eaghavan whose services were kindly lent to the Conference by the Accountant General, Bombay.

A. F. L. BEAYNE,— 6-6-1932.

APPENCICES.

APPENDIX -A -1						
REVENUE.					[In lakhs of Rupees,]	
Major Heads.	1927-28.	1928-29.	1929-30.	1930-31.*	Basic figures adopted by Expert Committee.	Revised Basic figures adopted by Chairman.
V. Land Revenue	108-85	106-02	91.28	98.35	102.05	102.00
VI. Excise	88.76	38-37	35.76	25.66	33.00	239.00
VII. Stamps	19.23	18.16	19.24	18.72	20.30	20.00
VII. Forests	7.13	6.54	6.12	5.68	6.60	6.80
IX. Registration	1.60	1.54	1.42	1.35	1.52	1.50
IX- A. Scheduled Taxes 0-54	0.54	0.54	0.87	0.57	0.55	0.55
XIII. Irrigation	0.80	4.77	3.97	3.31	4.51	4.00
XIV. Miscellaneous Irrigation.	0.26	0.22	0.17	0.15	0.22	0.22
XVII. Administration of Justice.	2.08	2.04	1.96	1.81	2.03	2.08
XVIII. Jails and convict Settlements.	1.17	1.12	1.23	0.80	1.17	1.00
XIX. Police	0.87	1.47	1.03	3.10	0.37	0.87
XXI. Education	1.10	1.27	1.17	1.18	1.18	1.18
XXII. Medical	0.59	1.33	1.32	1.06	1.32	1.20
XXIII. Public Health	0.11	0.75	0.74	0.72	0.75	0.75
XXIV- Agriculture	0.47	0.74	0.50	0.47	0.57	0.50
XXVI. Miscellaneous Departments.	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	1.68	1.38
XXX. Civil Works	0.93	1.21	1.74	1.35	1.29	1.29
XXXIII. Receipts in-aid of Superannuation.	1.87	1.77	1.99	1.69	1.88	1.70
XXXIV. Stationery and Printing.	0.36	0.44	0.47	0.42	0.42	0.42
XXV. Miscellaneous	0.10	0.15	1.12	0.51	0.16	0.16
Total	190.00	188.43	170.98	166.08	181.77	176.35
XVI. Interest	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.05	0.65	0.65
Total Basic revenue.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	182.42	177.00
* Specially obtained from the Accountant General, Bombay.						

APPENDIX -A -2							
EXPENDITURE						[In lakhs of Rupees,]	
Major Heads.	1927-28.	1928-29.	1929-30.	1930-31.*	Additions	Basic figures adopted by Expert Committee.	Revised Basic figures adopted by Chairman.
5. Land Revenue	13.98	14.13	13.76	14.19	0.44	14.39	14.63
6. Excise	2.23	2.43	2.42	2.32	1.00	3.39	3.32
7. Stamps	0.44	0.44	0.40	0.40	0.02	0.45	0.42
8. Forests	3.99	3.84	3.66	3.57	0.18	4.01	3.50
9. Registration	0.82	0.81	0.83	0.87	0.00	0.82	0.87
XIII. Irrigation	31.32	33.39	34.95	33.12	0.00	33.22	33.12
15. Miscellaneous Irrigation.	18.90	13.80	16.38	17.83	0.00	16.36	17.83
22. General Administration	20.49	21.05	21.43	21.46	2.35	23.50	23.81
24. Administration of Justice.	11.57	11.48	11.68	11.55	0.35	11.93	11.90
25. Jails	6.30	6.23	6.17	6.45	0.14	6.37	6.59
26. Police	36.16	35.82	35.72	36.75	5.31	41.21	42.09
27. PORTS AND Pioltage	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
31. Education	26.22	27.39	27.80	29.52	0.10	27.24	29.62
32. Medical	6.04	6.64	6.95	6.60	0.24	6.78	6.84
33. Public Health	2.77	2.56	2.62	3.12	0.16	2.81	3.28
34- Agriculture	4.71	4.56	5.17	5.39	2.61	7.42	8.00
35. Industries	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.10	0.12
37. Miscellaneous Departments.	0.28	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.09	0.34	0.35
41. Civil Works	30.17	29.92	29.36	26.03	-3.49	26.32	22.54
46. Stationery and Printing.	1.10	1.09	1.11	1.08	1.22	2.32	2.30
47. Miscellaneous	1.23	1.91	1.23	1.12	0.00	1.45	1.12
Total	219.00	217.91	222.02	221.70	10.80	230.43	232.50
19. Interest	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	31.09	27.00
21. Reduction of Debt	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
43. Famine Relief	2.33	0.28	5.87	2.05	0.00	0.00	2.05
45. Pensions	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	16.50	9.00
Total Basic revenue.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	279.82	270.55

APPENDIX B.

Statement showing savings due to the several measures of retrenchment ordered since 1st April 1931,

(Figures in thousands of rupees)

Budget head.	Expenditure 1930-31.	Permanent saving due to saving due in retrenchment	Temporary saving due to 10% cut.
5. Land Revenue	14.19	1.13	47.00
6. Excise	2.32	13.00	14.00
7. Stamps	40.00	2.00	..
8. Forests	3.57	4.00	9.00
9. Registration	87.00	..	..
XIII. Irrigation	33.12	1.85	54.00
15. Miscellaneous Irrigation	17.83	1.03	..
22. General Administration	21.46	2.01	1.80
24. Administration of Justice	11.55	44.00	1.16
25. Jails	6.45	*	..
26. Police	36.78	89.00	45.00
31. Education	29.52	3.66	34.00
32. Medical	6.60	*	..
33. Public Health ..	3.12	4.00	3.00
34. Agriculture	5.39	59.00	59.00
36. Industries	4.00	..	..
37. Miscellaneous departments	26.00	..	..
41. Civil Works	26.03	80.00	80.00
46. Stationery	1.08	*	..
47. Miscellaneous	1.12	3.00	2.00
Total	..	12.55	6.43

* Figures not available.

APPENDIX C.

APPENNDIX C-1						
Name of Province.	Area in thousands of square miles.	Population in thousands.	5— Land Revenue and 22—General Administration.		24— Administration of Justice.	
			Expenditure in 1930-31	Expenditure per head	Expenditure in 1930-31.	Expenditure per head
			In thousands of Rs.	Expenditure per Square mile.	In thousands of Rs.	Expenditure per Square mile.
				Rs. A. P,		***Rs. A. P,***
Sindh	47	3,885	4,307	1 1 9 91 10 3	1,193	0 4 11 25 6 2
Bombay including Sindh	124	22,260	28,346	1 4 5 228 9 7	7,477	0 5 4 60 4 9
Punjab	100	23,581	15,101	0 10 3 151 0 2	5,740	0 3 10 57 6 4
Assam	49*	8,622	4,922	0 9 1 100 7 2	1,167	0 2 2 23 13 1
Central Provinces	100	15,473	9,706	0 10 0 100 7 2	3,087	0 3 2 30 13 11
Bihar and Orissa	83	37,590	9,504	0 4 1 114 8 1	4,138	0 1 9 49 13 9
N.-W. P. Province	13	2,425	2,355	0 15 6 181 2 6	786	0 5 2 60 7 5
Madras	142	46,749	30,712	0 10 6 216 4 6	9,917	0 3 5 69 13 5
Bengal	77	51,023	17,067	0 5 5 221 10 4	10,659	0 3 5 138 6 10
Burma	234	14,666	16,324	1 1 10 69 12 2	6,438	0 7 0 27 8 2
United Provinces	106	48,409	24,537	0 8 1 231 7 8	7,687	0 2 6 72 8 3

*Exclusive of unsurveyed territory.

APPENENDIX C -2

Name of Province.	Area in thousands of square miles.	Population in thousands.	26 — Police. Expenditure in 1930-31 In thousands of Rs.	26 — Police. Expenditure per head	26 — Police. Expenditure per Square mile.	31 — Education. Expenditure in 1930-31. In thousands of Rs.	31 — Education. Expenditure per head	31 — Education. Expenditure per Square mile.
				Rs. A. P,			Rs. A. P,	
Sindh	47	3,885	4,133	1 1 0	87 14 7	2,780	0 11 5	59 2 5
Bombay including Sindh	124	22,260	19,877	0 14 3	160 4 9	20,670	0 14 10	166 11 1
Punjab	100	23,581	12,813	0 8 9	128 2 1	17,130	0 11 8	171 4 10
Assam	49*	8,622	3,019	0 5 7	61 9 10	3,340	0 6 2	68 2 7
Central Provinces	100	15,473	6,232	0 6 5	62 5 2	5,698	0 5 10	56 15 7
Bihar and Orissa	83	37,590	8,652	0 3 8	104 3 10	9,055	0 3 10	109 1 7
N.-W. P. Province	13	2,425	3,525	1 7 3	271 2 6	2,063	0 13 6	158 11 1
Madras	142	46,749	17,905	0 6 5	126 1 6	29,712	0 10 2	209 3 10
Bengal	77	51,023	22,263	0 7 1	289 2 0	14,178	0 4 2	184 2 1
Burma	234	14,666	15,914	1 1 5	68 0 2	10,920	0 11 10	46 10 8
United Provinces	106	48,409	17,997	0 6 0	169 12 6	20,805	0 6 1	196 4 4

NOTE.— The figures shown as expenditure in 1930-31 against Sindh represent the basic figures of expenditure plus the cost of separation as given in the expert Committee's Report.

