

THE MUSLIMS OF THE PUNJAB AND THEIR POLITICS, 1936-1947

by
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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is concerned mainly with the political development of the Muslims in the Punjab during the years 1936 to 1947, though it takes into account certain aspects of their socio-economic life, mainly as a background to the political study. For this purpose an examination has been conducted into the degree to which Muslims participated in the economic life of the Province in comparison to the other two major communities in the Punjab (Hindu and Sikh), with particular reference to the areas of land-ownership, finance and debt, industry, education and the public services.

The political analysis contained in this work is largely confined to the struggle for supremacy which occurred between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League from 1936 onwards. This period, for the purpose of the study, has been divided into four main sections - the election of 1937, the Ministries of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, and the election of 1946. During each phase the changing fortunes of the two contenders (the Unionist Party and the Muslim League) are recorded and discussed in the light of provincial and national developments. Thereby the thesis embraces the decline of Unionism, and the eventual triumph of the League at the polls in 1946, whilst.

analyzing those factors which frustrated and fostered the growth of Muslim nationalism (as expressed in the demand for 'Pakistan') in the Punjab. The thesis concludes by considering the events which prevented the Muslim League from realizing power following its election victory in 1946, and by examining the periods of coalition government and Governor's rule immediately prior to Partition.

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GLOSSARY

Bajra	A food-grain, being a species of millet.
Crore	10,000,000.
Darbari	A member of a Darbar, i.e. a court, audience or levee.
Doab	A tract of land lying between two rivers.
Fiqah	Islamic jurisprudence.
Gaddi	A throne or seat.
Ghee	Clarified butter.
Gram	The term usually referred to varieties of pulse, notably the chick-pea.
Gurdwara	Sikh temple.
Hadis	The traditional sayings and doings of the Prophet Mohammad.
Hakim	Physician.
Hartal	Strike.
Inamdar	The holder of a rent-free grant of land.
Jagirdar	Holder of a revenue-free grant of land. Usually the recipient received the award in recognition for service to the Government.
Jehad	Holy war.
Jirga	Council of elders.
Jowar	A species of millet, sown in July and reaped in November and December.
Kalima	Islamic creed.
Kanungo	Revenue official operating both at village and District level. This officer usually kept the records relating to the value, tenure, extent and transfers of holdings, and assisted in the measurement and survey of agricultural land.
Lakh	100,000.
Lambardar	A village headman. Mantras - Prayers.
Maulvi	A learned man or teacher (especially of Arabic), an expounder of Islamic law.
Maund	A weight equal to approximately 84 lbs.
Mian	A term of respect, similar to 'sir' or 'master' applied to an old or respected person.
'Muhhaqqaq'	Researcher.
Mullah	A religious teacher or learned man.
Munshi	A writer or secretary; the term was often applied by Europeans to teachers and interpreters of Persian.
Nawab	During Moghul rule this title was conferred on a Governor of a Province. Under British rule, however, it became merely a term applied to men of high social rank, no office being attached to it.

Pachotra	Village headman's fee.
Patwari	Village accountant, whose duty it was to keep and produce, when required by government revenue officers, all accounts relating to lands, produce, cultivation, changes of ownership, and past assessments of the village.
Rais	Head of an old-established family, landed gentleman, Chief.
Rabi	The spring harvest; the grain was usually sown in October and November and harvested between March and May.
Sajjada Nashin	Successor to the Saint.
Sufedposh	Village dignitary.
Tahsildar	A Revenue Collector.
Thal	Grazing groundaviae,
Tumandar	A tribal chief.
Ulema	Religious leaders.
Zamindar	A landowner. In the Punjab the term specifically applied to a cultivating proprietor.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.G.	Agent to the Governor-General (Punjab States).
A.I.M.L.	All-India Muslim League.
AR.	Assessment Report.
B. and R. Br.	Bridges and Roads Branch (Public Works Department).
C.I.F.	Commander, Order of the Indian Empire.
Comm.	Commissioner.
D.C.	District Commissioner.
DG.	District Gazetteer.
D.I.G.	Deputy Inspector General (of Police).
Div.	Division.
E.A.C.	Extra Assistant Commissioner.
G. of I.	Government of India.
Gov. Gen.	Governor-General.
GR.	Governor's Reports.
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government.
I & B.	Information and Broadcasting.
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service.
I.O.	India Office.
IOL.	India Office Library, London.
IOR,	India Office Records, India Office Library, London.
M.L.A.	Member of the Legislative Assembly.
M.L.C.	Member of the Legislative Council.
N.D.C.	National Defence Council.
N.L.	Newspaper Library (British Library), Colindale.
N.W.F.P.	The North-West Frontier Province.
N.W.P.	North-West Provinces.
Offg. Sec.	Officiating Secretary.
Parl. Board	All-India Muslim League Parliamentary Board.
PBRL.	Punjab Government Board of Revenue Library, Lahore.
PEP.	Punjab Education Proceedings.
PER.	Punjab Education Reports.
PGRC.	Pakistan Government Research Centre, Lahore.
PGSL.	Punjab Government Secretariat Library and Archives, Lahore.
PHCL.	Punjab High Court Library, Lahore.
P.N.P.P.	Punjab Nationalist Progressive Party.
PPA.	Punjab Press Abstracts, Punjab Government Secretariat Library, Lahore.
PPL.	Punjab Public Library, Lahore.
P.W.D.	Public Works Department.
S. and G. Dept.	Services and General Department.
Sec.of	State Secretary of State for India.

SOAS Lib. School of Oriental and African Studies, Library.
SR. Settlement Report.
U.P. The United Provinces.
U.Sec. Under Secretary.
U.Sec of State Under Secretary of State for India.
U.T.C. University Officers Training Corps.

INTRODUCTION

Had the All-India Muslim League failed to secure the support of the political and religious leaders of the Punjab's thirteen and a half million Muslims Pakistan, in all probability, would never have been realized as an independent and sovereign nation. The vast majority of the Muslim political and religious elites, together with the Muslim electorate, however, drawn by the vision of a Muslim home-land, which seemed to promise not only an Islamic haven but also a state in which Muslims would prosper economically and socially, pledged their allegiance to the Muslim League, as was convincingly demonstrated by the 1946 elections. A variety of factors had influenced that outcome: an Islamic state as epitomized by 'Pakistan' appealed to the pious and God-fearing, whilst a nation in which Muslims were to be dominant held obvious attractions for the more materialistic and ambitious amongst the 'Believers', especially as in the future all political and economic power would reside in Muslim hands. Yet a decade earlier Muslim nationalism had failed to excite or attract the Muslim leadership of the day in the Punjab, the Province's political life having been dominated by provincial considerations as personified by the Unionist Party. In fact none of the Unionist Party's Muslim leaders - Fazl-i-Husain, Sikander Hyat Khan, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana - believed in the desirability of communal politics or a Muslim state. Thus the Muslim League's success in the Punjab culminated only after nine years of struggle to undermine the influence of Unionism and to persuade the large landed Muslim magnates who dominated and led the Unionist Party to forsake it in favor of the Muslim League and 'Pakistan'. It is the aim of this thesis, therefore, to analyze the dramatic change which occurred in the political alliances and loyalties of Muslims in the Punjab in the period 1936 to 1947, whilst at the same time attempting to place the events of those years in social and economic perspective.

Before the British occupation in 1849 the Punjab lying in the north-west corner of India had for centuries provided the route whereby virtually every foreign invader of Hindustan had assailed the country. The most dramatic effect of this process had been the establishment of the political ascendancy of Islam in certain parts of the Province as early as the tenth century A.D.. By the nineteenth century Islam had emerged as the dominant religion in the region. The

spread of Islam and the continued existence of Hinduism, the dominance of which it had broken, led to a coexistence of faiths which at times was decidedly uneasy. This in turn prompted Guru Nanak (1469-1539), the founder of Sikhism, to preach a new religion which sought to incorporate the most appealing elements of Islam and Hinduism. Whilst the Sikh religion did attract a substantial following it never rivaled in numbers either Islam or Hinduism, though for a while it did play a dominant political role in the Punjab, and until the end of British rule the Sikhs enjoyed an economic

importance far in excess of their population status. As a consequence of these religious developments the twentieth century Punjab was largely inhabited by the members of three main communities - Muslim, Hindu and Sikh - whose adherents frequently shared a common racial or tribal ancestry and identity, as in the case of the Rajputs and Jats. Despite past common ties, however, all three religious groups radically divided Punjabi society. In the case of the Muslims the religious divisions or differences, which identified them as a separate community, were made all the more poignant by the fact that by the late nineteenth and twentieth century's a more marked degree of poverty and lack of opportunity also distinguished the average Muslim from his non-Muslim neighbors in the Province.

Thus in spite of the presence of a small class of extremely wealthy Muslim zamindars who controlled vast tracts of land principally in the western portion of the Province, the Muslims as a whole represented an economically depressed section of society in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs. Their numerical superiority had not spawned a similar dominance in such areas as land ownership, credit, commerce and industry, or in the realms of education, the professions and government service. A number of factors had coalesced to mould the Muslim condition. The collapse of Mughal power in India in the eighteenth century removed the advantages the Muslim Empire had afforded its Muslim subjects, whilst the political ascendancy of the Sikhs in the Punjab (1772-1849) resulted in substantial tracts of land passing from Muslim to non-Muslim hands. The advent of British rule in 1849 merely accelerated this trend, not because of deliberate government policy, but as the inescapable consequence of the laws and customs the British introduced concerning land ownership, the payment of land revenue, and the repayment of mortgage debts. The changes led to a considerable rise in the value of land, which in turn made the money-lenders extremely anxious to acquire control over it. British rule further aided their designs in that law courts frequently forced peasant cultivators and large landowners alike to forfeit their land if they defaulted in the payment of interest, often compounded, on the loans they had secured. The money-lender, therefore, graduated from his traditional role as village accountant and financier, to become a major investor in land, his gains having been made largely at the expense of Muslim agriculturists. The overwhelming majority of money-lenders were Hindus drawn principally from the Bania, Khatri and Arora castes, though from the beginning of the twentieth century Sikh money-lenders also began to come into prominence particularly in the rural areas.¹ The Hindus and Sikhs, by the 1930's and 1940's, controlled approximately half of the agricultural resources of the Province. In addition the Hindus dominated the industrial and commercial spheres, and the civic, economic and educational life of the Punjab (see chapters I, II and III).

¹ M.L. Darling, *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*, London, 1925, pp. 212-213; Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. 1, Lahore, 1930, pp. 22, 138, 223, 310-312, PPL.

Education under British rule had taken on a western direction and flavor; the indigenous system of learning which had largely been under Muslim control had been denigrated and replaced. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Muslim attitude was lukewarm especially as western educational practices were often regarded as offensive to their religious and moral values. Also the greater degree of poverty which existed amongst Muslims as a whole restricted their entry into government schools and institutions. By contrast the Hindus and Sikhs were less affected by cultural and pecuniary considerations, and they responded to the new educational order with a far greater degree of vigor and enthusiasm. Though the British, in the closing years of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, did attempt to make the learning process more economically accessible to Muslims no serious steps were taken to appease their cultural objections. The result was that throughout the British period Muslims lagged behind Hindus and Sikhs, most particularly at the higher stages of education, as was reflected by their low level of participation in the professions and government service generally.

Despite the comparative economic and educational backwardness of the community, however, the Muslim landed elite played a prominent role in the political life of the Punjab in the twentieth century. This resulted from a number of factors. To begin with the Paramount Power desired to ally itself firmly with the landed aristocracy and squirearchy of the Province as a means of entrenching its own position. That strategy found expression in the Land Alienation Act of 1901, whereby the British in effect protected all landowners, of whom the large Muslim magnates of the western Punjab were the most influential, from losing land and thereby power to the traditional money-lending castes.² Furthermore as the process of limited democratization accelerated during the course of the twentieth century the influence of the large zamindars was translated into political power. The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 by recognizing the pre-dominant rural composition of the Punjab dictated that in future the rural block and leadership, namely the large and powerful landowners, should monopolize political power. Muslims as such, however, were denied a statutory majority to which their population status would otherwise have entitled them, a factor which prompted Fazl-i-Husain in 1923 to found the Unionist Party - a political structure which by promising to advance the interests of the rural community and its leaders sought to attract sufficient non-Muslim adherents to permit the rural Muslim leadership, in coalition with their non-Muslim allies, to dominate the Legislature in the Province. Its class interests, therefore, overrode any communal appeal, as was apparent from the fact that the Party adopted and espoused a non-communal philosophy. By the late 1930's and the early 1940's, however, national politics began to intrude into the Punjab, eventually eroding the Unionist Party's non-communal stance.

² N.G. Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900*, Duke University, 1966, pp. 89-90; M.L. Darling, op. cit., p. 187; *Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30*, op. cit., p. 133, PPL.

The imminence of the 1937 elections caused Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League to woo provincial Muslim leaders to pledge their support to the League in order to improve League prospects at the polls and to transform it into a truly national organization. Jinnah's overtures for cooperation were rejected by the Unionist leadership which feared that any intrusion by the League into Punjabi politics would encourage the growth of factionalism in Muslim Unionist ranks.³ Furthermore the Unionists, dependent as they were upon non-Muslim cooperation, could not afford to subscribe to the communal creed of the Muslim League. Consequently in 1937 the Muslim Punjab following the dictates of its Unionist leaders forcibly rejected Jinnah and the League.⁴ Unionist ascendancy, however, did not prohibit Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Unionist Premier, from seeking a rapprochement with Jinnah in October 1937 (Sikander-Jinnah Pact). Recognizing the potential of the Muslim League to ferment future divisions amongst his Muslim supporters he sought to curtail that threat by gaining control of any future League organization in the Province, whilst at the same time assisting the League to safeguard wider Muslim interests in India as a whole. Ambition also helped to spawn Sikander's actions, desirous as he was for a national role for himself.

Sikander's national ambitions, however, were doomed to failure. Jinnah was determined that the Muslim League should not remain subordinate to the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and that he should continue at the helm of Muslim national affairs. A number of inter-related events greatly influenced the outcome of this contest, and ultimately favored Jinnah. The outbreak of war in 1939 led the Indian National Congress to demand India's immediate independence as the price the British should pay to secure the country's cooperation in the prosecution of the war.⁵ Such a development was unwelcome to the Muslim League and the British; the League was totally opposed to majority rule as it would have placed the future of the Muslim community in the hands of the Hindu controlled Congress, whilst the British had no intention of forfeiting their great Asiatic reservoir of manpower and raw materials, at least for the duration of the war. As a result Jinnah and Linlithgow, the Viceroy (1936-1943), entered into a secret pact designed to protect their respective positions from the Congress challenge. The outcome was that both sought to establish that the Congress alone could not make constitutional demands in the name of India. In March 1940 the All-India Muslim League adopted the potentially popular demand for the establishment of an independent Muslim state or states, and in August 1940 the British insisted that any future constitutional advancement theoretically depended on its acceptance by the minorities - which in practice meant Jinnah's Muslim League. But for

³ Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, Bombay, 1946, p. 308; Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁴ At the 1937 elections the Muslim League captured only two of the 84 Muslim seats as compared to 72 secured by the Unionist Party - Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 75-80, CMD. 5589, IOR; Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 16 Feb. 1937.

⁵ See H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, London, 1969, p. 77.

the Viceroy to continue to frustrate the Congress by stressing that it did not represent certain large and influential groups in India, whose interests could not be ignored, it was essential that the Muslim League should remain united and free from internal wrangling; Linlithgow refused therefore to countenance Sikander's claims for Muslim leadership, or to give the Punjab Premier the assistance he sought to outmaneuver Jinnah.

Despite his eventual failure in the national orbit Sikander proved to be a formidable adversary to Jinnah in the Punjab, as did his Unionist successor as Premier (Dec. 1942) Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana. By the mid-1940's, however, Unionism was fast becoming an obsolete political philosophy which could not compete with the Muslim League's demand for an independent Muslim homeland, or satisfy Muslim aspirations constrained as it was by a non-communal creed. Also the Unionist Party was no longer in a position to guarantee to the large Muslim zamindars, who until that time had provided its most effective support, the power and privileges they demanded in return for their allegiance. Once it became clear that the British were sincere in their determination to abandon their hold on India the powerful Muslim landlords realized that the Muslim League, as one of the probable successors to the British Raj, alone could provide for their interests in the future. The result was an exodus of landed support from Unionist ranks which heralded the final disintegration of the multi-communal party and its philosophy.

As the 1946 elections approached it became increasingly apparent that the Unionists were a spent force; its Muslim leadership had defected in large measure to the Muslim League, and it possessed little or no popular following, the Muslim masses and electorate having been intoxicated to a great extent by the League's promise of 'Pakistan'. The elections in fact were the prelude to disaster in the Punjab. The Unionist Party was decisively routed at the polls. The Muslim League extensively employed religious leaders to legitimize its cause and objectives, and to discredit the Unionists by persuading the Muslim electorate and populace in general that only the League could serve the interests of Muslims and Islam. Such tactics helped to secure a landslide victory for the League, the partition of the Province and India became inevitable and so too did the holocaust that accompanied that 'surgery'.

The division of the Punjab, together with that of Bengal, symbolized the birth-pangs of the infant nation of Pakistan. In the Punjab that process was particularly bloody as the Province was submerged in internecine warfare. Regardless of the horror and brutality which accompanied Partition, however, it is evident that without the inclusion of the western Muslim majority districts of the Punjab, Pakistan as has been stated previously, in all probability would have remained a politicians' dream, and would have failed to achieve a territorial reality. Despite the importance of the Punjab's role in that process the study of the Province's history in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century has been a largely neglected field. Only a limited number of people, notably C.

Baxter,⁶ D. Gilmartin,⁷ Imran Ali,⁸ and I. Talbot,⁹ have attempted to analyze some of the political developments which occurred in these years. Even so none of them have sought to examine Muslim society in depth with regard to their economic, educational and industrial backwardness as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. This is an omission which needs to be rectified for the comparatively retarded Muslim condition, or the realization of it, seems to have played an important part in spurring Muslim separatism in the Punjab. Also in studying the relationships and rivalry which existed between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League no adequate explanation has been given for Sikander's decision to join the Muslim League and to advise his fellow Muslim Unionists to do likewise (Sikander-Jinnah Pact).¹⁰

This is a serious defect considering the importance of that development and the momentous effect it was to have on the future fortunes of the League in the Province. Also Sikander Hyat Khan's national ambitions have been either ignored or neglected, together with the considerations which occasioned them, as has the special relationship which existed between the President of the All-India Muslim League and the Viceroy - a factor which seriously compromised the Unionists and which had a direct effect upon the events which led eventually to the division of the Province. Similarly although Sikander's resignation from the Viceroy's National Defence Council (August 1941) - an episode which emphasized Jinnah's undisputed control over Muslim national politics - has been recognized as an important development, the Punjab Premier's actions in this regard have not been adequately explained.¹¹

In addition the role of Khizar Hayat Khan (Sikander's successor as Premier), who continued his predecessor's policy of attempting to thwart the League in the Punjab, has not been subjected to serious analysis. Again such an oversight merits attention, considering the fact that Khizar was influenced to a great extent by the British Governor of the Province, Sir B. Glancy (see Chapter VI), and that their close relationship was a major factor in frustrating Jinnah's Punjab policy. Furthermore although the vital 1946 elections have been scrutinized, and despite the fact that attention has been drawn to the economic factors which influenced the outcome, and to the support which the Muslim League enjoyed from the Province's Muslim landed and religious leaders, no in-depth study has been undertaken of the degree of official interference, bribery and intimidation which occurred, or of the great impact which the pro-League Firs' threats of divine displeasure and social ostracism had on the Muslim electorate.

⁶ C. Baxter, 'The People's Party Vs. The Punjab "Feudalists"', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, VIII, 1973.

⁷ D. Gilmartin, 'Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab', *Modern Asian Studies*, 13, 1979.

⁸ Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade Before Partition*, Lahore, 1975.

⁹ I.A. Talbot, '*The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab 1937-47*', Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1982.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 155-158; also D. Gilmartin, 522-..cit., pp. 505-506; Imran Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-20.

¹¹ For example Talbot merely states "The reasons for Sikander's climb down are still not fully clear...", I.A. Talbot, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

Finally the period following the 1946 elections, when the League failed to form a Ministry in the Punjab, has been largely neglected, as has the role the British played in the saga of Pakistan. The attitude of the Imperial power was crucial to the prospects for the realization of a Muslim homeland, and thereby to the survival of the Unionist Party. Linlithgow, who was personally opposed to the development, could have poured 'cold water' on the scheme at its conception and thus have seriously compromised the demand, but he failed to do so for fear of undermining his anti-Congress strategy.¹² Wavell (Linlithgow's successor) though anxious that the Pakistan issue should be publicly examined to demonstrate its impracticalities, was prevented from achieving that objective by the vacillating attitude of the Attlee government in Britain. 'Pakistan', therefore, was never fully exposed to the full glare of official and public scrutiny in India, and as such its shortcomings, such as the probable necessity for the division of the Punjab, were never publicly admitted by the League or commented upon by the British. Consequently 'Pakistan' was presented by pro-League Muslim politicians as the panacea for the problems of all sections of Punjabi Muslim society, and the reward for all their ambitions, a factor which contributed in no small measure to the success of its appeal in the Punjab and to the destruction of the Unionist Party.

It is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, to attempt to rectify the omissions which have been referred to above, and to produce a balanced, analytical history of Muslim political development in the Punjab from 1936 to 1947, whilst not neglecting to study and consider the socio-economic disadvantages and pressures which many Muslims were subject to. Such a study is essential for the understanding of the growth and spread of Muslim nationalism and the support for Pakistan which this generated - a process which in the past has been examined all too often with reference solely to the Muslim minority provinces and Bengal.

¹² Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 6 April 1940, MSS.EUR.F.125/19, IOR.

CHAPTER I

THE MUSLIMS OF THE PUNJAB - THE DEPRESSED MAJORITY

The Muslims of the Punjab owed their existence as a community to a common allegiance to Islam. Muslim society constituted a multi-layered structure ranging from a small extremely wealthy elite of very large zamindars or landowners, paying in excess of Rs. 1000 per annum in land revenue charges, to landless laborers. Also included were artisans, industrialists, urban workers, and a literate, professional middle-class. Powerful magnates together with the other categories mentioned above, however, were untypical of Punjabi Muslim society, which was dominated by a peasant class of very small proprietors and tenant farmers: only 3.3% of all the agricultural holdings in the Punjab exceeded 50 acres, the majority were ten acres or less, 25% ranging from one to three acres.¹³ Viewed as a whole, and irrespective of the divisions which existed within it, the Muslim community appears to have been economically backward as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. It is the purpose of this chapter, therefore, to attempt to estimate the investment which Muslims possessed in the Punjab in comparison to the other major groups (Hindus and Sikhs), and to analyze their economic failings. As such the enquiry has not been limited to an examination of a few specific regions and their inhabitants, or of a cross-section of individuals, as either method could easily give rise to distortions, and prove unrepresentative of the picture as a whole.

Punjabi Muslims constituted the largest single community in the Province (excluding the Princely States), accounting for 56% of the population.¹⁴ In common with the other major communities (Hindu and Sikh), the overwhelming number of Muslims occupied the rural areas, where they contributed 59.2% of the rural populace.¹⁵ They formed the majority community in 17 districts in the western portion of the Province Lahore (59%), Gurdaspur (51%), Sialkot (62%), Gujranwala (71%), Sheikhpura (66%), Gujrat (85%), Shahpur (83%), Jhelum (89%), Rawalpindi (83%), Attock (91%), Mianwali (87%), Montgomery (71.5%), Lyallpur (67%), Jhang (84%), Multan (81%), Muzaffargarh (87%), and Dera Ghazi Khan (89%) - whilst they were dominant in Jullundur (44%), Ferozepur (45%) and Amritsar (47%). The Hindus, in contrast, formed the majority in only six districts, all of which fell in the eastern part of the Province - Hissar (65%), Gurgaon (67%), Rohtak (81%), Karnal (66%), Simla (78%) and Kangra (91%) - and constituted the

¹³ H. Calvert, *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1936, pp. 219-220.

¹⁴ Total population, 23,580,852: Muslims, 13,332,460 (56%); Hindus, 5,417,188 (23%); Depressed Classes (Hindus), 1,310,709 (6%); Sikhs, 3,064,144 (13%); Indian Christians, 414,788 (2%): *Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. I*, pp. 2-7, IOR.

¹⁵ Total rural population, 19,763,604: Muslims, 11,702,800 (59.2%); Hindus, 5,202,341 (26.3%); Sikhs, 2,858,463 (14.5%): *ibid.*, Pt. I, p. 98.

most numerous group in two districts - Ambala (47%) and Hoshiarpur (40%). The Sikhs had no clear majority in any district, though they were the predominant communal group in Ludhiana (47%).¹⁶

Despite the numerical superiority which the Muslim community enjoyed, they constituted in the main an economically depressed section of society, though this fact is not always apparent from the 1931 Census (Punjab) returns, viz. occupations. In attempting to conduct a survey based on this source, it should be pointed out that workers, earners, dependents, etc., were classified according to caste and religion, and no distinction was made between the British Punjab and the Punjab States. Thus in considering the position of the Muslims in relation to the Hindus and Sikhs it must be borne in mind that in Punjab as a whole Muslims accounted for 52% of the population, as compared to 30% for Hindus (including Depressed Classes), and 14% for Sikhs.¹⁷ For the purpose of this chapter 41 castes were examined,¹⁸ embracing 24,174,000 individuals,¹⁹ representing 85% of the population of the entire Punjab (British and Princely States).²⁰ Even so in presenting the following findings it must be stressed that the Census provided a rough guide to society, rather than an absolutely accurate analysis; statistics were sometimes faulty, and thereby misleading. Nevertheless the 1931 Census is interesting in that it does provide a general indication of the comparative state of the Muslim community in the 1936-1947 period. As is evident from Appendix A Muslims were active in all the major spheres of provincial economic life, though their degree of participation was often inferior to that of non-Muslims in terms of their percentage of involvement, as compared to their status as the majority community.

Even though they appeared to account for the largest single earning group (52%), the economic demands made on them were much greater than for Hindus and Sikhs, in that Muslims supported the largest number of non-working dependents (see Appendix A). But the 1931 Census suggests that in all but one aspect Muslims dominated the agricultural life of the Province; 54% of all cultivators were drawn from the community, as were 61% of estate managers and agents, planters, forest officers and rent collectors, and 74% of all herdsmen. In the important area of persons living off the rent of land, Muslims were in the minority (49%), whilst at the menial level 55% of all field laborers and 60% of the hunting and fishing community were Muslims (see Appendix A). The comparative superiority which the Muslims exhibited in the majority of these spheres clearly reflected the fact that they were the most numerous group in the rural areas, and that they were not subject to the socio-religious restrictions which caused many high

¹⁶ Percentages calculated from information contained in *ibid.*, Pt. II, Table II, pp. 324-331.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, pp. 290-292.

¹⁸ Aggarwal, Ahir, Arain, Arora, Awan, Bawaria, Biloch, Brahman, Chaman, Chhimba, Chura, Dagi and Koli (one caste), Dhobi, Faqir, Gujjar, Harni, Jat, Jhiwar, Julaha, Kamboh, Kashmiri, Khatri, Kumhar, Lohar, Machhi, Meo, Mirasi, Mochi, Mussalli, Nai, Pakhwara, Kanet, Pathan, Rajput, Saini, Sansi, Sayad, Sheikh, Sunar, Tarkan, and Teli.

¹⁹ Figure calculated from information contained in *Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. I, pp. 366-367, IOR.*

²⁰ The population of the Punjab (British and Princely States) in 1931 was estimated to be 28,490,857: *ibid.*, Pt. II, p. 2.

caste Hindus to avoid direct cultivation, especially ploughing. Even so their position was not as healthy as suggested by the Census returns. In the vital area of land-ownership, which decided to a great extent the community's share of the gross agricultural production and thereby the wealth of the Punjab, Muslims did not control a percentage comparable to their status, either as the principal community in the Province, or the rural areas, as will be demonstrated later.

Turning to the spheres of mineral exploitation and industrial development, the Census is grossly misleading; it suggests that Muslims dominated both (see Appendix A). This misconception results from the fact that owners, managers, and clerks were included in the same category for the purpose of enumeration. In reality the industrial life of the Punjab was largely the reserve of the non-Muslims, particularly the Hindus, in terms of ownership, investment and profit. In the professional field the Muslim position has also been misinterpreted. The Census records that 48% of all lawyers, doctors and teachers were Muslims (see Appendix A). Though this figure indicates that in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs, the Muslims had not achieved a percentage reflecting their majority status, in reality their representation fell far short of this. The Census returns had been greatly exaggerated by the inclusion of bazaar *hakims*, and the indigenous teachers who were attached to every mosque throughout the Province. The reality of the situation is truly revealed when one considers that of the 576 pleaders, drawn from the major communities, who were enrolled on the register of the Punjab High Court between January 1940 and July 1947 only 148 (26%) were Muslims; the remainder comprised 318 Hindus (55%) and 110 Sikhs (19%).²¹ In addition out of a total of 2,122 Indian doctors of medicine practicing in the Province in 1943, whether they were registered under the British Medical Acts, or were graduates of the University of the Punjab, only 560 (26%) were Muslims.²²

With regard to the other categories of occupation included in Appendix A whilst they should be treated with caution, in view of the observations made above, they do appear to be more representative of the Muslim condition; less than 45% of those persons who enjoyed a private income were Muslims, 48% of all domestic servants were recruited from the community, as were 47% of the clerk-cashier group, 68% of the more menial laborers, and 76% of the most social degraded group, consisting of beggars, prostitutes, criminals, and the inmates of jails and asylums. The fact that Muslims were in the minority as recipients of private incomes is consistent with the fact that they did not enjoy the same economic advantages as the non-Muslims, as will be demonstrated in due course. Their minority status as clerks and cashiers, and the predominance they experienced in the laboring ranks reflected that they comprised the most educationally

²¹ Calculated from information contained in Punjab High Court Pleaders Enrolment Register (1939-1957), Lahore, 1957, PHCL.

²² Of the remainder 1,111 (52%) were Hindus, 369 (17%) were Sikhs and 82 (42%) belonged to minority communities. Calculated from information contained in the Punjab Gazette, Part III, October 1943, P10.529-570, PCSL.

backward group in the Province (see Chapter II). In respect of vagrants, etc., it is evident that the enumeration of beggars and prostitutes would prove a difficult, not to say delicate task, to allow for total accuracy, but in the case of criminals, prisoners and lunatics, court, prison and hospital records would facilitate an accurate estimation.

In order that a more realistic appreciation of the contribution made and benefits derived by the Muslim community in the economic life of the Punjab can be made, three specific areas have been chosen for detailed analysis. These consist of land-ownership, money-lending - as a source of both income and debt - and industry. In examining these avenues, particular consideration has been given to the fact that they made vital contributions to the exchequer of the Province, and exercised the greatest influence on the material well-being of the people.

In attempting to calculate the amount of land which the Muslim community owned in the year 1936 to 1947 it has proved necessary to draw on sources, in the form of Assessment Reports, which frequently pre-dated this period, as they contained the most up-to-date records of land-holdings in each district. Unfortunately the assessments were not conducted in sequence, but despite the lack of consistency, in terms of a fixed period of time, it has been possible to arrive at a realistic estimation. Also it should be borne in mind that land-ownership statistics recorded in Assessment Reports were expressed in terms of tribal, rather than religious groupings, though information available in these reports, supplemented by that provided by Settlement Reports and District Gazetteers facilitated a religious categorization. Some inaccuracy, however, must be allowed for in respect of land held by Hindus and Sikhs, as at times the Assessment Reports exhibited a degree of confusion in distinguishing between the two.²³ In respect of Muslim landowners, however, no such difficulties were encountered. The findings of the survey are detailed in Appendices Bi - Biv.

As will be seen each Appendix has been constructed with regard to the information contained in the various assessments, thus Appendix Bi deals with the division of land between Muslim and Sikh owners, as statements concerning the number of Hindu owners were omitted, though it was possible to calculate the amount of land held, and land revenue which they paid; Appendix Bii contains details of the number of land-owners and shareholders, the total area held and the land revenue paid for each community; Appendix Biii deals only with the number of owners and shareholders and total land held; Appendix Biv is restricted to the amount of land held by each community. The information so collated was drawn from every district of the Punjab,

²³ In the Rupar tahsil of the Amhala District, it was reported that the Hindu Jats who owned half the cultivated land in the area were orthodox Sikhs, whilst in the accompanying statement of landownership, the Jats were classified solely as Hindus. Similarly it was estimated that Sikh Jats held 86% of the land in the Moga tahsil of the Ferozepore district, but in the statistical tables they were listed as Hindus. See AR, Rupar Tahsil (Ambala District) 1917, PP. 7, 19-20, Statement No. V, p. vi, P/10264; AR, Moga Tahsil (Ferozepore District) 1912, pp. 12-13, Statement No. V, p.vii, P/1188, IOR.

with the exception of Simla, and as such represents a near total appreciation of the Province.

Even so, as Clive Dewey has explained, throughout the period of British rule the "accuracy of the official agricultural statistics was directly related to the efficiency of the agency through which they were collected". In the Punjab the patwaris were responsible for maintaining the land revenue records of each village. Though technically village servants, in reality they emanated from the highest stratum of village society, belonging to rich peasant families, or those of influential traders and money-lenders. Though the work produced by patwaris was, in theory, scrutinized by their immediate superiors, the kanungoes and tahsildars (revenue assessment officials), errors did occur. As long as village revenues were paid punctually, the statistics prepared by the patwaris remained largely unchecked and unchallenged. Between 1880 and 1914 attempts were made to convert the patwaris into efficient civil servants, but those improvements which were achieved were piecemeal, and the capabilities of individual patwaris continued to vary enormously. The post, in fact, was largely hereditary, thus standards of literacy varied greatly and many of the older officers were unable to comprehend the collation of modern statistics. Efforts were made to improve standards through recruitment, but difficulties were frequently encountered. Members of the mainly Hindu commercial class, the great reservoir of literacy in the Province, were generally reluctant to serve in remote districts, and the British were wary of employing them in large numbers, as they were often absentees who neglected their work, or they used their position to further the expropriation of peasant debtors in favor of their money-lending caste-fellows. Although some improvements were made, they were spasmodic. In the inter-war years the entire land revenue system deteriorated, and the compilation of agricultural statistics was affected by this decline.²⁴

Thus in considering the information which follows it is imperative that it should be regarded as an indication of the communal pattern of land ownership that existed in the Punjab, rather than an absolutely accurate statement of fact.

On the basis of the available information it seems that Muslims owned over 50% of the land in 15 (Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Gujrat, Attock, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali, Jhelum, Jhang, Shahpur, Rawalpindi, Multan, Muzzaffargarh) of the 28 districts examined. All of the former were Muslim majority districts, though in only six of them did the community possess a percentage of the land comparable with, or which exceeded their population ratio at the district level. In the remaining districts where they were numerically dominant - Lahore and Gurdaspur - they held only 31% and 35% of the land respectively, though in Jullundur where they constituted the predominant group, they held a percentage of the land (43%) almost

²⁴ Clive Dewey, "The Agricultural Statistics of the Punjab, 1867-1947" (article), *Bulletin of Quantitative and Computer Methods in South Asian Studies*, No. 2, March, 1974, pp. 3-9.

equivalent to their population status (44%). In only three (Gurgaon, Ludhiana and Karnal) of the eight Muslim minority districts surveyed did Muslims hold a proportion of the land comparable to their population ratios in those areas (see Appendices Bi-Biv). Consequently in the Province as a whole, the Muslim share of land appears not to have been equivalent to their predominant status in the rural areas. At the time of the various assessments the total land farmed in the Punjab, whether cultivated or uncultivated, amounted to 40,850,983 acres exclusive of Shamilat (land held in common by proprietary body of a village), village *abadi* (village sites) and Government property.²⁵

The Muslims representing 59.2% of the rural populace possessed 22,802,355 acres (56%), of which 18,456,209 acres (81% of the total Muslim land holding) were situated in the 15 Muslim majority districts and Jullundur; 10,938,112 acres (27%) was in Hindu hands, the latter accounting for 26.3% of all rural inhabitants; 5,968,920 acres (14.6%) was owned by the Sikh community, which comprised 14.5% of the rural population. Of the remaining land (2.4%) amounting to 1,141,596 acres, ownership was not specified in the district assessment reports in the case of 944,504 acres (2%), whilst 197,092 acres (0.4%) was owned by Christians.²⁶

The Muslim position was even weaker than it appeared to be. By 1936 of all the land situated in Jullundur, and the 15 districts where Muslims possessed the major holding, 11% was subject to usufructuary mortgage (see Appendix C). Whilst it is impossible to discern exactly what percentage of the land so mortgaged was Muslim owned, there is little doubt that Muslim property accounted for most of it, considering that it occurred in those areas where agriculture was Muslim dominated, and that the Muslim community was the most indebted in the Province.²⁷ If one assumes therefore that of the 11% of alienated land, at least 8% was Muslim owned, and translates that percentage to the findings recorded in Appendices Bi-Biv, it is found that 1,894,976 acres of the Muslim land situated in the western districts and Jullundur was probably mortgaged with possession.²⁸ Of the money-lenders who held this land, the majority were almost certainly non-Muslims. From information available in the Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report for 1936, it has been possible to calculate that of the 11% of

²⁵ That this figure represents a reasonable approximation of the amount of land being farmed in the Punjab in the 1936-47 period is clear from the fact that in 1936 it was estimated that 41,711,011 acres (exclusive of Shamilat, village *abadi* and Government property) were privately owned: Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1936, Statement No. III, p. vii, PBRL.

²⁶ Calculated from the findings recorded in Appendices Bi to Biv.

²⁷ Darling estimated that out of a total Provincial debt - secured and unsecured - of Rs. 75 crores, the Muslim community owed between Rs. 50 and Rs. 60 crores: M.L. Darling, *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*, London, 1925, pp. 9-10, 19-20.

²⁸ In the districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Gujrat, Shahpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Mianwali, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Jhang, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan and Jullundur, Muslims appear to have owned 18,456,209 acres out of a total of 23,687,200 acres at the time of the various assessments recorded in Appendices

Bi Biv. Assuming that 8% of the Muslim land was mortgaged with possession, that would involve a total of 1,894,987 acres.

territory mortgaged, 5% was to non-agriculturists and 6% to agriculturists (see Appendix C). Practically all of the former were non-Muslims; in the case of the latter it is not possible to be so specific, though the Punjab Banking Enquiry Committee of 1925 discovered that by and large the majority of agriculturist moneylenders were non-Muslims.²⁹ For the purpose of this study it has been assumed that at least 70% of the mortgaged Muslim land would have been alienated in favor of non-Muslims, thus of the 1,894,976 acres involved, 1,326,483 in all probability would have been held by Hindu and Sikh money-lenders. Therefore out of the entire provincial Muslim holding of 22,802,355 acres, in reality the community was in possession of only approximately 21,475,872 acres, or 51.5% of the entire agricultural land. This figure does not take into account the amount of Muslim land subject to usufructuary mortgage in those districts where non-Muslims held the major portion of the land, as there it is not possible, given the information available, to arrive at an equitable estimation. Even so, given the fact that some Muslim land would have been mortgaged with possession in those areas, it is probable that the amount of land actually farmed by Muslims throughout the Province was even less than the percentage estimated above.

Another factor which detracted from the Muslim position was that despite the fact that the community owned the major portion of the rich canal-colony land (64%),³⁰ in general Muslim land appears to have been less fertile than that in the possession of non-Muslims. On the basis of information available for 20 (Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Gurgaon, Gujrat, Attock, Dera Ghazi Khan, Ambala, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Rohtak, Karnal and Mianwali) of the 28 districts surveyed, it can be seen that whilst Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs owned approximately 55%, 24% and 20% of the land respectively in those areas, the Muslim community accounted for only 48% of the assessed land revenue, as compared to 20% paid by Hindus, and 31% paid by Sikh landowners,³¹ indicating thereby the inferior productivity of the Muslim holdings. Also in respect of all owners paying land revenue charges of, and in excess of Rs. 5 per annum, Muslims were in a minority in all but the lowest category, which suggests that comparatively more Muslims were found in the petty cultivating class than was the case for non-Muslims. Out of 1,398,000 landowners assessed in 1932, Muslims accounted for 50% of the very small owners liable to charges of between Rs. 5 and Rs. 10, 46% of those small

²⁹ An enquiry conducted in 1926-27, concerning 3,526 villages (i.e. 10% of the total number in the Province), revealed that of the 1,988 agriculturists engaged in money-lending in them, 1,033 (52%) were Sikhs, 843 (42.5%) were Hindus, and only 110 (5.5%) were Muslims: Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 192930, Vol. and Lahore Report, 1930, pp. 132 and 309, PPL.