APPENDIX C-3

Name of Province.	Area in thousands of square miles.	Population in thousands.	32 — Medical and 33 — Public Health.		41 — Civil Works	
			Expenditure in 1930-31 In thousands of Rs.	Expenditure per head Expenditure per Square mile.	Expenditure in 1930-31. In thousands of Rs.	Expenditure per head Expenditure per Square mile.
				Rs. A. P,		***Rs. A. P,***
Sindh	47	3,885	1,058	0 4 4	2,718	0 11 2
				22 8 2		57 13 2
Bombay including Sindh	124	22,260	8,186	0 5 11	11,993	0 8 7
				66 0 3		96 11 6
Punjab	100	23,581	6,675	0 4 6	13,479	0 9 2
				66 12 0		134 12 8
Assam	49*	8,622	2,150	0 4 0	5,839	0 10 10
				43 14 0		119 2 7
Central Provinces	100	15,473	1,913	0 2 0	7,025	0 7 3
				19 2 1		70 4 0
Bihar and Orissa	83	37,590	4,187	0 1 10	8,132	0 3 6
				50 7 2		97 15 7
N.-W. P. Province	13	2,425	709	0 4 8	5,007	2 1 0
				54 8 7		385 2 6
Madras	142	46,749	12,652	0 4 4	23,470	0 8 0
				89 1 7		165 4 6
Bengal	77	51,023	9,007	0 2 10	11,266	0 3 7
				116 15 7		146 5 0
Burma	234	14,666	5,751	0 6 3	23,821	1 10 0
				24 9 3		101 12 9
United Provinces	106	48,409	6,088	0 2 0	6,564	0 2 2
				57 7 0		61 14 10

NOTE.— The figures shown as expenditure in 1930-31 against Sindh represent the basic figures of expenditure plus the cost of separation as given in the expert Committee's Report.

APPENDIX - D

(In lakhs of Rupees.).

APPENDIX D-1							
Programme of Repayment of the debt incurred on the Lloyed Barrage Project.							
				Reduction of Capital debt.			
Year.	Amount of debt at beginning of year.	Expenditure of year.	Total Capital debt.	Savings.	Salvage value.	Recovery from Government of India.	Recoveries from Khairpur State.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1933-34	1,977.49	84.09	2,061.58	..	..	67.00	27.00
1934-35	1,982.49	59.24	2,041.83	100.00	25.00	..	..
1935-36	1,911.04	..	1,911.04	..	..	..	..
1936-37	1,881.25	..	1,881.25	..	..	..	..
1937-38	1,834.98	..	1,834.98	..	..	..	..
1938-39	1,763.54	..	1,763.54	..	..	..	..
1939-40	1,650.18	..	1,650.18	..	..	..	..
1940-41	1,552.40	..	1,552.40	..	..	..	..
1941-42	1,469.72	..	1,469.72	..	..	..	..
1942-43	1,394.14	..	1,394.14	..	..	..	..
1943-44	1,325.66	..	1,325.66	..	..	..	..
1944-45	1,261.50	..	1,261.50	..	..	..	..
1945-46	1,199.50	..	1,199.50	..	..	..	..
1946-47	1,137.50	..	1,137.50	..	..	..	..
1947-48	1,075.50	..	1,075.50	..	..	..	..
1948-49	1,013.50	..	1,013.50	..	..	..	..
1949-50	951.50	..	951.50	..	..	..	..
1950-51	889.50	..	889.50	..	..	..	..
1951-52	624.30		624.30				
1952-53	768.80	..	768.80	..	..	..	..
1953-54	724.10	..	724.10	..	..	..	..
1954-55	690.20	..	690.20	..	..	..	..
1955.56	667.10	..	667.10	..	..	..	..
1956-57	654.80	..	654.80	..	..	..	..
1957-58	653.30	..	653.30	..	..	..	..
1958-59	651.80	..	651.80	..	..	..	..
1959-60	650.30	..	650.30	..	..	..	..
1960-61	648.80	..	648.80	..	..	..	..
1961-62	647.30	..	647.30	..	..	..	..

(in lakhs of Rupees).

APPENDIX D-2

Programme of Repayment of the debt incurred on the Lloyed Barrage Project.

Year.	Capital Debt			Net capital debt.	Interest for year.	Revenue.		
	Recoveries on account of water courses.	Receipts from land sales.	Total			Corresponding total revenue.	Present total revenue.	Increase in total revenue.
	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1933-34	25.00	46.66	165.66	1,895.92	119.02	127.84	60.04	67.80
1934-35	25.00	59.81	209.81	1,832.02	119.98	136.71	60.04	76.67
1935-36	25.00	70.32	95.32	1,815.72	114.66	145.13	60.04	85.09
1936-37	19.03	82.41	101.44	1,779.81	112.87	153.97	60.04	93.93
1937-38	25.00	91.05	116.05	1,718.93	110.10	162.00	60.04	101.93
1938-39	25.00	90.05	115.05	1,648.49	105.81	201.82	60.04	141.78
1939-40	10.98	86.80	97.78	1,552.40	99.01	209.90	60.04	149.86
1940-41	1.50	81.18	82.68	1,469.72	93.14	217.86	60.04	157.82
1941-42	1.50	74.08	75.58	1,394.14	88.18	225.72	60.04	165.68
1942-43	1.50	66.08	68.48	1,325.66	83.65	252.98	60.04	192.94
1943-44	1.50	62.66	64.16	1,261.50	79.54	237.06	60.04	197.02
1944-45	1.50	60.50	62.00	1,119.50	75.69	260.39	60.04	200.35
1945-46	1.50	60.50	62.00	1,137.50	71.97	263.63	60.04	203.59
1946-47	1.50	60.50	62.00	1,075.50	68.25	266.32	60.04	206.28
1947-48	1.50	60.50	62.00	1,013.50	64.53	282.29	60.04	222.25
1948-49	1.50	60.50	62.00	951.50	60.81	285.17	60.04	225.13
1949-50	1.50	60.50	62.00	889.50	57.09	288.20	60.04	228.16
1950-51	4.70	60.50	62.20	824.30	53.37	290.98	60.04	230.94
1951-52	..	55.50	55.50	768.80	49.46	293.77	60.04	233.73
1952-53	..	44.70	44.70	724.10	46.13	295.22	60.04	235.18
1953-54	..	33.90	33.90	690.20	43.45	296.76	60.04	236.72
1954-55	..	23.10	23.10	667.10	41.41	298.21	60.04	238.17
1955.56	..	12.30	12.30	654.80	40.03	299.75	60.04	239.71
1956-57	..	1.50	1.50	653.30	39.29	301.24	60.04	241.20
1957-58	..	1.50	1.50	651.80	39.20	302.91	60.04	242.87
1958-59	..	1.50	1.50	650.30	39.11	304.40	60.04	244.36
1959-60	..	1.50	1.50	648.80	39.02	305.88	60.04	245.84
1960-61	..	1.50	1.50	647.30	38.93	307.67	60.04	247.63
1961-62	..	1.50	1.50	645.30	38.84	309.37	60.04	249.30

(In lakhs of Rupees.)

APPENDIX D-3					
Programme of Repayment of the debt incurred on the Lloyd Barrage Project					
Working Expenses.					
Year.	Anticipated General working expenses.	Collection charges.	Total working expenses.	Present working expenses.	Increase in working expenses.
	17	8	19	20	21
1933-34	63.18	3.84	67.02	31.57	35.45
1934-35	63.18	4.10	67.28	31.57	35.71
1935-36	63.18	4.35	67.53	31.57	35.96
1936-37	63.18	4.62	67.80	31.57	36.23
1937-38	63.18	4.86	68.04	31.57	36.47
1938-39	63.18	6.05	69.23	31.57	37.66
1939-40	63.18	6.30	69.48	31.57	37.91
1940-41	63.18	6.54	69.72	31.57	38.15
1941-42	63.18	6.77	69.95	31.57	38.38
1942-43	63.18	7.59	70.77	31.57	39.20
1943-44	63.18	7.71	70.89	31.57	39.32
1944-45	63.18	7.81	70.99	31.57	39.42
1945-46	63.18	7.91	71.09	31.57	39.52
1946-47	63.18	7.99	71.17	31.57	39.60
1947-48	63.18	8.47	71.65	31.57	40.08
1948-49	63.18	8.58	71.74	31.57	40.17
1949-50	63.18	8.65	71.83	31.57	40.26
1950-51	63.18	8.73	71.94	31.57	40.34
1951-52	63.18	8.78	71.96	31.57	40.39
1952-53	63.18	8.68	72.04	31.57	40.47
1953-54	63.18	8.90	72.08	31.57	40.51
1954-55	63.18	8.95	72.13	31.57	40.56
1955-56	63.18	8.99	72.17	31.57	40.60
1959-57	63.18	9.04	72.22	31.57	40.65
1957-58	63.18	9.09	72.27	31.57	40.70
1958-59	63.18	9.13	72.31	31.57	40.74
1959-60	63.18	9.18	72.36	31.57	40.79
1960-61	63.18	9.23	72.41	31.57	40.84
1961-62	63.18	9.28	72.46	31.57	40.89

After the year 1961-62, the balance of the debt amounting to 645.80 could be liquidated in 33 annual equated installments of principal & interest (the whole debt being thus liquidated in 60 years from the date of the completion of the work) of 45.38 per annum. The ultimate estimated increase in net revenue is 208.41 leaving an annual profit of 163.03.

(In lakhs of Rupees.)

APPENDIX D-4						
Programme of Repayment of the debt incurred on the Lloyd Barrage Project.						
		Application of Revenue		Debt at end of year.		
Year.	Increase in net revenue.	Payment of interest.	Balance available for general purposes.	Balance of capital debt.	Arrears of interest.	Total balance of debt.
	22	23	24	25	26	27
1933-34	32.35	32.35	..	1,895.92	86.67	1,982.59
1934-35	40.96	40.96	..	1,832.02	73.02	1,911.04
1935-36	49.13	49.13	..	1,815.72	65.53	1,881.25
1936-37	57.70	57.50	..	1,779.81	55.14	1,834.98
1937-38	65.49	65.49	..	1,718.93	44.61	1,763.54
1938-39	104.12	104.12	..	1,648.49	1.69	1,650.18
1939-40	111.95	99.01	12.04	1,552.40	..	1,552.40
1940-41	119.67	93.14	26.53	1,469.72	..	1,469.72
1941-42	127.30	88.18	39.12	1,394.14	..	1,394.14
1942-43	153.71	83.65	70.09	1,325.66	..	1,325.66
1943-44	157.70	79.54	78.16	1,261.50	..	1,261.50
1944-45	160.93	75.69	85.24	1,199.50	..	1,199.50
1945-46	164.07	71.97	92.10	1,137.50	..	1,137.50
1946-47	164.68	68.25	96.43	1,075.50	..	1,075.50
1947-48	182.17	64.53	117.64	1,013.50	..	1,013.50
1948-49	184.96	60.81	124.15	951.50	..	951.50
1949-50	187.90	57.09	130.81	889.50	..	889.50
1950-51	190.60	53.37	137.23	824.30	..	824.30
1951-52	193.34	49.46	143.88	768.80	..	768.80
1952-53	194.71	46.13	148.58	724.10	..	724.10
1953-54	196.21	43.45	152.76	690.20	..	690.20
1954-55	197.61	41.41	156.20	667.10	..	667.10
1955-56	199.11	40.03	159.08	654.80	..	654.80
1959-57	200.55	39.29	161.26	653.30	..	653.30
1957-58	202.17	39.20	162.97	651.80	..	651.80
1958-59	203.62	39.11	164.51	650.30	..	650.30
1959-60	205.05	39.02	166.03	648.80	..	648.80
1960-61	206.79	38.93	167.86	647.30	..	647.30
1961-62	208.41	38.81	169.57	645.80	..	645.80
After the year 1961-62, the balance of the debt amounting to 645.80 could be liquidated in 33 annual equated installments of principal & interest (the whole debt being thus liquidated in 60 years from the date of the completion of the work) of 45.38 per annum. The ultimate estimated increase in net revenue is 208.41 leaving an annual profit of 163.03.						

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E					
Year.	Basic deficit.	Cost of separation.	Total deficit.	Net Balance Revenue.	Net deficit ox Surplus —or +
1933-34	68.50	12.00	80.50	..	-80.50
1934-35	68.50	12.00	80.50	..	-80.50
1935-36	68.50	12.00	80.50	..	-80.50
1936-37	68.50	12.00	80.50	..	-80.50
1937-38	68.50	12.00	80.50	..	-80.50
1938-39	68.50	12.00	80.50	..	-80.50
1939-40	68.50	12.00	80.50	12.94	-67.56
1940-41	68.50	12.00	80.50	26.53	-53.97
1941-42	68.50	12.00	80.50	39.12	-41.38
1942-43	68.50	12.00	80.50	70.09	-10.41
1943-44	68.50	12.00	80.50	78.16	-2.34
1944-45	68.50	12.00	80.50	85.24	+4.74
1945-46	68.50	12.00	80.50	92.10	+11.6
1946-47	68.50	12.00	80.50	96.43	+15.63
1947-48	68.50	12.00	80.50	117.64	+37.14
1948-49	68.50	12.00	80.50	124.15	+43.65
1949-50	68.50	12.00	80.50	130.81	+50.31
1950-51	68.50	12.00	80.50	137.23	+56.73
1951-52	68.50	12.00	80.50	143.88	+63.38
1952-53	68.50	12.00	80.50	148.58	+68.08
1953-54	68.50	12.00	80.50	152.76	+72.26
1954-55	68.50	12.00	80.50	156.20	+75.70
1955-56	68.50	12.00	80.50	159.08	+78.58
1959-57	68.50	12.00	80.50	161.26	+80.76
1957-58	68.50	12.00	80.50	162.97	+82.47
1958-59	68.50	12.00	80.50	164.51	+84.01
1959-60	68.50	12.00	80.50	166.03	+85.53
1960-61	68.50	12.00	80.50	167.86	+87.36
1961-62	68.50	12.00	80.50	169.57	+89.07
1962-63	68.50	12.00	80.50	163.03	+82.53

APPENDIX F.

Note for the Sindh Conference.

By Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ayub S, Khuhro, M.L.C,

The Conference has now reached the final stage of its deliberations. There can be no doubt that the task with which the Conference was entrusted was very heavy, intricate and at the same time an important one. The case put forth by the majority of representatives, at all stages, in order to understand the real position of the Sindh Budget after the latter's separation, was a reasonable one. The conclusions that we have arrived at are as follows: —

Basic Figures (Income Side).
Lakhs.

1. Land Revenue ..... Increase of 7 lakhs (The reason being that the average of 10 years calculated both according to financial as well as revenue year gives the figure of net realizations to be 109.7. It was generally agreed that the 3 years taken by the Miles Irving Committee for calculating average were abnormally bad years and therefore they cannot reflect the correct position of the Sindh Land Revenue).

2. Excise figure was also increased by 4.5 lakhs for the same reason and also for the fact that Sindh M.L.O's. do not propose to support prohibition.

Expenditure Side.

1 . There has been an increase in Expenditure to the extent of 1.65.

2. For Pensions the basic-figure taken by the Miles Irving Committee is 16.50 whereas the actual payment under the head from Sindh Treasuries is only about 8.44. Miles Irving Committee have assumed that in 1933-34 Sindh Treasury will have to pay 9.0 lakhs.

This indicates a clear difference of 7.5 lakhs. It is generally agreed that Sindh should be charged that much what she pays. Thus there will be clear saving of 7.6 lakhs.

Retrenchment.

1. The figures supplied by the Commissioner's office indicate that the total permanent saving carried out is about 12.8 lakhs and temporary saving is 8 lakhs. It was unanimously agreed that the 10 percent cut in the salaries of Provincial as well as

Subordinate service be continued at least for 5 years till, these slump rates continue. If we exclude the saving effected by the cut in the salaries of Imperial service it will make hardly the difference of about one lakh. We have, therefore, got to calculate 20 lakhs as retrenched by the Bombay Government so far.

2. In addition the Conference has either unanimously or by majority decided to effect following retrenchments. The proposals have been more of a general character, because the Conference had no time to go minutely into details to work out the exact savings by retrenchment. It will be the function of the separated Sindh Government to undertake this task and I have no hesitation to think, that they will at least save as much as we have suggested in general.

Land Revenue (Saving due to reduction in the Village establishment owing to the appointment of Abdars and Canal Assistants and reduction in Supervising Tapedars as decided by the Bombay Retrenchment Committee) 2.0 lakhs.

General Administration (Three Huzoor Deputy Collectors Rs. 12,600, abolition of Dadu District 1.30) 1.70 lakhs

Administration of Justice (1 Assistant Judicial Commissioner costing Rs. 40,000, two City Magistrates Rs. 8,400, three Resident Magistrates Rs. 12,600) 0.70 lakhs

Jails 0.30 lakhs

Civil Works, (It was agreed that there should be a uniform cut of 10 percent which will give as much as the permanent and the temporary retrenchment has saved by the re-adjustment and re-arrangement, this figure can be saved easily) 1.8 lakhs

Total 6.5

Police. It was generally agreed that there is considerable room for retrenchment in Police but in order to satisfy the Hindu Members of the Conference no retrenchment was effected for the time being.

Cost of Separation.

The saving effected according to the detailed proposals I have already submitted is 6.5. Thus I would take the saving to be 6.5 lakhs. But we may have to add about 2 lakhs due to the cost of Audit Office and the Establishment for the Revenue Commissioner. Thus the net saving will be only 4.5 lakhs. It should however be remembered that cost of administration is already highest as compared to other provinces in India. Sindh spends nearly Rs. 7 per head which is double of Madras and almost three times of Bengal and Assam spends only Rs. 4 per head.

Expansion.

There appears no need at present to provide anything for expansion in the immediate future. The programme of roads and further development of the Agriculture Department should be made from extra 1 anna cess on sale of Barrage lands and the extra income from the Barrage area.

Remodeling of Phuleli and Karachi Canals as well as Artillery Maidan are productive schemes. There is however no immediate need for new districts of Dadu, Ghuni. District Court at Nawabshah, and the Mental Hospital.

The net result is as follows: —

	Lakhs.
Income Side	11.5
Pensions	7.5
Retrenchment already effected	20.0
New Retrenchment	6.5
Cost of separation	4.5
Add to this increase in expenditure	50.0
minus	1.65
	48.35

Round Figure 48.5

The net loss shown by the Miles Irving Committee in the first year of the separation is 110.42 lakhs. Deduct from this 48.5 lakhs thus saved. The net loss will be only 61.92 or 62 lakhs.

New Source of Revenue.

1. On account of tax on Electricity, Transfer of Property Act, New Court Fees and Stamps Act, Sindh will get at least 2 lakhs.

2. Due to the imposition of 1 anna cess per rupee of land revenue to meet the extra cost of separation till Sindh is sufficiently rich otherwise to meet the cost of administration will give at least Rs. 12 lakhs.

NOTE. — The Land Revenue in Barrage zone will be about 125 lakhs, outside Barrage zone it will be about 50 lakhs. Add to this the Hakabo charges to Jagirs in whole Sindh, will bring the total gross revenues to 2 crores straight off, and the one anna cess will thus give 12.5 lakhs. To be on the safe side I however take it to be 12 lakhs.

3. Income-tax collected in the Province of Sindh will give us, as calculated by the Federal Finance Committee, Rs. 21 lakhs. A deficit and a small province like Sindh cannot afford to give any contribution to the Federal Government and therefore it will be wrong to take into consideration any contribution from Sindh to Federal Government.