³⁰ Proceedings of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Vol. III, p. 29, PGRC.

	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Not Specified
Land Owned (Acres)	15,444,469 (54.7%)	6,745,015 (23.9%)	5,595,591 (19.8%)	450,831 (1.6%)
Revenue Paid (Rupees)	18,059,354 (48.1%)	7,298,874 (19.5%)	11,719,193 (31.2%)	450,831 (1.2%)

Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in Appendices Bi and Bii.

owners paying between Rs. 10 and Rs. 25, and 48% of those paying Rs. 25 and above (see Appendix D) - a category including medium owners cultivating between 20 and 40 irrigated, or up to 200 unirrigated acres, and large owners who possessed at least 50 acres in a canal-colony or more than 200 acres of unirrigated land.³²

Whilst with regard to the wealthiest section of landowners, records compiled in 1909 demonstrate that despite the existence of vast Muslim owned estates in the western half of the Province, less than 50% of the great landed magnates were Muslims, in that of those wealthy zamindars subject to annual land revenue payments of, and in excess of Rs. 1000 47% (173) were Muslims, 31% (115) were Hindus, 16% (58) were Sikhs and 6% (23) were Christians.³³

The overall pattern of Muslim land-ownership present in the Punjab by the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century was the result in the first place of conquest and conversion, and secondly of the ruthless alienation of land which occurred following the annexation of the Province by the British in 1849. The establishment of Islam began with the intrusion of Arab traders in Multan in the eighth century A.D., receiving impetus from the succession of Muslim invasions which took place from the twelfth to the sixteenth century,³⁴ culminating in the establishment of the Mughal Empire (which included the Punjab, and stretched from Kabul to the borders of Bengal) by Babur³⁵ following his military victories over the Afghan Sultan of Delhi and the Rajput leader Rana Sanga in 1526 and 1527. Though the foundations of Muslim dominance in the western Punjab had already been laid through the activities of determined proselyters in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, including Sheikh Baha-ud-Din Zakaria (b.1182) from Khwarizm and Baba Farid Shakarganj (b.1175). It was the zeal of these spiritual leaders, and those who followed them, which was largely responsible for the conversion of the Hindu agriculturists, rather than the sword of any conqueror.³⁶ For although the Awan, Biloch, Mughal and Pathan tribes all claimed descent from Muslim invaders and colonizers,³⁷ the Muslim Jett and Rajput tribes, which together formed the backbone of the Muslim community in the Punjab, in common with the Ghakars and Gujars had been converted to Islam.³⁸

By the time the Mughal Empire finally disintegrated (1761), and the Punjab first passed under the sway of Pathan, and then Sikh rulers, the Muslims had emerged as the major

³² See Report of the Land Revenue Committee, 1938, Lahore, 1938, p. 8, IOR.

³³ Punjab Government (Home) Proceedings, May 1909, Vol. 8114, IOR.

³⁴ DG, Multan, 1901-02, pp. 24, 29-50.

³⁵ Zahir-Ad-Din Muhammad Babur (1483-1530), first Mughal Emperor of India; following several unsuccessful attempts to seize Samarkand he turned his attention to India. Raids into the country had revealed the existence of growing discontent in the Afghan Sultanate of Delhi against Sultan Ibrahim, and encouraged by an invitation from the Governor of the Punjab, he staged an invasion, culminating in victory at Panipat on 21 April 1526.

³⁶ See DG, Multan, 1901-02, pp. 30-50; The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. I, p. 912, Vol. II, p. 796.

³⁷ S. S. Thorburn, *Musalman and Money-Lenders in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1886, pp. 20-23, 29-30, 32.

³⁸ See S. S. Thorburn op. cit, ibid., pp. 20-23, 29-30, 32; also SR, Jullundur, 1846-51, p. 14, W27/317546, IOR.

numerical group, being most numerous in the western districts, though the community lost both prestige and land during the Sikh period. The Sikhs oppressed those sections of Muslim society which they believed constituted a threat to their power. The Ghakhar tribe in particular suffered from this policy; their leaders were reduced to the position of tenant cultivators. Many of the leading Muslim families and tribes occupying the Cis-Indus area in the Salt Range and in the northern table-land were driven into exile, or forced to accept tenant status.³⁹

The Muslim Rajput aristocracy suffered similar treatment; they were over-taxed, oppressed by Sikh officials; their villages were frequently destroyed and their mosques desecrated. Temple (settlement officer) writing of their plight in Jullundur in the early 1850's concluded that as a result of Sikh persecution the Rajputs in that area had become a "bye-word" for "destitution", as there was hardly a Rajput estate in the district which was not in a state of decay.⁴⁰ Also the policy and class sympathies of Diwan Sawan Mal, appointed by the Sikh government as governor of Multan, resulted in the acquisition by Hindus of large tracts of land by purchase and direct grant in Multan and Jhang.⁴¹ The accumulative effect of these policies resulted in the control of land passing from Muslim to non-Muslim hands.

With the advent of British rule this trend was accelerated, though not as a result of direct Government policy or persecution, but as an inevitable consequence of the introduction of British customs and laws in respect of land-ownership and debt. Indebtedness itself was not a consequence of British rule, the Indian Famine Commission of 1879 considered that the agricultural population of India had not at any known period of their history been generally free from debt.⁴² Prior to the arrival of the British, however, usurers had advanced credit on the security of the crops, not the actual land. Though proprietary rights, with the power to sell or mortgage, had existed in some parts of the Punjab under Sikh rule, the exercise of the right of transfer had been restricted by a number of considerations. Joint-ownership had been far more common in the pre-annexation period, and it was extremely difficult to effect a transfer of property held in common either by groups of individuals, or the village community.⁴³ In addition a more potent impediment existed, land was not viewed as a desirable asset in the pre-British period. The crops were divided on a fifty-fifty basis between the cultivator and the State, thus if the cultivator and the proprietor were different persons, the latter received very little of the division of the harvest.⁴⁴ The State, therefore, frequently absorbed the owners' rental, and they were restricted in making excessive demands on their cultivators because they needed to retain sufficient tenants

³⁹ S.S. Thorburn, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴⁰ SR, Jullundur, 1846-1851, p. 14, V/27/314/546, IOR.

⁴¹ AR, Kabirwala Tahsil (Multan District) 1898, pp. 36-38, P/5609; SR, Jhang, 1874-80, p. 131, V/27/314/546, IOR.

⁴² Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1879, London, 1880, Part II, p. 130, IOR.

⁴³ Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp. 4-5, V/27/313/3, IOR.

⁴⁴ SR, Jullundur, 1846-51, p.27, V/27/314/546, IOR.

to work the land, the result was that land itself "was not a commodity that the possessors of capital desired to purchase." Consequently it was exceedingly difficult to raise a mortgage on land,⁴⁵ as was reflected in the low incidence of mortgages in the Province; immediately prior to British rule it was estimated that only 6% of the whole area of Gurdaspur district had been mortgaged,⁴⁶ whilst in Amritsar district less than 1% of the cultivated area was subject to mortgage.⁴⁷

Under the British all this changed. Following annexation summary settlements were executed in the countryside, under which many of them found to be in cultivating possession of land were treated as proprietors, as a result proprietary rights spread through the Province. At the same time a fixed cash revenue demand was introduced, replacing the elastic assessment practiced by the Sikhs, which had been decided annually on the size of the harvest and paid in kind. These changes had a dramatic effect on rural economics. The fixed assessment, which in good years meant that cultivators were left with a considerable portion of their crop, in that the average demand rarely exceeded 15% to 20% of the harvest,⁴⁸ as compared to 50% levied by the Sikhs, combined with the settled conditions which prevailed in the Province after 1857, and the extension of transport facilities⁴⁹ making markets more accessible, raised both the value of crops and land.⁵⁰ Had the cultivators been experienced in money matters the lessening of the burden of assessed revenue could have worked to their benefit, but ignorance caused surplus money to be squandered, and the failure of a crop often resulted in heavy borrowing to meet the revenue demand.⁵¹

Loans, however, were easily secured, for the introduction of property rights had "made an unconditional gift of a valuable estate to every peasant proprietor in the Punjab", raising his credit from the surplus of an occasional good crop, to the market value of his holding.⁵² Whilst in contrast to Sikh times, the money-lending classes appreciating the new value of land were anxious to make advances on the security of land. Wilson, who conducted the Shahpur settlement of 1887-94, was convinced that the "chief cause of the numerous transfers" in his district "undoubtedly is the great rise in the money value of land, which made the money-lending classes anxious to get hold upon it by advancing money on every opportunity to the improvident Mussalman landowners..."⁵³ The result

⁴⁵ Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp. 4-5, V/27/313/3, IOR.

⁴⁶ SR, Gurdaspur, 1854, p. 13, V/27/314/507, IOR.

⁴⁷ SR, Amritsar, 1856, pp. 13, 15, V/27/314/459, IOR.

⁴⁸ S.S. Thorburn, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

⁴⁹ By the early 1870's 400 miles of railway, 2,750 miles of canal and 1,000 miles of metalled roads had been constructed in the Punjab; M.L. Darling, op. cit., pp. 206-209.

⁵⁰ SR, Jullundur, 1880-86, p. 71, V/27/314/547, IOR.

⁵¹ S.S. Thorburn, op. cit., pp. 73-75.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 49-50.

⁵³ SR, Shahpur, 1887-94, pp.13-14, V/27/314/620, IOR.

often proved disastrous for the peasant cultivators; ignorant of the real value of money, and unable to judge the future consequences of debt, they borrowed heavily.⁵⁴

To the money-lenders the situation offered a hitherto unknown opportunity for exploitation, and they seized it. Prior to 1865 only 23 mortgages with possession had been recorded in the Amritsar tahsil; between 1865 and 1880 that figure increased to 798, whilst by 1900 it stood at 9,645.⁵⁵ Likewise in Gujranwala district prior to 1868 less than 1% of the land had been sold and approximately 1% was mortgaged. During the succeeding 25 years no less than 16.5% of the total area, and 21% of the cultivated area, paying 25% of the revenue demand, had changed hands, either by sale or usufructuary mortgage. 53% of the land sold, and 69% of the land mortgaged had passed into the hands of money-lenders, who by 1894 held 60% of the alienated land, including 13.5% of the total cultivated acreage of the district.⁵⁶

The money-lender had ceased to be merely the village accountant and financier, a role he had fulfilled for centuries,⁵⁷ to emerge as a major investor in land. The rewards such speculation offered were extremely lucrative, as is evident from the fact that between 1881 and 1911 the number of bankers, money-lenders and their dependants in the Province mushroomed from 90,793 to 193,890.⁵⁸ Despite the presence of some Muslim money-lenders in the frontier districts,⁵⁹ usury was opposed to the strict precepts of Islam, which discouraged greater involvement by the community.⁶⁰ The overwhelming majority of money-lenders were Hindus, the 'profession' being dominated by three main castes, the Bania operating principally in the area south of the Sutlej, the Khatri in the central Punjab and the Arora or Kirar, predominating in the west of the province.⁶¹ In general Hindu money-lenders were referred to collectively as 'Banias' (or Bunniahs) or 'Kirars'. These terms were synonymous with, extortion and greed:

"Shylock was a gentleman by the side of Nand Lall Bunniah ... His greed for grain, the shameless effrontery with which he adds 50 percent to a debt, calls the total principal ... with interest at 36 percent per annum ... and cajoles or wearies

⁵⁴ SR, Jullundur, 1880-86, p. 71, V/27/314/547, IOR.

⁵⁵ AR, Amritsar Tahsil (Amritsar District), 1892, p. 73, P/4081, IOR.

⁵⁶ DG, Gujranwala, 1893-94, pp. 83-84, IOR.

⁵⁷ S.S. Thorburn, op. cit., p. 50; SR, Panipat Tahsil and Karnal Parganah, 1872-80, pp. 111-112, V/3382, IOR.

⁵⁸ Census of India, 1881, Punjab, Pt.II, Table XII, p.2; Census of India, 1911, Punjab, Pt. I, p. 514, IOR.

⁵⁹ SR, Dera Ismail Khan, 1872-79, p. 364, V/27/314/482, IOR.

⁶⁰ DG, Multan, 1901-02, p. 190, IOR.

⁶¹ M.L. Darling, op. cit., pp. 212-213; DG, Shahpur, 1883-84, p. 57; DG, Jhelum, 1883-8, p. 44, 75, 90-91; DG, Gujrat, 1883-84, pp. 66-68; DG, Hazara, 1883-84, pp. 111-113; SR, Montgomery, 1868-74, pp. 51-52, V/27/314/583; SR, Muzaffargarh, 1901-03, p. 14, V/27/314/594; SR, Jhang, 1874-80, pp. 50-51, V/27/314/537; SR, Multan, 1873-80, pp. 14-15, Table I, p. lxxxvii, V/27/314/588; SR, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1869-74, p. 46, V/27/314/476; SR, Hazara, 1868-74, P. 85-87, V/27/314/516; SR, Rawalpindi, 1880-87, Table xxxii, p. xxx, V/27/314/613, IOR.

him (the debtor) into mortgaging ... an ancestral plot of good land...have entirely alienated the sympathies of district officers from men of his calling."⁶²

Yet it had been the establishment of British rule that had endowed the money-lending classes with the opportunity to profit from high interest charges, and the power to gain control over land which had been offered as security against a loan.

Under Hindu law, interest on money loans could not exceed the principal, though it did appear that a bond for the amount of the principal and interest not exceeding the principal could bear future interest. During the period of Sikh rule in the Province no creditor could recover as interest more than half the value of the principal in the case of money, or no more than an equivalent amount of principal in the case of produce.⁶³ Conversely British law allowed interest to accumulate without limit. This practice frequently proved ruinous to the debtor. Darling has cited two cases which effectively demonstrate this point. In 1896 a blacksmith of Hissar mortgaged his small plot of land for Rs. 26 at, 37½% interest. By 1906 the debt, without further borrowing, had increased through compound interest to Rs. 500, and in 1918 a court order was obtained whereby the money-lender was to be paid in full. Similarly a Jat peasant over the course of twenty years borrowed Rs. 350, repaying Rs. 450, leaving a balance of Rs. 1,000 outstanding, still to be paid.⁶⁴ Also in the pre-British Punjab, the transfer of ancestral land had been forbidden, thus it could not be seized in lieu of debt.⁶⁵ In contrast following annexation landowners were permitted both by sale and mortgage to transfer either acquired or ancestral property, on the condition that the near relatives of the proprietor, and after them other ancestral shareholders, had the right of pre-emption. If that right was not exercised, the proprietor could sell or mortgage at will.⁶⁶ Furthermore in 1866 the Chief Court had been established in Lahore and a code of civil procedure was introduced whereby all property became liable to attachment and sale in execution of a civil decree. In theory both the civil court and the district officer could avert the compulsory sale of land to meet a debt, if sufficient money could be raised from the land in other ways. In practice, this afforded little protection to those proprietors who were hopelessly burdened by debt.⁶⁷

Punjabi landowners, though predisposed to mortgage land, were loath to lose their proprietary rights. In 1873 the number of voluntary sales recorded in the Province averaged less than 6,000 per annum, only one owner out of every 334 selling his land. The aggregate area of assessed land so transferred annually was less than one acre per square mile. The money-lender, therefore, could not purchase land easily, but the law

⁶² S.S. Thorburn, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶³ Punjab Government (Home) Proceedings, June 1872, p. 459, Vol. 136, 10R.

⁶⁴ M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219.

⁶⁵ Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp. 6-7, V727/313/3, TOR.

⁶⁶ SR, Gujrat, 1870, p. 37, V/27/314/502, IOR.

⁶⁷ M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

gave him the opportunity to acquire it in default of debt. Under the circumstances many loans were advanced purely with the intention of eventually gaining the land: "Mortgage is often considered but one step from sale, and is almost as favorite a mode of investing money as buying outright."⁶⁸ The transfer was frequently effected by charging very high interest rates, and by refusing further credit to borrowers in periods of economic distress, e.g. famine or drought.⁶⁹

British courts provided the vehicle whereby such maneuvers could be realized, Mr. Justice Melvill, commenting in the early 1870's that civil courts were generally oppressive to debtors, and that it was Common for decrees to be given for as much as four times the amount of the principal, land and immovable property being frequently alienated as a result.⁷⁰ The money-lenders' position was strengthened further by the active sympathy of court officials. By 1884 the majority of money cases were decided by Indian judges or Munsifs. They were

"largely recruited from the Bunniah class, and are mostly men of town extraction and of good education. As a body they are ignorant of rural affairs, have no sympathy with agriculturists, and do not thoroughly understand their patois."

The Munsifs, therefore, were often partial:

"the chief function performed by this class of Judge is to terrorize defendants into coming to terms with their Bunniah-plaintiffs. Thus, out of 1,71,651 suits decided by munsifs in 1884, in only 48,177, or 28 percent, were judgments delivered after contest".

The remainder were not contested, either being disposed of by compromise, confession, withdrawal, or dismissal for default.⁷¹

British law in effect gave money-lenders a charter to dispossess their debtors and acquire land, without offering adequate protection to the landowners, who at best were ill-educated, and at worst illiterate. As such they fell easy victims to the moneylenders' wiles. Bonds were frequently drawn up, and the agriculturist, having no knowledge of what they contained, had to rely on verbal assurances, but such bonds were inviolable in the eyes of the law. Also once in debt, cultivators were completely at the mercy of their creditors, because of the system whereby interest was charged and allowed to compound. Interest payments were frequently paid in kind and in following this custom, agriculturist borrowers often failed to receive the true value of their crops,

⁶⁸ Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp. 44-53, V/27/313/3, IOR.

⁶⁹ Government of India Administration Report (Punjab), 1878-79, PP. 54-55, V/10/336, IOR.

⁷⁰ Selections from the Records of the Punjab Government, New Series No. XIII, Lahore, 1876, pp.9-10, V/23/343, IOR.

⁷¹ S.S. Thorborn, op. cit., pp. 129-131, 134.

whilst moneylenders through the manipulation of records, which were frequently falsified, received more than was their due. The opportunities, therefore, for debtors to clear their debts were rare, and as they were more often ignorant of such malpractices, injustices were committed, in effect, with the concurrence of the law.⁷²

The result was that the creditor class, overwhelmingly Hindu in composition, acquired vast tracts of land, either through mortgage with possession, or in default of debts. The victims of these proceedings were all too often Muslims, both in the western and eastern districts of the Province. Though it is not possible to be precise in calculating the effect which this had in reducing the total Muslim land-holding in the Province, it was very substantial as is indicated in the early Settlement and Assessment Reports.

In the Ambala district (East Punjab) between 1855 and 1888 it was estimated that 8½% of the cultivated area had been sold and approximately 14% mortgaged. Professional Hindu money-lenders held half of the mortgaged land in the Rupar and Kharar tahsils, one-third in Ambala and four-fifths in the Naraingarh tahsil, and either as mortgagees or vendors they had acquired practically all the land which had been forced onto the market. These two groups were so wealthy that in the Jagadahri tahsil they paid one-third of the total land revenue, and one-quarter in the Naraingarh and Ambala tahsils. Their economic advance had occurred largely at the expense of the heavily indebted Rajputs, three-quarters of whom were Muslims.⁷³ Similarly in Attock (N.W. Punjab) the Hindus (accounting for only 8.5% of the population by 1930), notably the Khatri, Arora and Brahman castes, who controlled trade and money-lending in the district, had gained possession of Muslim lands through purchase and mortgage: "A few acquired land in Sikh times ... But the great proportion of Hindu interest in land has been acquired by sale or mortgage. More thrifty, patient and far-seeing than the Muhammadan peasant ..." they succeeded "often as the result of accumulated interest on small original debts" in taking possession of substantial areas in the district.⁷⁴ The same process was discernible in Dera Ghazi Khan (S.W. Punjab). Between 1869 and 1897 Hindu financiers gained control over 30% of the land in three of the four tahsils in the district, acquiring property rights to 10% and more of the land in those areas. The vast majority of the property, whether alienated or sold, was or had been Muslim owned.⁷⁵

Muslim lands also passed to Hindu money-lenders in Gujrat district (central Punjab). In the twenty-year period following annexation the acreage owned by Brahmins and Khatri increased by 130%, and that of the Labanahs (Hindus and Sikhs) grew by 80%. These gains occurred largely at the expense of three Muslim tribes - the Syeds, Mughals

⁷² Selections from the Records of the Punjab Government, New Series No. XIII, Lahore, 1876, pp. 9-10, IOR: Note by Lt. Col. H.W.H. Coxe (Commissioner Jullundur), 29 June 1869, Punjab Judicial Proceedings, Nov. 1869, PGS.L.

⁷³ AR, Naraingarh Tahsil (Ambala district), 1888, pp. 20-21, P/3160, IOR.

⁷⁴ DG, Attock, 1930, pp. 115-116, IOR.

⁷⁵ DG, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1898, p. 90, IOR.

and Pathans.⁷⁶ In Gurgaon (S.E. Punjab) up until the 1880's the Muslim Meos had constituted the largest single land-holding tribe owning nearly the whole of the Ferozepur tahsil and the greater part of the Nur tahsil, possessing 387 of the 1,270 villages in the district. They were notoriously thriftless, and extremely poor cultivators, however, and these failings combined with the severe drought of 1877-78 caused them to fall easy victims to the Hindu credit machine. By June 1877 it was believed that 7% of the entire cultivated acreage of the district was mortgaged, rising to 10% in 1883, at least 6% of which was held by Hindus of a non-agriculturist tradition. The gains of this class had occurred largely to the detriment of the Meos, reducing still further the total percentage of land owned by Muslims in the Punjab.⁷⁷

The Muslim community was to suffer an even more serious reversal in Jullundur (N.E. Punjab). In 1849 the Jats, the majority of whom were Muslims, held half the land, and paid half the revenue assessment. Large tracts had also been owned by Muslim Rajputs, Syeds, Mughals, Pathans and Sheikhs, making it primarily a Muslim district in terms of land-ownership. Temple, the Settlement Officer, however, foresaw in 1851 the effect which the combination of debt and British law would have on the land-owning pattern in the district and he was convinced that the Hindu 'Khutrees' would emerge as the major beneficiaries.

"They are both the writers and the merchants of the Punjab. They are sure to thrive and multiply under British rule; as yet they possess but little land, and that little they have acquired by sale, mortgage and suchlike transactions ... many years hence it will be instructive to see whether Khutree proprietorship has, or has not, increased in this Doab."⁷⁸

Evidently Temple would not have been surprised to learn that by 1915-16 Hindus owned 34% of the land in the district, whilst the total Muslim holding had been reduced to 44% (see Appendix Bii). Multan and Muzaffargarh (S.W. Punjab) were two further areas where Muslims experienced serious losses to the Hindu money-lending classes. In Multan Muslim Jats were the principal victims. The land area mortgaged by the quinquennium 1897-98 was more than twice as large as in the quinquennium ending 1877-78, whilst the area sold was four times as large. The area under mortgage at the settlement of 1896-1901 was 272,574 acres, or 50% more than had been mortgaged at the settlement of 1873-80. The area sold in the twenty years between the first (1855-59) and second Settlement (1873-80) stood at 95,251 acres; that sold in the period between the second and third Settlement (1895-1901) was more than three times that amount. Of the land under mortgage by the third Settlement it was estimated that 89% was held by Hindu money-lenders, and of the land sold between 1880 and 1901 it was believed that

⁷⁶ SR, Gujrat, 1870, p. 21, V/27/314/502, IOR.

⁷⁷ DG, Gurgaon, 1883-84, pp. 51-52, Punjab Land Revenue Proceedings, March 1883, pp. 32, 40-41, 48-49, vol. 2009, IOR.

⁷⁸ SR, Jullundur, 1846-51, pp. 13-14, V/27/314/546, IOR.

61% had been acquired by that class. The result was the steady accumulation of land by Hindus: at the first Settlement it had been calculated they had owned 17% of the proprietary area; this had risen to 20.3% at the second, and 26.8% at the third, so that by 1901 they owned half as much land again as they in the early 1870's.⁷⁹ Similarly in Muzaffargarh between 1873 and 1908 14% of the cultivated area had been sold, the alienations being made largely in favor of Hindu money lenders, who by 1908 possessed 20% of the total cultivated acreage in the district. Furthermore they held an additional 8% of the arable acreage on usufructuary mortgage, as compared to 0.8% at the Settlement of 1873-80.⁸⁰

The alienation of land was not confined the examples quoted above, it was widespread throughout the Province, and increasing with each successive year.⁸¹ By 1877-78 it was estimated that 7% of the total agricultural acreage of the Punjab had been mortgaged; in 1874-75 alone 32,000 acres had been bought by money-lenders, and 119,000 taken on mortgage, and in 1892-93 money-lenders acquired 153,000 acres through sales, and 223,000 acres through mortgage.⁸² Whilst in the twelve month period 1899 to 1900, a total of 674,014 acres, which included 491,089 cultivated acres, had either been mortgaged with possession, or claimed by creditors in lieu of debts.⁸³

The major feature of this accumulative alienation was that the total Hindu land holding in the Province expanded largely at the cost of the Muslim cultivating body. As such the process played a significant role in shaping the land-ownership pattern current in the Punjab in the first four and a half decades of the twentieth century.

The expropriation continued unabated in the Punjab for almost fifty years following annexation. Though it had been recognized as a feature of provincial life from the earliest years of British rule, official opinion had been divided over whether it constituted an acceptable or retrograde trend, and whether measures should be adopted to control it.⁸⁴ Some officers like Melvill, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala from 1858 believed that the takeover of land by capitalists should not be discouraged as it would lead to more efficient cultivation, thereby increasing its revenue potential. Others, however, including Arthur Brandreth, the Commissioner of the Multan Division warned that the unabated alienation of land could have grave political consequences for the British, in that it could cost them the traditional loyalty of the landed classes. The controversy was only finally resolved in 1901 with the passing of

⁷⁹ Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1868-69, p. 53, V/24/2466; AR, Lodhran Tahsil (Multan district), 1878, pp. 2-3, 6-7; DG, Multan, 1901-02, p. 190, IOR.

⁸⁰ DG, Muzaffargarh, 1908, p. 113, IOR.

⁸¹ See Punjab Land Revenue Administration Reports, 1871-77, p. 79, V/24/2467; DG, Sialkot, 1894-95, p. 101; DG, Hissar, 1915, pp. 167-168, IOR.

⁸² Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, p. 44, 249, V/-27/313/3, IOR.

⁸³ Government of India Administration Report (Punjab) 1899-1900, Appendix 9, p. xxx, 11/10/357, IOR.

⁸⁴ For a full discussion of official opinion in the period up to 1901 see P.H.M. van den Dungen, *The Punjab Tradition*, London, 1972, Chapters II and III, pp. 42-195.

the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. The Government of India in enacting the measure had finally been convinced by the political argument, for although it hoped that it would improve the peasants' plight, the Act's primary purpose was to safeguard British interests and to cultivate the continuing support of the rural populace against the spread of Congress inspired nationalist agitation.⁸⁵

The most important provisions of the Act, which was designed to prevent proprietors being expropriated by money-lenders, divided the Punjabi tribes into agriculturist and non-agriculturist categories, the latter including Banias, Aroras and Khattris. Non-agriculturists were forbidden to buy land from agriculturists, nor could they take it on mortgage for a period in excess of twenty years, also an agriculturist's land could no longer be sold in execution of a money decree.⁸⁶

These measures, though they led to a substantial decrease in the area being transferred annually through mortgages, did not entirely exclude non-agriculturist money-lenders from gaining land.⁸⁷ The latter, operating through agriculturist agents, were still able to acquire land by sale and mortgage; such evasions were known as *benami* transactions. Following 1901, however, the position of the non-agriculturist, money-lending castes was generally eroded in the case of mortgage debt, and a class of agriculturist creditors came to the fore. Thus the expropriation of land was not eradicated in the Punjab, as the disqualifications inherent in the Act did not apply to agriculturist usurers. It was to be almost forty years before further major legislation would be enacted ostensibly to further safeguard the position of agriculturist debtors.

In 1938 the zamindari Unionist Government, anxious to justify its claim to be the protector of the poor cultivators, adopted a series of measures designed, so it was claimed, to improve the position of the indebted cultivating community. The resultant legislation, emanating from a government dominated by wealthy zamindars, did nothing to restrict the privileges enjoyed by rural creditors. The Land Alienation Act was amended to prevent land being held on usufructuary mortgage from being exhausted by the mortgagee, and to outlaw *benami* transactions. The latter were declared to be illegal, and the alienor was entitled to repossess the land. Also no member of an agricultural tribe was allowed to make a permanent alienation of land in favor of an agriculturalist creditor, and no transfer of land was permitted unless a five year period had elapsed since the full payment of the debt.⁸⁸ These amendments, however, did not prevent the agriculturist money-lenders from taking land for a period in excess of twenty years. Also an agriculturist money-lender could purchase land from

⁸⁵ N.G. Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900*, Duke University, 1966, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁶ M. Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, p. 133; Raja Hassan Akhtar (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *An Inquiry into Mortgages of Agricultural Land in the Pathwar Assessment Circle of the Rawalpindi District in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1926, p. vii, PPL.

⁸⁷ Government of India Administration Reports (Punjab), 1902-03, p. 23, V/10/359-360, IOR.

⁸⁸ Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 12 April 1938; 22 July 1938; 26 July 1938.

those indebted cultivators who were not his debtors. Thus the measures did not place the same restrictions on agriculturists, as on non-agriculturist money-lenders. By the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Bill, the Ministry determined to restore to agriculturists lands mortgaged by them to non-agriculturists before such transactions were forbidden by the Land Alienation Act. It stipulated that if interest derived by the mortgagee was found to equal or exceed the amount of the mortgage, then the latter would be liquidated and the creditor would receive no compensation. Whilst this legislation certainly benefited zamindars who were indebted to non-agriculturists prior to 1901, it placed no censure on agriculturist creditors who continued to receive interest in excess of the principal from mortgages enacted before 1901.⁸⁹ In fact the Punjab Registration of Moneylenders Bill, constituted the only measure which discriminated equally against both classes of creditor, The central provision of the Bill determined that all money-lenders who were not registered, and who did not possess a valid license would receive no assistance from the courts in recovering a loan. The Bill also stipulated that a money-lender's license would be cancelled if he charged interest in excess of the maximum laid down by the Relief of Indebtedness Act of 1934⁹⁰ if he failed to keep adequate accounts, or if he was found guilty of forgery or fraud.⁹¹

Despite these enactments indebtedness continued to be a dominant feature of rural life in the Province. The Unionist Ministry in common with preceding administrations failed to initiate a vigorous policy to eradicate the most fundamental cause of the problem - the vicious system of credit which ensured that once a cultivator fell into debt, he generally remained in that state.⁹² Although cooperative societies had been formed in many villages in the Punjab following the passing of the Cooperative Societies Act of 1904,⁹³ as a means of providing a cheaper and safer source of credit, the movement never possessed sufficient capital to seriously challenge or undermine the established system: in 1917-18 those money-lenders who enjoyed annual incomes of Rs. 500 and over, and were liable to taxation, alone advanced Rs. 28,000,000 in loans;⁹⁴ by comparison the Co-operative Societies provided only Rs. 74 lakhs to borrowers in 1923,⁹⁵ this figure rising to Rs. 111.50 lakhs in 1938-39, and Rs. 112 lakhs by 1943-44.⁹⁶ Debt was to remain the major problem which confronted the cultivating classes of the Punjab, and the Muslim community in particular. As investors in the highly lucrative credit business Muslims never equaled the commanding position enjoyed by non-Muslims, whilst they accounted for the vast majority of the debtor class.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 24 June 1938; 10 July 1938.

⁹⁰ In the case of secured loans this was 12% per annum simple interest or 9% per annum compound interest, and in the case of unsecured loans, 18% per annum simple interest and 14% per annum compound interest.

⁹¹ GR, Craik to Brabourne, 22 July 1938, P&J. 3596/38, IOR.

⁹² K.B. Sheikh Nur Mohammad (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *An Economic Survey of Bhambu Sandila, Muzaffargarh District, Lahore, 1935*, p. xvii, PPL.

⁹³ M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

⁹⁴ H. Calvert, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130.

⁹⁵ Punjab Cooperative Society Report, 1922-23, pp. 23-24, V/24/596, IOR.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 1939-1944, V/24/600, IOR.

After agriculture, money-lending was the most important 'industry' in the Province.⁹⁷ In 1920 Calvert calculated that the net income of those money-lenders earning over Rs. 500 per annum was approximately Rs. 500 lakhs, and if allowance was made for those below that income bracket, the total was well in excess of that sum. When compared with the fact that the net income of the North-Western Railway in 1917-18 amounted to Rs. 764 lakhs, and the net revenue from the major irrigation works in the Punjab for the same year was Rs. 267 lakhs, the significance of the money-lender's business of the Province is apparent. Tax returns for the 1917-18 period emphasize this fact, out of a provincial total of Rs. 30.7 lakhs, Rs. 7.4 lakhs were paid by money-lenders. There were more tax payers amongst this group than for any other trading or professional class: 15,035 money-lenders were assessed on collective incomes amounting to Rs. 35,000,000 compared to a total provincial income which was subject to tax, of Rs. 750 lakhs. On the basis of these findings Calvert observed:

"the province is dominated by the money-lender. He represents the richest single class. His profits probably exceed those of all the cultivators put together. Beside him, the professional class is inconsiderable; the industrial class is insignificant; even trade and commerce take second place."⁹⁸

Though Calvert's figures emphasize the economic power of the money-lending community, it is not possible to gauge from them the total number of usurers in the Province, as they were concerned only with those subject to tax. As a result calculations concerning the size of the community vary considerably. Calvert himself estimated in 1920 that the proportion of money-lenders, large and petty, to the total population was in the region of 1:100, as compared to 1:367 in the rest of India. In effect that meant that although the populace of the Punjab comprised only one-eleventh of the whole population of India, it supported one-fourth of all the money-lenders in the country.⁹⁹ In 1930 the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee was of the opinion that between 55,000 and 59,000 usurers were operating in the Province, i.e. 1:340 persons.¹⁰⁰ Though these findings vary tremendously, both indicate that an enormous number of individuals were connected with the advancement of credit.

As previously stated the Land Alienation Act (1901) effectively divided the money-lending community into non-agriculturist and agriculturist categories. Though Muslims were to be found in both groups, the credit machine continued to be monopolized by non-Muslims, both Hindus and Sikhs, the Sikhs having come into prominence after 1901. There were two main classes of non-agriculturist money-lenders, the Sahukars advancing rural credit, and the urban usurers operating in the towns and cities.

⁹⁷ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1950, p. 129, PPL.

⁹⁸ Calvert, op. cit., p. 130.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 130.

¹⁰⁰ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, p. 129, PPL.

Together they controlled the majority of debt in the Province, despite the fact that three-quarters of mortgage debt was held by agriculturists.¹⁰¹ The Sahukars were the most important group,¹⁰² consisting almost entirely of Hindu Baniyas, Khatri and Aroras, though there was a small element of Muslim Khojas operating mainly in Chiniot and Shahpur.¹⁰³ Despite the legislation of 1901 the Sahukar group had survived, primarily because there was no alternative source of credit, especially for unsecured loans, in certain parts of the Province, notably Karnal, Rohtak, Attock, Gurgaon and Mianwali: in 83% of 8,000 villages examined between 1926 and 1928 by the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry there were no agriculturist money-lenders. The influence which the Sahukars continued to wield was apparent from the fact that in 1928-29 they accounted for nearly 20% of all the income-tax assesses in the Province.¹⁰⁴

In the case of urban money-lenders, they usually combined usury with some other form of business, generally advancing loans for private consumption, rather than for industry and commerce which were financed largely by indigenous bankers. This class of money-lender was over-whelming Hindu in composition, though two small Muslim groups were discernible - the Khojas and the Pathans. The Pathans operated mainly in Lahore, the centre of their operations being the Landa Bazaar, thus although they belonged to a notified agriculturist tribe, their zone of activity resulted in them being classified in the urban category in this instance.¹⁰⁵

Also in respect of agriculturist creditors the Muslims constituted a small minority. The Land Alienation Act of 1901 had strengthened the position of this class of creditor, and expanded their numbers.¹⁰⁶ By 1928-29 it was estimated that there were approximately 19,000 such moneylenders operating in the Punjab, approximately 1,000 of whom were Muslims. These calculations were based on the findings of a survey of 8,000 villages (23% of the total number of settlements in the Province) conducted between 1926 and 1928, which revealed the presence of 4,340 agriculturist creditors, 49% of whom were

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁰² In 1928-29, 3,998 rural money-lenders were taxed on a net income of Rs. 169.70 lakhs, from a joint investment of Rs. 1,3061 lakhs. By comparison 2,292 urban money-lenders were taxed on a net income of Rs. 79.27 lakhs, from a joint investment of Rs. 923 lakhs: *ibid.*, pp. 330, 332.

¹⁰³ M. Darling, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-215.

¹⁰⁴ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 132-134, 137; K.G. Sivaswamy, *Legislative Protection and Relief of Agricultural Debtors in India*, Poona, 1939, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰⁵ M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-215; Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, pp. 129-131, 161, PPL.

¹⁰⁶ This is apparent from the fact that in 1889-90 in the Kot Kapura Utar assessment circle of Ferozepore district, there had been only 8 agriculturist mortgagees advancing Rs. 4,172 on loans with possession, by 1923 their number had expanded to 787, advancing Rs. 1,311,709. Similarly in the Pothwan assessment cycle of the Rawalpindi district, the number of agriculturist mortgagees had increased from 6 in 1885-86 to 280 by 1925-26, whilst the amount of credit they supplied to mortgagors had expanded from Rs. 2,212 to Rs. 60,303: Sardar Balwant Singh (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *An Inquiry into Mortgages of Agricultural Land in the Kot Kapura Utar Assessment Circle of the Ferozepore District in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1925, p. 22; Raja Hassan Akhtar, p. 19, PL.

Hindus, 45% Sikhs and 6% Muslims. The Sikhs predominated in the central Punjab, the Hindus in the Ambala division and Kangra, whilst the Muslims were most strongly represented in the districts of Rohtak and Jullundur, followed by Ambala, Hoshiarpur and Hissar.¹⁰⁷ The comparatively low number of Muslim moneylenders, whether agriculturist or non-agriculturist, was also reflected in the number of suits instigated by Muslims for the recovery of debts in the periods January 1939 to December 1939, and January 1941 to August 1947. Of approximately 4,729 creditors involved, only 15% (694) were Muslims, as compared to 64% (3,056) from the Hindu community.¹⁰⁸

There were two main reasons for the low level of Muslim participation - religion and lack of capital. The receipt of interest was contrary to the teachings of Islam.¹⁰⁹ Even so some Muslims were prepared to sacrifice religious scruples in the pursuit of profit. The Arains of Multan had been openly engaged in the mortgage business since the turn of the century,¹¹⁰ though others sought to enjoy the benefits of money-lending without offending against Islam. The Arains of Attock who advanced credit did so in return for a share of the produce of the mortgaged property, rather than for cash interest payments. Similarly Muslim agriculturist creditors operating in the rural areas surrounding Lahore lent money in return for labor, and the supply of supposedly 'free' gifts of fodder and manure.¹¹¹ Regardless, however, of whether individual Muslims sought to evade, or chose to ignore the teachings of their Faith in respect of usury, it is apparent that to an extent Islam did pose a barrier to greater Muslim participation. The main zones of operation for Muslim agriculturist usurers, with the exception of Jullundur, were those districts where the Hindu community was dominant. Many Muslims originating from these areas were not so orthodox as their co-religionists in the western Punjab, and it appears that Muslim creditors were restrained from operating at a similar level in the more conservative Muslim majority districts. Thus whilst the Nawab of Mamdot, one of the wealthiest zamindars in the Province, and the principal Muslim landowner in Ferozepore was enjoying an income from money-lending in 1915,¹¹² as late as 1930 there were no known Muslim agriculturist money-lenders in eight of the 12 districts of the Rawalpindi and Multan divisions.¹¹³

Nevertheless religion clearly did not present an absolute bar. By the 1930's there were groups of Muslims who were prepared to advance credit in return for cash interest payments. This caused the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee of 1929-30 to

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol.I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 138, 223, 310-312, PPL.