4. I am strongly of opinion that Sindh should not be made to pay the interest charges for the Pre-Separation debts. This amount as suggested by Professor Batheja should be charged to Bombay as Bombay will by separating Sindh benefit to the extent of about 75 lakhs straight off. According to the calculations of the Federal Finance Committee, Bombay will have deficit of 65 lakhs under the existing conditions if Sindh is separated. Bombay is entitled to 322 lakhs as share of Income Tax. Her full contribution to the Federal Government will be 203 lakhs. Thus the net saving to Bombay will be 54 lakhs straight off, if Sindh is separated. Bombay can therefore easily bear 21 lakhs of interest charges to get rid of Sindh, If Sindh continues to hang round the neck of Bombay like a millstone, after the Federal Government is established in India, Bombay will be having a deficit of about 25 lakhs per year inspite of the share of Income Tax as recommended by the Federal Finance Committee and therefore Bombay will be compelled to ask Federal Government for a subsidy of 25 lakhs per year to meet the Sindh deficit. To choose between the two certainly Professor Batheja's suggestion of making Bombay pay the interest charges is undoubtedly a clear gain to Bombay Government and a much lesser evil, if it is regarded as such. The result will at this stage be as follows: —

	Lakhs.
Interest charges for pre-separation debt charged to Bombay	21.0
Income Tax	21.0
Electricity, etc.	2.0
One anna cess	12.0
	56.0
	62.0
Net deficit	6.0

The net deficit thus boils down to only Rs. 6 lakhs. I have yet to suggest numerous sources of revenue for the province of Sindh in the light of the recommendations made by the Federal Finance Committee.

		Lakhs.
(a) The Tobacco Tax will be an indirect tax which will not be felt at all. This will give us alone at least 5 lakhs of rupees. It should be 25 per cent, of the cost of Tobacco to start with		5.0
(b) The Excise duty on cotton of Re. 1 per bale will give us about		10.0
(c) There are other minor sources of Income just as: —		
Licensing of: —		
	Rs.	
(a) Medical-Practitioners	30	
(b) Veterinary Surgeons	10	
(c) Money lenders 50 per annum	50	2.0
(d) Domestic Servants	1	
(c) Legal Practitioners	20	
(f) Sea Fishery		1.0
(g) Lottery		10.0
(h) Guns, Pistols, Swords, Re. 1 per year for each Gun and Rs. 2 for Pistol, annas 4 for Sword .		0.5
Total		13.5
Major Heads		15.0
Minor Heads		13.5
		28.5

These sources of revenue will give us surplus revenues of over 20 lakhs, to spend for the nation-building departments.

APPENDIX G

Note by three Hindu Members, (Professor H. L. Chablani, Mr. Lahhand Navalraiy M.L,A,y and Diwan Bahadur Murlidhar Jeramdas Punjabi),

Now that the work of the Conference is coming to a close we desire to place on record our general view of the matters under discussion. As a result of the discussion, the position which emerges appears to us almost hopeless. Since the Expert Committee reported, the financial position of Sindh has become decidedly worse inspite of severe retrenchment and additional taxation. The revenue receipts in 1930-31 and Revised Estimates of 1931-32 are lower than the basic figures assumed by the Miles Committee by as much as 24 lakhs while the expenditure in 1930-31 exceeded the Committee's basic figure by 2-3 lakhs. It has also been generally admitted that the expert committee has omitted from their estimates 1½ lakhs for a separate Accounts and Audit Office and 1 lakh for the establishment charges of the Revenue Commissioner. Against this, there is the improvement due to new taxation of 1 ½ lakhs to 2 lakhs, and to retrenchment to the tune of 12 lakhs, part of which cannot be regarded as of a permanently recurring character. In the first years of separation, the deficit of Sindh would thus stand considerably higher than the basic figure assumed by the Committee.

2. Our Muslim friends' way of overcoming the difficulties disclosed by the expert committee's report is first of all, to reduce the expert committee's estimate of the normal deficit by the heroic assumption that Sindh's revenue receipts in 1933-34 would exceed by 11½ lakhs the Committee's basic figures, and by as much as 35.5 lakhs the actual realization in 1930-31, the latest year for which accounts are available. Their second device is to cut down the pension liability by 7.5 lakhs, ignoring altogether the item in column 5 of the table on page 76 which estimates Sindh's liability for pensions already earned but not paid out of Sindh's treasuries, as well as the figure in column 9 on page 77 which gives the Committee's estimate of the Residue of Sindh's share of part-earned pensions. No reasons have been given for this reduction except the chairman's general impression that the Committee's estimate of 16 lakhs appears to be too high. We suggest that the calculations made by the Miles Committee be scrutinized by an expert actuary, for no mistake has been detected in the expert committee's calculations. The third device is a cut of 6.46 lakhs on the Committee's estimate of 11.05 lakhs on account of separation, inspite of the committee's serious warning in paragraph 40 of their report against the facile assumption that a separate Governor's province in Sindh could be administered with a much cheaper headquarters staff than that of a conventional Governor's Province. Their fourth device is to assume that the emergency cut in salaries including those of covenanted servants can be made permanent. Their fifth is to regard the whole of the amount saved since April 1931 by retrenchment as a permanent recurring saving inspite of the official statement that a substantial part of it is mere postponement of necessary expenditure. Over and above these cuts the Muslim

members of the Conference have proposed a further cut of 6.5 lakhs under Land Revenue, General Administration, Justice, Jail, and Civil Works, though the specific items mentioned by them as capable for retrenchment were considered necessary items of expenditure by almost all the non-Muslim members of the Conference. These bold devices are responsible for reducing the estimate of sub-committee's deficit by as much as 49 lakhs out of which we ourselves cannot regard more than 7 lakhs as recurring permanent savings due to retrenchment made by the Bombay Government since 1st January 1931.

3. As regards taxation our Muslim colleagues expect to get 8 lakhs out of income-tax under the Federal Committee’s proposal and have suggested further that 13 lakhs mentioned as contribution due from Sindh should be wiped out by the Central Government. We cannot rely even on this source of revenue as a certain item, for the Federal Committee’s estimate on pages 4 to 5 show a surplus of 4.50 crores, which is yet to be realized. These estimates of the Federal Committee are based on the assumption "that the present depression will come to an end and that there will follow a period of reviving trade accompanied by a gradual increase of prices, which if they do not reach the pre-slump level, will rise appreciably higher than the level now prevailing."

We do not ourselves expect the depression to pass away by 1933 and consider it therefore premature to count on 8 lakhs from income-tax a an item of Sindh’s revenue. As regards the wiping out of 13 lakhs of contribution this appears to be nothing else except a subvention from the Central Government and on which we have already expressed our views in a separate note. Among the new taxes proposed the only tax the burden of which is likely to fall partly on the shoulders of Sindh Muslims is the suggestion that there should be an increase of one anna in the rupee over the land revenue assessment both in the barrage zone and outside the barrage zone. The total revenue of Sindh both from the barrage and non-barrage zone during 1933-34 is not expected to be more than 156.1 lakhs on the basis of Appendix 8 so the total yield of this additional tax will be less than 10 lakhs of which 40 percent will fall on the shoulders of Hindu Zamdndars who are opposed to separation. The second tax proposed is the professional tax (a) on lawyers, doctors and money lenders; almost all of whom in Sindh belong to the minority communities. Even the suggested tax on employers of domestic servants is likely to fall almost exclusively on the non-Muslim community. The domestic servants of Muslims in the rural areas will easily be classed as either tenants or agricultural laborers and are in point of fact indistinguishable from these at certain seasons of the year. The Vend Fee on Tobacco is impracticable over the whole of Sindh owing to administrative difficulties; if restricted to towns it only means taxation of the consumer of tobacco in cities which are predominantly non-Muslims. The suggested transit duty on the cotton bales coming from up-country means taxation on the Punjab grower of cotton and will probably lead to diversion of trade from Karachi to other centers. On the most optimistic calculations the yield from the Professional tax will not exceed 2 lakhs and from Vend fees on tobacco another 2 lakhs and from the

Transit duty on Cotton bales 5 to 10 lakhs. A wide gap therefore yet remains to be filled up by other means.

4. For the reduction of interest charges our non-Muslim friends rely on what amounts to repudiation of debt. The proposal that barrage debt should be divided in the proportion of 15 to 85 between Bombay and Sindh, is on the face of it absurd, as it would mean that Sindh will have the whole of the proceeds of land sales and the Revenue from the barrage zone but will pay only 15 percent of the total capital debt on the barrage. Professor Batheja's proposal that the Central Government should wipe out the whole of the pre-reform irrigation debt amounts again to nothing more than a subvention from the Central Government. There remains the proposal that Bombay should take over 86 percent of the accumulated interest charges on the barrage capital on the ground that if the interest on the barrage debt had been met out of revenue, all revenue transactions on capital would have been regarded as closed as suggested by the expert committee in paragraph 32. In our opinion the proposer has misread and misinterpreted paragraph 32 of the report, which reads as follows: —

> "Our conclusion therefore is that no question of debt arises at all in respect of *past expenditure* from revenue. Throughout the *years prior to separation*, the revenues of the joint province *were devoted* to those objects which, at the time, appeared to be the most deserving in the interests of the province as a whole; it is quite immaterial in which particular division of province the expenditure *occurred*; and all *such* revenue transactions must, in our opinion, be regarded as closed. It follows that the only debt which requires to be distributed is that which entails *continuing* liabilities *in the shape of payment of interest and repayment of capital*."

It is clear that what the expert committee regarded as finally closed was only the *past* expenditure from revenue and not any *continuing* liability in the shape of payment of interest or repayment of capital. The original Barrage project expressly provides that the land sales and the revenue from the barrage are to pay for the capital expenditure of the barrage including accumulated interest. The Bombay Government has already paid 81 lakhs out of revenue and Famine Fund towards the interest on the barrage and it was on the definite undertaking that the *remaining* interest on the barrage will be added to the capital during the period of construction and paid out of revenue and land-sales from the Barrage zone that the Secretary of State sanctioned the project and the Bombay Legislative Council agreed to take up the responsibility of the barrage. If Sindh continues with Bombay this accumulated interest will certainly be met out by the revenue of the barrage which will then become a part of the whole presidency revenues. It is inequitable to take over the entire revenue and capital receipts of the Barrage and then throw on Bombay 85 percent of the accumulated interest. The assumption that Sindh revenues paid for the interest on the Deccan irrigation works is untrue in point of fact. At any rate since 1921 when the provinces came to have separate financial resources Sindh's revenues have always *fallen* short of expenditure in Sindh by more than half a crore annually, and it is absurd in the face of these facts to contend that Sindh should be presumed to have contributed towards the interest charges of the Back Bay scheme or the Deccan irrigation works. What strikes us even more absurd is the fact that even 15 percent of accumulated interest has been taken over not as an item of unproductive debt of Sindh but as part again of the Barrage capital. We consider all suggestions that Bombay should pay any part of the barrage debt and interest charges and Sindh should have the whole revenue from land sales and land assessment as equivalent to asking for subvention from the Bombay Government.

5. As regards the future expenditure, our Muslim friends have practically washed out all the estimates of Committee and the Bombay Government regarding the growth of capital expenditure and expenditure charged to revenue considered as inevitable under the conditions created in the Barrage zone. We have already indicated our view regarding these items. It would be sufficient for us to record our firm conviction that the anticipated revenue of barrage will hardly be sufficient for the inevitable growth of expenditure in the barrage zone — inevitable because it will become necessary if Government is to get its expected revenue from the barrage.

6. The assumed rates of assessment in the barrage zone have already been objected to by the zemindars of Sindh, Hindu as well as Muslim, and we are firmly convinced that they are pitched too high. Mr. Green's new proposals are based upon the prices ruling in January 1932 and on full 40 percent net assets wherever his original rates fell short of 40 percent standard. Since then, prices of cotton and oil seeds have fallen sharply and there is a general complaint that his rates are far too high and mark a very steep rise over the existing rates. As regards the prospects of full rates, which are much higher than either the slump rates in Appendix 8 or Mr. Green's new' proposals, being levied after 5 years, we consider the chance to be almost nil. On the question of these rates we wish to invite attention to the speeches made in the Bombay Legislative Council by Khan Bahadur Allah Bux on the 20th February 1932, and by Khan Bahadur Khuhro on the 11th March 1932 and to the resolutions passed at a meeting of Larkana Muslim and Hindu Zamindars, Jagirdars and Agriculturists under the chairmanship of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto in May 1931. On the general ability of the people of Sindh to bear more taxes we can do no better than quote from Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto's speech at the Round Table Conference in the course of which he said: "We shall be questioned by our people. The people have no money and they are already starving and cannot pay more taxes."

7. Our conclusion then is that Sindh cannot stand on its own legs for a generation to come, and that any attempt to add to the height of taxation in this period of acute depression, will create serious discontent among all classes of people in Sindh particularly among the non-Muslim communities who are generally opposed to separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency but on whose shoulders a very large part of burden of the proposed taxation is likely to fall.

APPENDIX H.

Memorandum by Mr. E. L. Price, C.I.E., O.B.E,

On Communications in Sindh.

1. I am driven by the facts to put Barrage *communications* absolutely first in the Provincial requirements of New Sindh.

I cannot believe that anybody conversant with the country and the facts will doubt the need.

The problem, like most of New Sindh's problems, *financial*.

I am aware that the Karachi Chamber of Commerce has been so perplexed by the financial difficulty that it has suggested that part of the finance at least should be taken from the sale-proceeds of Barrage lands.

And the logic that those lands cannot be expected to fetch fullest prices without roads is strong indeed.

On the other hand, the full sale-proceeds of Barrage Lands have been definitely earmarked against the cost of the Project from the very start, and any variation on that head might reasonably be rejected by the Government of India who lent the money and by the Government of Bombay who borrowed it (and remains still liable) as something approaching a breach of faith.

2. Before going into the finance purely from the Sindhi point of view, I wish to put before the Government of India and the Public certain relevant facts which affect incidentally all India but Sindh *in her hour of need* most of all.

The Import Duty on Motor Vehicles is a purely Revenue Duty, there being no production of Motor Vehicles (apart from mere "assembling") in India.

I consider the Import Duty costs the Government of India more than it brings in because the excise or import duty on petrol is worth more to Government than the Import Duties on Motor Vehicles, especially in the case of Motor-Buses and Lorries particularly required in Sindh.

The Import Duty on a Motor Bus or Lorry will amount to about Rs. 625 at most. (Cheaper types and chassis only will be preferred for Sindh, but I take the higher figure so as to be on the safe side.) This Rs. 625 has to be paid in a *lump sum*, cash on importation. A *lump sum* cash is a form of payment particularly disliked by Indians, specially by the Sindhi. He will more readily pay a larger amount in drips and drabs.

The import duty therefore restricts importation. The Customs Returns confirm this. But if the Import Duty were abolished and the vehicles came in free of duty, the imports and use would be greatly extended and the Government of India would get far more than it gave up out of the petrol (duty excise) of 8 annas per gallon.

I give figures in support of this contention.

A motor bus or lorry once imported is worked to an extent unparalleled in richer countries, namely, for full 10 hours per day every day, Sundays and holidays especially included.

Its average speed will be about 34 miles per hour. This would give a mileage (10 hours at 14 miles per hour for 30 days) of 4,200 miles per mensem.

To be absolutely again on the safe side I will calculate only 3,000 miles per mensem.

Probably only new vehicles so used will do 15 miles per gallon of petrol, but to be on the safe side I will assume that these overworked vehicles average that mileage per gallon throughout their three years of life.

Three thousand miles per mensem at 16 miles per gallon of petrol gives a monthly consumption of 200 gallons, yielding the Government of India Rs. 100 per mensem from the petrol duty/excise. In the three years of assumed life this comes to Rs. 3,600, worth to the Government of India fully five times the original import duty (Rs. 625 cash) sacrificed to entice the vehicle to come in.

The Government of India would accordingly profit on the whole transaction and the removal of the Import duty provided importation rose by anything over a mere 18%.

As the Import Duty, though differentiated, applies also to "Motor-Cars", I will deal with that type of vehicle separately, I am, for safety's sake, not taking into consideration the fact that so many of such cars are used as taxis or otherwise hired out and accordingly overworked almost as badly as the buses and lorries.

I take an average import duty at Rs. 750 and assume that the car will only be driven 1 ,000 miles per mensem and will do 25 miles per gallon of petrol. The life of a car thus treated might well reach 6 years. I will for safety's sake assume a life of only 5 years.

The petrol consumption will be only 40 gallons per month yielding to the Government of India Rs. 20 per mensem, Es, 240 per annum and in all Rs. 1,200 in 5 years against the original Rs. 750 Import Duty sacrificed to entice the car in.

The Government of India would accordingly profit on the whole transaction and the removal of the Import Duty provided importation rose by anything over 57%.

I am assured by such expert opinion as I can obtain that, if the Import Duties on Motors were taken off, and if the country were adequately supplied with motorable, not necessarily expensive, roads, importation and use of all three types would certainly double.

3. Sindh, in my opinion, needs Rs. 10,00,000 a year for 5 years for roads in the Barrage area.

I understand that the Roads Sub-Committee of the Sindh Communications Board are of the same opinion. There is no hope of that amount being forth-coming out of the Petrol Tax on the present basis: at the present moment Sindh only earns about 1½ lakhs per annum out of the Petrol Tax. Nor is there any prospect of such an amount coming out of (Bombay) provincial Revenues: the Government of Bombay have definitely stated that they are unable to provide any money out of Provincial Revenues for road construction in Sindh.

I am therefore driven to regard the Barrage Area roads programme as a financial *clean slate* with, nothing at all yet provided for communications, though without them, {a) the lands to be sold cannot be expected to fetch the fullest prices, and (&) the crops cannot be adequately marketed.

Criticism kindly afforded me by helpful friends during the preparation of this Memorandum shows me that some further simple explanations are needed.

The "life" of a motor-vehicle is of interest (I have to disregard the Owner in this connection) to the Government of India only, and then only while the Import Duties are maintained.

For Sindh the vehicles might be "immortal" with advantage, for the older and more ramshackle the vehicle is, the more petrol will it consume.

The number of vehicles to be enticed in by Roads as against, the number to be kept out by the Import Duties is difficult to estimate. Without the duties, I can but calculate that the New Sindh Roads might entice in 2 motor-buses or lorries per motorable mile, plus one "private" car.

I prefer however to base my estimates on the more likely supposition that the existing "Revenue" Import Duties on Motor Vehicles will be maintained, and that the Roads of New Sindh will be allowed to entice in only one motor-bus or lorry and ½ one "private" car per motorable mile.

The cost of making roads in the Barrage Area is another matter difficult to estimate.

I learn that the cost of the Malir-Kotri Road is estimated at only Rs. 1,500 per mile. This can hardly include culvert and bridge work, unless some "bargains" in existing structures are available.

The Roads in the Barrage Area will need mainly to converge on the two main lines of Railway. They will have to be like herring-bones with the Railway Lines as the back-bone.

I am aware that, thanks to the admirable foresight of the Barrage Engineers, many Bridge facilities have been included in the Canal construction, work. But these facilities were provided before the Roads plan was made. They cannot cover all the necessities of the case.

I therefore estimate the average cost per mile at Rs. 2,500.

If the Experts and Contractors can reduce that figure, all the better for New Sindh. I shall be only too pleased to be proved wrong.

On these assumptions I get as follows: —

First Year. — Borrow Rs. 10,00,000. Construct 400 miles of roads, thus enticing in 400 motor lorries and/or buses and 200 "private" Cars despite the discouragement of the Customs Import Duties.

Second Year[2]

Consumption of petrol — Gallons.	
By 400 motor buses/lorries	9,60,000
By 200 "private" Cars	96,000
	10,56,000
anns per gallon (leas 10%) Road Fund for Sindh Rs.	1,18,800

[2] This like the original cost would largely depend on the proportion where medaling was necessary.

Borrow further Rs. 10,00,000 making total debt Rs. 20,00,000. Construct further 400 miles of roads making now 800 miles, enticing in further 400 motor buses and/or lorries making total running 800 miles and further 200 "private" cars making total 400.

Third Year.
Consumption of petrol — Gallons.