¹⁰⁸ Of the remainder Cooperative Societies accounted for 2% (75), Sikhs 14% (677), Banks 4% (171) and Others 1% (55): Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in the Government Punjab Gazette, Pt. III-B, 1939, pp. 1-388, 390-507; 1941, pp. 1-50, 61-83, 85-149, 155-207; 1942, pp. 1-4, 5, 51-80, 85-174; 1943, pp. 1-90, 99-105; 1944, pp. 1-20, 23-96; 1945, pp. 1-89, 91-92; 1946, pp. 1-8, 11-64, 67-72; 1947, Pp. 1-46, PGSL.

¹⁰⁹ SR, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1869-74, p. 47, V/27/314/476, TOR.

¹¹⁰ DG, Multan, 1901-02, p. 190. IOR.

¹¹¹ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 136, 310, IOR.

¹¹² DG, Ferozepore, 1915, p. 110, IOR.

¹¹³ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, p. 138, PPL.

conclude that "the Muhammadan attitude towards the taking of interest is changing" as it was discovered that interest payments were received in Lyallpur and Okara, and even in so conservative a district as Multan.¹¹⁴ Also of the 55,582 Muslim depositors who had savings accounts with Post Office Banks in 1928-29, only 237 (0.4%) refused to receive interest payments.¹¹⁵ It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that where religious observance did not pose a deterrent to Muslim participation in the credit business, lack of resources did, particularly as the Muslim community in general did not possess anything approaching the amount of accessible capital available to the non-Muslim communities. This is indicated by the fact that in 1906-07 out of a total of 17,815 persons paying income tax on earnings of, and in excess of Rs. 1000 per annum, only 8% (1,438) were Muslims; of the remainder 79% (14,144) were Hindus, 8% (1,401) were Sikhs and 5% (832) were Christians,¹¹⁶ whilst of the 252,339 persons who had deposits amounting to Rs. 395.85 lakhs in Post Office Savings Banks throughout the Punjab and the Punjab States in 1928, Muslims accounted for only 22% of the savers, commanding Rs. 61.47 lakhs, i.e. only 15.5% of the total capital invested.¹¹⁷ Similarly of the 97 banking offices situated in the city of Lahore by 1946, which between them possessed a working capital in excess of Rs. 100 crores, only seven which jointly controlled only half a crore of rupees were Muslim owned.¹¹⁸

Furthermore in the same year in Lahore city Rs. 924,358 were paid by non-Muslims in the form of Urban Immovable Property Tax, as compared to Rs. 396,189 (30%) paid by Muslims. Non-Muslims also paid Rs. 519,203/3/- in tax on the sale of goods, as compared to Rs. 66,323/2/- (11%) paid by Muslims. This pattern seems to have been current through-out the province. As with Lahore, non-Muslims controlled the capital of Amritsar. In 1945-46 there were 6,292 non-Muslims assesses paying Rs. 3,833,794 per annum in Urban Immovable Property Tax; Muslim assesses totaled 1,500 paying Rs. 71,800 (2%). Whilst the figures relating to the payment of the Sales Tax exhibited a similar disparity: Rs. 25,500 (2.4%) was paid by Muslims, as against Rs. 1,030,648 by non-Muslims. In respect of income tax Muslims paid only Rs. 33,922 (7%) as compared to Re. 441,382 paid by non-Muslims.¹¹⁹ A similar trend was also apparent in the districts of Lyallpur, Gujranwala and Sialkot, as is demonstrated in Appendix E.

These statistics indicate the considerable extent to which non-Muslims controlled the capital, and in particular the urban wealth of the Province. Especially when one considers that in four of the areas cited above and in Appendix E Muslims accounted for over 50% of the population - 59% in the district of Lahore (58% in the city of Lahore), 63% in Lyallpur, 62% in Sialkot and 71% in Gujranwala; in Amritsar district the Muslim

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 138.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 334.

¹¹⁶ Punjab Government (Home) Proceedings, May 1909, p. 24, Vol. 8114, IOR.

¹¹⁷ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol.I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 333-334, PPL.

¹¹⁸ Proceedings and Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Vol. 14, pp. 464-465, PGRC.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 464-465, 472, 528.

community was predominant, comprising 47% of the total populace.¹²⁰ The pecuniary advantages so enjoyed by the non-Muslim communities further helps to explain their control of the credit machine in the Province, and the low level of Muslim participation.

By contrast the Muslims appear to have been the most indebted community in the Province. Various estimations arrived at during the last twenty-five years of British rule, and in the early post-independence period, suggest that Muslims were responsible for in excess of 60% of the Provincial debt. Darling calculated in the early 1920's that the total debt of the Punjab amounted to approximately Rs. 75 crores (mortgaged debt amounted to 45% of the whole), of which the Muslim community owed at least Rs. 50 crores, possibly as much as Rs. 60 crores,¹²¹ i.e. between 67% and 80% of the whole debt. By 1929 mortgaged debt alone accounted for an estimated Rs. 63 crores,¹²² 60% of which occurred in those districts where Muslims were in the majority, or predominated (Jullundur, Gurdaspur and Ambala.)¹²³ Whilst research conducted in 1950 disclosed that in those districts ceded to Pakistan in 1947,¹²⁴ Muslims had been responsible for 78% of the total debt in the years 1920 to 1950, though of that percentage 11% referred to the post-partition period.¹²⁵

It is not possible to explain the heavy rate of Muslim debt purely in terms of the fact that they were the largest group in the Province, as in percentage terms their liabilities surpassed their population ratio. One must consider other reasons in attempting to arrive at a balanced conclusion. Many causes of debt, in fact, were common to all Punjabis, regardless of their religion. In the first place there was no stigma attached to indebtedness as it was considered prestigious to command credit, as is reflected in the Punjabi saying, "A man cannot be forgiven without priestly aid, or be respectable without a banker's aid".¹²⁶ Also high interest rates, ranging from 12% to 50% by the 1930s,¹²⁷ meant that once a cultivator was in debt he remained in that state. Re-payment customs conspired to aggravate this; the majority of indebted zamindars paid their

¹²⁰ Calculated from information contained in the Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. II, Table V, p. 26, Table XIII, pp. 238-240, 245, IOR.

¹²¹ M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10, 19-20.

¹²² Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Lahore, 1930, p. 336, PPL.

¹²³ By 1936 5,109,257 acres were held on usufructuary mortgage in the Punjab, of which, 3,056,021 (60%) were located in those areas referred to in the text. Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1936, Statement No. III, pp. ii-vii, PGSL.

¹²⁴ Lahore, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Gujrat, Shahpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Mianwali, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Jhang, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan.

¹²⁵ Hassan Ali Syed (Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry, Pakistan), Report on the Need and Supply of Credit in the Rural Areas of the Punjab, Lahore, 1951, p. 54, PPL.

¹²⁶ SR, Lahore, 1865-69, p. 60, V/27/314/546, IOR.

¹²⁷ Interest rates ranged from 12% to 24% in Multan for cash loans, and from 25% to 50% for grain advances; in Gurgaon 24% interest was charged on money loans from the date of advancement to the spring harvest, after which compound interest was levied, while on mortgages without possession 24% interest payments were demanded; in Amritsar interest rates on the various loans varied from 12% to 30%: Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 227, 231, 234, PPL.

creditors in kind, usually parting with the bulk of their harvests each year to meet interest charges. The result was that they rarely received the full value of their crop, and thus were rarely in a position to redeem the principal.¹²⁸ It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the main causes for borrowing was the repayment of previous loans. In 1923 the Punjab Cooperative Society allocated the largest portion of its budget to assist its members to redeem old debts¹²⁹ in 1925 an investigation in Ferozepur discovered that 64½% of all consideration money was utilized to repay previous debts. Whilst an enquiry conducted in the south-west of the Province in the late 1930's revealed that the repayment of existing loans resulted in further debts being incurred in over 40% of all cases examined.¹³⁰

Inheritance customs also increased the likelihood for debt. On the death of a landowner the holding was usually sub-divided amongst his heirs, a process which continued through each succeeding generation, until the properties were reduced to extremely small plots, which were uneconomic, and thereby vulnerable to debt.¹³¹ This problem was most acute in the more fertile areas of the Province, e.g. the densely populated districts of Hoshiarpur and the central Punjab, as exceptional fertility and large populations were synonymous, resulting in a high level of fragmentation.¹³² Though even in less productive tracts, heavy populations often caused the same result. In the mainly Muslim village of Bhambu Sandila in Muzaffargarh district 58% of the holdings were jointly held by more than five persons; 43% of the cultivators farmed 2 acres or under, and 63% 5 acres or less. The majority of owners, therefore, enjoyed a very small margin of profit, "indeed most of them had no margin at all", thus the smallest aberration in the form of cattle disease or drought posed a major crisis, resulting in heavy borrowing.¹³³ Similar conditions prevailed throughout the district, by 1900 87.4% of the mainly Muslim proprietary body held on average only 2.5 acres per owner, at a time when it was estimated that a landed family required between 13 and 15 acres to subsist. The result was widespread debt involving 95% of all owners.¹³⁴

Even where land was plentiful and fertile the vicissitudes of nature could neutralize these advantages. The failure of the monsoon, water-logging, flooding, and the consequent destruction of crops, followed by famine, all resulted in the accumulation of debt. Drought was responsible for the "enormous increase" in transfers through mortgage in the Ambala district in the late 1860's¹³⁵ and in 1877-78 it resulted in 5% of

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229; AR, Mamdot Jagir (Ferozepur District), 1913, pp. 17-18, P/9189, IOR.

¹²⁹ Punjab Cooperative Society Report, 1922-23, pp. 23-24, V/24/596, IOR.

¹³⁰ K.G. Sivaswamy, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹³¹ B.H. Baden-Powell, *The Land Systems of British India*, Oxford, 1892, p. 346.

¹³² M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24, 30.

¹³³ K.B. Nur Mohammad (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *An Economic Survey of Bhambu Sandila, Muzaffargarh District*, Lahore, 1935, Preface, pp. v-vi, PPL.

¹³⁴ AR, Sinanwan Tahsil (Muzaffargarh District), 1900, pp. 89, 94-96, W6077, IOR.

¹³⁵ Extracts from the reports of local officials, p. 20, enclosure, Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1869-70, V/24/2466, IOR.

the cultivated land in Rohtak being mortgaged.¹³⁶ In the Hissar district between 1901 and 1916 a succession of poor harvests caused the mortgage rate to triple.¹³⁷ Diseases amongst livestock also contributed to borrowing; draught animals were essential for cultivation, and the loss of cattle proved so serious between 1918 and 1923 that the Cooperative Society allocated 22.2% of its loan budget to provide borrowers with the means to replace stock.¹³⁸

As the century progressed natural disasters continued to play a part in increasing indebtedness.¹³⁹ In the Punjab as a whole Darling observed that out of a five year cycle, the farmer generally experienced one good year, one bad year, and three "middling" years. In a bad year he would be forced to borrow for all his needs - domestic, professional and social - and though it was possible if he was thrifty to pay interest charges during the "middling" years, it was only in a good year that he could actually reduce his debt:

"Once in debt, therefore, it is almost impossible to escape. If he were thrifty and business-like he might succeed, but he is rarely either the one or the other, and the money-lender is always there to tempt him deeper into the mire."¹⁴⁰

This lack of thrift, which was common amongst all the religious groups to varying degrees, compounded the 'natural' problems agriculturists faced. Local custom demanded lavish expenditure for social celebrations, which in turn often caused recourse to the money-lender. The average Punjabi preferred to incur debt for expenditure on a marriage or the ceremonies attendant upon births and deaths, rather than face the humiliating comments of his neighbors.¹⁴¹ Even poverty did not prohibit such unproductive extravagance. An enquiry conducted in 1940 into the affairs of poor artisans resident in Lahore revealed that in the case of 31 Muslim and 23 Sikh families examined, marriage expenses were a major cause of borrowing. The Muslim and Sikh families lavished 24% and 25% respectively of all the loans they incurred on marriages, which represented the largest single item in the Muslim,-and the second largest in the Sikh case.¹⁴²

Borrowing to finance social observances was economically unproductive, and it appears that in general the Muslims were the worst offenders. In 1888 Lyall, the Lieutenant Governor, noted that whilst debt in the eastern districts of the Punjab was largely a

¹³⁶ SR, Rohtak, 1873-79, p. 63, V/27/314/616, IOR.

¹³⁷ DG, Hissar, 1915, pp. 167-168, IOR.

¹³⁸ This percentage represented the second largest single item in their return: Punjab Co-operative Society Report, 1922-23, pp. 23-24, V/24/596, IOR.

¹³⁹ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol.1, Lahore, 1930, pp. 235-237, PPL.

¹⁴⁰ M.L. Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁴¹ Raja Hassan Akhtar, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁴² Percentages calculated from information quoted by Faiz Ilahi (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *Some Poorer Artisan Classes of Lahore*, 1941, p. 27, PPL.

result of genuine shortages and poverty, in the Muslim majority western districts this was not always the case. There indebtedness was frequently spawned and aggravated by displays of extravagance totally out of proportion to the means of the owners, both large and small.¹⁴³ Observations of this nature frequently recurred throughout the British period, and in the immediate post-independence years. In the 1870's Steedman, the Settlement Officer in Jhang, stated that there was hardly a Muslim zamindar in the district who was not in debt, largely as a result of extravagance.¹⁴⁴ In Muzaffargarh in the early 1880's it was observed that in comparison to the Hindus, Muslims were "spendthrift and improvident", lavishing far more than their resources could bear on marriages, betrothals, circumcisions and funerals.¹⁴⁵ Similarly the Gazetteer for Dera Ghazi Khan compiled in 1898, recorded that Muslim landowners, two-thirds of whom were in debt, preferred to squander resources on such celebrations, rather than exercise thrift.¹⁴⁶ Such ostentation was judged to have contributed, to a large extent, to Muslim indebtedness in Multan and Mianwali in the pre-1920 period.¹⁴⁷ A decade later Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners in the Province recognized that extravagance continued to contribute to the problem of debt, especially in the divisions of Jullundur, Lahore and Rawalpindi.¹⁴⁸ In addition Muslims, particularly in the conservative western districts, often regarded themselves as the *murids* (disciples) of a particular Pir or spiritual leader. Offerings were made at the shrines frequented by these 'Divines', resulting only too frequently in borrowing by the devotees:

"They (*murids*) pay constant visits to shrines and places of pilgrimages, and make offerings there which they cannot afford ... the agriculturists make them (Pirs) presents out of all proportion to their incomes, and vie with one another in the largeness of their gifts."¹⁴⁹

The volume of Muslim debt resulting from these practices, marriages in particular, can be assessed to some extent from the fact that by 1950 loans to finance social functions and observances accounted for the third largest single cause of debt amongst all classes of Muslims inhabiting those areas of the Punjab which were ceded to Pakistan.¹⁵⁰

Litigation proved a further cause of unproductive debt. Sections of the Punjab peasantry, at least until the early 1920's, most particularly in the districts of Jullundur, Mianwali, Amritsar, Muzaffargarh, Lahore, Ferozepore, Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur, seemed to possess an almost passionate obsession for litigation as a means of settling

¹⁴³ Notes by J. Lyall, 17 July and 22 August 1888, Punjab Civil Secretariat Printed Files (Revenue), PBRL.

¹⁴⁴ SR, Jhang, 1874-80, pp. 131-132, V/27/314/537, IOR.

¹⁴⁵ DG, Muzaffargarh, 1885-84, pp. 85-84, IOR.

¹⁴⁶ DO, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1883-84, p. 69, ICR.

¹⁴⁷ DG, Multan, 1901-02, p. 189; DG, Mianwali, 1915, pp. 112-113, IOR.

¹⁴⁸ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 235-237, PPL.

¹⁴⁹ DG, Muzaffargarh, 1883-84, p. 85, IOR.

¹⁵⁰ 28.2% of all loans were for domestic purposes, 21.2% for the purchase of cattle, and 15.6% for social celebrations: Hassan Ali Syed, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

disputes. As such an over-burdened people often dispersed limited resources in this way. Calvert estimated that in the early 1920's two and a half million people, approximately 40% of the adult population, were involved in court cases, either as contesting parties or witnesses; the result was the wasteful expenditure of between 3 or 4 crores of rupees per annum.¹⁵¹ By the mid-1920's and 1930's, however, the volume of litigation in the province appeared to be decreasing,¹⁵² and Darling's research led him to conclude that it was only of secondary importance *vis-a-vis* debt in the Province as a whole, though it continued to pose a major problem in the districts mentioned above.¹⁵³ Also evidence does exist to suggest that in the case of the Muslim community, it was not a serious cause of debt. Following Partition it was discovered that only 3% of Muslim debt resulted from expenditure on court cases.¹⁵⁴

Though the vagaries of nature and extravagance were clearly potent causes of debt, ironically the problem was also aggravated by the wealth potential of the land:

"It would be a mistake to suppose that ... debt is in all cases a sign of poverty. It is on the contrary often an indication of easy credit and careless affluence; over and over again the richest and best irrigated villages will be found to be most heavily indebted."¹⁵⁵

Where owners possessed little credit, in the form of productive, and therefore valuable land, debt was uncommon. Thus there was a lower incidence of debt in the less fertile areas of the south west, where in the 1920's land could be bought for Rs. 50 an acre, than in highly fertile central districts, where an acre of land could command Rs. 500. It is hardly surprising therefore that by the turn of the century, five of the eight most heavily mortgaged districts (Lahore, Amritsar, Ferozepore, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana, Sialkot and Lyallpur) were amongst the most productive in the Province.¹⁵⁶ Significantly it was found thirty years later in the village of Bhadas in Gurgaon district, that "the only zamindars free of debt are those who have no credit."¹⁵⁷

A further indication between credit and debt is provided by the fact that despite the presence of poor quality land in the south-west, and in certain areas of Dera Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh and Multan, the Province as a whole was very prosperous. From 1868 to 1920 the population had increased by 20%, whilst in the same period cultivation expanded by 50%, and the gross value of the produce rose from approximately Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 100 crores. At the same time the pressure on the land declined. The total

¹⁵¹ H. Calvert, op. cit., p. 206.

¹⁵² Report of the Unemployment Committee, 1937-38, Lahore, 1938, p. 49, PPL.

¹⁵³ M.L. Darling, op. cit., pp. 76-78.

¹⁵⁴ Hassan Ali Syed, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

¹⁵⁵ AR, Gohana Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1907, p. 12, P/7841, IOR.

¹⁵⁶ SR, Rohtak, 1873-79, p. 111, V/27/314/616; SR, Rohtak, 1905-1910, p. 19, V/27/314/618, IOR: M.L. Darling, op. cit., pp. 91-95, 228.

¹⁵⁷ Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, p. 228, PPL.

population per 100 cultivated acres decreased from 86 in 1868 to 76 in 1911, and the number of agriculturists per 100 acres declined from 46 to 43. Consequently the average value of gross produce per head of population rose from less than Rs. 22 in 1868 to Rs. 60 by 1920, indicating that the average income of an agricultural family had trebled. Increased productivity was responsible for this development. In 1872 the Punjab had received only 4 lakhs of rupees for its surplus grain, in 1913 the figure was 1,448 lakhs, and in 1918-19 approximately 2,437 lakhs. From 1890 to 1920 exports increased sevenfold in value, whilst imports increased only fourfold. The wealth of the Punjab was such that between 1911 and 1913 Rs. 1,000 lakhs worth of gold and silver had been absorbed in the Province, and by the 1920's that figure had increased to Rs. 2,169 lakhs, whilst the average amount deposited in Punjabi banks was double the average for the remainder of India.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that only the better-off could borrow. Even the small owner possessed a valuable commodity in land, but he was often poor in the sense that he did not have the necessary liquid assets to meet his everyday expenses, hence his recourse to the money-lender. Once indebted, despite the continuing value of his holding, he became in effect the tenant of his creditor who enjoyed the surpluses produced as interest. Thus in this sense poverty was both a cause and an effect of indebtedness.¹⁵⁹

So far this examination of the factors which contributed to debt were applicable to all the communities in the Province, irrespective of religion. The question remains, therefore, why were the Muslims so heavily indebted in comparison to the Hindus and Sikhs? The answer is partly given by comparing the characteristics of some of the major tribes which contributed to the composition of the various communities:

"As a general rule, whatever be the nature of the soil he cultivates...the caste of the agriculturist, which determines his habits and custom and natural disposition will determine his economic condition."¹⁶⁰

Evidence suggests that many Muslim cultivators were not as proficient as their non-Muslim neighbors, and therefore more vulnerable to borrowing. The classic example which demonstrates this point was the constant comparison made by British officials between the excellent husbandry of Hindu and Sikh Jats, and the inferior efforts of Muslim Jats and Rajputs, though the failings of the latter were frequently shared by the non-Muslim clan members. Purser and Fanshawe, the Settlement Officers in Rohtak in the 1870,s, noted that the Hindu Jats in the district were very good cultivators, and the Muslim Mula Jets "though generally recent converts, are already far inferior to the Hindus", whilst the worst cultivators were the Muslim Rajputs.¹⁶¹ This view,

¹⁵⁸ H. Calvert, op. cit., pp. 68, 162.

¹⁵⁹ F.L. Brayne and Shiv Dyal (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), An Economic Survey of Bhadas, A Village in the Gurgaon District of the Punjab, Lahore, 1938, p. 81, PPL.

¹⁶⁰ DO, Gurgaon, 1910, p. 100, IOR.

¹⁶¹ SR, Rohtak, 1873-79, pp. 53-55, V/27/314/616, IOR.

particularly of the Rajput, persisted; the 1907 assessment report for Gohana tahsil stated, "Their houses are always inferior, their fields ill-weeded, the sound of the mill begins late, and the sun generally catches them a-bed."¹⁶² This condemnation of the Rajput, especially Muslim tribal members, was practically universal throughout the Punjab.¹⁶³

This dichotomy, between Jat and Rajput, is explained to a great extent by the divergence of socio-cultural tradition between the two tribes. The yeoman Jat was the backbone of the Punjab peasantry. Though they often exhibited extravagance in celebrating marriages and conducting funerals¹⁶⁴ in all other respects they were generally "thrifty to the verge of parsimony" whilst being "unremitting in toil ... self-reliant in adversity, and enterprising in prosperity".¹⁶⁵ By contrast the Rajput, who by tradition regarded himself as a warrior rather than a farmer regardless of his actual social and economic circumstances, was constrained by the inherent belief that he was the heir to his tribe's former aristocratic supremacy in the Province. Consequently a Mian (Rajput), to preserve his name and honor unsullied, attempted to observe four fundamental maxims: he should never marry a social inferior; he should not accept bridal payments; his female household were expected to observe strict *purdah*; he should refrain from ploughing.¹⁶⁶ The last two observances were the most damaging. Some Rajputs shunned cultivation altogether, preferring to rent their lands to the more industrious Jats,¹⁶⁷ and when they did farm in person, by retaining *purdah* they deprived themselves of a valuable source of labor, in that Rajput women, as opposed to those of the Jats, generally did not assist their men folk in the fields.¹⁶⁸ Such practices, combined with the Rajputs' delusions of social supremacy spawned indolence.¹⁶⁹

Purely Muslim tribes also came in for similar condemnation. The Muslim Meos of Gurgaon district were regarded as thriftless and poor cultivators,¹⁷⁰ as were the Bilochis of Rohtak and Dera Ghazi Khan.¹⁷¹ Similarly the Muslim cultivators of Multan, regardless of their tribal affinity with the exception of the Arain market-gardeners were described as lazy and apathetic,¹⁷² whilst the Hindu farmers of Attock were proclaimed to be more thrifty, patient and far-seeing than the Muslim peasantry.¹⁷³ This criticism

¹⁶² AR, Gohana Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1907, p. 10, P/7841, ICR.

¹⁶³ See SR, Amritsar, 1888-93, p. 2, V/27/314/460; AR, Ludhiana Tahsil (Ludhiana District), 1911, pp. 11-15, P/8677; M.L. Darling, op. cit., pp. 35-39.

¹⁶⁴ AR, Rohtak Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1909, pp. 12-13, P/8121, IOR.

¹⁶⁵ AR, Samrala Tahsil (Ludhiana District), 1910, p. 15, P/8672, IOR.

¹⁶⁶ DG, Kangra, 1924-25, p. 163, IOR.

¹⁶⁷ AR, Samrala Tahsil (Ludhiana District) 1910, p. 15, P/8672, ICR.

¹⁶⁸ AR, Gohana Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1907, p. 10, P/7841; AR, Rohtak Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1909, pp. 12-13, P/8121, IOR.

¹⁶⁹ AR, Samrala Tahsil (Ludhiana District), 1881, p. 15, P/8401, IOR.

¹⁷⁰ DO, Gurgaon, 1910, pp. 100-101, IOR.

¹⁷¹ SR, Rohtak, 1873-79, pp. 33-35, V27/314/616; DG, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1883-84, p. 69, 1890, p. 90, IOR.

¹⁷² AR, Lodhran Tahsil (Multan District), 1878, P. 3, p/1294, IOR.

¹⁷³ DG, Attock, 1930, p. 115, IOR.

was repeated in Gurgaon. There the Hindu Ahirs had sunk wells to avert the adverse effects of drought. The Muslim Meos, however, declined such labor, preferring to rely on the presence of surface water and risk the consequences should water shortages occur.¹⁷⁴ In Muzaffargarh district, the comparison between Hindu and Muslim cultivation was very marked:

"On the holdings of the former (Hindus) are found good cattle, decent brick buildings, fruit trees and such intensive crops as cane, pepper and vegetables, while on the latter (Muslims), half-starved worn-out cattle, mud huts and no better crops than indifferent wheat";¹⁷⁵

remarks which strongly echoed those of Brandreth who effected the settlement of the Ferozepur district almost eighty years before.¹⁷⁶ These comparisons between Muslim and non-Muslim cultivators were drawn from official reports covering the period 1851 to 1935, and therefore were indicative of the general state of Muslim husbandry.

Various explanations have been offered for the comparative inferiority of Muslim cultivation, and the resultant heavy indebtedness of the Muslim peasantry, and community in general. Ibbetson, the author of the Punjab's contribution to the 1881 Census, was convinced that Muslim inferiority emanated directly from their adherence to Islam. He believed conversion had resulted in their degeneration, causing conceit, extravagance, thriftlessness and indolence.¹⁷⁷ This view, however, was disputed by Fenton, who compiled the Jullundur Gazetteer of 1904. He based his opinion on the fact that many Muslims were neglectful of their religion, citing the Muslim Rajputs as a prime example; he claimed that the latter were so wedded to Hindu ways that they frequently patronized Hindu priests, and maintained Hindu customs. In common with Ibbetson, however, he accepted that Muslims did exhibit a degree of character inferiority, in comparison to non-Muslims:

"Conversion from Hinduism was generally the result of persecution, thus one could expect the descendants of men who could not resist persecution to be inferior to those who could ... the weakness of mind leading to conversion, would show itself in worldly affairs."

Though he qualified this statement by postulating that large portions of the Muslim community were less developed than Hindus because they were only just emerging from the pastoral stage, which had long been surmounted by the latter.¹⁷⁸ Fenton's explanations echo the Darwinian theory of 'survival of the fittest', which was current in

¹⁷⁴ DG, Gurgaon, 1910, p. 101, IOR.

¹⁷⁵ K.B.Sheikh Nur Muhammad, op. cit., Preface, pp. v-vi.

¹⁷⁶ See SR, Ferozepur District, 1851-55, p. 5, V/27/314/488, IOR.

¹⁷⁷ *Census of India*, 1881, Punjab, Pt. I, pp. 103-104, IOR.

¹⁷⁸ DO, Jullundur and Kapurthala State, 1904, pp. 129-130, IOR.

the mid- and late Victorian period. Though they do dispose of Ibbetson's claim to an extent, they prove no more satisfactory in providing a rational explanation for the Muslim predicament.

One factor appears evident. Muslims, the majority of whom shared a common ancestry with Hindu and Sikh Punjabis, were not congenitally inferior. Though it is apparent that the Muslim character had been shaped to an extent by Islam, but not in the way supposed by Ibbetson and Fenton. In this context Thorburn provides a far more plausible explanation:

"Sikhism and Hinduism do not interfere with a man's natural desire to better himself in the world by his own exertions. Mahomedanism teaches its disciples to accept every misfortune as the will of 'Allah'. It unfits him for the struggle of life. Accordingly, we find, whenever Sikhs, Hindus, and Musalmans cultivate side by side, that the last-named are the worst farmers."¹⁷⁹

Though Thorburn's assessment is guilty of generalization, it is relevant, in that fatalism, particularly in the more orthodox districts, did militate against the pursuit of enterprise. This was particularly evident in the Division of Multan, which was conspicuous for the lack of diversity exhibited by its Muslim inhabitants. Despite the fact that the area experienced the highest summer temperatures in the Province, which combined with a general scarcity of water, made agriculture un-certain, very few cultivators sought to implement their earnings through emigration or army service.¹⁸⁰ The absence of enterprise was also apparent in Muzaffargarh. There Muslims outnumbered Hindus by eight to one, and of the Muslim proprietors by the 1880's 70% were in debt, as compared to only 30% in the case of Hindus, the reason being that Muslims were more improvident, and lacked their enterprising zeal:

"Muhammadans are mostly spendthrift and improvident. The Hindus are the reverse... Muhammadans have only one source of income, *viz.*, agriculture. Hindus who own and cultivate land, almost always combine money-lending and trade with agriculture. Hindus acquire land as payment for debts, Muhammadans generally borrow money to buy land."¹⁸¹

In the final analysis, however, the locations which many Muslims inhabited throughout the Province, probably exerted the most crucial influences on the level of Muslim industry and thereby indebtedness. It was a feature of the Province that the 'Bet' areas, or riverain tracts, were occupied primarily by Muslims.¹⁸² The possession of Bet lands

¹⁷⁹ S.S. Thorburn, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁰ DG, Multan, 1901-1902, pp. 106-107, IOR.

¹⁸¹ Word underlined in text in italics in the original, DO, Muzaffargarh, 1883-84, p. 83, IOR.

¹⁸² Two main theories have been postulated to explain this phenomenon. One explanation is that the Muslim invaders, being pastoral farmers by nature, seized the rich pasture lands in the vicinity of the rivers, and once

was a mixed blessing. Though the soil was rich in alluvial muds, placing it amongst the most fertile in the Punjab, the localities were subject to frequent devastating flooding, and were the most unhealthy in the Province because of the high incidence of fever, particularly malaria. In 1924 the river Beas flooded a dozen times, devastating villages and crops over a twenty square mile area.¹⁸³ Malaria was so prevalent in Ludhiana in the months of August to November that "one can scarcely find ... an able-bodied man who is not suffering from it"; in the period 1891 to 1900 the annual average death toll was approximately 14,810, and in 1892 and 1900 epidemics were responsible for 20,653 and 26,861 deaths respectively.¹⁸⁴ The heavy flooding and accompanying fever had a weakening effect on the population, resulting in broken constitutions, apathy and poor cultivation.¹⁸⁵ But the land was highly productive, and as such attracted heavy speculation on the part of money-lenders, who found a ready market where such precarious conditions prevailed.¹⁸⁶

Geography, therefore, often resulted in a high level of indebtedness. No one factor alone, however, could be held responsible for the greater involvement of the Muslims as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. That resulted from an amalgamation of causes. In the final analysis, it would appear that location, a comparatively higher degree of extravagance, a lower level of general productivity, and possibly a more entrenched belief in God's will as opposed to man's free will, all combined to make the Muslim community the most vulnerable to debt.

Thus so far it is apparent that Muslims were economically depressed. This pattern was evident in the industrial sphere. Though the Punjab's economy was dominated by agriculture, industrial production by the 1930's and 1940's was not insignificant in terms of the contribution it made to the Province's wealth. By 1937-38 it was valued at Rs. 157,407,500, as compared to Rs. 586,699,000 representing the aggregate value of the principal agricultural crops,¹⁸⁷ (a further 4 crores of rupees was contributed by dairy farming).¹⁸⁸ Prior to the turn of the century the mass of artisans had worked, not in factories or for capitalists, but as individual craftsmen.¹⁸⁹ Industry, such as existed, concentrated on small scale production. It was the expansion of communication routes, particularly roads and railways, which stimulated industrial growth.¹⁹⁰ By 1911 3,750

established, stimulated the process of conversion amongst the riverain dwellers, notably the Gujars and Dogars. The other argues that during the period of Sikh supremacy, the latter took possession of the upland areas, forcing the Muslims down into the Bet: M.L. Darling, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

¹⁸³ Ibid., pp. 68-71.

¹⁸⁴ DO, Ludhiana, 1904, p. 44, IOR.

¹⁸⁵ SR, Ferozepur, 1851-55, p. 5, V/27/488; DG, Muzaffargarh, 1883-84, p. 85, IOR.

¹⁸⁶ M.L. Darling, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁸⁷ Rice, wheat, barley, jowar, bajra, maize, gram, rabi oil seeds, tobacco, sugar cane, cleaned and unginned cotton: K.T. Shah, *Industrialization of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1941, pp. 35-38, 43.

¹⁸⁸ N.C. Wright, *Report on the Development of the Cattle and Dairy Industries of India*, Delhi, 1937, p. 174, 10L.

¹⁸⁹ *Census of India*, 1881, Punjab, Pt. I, p. 376, IOR.

¹⁹⁰ W. Hoey, *A Monograph on Trade and Manufactures in Northern India*, Lucknow, 1880, p. 2.

miles of rail had been laid throughout the Punjab, linking the Province with the port of Karachi, in addition to which 2,000 miles of metalled and 20,000 miles of unmetalled roads had been constructed. Furthermore the river Indus and the lower reaches of the Jhelum, Chenab and Sutlej were navigable throughout the year, as were 387 miles of the immense canal system.¹⁹¹ Even so the Punjab was completely land-locked, and its distance from the sea, in spite of the link with Karachi, acted as a tariff barrier against competitive imports, which in turn stimulated production for local requirements, but checked the export of bulky commodities for consumption abroad.¹⁹² The advantages, however, far outweighed the disadvantages, especially since Swadeshi banking in the 1911-17 period had proved extremely successful in eliciting capital from private hoards, which combined with the inability of banks to secure adequate short term investments, had forced them to concentrate on industrial investments, which in turn led to the growth of new companies.¹⁹³

The Provincial Government, though conscious of this increased industrial activity, remained an interested bystander. Rather than giving encouragement to large scale production, which could have proved detrimental to Britain's export market, it concentrated on fostering cottage industries. Thus hand-weaving was encouraged through the founding of a model weavery; the production of raw silk was promoted through the establishment of Salvation Army owned cocoon farms at Changa Manga, Lahore, Chaua Pail and Ludhiana, and the Mayo School of Arts attempted to resuscitate cotton printing. But the Government refrained from giving any direct help to the cotton power industry.¹⁹⁴ The attitude of the Government was reflected in the fact that 'Industries' formed a small sub-department of the Department of Agriculture.¹⁹⁵ But the report of the Royal Commission on Indian Industries in 1918, and the demands of the 1914-18 war had the effect of stimulating interest in industrialization, both for defence purposes and economic development. The Punjab Government responded by founding a separate Department for Industries in 1920. In theory it was charged with the control of Government educational institutions dealing with technology and industry, and the examination of the industrial potential of the Province. Also it was expected to provide an advisory service for factory owners and potential industrialists; to establish model factories; to organize marketing facilities, and to provide loans to those concerns in need of financial assistance. In practice, however, the Department concentrated on educational ventures, neglecting its other responsibilities.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹¹ A. Latifi, *The Industrial Punjab*, Bombay, 1911, Introduction, pp. xii-xiv.

¹⁹² Ahmad Mukhtar, *Factory Labour in the Punjab*, Madras, 1929, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹³ A.C. Badenoch, *Punjab Industries, 1911-1917*, Lahore, 1917, Introduction, pp. i-ii.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3, 8-12, 18, 21.

¹⁹⁵ The sub-department had been inaugurated in 1905 as a result of Curzon's re-organization programme: see Punjab Commerce and Industry Proceedings, April-Dec. 1905, Vol. 7022, IOR.

¹⁹⁶ In 1921 the total budget of the Department amounted to Rs. 350,912, more than half of which was allocated for the construction of a college of engineering. In 1939 out of a budget of Rs. 2,190,150, two-thirds was spent on providing technical training: K.T. Shah, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

In spite of these shortcomings, by the 1920's the process of industrialization, through private enterprise, was established in the Punjab;

"Large-scale production, a necessary consequence of the introduction of machinery, had been accompanied by (the) centralization and monopolization of control in the hands of a few."¹⁹⁷

Of this 'few' the overwhelming majority were non-Muslims. In 1921 there were 763 factories in the Province in each of which at least ten persons had been employed between 14 March and 14 May.¹⁹⁸ Hindus owned 455 (60%), Sikhs 45 (6%) and Muslims 96 (12.5%); of the remainder 102 (13%) were operated by the Government or local authorities, 38 (5%) were registered companies in the control of European, Anglo-Indian and Indian directors, 18 (2%) were owned by Europeans and Anglo-Indians, 8 (1%) by Parsis, and there were 2 (0.2%) listed as belonging to 'others'. In all the factories a total of 769 managers were employed - 513 (67%) Hindus, 54 (7%) Sikhs, 112 (14.5%) Muslims, 76 (10%) Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and 9 (1%) Parsis.¹⁹⁹ This similarity between the two sets of statistics suggests that managers were generally employed on communal grounds. This trend was also observed by Faiz Ilahi in 1941; many of the artisans he interviewed in Lahore, admitted that employers tended to patronize employees belonging to their own communities.²⁰⁰

By 1921, therefore, the evidence available demonstrates that non-Muslims, particularly the Hindus, dominated the industrial life of the Province, both at the proprietor and managerial levels. The 1921-1931 decade witnessed considerable industrial advancement in the Punjab. This was encouraged by further expansion of the transport system, the provision of sidings to large mills and factories, and an improved electricity supply, as a result of the Mandi Hydro-Electric scheme. The resultant industrial growth can be judged from the fact that in 1921 there had been 297 factories registered under the provisions of the Indian Factories Act²⁰¹ employing 42,428 operatives, whilst by 1930 there were 526 such factories, with a combined work force of 49,549. In spite of the increase in the number of concerns, there had not been a corresponding growth in the number of employees. This was due, in part, to the fact that the larger factories, e.g. railway workshops, had introduced mechanization. Also many of the newer

¹⁹⁷ Ahmad Mukhtar, p. 2.

¹⁹⁸ Census of India, 1921, Punjab and Delhi, Pt. I, p. 364, IOR.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., Pt. II, Table XXII, p. 412.

²⁰⁰ Faiz Ilahi, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁰¹ According to the Factories Act of 1911, as modified in 1926, a registered factory constituted those premises utilizing mechanical (steam or water) or electrical power, and employing not less than 20 persons simultaneously on any day in the year; or any premises used for manufacturing purposes, with or without the use of mechanical or electrical power, in which not less than 10 persons were simultaneously employed on a daily basis: India Acts Reprinted As Modified, 1926-28, Calcutta, 1928, p. 6, V/8/104, IOR.

establishments represented small concerns, employing small labor forces, e.g. hosiery factories, rolling-mills, flour mills, etc.²⁰²

This industrial growth did little to alter the communal *status quo* in respect of ownership and financial control. From factory lists contained in the District Gazetteers, it has been possible to assess from the names of the various concerns the community to which the proprietors belonged. 874 Factories were listed as being in operation in 1931.²⁰³ This figure is much larger than that given in the Census of 1931, as it included 'factories' both within and outside the provisions of the Factories Act. Of the total number it was not possible in the case of 91 concerns (10%) to determine the ownership; of the remainder, 504 (58%) were owned by Hindus, 61 (7%) by Sikhs, 114 (13%) by Muslims, 6 (0.7%) by foreigners, 63 (7%) by Government, 23 (3%) by 'Others' and 12 (1.3%) were of mixed ownership. Not only did Hindus and Sikhs together control the majority of the factories, they appear to have employed more operatives than were found in Muslim concerns, suggesting a heavier economic investment. Of a total of 23,244 operatives who were engaged in the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim owned establishments, 17,958 (77%) worked for Hindu owners, 2,174 (9%) for Sikhs, and 3,112 (14%) for Muslims, representing an average work force of 36 and 29 for non-Muslim and Muslim owned factories respectively.²⁰⁴

There were only two branches of industry in which Muslims played a dominant role - tanning and the production of iron at Batala. According to the 1931 Census, 13,322 persons were involved in the tanning and leatherwork industry, 11,312 of these following the profession as their principal occupation. There is some doubt, however, whether this figure is truly representative, as only one person was recorded as a tanner in the whole of the Multan district,²⁰⁵ whereas an enquiry conducted in 1938 revealed that more than 60 people were engaged in tanning in the city of Multan alone.²⁰⁶ In the absence of accurate returns it is impossible to state how many persons were involved, but it would seem to have been larger than indicated in the Census.