By 800 motor buses/lorries	.. ..	19,20,000
By 400 "private" cars	.. ..	1,92,000
Gallons	.. ..	21,12,000
@ 2 annas per gallon (less 10%) Road Fund for Sindh,	Say Rs.	2,37,000

At this point it would be advisable to take new stock of the position. It might be found that on Barrage agricultural development it was necessary to intensify progress in road-making. It might be found that it was more advantageous to go more slowly. I believe the former is more likely. But I would not be so incautious as to rule out the possibility of the latter.

But, at all events, by the third year I have Rs. 20,00,000 of new debt, 800 miles of new roads, and a permanent new income of Rs. 2,37,000.

If it is necessary to set aside even as much as Rs. 125 per mile[3] per annum for maintenance and repairs, costing Rs. 1,00,000 — I still have Rs. 1,37,000 — for payment of interest and sinking funds, this quite apart from any other source of help within the province, — all *new* roads and *new* money for *New* Sindh.

I understand that the "Road Fund" will run out in 1934 unless renewed.

The petrol Duty/Excise being a tax reserved to the Central Government, the Provincial 2 annas (less 10%) of course cannot be imposed without Imperial sanction. But the necessities of the case of Sindh are such that I am clear that the necessary sanction will be allowed to Sindh even if the Road Fund in other Provinces is allowed to lapse.

4. I may be told that the use of Road Fund " for this Barrage Area construction is not quite in accordance with the Rules.

It is no use putting *Rules* against *Necessity*.

"Nice customs courtesy to great Kings."

[3] This like the original cost would largely depend on the proportion where medaling was necessary.

It seems insufficiently understood that we are on the verge of an *Economic Revolution* in Sindh. We stand economically in 1932 exactly where Egypt and the Lyallpur District stood forty years ago in 1892.

If existing " Rules " stand in the way, they must be altered or at least suspended for 5 years in their application to New Sindh.

We have 90 years of arrears in roads to make up in 5 years.

There is admittedly no means of tackling the vital problem of communications in Sindh except by some such system of borrowing.

Cash from Revenue on the scale required cannot possibly be secured either in Sindh or in Bombay. Unless we can make up these arrears of 90 years in 5 years, so as to synchronies the developments of production and transport within the Barrage Area, the success of the whole Barrage project will be jeopardized, and (even with more luck than looks likely in the markets for primary products) the Barrage benefits anticipated can never accrue as they should do either to the people of Sindh or to its Government.

More might be added as to the general need of communications for efficient and economical administration.

" Transport is Civilization ",

But the case for Provincial roads in Sindh has been before Governments on the civilization argument for nearly 90 years with little result.

I stick therefore to the economic argument, to the necessity argument, that roads in the Barrage Area are essential because without them (a) the lands to be sold cannot be expected to realize the fullest prices, and (b) the crops cannot be adequately marketed.

APPENDIX I.

Historical Note on Land Revenue Assessment in Sindh by Mr. H. Dow. C.I.E. I.C.S., Revenue Officer, Lloyd Barrage and Canals Scheme.

The Bombay Land Revenue Code applies to both the Presidency and Sindh, and lays down in Section 107 that in revising assessments of agricultural land, regard shall be had to the profits of agriculture. The Bardoli Report has drawn attention to the fact that the Land Revenue Code does not state what share the State is to take of the "profits of agriculture". A recent official pronouncement on the subject is contained in paragraph 5 of G. R. 1790/24 of 13th May 1927 in which it is stated that the Governor in Council considers that he may appropriately adhere to the present practice of regarding 50% of the rental value as the maximum limit of the proportion which the State is entitled to take, and that this is a principle which should be embodied in the law on the subject-Section 100 of the Land Revenue Code should be modified accordingly But no such modification has yet been carried out.

2. The purpose of this note is to examine the theories that have been held and the practice that has been followed, with regard to the fixing of assessments in Sindh since the British occupation. The Talpur rulers took a varying share of the gross produce of the fields which generally varied from one-fourth to one-third on canal irrigated lands, and was still higher for lands which were naturally flooded. The most usual form in which these rents or assessments were levied was '*batai*' an actual share of the crop, but it was sometimes commuted into cash. In a very interesting report written in 1847 on the Chandookah Purgana, which corresponds to the present Larkana sub-division, Lieutenant Hugh James enumerates four methods in which assessments were levied. The first was '*batai*' which varied from one-fourth to half and was usually two-fifths. The second was known as *kasgi*, which was a rent collected in grain, but estimated according to the acreage cultivated and not according to the actual amount of crop grown. The usual rate was 7 kasas per *bigha*, (a *bigha* is about half an acre, and there are 60 *kasas* to a *kharar,* which is equal to 29½ English bushels). The third method was known as the *Eri Rakab*, and was a commutation of the *kasgi* into cash. The fourth method was actual cash rents, which varied from Rs. 3 to Rs. 5 per *bigha*. When it is remembered that these levies, whether of *batai, kasgi*, or *eri rakab*, were made on the gross produce of the field, the heaviness of their incidence is apparent. Lieutenant James also enumerates a large list of other customary exactions which were levied in addition. There were the shakranji, measurers' fees and patwarees' fees, and tahsildari on lands paying cash rent, batai fees at so much per *kharar* and also on each name entered in the *batai* records, fees for weighment and for the payment of watchmen, and also the kotwal's fee.

3. There was a great divergence in the actual shares or proportion of produce taken in different places and for different kinds of cultivation, and indeed only one principle emerges quite clearly. That is that the Talpur Ameers took all they could get, and frequently ruined the best lands by taking so much that cultivation became unprofitable. On gardens in Chandookah the share levied was usually five-sixths of the gross produce and never less than one-half, and it became unprofitable to attempt to grow anything but date groves which needed little attention. The prevailing theory and practice undoubtedly was that the Talpur rulers were the owners of the soil and had a right to draw as much revenue from it as they felt it politic, or felt themselves powerful enough, to do. The earlier Talpurs made a few grants (the later Taipurs made them more freely) of revenue free grants to their supporters, who were mostly Baluchis. The origin and subsequent history of these "*jaghirs*", as they were called, has been dealt with at length, though somewhat untidily, in the History of Alienations in Sindh, compiled under the authority of Government in 1878 and printed in 1886. It is not necessary to refer to them further here. For the rest, the Talpur Amirs most frequently farmed out the revenues to zamindars, whose only right was to collect the revenue due to the State from the actual cultivator and to pay over to the Talpur Amirs the sum for which they had taken over the farm. This system provided no check upon oppression by the zamindar, who was left free to collect what he could so long as he paid the stipulated sum into the treasury, and the zamindar himself, though he or his family might continue to farm the same land for many years had no security of tenure, l)ut was always liable to be displaced by the acceptance of a higher bid from a rival or from a new-comer.

4. With the conquest of Sindh in 1843, the British Government stepped into the position of the Amirs' Government, and all revenues or dues hitherto payable to the Talpur Amirs became payable to the British Government. Attempts are even now sometimes made to argue that the zamindars originally had allodial rights in the land of which the British Government have deprived them. There was nothing in the Talpurs' practice to support this claim. Even the jaghirs held by the Talpur and other Belooch chieftains were held at the pleasure of the Talpur rulers and were frequently cancelled when the holders fell into disfavor. It is not conceivable that the ordinary zamindar should have been regarded as having a more permanent and inalienable interest in the land than the favored grantees belonging to the dominant aristocracy. It is not helpful to trace the history of land tenure back to before the Muhammadan invasion of Sindh under Muhammad Kasim in 711 A. D. when it is alleged that allodial rights existed under the Rajput feudatories. Whatever tenures or rights in land may have existed in those dim days, — and we know very little about them — at the time of the British conquest of Sindh, the zamindar, as the British found him, had lost any privilege except the right to claim a certain share of the grain produced within the area cultivated by men who tilled under his directions in return for his collection and due payment of the State share of the produce.

5. The variety of the pitch of assessment at the time of the conquest has been mentioned. The British administrators from the beginning attempted to avoid the capriciousness of the old assessments and at once reduced the *maximum* Government demand to one-third of the gross produce of the land. But the ascertainment of existing practice was still necessary, and this was a matter calling for careful enquiry and detailed study of a kind which Sir Charles Napier, with his preference for rough and ready methods was ill fitted to carry out. Sir Charles Napier was not unduly favorable to the pretensions of the zamindars: he regarded them merely as intermediaries and was anxious to deal wherever possible, with the actual cultivators of the land. But he did comparatively little to carry these ideas into execution, and although some of his officers made careful inquiries into prevailing customs, little was done to evolve order out of the existing chaos, and when H. E. Sir George Clerk visited Sindh at the close of Sir Charles Napier's regime, he found the collection of revenue to be mainly in the hands of the subordinate native officials, whose exactions were uncontrolled. Sir G. Clerk's ideas, contrary to those of Sir Charles Napier, were in favor of making more use of the zamindars, or other persons such as heads of tribes or "*muccadams*" who had influence or authority over the actual cultivators, for the collection of the revenues. By making agreements with these for a term of years, the Government collectors and deputies would, he thought, be relieved of much detailed work and be better able to get a clear view of the whole system and work out a more permanent arrangement.

6. One of the first things to which attention was devoted was the substitution of money payments for *batai*. Sir C. Napier had himself, at any rate by 1846 when his "Revenue Regulations" were issued, recognized the advantages of money payments over *batai*, but he had not been very successful in carrying out the change. He had even authorized the grant of land in "fee simple" on payment of the estimated value of the Government share capitalized at twenty years' purchase; little advantage however was taken of this and the practice was forbidden by the Bombay Government in 1856. In pursuance of the ideas favored by Sir G. Clerk, Napier's successor, Mr. Mansfield, introduced a seven years' settlement, the assessments being based on the cash value of the Government's *batai* share, and fixed for seven years. These settlements were introduced wherever opportunity occurred in 1847-48, and expired in 1853-54, when there was a universal demand on the part of the land holders for reversion to the old system of payment by *batai*, on the ground that the cash assessments were oppressive. And that they undoubtedly were, is indicated by the following list of the average prices realized for all grains taken by Government as *batai* and sold. —

				Per kharar. Rs.
1847- 48	..	..	..	30 to 35
1848- 49	..	..	..	23
1849- 50	..	..	..	15.4
1850- 51	..	..	..	12.4
1851- 52	..	..	..	9.12

The very high prices prevailing in 1847-48 were due to the Punjab Wars, and it was on these that cash assessments had been fixed. It is no wonder that when prices had fallen to less than one-third that level that the cash assessments were found oppressive. The heaviness of these cash assessments during the later years of the seven years' settlement was aggravated by the fact that no remissions were allowed except for damage caused by floods. It was Mr. Frere who later laid down the principle that whenever loss occurred to the zamindar, whatever the cause, the cash assessment should be set aside and the crop should be *bataied*.