²⁰² *Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. I, p. 41, IOR.*

²⁰³ It is possible that this figure is slightly exaggerated, as in some cases a number of factories were bracketed together, and unless it was definitely stated that they represented one concern, they were considered as separate entities. Had all the factories bracketed together been treated as single enterprises, the total number would have been 861.

²⁰⁴ Calculated from information contained in Punjab District Gazetteers, 1931, Industry sections - Amritsar, pp. xciv, xcvii, cii, cv, cxii; Montgomery, pp. lxxvi-lxxvii; Karnal, pp. cviii-cix, cxi; Hoshiar-pur, p. xcii; Ambala, pp. xcii, xciii; Kangra, pp. cvii, cx; Simla, p. lxxvii; Muzaffargarh, pp. lxxvii, lxxix; Hissar, pp. cii, cviii, cx-cxi; Dera Ghazi Khan, pp. xcvii, ci Rohtak, p. cxxii; Multan, pp. cxlvi-cxlvii, clii-clix, clxiv, clxviii, clxv, clxxi; Lyallpur, pp. xcvi,c,civ,.cvi, cc, cxii, cxvi, cxviii, cxxii, cxxiv, cxxvii, cxxx, cxxxiv, cxxxvi; Gurdaspur, cxx, cxxiii; Gujrat, pp. lxxvii, lxxviii; Jhelum, pp. lxxx-lxxxi; Gurgaon, pp. xcvi, cxix; Rawalpindi, pp. xcvi-xcvii; Jhang, pp. lxxiv, lxxvi; Sialkot, pp. cxvi, cxviii; Gujranwala, pp. xcvi-xcvii, c-ci; Ferozepore, pp. cxxvi, cxxix, cxxxii, cxxxv; Hissar, cii, cviii, cx-cxi; Mianwali, pp. lxxxviii-lxxxix; Ludhiana, pp. xciv-xcv; Lahore, pp. civ-cxiii; Attock, pp. lxxx-lxxxi; Shahpur, pp. cii-cv; Jullundur, pp. cxiv, cxix, cxxi, PBRL.

²⁰⁵ *Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. II, p. 170, IOR.*

²⁰⁶ Roshan Lal Anand (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *Tanning Industry in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1939, p. 15, PPL.

Despite the discrepancy recorded above it is clear that tanning and associated leather crafts made a substantial contribution to industrial output in the Punjab. After weaving, it was the second biggest employer of labor;²⁰⁷ at least 167,345 boot, shoe and sandal manufacturers depended on it as a source of raw material.²⁰⁸

The method of curing leather, however, was crude and wasteful, and the industry generally was the preserve of illiterate cottage tanneries. By 1939, only two tanneries were registered under the provisions of the Factories Act - one in Wazirabad, the other in Sialkot. Tanning in the villages was mostly done by Chamars, who were predominantly Muslim, though other groups involved included Muslim Khatiks and Chamrangs, the mainly Muslim Dabgars, and the Hindu Pasis. Hindu involvement, both at the laborer and financier levels was extremely small, owing to the caste prejudices against handling animal products. As a result the industry was almost exclusively financed by Muslims, the Khojas exercising a virtual monopoly.²⁰⁹

The location of foundries at Batala, resulted mainly from the suitability of the local sand deposits, which proved very valuable in the construction of moulds, and the fact that the surrounding area was populated by large numbers of Lohars (blacksmiths). The origin of the industry dated back to the 1880's when a local capitalist, Rai Sahib Ganda Mal, began manufacturing sugar cane presses in response to local demands. It was the sons of his Muslim mechanic, Mirani Bux, however, who expanded the industry by founding independent concerns, Mal having discontinued production when a boiler in his foundry exploded, killing three men.²¹⁰

By 1941 there were 26 foundries in Batala, 22 of which were owned by Muslim Lohars, most of whom were illiterate, and who relied on clerks to carry out clerical work. The labor force was similarly dominated by Muslims; all of the 49 mould-contractors were Muslims, so were 78 of the 79 molders.²¹¹ This Muslim dominance, however, occurred in an industry which made only a comparatively small contribution to the over-all industrial wealth of the Province. In 1932 the iron industry earned Rs. 2,251,250,²¹² a figure which represented the entire iron production of the Province, which by 1939 had 46 foundries, including those at Batala. The Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry attempted in 1941 to discover the capital investment in the Batala concerns, but it proved to be a complicated task. Not only was there the problem of evaluating land, buildings and machinery, but the working capital fluctuated with the measure of

²⁰⁷ Ibid., Foreword, p. iii.

²⁰⁸ *Census of India*, 1931, Punjab, Pt.II, Table X, p. 179, IOR.

²⁰⁹ Roshan Lal Anand, op. cit., Preface, pp. iii-viii, pp. 19-21, 66, 68-69.

²¹⁰ L.R. Dawar (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *Iron Foundry Industry at Batala*, District Gurdarapur, Lahore, 1941, pp. 1, 11, 16-17, PPL.

²¹¹ Ibid., pp. 8-9, 44-45.

²¹² K.T. Shah, op. cit., p. 39.

industrial activity, the foundry owners taking short-term loans according to their immediate requirements. Even so it was established that of the 26 foundries, one, a limited company, had a paid up capital of Rs. 107,250, of the others the largest investment was estimated to be Rs. 80,000, and the smallest Rs. 6,000. Thus on the whole they were small establishments, added to which at the outbreak of war in 1939 the industry was placed under strict Government control to conserve scrap iron, and output was confined to a limited number of articles, e.g. ploughing implements, etc., for which there was only a seasonal demand, as a result of which the foundries were idle for a number of months each year. The industry was further handicapped because it lacked adequate capital, and high interest rates demanded for that which was available inhibited growth. Also the industry was retarded, because the majority of the illiterate owners employed no trained business assistants, salesmen or qualified engineering staff; only one of the 26 foundries was under the supervision of a trained engineer.²¹³

The Muslim community, therefore, only exercised control over two spheres of the Punjab's industrial life. Of these, tanning, though important, was backward, ill-organized and wasteful, representing a cottage industry, rather than an intensive branch of production, whilst the enterprises at Batala were mainly petty concerns, operating on a small profit margin. Neither demanded large capital investments. Industry in general, however, received its greatest impetus from the availability of capital:

"As in the previous decade, the demand for industrialization came from those seeking to employ capital and from the middle classes seeking employment outside the overcrowded literary professions."²¹⁴

As in the case of money-lending, Muslims in general simply did not possess comparable resources to match the degree of investment made by non-Muslims, Hindus in particular, whilst the professions were almost the preserve of the latter.

In many respects, therefore, the Punjab was a Muslim province in name only. Though the community dominated the Province numerically, it barely controlled 50% of the agricultural land, it was the most emburdened in respect of debt, and in the crucial economic spheres of usury and industry it constituted only a small minority amongst the investors. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the comparative backwardness which Muslims experienced was reflected in their low level of participation in the field of education, and that in turn had a retrograde effect on the number of Muslims who entered the 'professions', particularly the Provincial and Indian Civil Services. The fact that Muslims as compared to Hindus and Sikhs failed to achieve levels of participation and employment comparable with their majority

²¹³ L.R. Dawar, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 9-10, 53.

²¹⁴ *Census of India*, 1931, Punjab, Pt. I, p. 43, IOR.

population status did not, to begin with, influence the course of provincial politics. The political life of the Province was dominated by an extremely wealthy Muslim zamindar elite, which collectively felt neither socially nor economically threatened by the Hindu and Sikh industrialist, trading and administrative classes. Also although some Muslim politicians expressed concern over the general unsatisfactory state of their less fortunate co-religionists, the need in the late 1930's and early 1940's to maintain a multi-communal coalition in the Province, to enable the Muslim controlled Unionist Party to command a majority in the Provincial Assembly prevented any reforms being enacted to specifically benefit the Muslims. It was only with the growth of Muslim nationalism and the emergence of a Muslim League Opposition Party in the Punjab that the retarded economic condition of the Muslim community in general, as compared to that of non-Muslims, assumed a political dimension. Even so it represented, by and large, an offshoot of communalism, in that the resentment of the poorer and deprived sections of Muslim society was directed mainly against the Hindu economic elite, rather than against privileged sections of Muslim society.

CHAPTER II

POLICY, PREJUDICE AND POVERTY - THE MUSLIM RESPONSE TO WESTERN EDUCATION IN THE PUNJAB, 1849 to 1947

The spread of western education in the Punjab was a direct consequence of the annexation of the province by the British in 1849. Whilst Hindus and Sikhs exhibited a willingness to embrace the new learning, Muslims were far less enthusiastic. The roots of this phenomenon lay in the cultural confrontation born out of British paramountcy in India, and the general poverty which afflicted the Muslims to a greater degree than the other communities. For many Muslims the new educational order was a living reminder of lost political hegemony, and was regarded as constituting a dangerous challenge to their culture, society and religion. There were others, however, who though free from such prejudices were unable to bear the cost of western learning. Initially Muslim alienation and lack of opportunity was intensified by British refusals to compromise on the vital issues of religious teaching, which was forbidden in Government schools, or to allow financial inducements to encourage greater Muslim participation. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, and during the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, a conciliatory approach was adopted to gain Muslim cooperation. Though it contributed to removing some of the economic barriers which inhibited greater Muslim enrolment, religious education was never sanctioned as part of the regular curriculum, as a result there remained in the community a strong seam of religio-cultural prejudice towards government learning and institutions.

To begin with British educational policy constituted a direct attack on traditional Muslim scholarship. As a result Muslims resented the new system. Up until 1849 the Muslims had controlled the indigenous education system: "As educators (Muslims) are in possession of the field; not only is the Koran taught in every mosque, but outside a great many mosques the standard Persian works are taught to all comers" Consequently Muslim schools were recognized to be "the most genuine educational institutions in the country."²¹⁵ In spite of their complimentary observations, however, the British clearly regarded the Muslim *madrasas* (schools) as an obstacle to the introduction of government sponsored western learning through the medium of government schools. Thus whilst the Director of Education in July 1857 noted that "the idea of education is not new to the Panjabis. We find all the school phraseology readymade to our hand, and chiefly supplied by the Muhammadans", he made it clear that Muslim educationalists would not receive government support. "Certainly I find that the natural tendency of things, if left to themselves, is to throw the whole weight of

²¹⁵ Extract from PER, 6 July 1857, quoted by G.W. Leitner, *History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab since Annexation and in 1882*, Calcutta, 1663, pp. 56-59.

Government in this matter of education on to the side of the Muhammadans - a tendency to be much resisted."²¹⁶

The Director's concluding phrase revealed the official objective: the Muslim educational system was to be replaced. This development resulted from the Government's determination to establish a system in keeping with its traditions, culture and administrative needs, and which would reflect its political dominance. To achieve these ends the British were prepared to be ruthless in breaking the Muslim monopoly. The Deputy Commissioner of Jhujjar suggested in 1859 that "The evil may be gradually remedied by selecting Teachers from amongst the Hindu pupils of Tahsili school."²¹⁷ The use of the word 'evil' to describe Muslim control demonstrated the strength of feeling behind the British strategy. The remedy seemed simple; if Muslim teachers were removed, then Islamic teaching practices would disappear with them. It was a proposal which the Director of Education supported and expanded:

"we cannot supersede (*sic*) them so long as they retain their popularity. District Officers, however, might prepare the way for a gradual change by encouraging more Hindus to qualify as teachers, and by appointing them to schools where the residents are not too strongly prejudiced in favor of Mahomedan instructors."²¹⁸

District officials, however, employed more than persuasive measures to accomplish this goal. Government schoolmasters, zaildars, lambardars, and tahsildars, at times used intimidation to ensure that boys attended government schools rather than Muslim institutions. Furthermore occasionally persecution was directed against those who maintained indigenous and unaided schools in competition with government institutions. Leitner, the Orientalist and educationalist, quoted instances of teachers having been expelled from their ancestral villages, of a jagirdar being prevented from returning a *muafi* (rent-free grant of land) to an indigenous school, and of *muafis* being resumed on the death of teachers who left no heirs, instead of the grants being maintained for educational purposes.²¹⁹

Widespread resumption undoubtedly played a part in the destruction of the Muslim educational system. Leitner claimed that the majority of teachers and maulvis had been in possession of rent free grants of land. After annexation, the Province had been expected to provide revenue for the imperial coffers; this was achieved in part by resuming rent-free lands. No distinction was made by the Government between land which had been awarded for service to the state and that granted for charitable educational purposes. The latter generally inalienable up to 1849, also had been resumed:

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²¹⁷ PER, 1859-60, pp. 27-28, L/P&J/3/1157, IOR.

²¹⁸ PER, 1860-61, p. 15, E2VI, IOR.

²¹⁹ G.W. Leitner, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

"it was a common custom in former times to give grants of rent-free land to persons who were bound in return to teach youth. Most of these grants...have been resumed...."

In only a few places was the continuance of such grants permitted (Sultanpur in Amritsar District, Badanath in Sialkot District, Jugraon in Ludhiana District and Lashari and Pakpattan in Gugaira District), on the condition that schools so endowed were subject to government inspection, and would "be gradually made to conform to the rules laid down..."²²⁰ Thus loss of independence, and thereby their character, was the price demanded in exchange for their continuance.

As a result of the various measures taken by the government, there was a serious decline in pupil attendance at indigenous schools. Whereas in 1854 at least 333,550 pupils attended such schools,²²¹ by 1883 their number had fallen to 135,385.²²² This development, and especially the role which resumption was believed to have played in it, was counterproductive to securing Muslim participation in the government system. It was not the scale of resumption but its effect on the Muslim mind, which associated the general decline of Muslim society, especially the scholastic classes, with government policies: the National Muhammadan Association claiming in February 1882 "that these (resumption) proceedings entailed wholesale ruin on the Muhammadan community in general, and the scholastic classes in particular..."²²³

British officialdom to justify its actions added insult to injury by denigrating the content of Muslim education. In 1881 Ibbetson, the Punjab Censor, declared "The primary education of the Mussalman is confined to learning parts of the Quran by rote, and perhaps being able to read, though never to understand it."²²⁴ It was an observation not confined to the Punjab; Griffith, the Director of Education for the North-Western Province, complained that in Muslim schools

"there is no mental training, nothing in fact which can be called education... The eye learns to recognize, and the hand to form the Persian characters. Words are then committed to memory; and this is nearly all the instruction that the teacher wishes to impart or the pupil to receive."

²²⁰ Extract from PER, 1856-57, quoted in *ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

²²² Report of the Indian Education Commission, 1882-84, pr. 621-622, V/26/860/1, IOR.

²²³ G. of I, Home Dept. (Education) Proceedings, PEP, Nov. 1885, Vol. 2466, p. 262, IOR.

²²⁴ *Census of India*, 1881, Punjab, Pt. I, p. 406, IOR.

Griffith also objected to what he considered to be the highly immoral character of some of the works which were studied, referring to the "elaborate indecency of the Bahar-o-Danish...."²²⁵

Only one 'Punjab' official championed the cause of Muslim learning, though he weakened his case to an extent by basing it solely on the achievements of an institution situated outside of the Punjab, and which was untypical of Muslim schools in general. Using the Deoband Perso-Arabic school as his example, Leitner described a course of education which entailed seven years of study, and included the use and consideration of works in Urdu dealing with Islam, a vocabulary in verse in Arabic, Persian and Hindi, verbal roots and conjunctions, admonitions in verse, an early letter writer with epistolary exercises, and a lexicon in Arabic and Persian. Literary pieces which were studied involved the works of famous poets, and the letters of Aurangzeb to his sons. In addition Leitner demonstrated that the sciences were not neglected, as both mathematics and medicine were studied at Deoband. Having established that Muslim schools could be genuine and efficient places of learning, he dismissed such official criticisms as voiced by Ibbetson and Griffith, attributing them to the possession of only "an elementary knowledge..." of Persian education.²²⁶

The contending arguments in this controversy appeared in part to echo the battle of an earlier age between Macaulay and the British Orientalists in Bengal, who in 1823 founded Sanskrit College, not as a bastion of Hindu conservatism or reaction, but as an educational experiment in cultural fusion.²²⁷ In the Punjab, however, the debate concerning the merits of Muslim education was purely academic because Muslim learning, having lost official patronage, had ceased to be of relevance. Persian had been abolished in 1837 as the language of the courts,²²⁸ whilst in 1864 the Central Government had ruled that only English would in future constitute the examination medium for the senior covenanted appointments.²²⁹ As early as 1854 the significance of the supersession of Persian by English had been apparent to the Directors of the East India Company:

"persons who possess a Knowledge of English are preferred to others in many employments, public as well as private, a very moderate proficiency in the

²²⁵ Griffith to Elliot, 30 Aug. 1871, Selections from the Records of the Govt. of India, Correspondence on the subject of the Education of the Muhammadan Community in British India and Their Employment in the Public Services, Calcutta, 1886, pp. 192-195, H1(7), PGSL. (Hereafter referred to as Correspondence on Muhammadan Education).

²²⁶ G.W. Leitner, op. cit., pp. 60, 63-64, 73-74.

²²⁷ The aim of the College's founder, H.H. Wilson, had been to preserve Hindu classical and scientific learning, whilst providing opportunities for scholars to study European disciplines. See D. Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Muslim Mind*, Princeton, 1979, p. 47.

²²⁸ See P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 36.

²²⁹ Proceedings and Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Vol. I, p. 465, PGRC.

English language is often looked upon by those who attend school instruction as the end and object of their education..."²³⁰

The introduction of English, and the importance of western education impressed a small body of Muslims. Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan (educational reformer, founder Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) and the British India Association of N.W.P. determined to encourage increased Muslim participation in the sphere of western education. In a letter to the Governor-General in August 1867, Sir Sayid outlined the Association's concern at the poor Muslim response to western learning, and its desire to reverse the trend:

"I would especially call their attention to the urgent necessity there is for the study of English. It is not only requisite on account of the many lucrative posts which it enables those who study it to fill, but on account of the manifold uses it confers in the daily routine of life."²³¹

Whilst Sir Sayid's advice was sound, and the rewards tempting, there were profound socio-religious considerations which discouraged the adoption of western education by many Punjabi Muslims. These were cited by Muslim critics to the Education Commissions of 1871 and 1882. Some of the commentators were of the opinion that government education was unpopular because it corrupted the manners and morals of Muslim pupils, and as a result the 'better classes' refused to subject their sons to such damaging contact.²³² In this context they complained that western learning failed to devote sufficient attention to the cultivation of qualities inherent in traditional Islamic etiquette and culture: the reverence of God, and consideration for parents, teachers, and the aged.²³³ Consequently many of the wealthier families preferred to educate their children privately at home. This practice was also popular because the 'better-born' were usually unwilling to permit their heirs to associate at classroom level with pupils of a lower social status.²³⁴

Muslim reluctance to acquire the new education, however, was not confined solely to the elite, and even in that category rejection did not always occur on account of apprehension concerning etiquette and social exclusiveness. In response to the 1871 Commission, Rahim Khan, Medical Fellow and Member of the Punjab University Senate, portrayed Muslim society as consisting broadly of three classes. These comprised the upper class including nawabs, jagirdars and rich zamindars; the middle

²³⁰ Court of Directors (East India Company) to Governor-General, 19 July 1854, PEP, Oct. 1867, Vol. 24, PP. 39-40, IOR.

²³¹ Memorandum by the British Indian Association (N.W.P.) to Governor-General, 1 Aug. 1867, PEP, Oct. 1867, Vol. 24, p. 43, IOR.

²³² Report of the Indian Education Commission, 1882-83, Calcutta, 1882-84, p. 486, v/24/860/1, IOR.

²³³ G.W. Leitner, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

²³⁴ Report of the Indian Education Commission, 1882-83, Calcutta, 1882-84, p. 505, v/24/860/1, IOR.

class which included maulvis, munshis and respectable government servants; the lower class which consisted of tradesmen, e.g. carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. Rahim claimed that members of the upper and lower strata, as a rule were indifferent to the education of their children. The rich classes had no need to acquire western learning whereas the poor rejected it because they considered it essential for their heirs to acquire ancestral professions. It was only the 'middle class', Rahim contended, who "having no riches and no other profession than "that of the pen" devote their heart and soul to the education of their offspring."²³⁵

Social considerations, and family and professional traditions did not pose the only obstructions to the adoption of western education. A further contributory factor was that certain means of instruction in use, namely picture books, were offensive to Muslim traditions. It was an obstacle which the Reverend Forman, "the Nestor of schoolmasters in the Punjab", recognized and condemned. Forman had observed from Lahore to the Frontier districts the "*strongest aversion among the lower classes of Muhammadans to our schools in consequence of the extent to which pictures of living objects were depicted in our books*", as Islam forbade the portrayal of animate objects. As a result of Forman's criticism the Senate in June 1879 advised that such books should not be employed in Frontier schools,²³⁶ though their use continued throughout the remainder of the Province.

Of all the non-economic social factors, however, which contributed to limit the appeal of government education, the exclusion of religious instruction was the greatest. The Muslim members of the Punjab University Senate had bluntly stated in response to the 1871 Commission that western education would "never be thoroughly popular with the Muhammadans, as it ignores their religious teaching...."²³⁷ The Registrar of the University, however, refused to be drawn on the issue, stressing that the Senate "cannot advocate the introduction of religious teaching In Government Schools, as this would be infringing one of the fundamental principles of our educational system."²³⁸

This was in keeping with Imperial policy. The Viceroy, Mayo, in initiating the 1871 Commission had made it clear that whilst he supported the inclusion of classical subjects to broaden the appeal of government schools to Muslims, he would not permit the introduction of religious instruction.²³⁹ Provincial administrations in the Punjab rigidly subscribed to this view for the greater part of British rule, thereby maintaining the barriers its exclusion constituted, though by 1915 official attitudes had relaxed to the

²³⁵ Memorandum by K.B. Rahim Khan, enclosure, Pearson, Registrar, Punjab University College to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 17 April 1872, PEP, April 1872, Vol. 136, p. 283, IOR.

²³⁶ G.W. Leitner, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

²³⁷ Views of the Muhammadan Members of the Senate, Punjab University College, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 17 April 1872, PEP, April 1872, Vol. 136, p. 285, IOR.

²³⁸ Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 157, p. 80, IOR.

²³⁹ G. of I., Home Dept. (Education) Proceedings, 7 Aug, 1871, (extract), PEP, Aug. 1871, Vol. 105, p. 128, IOR.

extent that religious teaching was allowed in school premises out of school hours and not as part of the official programme.²⁴⁰

The refusal to provide for Muslim religious instruction was a symptom of the general lack of sympathy displayed by Punjab officials for the community as evinced by their reactions to the two Commissions of Inquiry of 1871 and 1882. The Provincial Government on both occasions even refused to admit that the community was educationally backward. In 1871 the Lt. Governor, Davies, claimed that "In the Punjab Proper...the Muhammadan population avail themselves of the educational opportunities offered to them to as great a degree in proportion to their numbers as the Hindu population."²⁴¹ This statement was misleading and false as it ignored the evidence of the University Senate, which had been presented to the local government. The Senate had observed that Muslims, who accounted for 53% of the population, constituted only 38% of the total number of pupils in government village schools, 20% in government English schools, and only 5% in government colleges. It was a state of affairs which had caused the University Registrar to conclude "it appears that Muhammadans do not avail themselves of the education offered so readily as the Hindus..."²⁴² Ten years later the Provincial Government continued to display an unrealistic attitude. It argued that "The Muhammadans are not backward in taking advantage of the existing educational facilities", a deduction based on the fact that total Muslim representation had increased from 35% in 1871-72 to over 38% in 1881.²⁴³ This low increase, coupled with the fact that the Muslim community had not achieved a position in education comparable to its population ratio (51% in 1881) demonstrated that they were backward!

However inadequate the conclusions of the Punjab Government were, the 1871 Commission which was devoted solely to examining the Muslim position, and whose findings as far as the Punjab was concerned, drew heavily on the views expressed by the Punjab University Senate membership, revealed that the main factors behind Muslim reticence were religious, social and pecuniary. In 1882 these views remained unchallenged, and were incorporated in the Punjab's contribution to that inquiry. Nevertheless the European Senate members had tended to disregard the socio-religious sensitivities of the Muslim community, whilst a majority of them opposed the provision of any financial inducements to alleviate Muslim difficulties. The Registrar noted that "the strongest reason alleged (for the low level of Muslim enrolment) is the general poverty and unthrifty habits of the Muhammadan people, owing to which they fail to

²⁴⁰ Godley, U. Sec., Punjab Govt., Education Dept. to Sec., G. of I., Education Dept., 20 April 1915, PEP, April 1915, Vol. 9695, p. 18, IOR.

²⁴¹ Griffin, Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt. to Sec., G. of I, Home Dept., 21 Feb. 1873, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, pp. 77-78, IOR.

²⁴² Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, pp. 80-81, TOR.

²⁴³ G. of I, Home Dept. (Education) Proceedings, 15 July 1885 (extract) PEP, Nov. 1885, Vol. 2466, pp. 257, 261; IOR.

secure for themselves advantages which they would gladly accept."²⁴⁴ Although this view, as will be seen later, was not entirely representative of the opinions of the Muslim members of the Senate, the latter did acknowledge that poverty prevented many from enjoying the educational facilities, and they urged that financial aid in the form of scholarships be provided by the Local Government to reduce the scale of the problem.²⁴⁵

The adverse reactions of the European Senate members to the Muslim recommendation revealed not only a lack of sympathy, but a degree of prejudice which partly contributed to the perpetration of Muslim backwardness in education. Of the twelve European members, excluding the Registrar, whose views were recorded, nine were currently serving as civil servants, whose periods of service in India ranged from 12 to 27 years.²⁴⁶ Of the non-officials, Forman was one of the leading educationalists in the Punjab. The majority, therefore, should have been capable of balanced judgments. Of the total, however, only three demonstrated any sympathy for the Muslims, six were strongly opposed to offering financial assistance to the community, and only two questioned the assertions of the Registrar and the Provincial Government that Muslims were not in need of any special consideration. In addition a strong current of anti-Muslim bias was apparent throughout their deliberation.²⁴⁷

In opposing the provision for special scholarships for Muslims as requested by the Muslim Senate Members, Lindsay (Judge of the Chief Court of the Punjab) wrote, "I think such a system would give rise to much bitter feeling, and I doubt whether the result as regards Muhammadans would justify the measure."²⁴⁸ Whilst Maclagan (Chief Engineer, Public Works Department) interpreted their low attendance in Government schools as a character defect common to all:

"The Muhammadans as a rule, are more inert (than Hindus), - a smaller proportion of them rise to the higher efforts required for higher attainments, a

²⁴⁴ Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, p. 81, IOR.

²⁴⁵ Opinion of the Muhammadan Members of the Senate, Punjab University College, on Muhammadan Education, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, p. 92, IOR.

²⁴⁶ C.R. Lindsay, Judge, Chief Court of the Punjab, entered service 1844; Col. R. Maclagan, Chief Engineer, Dept. of Public Works, entered service 1860; L. Griffin, U. Sec., Punjab Govt., entered service 1860; P.S. Melvill, Commissioner, Rawalpindi, entered service 1846; T.E.D. Brown, Surgeon, entered service 1858; J.W. Smyth, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, entered service 1858; R.E. Egerton, Financial Commissioner, entered service 1849; J.G. Cordery, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, entered service 1856; C. Boulnois, Judge, Calcutta Court of small causes, n.d., India Army and Civil List, July 1869, p. 23; India Office and Civil Lists, July 1872, pp. 2-4, 7, 82, 244; July 1873, p. 5, IOL.

²⁴⁷ See Opinions of European Senate Members, Punjab University College, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, pp. 86-88, 92-93, IOR.

²⁴⁸ Opinion of C.R. Lindsay, *ibid.*, p. 86.

larger proportion taking to employments which can be obtained with less learning or smaller exertion."²⁴⁹

Griffin (Officiating Secretary to Punjab Government) even went so far as to deny that the Muslim community represented a backward class within Punjabi society, as they held a majority of 'good appointments' under the Government, and as such were not in need of any special consideration in the field of education: "They had far more than the share which, taking their numbers into consideration, might be thought their right...". Furthermore in opposing the giving of grant-in-aid to Muslim schools, Griffin revealed the depth of his contempt: "It is to throw the education of the masses into the hands of the priests, and those who advocate it should logically advocate the education of the youth of Europe being again entrusted to the Jesuits."²⁵⁰

The tone these gentlemen adopted reflected an almost total lack of concern for the predicament of the Muslim community. In fact, Griffin's claim that the Muslims did not represent a depressed section of society, an assertion he based on their employment level in the bureaucracy was a blatant misrepresentation. Ten years after he made those remarks Muslims represented a majority in only one class of the services, accounting for 54 out of the Extra Assistant Commissioners posts, in comparison to 38 appointments held by the Hindus. Out of a total of 312 administrative and judicial appointments Muslims held only 141, whilst of the 440 positions which included executive and assistant engineers, assistant surgeons, professors and headmasters, and forest rangers, Muslims accounted for only 168.²⁵¹ In addition to which in 1872 even Pearson, the Registrar, had openly admitted that Muslims constituted a minority in the services, particularly with regard to those appointments where a knowledge of English was required:

"when we come to departments where English is necessary, the Hindu has the advantage, and consequently... if the average salary of the two were calculated, that of the Hindu would be found far the highest, because English work receives, as a rule, higher remuneration."²⁵²

The absence of concern displayed by the European Senate members was also complemented by ignorance of which the following case is but one example. C. Boulnois (Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes) offered a novel explanation for Muslim failures in English education. He stated that "For an Indian Muhammadan to acquire English really well would draw largely on an imitative faculty which their

²⁴⁹ Opinion of R. Maclagan, *ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁵⁰ Opinion of L. Griffin, *ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁵¹ Young, Sec., Punjab Govt. to Sec., G. of I, Home Dept., 19 April 1883, Correspondence on Muhammadan Education, p. 291, H(1)7, PGSL.

²⁵² Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, p. 81, IOR.

customs seem to me to discourage."²⁵³ Presumably it had not occurred to him that Muslim custom required prayers to be spoken in a foreign language (Arabic) which, to the vast majority, necessitated the exercise of considerable imitative ability! It seems almost inconceivable that Boulnois' point of view was conveyed unchallenged to the Provincial Government, but its inclusion is difficulties In fact that Muslims indicative of the superficial way in which Muslim were often treated in the Punjab.

only two European Senate members were inclined to admit were in need of special help, which they believed could be provided through scholarships. Melvill (Commissioner of Rawalpindi) believed that such a provision was desirable and just, but only in so far that it would equip Muslims for Government service.²⁵⁴ T. E. Brown, a Government surgeon, adopted a similar stance. He argued that by granting special scholarships specifically for the study of English, Muslims would be better equipped to compete in those areas of the service where a knowledge of the language was required.²⁵⁵ In advocating this approach Melvill and Brown were in a minority of two, and their views were not even considered by the Registrar who, in presenting his report, dismissed the idea of providing scholarships specifically for Muslims: "if a number of additional stipends were specifically given for their benefit, the holders would not do anything worth the outlay."²⁵⁶

In making this comment the Registrar reflected the majority opinion of his European colleagues. The reasons for their general prejudice, especially regarding the Muslim character, had both political and social origins. It occurred in part, according to Leitner, from misconceptions concerning the Muslim role in the Mutiny,²⁵⁷ although by the 1870's and '80's it seems to have been engendered to a greater extent by the belief that Islam and degeneracy were synonymous. It was an opinion clearly expressed by Ibbetson in the Punjab Census of 1881:

"It is curious how markedly for evil is the influence which conversion to even the most impure form of Mohomedanism has upon the character of the Panjab villager; how invariably it fills him with false pride and conceit, disinclines him from honest toil ... when we move through a tract inhabited by Hindus and Musalmans belonging to the same tribe, descended from the same ancestor, and living under the same conditions ... (we) find that as we pass each village, each field, each house, we can tell the religion of its owner by the greater idleness, poverty, and pretension, which mark the Mussalman..."²⁵⁸

²⁵³ Opinion of C. Boulnois, *ibid.*, p. 93.

²⁵⁴ Opinion of P.S. Melvill, *ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

²⁵⁵ Opinion of T.E. Brown, *ibid.*, p. 86.

²⁵⁶ Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, *ibid.*, p. 82.

²⁵⁷ G.W. Leitner, p. 53.

²⁵⁸ Census of India, 1881, Punjab, Pt. I, pp. 103-104, IOR.

Also the opposition to offering grants-in-aid, so forcibly expressed by Griffin, was in keeping with earlier British policy. As late as 1881, and in spite of the decline which had occurred in indigenous education, 40% of the total number of pupils in the Punjab were enrolled in private institutions, the vast majority of which were controlled and attended by Muslims.²⁵⁹ It is not surprising that the provincial administration, of which Griffin was a senior member, should be unenthusiastic about aiding a system which continued to command a formidable following in the Province, and whose monopoly it was the purpose of British policy to undermine. Thus although the University Senate on 27 January 1872, had approved the establishment of Muslim aided schools, the activity was limited to the Rawalpindi Division, and did not include the provision of such grants to established institutions.²⁶⁰ Political considerations of a communal nature were also voiced in opposition to the adoption of pecuniary measures to aid the community. Although only two European members of the Senate, Lindsay and Griffin, proffered this objection, Griffin's position as Secretary to the Government gave it weight. The latter contended, "I believe it is impolitic and certain to lead to after embarrassment ... to stimulate the education of one class at the expense of any other."²⁶¹

In presenting the opinions of the European Senate members to the Imperial Government, both the Registrar and the Provincial Government were at pains to establish that Muslim education in the Province was being conducted along the lines suggested by the Viceroy at the time of the Commission's appointment, and as a result no further measures were necessary. In July 1872 the Registrar pointed out that in accordance with viceregal policy "the principle of promoting the cultivation of the vernaculars and of the study of oriental classics has from the first been maintained by the Senate..."²⁶² whilst the appointment of Muslim teachers in English schools had not been overlooked. As a result, the Lt. Governor could safely, if erroneously, claim in February 1873 that "The suggestions of these gentlemen (Members of Senate) for the encouragement of Muhammadan education show that no special action is necessary on the part of the Government." Furthermore, in support of these views Griffin assured the Imperial Government that the Hindu and Muslim members of the Senate were unanimous "as to the absence of all just complaint with the Government system (of education) in the Punjab."²⁶³

Griffin's assertion, however, was spurious. The Registrar and the local government had conspired to engineer Muslim evidence to suit their purpose, and had rejected such Muslim recommendations which were at variance with their own point of view. Thus in

²⁵⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 405-406 and G.W. Leitner, Pt. III, p. 1.

²⁶⁰ Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, p. 80, IOR.

²⁶¹ Opinions of C.R. Lindsay and L. Griffin, *ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

²⁶² Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, *ibid.*, p. 80.

²⁶³ Griffin to Sec. G. of I, Home Dept., 21 Feb. 1873, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, pp. 77-78.

presenting their case the Muslim Senate members on 8 July 1872 had pointed out that they had been compromised with regard to the scope of their criticism:

"As it is the desire of Government not to make any alterations in the subjects of education, but only to amend the mode of education, we therefore confine our remarks to the latter; otherwise, we would have expressed our opinion at more length on all points connected with the improvement of education."

In the event they recorded their approval of the British system's treatment of the English, Arabic and Persian languages, recognizing the importance of English education in particular, but they tempered this with a strong plea to the Government to recognize the general poverty of the community, and to provide pecuniary assistance in the form of grants-in-aid and scholarships to encourage the recruitment of Muslim pupils.²⁶⁴

The validity of these observations was further reduced by the fact that they represented a second, and muted, appraisal. The original memorandum, presented in April 1872, had been decidedly critical. As previously stated, the Muslim Senate members deprecated the absence of religious instruction in government schools, and the government's reluctance to give financial aid for their co-religionists. In fact they had made a specific request for the appointment of teachers of all denominations to cater for the pupils' religious needs, and for the provision of stipends for Muslims in all government schools. In addition they regretted that the study of 'Oriental Classics' had been designated a subordinate position to western learning, claiming that it would not encourage the learned classes to support the British system. Defending Oriental studies they argued that to pass the lowest oriental examination at the Punjab University College required infinitely more study than to take the B.A. degree at Calcutta University. They laid stress on the high standards set by Indian scholars and added, "to consign native scholars, many of whom could teach the most eminent European Orientalists, to a position of inferiority is neither just nor expedient."²⁶⁵

Moreover the original memorandum had been accompanied by statements supporting to various degrees the criticisms and recommendations it contained, which had been contributed by representatives of three sections of Muslim society - religious, academic, and journalistic. The Sunni Maulvis, whose views were recorded, and Muhammad Latif, the editor of the *Anjuman-i-Punjab*, recommended the immediate introduction of religious study, stressing that the government system would remain unpopular amongst Muslims so long as it was omitted. Latif even urged that special Muslim schools should be established in which instruction in the Koran would be permitted,

²⁶⁴ Opinion of the Muhammadan Members of the Senate, Punjab University College, on Muhammadan Education, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol. 137, p. 92, IOR.

²⁶⁵ Views of the Muhammadan Members of the Senate, Punjab University, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 17 April 1872, PEP, April 1872, Vol. 136, p. 285, IOR.

and that the Fiqah and Hadis should form part of the curriculum in all government schools.²⁶⁶

Conversely Rahim Khan, the academic, though he supported the demands for special pecuniary measures to aid Muslims, did not press for the introduction of religious study. Though he conceded that its exclusion was responsible for the rejection of government learning by "the lower order of the community", he was confident that the "enlightened members" would enroll their children if special stipends were available in government schools and colleges.²⁶⁷

The Muslim members of the Senate and the other Muslim commentators therefore had two main complaints with the existing system - the exclusion of religion and the absence of financial assistance. Both were an anathema to the Government, whilst all the views expressed denied the official claim that Muslims supported and were satisfied with the education available. In addition Muslim pleas for financial aid constituted a serious challenge to the views of the majority of the European Senate members, that such consideration was unnecessary. In short the Muslim contribution to the proceedings constituted an embarrassing analysis which the administration preferred to ignore. Their evidence was therefore rejected on two specific counts. That of the Muslim Senate members was refused credence because the Lt. Governor regretted that it "has been submitted in such a form as to deprive it of much of the weight to which it would naturally be entitled...", i.e. it had not been signed by the individual commentators. Whilst the supporting statements were ignored because they represented "The anonymous production of certain gentlemen unconnected with the Senate ... and, though they may contain some suggestions worthy of consideration ... no weight can be attached to any such communications..." because "the request of the Government was merely for the opinion of the members of the Senate..."²⁶⁸

These reasons proffered by Griffin on 26 April 1872 were far from satisfactory. In the first place the Registrar had assured him that the April memorandum of the Muslim Senate members did represent their genuine feelings, and had been compiled by Leitner from the reports of "frequent discussions upon this subject in the Executive Committee of the Senate..."²⁶⁹ In considering why it had been unsigned, Griffin had complained that the Lt. Governor was unable to understand why any 'native gentlemen' should be unwilling to append their signatures to views recorded by them.²⁷⁰ The reason, however, was obvious. To express opinions totally out of favor with the Government

²⁶⁶ Opinions of Sunni Maulvis on Education and Khazis, and Memorandum by Muhammad Latif, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec. to Punjab Govt., 17 April 1872, PEP, April 1872, Vol. 136, pp. 284, 286, IOR.

²⁶⁷ Memorandum on Muhammadan Education in India by Rahim Khan, 17 April 1872, enclosure, Pearson to Offg. Sec., Punjab Govt., 17 April 1872, PEP, Vol.136, p.284, TOR.

²⁶⁸ Griffin to Pearson, 26 p. 292, IOR.

²⁶⁹ Pearson to Griffin, 17 p. 283, IOR.

²⁷⁰ Griffin to Pearson, 26 IOR.

would court the displeasure of the Lt. Governor, whose prerogative it was to sanction privilege and forward opportunity. This was partly borne out by Leitner, who attributed the Muslim commentators' reluctance to sign to the fact that "so strongly, if erroneously, did the Muhammadan community believe itself under the disfavor of Government, that its most prominent members gave me their views...with the injunction not to mention their names."²⁷¹ In dismissing the independent Muslim statements which had been submitted in support of the Muslim Senate members' views, one cannot deny that the Government was within its rights to reject opinions it had not sought. Nevertheless it was a short-sighted and unrealistic move in view of the fact that Griffin had admitted the possibility that they merited consideration. Also not all the statements had been anonymous as he claimed. Latif and Rahim Khan had signed theirs, and the latter was a member of the Senate, which Griffin evidently 'overlooked' when he stated that they were all unconnected with that institution.

It is evident that the opinions were rejected on account of their content and not their presentation. Griffin's plea that the memorandum of April 1872 would have received attention if signed²⁷² cannot be accepted as the signed memorandum of July 1872 which succeeded it, had also been disregarded and largely misinterpreted. This lack of consideration was synonymous with the fact that the Provincial Government determined not to concede that the Muslim community was backward or in need of special consideration and assistance. This attitude continued to govern provincial educational policy throughout the following decade and a half. Thus in response to the Commission of 1882 the Punjab Government remained rigidly attached to the position it had adopted in 1872, refusing to consider the introduction of special measures to assist the Muslim community.²⁷³

By the early 1880's, therefore, as a result of a combination of government policy, and Muslim conservatism and poverty, an impasse had been reached regarding Muslim participation in government education. The position was to alter within the following decade. This was the result of a change in Central Government policy and the social and political re-awakening within Muslim society. The former resulted largely from the attitude of Dufferin, the new Viceroy, and the recommendations of the Hunter Commission (1882), both of which were out of sympathy with the Punjab's stance. The Government of India and the Viceroy in particular had begun to view with alarm those middle-class, Hindu dominated political organizations, such as the three Presidency Associations (Calcutta, Bombay, Madras) established in 1851-52, which coalesced in 1885 to form the Indian National Congress.²⁷⁴ Official opinion from the mid-1880's grew

²⁷¹ G.W. Leitner, op.cit., P. 53.

²⁷² Griffin to Pearson, 26 April 1872, PEP, April 1872, Vol. 136, IOR.

²⁷³ Resolution of G. of I, concerning Muhammadan Educational Endowments, PEP, Nov. 1885, Vol. 2466, pp. 257, 261. IOR.

²⁷⁴ For information on formation of Congress see S.R. Mehrotra, Emergence of the Indian National Congress, Delhi, 1971, Ch. IV.

increasingly suspicious of their aims, believing that they were committed to undermine British rule in India.²⁷⁵ Hence Dufferin's willingness to appear sympathetic to the Muslims betrayed a desire to use that community as a counterweight to the Hindu controlled Congress.²⁷⁶ As for the movement for Muslim renewal, it was the result of a determined effort on the part of the Muslim educated elite to confront Government with the dilemma facing their co-religionists. This concern found expression at the national and provincial levels through the endeavors of the National Muhammadan Association and the Anjuman-i-Islamia.

Dufferin, at the outset of his viceroyalty, had assured the Muslim leaders of Western India that he would consider the representations which had been submitted to his predecessor by the National Muhammadan Association in February 1882.²⁷⁷ The Muslim leaders through the memorial had sought to impress upon the Government the deteriorating state of Muslim education. The serious decline in their opinion was the result of the resumption proceedings, the supersession of Persian by English, and the order of 1864 which ruled that English alone would constitute the examination medium for the more coveted government appointments.²⁷⁸ Whilst the 1882 Commission, which considered the memorial as part of its examination of education in general, did not admit the Association's charges, it adopted a conciliatory and constructive attitude towards Muslim education. In spite of the Punjab Government's assertion that no change was necessary, the Commission under the chairmanship of W.W. Hunter, made a number of recommendations designed to reconcile Islamic cultural needs with western education. Although it was adamant in its opposition to the introduction of religious instruction, it urged that provision be made for Persian to be taught in middle and high schools situated in Muslim majority areas. The Commission further recommended that indigenous Muslim schools should be liberally encouraged to introduce purely secular courses in their curricula; it advised an increased employment of Muslim inspecting officers, and the establishment of normal schools to train Muslim teachers. In addition it recommended that a graduated system of special scholarships for Muslims should be established and that in all classes of maintained schools a proportion of free studentships for Muslims should be reserved for the community. Furthermore, to prevent Muslim claims for assistance being overlooked, the Commission suggested that for the purpose of departmental reports the community should be treated as a special class requiring assistance.²⁷⁹

These provisions, which received full support from the Viceroy, made it extremely difficult for the Punjab Government to maintain its previous uncompromising attitude.

²⁷⁵ See L. Griffin, 'The Place of the Bengali in Politics', *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. 51 (1892), *An Advanced History* pp. 811-819.

²⁷⁶ R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri, K.K. Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, London, 1956, p. 841.

²⁷⁷ G. of 1, Home Dept. (Education) Proceedings, 15 July 1885 (extract) PEP, Nov. 1885, Vol. 2466, p. 251, IOR.

²⁷⁸ Report of the Indian Education Commission, 1882-83, Calcutta, 1882-64, pp. 496-498, V/26/860/1, 10R.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 505-507.

Dufferin in 1885 declared that he attached 'special importance' to the recommendations concerning the treatment of Muslims as a special class. According to the Viceroy "a liberal provision of scholarships..." was essential to attract Muslims into the realms of higher education, and he cautioned that "their wants must not be overlooked in the framing of any general scheme of scholarships for any Province..."²⁸⁰ This directive completely rejected the Punjab Government's position as enunciated by the Lt. Governor to the Commission of 1882: "It is not for the Government to confer special privileges upon any one class of its subjects when they have failed to avail themselves of the opportunities freely offered to all."²⁸¹

The publication of the Commission's findings and recommendations in 1883, together with the sympathetic attitude of the Viceroy, spurred Muslim leaders in the Punjab to take positive steps. In 1885 the Anjuman-i-Islamia was founded in the Province, to promote the dissemination of western learning and religious instruction amongst Muslims, especially the poorer classes.²⁸² On 3 January 1887 the Anjuman submitted a memorial to Aitcheson, the Lt. Governor. It was a skilful piece of work, which refrained from recrimination and prejudice. It appealed for the Lt. Governor's aid; the memorialists assured him that they had no sympathy for those who blamed the Government for the Muslim plight, claiming that it was due as much to their own apathy as to other causes. They emphasized that they did not seek assistance as a special privilege, but as a community which had erred and was in need of help. In spite of some increase in Muslim attendance in English schools, the Anjuman stressed that the community remained backward because of its general poverty, which posed the main stumbling block to their further participation in education. Finally it astutely reminded Aitcheson of the Commission's recommendations that "nothing short of special scholarships would enable the Muhammadans to keep up with the wealthier sections of the community." Whilst soliciting financial assistance for the community, the memorialists pointed out that the Governments of Bombay, Bengal, and Madras, in compliance with the Commission's advice, had already inaugurated schemes to provide pecuniary aid for the Muslim community.²⁸³

The tactful presentation of the problems by the Anjuman had the desired effect. In February 1887 Aitcheson sanctioned the establishment of special awards, known as 'Jubilee Scholarships' for the encouragement of education amongst Muslims. Of these 14 were to be awarded annually on the results of the 'Entrance', 'Intermediate', and Bachelor of Arts examinations of the Punjab University. In addition 44 Jubilee Scholarships of Rs. 4 per mensem were to be awarded annually on the results of the middle school examinations, to be tenable in high schools. Half of these awards were to

²⁸⁰ G. of I, Home Dept. (Education) Proceedings, 15 July 1885 (extract), PEP, Nov. 1885, Vol. 2466, p. 61, IOR.

²⁸¹ Report of the Indian Education Commission, 1882-84, p. 504, v/26/860/1, IOR.

²⁸² Fazl-i-Husain, Hon. Sec. Islamia College Committee, to Godley, U. Sec., Punjab Govt., Education Dept., 4 March 1914, PEP, April 1919, Vol. 9432, pp. 3-4, IOR.

²⁸³ Memorial of the Anjuman-i-Islamia to Aitcheson, 3 Jan. 1887, PEP, Feb. 1887, Vol. 2915, pp. 4-7, IOR.

be given to those Muslim candidates who had been successful in the vernacular examination. The scholarships were of two years duration, though in the case of students desiring to study English they were extended to four years. District and municipal boards were also authorized to grant Jubilee scholarships to the value of Rs. 2 per mensem tenable in middle schools, to Muslim boys, on the result of upper primary school examinations in each district.²⁸⁴ In addition by 1890 one half of the free scholarships awarded in secondary schools, and one half of the half-fee places available in those institutions and colleges, were reserved for Muslims.²⁸⁵

By the end of 1898, 264 Jubilee scholarships had been instituted, 20 in colleges and 244 in schools. The change that had occurred in provincial thinking on the subject of Muslim education and financial assistance was evident from the fact that inspecting officers held the unanimous opinion that the awards, together with fee concessions enjoyed by the community, were essential for its continued progress.²⁸⁶ Moreover other financial inducements were provided by the local government to encourage Muslim enrolment. These included Zamindari, Open, Victoria and College scholarships. By 1900, 44 high school Victoria scholarships were available to Muslims, though with the creation of the N.W.F.P. as a separate province in 1901, the number was reduced to 35.²⁸⁷ As from the beginning of the 1914-15 financial year the Provincial Government decided that Victoria, together with Open and Zamindari Scholarships would be paid from provincial revenues at the rate of Rs. 6 per mensem the last two classes of awards being open to members of all communities.²⁸⁸ Zamindari scholarships, however, by virtue of the fact that they were reserved specifically for agriculturists, were of great benefit to Muslims who constituted the majority of that class.

Six Open scholarships were also assigned to each district, with the exception of Simla which received two.²⁸⁹ Also one Zamindari scholarship was allotted to each district, and by 1914 the distribution of Victoria scholarships followed the same pattern.²⁹⁰ In addition, by 1913 the Local Government annually awarded 32 College scholarships on the results of the matriculation examination, 15 of which were reserved for Muslims. The value of each was Rs. 10, plus full payment of fees, and they were valid for a 12 month period.²⁹¹

²⁸⁴ Holroyd, U.Sec., Punjab Govt., Home Dept. (Education) to Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Inspectors and Principals of Government and aided colleges in the Punjab, 14 Feb. 1887, PEP, Feb. 1887, Vol. 2915, p. 10, IOR.

²⁸⁵ PER, 1899-1900, p. 86, E2VI, IOR.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ The allocation of these awards was based on the distribution of the Muslim population; the Divisions of Lahore, Multan and Rawalpindi received 14, 11 and 10 respectively: PEP, June 1902, Vol. 6311, p. 54, IOR.

²⁸⁸ Godley to Divisional Commissioners, Punjab, 29 Aug. 1913, PEP, Oct. 1913, Vol. 9180, p. 33, IOR.

²⁸⁹ Godley to Registrar, Punjab University, 8 May 1913, PEP, Sept. 1913, Vol. 9180, p. 15, IOR.

²⁹⁰ Godley to Divisional Commissioners, Punjab, 29 Aug. 1913, PEP, Oct. 1913, Vol. 9180, p. 33, IOR.

²⁹¹ Amendment to Articles 155 and 156, Punjab Education Code, Gazette Notification, 26 May 1913, PEP, May 1913, Vol. 9180, pp. 61-62, IOR.

The Anjuman-i-Islamia had played a prominent role in pleading the cause for such measures. Its activities, however, were not limited solely to lobbying the Local Government: it attempted to further Muslim educational activity through the founding of institutions of its own. The Education Report of 1889-90 recognized the part played by Muslim gentlemen and societies in promoting western education.²⁹² Of these the Anjuman emerged as, and remained the most important Muslim organization in the Punjab engaged in that work. Its philosophy was to promote western education, but not at the expense of Islamic learning, seeking to provide a programme to accommodate the two. Its main ambition in pursuing that objective was to promote educational parity between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially the Hindus, and thereby provide employment opportunities for the members of the Muslim community.²⁹³

The Anjuman started by founding an upper primary school for boys in 1886, catering for 191 pupils. In 1888 'middle' classes were introduced, and in 1889 'high' classes were added. By 1912, the number of students numbered 2,149 which warranted the division of the school into two institutions. In addition the Anjuman maintained a number of primary and religious schools for girls, one Anglo-vernacular middle school for girls, and the Hamidia school, established with the object of spreading advanced Arabic learning and the training of Muslim missionaries. In keeping with the Anjuman's policy, these institutions adopted a course of study which, whilst imparting secular instruction in accordance with the official departmental curricula, also catered for the religious needs of the pupils. The institutions were highly efficient, as a result of which they were recognized by the Department of Education and the University, and District Board scholarships were made tenable to them. The Anjuman, however, neither applied for, nor accepted grants-in-aid until 1907, by which time it required financial assistance. The needs of the body had outgrown the funds which it collected privately, and which were no longer sufficient to finance its educational projects.²⁹⁴

The Anjuman's most ambitious undertaking concerned the founding of Islamia College in 1892. To begin with it comprised Intermediate Arts (F.A.) classes. In 1900 B.A. and M.A. courses were started, the latter devoted solely to the study of Arabic. At that time the college had an attendance of 104 students. By 1912 it had been extended considerably: it possessed a hostel accommodating approximately 140 boarders, a library, a main block consisting of 16 lecture rooms, four science laboratories, and a hall. It was served by a staff of 11 (Principal, five professors, two readers and three maulvis) and had 200 scholars on its rolls. Despite these extensions it was not large enough to meet the increasing demands placed upon it. Between 1910 and 1914 the number of students had doubled, and it was estimated that by the 1920's the college would have to make provision for 1,000 places. Expansion on this scale was considered essential by the College Committee to enable Muslims to rectify the deficiency they experienced in the

²⁹² PER, 1889-90, p. 86, E2VI, IOR.

²⁹³ A. Waheed, *The Evolution of Muslim Education*, Lahore, 1936, pp. 4-5.

²⁹⁴ Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 4 March 1914, PEP, April 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 3, IOR.

realms of higher education, for in 1912 the community accounted for only 527 of the 2,539 students enrolled in the Arts Colleges of the Punjab University.

The Committee's ambitions entailed an expenditure programme which could only be met by seeking government assistance, or to an extent by increasing fees dramatically. The latter was not feasible in view of the Anjuman's aims to provide education for the, poorer sections of Muslim society. As Fazl-i-Husain (the Honorary Secretary, Islamia College Committee), pointed out, the general poverty of the community required that fees be kept as low as possible. Thus the Committee refused to increase the existing scale of charges which stood at Rs. 4 per month in Intermediate Arts classes and Rs. 5 per month in B.A. classes. Besides the cost involved in the basic expansion of the college, the Anjuman was also anxious to promote further enrolment through the provision of eight merit scholarships to the total value of Rs. 98 per month, and to provide free scholarships for 15% of the total number of students in each class. Also it proposed to continue to provide the Rs. 200 it paid each month in small stipends to poor students, "such stipends being generally only just sufficient to cover...college fees."²⁹⁵

In an attempt to realize these aims, the Committee, through Fazl-i-Husain, sought the assistance of the Provincial Government in April 1914. It requested a maintenance, as well as a building grant. The former was for Rs. 18,000 a year to be increased after 1916 to Rs. 40,000 per annum. In respect of the latter, Rs. 8 lakhs were solicited to be given in three installments; 2 lakhs in 1914, and two equal sums of 3 lakhs in 1915 and 1916. In addition the Government was also asked for technical assistance in the surveying of the Shadara site and the construction of the buildings. In penning these requests Husain argued that it was the Government's duty "to help the Mussalmans to regain lost ground in the educational race", especially as the Anjuman's institutions had consistently maintained a high record of discipline, and "unflagging loyalty to the Government." Also Husain suggested that the granting of aid would achieve a reciprocal end, in that it would benefit Muslims, and thereby assure the Government of their continuing support and loyalty: "it will prove a source of strength both to the Government and the Muhammadan community."²⁹⁶

The Punjab Government's response was sympathetic. O'Dwyer the Lt. Governor agreed in April 1914 that the proposed expansion was necessary to meet the growing demand of Punjabi Muslims for higher education. But any pecuniary help from the Government was made contingent on the Muslim contribution towards meeting a reasonable proportion of the costs involved. In addition, more crucial conditions were stipulated. The College accounts were to be properly audited, and initially the recurring grant would be given for three years only; its periodic renewal being "subject to the working

²⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 3-4, 17.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

of the College being proved to be satisfactory not only as regard educational results, but in respect of the tone and discipline of the institution". The most significant condition the Government imposed, however, was that the College Committee would not be free in the matter of appointing staff: "new staff shall be subject to the approval of Government."²⁹⁷ If the Committee accepted these conditions, which amounted to a considerable degree of government control over the College, the Government of India was prepared to make a grant of Rs. 25,800 towards the initial cost of the scheme, and an annual allocation of Rs. 30,000 for the College.²⁹⁸

The demands made by O'Dwyer represented a strategy in keeping with Imperial policy. In April 1911 the Viceroy, Hardinge, had directed Harcourt Butler (Education Member, Gov. General's Council) to maintain contact with those Muslim leaders, concerned to accept government control being exercised over the proposed institution.²⁹⁹ This was considered essential in order to prevent educational institutions causing the Government political embarrassment. Thus, when in 1900 the Secretary of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, had re-organized the Urdu Defence Association in retaliation against Macdonnell's (Lt. Governor N.W.P. 1895-1901) Hindi resolution, the latter had been able to force Mohsin-ul-Mulk to abandon his protest under threat of the withdrawal of the government grant from the College.³⁰⁰ For although, theoretically Aligarh represented a private venture, in practice Government patronage assured its continuance.³⁰¹

Fazl-i-Husain was deeply suspicious of permitting any measure of government control,³⁰² but financial considerations overrode his personal objections. In April 1915 the College Committee by seeking the Provincial Government's approval for the appointments of M. Hamid Khan as Professor of Biology and M. Muhammad Shafi as Professor of Arabic and Persian,³⁰³ demonstrated its willingness to abide by the Government's stipulations. This pattern was thereby established for future College-Government relations.

Regardless of the Government's determination to limit the independence of the College Committee, the establishment of the College by the Anjuman represented the height of Muslim endeavor and achievement in the promotion of western education in the Punjab. In terms of simple numbers, however, the College could not hope to compete with those institutions which had been founded for the advancement of the Hindu and Sikh communities. By 1914 Islamia College had approximately 300 students in

²⁹⁷ Godley to Fazl-i-Husain, 6 April 1914, PEP, April 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 20; Godley to Sharp, Offg. Joint Sec., G. of I, Education Dept., 10 July 1914, PEP, July 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 8, IOR.

²⁹⁸ Sharp to Godley, 18 Aug. 1914, PEP, Aug. 1914, Vol. 9432, pp. 8-9, IOR.

²⁹⁹ Hardinge to Harcourt-Butler, 9 April 1911, Butler Collection, EUR. MSS. F.116/65/68, IOR.

³⁰⁰ S. M Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1965, p. 85-86.

³⁰¹ F. Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 128-131.

³⁰² See Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 4 Oct. 1914, PEP, pct 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 28, IOR.

³⁰³ Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 26 April 1915, PEP, May 1915, Vol. 9695, pp. 5-6, IOR.

attendance, by comparison the D.A.V. College had an enrolment of 1,000 students, whilst the Dyal Singh College catered for 400 students, the Khalsa for between 200 and 400, and the Hindu College for approximately 100.³⁰⁴ In fact private Muslim enterprise never equaled that of the non-Muslim in the field of education. The Education Report for 1923 maintained that the general poverty of the Muslim community prevented it from exhibiting the same degree of enterprise in establishing communal schools as was displayed by the other communities.³⁰⁵ Thus out of a total of 311 private Anglo-vernacular middle and high schools for boys which had been established throughout the Province by 1933-34, only 58 (18.6) were managed by Muslims. In comparison 134 (43.09%) and 74 (23.79%) were run by Hindus and Sikhs respectively.³⁰⁶ By 1946, excluding those institutions managed by the University and the Government, of the 16 colleges situated in Lahore, only three were controlled by the Muslim community. Similarly of the 10 privately managed high schools, only 13 were in Muslim hands.³⁰⁷

The contribution which private Muslim institutions could make, therefore, was limited. The 1923 Education Report recorded that in that year the additional Muslim enrolment which had occurred had been almost entirely in government schools.³⁰⁸ This clearly represented the norm. In 1927-28, 45,003 Muslims were enrolled in government and private institutions in the Ambala Division, of whom only 7,557 attended the latter. Similarly in the Rawalpindi Division 147,650 Muslims were in receipt of both types of instruction, but only 3,525 of these were registered in private schools.³⁰⁹

These figures demonstrate not only the comparatively low numbers which were involved in the private sector, but that the earlier prejudices and reservations which had posed a barrier to Muslim participation in government schools were breaking down. Progress had been gradual but constant, and seems to have begun in the early 1890's.

During the academic year 1891-92, the figures clearly show that the number of Muslims receiving English education had started to increase significantly. In secondary schools there had been an increase of 10%, mainly at the Anglo-vernacular level, whilst in arts colleges the improvement had been over 13%. In spite of this progression, however, Muslims remained backward in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs. In the case of government school attendance, only one in 17 Muslim boys and one in 88 Muslim girls of school-going age attended. By comparison one in nine Hindu boys and one in 22 Hindu girls were enrolled, whilst one in eight Sikh boys and one in 56 Sikh girls were receiving government instruction.³¹⁰ During the first two decades of the twentieth

³⁰⁴ Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 4 March 1914, PEP, April 1914, Vol. 9432, pp. 4-5, IOR.

³⁰⁵ PER, 1922-23, p. 74, E2VI, ICR.

³⁰⁶ PER, 1933-34, p. 110, E2VI, IOR.

³⁰⁷ Indian National Congress Memorandum submitted to the Punjab Boundary Commission, Punjab Boundary Commission Proceedings and Report, Vol. I, p. 465, PGRO.

³⁰⁸ PER, 1922-23, p. 74, E2VI, ICR.

³⁰⁹ PER, 1927-28, pp. 118-119, E2VI, ICR.

³¹⁰ PER, 1891-92, pp. 92-93, E2VI, IOR.

century the number of Muslim pupils in government schools increased dramatically from 67,665 in 1900,³¹¹ to 164,982 by 1919-20.³¹² These developments reflected the community's awareness of the necessity for western education, and were in part also a response to the changed attitude of the Punjab Government, whose earlier hostility and contempt towards the community had under Central Government prompting given way to concern and encouragement. Even so, though scholarships reflected the Government's change of heart, and had played a part in making western education more accessible, their scope was limited by the relatively small numbers they affected. The significant factor in encouraging greater Muslim participation was the Government's determination to reduce the prohibitive economic barriers which continued to restrict Muslim involvement, through the revision of the fee system.

During the 1880's pupils in government English schools were charged fees in relation to their parental income. The lowest grade of charge being for an income of below Rs. 25 per mensem, the highest for income in excess of Rs. 200. Fees were prescribed accordingly in the various classes of primary, middle and high departments; the lowest being two annas, rising to six annas per month for pupils studying English, whilst the highest fee charged was Rs. 5 in high departments. In vernacular schools the rate varied according to locality, though the sons of agriculturists who contributed to the 1% agricultural cess received free education. In contrast non-agriculturists were generally charged one anna per month in primary schools and from one to two annas in middle schools. In the Ludhiana district, however, there was a fixed rate for each class rising from one to four annas in primary schools, and five to six annas in middle schools. In English schools run by missionaries, fees were charged, but there was no uniform rate, and in aided vernacular schools no charges were made.³¹³

The change in Local Government policy, which had resulted in the granting of scholarships to Muslims, prompted a re-assessment of the fee system. In February 1889 the Provincial Government sought the approval of the Government of India for the abolition of fees at the primary level, as an inducement to encourage greater agriculturist participation. The Viceroy, Lansdowne, responded by offering no more than tacit approval. He sanctioned only a temporary suspension, insisting that free education would not be appreciated.³¹⁴ The local government, however, chose to ignore the Viceroy's caution, and the temporary measures became a permanent feature of provincial educational policy which preceded by 17 years a similar move by the Government of India.

³¹¹ PER, 1899 -1900, pp. 84-85, E2VI, IOR.

³¹² PER, 1919-20, p. 49, E2VI, IOR.

³¹³ Holroyd to Sec., Punjab Govt., 10 Jan. 1882, PEP, Feb. 1882, Vol. 1818, p. 15, ICR.

³¹⁴ MacDonnell, Sec. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. to Governor, Punjab, 13 July 1889, PEP, Jan. 1891, Vol. 3844, p. 16, ICR.

The Central Government did not seriously consider following the Punjab's example until 1906, by which time it regarded it

"both as a form of relief to certain classes of the community akin to the reduction of taxation, and as an educational measure intended to remove an obstacle to the spread of primary education."³¹⁵

Not unnaturally the Punjab Government supported the move and the philosophy behind it. Despite this in March 1910, lack of funds forced the Government of India to shelve the scheme.³¹⁶ This did not have an adverse effect in the Punjab where, as a result of the policy adopted in 1889, agriculturists' children, and those of village *kamins* (menials) continued to enjoy exemption from fees in all five vernacular primary classes.³¹⁷ In addition, though similar concessions did not apply in the upper primary classes of Anglo-vernacular schools, there only half rates were levied in the case of agriculturists, and by 1911 50% of all places in all secondary classes were reserved free of charge for pupils whose parents were unable to meet educational expenses. This concession also applied to the children of teachers in recognized schools whose salaries did not exceed Rs. 30 per mensem.³¹⁸

The introduction of the fee concession principle led officers at the district level in the Punjab to seek a wider application. In January 1914 the Deputy Commissioner for Jhelum urged the Provincial Government to extend similar benefits to Muslims studying in English schools in his district. In making this request he pointed out that although the community, which was mainly agriculturist, represented 88% of the local population, as a result of its general poverty it accounted for only 27% of the pupils in the high, 34% in the middle, and 40% in the upper primary departments of English schools. In order to rectify the position he suggested that though "No concession can be made to Muhammadans as such...concessions may be made to them as agriculturists."³¹⁹ The Provincial Government readily agreed. In March 1914 it sanctioned a fee reduction for agriculturists; in high departments half rates were to be levied, whilst in middle and upper schools the class would be required to meet only three-eighths of the charges.³²⁰ The following month the Mianwali district was included in the scheme, and Godley, the Director of Education, asked the Commissioner of the division, Popham Young, to give his views for an even wider application of the concession to include Attock and Shahpur: "these being also districts containing a large

³¹⁵ Risley, Sec., G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec., Punjab Govt., Home Dept. (Education), 22 Nov. 1906, PEP, July 1907, Vol. 7553, pp. 17-18, IOR.

³¹⁶ Endorsement by G. of I., Home Dept., No. 152, 22 Feb. 1910, PEP, March 1910, Vol. 8393, p. 10, IOR.

³¹⁷ Godley to Sec., G. of I., Home Dept., 23 July 1908, PEP, Sept. 1908, Vol. 7563, p. 138, IOR.

³¹⁸ Amendments to articles 203, 203-A and 204, Punjab Education Code, Gazette Notification, 30 Nov. 1911, PEP, Dec. 1911, Vol. 8667, pp. 5-6, IOR.

³¹⁹ Wilson Johnston to Popham Young, Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, 22 Jan. 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 6, ICR.

³²⁰ Godley to Popham Young, 19 March 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 8, IOR.

number of Muhammadans who are educationally backward."³²¹ Popham Young agreed, but he proposed a more generous application of the concessions to include the entire tract between the Indus and Jhelum rivers, excluding urban areas, as "Poverty and all the causes which make for backwardness in education..." were manifest throughout the region.³²² Godley responded favorably, sanctioning a uniform levy of fees at half the ordinary rate for agriculturists attending secondary and upper primary classes in all government and Anglo-vernacular schools, to take effect from 1 April 1914.³²³ As a consequence of this decision District Officers between 1914 and 1916 sought and obtained similar benefits for agriculturists in the districts of Gujrat,³²⁴ Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh.³²⁵

Though the scheme was aimed at agriculturists, it had been engineered by Godley and Popham Young specifically to benefit Muslims. By the 1930's it had been expanded to the extent that Muslims enjoyed 50% fee concessions in all Anglo-vernacular schools,³²⁶ and in the secondary departments of all the schools in the Province.³²⁷ There is no doubt that these fee reductions acted as a tremendous inducement in encouraging the enrolment of Muslims in government schools. The Education Reports for 1932-33 and 1933-34 bear testimony to this. Both claimed that without them there would have been a considerable decrease of pupils at the primary and middle stages of Anglo-vernacular schools.³²⁸ In addition to fee concessions, the Provincial Government adopted other measures to increase Muslim participation. These included the employment of Muslim teachers in their home localities, by instituting training units in conjunction with high schools in remote parts of the Province (e.g. Kot Adu in Muzaffargarh, Taunsa in Dera Ghazi Khan, Pasrur in Sialkot and Dharamsala in Kangra), and by admitting Muslim students from backward areas on special terms to receive Anglo-vernacular training at the Central Training College, Lahore.³²⁹ Also in the 1920's, '30's and '40's efforts were made at coordinating the instruction in village schools with the actual needs of the rural population, thereby making education more relevant. Syllabuses were enlarged to cater for gardening, rural pursuits and village account keeping.³³⁰

The Government, as well as offering inducements to promote participation, also employed a measure of compulsion, but it met with little success. The Primary Education Act of 1919 had established the principle of compulsory education for boys of all communities at the primary level. As applied in the Punjab, however, the Act

³²¹ Godley to Popham Young, 18 April 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 8, IOR.

³²² Popham Young to Godley, 28 April 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol. 9432, pp. 8-9, IOR.

³²³ Godley to Popham Young, 21 May 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 9, ICR.

³²⁴ Godley to Popham Young, 21 Aug. 1914, PEP, Aug. 1914, Vol. 9432, p. 7, IOR.

³²⁵ Godley to Inspector of Schools, Multan Division, 17 April 1916, PEP, April 1916, Vol. 9919, P. 13, ICR.

³²⁶ PER, 1935-36, p. 87, E2VI, IOR.

³²⁷ PER, Quinquennium ending 1936-37, p. 116, E2VI, ICR.

³²⁸ PER, 1933-34, pp. 105-106, E2VI, IOR.

³²⁹ PER, 1927-28, p. 11, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁰ PER, 1933-34, p. 19; 1938-39, pp. 101-102, E2VI, IOR.

represented a paradox, for it was admitted by the Education Report for 1924-25 that it could only succeed on a voluntary basis, with the villagers rather than local bodies enforcing the measures.³³¹ In essence, its main purpose was to ensure that pupils who were enrolled at the primary level, completed that stage of their education, rather than securing the attendance of all boys of school-going age.³³² The Government had baulked at employing it to achieve the latter, believing that it would not be worth the cost involved.³³³ In retrospect it proved largely unsuccessful in attaining even its limited aim, for although it met with success in urban areas such as Lahore and Amritsar where a measure of enforcement was possible, ensuring that 93% and 94% respectively of boys of school-going age were in attendance,³³⁴ in the Province as a whole its achievements were far less spectacular. By 1934-35, 2,982 areas were subject to compulsion, but in the majority of these, the leakage of pupils at the primary level was as bad as in non-compulsory areas, the reasons being that the process of law was too slow and contained too many loopholes to achieve enforcement; litigation was prohibitive; and punishments were ineffective.³³⁵

Government action concerning provincialisation, however, certainly forwarded the cause of Anglo-vernacular education, and was of great benefit to Muslims in particular. It was adopted as official policy in 1922 thereby relieving District Boards, many of which were impoverished, of the expense of maintaining high schools, thus enabling a concentration of finance on expanding Anglo-vernacular middle schools. This in turn enabled the brighter pupils in the rural areas to complete high school courses, free from the handicap which had previously existed as a result of their ignorance of the English language.³³⁶ Grants were provided to aid the process, based on the needs and resources of each district, which was graded in accordance with this principle. Initially a rich district received 50% of its approved additional expenditure in the form of maintenance grants, whilst poor and backward districts received between 50% and 90% of the necessary expenditure.³³⁷ By 1936-37 the districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Simla were graded at 100%; Kangra, Attock and Mianwali at 90%; Rohtak, Gurgaon, Sialkot, Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan at 80%; Hissar, Ludhiana and Lahore at 70%; all the remaining districts had a grade of 60%, except Lyallpur which was graded at 50%.³³⁸ As early as 1927, Leitch Wilson (Inspector of Schools, Rawalpindi) claimed that provincialisation and the subsequent encouragement of Anglo-vernacular education had conferred benefits especially on the Muslim population;³³⁹ by making Anglo-vernacular learning more accessible to them.

³³¹ PER, 1924-25, pp. 14-15, E2VI, IOR.

³³² PER, 1931-32, p. 4, E2VI, IOR.

³³³ PER, 1929-30, pp. 4-5, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁴ PER, 1927-28, pp. 8-9, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁵ PER, 1933-34, p. 19; 1938-39, pp. 101-102, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁶ PER, 1925-26, pp. 14-15, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁷ PER, 1926-27, p. 100, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁸ PER, 1937-38, p. 129, E2VI, IOR.

³³⁹ PER, 1926-27, p. 104, E2VI, IOR.

The granting of concessions, especially in respect of fees, whilst they went some way in alleviating the financial problems which faced Muslims, did not eliminate them. The absence of full fee concessions at the secondary and higher levels inevitably caused Muslim numbers to diminish. In an attempt to offset this disability and improve Muslim prospects Fazl-i-Husain introduced a limited scheme of reservation. Husain had been appointed the Province's first Minister of Education in 1921 under the system of dyarchy established by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, and the subsequent Reforms Act of 1919, whereby education in common with other subjects - public health, public works, local self-government and agriculture (but not land revenue) - were transferred from central control to Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislatures.³⁴⁰ The Muslim Minister used his position to ensure that the small Muslim attendance at the highest levels of education would not be reduced still further through open competition. In November 1921 and in 1922, 40% of the admissions to Government College, Lahore, and the medical schools in Lahore and Amritsar, and the Central Training College for teachers in Lahore were reserved for Muslims.³⁴¹

The use of reservation, as a means of assisting Muslim education, was not widely applied in the Province, and thus the advantage which it offered the community was limited. It was bitterly resented by the vast majority of the non-Muslim members of the Legislative Council, who under the leadership of Raja Narendra Nath attempted unsuccessfully in March 1923 to move a censure motion against the Education Minister.³⁴² Its lack of success did not diminish the Raja's opposition. He continued to oppose the reservation principle as a member of the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission appointed in 1929 to consider the education question.³⁴³ Narendra Nath claimed that such a measure would result in class rivalries and jealousies, and would hinder the realization of responsible government, as envisaged by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.³⁴⁴ Despite this objection the Auxiliary Commission supported the reservation principle and advised the Provincial Government to consider carefully reserving places for Muslims in those publicly managed institutions in which it was not possible to admit all applicants. The Punjab Government, which was keenly aware of the dangers of communal preferment, declined this advice, though it did so on

³⁴⁰ Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. I, London, 1930, p. 380, V/26/261/17, IOR.

³⁴¹ Memorandum on the communal composition of the Services in the Punjab and other provinces, pp. 6-7, S.&G.4093/1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

³⁴² Punjab Legislative Council Debates, 15 March 1923, pp. 1,274, 1,311, 1,320, V/9/3419, IOR.

³⁴³ Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. I, London, 1930, p. 378, V/26/261/17, IOR.

³⁴⁴ In support of the last point Narendra Nath quoted from the Montagu -Chelmsford Report (para. 231), which stated that it had reluctantly acquiesced over the introduction of communal electorates, and it had condemned any further extension of the communal principle; Minute of dissent by Raja Narendra Nath, Review of the Growth of Education in British India by the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission, Delhi, 1929, C..Vol. X, 1929-30, IOR (Hereafter referred to as the Hartog Commission.)

other grounds. It argued that the measure was not needed in any school in the Province, as the number of Muslim pupils had risen from 159,791 in 1917 to 516,831 by 1927.³⁴⁵

This increase, however, had occurred primarily at the primary level as a consequence of the provision of free education. The Punjab quinquennial report on education ending 1921-22 recorded that the Muslim community was in the lead regarding the aggregate number of pupils under instruction in all types of institutions, the Muslim total being 241,743 as compared to 212,005 for Hindus and 76,376 for Sikhs. This represented an increase of 42.3% for Muslims, 19.6% for Hindus and 47.7% for Sikhs, during the five years under review.³⁴⁶ By 1924-25 Muslims accounted for 50% of all primary school pupils, which represented an overall increase of 7% from the 1919-20 period, when Muslim pupils in primary schools had numbered 116,722 out of a total of 272,478. By 1935-36 the Muslim percentage at the primary level had dropped slightly to 48%, and from then until 1945 it remained constant at 47%. At the middle and high levels of secondary education, however, Muslim percentages, in comparison to their primary position, dropped sharply. The Education Report for 1919-20 demonstrated that only 34% of all pupils in middle schools were Muslims. Their position had improved only slightly by 1944-45, when the community contributed 39% of middle school participants, and although they achieved 41% in 1930-31, and 39.5% in 1936-37, the figure remained fairly constant at either 38% or 39% in the period up to 1945. With regard to high schools, in 1919-20 Muslims comprised only 31% of the total number of pupils on the rolls, dropping to 28% by 1924-25, though Muslim enrolment had increased slightly by 1930-31 when it stood at 29%. During the succeeding years up to 1945, there was only a minimal improvement, Muslims representing 32% of pupils receiving high school education in this period.³⁴⁷

In respect of those Muslims willing to enroll their children in government schools, it is evident that poverty and not prejudice prevented a similar level of participation at the higher, as at the primary level. Also, this poverty explains to an extent why Muslim enrolment was not even higher at the primary stage, despite the incentives which were offered. Throughout the 1930's and '40's poverty continued to be cited in provincial education reports as a crucial factor in preventing greater Muslim involvement.³⁴⁸ In the 1939-40 Report, the Inspector of Schools for Rawalpindi wrote that the community's backwardness was "mainly due to its appalling poverty in the countryside ...", and he stressed that substantial relief was still required in the form of fee remissions, and the provision of free books and writing materials.³⁴⁹ Even so, such methods could only help

³⁴⁵ Hartog Commission, pp. 206-207, C.vol. X, 1929-30, IOR.

³⁴⁶ PER, Quinquennium ending 1921-22, p. 138, E2VI, IOR.

³⁴⁷ Calculated from figures given in PER, 1919-20, Table III-A, p. xi; 1924-25, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xx-xxiii; 1930-31, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xii-xv; 1935-36, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xii-xv; 1937-38, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xii-xv; 1939-40, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xii-xv; 1941-42, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xvi-xix; 1945-44, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xiv-xvii; 1944-45, Tables IV-A and IV-B, pp. xiv-xvii, E2VI, IOR.

³⁴⁸ See PER, 1935-36, p. 87; 1937-38, pp. 125-126; 1939-40; pp. 110-111; 1941-42, p. 49, E2VI, IOR.

³⁴⁹ PER, 1939-40, p. 111, E2VI, IOR.

those Muslim families who were in a position to allow their children to attend schools. In many of the poorer agricultural families children constituted an integral part of the economic unit, and could not be spared. An economic inquiry conducted in the mainly Muslim village of Bhadas in Gurgaon District in 1936 observed that the offspring of tenants were employed, as soon as they were old enough, in tending cattle and with cultivation generally. This was especially important in those areas where the cost of hired labor could not be met. The survey concluded that whilst the tenants were often not in a position to pay school fees, the children in any case, because of the vital contribution they made to the family's finances, could not be allowed to attend school.³⁵⁰ These observations were applicable to all poor agriculturists throughout the Punjab, the majority of whom were Muslims.