7. When these seven years' settlements came to an end in 1853-54, Mr. Frere, who had been Commissioner in Sindh since 1851, proceeded to introduce what he called a Rough Survey into Sindh. Detailed instructions were issued for the preparation of maps and the recording of rights over land, and it was Mr. Frere's intention that this rough survey should be the preliminary to a regular revenue survey and a permanent fixing of the assessment. Wherever possible Mr. Frere was anxious to get rid of *batai* and substitute assessments in cash. He had no objection to a long period of guarantee "whenever the cultivator wishes to secure a lease, either of a village or any portion of it, with a view to secure himself against any enhanced assessment in consequence of improvements which he may make in the land, every encouragement should be afforded him to do so for terms not exceeding 30 years". In March 1854 Mr. Frere ordered, "No settlement should be made for more than one season unless at the express desire of the people. The lease was intended to bind Government, and prevent the assessment being raised as the produce increased, or cultivation extended. It was intended to be a safeguard to the cultivator against over-assessment, and not to tie him to an onerous assessment; and if he does not desire such protection, or cannot see its efficacy it should not be imposed as a condition."

Elsewhere Mr. Frere thus explains the objects of his Rough Survey and Settlement. —

> "That object, in so far as the Government Revenue is concerned is, on the one hand *first* to fix a limit to the Government demand and *second* on the other to define who is to pay that demand; thereby securing the zamindar from unjust exaction and the Government from loss of revenue."

But it does not appear that Mr. Frere made any attempt to lay down what the Government share of the produce ought to be. He is constantly advising moderation and even leniency, but the only standard is what was done before, which appears to be taken as a maximum and generally reduced.

8. This Rough Survey and Settlement turned out to be a much longer and more troublesome business than had been contemplated. To start with there was so little local knowledge available that it was difficult to lay down rules that were at once sufficiently

precise and suitable to local conditions, and as many of the officers working on the survey had been trained in the Dekhan survey, the "rough" survey became too much tied up with Bombay principles and methods, which were really quite inapplicable to Sindh. The great drawback was the failure to notice the fundamental difference between irrigated and other land, and the attempt to classify different modes of irrigation as if they were different qualities of soil led to absurdities. *E.g.*, Captain Pelly in 1854 gives a classification of ten different sorts of Sindh soils, in which modes of irrigation such as *sailabi, moki, charki*, appear side by side with descriptive adjectives *like kacho, chiki, dangar* (*dangachhi*), as different kinds of soil, and their average depths and general characteristics are given and contrasted. It is, of course, true that the mode of irrigation has its effect on soils and that lands which owing to their situation are exposed to frequent natural flooding may be found different in texture and composition from other lands. But a classification that treated lift and flow lands as intrinsically different owing to variable accidents of command. was on the face of it absurd. So little were the correct principles of soil classification understood that it was possible for the head of the Sindh Revenue Survey in the course of an official report in 1857 to make the extraordinary statement that "Rice is chiefly grown in *charki* (i.e. lift) soil, and is *moki* (i.e., flow) cultivation."

9. The Sindh Revenue Survey at this time was recruited largely whose previous training, if any, had been in the Deccan Survey, and their attempts to make the facts of Sindh fit into the theories and practice of the Deccan were a failure. Almost invariably they failed to realize that the facility for irrigation and the cost of irrigation were the dominant features which should decide what assessment lands in Sindh could pay. For many years therefore, lands settled on wells were assessed more highly than lands irrigated from canals and lift lands more highly than flow, apparently because the lands and the crops were usually better. It does not appear to have occurred to the assessing officers that the cost of watering land by well or by lift was high, and that therefore such irrigation could be profitable only when applied to the best lands and combined with laborious effort. It is true that attention was drawn to this fact ill a report by Captain Day, Settlement Officer, Rohri, in 1857. He says "In regard to the assessment one thing has surprised me much, that well lands have been rated so very much higher than lands which are watered by natural irrigation or inundation. I have no doubt that the produce is superior in the former case but the expense of raising it is so very much greater and this must act as discouragement to the sinking of wells. I observe, moreover, that the people among themselves arrange matters differently; they take care to demand a smaller share in case of well land than in *bosi* ones But Captain Day was a junior officer, and no one appears to have taken very much notice of his remarks. It was not till the early years of this century that the principle that lift rates should be lower than flow was general admitted.

10. Mr. Frere was himself an officer who came to Sindh from the Deccan, and it is probably due to his familiarity with the Bombay land revenue system that his

instructions issued from time to time to survey officers never lay down what the proportion Government was entitled to take of the net or gross produce ought to be. The Talpur system, to which the British Government succeeded and on which British practice purported to be based, went on the principle that the Government was entitled to a definite share of the gross produce, though that share was not the same in all places and conditions. Mr. Frere abandoned this theory, while still taking existing practice as the basis of his assessments, and since his days settlement officers have been without any clear guiding principle. Settlement officers have based their settlements on the last settlement. Anomalies have from time to time been got rid of, and experience has gradually led to a general leveling down of assessments: but the principle underlying the Talpur practice has been almost wholly obscured.

11. Mr. Frere's settlement officers had first of all to mark out the limits of villages, then to measure the fields, fit them into the map, classify the soils, and then to make the settlements. But by 1862 only about one-third of Sindh had been surveyed in this way at a cost of 8 lakhs, and no settlements had, been made. In 1862 a Settlement Officer was appointed from Bombay to draw up a regular scheme of classification of soils and settlement, and between that date and 1864-65 the "Original Settlements" were introduced. These original settlements were the last step in the Deecanisation of the Sindh system. Under them, land was classified with reference both to soil and water supply and by adopting the "diffused rate" system Sindh was made to conform to the Bombay practice under which land revenue was livable every year on all land. The land was divided into large survey numbers, of each of which it was assumed that a certain proportion would remain fallow each year, and a rate of assessment which took this proportion of fallow into consideration, was livable on each number each year. The system broke down because zamindars cultivated the whole of a survey number in one year without any fallow, thus paying a very light acreage assessment, and then relinquished the number entirely in the years in which it lay fallow, taking up and cultivating other vacant land in its place in the same way. Thus these original settlements proved so detrimental to the revenue that they had to be abandoned, and in 1875 the "Revision Settlements" were introduced.

12. Under the Revision Settlements smaller survey numbers were formed, classified according to soil and irrigation, and an assessment fixed on each survey number to be paid only when the number was cultivated. The zamindar was allowed to retain a lien over his lands during a certain prescribed fallow period which varied from one fallow in four years for rice to three fallows in four years for *kharif* lift lands.

But Sindh settlement officers had not yet shaken themselves free from the influence of the Bombay system, which demanded a detailed soil classification. The time taken by these soil classifications was so great that the introduction of the revision settlements was delayed to the detriment of Government revenue, and this fact led to the introduction of the Temporary Settlement, introduced experimentally in 1881.

13. Under the Temporary Settlement the detailed classification for soil and water was abandoned, and rates of assessment were fixed according to the source and mode of irrigation immediately on the conclusion of survey operations in a taluka. The Temporary Settlements proved very acceptable to the zamindars and led to a great increase of cultivation and so to increased revenue. The name was changed from Temporary to "Irrigational Settlement" and although the rules regarding them have since been modified from time to time, the system remains substantially unchanged, and these irrigational settlements, revised from time to time, are in force in Sindh today.

The only vestige of the old soil classification retained in Sindh settlements today is in the grouping. The villages of a taluka are in a modern settlement frequently classified into two or more groups, and quality of soil is one of the factors that enters into grouping. But the group is a large unit, sometimes embracing the whole or the greater part of a taluka, and no attempt at detailed soil survey is made.

14. The more recent history of the detailed soil survey may be given here. When the Sukkur Barrage Project was seriously taken up fifteen years ago, it became necessary to ascertain what proportion of the vacant lands which would be brought under command were cultivable lands, and whether they were of good or indifferent quality. The records of the old classification by the Sindh Survey Settlement Department were in many cases available, but on examination the work was found to have been so badly done that there was no alternative but to do it over again. Government therefore in 1917-18 appointed Mr. C. M. Baker and Mr. C. M. Lane to make a new classification of the unoccupied lands which would come under the Sukkur Barrage Canals. They spent two seasons over the work, the land being only roughly classified as good, poor but cultivable, cultivable only with rice, and uncultivable. Mr. Baker, at least, had an unrivalled knowledge of Sindh soils, but he had to work with a large staff of classers whose qualifications for the work were not great.

While the classification has proved of great value for the purpose for which it was undertaken, it is undoubtedly more reliable in its broad results than in its details. The correct classification at sight of Sindh soils is really a very difficult matter, upon which expert Sindh zamindars will frequently disagree or will be unwilling to give a definite opinion.

15. Mr. Baker, however, was still of opinion that it might be possible to carry out, at a reasonable cost, a detailed number to number soil survey which might form the basis of settlement operations. Fortunately he was permitted by Government to put this to a test, and in 1922-23/1924-25, he attempted to carry out a detailed survey of two talukas, one (Labdaria) selected because it was thought to be particularly easy, and the other (Kandiaro) as being a difficult one. In both cases Mr. Baker himself came to the conclusion that the task was an impossible one, and Government have apparently

acquiesced in his conclusion. The question of making Sindh assessments depend on a detailed soil classification is not likely to be revived in the near future by anyone having knowledge of the intrinsic difficulty of the operation.