Though poverty continued to be of paramount importance in limiting Muslim participation, other factors also contributed: Muslim conservatism, apathy, the prevailing economic depression and unemployment were all cited by the Education Report of 1937-38.³⁵¹ Parental indifference, the scattered population in rural areas, and the fatalistic attitude of the community also played a part in limiting the Muslim response,³⁵² as did the belief held by many cultivators that government education would make their sons unfit for agriculture. Although this prejudice was cited by Godley in 1912,³⁵³ as a reason for Muslim non-participation, its relevance in the 1930's was recognized by Waheed who in a work on the evolution of Muslim education published in 1936, argued that Indian Muslims who were mainly agriculturists, had totally different educational needs from the urban intelligentsia for whom the English educational system had initially been devised.³⁵⁴ The Government was evidently aware of this problem, for in the 1930's, as has been stated, it introduced an agricultural bias into rural education in the form of kitchen gardens and village and farm accounting.³⁵⁵

Of all the social factors, as opposed to purely economic ones, which prevented a wider acceptance of the Government system, religious considerations remained the most obdurate. The Government of India for its part recognized that the issue had to be resolved, and showed a willingness to relax the views which it had held previously concerning purely secular education. Although Curzon in 1904 had re-affirmed the Central Government's commitment to maintaining an exclusively secular system,³⁵⁶ this philosophy was challenged by the findings of the Allahabad Educational Conference of

³⁵⁰ F.C. Brayne and Shiv Dyal, Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, *An Economic Survey of Bhadas, A village in the Gurgaon District of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1936, p 61, PPL.

³⁵¹ PER, 1937-38, pp. 125-126, E2VI, IOR.

³⁵² PER, 1935-36, p. 87, E2VI, IOR.

³⁵³ Godley to Joint Sec., G. of I., Education Dept., 9 Feb. 1912, PEP, Feb. 1912, Vol. 8910, pp. 13-14, IOR.

³⁵⁴ A. Waheed, *op.cit.*, p. 78.

³⁵⁵ PER, 1933-34, p. 19, E2VI, IOR.

³⁵⁶ G. of I., *Indian Educational Policy*, Calcutta, 1904, p. 25, (1)2887/1, IOR.

1911.³⁵⁷ Of the nine Directors of Education whose views were recorded, five (Coverton - Burma; Hallward - E. Bengal and Assam; de la Fosse - U.P.; Kichler - Bengal; and Wright - Central Provinces) recognized the demand for religious instruction. Whilst practically all of the other commentators, both Muslim and non-Muslim, with the sole exception of R.N. Mudholkar, were favorably disposed to the introduction of religious learning. Mudholkar's reservation resulted from the fact that the establishment of a school at Amraoti, combining instruction in the principles of Hinduism with education suitable for modern requirements, had subsequently contributed to religious reaction and political propagandism. None of the other speakers who contributed to the debate (Maulvi Syed Shams-ul-Huda, the Bishop of Lucknow, Masani, Gokhale, Pandit Sundar Lal, Mudhava Rao (previously Dewan, Mysore), Arundale (Central Hindu College), Subramani Aiyar, Nawab Abdul Majid, Zia-ud-din Ahmed, Rev. Golland, Rev. Dr. Ewing), however, supported this view or opposed religious education in government schools. Although de la Fosse recognized that problems did exist in limiting the use of religious learning:

"The public are of opinion that moral instruction must be based on religious sanctions. But religious instruction to be effective must be dogmatic, and this stood in the way of any general adoption of such teaching in public schools."

Against this, Maulvi Shams-ul-Huda stressed that the Muslim community "greatly felt the need of direct religious instruction though they also appreciated the difficulties of Government." Nevertheless he predicted "If religious instruction is insisted on English education will become more popular with Muhammadans."³⁵⁸ Godley's contribution to the proceedings was in part confusing. He stated that in secondary schools in the Punjab religious teaching was given by various bodies, Christian, Muslim and Hindu, whilst in Board primary schools, such instruction was absent, though moral instruction was given both by example and the study of set text books.³⁵⁹ In respect of his statement concerning secondary schools, religious instruction was not permitted in Government schools until 1915, and then only out of school hours.³⁶⁰ Presumably the Director of Education was referring to those secondary schools which were outside the Government fold. With regard to moral instruction, this type of learning, not based on any religious ideology, was an integral part of the Curzonian plan.³⁶¹ It is clear that its

³⁵⁷ The conference resulted from the desire of H.W. Orange (Director-General of Education, G. of I.) to encourage an exchange of views between provincial Directors of Education and other officials and non-officials interested in education. It convened at Allahabad under the chairmanship of Harcourt-Butler (Ordinary Member, Gov. Gen's Council) at the beginning of 1911, the proceedings being of an informal nature: Selections from the Records of the G. of I., Education Dept., No. cccxlviii, Papers regarding the Educational Conference, Allahabad, Feb. 1911, Calcutta, 1911, Preface, SIVL 9457, S.O.A.S. Lib. (Hereafter referred to as the Allahabad Conference).

³⁵⁸ Allahabad Conference, Calcutta, 1911, pp. 14-19, SIVL 9457, S.O.A.S. Lib.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

³⁶⁰ Godley to Sec., G. of I., Education Dept., 20 April 1915, PEP, April 1915, Vol. 9695, p. 18: Hartog Commission, Delhi, 1929, p. 203, C. Vol. X, 1929-30, IOR.

³⁶¹ See G. of I., *Indian Educational Policy*, Calcutta, 1904, p. 25, (1) 2887/1, IOR.

conception was prompted by the desire to provide an acceptable substitute for religious instruction to meet the concern for the teaching of personal behavior and responsibility, but free from theological conceptions.

The Allahabad Conference examined this medium and found it wanting. Richey (Director of Education, N.W.F.P.) declared that in his Province it was impossible to divorce moral from religious instruction, and Ewing (Principal, Forman Christian College, Lahore) observed that moral teaching by means of special textbooks was impossible.³⁶² Both these opinions reflected the feelings of the majority of headmasters and school inspectors in the Punjab, who were highly skeptical of the value of this type of instruction, though this was not revealed by Godley to the Conference. Moral instruction in the Province was provided through the medium of a set of reading books prepared by Holroyd (Director of Public Instruction 1868-1891). These contained much information, which seemed to have little relevance to personal morality, e.g. the study of animals, their structure, habits, utility, etc. Only those in use in the upper primary and lower middle vernacular classes directly inculcated love of parents, loyalty to the Government, charity, punctuality, industry, honesty, etc. Moral readers in Anglo-vernacular high departments continued these themes under such headings as 'My Duties', 'Duties to Self', 'Others' and 'God'. Only in denominational schools were sacred books (the Bible, Quran, etc.) used to impart moral tuition, and the Anjuman-i-Islamia accepted the responsibility for the circulation of such literature in Muslim schools. In Christian Mission schools, teaching was denominational also, though such schools, so it was claimed, were usually "careful, while basing their instruction on the Bible, to teach only such principles as are generally acceptable" to all. Despite the official questioning of the value of moral instruction given in government schools, the Anjuman-i-Islamia favored its continuance, though it stressed that it would be more effective if based on religious doctrines.³⁶³ It was a timid stance which the Anjuman adopted, but it clearly preferred to have half the cake than none at all!

Though Godley refrained from criticizing the principle of moral teaching, the obvious disillusionment expressed by other speakers at Allahabad, notably Richey, de la Fosse, Gokhale and Ewing,³⁶⁴ impressed the Government of India with the need to re-examine its position regarding religious instruction. In September 1911 all the Provincial Governments were invited to consider the problem. In February 1913, the Viceroy, Hardinge, in referring to the Allahabad discussions, observed that the most thoughtful minds in India lamented the tendency of the existing system of education to develop the intellectual at the expense of the moral and religious faculties. Hardinge was sympathetic to their views, and urged a re-thinking of the secular doctrine declaring that he hoped that enlightened opinion and accumulated experience would provide a practical solution to what was unquestionably "the most important educational problem

³⁶² Allahabad Conference, Calcutta, 1911, pp. 15-18, SIVL 9457, S.O.A.S. Lib.

³⁶³ PER, 1909-10, pp. 23-26, E2VI, TOR.

³⁶⁴ See Allahabad Conference, Calcutta, 1911, pp. 15-18, SIVL 9457, S.O.A.S. Lib.

of the time". That he did not go further in promoting this theme resulted from what he termed the necessity of the Government of India to maintain a position of complete neutrality in matters of religion.³⁶⁵ By openly recognizing the problem and the dissatisfaction with official religio-educational policy, however, Hardinge had revealed the willingness of the Central Government to reconsider its previous stance.

This development clearly influenced events in the Punjab. In 1915 the Local Government decided to allow religious instruction in government schools, on the understanding that it would be conducted out of school hours, and only if requested by parents. Also the cost involved was not to be met from public funds.³⁶⁶ The Government of India was satisfied with the Punjab's decision, and in 1921 it urged all local governments to adopt a similar policy, subject to the same conditions, arguing that it was of "the opinion that the embargo which hitherto had been placed on the introduction of religious instruction in publicly managed schools may be removed."³⁶⁷ In 1929 a Committee presided over by Sir Philip Hartog (Member of the Public Service Commission), which had been appointed by the Indian Statutory Commission to review the growth of education in British India, recommended that a more positive policy should be adopted regarding religion and education, particularly in the case of Muslims. It reasoned that the educational backwardness of that community was the result not only of its general poverty, but also reflected the Muslims' preference for religious instruction. It urged those provinces where Muslim educational progress was impeded by religious difficulties not to leave religious teaching solely to private institutions, as the latter generally had achieved very little in raising educational standards. Rather, the Committee advised that Provincial Governments should secure sounder education for Muslims by catering for their demand for combined religious and secular education. Thus the Hartog Committee advocated a more thorough integration than that proposed by the Government of India in 1921, or as employed in the Punjab from 1915 onwards. Only one member of the Committee, Raja Narendra Nath, objected to the proposal, complaining that it would yield to the sentimental conservatism of the Muslims.³⁶⁸ The Raja, however, had long been an opponent of any preferential treatment being given to Muslims in the field of education, and his stance reflected his continued communal preoccupation.

The Punjab Government did not adopt the Committee's advice, preferring to continue the policy introduced in 1915. Its policy in educational matters continued to be dictated by the fact, that throughout the 1920-46 period, education officials persistently viewed Muslim backwardness in economic terms, acknowledging the religious aspect mainly as

³⁶⁵ G.of I., *Indian Educational Policy*, 1913, Calcutta, 1913, pp. 4-5, (1)2287/2, ICR.

³⁶⁶ Godley to Sec., G.of I., Education Dept., 20 April 1915, PEP, April 1915, Vol. 9695, p. 18; Hartog Commission, Delhi, 1929, p. 203, C. Vol. X, 1929-30, IOR.

³⁶⁷ Hartog Commission, Delhi, 1929, pp. 203-204, C. Vol. X, 1929-30, IOR.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194, 199-200, 204, 350.

being of only minor importance.³⁶⁹ Thus although in 1937 the official Punjabi attitude towards religious education relaxed slightly, this was confined only to one district in the Multan Division. In 1937 the District Board, encouraged by the Multan Inspector of Schools, sanctioned Rs. 1,000 as payment to mullahs to give religious instruction in government schools after school hours.³⁷⁰ The innovation proved an unqualified success, in so much as the district alone was responsible for approximately two-thirds of the total increase of pupils which occurred throughout the entire Division in 1938-39.³⁷¹

This was proof indeed of the beneficial effect which could be produced by catering for Muslim religious sensibilities, and also of the constraining effect which the absence of religious instruction continued to exercise in the field of education. It is apparent from Education Reports compiled during the last ten years of British rule that this policy was never expanded to include the entire Province, and Muslim politicians and educationalists in the 1940's continued to stress the need for religious instruction in schools. In an address to the All-India Muslim Educational Conference held at Agra in December 1945, Liaquat Ali Khan (secretary, All-India Muslim League) claimed that any educational scheme which ignored religious teaching would fail to appeal to Muslims.³⁷² Four years before this, Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, in presenting a case for the need for religious instruction, had quoted Iqbal as saying that Muslim education must be grounded on the "rock of religious and moral principles..." Though Ashraf himself was of the opinion that both the Quran and Hadith should be interpreted in the light of modern knowledge.³⁷³ Similarly F.K. Durrani who, as a member of A.I.M.L.'s Education Committee, was clearly a spokesman for the League, appealed for religious teaching in conjunction with modern education. Though he cautioned that most religious instruction was a relic of the Muslim imperial age, "and not until it emancipates itself from that tradition will it be able to make any contribution to the revival of Islam." He desired that all Muslim pupils should be instructed in the basic tenets of their faith and religious duties, but without permitting any interference in scientific studies, claiming that there was no such thing as an Islamic viewpoint on the study of chemistry, physics, and the other sciences.³⁷⁴

The ideas expressed by both Ashraf and Durrani were free from bigotry, both regarded the role of religion as complementing rather than opposing the acquisition of secular

³⁶⁹ See PER, 1920-21, p. 66; 1921-22, p. 139; 1922-23, p. 74; 1927-28, p. 119; 1935-36, p. 87; 1937-38, pp. 125-126; 1939-40, pp. 110-111; 1941-42, p. 49. E2VI, IOR.

³⁷⁰ PER, 1937-38, p. 126, E2VI, ICR.

³⁷¹ PER, 1938-39, p. 102, E2VI, ICE. Mohammad Ishaq claimed incorrectly that the district was responsible for two thirds of the total Muslim enrolment which occurred throughout the entire Province: M. Ishaq, 'Islamic Religious Instruction in the Schools of the Punjab and Bengal in the British Period', Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1956.

³⁷² Liaquat Ali Khan, *Muslim Educational Problems*, Lahore, 1945, pp. 22-25, 38, 39.

³⁷³ S.M. Ashraf, Al-Minhaz - *The Evolution of Curriculum in the Muslim Educational Institutions of India*, Lahore, 1941, pp. 153, 161.

³⁷⁴ F.K. Khan Durrani, *A Plan of Muslim Educational Reform*, Lahore, 1947, Preface, p. viii, pp. 13, 48, 51.

knowledge. Yet their treatises (*Al-Minhaz - The Evolution of Curriculum in the Muslim Educational Institutions of India* and *A Plan of Muslim Educational Reform*), both of which were published in Lahore, failed to influence Government thinking on the matter. The majority Muslim Government in the Punjab, following the Unionist victory in 1937, failed to accommodate more fully Muslim sensibilities on the religious instruction issue, or expand the successful Multan experiment. Several reasons for these failures are apparent. The Unionist Party was a multi-communal coalition. Its continued existence depended on the pursuit of policies that the minority communities within it, who held the balance of power in the legislature, would not object to. The Government could not risk a repeat of the 1923 episode when Fazl-i-Husain had faced a censure motion, because it was believed he was favoring Muslims at the expense of the other communities. Secondly, and more significantly, the education question never developed into a major issue of contention in the Legislative Assembly. Because questions in the Assembly on the communal composition of the services, and the inferior position of Muslims, proved a grave embarrassment to the Unionist Government, Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier, introduced a convention in 1938 whereby no Minister would answer any question likely to result in communal misunderstanding or embitter communal feelings.³⁷⁵ This resulted in the practical exclusion of communally orientated debates, a development which narrowed considerably the scope for the introduction of 'educational' and other disputes involving communal comparisons. Lastly, as has been stated previously, in spite of the Hartog Committee's recommendations, Muslim participation continued to be viewed by education officials in general in the light of economic, rather than religious, considerations. Thus no pressure was placed upon the Government, from Muslim M.L.A.s or officials to accept a change of emphasis, and introduce religious instruction in Government schools as part of the curriculum.

The cumulative effect of the Government's failure in this respect, and the persistent poverty of the community, was that Muslims remained the most educationally backward section of Punjabi society. In no sphere of education was this more apparent than at the university level, as is demonstrated in Appendix F. Of the students who graduated in 1938, 1939, 1941, 1943 and 1944, Muslims accounted for only 27%, 26%, 38%, 24% and 38% respectively.³⁷⁶ The comparatively high percentages recorded in 1941 and 1944, however, are misleading, as in both years the records were incomplete, and this tended to exaggerate the Muslim position. (If one compares the graduate percentages for the years under review, with those for Muslims attending degree courses in Appendix F it is clear that performance and enrolment percentages correspond approximately for all the years other than 1941 and 1944.) In respect of the degrees taken, Muslims, on account of their cultural heritage, were more attracted to the Arts, particularly Arabic and Persian, than the Science disciplines. The *Punjab Gazette*

³⁷⁵ Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 March 1938, p. 668, V/9/3471, IOR.

³⁷⁶ Percentages calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazettes, Part III-A, 1939, pp. 25-42, 33, 36, 40-41, 103-227; 1941, pp. 26, 102-104, 213-215, 284-329, 348, 353-366; 1943, pp. 25-51; 1944, pp. 57-206; 1945, pp. 1-3, 117-118, 120-121, 157-160, 162-163, 173-176, 259-260; 1946, pp. 1-2, PGSL.

for 1941 recorded that out of 2,499 successful B.A. candidates, 725 (29%) were Muslim. In the same year, of the 193 B.Sc. candidates who graduated in April and 44 who graduated in November, only 26 (13%) and three (6.8%) respectively, were Muslims.³⁷⁷ Similarly in 1944, of 2,731 B.A. and 366 B.Sc. graduates, Muslims accounted for only 678 (25%), and 50 (14%)³⁷⁸ in each class. Furthermore Muslims were backward in other scientific disciplines. In 1939 Muslims received only 42 (28%) of the 151 Medical, and eight (20%) of the 39 Agricultural Science degrees³⁷⁹ awarded in that year. The figures for 1941 revealed a similar low performance. Of the 117 Medical degrees, only 37 (32%) went to Muslim recipients,³⁸⁰ whilst in 1945 the Muslim share decreased further: Muslim students received 23% (45 out of 193) of the Medical, and 36% (38 out of 104) of the Agricultural Science degrees.³⁸¹

The Punjab University provided the most advanced form of education available in the Province, and potentially, the highest reward in employment terms. The failure of the Muslims to enjoy the former, or compete for the latter in greater numbers, reflected their backward position regarding post-secondary education in general. As all pupils, regardless of community, advanced from one stage of learning to the next, their numbers obviously diminished as a result of the selective process. With regard to Muslim pupils and aspiring scholars, however, their numerically inferior position at the secondary stage was depleted even further at the high school and particularly at college and university levels. Financial factors certainly influenced this process, particularly since the expense of education became more demanding at each successive stage of learning. But there is little doubt that lack of incentive also played a crucial part in limiting Muslim participation in the higher spheres of education. Advanced levels of instruction were largely the reserve of the economic elite, thus the lack of Muslim students cannot be explained purely in financial terms, as there existed in the Punjab as in Bengal - a wealthy land-owning Muslim class capable of financing their offspring's careers to the highest level. In general, however, this class remained indifferent to higher education. They were not subject to the same economic pressure which caused those of a professional background to seek education as a means of guaranteeing future economic stability, having placed their reliance on the possession of land. Also they did

³⁷⁷ Calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazette, Part III-A 1941, pp. 213-215, 284-322, 329, 353-366, PGSL.

³⁷⁸ Calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazette, Part III-A, 1944, pp. 123-128, 170-202; 1945, pp. 1-3, 120-121, PGSL.

³⁷⁹ Calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazette, Part III-A, 1939, pp. 33, 36, 40-41, 103-104, 226-227, PGSL.

³⁸⁰ Calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazette, Part III-A, 1941, pp. 26, 102-104, 326, 348, PGSL.

³⁸¹ Calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazette, Part III-A, 1945, pp. 117-118, 121, 157-160, 162-163, 173, 177-179, 260, PGSL.

not exhibit the desire to acquire knowledge for its own sake to the same degree as the members of other communities.³⁸²

Nevertheless, it is remarkable, considering the social and economic disadvantages which Muslims were subjected to, that they participated to the extent to which they did. The indigenous system of learning which the community had developed and controlled prior to annexation, and which had catered specifically for their socio-religious needs, had been attacked, undermined and largely replaced. Furthermore it had been succeeded by a code of education which many sections of Muslim society found offensive, and which the vast majority could not afford. In addition its supersession had been perpetrated by rulers who, to begin with, not only displayed open contempt for Islamic learning, but who were unsympathetic towards the community's needs and difficulties. Muslim participation, limited though it was, had been prompted by various considerations. There was the economic pressure on the land, which caused some to seek alternative avenues of employment through education. In addition social pressures existed, resulting from the endeavors of Muslim societies concerned with the propagation of western education in drawing attention to the disadvantages the community experienced, as compared to other communal groups, by abstaining from government education. In the final analysis, however, the fact that Muslims participated at all owed as much to their realization of the necessity of western education for the advancement both of the individual and the community as a whole, and the willingness of many Muslims to set aside religious and social objections to achieve those ends, as to the earnest endeavors of some British officials to remove and reduce some of the economic barriers which had previously prevented a very considerable number of the community from achieving their educational ambitions.

³⁸² See S.U. Ahmed, 'The History of the City of Dacca in the Nineteenth Century', Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1978. Ch. III.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE FOR MUSLIM EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The general educational backwardness of the Muslim community was reflected in the low level of appointments held by Muslims in the Provincial Public Services, which included the Provincial Civil Service (P.C.S.), and in the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.).³⁸³ It was a serious failing considering that government officials, as the administrators of British India, enjoyed more than a little power, influence and prestige, as well as significant financial rewards. Thus Muslim leaders, drawn mainly from the educated elite, determined to reduce the disadvantages their co-religionists experienced in securing posts for them in government service. They strove to persuade the Provincial and National Governments to adopt recruitment procedures whereby appointments would reflect the population status of the Muslim community as a whole (56% in the Punjab, 25% in British India) rather than the academic ability of the contesting candidates. In short they sought to increase the Muslim share of government appointments through nomination and reservation, rather than by the existing system of competition and selection, both of which reflected academic achievement. Their efforts began to achieve concrete results from the mid 1920's onwards. To begin with, however, the Punjab and Central Governments had adopted a cautious approach in attempting to accommodate Muslim demands, though gradually they conceded the validity of the Muslim argument. In the late 1930's and the 1940's, however, the situation in the Punjab was complicated by the necessity of the Muslim-dominated Unionist Government to maintain a multi-communal coalition in order to retain its majority in the Legislature. It was forced to refrain from overt communal acts, and although the Ministry did facilitate an improvement in the level of Muslim participation

³⁸³ Prior to 1857 the public services had consisted of the covenanted and uncovenanted sections. The former comprised the senior administrative service recruited in England, whilst the latter represented a lower executive service recruited in India. In 1892 these two services were officially designated as the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.) and the Provincial Services. Of the latter the Provincial Civil Service (P.C.S.) was the senior branch. As a result of the Lee Commission's recommendations of 1924 their respective roles were further modified and defined, a development which expanded and enhanced the importance of the provincial sector. The Commission divided the main services into three categories on the basis of whether the subjects in their charge were 'reserved' and thereby subject to the authority of the Central Government, and Secretary & State for India, or were 'transferred' and under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Governments. In effect, therefore, the administration was divided between the All-India Services (reserved) including the I.C.S., the Indian Police Service, and the Indian Service of Engineers; the Central Service (reserved) dealing with the Indian States, foreign affairs, the administration of government railways, posts and telegraphs, customs, audit and accounts and the scientific and technical departments; and the Provincial Services (Transferred) with authority over educational, agricultural, veterinary and medical services, and the Roads and Building Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers; see B.B. Misra, *The Bureaucracy in India*, Delhi, 1977, pp. 93, 247-248.

in the Provincial Services, it was not proportionate to their population status. Even so by the 1930's and 1940's the overall Muslim position in the Provincial Services and the I.C.S. had improved, largely as a result of the petitioning by the Muslim elite, and the responses of the Provincial and National Governments. In analyzing the factors which controlled, and the measures which promoted Muslim employment, the enquiry cannot be limited solely to the 1936-47 period, especially as recruitment to the Provincial Services and the I.C.S. from all the communities, had been subject to practices and rules established prior to that period.

As early as 1867 Sayid Ahmed Khan (1817-98, educational reformer, founder of Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) had urged his co-religionists to equip themselves educationally to secure service under the British.³⁸⁴ Whilst in 1882 the National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta, in view of the paucity of Muslims enjoying government employment, had petitioned the Viceroy, Ripon, to introduce measures to increase Muslim representation. The views of the Provincial Administrations were sought in respect of this request. The Punjab Government responded by dismissing the plea, claiming that the Muslims, who numbered 12 million as compared to 84 million for Hindus and Sikhs in the Province, "have their full share of high uncovenanted appointments...."³⁸⁵ In support of this claim the Provincial Government produced the following figures:

Appointments	Muhammadans	Hindus
Extra Assistant Commissioners	54	38
Tahsildars	50	72
Munsiffs	28	46
Superintendents of Settlement	9	15
Total Administrative and Judicial Appointments	141	171
Executive and Assistant Engineers, Public Works Dept.	2	18
Assistant Surgeons	13	52
Professors and Headmasters, Education Dept.	4	22
Forest Rangers	8	9
Grand Total	168	272

In effect the Local Government's assertion rested solely on the fact that Muslims accounted for 54 of the 92 Extra Assistant Commissioners. In every other branch of the services, however, Muslims had failed to achieve a percentage of posts to equal those held by Hindus, or proportionate to their population status. The Punjab Government

³⁸⁴ British India Association (N.W.P.) to Viceroy, 1 Aug. 1867, PEP, Oct. 1867, p. 40, Vol.24, TOR.

³⁸⁵ *Selections from the Records of the Govt. of India, Home Dept., No. CCV, Correspondence on the Subject of the Education of the Muhammadan Community in British India and Their Employment in the Public Services Generally*, Calcutta, 1886, pp. 237-244, 291-293, PGSL. (Hereafter referred to as Correspondence on the Subject of Muhammadan Education.)

was careful to absolve itself of responsibility. It placed the onus squarely on the educational backwardness of the community, commenting that in branches requiring special and technical knowledge (e.g. public works, medical and educational) Muslims lacked the necessary qualifications, and therefore they accounted for only an "insignificant minority" amongst government employees. Furthermore the Local Government insisted that the Muslim position of inferiority did not result from any anti-Muslim bias on its part. In order to substantiate its analysis, it pointed out that even in those professions which were independent of government control, Muslims because of their educational failings were in the minority: out of 154 pleaders registered in the Province only 27 were Muslims, the remainder being Hindus.³⁸⁶

It was a convincing argument. Yet the view had persisted in Muslim circles that the community's initial low share of government appointments resulted not from an inferior educational standard, but because it had been penalized for the role it played in the 'Mutiny' of 1857.³⁸⁷ 'A Punjabee' claimed that Muslim numbers in the services started to decrease after 1857, though he qualified this statement by observing that "a few far-seeing British officers realized that the administration was passing rapidly into Hindu hands", as a result of which the Provincial Government attempted to increase the Muslim intake, compatible with educational requirements.³⁸⁸ At least one British official, writing in 1882, testified to the existence of British resentment towards the Muslims: Meitner cited the Education Department in the Punjab as exhibiting anti-Muslim "prejudice" in respect of appointments, but he insisted that the reaction represented only a temporary phase.³⁸⁹

Thus though prejudice had undoubtedly played a part in limiting Muslim participation in government service, its effect had been short-lived. By the 1880's the crucial factor which persisted in aggravating the Muslim predicament was the fact that the majority of the Muslim elite had failed to acquire western learning, particularly a knowledge of English. This was affirmed by Holroyd (Director of Education 1869-91) in 1883:

"This (paucity) is due neither to favoritism of any kind, nor to want of intellectual power or of physical energy on the part of the Muhammadans ... but simply to the fact that so few Muhammadans are available who have received an English University Education."³⁹⁰

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293.

³⁸⁷ See Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, p. 263 and Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, Lahore, 1967, pp. 6-9.

³⁸⁸ A Punjabee, *Punjab Politics*, Lahore, 1936, pp. 1-2.

³⁸⁹ G.W. Leitner, *History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab Since Annexation and in 1882*, Calcutta, 1882, p. 53.

³⁹⁰ W.M. Young, Sec., Punjab Govt, to Sec., G.of I., Home Dept., 19 April 1883, *Correspondence on the Subject of Muhammadan Education*, p. 301.

Holroyd's explanation appears justified in that although Muslims were in a minority in all but one branch of the Provincial Services, they had been admitted to those senior uncovenanted posts for which stringent educational qualifications were not required. Until the late 1870's the appointment of Extra Assistant Commissioners had occurred solely on the recommendations of High Court Judges and Financial Commissioners. Persons so appointed were required to pass examinations only after nomination. Also in respect of this rank, and that of Tahsildar and Munsiff, a knowledge of English was not required, though candidates for the last two posts had to pass the prescribed examinations.³⁹¹

Despite the barrier which the education factor posed to increased Muslim involvement the Central Government, in considering the representations of the National Muhammadan Association, refused to exempt Muslims from the examination process. In respect of appointments which occurred through patronage, however, it suggested that Muslims should enjoy preferential treatment in those provinces where they held only a small number of appointments, in order that they could gradually achieve their full share of state employment.³⁹² In the communally charged atmosphere of the Punjab, however, such a suggestion was fraught with problems. Communalism was endemic in the 1880's and by 1900 it had become the dominant feature in the Province.³⁹³ Even so the Lt. Governor, Ivan (1887-92), was sympathetic to the Muslim case and he desired to improve it. When therefore the Anjuman-i-Islamia in 1887 raised the matter of the under-employment of Muslims in government offices, Lyall conceded that appointments should reflect the respective proportions of Muslims and Hindus amongst the middle and upper classes (landowners, merchants, shopkeepers), from which recruitment mainly occurred. But he refused to introduce rules for proportional representation in the services. Sensible of the communal repercussions his actions could engender, he secretly requested all Departmental Heads, Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners to "assign a due proportion of appointments to Muhammadan candidates" so far as was compatible with the best interests of the service and the availability of qualified men. Also in 1888 the Punjab National Muhammadan Association was encouraged to prepare and circulate a list of qualified men amongst Departmental Heads, whilst the *Rafiq-i-Hind* undertook to publish vacancy notices free of charge.³⁹⁴ Lyall's initiative, however, and the actions of the Muhammadan Association and the *Rafiq-i-Hind*, achieved no dramatic results.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 292-293.

³⁹² *Memorandum on the Communal Composition of the Services in the Punjab and Other Provinces*, p. 3, L/S&G/7/30, IOR. (Hereafter referred to as *Memorandum on Punjab Services*.)

³⁹³ K.W. Jones, 'Communalism in the Punjab - The Arya Samaj Contribution', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XVII, 1, 1968, pp. 52-54.

³⁹⁴ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, pp. 3-4. Also see K.W. Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab*, Berkeley 1976, pp. 183-184.

During the following ten years the situation remained unchanged. It was this stagnation coupled with continuing Muslim discontent which prompted Thorburn (Financial Commissioner) in 1899 to advocate Government action to secure a higher proportion of Muslim officers. Though he recognized that educational backwardness had militated against Muslim prospects, he suggested a formula whereby Muslims would be required to possess adequate qualifications to gain admission to the services, but would be free from open competition with candidates from other communities. This was to be achieved by reserving a percentage of ministerial and gazetted appointments for members of the community.³⁹⁵ The Provincial Government acted on Thorburn's advice. In 1900 it was decided that four (36%) out of every eleven appointments to the Judicial Branch would be conferred on Muslims,³⁹⁶ and the following year the Local Government decreed that in all the districts except Kangra and Simla "should less than 30 percent of the ministerial appointments be filled by Muhammadans or more than 70 percent by any one class." These directives, however, to prevent any sectarian repercussions remained confidential.³⁹⁷

Even so by the turn of the century the reservation principle had been established in the Province. During the following 25 years it was extended, though largely as a means to protect rural or agricultural interests, especially those of the zamindar community, against competition from urban Hindus. The Provincial Government, in common with the Government of India, regarded the rural classes, especially in the large zamindars as their principle source of political support. In order to strengthen this relationship the Punjab Government promoted a blatant paternalistic policy to promote zamindar rights; one of its objects being to drive a wedge between the rural masses on the one hand and the urban elite and the Congress Party on the other.³⁹⁸ In short, provincial policy was intended, in the words of W.R. Wilson (D.C. Jhelum), to create a "Junker" class for the protection of British interests.³⁹⁹ This principle was also applied to the public services, in that the Government intervened following the First World War to regulate recruitment to the advantage of the zamindar community, by limiting the need for them to compete against the more highly educated urban Hindu elite. The war provided the Local Government with the opportunity to initiate such a policy, in that in appointing a committee in 1918 to consider zamindar representation in the services it stressed that "The response of the rural classes throughout the province to the call for recruits during the war gave emphasis to their claims for greater representation in the civil services..."⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁵ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 4, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

³⁹⁶ Note by Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, 11 Oct. 1933, 1/S&G/7/30, IOR.

³⁹⁷ Judicial and General Sec., Punjab Govt., to all Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, 28 May 1901, enclosure, C.C. Garbett, Chief Sec., Punjab Govt., to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, 1/S&G/7/30.

³⁹⁸ See N.G. Barrier, 'The Punjab Disturbances of 1907', *Modern Asian Studies*, 1, 1967, pp. 354-355 and N.G. Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900*, Duke University, 1966, pp. 82,92-94,97.

³⁹⁹ *The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India: Evidence taken in the Punjab*, London, 1927, p. 809, V/26/500/11, IOR.

⁴⁰⁰ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 4, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

Both the committee and the Provincial Government agreed that the zamindar's share of appointments should be increased. In justifying this decision O'Dwyer, the Lt. Governor, again cited the military contribution of the class, but he sought to strengthen even further their role it claim for greater employment by emphasizing the important role played in the affairs of the Province. He pointed out that 90% of the Punjab's population was rural, 54% of whom were zamindars, who contributed 66% of the total provincial and imperial revenue from the Province. In recognition of their importance, therefore, the Government ruled that in future in certain branches of the services appointment percentages would be reserved for zamindars:⁴⁰¹

Provincial Civil Service (Executive and Judicial Branches)	50%
Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars	66%
Munsiffs	66%
Excise Dept.	50%
Agricultural Dept. - no percentage fixed, though preference to be given to zamindars	-
Veterinary Dept.	66%
Cooperative Dept.	80%
Forest Dept.	66%
Jail Dept. - no percentage fixed	-
Medical Dept. - no percentage fixed, same as for Agricultural Dept.	-
Sanitary Dept.	60%
Public Works Dept. (Building and Roads) - no percentage, zamindars to be encouraged to avail themselves of technical training	-
Public Works Dept. (Technical Posts) - as for Buildings and Roads Branch	-
Revenue Branch	66%
Clerical Establishments in all Departments - no percentage; where proportion of zamindars was unduly low, preference was to be given to zamindar candidates who possessed the necessary qualifications	-
Police - at least half of the direct appointments	-

No time limit, however, was fixed for their attainment. Such a provision would have been impracticable as the reforms were subject to the condition that a sufficient number of adequately qualified candidates were forthcoming.⁴⁰² Thus although an attempt had

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

been made to ensure improved zamindar employment, educational qualifications remained an important prerequisite for its achievement. Also the Provincial Government had been careful to avoid any communal complications by treating all zamindars as a backward class irrespective of religion. Nevertheless it was acknowledged in Government circles that the action would especially benefit Muslim agriculturists.⁴⁰³

The Provincial Government's preoccupation with providing opportunities for Muslims in particular was further revealed in 1925. In that year instructions were issued to the effect that whilst it was not possible to stipulate rigid proportions, attempts were to be made to create a departmental structure in the Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department, to allow for 40% Muslim participation, 20% Sikh and 40% Hindu and 'others'. Similar guidelines were also laid down in respect of recruitment to the Executive Branch of the Punjab Civil Service, where nominations were to be made in accordance with communal strength.⁴⁰⁴ In continuation of this policy, in 1932 40% of the student places in the Central Training College for government teachers were reserved for Muslims, applicants from that community being required to possess only the minimum educational qualifications. In the same year Muslims were also guaranteed 50% of all future appointments in the subordinate service of the Irrigation Branch (P.W.D.).⁴⁰⁵

For all practical purposes, therefore, the Provincial Government had provided for reserved recruitment for Muslims, at least in certain departments. Its actions in promoting Muslim prospects, though not the method employed, were in keeping with the recommendations of the Public Service Commission of 1911, which had advised against permitting any one class to dominate the services, and the decision of the Central Government in 1923 to encourage a more representative participation through nomination, to achieve a balance between Hindus and non-Hindus.⁴⁰⁶ The surreptitious manner in which the Punjab Government had attempted to improve the Muslim position, coupled with the fact that the Government of India had refrained from reserving definite percentages for Muslims, failed to satisfy Muslim leaders in the Punjab Legislature.

In July Feroz Khan Noon had requested the Local Government to submit detailed information on the composition of the Provincial Services.⁴⁰⁷ On 29 June 1926 the Government complied with the request (the statistics were not reproduced in the published proceedings of the debate).⁴⁰⁸ The circulation of the information

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁰⁵ C.C. Garbett, to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁴⁰⁶ *Punjab Legislative Council Debates*, 19 July 1927, Vol. X, pp. 874-87i4 V/9/331, IOR.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 6 July 1925, Vol. VIII, pp. 166-181, V/9/3426, IOR.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 29 June 1926, Vol. IX, p. 1,059, V/9/3428, IOR.

demonstrated the respective strength and weakness of the non-Muslims and Muslims. The resulting debates which this evoked emphasized the existing conflict of communal interests. Whilst non-Muslims advocated the retention of the full competitive system, Muslim members demanded nomination and reservation programmes. Sardar Ujjal Singh on 19 July 1927 introduced a resolution into the Legislative Council advocating that all departmental posts should be filled by open competition, or failing that by the most highly qualified candidates irrespective of caste or creed.⁴⁰⁹ This demand was strongly supported by the urban Hindu members; the Muslim element opposed it, Sayid Muhammad Husain insisting that only a fairer sharing of the "loaves and fishes of appointments" would ease communal tension.⁴¹⁰ These sentiments were echoed by Faiz Muhammad when on 22 July he proposed in resolution form, in retaliation to Ujjal Singh's measure, that the Council should recommend the Government to increase the number of Muslim officers in the Provincial Services to at least 55% of the total cadre in each branch.⁴¹¹

These developments were an acute embarrassment to the Local Government. They threatened to undermine its declared urban-rural philosophy in respect of appointments, by forcing it either to rely solely on academic merit, or to adopt a blatantly communal approach to recruitment at a time when it was already in the process of attempting to achieve a communal balance in the services through reservation, though without declaring it to be official policy. Consequently the Government refused to be drawn in the matter, and it acted to defuse the situation in the Legislature by persuading Ujjal Singh and Faiz Muhammad to withdraw their resolutions.⁴¹²

Furthermore it declined to acknowledge that definite percentages had been, or would be adopted in respect of Muslim appointments. Instead in order to satisfy Muslim leaders that the Government was conscious of the plight of their co-religionists, whilst not unduly alarming Hindus and Sikhs, the Governor, de Montmorency (1928-1933), defined official policy in the least inflammatory manner. He declared that recruitment would be conducted to avoid preponderance by any one class, whilst ensuring that competition would continue to be employed whenever the best interests of the services demanded it.⁴¹³ Despite the fact that Muslims continued to represent a minority in the Provincial Services the Local Government refused to deviate publicly from de Montmorency's policy statement, or admit to, or expand the limited measures of reservation which had been introduced. It decided, largely for politico-communal considerations, to abstain from further action until the leaders of the various communities themselves arrived at an acceptable solution concerning the vexed

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 19 July 1927, Vol. X, p. 866, V/9/3431, IOR.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 19 July 1927, Vol. X, p. 867, V/9/3431, IOR.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 22 July 1927, Vol. X, p. 1,068, V/9/341, IOR.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, 22 July 1927, Vol. X, p. 1,068, V/9/341; *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 10, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁴¹³ C.C. Garbett to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

question of service percentages. It made this position clear in response to an enquiry by the Central Government in February 1934. The Punjab Government opposed the introduction of rigid percentage rules, arguing that though "Muslims are inadequately represented ... process of readjustment must be gradual..." It emphasized that any attempt to "force the pace" would have the "most unfortunate results": "To introduce a drastic change in advance of consent of all communities could, not fail to rouse strong communal feeling."⁴¹⁴

Academic qualifications remained the crucial requisite for aspirants seeking entry into the Provincial Services, though competitive examinations were the exception rather than the rule. A B.A. degree constituted the minimum requirement necessary to permit appointments to the Provincial Civil Service and to the posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police,⁴¹⁵ a condition which also applied to Tahsildar appointments from 1929 onwards.⁴¹⁶ Appointees to the post of Forest Ranger, Naib-Tahsildar and Sub-Inspector of Police were required to have passed the Intermediate Examination in Arts and Sciences,⁴¹⁷ whilst even the lowly clerk had out of necessity to be literate and pass qualifying tests.

Recruitment to the Provincial Services⁴¹⁸ occurred mainly as the result of direct nomination or by promotion from the subordinate services.⁴¹⁹ Only in the case of the Provincial Civil Service was open competition employed and that too only in the case of 25% of the appointments. Of the remainder, 37% were made through nominations from amongst Tahsildars, 12% resulted from nominations from the subordinate Ministerial service, and the remainder were nominated by the Governor. In the case of specialist posts (e.g. Engineering Branch of P.W.D., and Posts and Telegraph Dept.) officers were usually appointed on a selection basis, though with regard to the subordinate services, which accounted for the majority of Government servants ranging from Tahsildars to clerks, competitive tests were rarely used.⁴²⁰ The nomination process had been widely applied only after 1923, its aim being to facilitate a more equitable distribution of

⁴¹⁴ G. of I. to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Feb. 1934, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁴¹⁵ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 2, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁴¹⁶ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 23 Feb. 1942, Vol. XVII, p. 540, V/9/3739, IOR.

⁴¹⁷ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 2, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁴¹⁸ All senior officers belonged to the Provincial Services. These included all the members of the Provincial Civil Service (District and Sessions Judges, District and Assistant Commissioners, Sub-Judges and Extra Assistant Commissioners), also Superintendents of Police, Postal Superintendents, Superintendents of Jails, District School Inspectors, Engineers, Civil Surgeons, District Medical Officers, Directors of Public Health, Veterinary Superintendents, Forest Conservators, Registrars, Directors of Agriculture, Deputy Collectors, etc., and assistant and deputy officers in each class.

⁴¹⁹ The Subordinate Services included the majority of Government servants ranging from officers holding responsible charges (Tahsildars, Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Police, Head Constables, Subordinate Engineers, Superintendents of offices and Head Clerks) to clerks on lowly salaries.

⁴²⁰ Punjab Govt. to G. of I., Home Dept., 15 May 1933, WS&G/6/313; *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 1, 11/S&G/30, IOR.

appointments.⁴²¹ Recommendations for such appointments were submitted to the Governor by a Selection Board, which received proposals from Divisional Commissioners and Senior Departmental Heads. In making its recommendations the Board took into consideration the educational qualifications and personal suitability of the candidates as well as the record of service and loyalty of the candidates' families.⁴²²

Even nomination, however, had failed to give a fair representation to Muslims, particularly with regard to senior appointments. Muslim educational backwardness was largely responsible for their continued low numbers. Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Punjab delegate, elected to Council of State 1920), speaking in the Council of State in March 1925, had alluded to this handicap and its causes. He pointed out that Muslims, the majority of whom were poor agriculturists occupying rural tracts, were not in a position to finance the education necessary for their sons to achieve qualifications of the standard required for government service.⁴²³ It was a luxury which only a small minority could afford (see Chapter II). Tiwana's assertions were borne out by the fact that in the period 1923 to 1928 Muslims accounted for only 94 out of the 355 pupils (26.5%) attending the Maclagan Engineering College at Mughalpura. During the same period only 183 (27.2%) of the 671 pupils studying at the Government School of Engineering at Rasul were Muslims.⁴²⁴ With regard to successful candidates who had passed the civil engineering course at the Thomson Civil Engineering College at Roorkee in the year 1925 to 1934, only 11 (7.3%) out of a total of 150 were Muslims. Similarly of the 458 and 102 successful pupils in the overseer and draughtsman classes at the Government Institute at Rasul during the same period, Muslims had numbered 143 (31%) and 17 (16.7%) respectively.⁴²⁵ These low levels of participation and performance were reflected in the composition of departments requiring technical qualifications, e.g. only 10% of the gazetted officers and 34.1% of non-gazetted officers serving in the Irrigation Research Institute in 1938 were Muslims.⁴²⁶

Muslim educational weakness was similarly apparent in a non-technical branch of the Provincial Service. In the subordinate judiciary four out of every 11 appointments had been reserved for Muslims. If the community failed to secure this proportion at the preliminary selection, non-Muslim candidates who had achieved higher marks were passed over to ensure the requisite number of Muslim appointments.⁴²⁷ An examination of the results of the qualifying examinations for Sub-Judge candidates held in 1930, 1931 and 1932 provides a clear indication of the competitive and academic failings of Muslim candidates, as well as the low performance which the Government was obliged to

⁴²¹ *Punjab Legislative Council Debates*, 19 July 1927, Vol. X, pp. 874877, v/9/3431, IOR.

⁴²² Punjab Govt. to G. of I., Home Dept., 15 May 1933, IA/S&G/6/313, IOR.

⁴²³ *Council of State Debates*, 2 March 1925, Vol. V, p. 419, v/9/224, IOR.

⁴²⁴ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 15, L/sw/7/30, IOR.

⁴²⁵ *Punjab Legislative Council Debates*, 26 March 1935, Vol. XXVI, pp. 846-649, V/9/3448, IOR.

⁴²⁶ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 25 Jan. 1938, Vol. II, pp. 863- 864, v/9/3457, IOR.

⁴²⁷ Punjab Govt. to G. of I., 15 May 1933, L/S&G/6/313, IOR.

accept in order to maintain the reserved level of Muslim representation. This is apparent from the fact that in 1930 the selected Muslim candidates had stood 7th, 11th, 62nd, and 69th in order of merit, whilst in 1931 and 1932 they had stood 13th, 14th, 16th, and 33rd, and 11th, 24th, 25th, and 28th respectively.⁴²⁸

In the light of this evidence 'Punjabee' in commenting on Muslim employment in the Provincial Services, was wrong to dismiss the education factor as being no longer applicable. In 1936 he wrote:

"It is one of the fictions which have been proved to be fictions but are so perseveringly persisted in ... Even among Hindus and Sikhs it is not merit that is the passport to Government offices, but favoritism and nepotism of the men round about the posts which fall vacant."⁴²⁹

'Punjabee', however, was merely echoing a widespread belief. In February 1934 a special supplement to the Lahore based *Weekly Mail* had been printed in the form of an open letter to the Governor. It complained that there was widespread nepotism in the services, though it concentrated its exposure on the Hydro-Electric Branch of the P.W.D. It charged the Minister in charge of the Department, Gokul Chand Narang, of being a communalist, and of using his influence to promote the interests of non-Muslims and of undermining the Muslim position. In support of these allegations the article revealed that of the 48 gazetted officers in the Department, and 140 non-gazetted (technical) officers, Muslims numbered only nine and 43 respectively.⁴³⁰

These accusations, though in the specific case of Gokul Chand they remained unproved, should not be totally dismissed, despite the fact that they ignored Muslim educational failings. The appointment system in the Punjab was open to abuse. The majority of appointments were made by Departmental Heads, who were only required to consult Ministers in the case of important subordinate posts.⁴³¹ Though they were charged to ensure that no one class or community predominated in their departments,⁴³² the Government did not prohibit the employment of relatives, which in itself encouraged suspicions of unfair practice.⁴³³ In the circumstances corrupt practices did occur as was admitted by Maynard (Finance Minister) in March 1923. He revealed that some candidates had been unfairly "overlooked because someone wished to put in a friend of his own or a member of his own community."⁴³⁴

⁴²⁸ Appendix H, enclosure, *ibid.*

⁴²⁹ A, *Punjabee*, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

⁴³⁰ Supplement to *Weekly Mail*, 19 Feb. 1934, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁴³¹ *Memorandum on Punjab Services*, p. 15; C.M. Trivedi, Dept. Sec. Govt., of I, to Under Sec. of State, 11 Dec. 1933, 11/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁴³² *Punjab Legislative Council Debates*, 28 June 1934, Vol. XXV, p. 235, V/9/3447, IOR.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, 16 March 1934, Vol. XXIV, p. 920, V/9/3446, IOR.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, 15 March 1923, Vol. IV, p. 1,298, V/9/3419, IOR.

In the 1930's, however, the evidence suggests that nepotism was not widespread, as in the years 1930 to 1934, only one appointment resulting from communal partiality was detected.⁴³⁵ Furthermore, at least in theory, the Government of India Act (1935) had limited the scope for such corruption. It focused attention on the rights of the minority communities, especially regarding Government employment: Provincial Governors were invested with special responsibilities to protect minority interests and "to secure a due proportion of appointments to the several communities".⁴³⁶

Thus whilst corrupt advancement did occur in the pre-1935 period, it was not of the intensity to affect dramatically the Muslim position. The comparatively low number of Muslims in the Provincial Services resulted, in the final analysis, because of their educational backwardness and lack of appropriate educational qualifications, rather than from a concerted intrigue perpetrated by influential Hindu and Sikh officials. This is borne out by the fact that the Muslim share of appointments was highest in those areas of subordinate employment (see below), where the potential for unfair preferment, particularly by Heads of Departments, was greatest.

The extent to which Muslims had failed by the mid-1930's to secure an adequate percentage of Government appointments, comparable with their population status (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities accounted for approximately 56%, 23% and 13% of the population of the Punjab in 1931⁴³⁷ was demonstrated by a Government survey on the composition of the services conducted in 1933 (see Appendices G and H). Out of 37,006 Government posts ranging from District Officers to clerks which were held by Indians, Muslims had secured only 17,737 (48%) of the total (Hindus and Sikhs held 40% and 10% of the appointments respectively, whilst members of other minorities had secured the remaining). In addition the vast majority of Muslim appointments occurred in the subordinate and clerical branches of the services, as is evident from an analysis of fifteen branches of the Punjab service, accounting for 52% of the entire personnel employed in the Provincial Administration (see Appendix I). Here, Muslims held 53% of the subordinate and 46% of the clerical appointments, but only 34% of the superior positions. Thus Muslims only approached parity with the other communities in respect of positions not demanding high academic achievement, and where the element of nomination was strongest.

The relative paucity of Muslim officers in the services continued to be a point of contention in the pre-election (1937) period, and this was reinforced by the persisting belief among Muslims that the community continued to suffer as a result of communal bigotry on the part of non-Muslim officers. Such feelings gave birth to the Muslim Rights Protection Board in 1934, which included amongst its patrons Malik Bark. Ali

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2 March 1934, Vol. XXIV, pp. 415-416, V/9/3446, IOR.

⁴³⁶ Linlithgow to Woodhead, Governor of Bengal, 22 June 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Provincial Governors, 22 June 1939, L/S&G/7/31, IOR.

⁴³⁷ *Census of India 1931*, Punjab, Pt.I, pp. 11, 317, IOR.

(Advocate, Board's President) and Iqbal (Philosopher, President A.I.M.L. 1930). The body was organized to advance Muslim interests generally, and in particular to secure the rights of Muslims in the public services by bringing pressure to bear on the Government.⁴³⁸ The efforts of the organization, however, were frustrated by the attitude of the Local Government and the political temper of the time. Even Fazl-i-Husain, the most influential Muslim leader in the Punjab, a man who had previously achieved reservations for Muslims in the sphere of education could not afford to publicly support similar measures in respect of the services. Husain appreciated that the Muslim dominated Unionist Party, which he had founded (1923), would be unable to achieve a majority in the post-election Legislature unless it formed a multi-communal coalition. As such in 1935 he refused to accommodate Feroz Khan Noon's suggestion that a Muslim Zamindari Party be created to promote Muslim interests, and in particular "To secure [a] proper share of the Public Services for the Mussalmans."⁴³⁹

Husain's determination not to allow the service question to develop into a serious electoral issue, or to subscribe to any radical reform programme which would alienate non-Muslim Unionist supporters or possible allies, is apparent from the treatment it was afforded in *Punjab Politics*. This pamphlet was a pro-Unionist propaganda publication, written with the knowledge and support of Fazl-i-Husain,⁴⁴⁰ which he hoped would pave the way for inter-communal political cooperation.⁴⁴¹ As such although the pamphlet referred in detail to the paucity of Muslims in the services, it did not advocate a radical solution to the problem. Instead it preached moderation, placing the onus for any future settlement on inter-communal agreement: "It is for the sister communities to decide whether they will let the Muslims have their legitimate share in the "shamilat" of the province or whether they will try to do them out of it and thus cause friction and trouble." A possible basis for agreement was proffered whereby Muslims and non-Muslims would receive a 41%:49% appointment allotment, but there was no suggestion that it should be achieved through legislation. Rather it was stressed that non-Muslim acceptance of the formula would prevent more extreme Muslim demands occurring in the future.⁴⁴²

In spite of its conciliatory approach the sentiments expressed in the pamphlet were indicative of a desire to improve the Muslim lot in the services, and it recognized, though it did not openly approve or promote the Muslim desire "to obtain their rights on population basis."⁴⁴³ With the Unionist victory in the 1937 elections, it was inevitable that some of its Muslim supporters would not be satisfied by the prosecution of a socio-

⁴³⁸ Supplement to the *Weekly Mail*, 19 Feb. 1934, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁴³⁹ Noon to Fazl-i-Husain, 9 Aug. 1935, Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, Lahore 1976, pp. 425-427; Azim Ahmad, *Fazl-i-Husain*, Bombay, 1946, p. 306.

⁴⁴⁰ Fazl-i-Husain to Azim Husain, 3 April 1936, Waheed Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

⁴⁴¹ Fazl-i-Husain to Bhai Parmanand, 21 Feb. 1936, *ibid.*, pp. 496-497.

⁴⁴² A Punjabee, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

economic programme which did not relate specifically to Muslim needs. The community remained a minority in the services, and a number of Muslim M.L.A.s, notably Mian Abdul Rab (Jullundur South, Muhammadan Rural), determined to make an issue of the matter. This posed a particularly thorny problem for Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Unionist Premier. The exclusion of questions leading to communal controversy remained essential for the continuance of the multi-communal coalition,⁴⁴⁴ yet 24 out of the 28 questions relating to service percentages, which were raised by Muslim M.L.A.s in the period from 22 March 1938 to 20 April 1939, came from the Government benches.⁴⁴⁵

In an attempt to prevent communally orientated debates damaging the Party, the Premier, Sikander Hyat Khan, announced in March 1938 that all questions likely to cause communal misunderstanding, including those 64 pertaining to service percentages, would not be answered in the Assembly,⁴⁴⁶ though later he conceded that statements pertaining to communal topics would be allowed to unstarred questions. It was a shrewd tactic, for answers given to that class of question seldom caught the attention of the press. Also the right of posing supplementary questions did not exist, and as a result no opportunity existed for further examination of the Government's response.⁴⁴⁷ Thus the possibility for resultant acrimonious communal exchanges was prevented.

The Premier's action, born out of political necessity, belied a desire on his part to improve the Muslim position in the services. In 1933, in an attempt to achieve an inter-communal consensus on recruitment, Sikander had attempted, in concert with Hindu and Sikh leaders, to arrive at a solution beneficial to his co-religionists. He had suggested that whilst 20% of all service appointments ought to remain subject to competition, the remainder should be distributed on a population ratio basis. This did not appeal to the non-Muslim negotiators. Sir Jogendra Singh (Sikh leader, Minister of Agriculture) countered with a proposal that 50% of all appointments should be reserved for Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and others receiving 28%, 17% and 5% respectively. Though this compromise favored non-Muslims, who would receive proportions in excess of their population strength, Sikander was inclined to accept it.⁴⁴⁸ At the time those tentative discussions achieved no positive result, but they clearly contributed to molding future Unionist policy.

⁴⁴⁴ By March 1938 the Unionist coalition commanded the support of 119 M.L.As in an Assembly of 175. Of the Ministry's supporters 41 were non-Muslims.

⁴⁴⁵ See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 22 March 1938, Vol. IV, pp. 70-73; 1 April 1938, Vol. IV, pp. 526-527, 529-530, 536; 4 April 1938, Vol. IV, pp. 610, 618, 635; 7 April 1938, Vol. IV, pp. 736-737; 8 April 1936, Vol. IV, pp. 808, 813-814; 16 March 1939, vol. VIII, p. 185; 22 March 1939, vol. VIII, pp. 524-525; 27 March 1939, Vol. VIII, p. 735; 29 March, Vol. VIII, p. 882; 12 April 1939, Vol. IX, p. 489; 20 April 1939, Vol. IX, p. 830, IOR.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10 March 1938, Vol. III, p. 668, V/9/3471, IOR.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5 April 1938, Vol. IV, p. 685, V/9/3487, IOR.

⁴⁴⁸ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1933, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, MSS. EUR. 352/16, IOR.

To begin with, communal considerations caused Sikander's Ministry to adopt a cautious approach to the reservation question. Initially the Ministry based its policy on the British precedent, to prevent any one class monopolizing the services, whilst securing an equitable share of appointments for agriculturists.⁴⁴⁹ The amount of Muslim dissatisfaction, especially from within the Unionist Party, forced Sikander to abandon this formula and introduce tenable reforms which would satisfy his Muslim supporters, whilst not causing a breach with his non-Muslim allies. On 11 April 1938 the Ministry undertook to correct 'inequitable' representation through future recruitment.⁴⁵⁰ In order to achieve this, the Premier directed in March 1939 that Muslims were to be guaranteed 50% of all appointments, whilst Sikhs would receive 20% and Hindus and 'others', the remaining 30%.⁴⁵¹ In order to ensure that the new recruitment rules were enforced, all departments were required to supply the Government with six-monthly statements recording communal employment ratios.⁴⁵²

To achieve the adoption of the reservation principle regarding Muslim recruitment, the Premier, out of necessity, had to make concessions to the Sikh and Hindu communities. Thus they were guaranteed levels of recruitment in excess of their population percentages. In essence it was the price that had been solicited for co-operation in 1933, and this demand did not diminish once Sikh and Hindu elements had realized the position of virtually holding the balance of power in the Unionist Ministry.⁴⁵³ The introduction of a 50% reservation for Muslims was a compromise. Whilst it left some Muslim elements dissatisfied,⁴⁵⁴ and caused resentment among a number of non-Muslims, who regarded it as an infringement of their vested interests,⁴⁵⁵ it did nothing to disrupt the communal complexion of the Unionist Ministry.

The measures adopted by the Unionist Government to encourage Muslim recruitment, though restricted by political considerations, did achieve a small measure of success in the period up to 1946. It is apparent, however, that increased Muslim employment was more marked amongst officers of mainly 'Provincial' rank serving in the Civil Department at the District and Divisional levels⁴⁵⁶ than amongst the personnel of 'Provincial' and 'Subordinate' rank employed in the departments generally. Between 1936 and 1946 the number of Indian personnel in the Civil Establishment (Provincial

⁴⁴⁹ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 17 June 1937, Vol. I, p. 265, V/9/3456, IOR.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11 April 1938, Vol. IV, p. 854, V/9/3487, IOR.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 13 March 1939, Vol. VIII, p. 70, V/9/3540. It was subsequently decided that 5% of the 30% allotment would be specifically reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Indian Christians, etc., *ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1940, Vol. XIV, p. 921, V/9/3674, IOR.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 13 March 1939, vol. VIII, p. 72, V/9/3540, IOR.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴⁵⁴ See *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 2 Feb. 1940, Vol. XI-A, p. 31, V/9/3608, IOR.

⁴⁵⁵ See *ibid.*, 13 March 1939, Vol. VIII, pp. 72-73, V/9/3540, IOR.

⁴⁵⁶ This Department was served by District, Sessions, and Sub-Judges, Extra Assistant Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, District School Inspectors, Civil Surgeons, Executive Engineers, Forest Conservators, and their deputies, as well as by Tahsildars and Naib -Tahsildars, the last two categories being of subordinate rank.

Rank) in the Divisions increased from 774 to 1,057. In every Division Muslims benefitted from this expansion, their share of such appointments rising from 29% (38) to 31% (50) in the Ambala Division, 33% (47) to 38% (78) in the Jullunder Division, 35% (70) to 45% (122) in the Lahore Division, 45% (63) to 55% (113) in the Rawalpindi Division, and 41% (66) to 51% (109) in the Multan Division. With regard to Muslims serving as Tahsildars (subordinate appointments) the percentage fell slightly from 57% (67) to 54% (60), whilst that for Naib-Tahsildars remained constant at 52% (85 in 1936 and 85 in 1946).⁴⁵⁷ This overall increase in the percentages of Muslim officers resulted from the Ministry's policy of attempting to ensure that the ratio of officers, particularly in the offices of Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Revenue establishment, should reflect the communal composition of the local populations.⁴⁵⁸ As such it represented an important public relations exercise specifically intended to satisfy those Muslim critics who complained of the paucity of Muslim officers in Muslim majority areas.⁴⁵⁹

In respect of the services as a whole the increase of Muslim officers of all grades (Provincial and Subordinate) was much smaller. This is evident from a survey conducted to include 20 of the 35 Departmental and Office Lists recorded in the Punjab Civil Lists for 1936 and 1946. In 1936 the combined cadre for the sections examined accounted for 2,089 'Provincial and Subordinate' positions held by Indians. Of these 778 (37%) were held by Muslims, 927 (44%) by Hindus, 369 (18%) by Sikhs and 15 (0.7%) by members of the minority communities, mainly Indian Christians. By 1946 the Indian element in these branches of the service had expanded to include 3,277 officers, of whom 1,351 (41%) were Muslims, 1,268 (39%) were Hindus and 645 (20%) were Sikhs; once again Indian Christians accounted for most of the remainder (13). Thus the overall Muslim improvement in these areas of service was a mere 4% (see Appendix J).

As a result of government measures the actual number of Muslim employees had increased in all but three of the branches, whilst in terms of the proportion of appointments held Muslims enjoyed an increase in 15 of them. This process had clearly been aided by the growth in manpower which had occurred in the majority of the departments and sections. Such expansion had been most dramatic in the Public Works Department and in the Canal Supervision and Maintenance Section. Even so in one branch which had enjoyed a significant increase in personnel Muslim representation had seriously declined. Although the number of Indian Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to the Government had multiplied from seven to 52, Muslim appointments had risen from three to only 15 (see Appendix J). Educational factors no doubt were to an extent responsible for this, for as the posts were under ministerial

⁴⁵⁷ In collecting this information the religion of each officer was decided on the basis of the individual's name. Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in Punjab Civil List, Jan. 1936, Lahore, 1936, Part XXXIX, pp. 219-223; Punjab Civil List, Nov. 1936, Lahore, 1946, Part XXXIX, pp. 273-287 a, PGSL.

⁴⁵⁸ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 2 Feb. 1940, Vol. XI-A, pp. 28-31, V/9/3608, IOR.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

control it is unlikely that unfair practices had occurred, considering that the Premier and the Ministers of Public Works (Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana) and Education (Abdul Haye) were Muslims, and were in a position to check any communal excesses on the part of their three non-Muslim cabinet colleagues. In the case of H.Q. Office Superintendents, the area of employment where Muslim representation had suffered the most serious decline (see Appendix J) the cause is not so apparent. Such appointments usually occurred as the result of promotion on the basis of seniority from the ranks of the head clerks - positions traditionally dominated by non-Muslims. Of approximately 222 Assistant Superintendents and head clerks serving in the transferred departments in 1933 only 65 (29%) were Muslims.⁴⁶⁰ This could help to explain the Muslim paucity amongst Office Superintendents in 1946, but not the fact that ten years earlier Muslims had held almost half of these posts (see Appendix J). Two possible explanations for the Muslim decrease are that either qualified candidates were genuinely not available, or a degree of preferment in favor of Hindus in particular had occurred in spite of Government policy.

Despite this setback the Muslim position in the services had improved, but not dramatically. This gradual progression resulted from a number of factors. To begin with it was not possible for the Unionist Ministry to achieve a spectacular result in nine short years without its employing radical measures, which were precluded by political necessity. Thus the Ministry's decision that the percentage reservations should apply only to fresh recruitment⁴⁶¹ dictated that the increase of Muslim officers in government service would be a slow and gradual process. In effect it could only occur in relation to the growth in service personnel, and as a result of vacancies caused through retirement. Also Muslims remained educationally handicapped, and this at times clearly negated the advantages which had been proffered by the reservation process.

The community's comparative educational backwardness was apparent from the low number of Muslims, as compared to Hindus, who applied for the posts of Statistical Officer, Physical Chemist and Physicist which were advertised by the Irrigation Research Institute in 1937 and 1938. Of the 106 applicants for the first post, only six were Muslims, five of whom held Masters' degrees. By comparison, there were 94 Hindus, all graduates, and 69 possessed Masters' degrees. Of the 22 applicants who competed for the appointment of Physical Chemist, 19 were Hindu graduates, including three Doctors of Philosophy, two Doctors of Science, seven Masters of Science, and one Master of Arts. Only one Muslim, an M.Sc., applied. In respect of the third post, of the 25 applicants, 23 were Hindus, 18 of whom held Masters' degrees, and one a Doctorate. There were only two Muslim applicants, holding the degree of Master

⁴⁶⁰ *Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities Serving in the Different Departments of the Punjab Govt., Jan. 1933*, pp. 1-20, enclosure, C.C. Garbett to U.S. of S., 31 Aug. 1933, 14/S&D/7/30, IOR.

⁴⁶¹ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 5 March 1940, Vol. XII, p. 74, V/9/3624, IOR.

of Science and Doctor of Science respectively.⁴⁶² The paucity of Muslim candidates was further demonstrated by the number who appeared at the Joint Public Service Commission examinations from 1937 onwards. In 1937-38 and 1938-39 Muslims accounted for only 32% and 39% of those who qualified. Whilst with regard to the Ministerial Services (Junior Clerks) examinations conducted in 1939-40 and 1940-41, though Muslims represented 49% and 42% respectively of the candidates, they accounted for only 40% and 38% of those who qualified.⁴⁶³ Even in Departments where posts were specifically reserved, there were not enough qualified Muslims to fill various vacancies. For example, in the period 1937-41 and 1945-46 the Commission was unable to recommend any Muslim candidates for the following reserved posts - Lecturer in Surveying and Drawing at the Punjab Engineering School, Rasul; Assistant Dental Surgeon, de Montmorency College, Lahore; Superintendent of Industries, Assistant Conservator of Forests, Lecturer in Civil Engineering, Rasul; Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Bridges and Roads Branch; Deputy Warden of Fisheries; Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Public Health Branch; Shift Engineer, P.W.D., Electricity Branch.⁴⁶⁴

The increased involvement of Muslims in the Provincial Services in the Punjab had only assumed real significance in the 1920's and 1930's. The same period witnessed a Muslim campaign at the national level to secure for the community a guaranteed percentage of appointments to the Indian Civil Service. It involved two influential Punjabi Muslim leaders, Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Fazl-i-Husain. Although both promoted the All-India interests of their community, their efforts could not fail but to enhance the prospects of Punjabi Muslims, who by 1924 had secured 25% of the appointments held by their co-religionists in the I.C.S. Only one province, the U.P., had contributed more Muslim officers to the service - six as compared to the Punjab's five.⁴⁶⁵ The Indian Civil Service was the most important of all the services, and as late as 1924 its personnel was overwhelmingly European. Of the 1,363 members of the service only 189 were Indians, 25 of whom were Muslims.⁴⁶⁶ Muslim leaders in the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of State were concerned that the Muslim proportion of appointments should reflect more fully their population status in the country as a whole. The logic behind this desire was expressed succinctly by Maulvi Abdul Karim (Muhammadan Rural Division, Dacca) in the Indian Assembly in March 1923: "a community in a country derives its importance, its influence and its powers on various grounds, on

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, 27 Jan. 1938, Vol. II, pp. 980-985, V/9/3468, IOR.

⁴⁶³ Annual Reports of the Working of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. Joint Public Service Commission, 1937-38, Lahore, 1938, Appendix D, p. xx; 1938-39, Lahore, 1940, Appendix C, pp. i-ii; 1939-40, Lahore, 1941, Appendix B, p. xix; 1940-41, Lahore, 1942, Appendix B, p. xvi, PGSL.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1939-40, Appendix B, p. xix; 1940-41, Appendix B, p. xvi; 1747-46, Appendix A, pp. x-xii, xix, PGSL.

⁴⁶⁵ Note by Abdul Karim, 14 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR. (Karim's note was based on the Combined Civil List for India, March 1924.)

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

population, on wealth, on education, and I may add, on the share it has in the administration of the country."⁴⁶⁷

Two significant developments stimulated Muslim interest in the question of I.C.S. recruitment - the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, as embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919, and the acceptance by the Central Government of the Lee Commission Report of March 1924. The former had accepted the terms of the 'Lucknow Pact' which recognized the right of Muslims to enjoy a consistent proportional representation in the Provincial Assemblies,⁴⁶⁸ but the Lee Commission,⁴⁶⁹ which had begun its enquiries in 1923, though it advocated expanding the Indian element in the I.C.S. to a position of parity with the European officers, did not recommend a fixed proportion of appointments for Muslims.⁴⁷⁰

In fact leaders of the Indian minorities, in an effort to influence the Lee Commission had launched their campaign to secure appointment reservations in the I.C.S. before the Commission published its findings. In January 1923 Sir H. Gidney (Anglo-Indian leader) had introduced a resolution in the Indian Assembly calling on the Government of India to modify the competitive system to allow for a greater intake of candidates from the minority communities into the I.C.S., to be achieved through nomination. Of the 19 Muslims who took part in the division, 18 voted for Gidney's motion, which despite this support was defeated.⁴⁷¹ This reversal did not end the matter. Two months later K. Muppil Nayar (W. Coast and Nilgris, Non-Muhammadan Rural) re-opened the question by recommending that the Central Government should adjust the recruitment procedure so as to discriminate in favor of candidates from those communities and classes which were poorly represented in the I.C.S., subject to the proviso that such persons should be adequately qualified to discharge their duties.⁴⁷² This resulted in a heated and divisive debate demonstrating the passion with which the Hindu majority, whose co-religionists dominated the Indian membership of the I.C.S., and the minority

⁴⁶⁷ Extract from Official Report of Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 March 1923, p. 3,197, J.& P.2298/1923, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁶⁸ The Lucknow Pact (Dec. 1916) represented an agreement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. Congress accepted the principle of separate elections for Muslims and agreed that in the Muslim minority provinces of the U.P., Bihar, Bombay and Madras, Muslims should have 30%, 25%, 33% and 15% of the elected Indian membership in the Legislatures. In the Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, Muslims were to receive only 50% and 40% respectively. The reforms of 1919 accepted the 'Pact', though by including special constituencies in the Assemblies they slightly altered the communal composition of the elected element, e.g. in the Punjab as a result of the Act of 1919 Muslims were guaranteed only 45% of the seats. See P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 186-187.

⁴⁶⁹ The task of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, which functioned under the chairmanship of Lord Lee, was to find a way of meeting demands for more rapid Indianization and of solving the problems posed by the falling-off in British recruitment and the premature retirement of officials disgruntled by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.

⁴⁷⁰ India Office Memorandum on Recruitment for the I.C.S., 27 April 1936, S.& G. 1539/37, 1,/S&D/7/173, IOR.

⁴⁷¹ *Indian Legislative Assembly Debates*, 24 Jan. 1923, Vol. III, p. 1,442, V/9/54, IOR.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, 10 March 1923, Vol. III, p. 3,192, V/9/56, IOR.

members defended the respective positions of their communities. Halley, the Home Member, alarmed by the acrimonious exchanges, intervened in an attempt to pacify both sides. He made it clear that whilst the Government of India had no intention of acting on Muppil Nayar's proposal, it would endeavor to "prevent the preponderance in the Indian Civil Service of the representatives of any one community or any Province."⁴⁷³

This assurance failed to satisfy the Muslim leaders, who believed that the rights of their community could only be protected through a strict reservation policy. Consequently in February 1924 K. Ahmed (Rajshahi Division, Muhammadan Rural) introduced a resolution into the Indian Assembly to the effect that in the Muslim majority and minority provinces, Muslims should be guaranteed a representation of 52% and 25% respectively both in the provincial legislatures and the government services. He suggested that the I.C.S. percentage could be achieved by following the precedent of the Bengal Pact,⁴⁷⁴ whereby Muslims satisfying a basic academic test would continue to be appointed in preference to non-Muslims until the 25% appointment ratio had been achieved.⁴⁷⁵

Ahmed failed, however, to gain unanimous Muslim support. Maulvi Muhammad Yakub (Rohilkund and Kumaon Divisions, Muhammadan Rural) denounced the resolution because it adhered too closely to the Bengal agreement, which many Hindus and Muslims had refused to accept.⁴⁷⁶ Although this objection was valid, Yakub's main concern in opposing Ahmed was to protect Muslim political interests in the U.P., his home province. He feared that if adopted, Ahmed's proposal would undermine the terms of the Lucknow Pact which, as ratified by the Act of 1919, had guaranteed a Muslim representation of 33% in the Provincial Legislature.⁴⁷⁷ Motilal Nehru (U.P. Cities, Non-Muhammadan Urban) took advantage of this division of Muslim opinion to ensure that the motion was abandoned, by proposing that the question should be settled by a 'Round Table' conference as had previously been agreed by the Assembly members.⁴⁷⁸

Muslim leaders in the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of State, notably Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, were not prepared to leave the matter to such arbitration, especially as the Lee Commission had failed to support the reservation principle. On 10

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3,211, 3,227.

⁴⁷⁴ The Bengal Pact (1923) represented an attempt by the Congress leader C.R. Das to achieve a Hindu-Muslim electoral alliance in Bengal by promising Muslims separate electorates on the basis of population and a generous allocation of public service appointments. The agreement, however, was not endorsed by the Indian National Congress. See R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, Oxford, 1974, p. 23.

⁴⁷⁵ Extract from Official Report of the Indian Legislative Assembly Debates, 17 Feb. 1924, pp. 772-773, 13/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 777-778.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 776.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 783.

June 1924 Tiwana organized a meeting of Muslim representatives from both Houses;⁴⁷⁹ it was unanimously agreed to request the Government of India to reserve a fixed percentage of appointments for Muslims by conducting examinations "in such a manner as to ensure adequate representation of the Muslims in the Services."⁴⁸⁰ This demand was voiced in a petition to Sir Alexander Muddiman, the President of the Council of State, outlining Muslim grievances; it demonstrated that in some areas of government service there were no Muslim officers, whilst in others they did not account for 5% of the total, and that of the 2,000 officers employed by the Indian Railways, less than 50 were Muslims.⁴⁸¹ This submission was accompanied by a series of notes compiled by Maulvi Abdul Karim (Bengal) detailing the paucity of Muslims in the I.C.S. and the other services. He succinctly portrayed their appalling position in the table reproduced below, observing "The figures speak for themselves and comment would we [sic] superfluous."⁴⁸²

Service	Europeans and Anglo-Indians	Non-Muslim Indians	Muslims	Total	Percentages
Railway	1,627	320	45	1,992	2.2
Finance and Accounts	124	124	9	257	3.5
Public Works Department	564	355	47	966	4.8
Education	274	116	21	411	5.1
Forest	306	41	4	351	1.1
Police	730	51	24	805	2.9
Certain Scientific Services	106	44	3	153	1.9
Agriculture	82	37	5	124	4
Jail	70	8	1	79	1.2
Medical	314	67	6	387	1.5
Judicial	143	134	25	302	8.2
Indian Civil Service	1,174	164	25	1,363	1.8
Total	5,514	1,461	215	7,190	2.9

Source: Abdul Karim to Sir Alexander Muddiman, 15 June 1924, 14/S&G/7/17, IOR.

Karim emphasized that if the Lee Commission's recommendations resulted in the further domination of Indian appointments in the I.C.S. by Hindu officers, it would cause great resentment amongst Muslims. He argued that that outcome could be avoided as there was no shortage of suitable Muslim graduates for government

⁴⁷⁹ S.M.V. Oosman (Madras), Abdul Karim (Bengal), Abdul Qaiyum (N.W.F.P.) Ajab Khan (Punjab), Abdul Kasem (Bengal), Wajidhuddin (U.P.), M.D. Yakus (U.P.), K. Ahmad (Bengal), Ahmad Ali Khan (Assam), Mohammad Shams-uz-Zoha (Bengal), Mohammad Ismail Khan (Bihar), Alimuz Zamand Chaudhry (Bengal), S.A.K. Jeelani (Madras), G. Murtaza (Madras).

⁴⁸⁰ Memorandum by H.G. Haig (Home Dept., G. of I.), 1 Aug. 1924 S.&G. 2226/24, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁸¹ Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Others to Muddiman, 10 June 1924, S.&G. 1670/24, S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁸² Note by Abdul Karim, 15 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

service.⁴⁸³ But he contradicted this assertion by attacking the very criterion - university education on which I.C.S. recruitment was based, by stating that it should not be considered the sole requisite for employment.⁴⁸⁴ In fact Karim's inconsistency revealed the essential weakness of Muslim candidates, which was their inability through competition to secure a percentage of appointments compatible with their population strength. Most important of all, however, Karim warned the Government of India that if it failed to rectify the existing disparity in the I.C.S. it would risk jeopardizing the traditional Muslim loyalty it enjoyed.⁴⁸⁵

Tiwana's petition supported by Muslim leaders from the Upper and Lower Chambers, combined with Karim's implied threat had a decisive impact on the Central Government. It accepted the Muslim claim that the competitive system contained inherent flaws: "The basic fact is that unrestricted competition will undoubtedly result in the preponderance of certain communities" to the exclusion of Muslims.⁴⁸⁶

In order to check this trend and satisfy Muslim demands, Haig (Officer on Special Duty with the Home Dept.) suggested that a more equitable communal balance could be achieved in the I.C.S. if the recruitment rules were modified to allow for one third of future appointments to be reserved from the competitive process, for distribution amongst the minority candidates.⁴⁸⁷ The Viceroy, Reading, acted on Haig's suggestion, and on 27 August 1924 he recommended to the Secretary of State (Birkenhead) that new recruitment rules should be formulated to satisfy legitimate communal claims. In support of this assertion he pointed out that of the 45 successful Indian candidates who had sat the I.C.S. examinations in London and Allahabad between 1922 and 1924, not one had been a Muslim. Whilst in the same period only three of the eight candidates (three Muslims, two Hindus, two Burmese, one Anglo-Indian) who had been nominated for the service were Muslims.⁴⁸⁸ In order, therefore, to prevent "absolute Hindu predominance..." Reading recommended that one third of all future vacancies should be exempt from direct competition to allow for an increased intake of entrants from the minority communities.⁴⁸⁹ The Viceroy, to ensure acceptance of the formula, emphasized that it would not result in a deterioration of the service, as only nominees possessing high academic qualifications would be admitted.⁴⁹⁰ In spite of some initial

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 8 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 1 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁸⁶ Memorandum by H.G. Haig, 1 Aug. 1924, ii/S&G/6/17, IOR.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁸ Viceroy to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 Aug. 1924, L/S&G/7/235, IOR.

⁴⁸⁹ Viceroy to Sec. of State, 5 Feb. 1925, L/S&G/7/236, IOR.