16. The influence of the Bombay land revenue system on that of Sindh, as already pointed out, has led to the fact being obscured that the Government assessment in Sindh, deriving from Talpur practice, was based on Government's rights to a definite share of the produce. The assessments fixed by the officers of the old Sindh Survey Department seem to have based on the facts as they found them, corrected by reference to no clear principles. Collectors of districts, regarding the officers of the Survey Department as experts, formally forwarded their settlement reports to Government without any critical review of their proposals. As time passed and talukas came under resettlement, the settlement officer merely based his proposals on the last report, assuming that that must at any rate have been all right at the time that it was written.

17. Sir Evan James, who was Commissioner in Sindh from 1891 to 1900, was less willing than his predecessors to accept the recommendations, often entirely unsupported by reasons, of the Survey Officers, and began to reject their proposals and to give the work to young civilians to do afresh. One of the first officers of the Indian Civil Service to be given such a task was Mr. C. M. Baker, who has stated that all the advice he got from his Collector on the subject was "just put on four annas all round — that's what they mean by revising a settlement." No clear principles were laid down for the guidance of officers, and the general result has been that, though later settlement reports are often full of valuable information bearing on the economic condition of the taluka with which they deal, there has been no clear nexus between this information and the rates imposed, which have usually been fixed arbitrarily, either with reference to the rates prevailing in the expiring settlement, as by comparison with the rates in force in adjoining talukas. If the general condition of the taluka appeared to be prosperous, rates were put up by a few annas, without much consideration of why they should not be put up by as many rupees: if the general prosperity of the taluka appeared to be declining, rates were put down a few annas, without enquiry whether a far greater decrease was not necessary to arrest the decay. As the general trend during the period has been one of increasing prosperity and rising prices, the process has generally meant a decrease in Government's share of the produce with a general acceptance by the zamindar of the arbitrariness of assessments which has told in his favor. Thus the whole pitch of assessments in Sindh has become very low, whether they are compared with those levied on similarly canal irrigated lands in the Punjab or with those levied in the rainfall irrigated lands of the Deccan and Gujrat. At the same time, while the assessment on most lands has become far too low, owing to the natural timidity of settlement officers who have had no clear principle to guide them, the assessment on some lands has for the same reason remained too high. Thus the *rabi barani* rate fixed in the Sakrand Settlement which was in force from 1890 to 1921 was the

absurdly high one of Rs. 2-4-0 per acre, and was actually the same as the rice rate for the same group.

18. This lack of guiding principle has not of course remained unnoticed by all the settlement officers whom they should have directed. Mr. Baker in his proposals for the settlement of the Jacobabad taluka, submitted in 1905, attached a statement of the results of crop experiments with a calculation of what the assessments would be if fixed in each case at 40 percent of the *khatedar's* net assets, which he considered to be a fair rate. Though his report makes it clear that he tested his rates with reference to this statement, he did not press for any general adoption of the 40 percent standard, and the Commissioner in Sindh's forwarding letter makes no mention of this standard, and indeed proposed variations, which were accepted by Government, in the direction of reducing the lift rate "by 4 annas all round", and increasing the *bosi* rate by "4 annas all round".

19. In 1909, Mr. Covernton submitted settlement proposals for the Dadu taluka on which Mr. Baker, then Collector of Larkana, wrote as follows: —

> "Instead of evolving the settlement rates from his inner consciousness in the old-fashioned way, Mr. Covernton has followed a more practical method. He has taken the trouble to find out what the crops are really worth to the zamindar, and then fixed, or at least tested his rates by reference to the figures thus arrived at, his assumption being that the assessment should be about one-third of the net produce (in other words of the zamindar's share). The question is whether this assumption is justified. There are no Government orders as to what the standard should he, and I believe no other Sindh Settlement Officer except myself has ever considered the question. The standard on which I used to base calculations was 2/5ths of the zamindari share; but I regarded that rather as a maximum and tried to keep well within it."
>
> "In the zamindari provinces of India the standard is commonly half or two-fifths of the zamindars assets. But then these assets are mostly in the form of cash rents, and the figures represent what the zamindar actually gets. In Sindh our figures can only be estimates and averages, and we must have one rate for bad fields and good fields in the same *deh*. It follows that our standard must be lower."
>
> "Mr. Covernton's standard of l/3rd, which has the advantage of differing little from prevailing rates in Sindh, seems to me a fair one. It is true that the Mirs took l/3rd of the gross produce as it really was each year; they did not attempt to take in a bad year l/3rd of what the gross produce would be in a normal year. Besides the high rate was a good deal toned down by concessions on one side and peculation on the other."

Neither the Commissioner in Sindh in forwarding this report to Government nor Government in passing its orders, made any reference whatever to the standard with reference to which the rates purported to have been fixed.

One further quotation may be given. Mr. Hudson, as Collector of Larkana, forwarding the Mehar settlement report in 1915, said: —

> "What we must be guided by is the main problem that confronts all Sindh Settlement Officers. A perusal of many of the reports would lead one to believe that the usual method is to presume that the existing rates were divinely inspired at the time of their introduction, and that all the Settlement Officer has to do is to add a little or substract a little to suit any improvement or deterioration that has taken place since they were introduced. This is quite an easy way of doing it, but it presupposes a great deal, especially when one remembers that the old Settlement Officers frequently gave no reasons whatever for their 'inspired' rates. In the case of Dadu, Mr. Covernton adopted a more scientific method. He endeavored to find out what the crops were really worth to the zamindar, and *assumed* that one-third of the net produce was the proper assessment rate. His rates were accepted, but though the Collector (Mr. Baker) drew special attention to this novel method, neither the Commissioner nor Government expressed approval of the method or explicitly ratified the assumption that Government's share should be one-third. Personally I think the method an infinitely preferable one to the old-fashioned way (which Mr. Baker described as 'evolving the settlement rates from one's inner consciousness') but it requires in my opinion a mass of reliable data in the form of crop experiments which are not available in the present case."

But again neither the Commissioner in Sindh nor Government made any reference to Mr. Hudson's implied criticism of their reticence, and both the Commissioner's forwarding letter and Government's order of sanction were silent regarding the standard with reference to which settlement rates ought to be fixed.

21. It may here be stated that there is among the Commissioner's Special Circulars one that purports to lay down instructions for the guidance of Settlement Officers. This also is silent on the one vital point of what the Government share should be, though there is one passage in which the 40 percent standard is hinted at. The passage runs. "Thus if there are two groups A and B, and in A the ratio of existing assessments to rents appears to be 40 percent while in B it appears to be 25 percent, it will be necessary (other things being equal) to propose enhancements for group A with much greater caution and circumspection than in group B. And the Settlement Officer should always record, for the information of Government, what he considers to be the ratio of incidence of his proposed assessments on the rents as ascertained by him."

22. The preceding paragraphs may now be summarized. The Talpurs levied a definite share of the gross produce as land revenue. In the earlier period of British administration the severity of the Talpur system was much mitigated, but owing to the influence of officers familiar with the Bombay land revenue system the basis of the system became obscured. Mr. Baker and other officers who have followed him, in their search for a reasonable basis for assessments have gone back to the Talpur claim of a definite share of the produce, but have substituted a percentage of the net produce to the zamindar for the old claim of a share of the gross produce of the field. The principle brought forward by Mr. Baker in 1905, was that the maximum assessment to be levied from the zamindar should be 40 percent of the zamindar 's net produce. Although in the absence of any declaration of Government's views on the matter, later settlement officers have not always considered it obligatory to follow this principle, yet those who have tried to base their rates on any definite principle have followed this, it may now be said that Government by their continued acceptance of settlement proposals based on this principle have accepted the principle, which is now part of the settlement law of Sindh.

23. Nor does it seem that any acceptable basis can be found for Sindh rates of assessment except by a reversion to Talpur practice in asserting Government's right to a definite share of the produce. It has been shown in the early part of this note that the Talpur share was a share varying from one-half to one-fourth of the gross produce of the field (not a share of the net produce or of the zamindar's share only). If the question he raised of the amount of the share to which Government may justifiably lay claim, no Sindh zamindar is likely to appeal to Talpur precedents; the Talpur assessments were obviously heavy, as may be seen by a reference to modern assessments in Khairpur State where the old practice has remained in essentials unimpaired. Yet Talpur practice would appear to be the only thing to which a Sindh zamindar objecting to the standards fixed by Government in Sindh could legitimately appeal.

24. The determination of "The net assets" of the zamindar in Sindh does not present the same difficulties as in the Presidency proper, nor is it necessary to discuss whether for that phrase might not be more fitly substituted "profits of agriculture", "rent" or "annual value". Owing to practically universal prevalence in Sindh of produce rents the term net assets is one that is readily understood and the net assets are capable of sufficiently precise determination. The zamindar gets as his rent from the cultivator a definite share of the produce, anti the few expenses such as clearance borne by the zamindar are similarly fixed by custom and can be readily estimated. The determination of the net assets is therefore almost entirely a matter of keeping and tabulating proper data of the outrun of crops and the movements of prices. The principal matter to which attention must be devoted in Sindh if settlement proposals are to be put on a satisfactory basis is the preparation and constant maintenance of a reliable record of outturns and prices.

APPENDIX J.

Statement showing average whole-sale prices per maund of principal agricultural commodities in the Barrage Talukas in Sindh for the four periods.

Period.	Paddy.			Cotton.			Juar.			Bajri.			Wheat.			Oil-seeds.		
	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
1928-29	3	9	0	10	13	0	4	0	0	5	4	0	5	14	0	7	3	0
1930-31	1	14	0	5	6	0	2	0	0	2	15	0	2	7	0	3	0	0
Jan-32	1	8	0	8	10	0	2	0	0	2	7	0	2	14	0	3	11	0
Apr-32	1	8	0	6	3	0	1	0	0	2	4	0	2	5	0	3	3	0

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