⁴⁹⁰ Viceroy to Sec. of State, 23 Feb. 1925, L/S&G/7/236, IOR.

qualms that the proposal would upstage the Lee Commission's recommendations,⁴⁹¹ the Secretary of State authorized its adoption.⁴⁹²

The introduction of the new system, however, left some Muslim leaders dissatisfied. In March 1930 Muhammad Yakub complained that Muslim interests had been prejudiced by the fact that they were required to share the 334 appointment reservation with other smaller communities.⁴⁹³ The time was propitious for a sympathetic hearing, for the Government of India was eager to reward the Muslim community for having remained aloof from Gandhi's civil disobedience movement.⁴⁹⁴ It therefore authorized a survey of I.C.S. personnel recruited since 1925, to be completed by 1932. The findings, which embraced all of the All-India Services (see Appendix K), proved the validity of Yakub's claim, the Government of India admitting that Muslims had failed to receive a fair share of appointments. It noted that although the community comprised approximately 25% of the population of British India, and was thus entitled to a major share of the 33½% reservation, they had received annually between 18% and 20% of the appointments, and at times even less.⁴⁹⁵ Of the 193 Indians, exclusive of Burmese, who had been selected for the I.C.S. by examination and nomination in the period only 39 had been Muslims, as compared to ten Indian Christians, six Sikhs, three Parsis and one Anglo-Indian.⁴⁹⁶ The result, as the Government of India pointed out, was that the smaller communities had gained at the Muslims' expense.⁴⁹⁷ In order to rectify this anomaly the Government of India, in March 1933, advised the Secretary of State that out of the 33½% reservation 25% should be specifically reserved for Muslims, the remaining 8½% to be distributed between the non-Muslim minority contenders. If, in any one year, no other minority candidates were forthcoming, the Central Government proposed that the Muslims should receive the full 33½% quota.⁴⁹⁸ These conditions were to apply only to initial recruitment; promotion was to continue to be decided solely on the basis of merit.⁴⁹⁹

In an attempt to gain further concessions Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, who was serving on the Services and General Committee which had been appointed to consider the Government of India's proposals,⁵⁰⁰ and Fazl-i-Husain, who at the time was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, appealed to the Central Government to be even more generous. Tiwana argued that on population grounds Muslims were entitled to a 29.3% reservation quota, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians 2.35%, Sikhs 1.67%

⁴⁹¹ Minute by P.H. Bumbell, 5 Dec. 1924, L/S&G/7/235, IOR.

⁴⁹² The original acceptance was not recorded, but it is referred to in letter, Sec. of State to Viceroy, 20 Aug. 1925, L/S&G/7/236, IOR.

⁴⁹³ *Indian Legislative Assembly Debates*, 24 March 1930, Vol. III, pp. 2,346 - 2,347, V/9/91, IOR.

⁴⁹⁴ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of L/S&G/7/241, IOR. State, telegram, 22 Oct, 1930.

⁴⁹⁵ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of L/S&G/7/243, IOR. State, telegram, 26 March 1933.

⁴⁹⁶ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of L/S&G/7/243, IOR. State, telegram, 27 March 1933.

⁴⁹⁷ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, L/S&G/7/243, IOR. 26 March 1933.

⁴⁹⁸ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. State, telegram, of L/S&G/7/243, IOR. 27 March 1933.

⁴⁹⁹ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁵⁰⁰ Services and General Committee

and Parsis 0.1% respectively. He conceded, however, that Anglo-Indians should be exempt from such a procedure to satisfy defence needs,⁵⁰¹ but once the Anglo-Indian element had been appointed he insisted that the remainder of the 33⅓% quota should be distributed amongst the other candidates from the minority communities strictly on a population basis.⁵⁰² Fazl-i-Husain was also of the opinion that the concessions postulated for the non-Muslim minorities were far greater than their population status warranted. He regarded the proposed 25% reservation quota as being totally inadequate to permit Muslims to recover lost ground,⁵⁰³ and he urged the Central Government to guarantee his community 35% of all fresh appointments until such time that Muslims occupied 25% of the administrative posts.⁵⁰⁴ Similarly the Muslim League criticized the Government of India's proposed programme; it advocated that the percentage reservation should reflect Muslim representation in the Indian Legislature (33⅓%).⁵⁰⁵

These complaints and recommendations failed to influence the Central Government. Tiwana's plea for proportional representation had been rejected by the Service and General Committee on the grounds that its enforcement would have resulted in the practical exclusion of all minority candidates, other than Muslims and Anglo-Indians.⁵⁰⁶ The Government of India, therefore, refused to consider permitting the Muslim quota (except when no other minority entrants were forthcoming) to exceed 25%.⁵⁰⁷

Though the Indian Government's reform programme disappointed some Muslim leaders because it had not gone far enough, it was greeted with reservation at the India Office where it was believed in some circles that too much privilege had been conceded. Smith, the Secretary of the Services and General Department, viewed the package purely as a device to placate Muslim sentiment,⁵⁰⁸ and he feared that it would disrupt the 50:50 European-Indian I.C.S. recruitment ratio which had resulted from the Lee Commission recommendations. As such he believed that it was more important to abide rigidly to that ratio than "to concede one more place to the Muslims".⁵⁰⁹ Furthermore he questioned the wisdom of granting Muslims a further 8⅓% share of appointments in the event of there being no candidates from the other minorities, as he

⁵⁰¹ Anglo-Indians were traditionally regarded by the British as being trustworthy and as such were entrusted with positions in vital service areas, such as the Railways and Telegraph Departments, in the belief that their loyalty would not be subverted in times of civil unrest.

⁵⁰² Services and General Committee note (n.d.), L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁵⁰³ It was officially estimated that it would take between 25 and 30 years before Muslims achieved a 25% representation in the I.C.S.; Note by Sir F. Stewart on Communal Representation in the Services, 9 Nov. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵⁰⁴ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 11 Oct 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵⁰⁵ Minutes of Evidence taken before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, p. 1,238, 1 Aug 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵⁰⁶ Services-and General Committee note (n.d.), L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁵⁰⁷ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 28 Sept. 1933, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁵⁰⁸ Minute by F.W.H. Smith, 12 April 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 28 April 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

judged that the practice would lead to considerable resentment among non-Muslims. Despite these misgivings, however, Smith offered tacit agreement to the planned reforms on the condition that the Muslim quota should never exceed 25%, and should not be permitted to interfere with the balance of European-Indian recruitment.⁵¹⁰ Similarly, Stewart, the Permanent Under-Secretary, disliked the changes. He believed that communal representation was essentially wrong, but he accepted that such a provision was necessary to correct the existing communal imbalance in the I.C.S. ... Nevertheless he considered that it should not be made a permanent recruitment feature because of the disability it inflicted on the Hindus.⁵¹¹ In spite of the obvious disquiet which existed amongst his senior colleagues the Secretary of State approved the scheme,⁵¹² because it was feared that if the issue was not settled before the inauguration of the new constitution,⁵¹³ the subject of Muslim recruitment to the I.C.S. could result in serious political repercussions to the detriment of the planned constitutional advance.⁵¹⁴

The recruitment procedure introduced in 1925 and amended in 1933 though it favored the smaller minorities, in that they had been guaranteed a proportion of reserved appointments in excess of their population status, nevertheless led to a significant increase amongst Muslim personnel in the I.C.S., largely as a consequence of the nomination process (see Appendix L). Both competition and nomination were employed to recruit Muslims.⁵¹⁵ From 1925 onwards the Public Service Commission was obliged to recommend all nominees from amongst the candidates who had taken the examination in India.⁵¹⁶ In practical terms this meant that if the number of Muslim candidates selected by competition, was not sufficient to satisfy the Muslim reservation quota, then other Muslim candidates whose performance at the Delhi I.C.S. examinations had not entitled them to direct entry, but whose academic standard was high, were nominated to the Service to complete the 25% quota reserved for their community. Two I.C.S. entrance examinations were held, one in London, the other in India. To begin with the Indian examinations were conducted at Allahabad, but from 1928 onwards they took place in Delhi. Recruitment in India was subsequent to that in London. At the London examination candidates were appointed in strict order of merit,

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 12 April 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵¹¹ Note by Sir F. Stewart, 9 Nov. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵¹² Sec. of State to G. of I., Home Dept., 27 Oct. 1933, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

⁵¹³ By 1930 the British Government had specifically pledged itself to grant Dominion Status for India, to be achieved through the establishment of responsible governments in the provinces, an extension of the franchise to 30 million voters, and the inauguration of a Federal Government to include representatives of the provinces and States. Diarchy was to be abolished in the provinces, and introduced at the Centre. The Governor-General was to be responsible for the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs; all remaining posts were to be held by Ministers responsible to the Legislature. Both the Viceroy and the provincial Governors were to have special powers for the protection of minorities, and to enable them to assume control of the administration in the event of a constitutional breakdown. See J. Glendon, *The Viceroy at Bay*, London, 1971, pp. 18-19.

⁵¹⁴ Note by Sir F. Stewart, 9 Nov. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

⁵¹⁵ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 March 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

⁵¹⁶ Rules for Appointment to the I.C.S., otherwise than by Competitive Examination of Persons Domiciled in India, L/S&G/7/237, IOR.

and the number of appointments to be made on the results of the Delhi examination was decided by deducting the number of Indians recruited in London from the number of Europeans recruited there, in order to maintain the 50:50 balance between Europeans and Indians.⁵¹⁷ At Delhi, however, selection did not always occur solely on the basis of merit, because in order to comply with the reservation rules for minorities it was often necessary to pass over Hindu candidates with higher marks, in order to nominate less successful minority candidates. For example, in 1930 five of the Muslims nominated to the I.C.S. had stood 10th, 11th, 14th, 16th and 20th respectively at the Delhi examination.⁵¹⁸

The result of this procedure was that the Indian examination provided a far more attractive option for Muslims than those held in London. The recruitment quotas, guaranteed to Muslims and other minority candidates, meant in effect that they did not have to compete with Hindu aspirants, as they were required only to achieve a standard of performance sufficient to enable nomination to take place. Also Hindus, because of the high level of success they attained through competition, were effectively barred from the nomination process.⁵¹⁹ These considerations were largely responsible for the large number of Muslim candidates who sought appointments at the examinations in India. 1,063 Muslims competed at Allahabad and Delhi in the years 1924-40, representing 29.9% of the total candidate body. Of these Muslim candidates, 434 were from the Punjab, accounting for 50% of all the Punjabi candidates (Muslim and non-Muslim), and 41% of the total number of Muslim candidates from all the provinces and states (see Appendix L). This high level of Punjabi Muslim participation also seems to have been encouraged by the fact that with the change of examination centre from Allahabad to Delhi in 1928, the examination became more accessible to them, as is suggested by the significant increase that occurred after this date amongst Punjabi Muslims taking the Indian examinations (see Appendix L).

On the basis of a survey encompassing the 1924-40 period,⁵²⁰ it is possible to draw three basic conclusions. In the first place, Punjabi Muslims did not perform as well in the competitive examinations as non-Muslims from their own province. Secondly, despite this failing, Muslims from the Punjab exhibited superior academic qualities in comparison to Muslims from other parts of India. Finally, Punjabi Muslims were major beneficiaries through nomination. Between 1924 and 1940, 13 Punjabi Muslims gained competitive appointments as compared to 27 non-Muslims from the Punjab. The majority of the non-Muslim successes (17) occurred in London, where only four Muslims were successful (see Appendices L and M). There the competition, on account

⁵¹⁷ India Office Memorandum on Recruitment for the I.C.S. 27 April 1936, L/S&G/7/240, IOR.

⁵¹⁸ Statement, enclosure 'draft letter' by F.W.H. Smith, 3 June 1930, L/S&G/7/240, IOR.

⁵¹⁹ F.W.H. Smith to Sec., Civil Service Commission, 19 June 1933, L/S&G/7/245, IOR.

⁵²⁰ The survey was limited to the 1924-40 period because information was not complete for the years prior to 1924. Also recruitment for the I.C.S. was suspended in 1942 as a result of the war, and information for the years 1941 and 1942 is not available.

of the European element, was far keener than in India. The performance of Punjabi Muslims at the Indian examinations, however, was more impressive, in that of the 19 candidates from the Province who were recruited as a result of competition, nine (47%) were Muslims. Even so when one considers that 50% (434) of the total number of candidates from the Punjab who sat the Indian examination in the 1924-40 period were Muslims and they gained 47% of the competitive appointments secured by the Province, as compared to 42% (eight) taken by Hindus, who represented only 34% (298) of the candidate body from the Punjab (see Appendix M) it is clear that the latter possessed a decided advantage in terms of academic ability. Nevertheless of the 36 Indian Muslim candidates who gained entry to the I.C.S. through competition 13 (33%) were from the Punjab, as were 21 (43%) of the 49 Muslims who were nominated for the Service (see Appendices L and M). Both these last two results reflected the academic superiority of Punjabi Muslims as compared to Muslims from other parts of India.

Although competitive success at the examinations resulted from the highest academic achievement, nomination also depended on a high standard of ability on the nominee's part. The Civil Service Commission traditionally recommended only those candidates who had achieved a high mark at the 'viva voce' combined with a satisfactory performance in the written tests.⁵²¹ In practice this meant that when Muslim candidates were nominated, their nomination occurred as a result of their examination results, i.e. those Muslim candidates who had achieved the highest marks at Delhi in relation to other Muslim competitors were nominated. Solely in terms of Muslim academic standards the prowess of Punjabi Muslims was reflected in the examiners' report compiled in 1942. It was a feature of the Indian examinations that the level of performance of the majority of candidates, from all communities, was poor.⁵²² Consequently in 1942 it was decided to conduct a preliminary selection to eliminate the most unsuitable candidates in an attempt to raise the general standard.⁵²³ The I.C.S. Selection Committee reported that with 126 the single exception of the Punjab "where the general standard of the candidates was very good not only academically but also as regards sports and U.T.C. record..." the quality of candidates on the whole was disappointing. The majority of the candidates from every other province, according to the Commission, were unsuitable for the Service.⁵²⁴ This report did not differentiate between the different communities in the Punjab, which testifies to the fact that it embraced the potential of Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Furthermore the advantage enjoyed by Punjabi Muslim candidates was clear in that in the other Muslim majority Provinces - Sindh, N.W.F.P. and Bengal - the number of applicants, regardless of their

⁵²¹ Federal Public Service Commission to G. of I., 29 April 1940, enclosure, P.A. Menon, U. Sec. to G. of I., to Sec., S. & G. Dept., 6 May 1940, L/S&G/7/250, IOR.

⁵²² I.C.S. Examiners' Report, 1938, L/S&G/7/248; *ibid.*, 1939, enclosure, P. A. Menon to Under. Sec. of State, 28 Sept., 1939, L/S&G/7/249, IOR.

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, 1942, enclosure, Minute by G.C.M. Lewis, 24 March 1943, L/S&G/7/252, IOR.

⁵²⁴ Reports of the I.C.S. and Indian Police Selection Committees constituted for different selection areas in 1941, enclosure, Minute by G.C.M. Lewis, 20 Nov. 1941, L/S&G/7/252, IOR.

suitability, had been so small that the Committee decided not to eliminate any of them.⁵²⁵

Thus the high level of nominated appointments gained by Punjabi Muslims did not occur because the Punjab, as the premier Muslim province in British India, had been guaranteed the lion's share of the Muslim reservation. Such considerations did not influence the nomination process. In fact the Public Service Commission was not required to consider provincial factors when selecting nominees.⁵²⁶ Thus when Sir Horace Williamson (Indian Police—retired, appointed Adviser to Secretary of State 1937), out of consideration of the tremendous contribution the Punjab had made to the war effort, attempted to persuade the Government of India to allow an extra nomination to be made in 1941 to allow for the appointment of a Punjabi Muslim, as none had been recruited in that year, his action failed to elicit any official sympathy or support.⁵²⁷ Whilst such a plea delivered on the Province's behalf did not result in a reciprocal gesture by the Central Government, it is apparent that neither the Government of India, nor the Provincial Government, were prepared to ignore the entreaties of powerful Indian families anxious to secure a nominated appointment for one of their members. Consequently both Governments were guilty at times of exerting unfair influence to procure the recruitment of candidates from the political elite, though such occurrences were rare. In the period 1924-40 two such attempts were made on behalf of Muslim candidates from the Punjab, one of which met with success.

In December 1932 Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State, drew the attention of the Viceroy to the fact that the son of the late Sir Muhammad Shafi (Punjab Muslim leader and Loyalist, nominated to the Provincial Legislative Council 1909 and 1912; Member of Imperial Legislative Council 1911, 1914, 1917; Vice-President Viceroy's Executive Council 1922-25) had taken the London examination that year. Although he had not been within 80 places in the order of merit of the last candidate to have gained a competitive appointment, and was young enough to compete the following year, the Secretary of State argued that he had a special claim to nomination on account of his father's distinguished record of service.⁵²⁸ It was a consideration which the candidate's mother and sister exploited to the full. Amin N. Shafi solicited the assistance of Hoare on her son's behalf,⁵²⁹ whilst Begum Shah Nawaz attempted unsuccessfully to enroll the support of the Under-Secretary of State, R.A. Butler, to advance her brother's case.⁵³⁰ The Viceroy, for his part, agreed with Hoare that Shafi's son had "a somewhat special claim to nomination to the I.C.S..." He refused, however, to commit himself further, commenting that the Civil Service Commission, whose recommendation the

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁶ Extract from Official Report of the Council of State Debates, 15 Nov. 1937, p. 605, L/S&G/7/248, IOR.

⁵²⁷ Note by Sir Horace Williamson and Hasan Suhrawardy, 4 July 1941, L/S&G/7/251, IOR.

⁵²⁸ Hoare to Willingdon, 15 Dec. 1932, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

⁵²⁹ Amir N. Shafi to Hoare, 22 Aug. 1932, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

⁵³⁰ Butler to Begum Shah Nawaz, 25 Jan. 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

Government usually followed, would no doubt take into account the career of Shafi's father.⁵³¹ The Commission, however, did not recommend Shafi Junior for nomination. Shafi's poor performance in London precluded such consideration, especially as it had been agreed in 1925 that nominees were to be selected only from amongst those Delhi candidates who had exhibited a high level of ability. Also it had already been decided that only one nomination, and three competitive appointments, were to be made following the results of the 1933 Delhi examination. Anis Ahmad Rushdie, who had stood fourth in order of merit at Delhi clearly had the strongest claim to be nominated. The Government of India, however, was clearly embarrassed by the situation, and in order to avoid giving offence to the Shafi family by nominating Rushdie in preference to Shafi, it decided not to make any nominations that year: Instead it persuaded the India Office to increase the number of Delhi competitive places from three to four,⁵³² thereby accommodating Anis Ahmad through direct recruitment. The India Office agreed to the stratagem, Anderson, the Principal of the Political Department (I.O.) caustically observing that the only advantage the maneuver possessed was that when Lady Shafi enquired why her son had not been chosen, the Government of India could reply "Because there were no nominations this year."⁵³³

The episode demonstrated the degree of influence which the political elite were capable of exerting, when, as in this case, they were able to petition the Secretary of State, the highest British Indian authority, and provoke a response which was not unsympathetic. Furthermore Hoare's reaction was reprehensible in view of the nomination rules. These stated that any attempt on the part of a candidate to enlist support for his application through persons of influence would lead to immediate disqualification. Also recommendations on behalf of candidates were to be considered as invalid if presented by persons not associated with the candidate's academic performance at school or university.⁵³⁴

In the case of Ata Muhammad Khan Leghari, however, both the Central and the Provincial Governments connived to achieve his appointment in a most unscrupulous manner. The Provincial Government took advantage of the fact that the ill-health of one of the successful candidates, Ali Ashgar, necessitated a further Muslim nomination to be made in 1936. The Punjab Government prevailed upon the Government of India to recommend Leghari, who had appeared at the London examination, a factor which usually precluded candidates from nomination. The Provincial Government reasoned that as the son of a leading Tumandar of Dera Ghazi Khan who had been recently knighted, and who represented Tumandars in the Legislative Council, Leghari was by

⁵³¹ Willingdon to Hoare, 3 Feb. 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

⁵³² G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 31 May 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

⁵³³ Note by Anderson, 1 June 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

⁵³⁴ Rules for Appointment to the I.C.S. otherwise than by Competitive Examination of Persons Domiciled in India, L/S&G/7/237, IOR.

birth and social position suited for nomination to the I.C.S.⁵³⁵ By acceding to the Punjab Government's request the Government of India passed over another Punjabi Muslim, Cheema, who had achieved the same marks in the 'viva voce' as Leghari but was 40 places higher in order of merit, and who had been recommended for nomination by the Civil Service Commission.⁵³⁶ In justifying this procedure the Central Government reasoned that Cheema, in spite of the fact that he had obtained higher marks than Leghari "seems to be a Punjabi Muhammadan of an ordinary type with merely Indian education."⁵³⁷

Considering that 'a mere Indian education' had enabled Cheema to surpass by a considerable margin the efforts of Leghari, 'blessed' as he was with the educational advantages provided by Aitchison College, Lahore, and Christ Church, Oxford,⁵³⁸ it is obvious that the Central Government had complied with the Punjab's request purely out of political considerations. The Leghari family was one of the largest landholding families in the Province. Sir Jamal Khan Leghari, a known supporter of the Government,⁵³⁹ possessed 150,000 acres, and a jagir which yielded an income of Rs. 50,500 annually. As Sir Jamal had considerable political influence in Dera Ghazi Khan,⁵⁴⁰ the Provincial Government clearly desired to associate the Leghari family with the Provincial administration. Initially, however, despite the concurrence of the Central Government, the endeavors of the Punjab Government on Leghari's behalf were frustrated temporarily by the recovery of Ali Ashgar.⁵⁴¹ It was not until the following year that Leghari, who had stood 148th at the Delhi examination of 1937, an improvement of seven places on his efforts in London, was elevated to the ranks of the 'Heaven Born'.⁵⁴²

The desire of the Punjab Government to employ the sons of powerful individuals was further demonstrated by its treatment of Muhamad Azim Husain. As the son of Fazl-i-Husain, the most influential Muslim leader in the Province, Azim Husain was regarded as a potential asset. In securing his posting to the Punjab in 1936,⁵⁴³ however, neither the Local nor Central Governments had been guilty of corrupt practice, for Husain, a Muslim nominee, had stood fifth in order of merit at the Delhi examination,⁵⁴⁴ thus he owed his appointment to personal effort rather than governmental intrigue.

⁵³⁵ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 3 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

⁵³⁶ Minute by F.W.H. Smith, 6 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

⁵³⁷ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 3 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁹ Sir Mohammad Jemal Khan Leghari had rendered valuable service to the Punjab Government during the serious inter-tribal disturbances which occurred in Dera Ghazi Khan from 1915 to 1919, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 May 1944.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 21 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

⁵⁴² I.C.S. Nominations List, 1937, enclosure, D. M. Cleary to Sir Zafrullah Khan, 22 June 1937, L/S&G/7/247, IOR.

⁵⁴³ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 10 Oct. 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

⁵⁴⁴ G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

But the vast majority of Punjabi candidates, successful or otherwise, were not the scions of politically influential men. Though, all enjoyed the necessary financial resources to enable them to acquire a university degree in order to compete at the I.C.S. examinations.⁵⁴⁵ A survey of the socio-economic backgrounds of the Punjabi candidates who appeared at the Delhi I.C.S. examinations between 1930 and 1940⁵⁴⁶ indicates that most of the Muslim candidates, in common with those from the other main communities, belonged to four main economic groups - government service, professional practice, agriculture, commerce and industry (the last two included as one category). The majority of Muslim candidates (57%) in fact came from service families. Of the remainder 18% had an agricultural heritage, and 9% belonged to commercial and industrial families (see Appendix N).

In considering the parental background of the candidates, the most striking factor to emerge is that more Muslim candidates came from a service tradition than was the case for Hindus and Sikhs, despite the fact that Muslims were in the minority as compared to non-Muslims in this sphere of employment. Allowing for the overall educational backwardness of the Muslim community, however, the fact that the majority of Muslim candidates were from service families was not such an extraordinary development; in that that section of society, more than any other, reflected the height of Muslim academic achievement, limited though it was generally. The minority position of Muslim candidates from the professional classes (medicine, law, accounting, teaching), however, reflected in part the fact that in this sphere of employment the Muslim community was not well represented. Considering that the 'professions' were in themselves an expression of a literate heritage, it is significant that all the communal groups drew relatively small numbers of candidates from this tradition. This in part was a reflection of hereditary professional preference on the part of youths whose fathers belonged to professional vocations. In addition to which degree holders in professional and vocational subjects did not qualify for admission to the I.C.S.⁵⁴⁷ Finally, more Muslims came from agricultural, and less from a commercial and industrial tradition than was the case for Hindus. This was a trend which resulted to a large extent from the respective roles which the two communities played in these spheres of provincial life, in that Muslims were more greatly involved in agriculture than Hindus, whilst the Hindu community dominated the industry and commerce of the Province. Also agriculture, industry and commerce provided an hereditary source of income, which explains the comparatively low number of candidates from these

⁵⁴⁵ Home Dept. Notifications, Rules for Entrance June 1935, enclosure, Minute by Anderson, 25 L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

⁵⁴⁶ In conducting a survey of the socio-economic backgrounds of Punjabi candidates information was obtained from I.C.S. admission forms and examiners' statements. It proved necessary to limit the enquiry to the 1930-40 period, because of the lack of information for most of the earlier years. Nevertheless this limited analysis accounts for 76% of the total number of Punjabi, and approximately 81% of Muslim candidates from the Province who appeared at the Indian examinations between 1924 and 1940.

⁵⁴⁷ Home Dept. Notification, Rules for Entrance into the I.C.S., 27 June 1935, enclosure, Minute by Anderson, 25 Oct. 1935, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

backgrounds. The new generation from these groups were not as vulnerable to outside economic pressures as were their compeers whose sole income would be based on their profession rather than inheritance.

In the case of those Punjabi Muslims who were recruited in the 1924-40 period it is not surprising that seven of the 13 examinees who gained competitive appointments emanated from a 'service' tradition, considering that contenders from that background dominated the field. Of the remainder four were from 'business' and two from 'professional' families (see Appendices O and P). With regard to the 21 Muslim nominees from the Punjab, although those from a 'service' heritage were not in the majority, they did comprise the largest single group: seven originated from that class; five were agriculturists; four were from a professional tradition; one was from a business family and one came from a mixed economic background, encompassing both 'service' and agriculture. There was no information available concerning the antecedents of the remaining three candidates (see Appendix Q).

Nomination had secured for Punjabi Muslims the majority of I.C.S. appointments from the Province in the post-1924 period. The numbers involved, however, were very small. The Provincial Services provided a far greater occupational outlet, and in that sphere, in spite of reservation, Muslims remained a minority. By the early 1930's the public services provided employment for 0.4% of the population of the Punjab,⁵⁴⁸ which was not insignificant considering that only approximately 3% of the population (representing the proportion of literate males - 20+) were eligible to seek appointments.⁵⁴⁹ Even so the Province was producing far more graduates than could be absorbed by the administration, and serious unemployment existed amongst this class.⁵⁵⁰ The Muslim position in this respect could have been improved if the community had been granted proportional reservation on the basis of its population percentage (i.e. 56%), but that had not been possible because of political considerations and the composition of the Unionist Party.

The failure of the Muslims as a community to secure a larger share of service appointments because of their under-achievement in education, and in spite of a favorable recruitment procedure, contributed in part to the eventual failure of the Unionist Party to withstand the political challenge of the Muslim League. In essence it demonstrated that the Unionist Ministry, although dominated by Muslims, was unable to proceed beyond certain politically acceptable limits to promote Muslim

⁵⁴⁸ *Report of the Punjab Unemployment Committee, 1937-38*, Lahore, 1938, pp. 48-49, PPL.

⁵⁴⁹ Calculated from information contained in *Census of India, 1931, Punjab*, Pt. I, pp. 11,256, IOR. Total Population of British Punjab, 23,580,852; literate male population of 20 years and over, 768,475; percentage of literate males of 20 years and over to total population, 3%. Although some women were employed in the Provincial Services, e.g. the Education Department, their number was so insignificant that their presence does not detract from the main hypothesis.

⁵⁵⁰ *Punjab University Enquiry Committee Report, 1932-33*, Lahore, 1933, p. 83, PPL.

advancement. The situation was clearly ripe for exploitation, especially as communalism intensified in the pre-1946 election period. The Punjab Provincial Muslim League in its election manifesto, published in 1944, undertook to secure the advancement of backward communities in the Provincial Services,⁵⁵¹ which in effect meant improving Muslim prospects. Such a development was irrevocably linked with the establishment of a Muslim State,⁵⁵² for as Hosain Imam (League leader, Bihar) bluntly stated to the Council of State in April 1944, Muslims could only be guaranteed their rightful share of service appointments by the division of the country into Hindustan and Pakistan.⁵⁵³ The belief that the creation of a Muslim homeland, in addition to safeguarding the integrity of Islam,⁵⁵⁴ would provide a panacea for the socio-economic problems of the Muslim community gained tremendous credence in the Punjab prior to the election.⁵⁵⁵ Thus as the electoral contest approached the Unionist Government could offer no attractive alternative to the prospects promised by the realization of Pakistan, as Unionist unity and philosophy had fallen victim to an expression of militant communalism, as epitomized in the demand for an independent Muslim State (see Chapter VI below). Pakistani was yet to become a reality; it was untried and undefined, and as such it promised all things to all men. Conversely, the Unionist Ministry had administered the Punjab for nine years; its policies and limitations were known, and as a result open to criticism. Its limited achievement in respect of the composition of the services could offer no substitution to the prospects embodied in the creation of a Muslim nation, unencumbered by communal considerations.

In the final analysis, whilst it would be incorrect to suggest that 'Pakistan' was conceived wholly with the purpose of providing 'jobs for the boys', it would be naive to ignore the attraction this proposition held for large numbers of Muslims, particularly those belonging to the educated elite. Unionist policies concerning service recruitment could only offer parity with the other communities, to be achieved gradually. Alternatively Pakistan appeared to guarantee the prospect of total Muslim dominance of the 'loaves and fishes' of official patronage as Muslims were presented with the opportunity to control, and thereby to monopolies, the distribution of appointments.

⁵⁵¹ *Manifesto of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League*, Delhi, 1944, p. 8, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵⁵³ Extract from the Official Report of the Council of State Debates, 6 April 1944, pp. 668-670, L/S&G/6/3628, IOR.

⁵⁵⁴ Muslim League propagandists in the Punjab propagated the belief that Islamic law would be established with the creation of Pakistan (Viceroy to Sec. of State, 22 Oct. 1945, g/3/1/105, IOR). The manifesto of the Provincial Muslim League certainly encouraged this belief in that it quoted the Working Committee's resolution passed at the Lucknow session (Oct. 1937) of the All India Muslim League "To abolish and remove un-Islamic customs and usages from Muslim society": *Manifesto of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League*, Delhi, 1944, Appendix II, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁵⁵⁵ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug. 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

CHAPTER IV

MUSLIM POLITICS AND THE ELECTION OF 1937 - FACTIONALISM AND FEUDALISM

The political life of the Punjab and of the Muslim community had been dominated by the Unionist Party since the early 1920's. The absence of basic democratic practices, combined with a leadership representing the most powerful socio-economic faction in the Province guaranteed the party's victory in 1937. As the vehicle of the powerful landed feudal elite, its success reflected the ability of that social group to influence and control the electorate. Manifestoes, the hallmark of western electioneering practice, were employed, but they amounted to little more than a superfluous nicety, indulged in to create the atmosphere of a democratic contest, but in reality offering no real challenge to the traditional autocracy of the country areas. To the contesting candidates in the rural constituencies which dominated the Provincial Assembly,⁵⁵⁶ it was the support of influential landlords, rather than the enunciation of party dogma which provided the key to success, and as such patrons and not policies largely decided the outcome. The fact that the majority of Punjabi Muslims constituted a backward section of society in many areas crucial to provincial life - e.g. education, the public services, commerce and industry - did not constitute a significant issue in the 1937 elections.

The actual electoral contest was influenced by two major pieces of legislation - the Alienation of Land Act, 1900 and the Government of India Act, 1935. The former had divided the Province's populace into land-owning and non-land-owning tribes, creating an economic hegemony based on land-owning traditions and not religious allegiance; the latter as applied to the Punjab effectively prevented the dominant Muslim community from forming a workable majority in the Provincial Legislature.⁵⁵⁷ The creation of a coalition, therefore, was essential to enable any Muslim dominated party to form a stable government. Thus whilst the Act of 190 (Alienation of Land) had helped to precipitate the emergence of non-religious based economic alliances, that of 1935 (Government of India) deemed such alliances to be a necessary prerequisite to enable

⁵⁵⁶ Out of a legislature of 175, 157 seats were for separate electorate constituencies. Of the latter 138 were rural constituencies, whilst of the 18 special interest seats in the Assembly, 5 were reserved for landholders, which resulted in a total rural representation of 143. See Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 73-61, CMD. 5589, IOR.

⁵⁵⁷ Although the Muslims represented 56% of the provincial population in 1931, the community under the terms of the 1935 Act had been guaranteed by separate elections only 84 seats out of a total of 175, though Muslims possessed a majority in 7 (2 women, 3 landholders, 2 labor) of the special interest constituencies. Theoretically, therefore, it was possible for a Muslim party, which captured all the reserved, and seven special interest seats, to command a small majority in the legislature. In practice, however, a development of that nature, as a result of urban-rural rivalry and factionalism was highly unlikely, as the 1937 elections demonstrated. *Times of India* (Bombay), 13 March 1946.

any one political group to govern the Province. This political reality reaffirmed the traditional non-communal role of the rural elite's Unionist Party (founded 1923).⁵⁵⁸ Because of the absence of any serious contender, its championship of rural interests and, most important of all, its monopoly of landed gentry support, assured the Party's success at the polls. Jinnah (President, All-India Muslim League), realizing the dominant role the Unionist Party played in the politics of the Punjab, attempted unsuccessfully to persuade its Muslim membership to accept League control, a failure which caused him to seek allies from amongst the two Muslim urban parties (Ittihad-i-Millat and Majlis-i-Ahrar), neither of which were capable of challenging Unionist supremacy in the rural tracts. The Unionist Party, though unimpeded by a strong opposition, nevertheless possessed an 'Achilles heel' factionalism. Events in the pre-election period, however, prevented the development of serious schism in the party, thereby denying Jinnah and other anti-Unionists the opportunity to create a split amongst, or encourage desertions by Muslim Unionists.

The political supremacy enjoyed by the landed elite resulted from the economic power they exercised in the constituencies, and the feudal ties of loyalty which bound the peasantry and tenantry to them. The Punjab was predominantly a province of small owners and cultivators: by the late 1930's, of the 3,470,248 persons eligible to pay land revenue, over half (1,759,260) paid only Rs. 5 per annum or less, whilst those who could be termed 'large landlords' numbered just 6,277.⁵⁵⁹ The continual division of holdings, as a result of death and inheritance customs, had forced many small cultivators to seek additional land as tenants, thereby placing them firmly under the control of the large landlords, whose dominance was exemplified by the fact that they could claim from between a quarter and a half of the crop produced on the tenanted land as rent.⁵⁶⁰ Professor Narain, in commenting in 1938 on landlord-tenant economic relations, emphasized the exploitation inherent in the relationship:

"The ... landlord is able to exploit the tenant because of the constantly growing pressure of population on the soil. Land is scarce relatively to demand, and there are no alternative means of earning a livelihood for the tenant class. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the landlord's share should contain a large element of loot."⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁸ Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, Bombay, 1943, pp. 153, 318.

⁵⁵⁹ In the Punjab, because of the great variation in the productivity of the soil, it would have been deceptive to differentiate between large and small owners purely in acreage terms, as an owner of 500 acres of colony land was much better off than one who farmed 5,000 acres in the desert Thal. Thus the amount of land revenue paid per owner offered a much surer guide to a zamindar's status, the Land Revenue Committee decreeing in 1938 that those cultivators who paid in excess of Rs. 230 per annum could be deemed to be large landlords, i.e. any owner who held at least 50 acres in a canal-colony, or more than 200 acres in an unirrigated tract. *The Report of the Land Revenue Committee*, 1938, Lahore 1938, p. 80, Appendix I, p. i, IOR.

⁵⁶⁰ J. McDouie, *Punjab Land Administration Manual*, Lahore, 1908, p. 3.

⁵⁶¹ *The Report of the Land Revenue Committee*, 1938, Lahore, 1938, p. 32 (Calvert recorded similar views in this report, see pp. 205-215), IOR.

Also the small cultivator and landowner had no means to protect himself from existing feudal exploitation. In the western Punjab where the majority of the great landed estates, and the overwhelming bulk of the Muslim population were situated, the cultivating class was thinly scattered throughout the rural tracts and therefore highly vulnerable; large settlements were few and far between, thereby denying most individuals the opportunity to present a united front to counter landlord oppression.⁵⁶²

Crude economic exploitation alone, however, did not solely account for the political supremacy of the agrarian elite, for it was bolstered by strong feelings of feudal loyalty on the part of the smaller cultivators for the local gentry, often emanating from their membership of the same clan group or *biraderi*. This was clearly demonstrated in the case of a water dispute which occurred in the village of Durrana Langana (Multan District) in 1925. Despite the construction of a tail-cluster in 1916 the distribution of water from the Kassi canal to owners in Durrana Langana and to the Sikhs and Bappis in Kirpalpur led to dangerous friction:

"The Dehars in Durrana Langana, and the Sikhs and Bappis in Kirpalpur are equally influential, and represent the typical "Squires" common in the District. The two sides had gathered a large number of followers who were ready to lay down even their lives for their masters. There can be no complaint of general injustice to the village in the distribution of the water of this Branch as all the land falling in the Chakbandi belongs to one family."

Thus the 'forces' of the conflicting landowners were not offended parties, merely loyal devotees prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in the cause of their feudal superiors (bloodshed was only avoided by the timely intervention of the police).⁵⁶³

The iron grip which the landed 'elite exercised over the political life of the Province is evident from a scrutiny of Muslim representatives who sat in the Provincial Legislative Council following the inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919).⁵⁶⁴ In the four elections held in 1920, 1923, 1926 and 1930, only 51 different persons had been elected to the Legislative Council, from the 21 Muslim seats situated in the Muslim majority districts of the western Punjab. All of them belonged to the landed gentry, 13

⁵⁶² M. L. Darling, *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*, London, 1925, pp. 111-113.

⁵⁶³ R. K. Seth and Faiz Ilahi, *Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, An Economic Survey of Durrana Langana, A Village in the Multan District of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1906, p. 86, PBRL.

⁵⁶⁴ Under the terms of the G.O.I. Act (1919) the majority of the members (71 out of 94) of the Punjab's Legislative Council were to be elected, but the electorate was severely restricted (3.4% of population). The seventy-one elected seats were divided between special constituencies representing particular interests (i.e. University, Labor, Women, Landholders, Anglo-Indian, European) and separate communal seats, subdivided into urban and rural categories for the Muslims (5 urban, 27 rural), Hindus (7 urban, 13 rural) and Sikhs (1 urban, 11 rural). Ministers who were appointed from the elected element were given responsibility for transferred subjects, e.g. Education and Agriculture, but Finance, Law and Order remained directly under the Governor's control.

were listed as Punjabi chiefs and many were provincial and divisional *darbaris*. As Craig Baxter has observed, "The names form a listing of the squirearchy of Punjab." Of the successful candidates many were returned more than once: Nawab Choudhry Fazl Ali of Gujrat, Malik Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon of Shahpur, Syed Raza Shah Gilani of Multan and Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari of Dera Ghazi Khan were successful in each of the four elections, seven were returned three times, and a further 13 were elected twice. The measure of influence which this 'squirearchy' wielded is further exemplified by the fact that in the 21 constituencies referred to above, only two of the seats (Lyallpur South and Gujranwala) were captured by different candidates at each election, though in Gujranwala two of the representatives belonged to the same family.⁵⁶⁵

The importance of the landed 'elite in the politics of the Province was fully appreciated by Fazl-i-Husain who by 1918, as a result of his ability and force of personality, had emerged as the most important Muslim leader in the Province.⁵⁶⁶ Husain himself did not belong to the large landlord class; by profession he was a lawyer, whose father and forbears had sought government service, both under the Sikhs and the British, their family having lost its ancestral estate in Gurdaspur with the collapse of Mughal power.⁵⁶⁷ With the Government of India Act of 1919, and the granting of limited responsibility to elected Indian representatives, the growth of political parties, which previously had not existed in the Punjab,⁵⁶⁸ became inevitable: "Fazl-i-Husain was the first to grasp the fact that ultimately political power in the new Council must rest mainly with rural Muslim members, and he, therefore, immediately set himself to weld them into a united party."⁵⁶⁹ In order to identify himself fully with the interests of the landed elite he contested and won a landholders' seat in the election of 1920.⁵⁷⁰

Also the Muslim community though numerically in a majority in the Province had been denied a similar status in the Legislature, as they were allowed only 45.5% of the total membership, elected and nominated. Fazl-i-Husain accepted, therefore, that if the Muslims were to play a major role in the reformed Council they could do so only with non-Muslim support. It was this realism prompted by a perceptive understanding of

⁵⁶⁵ C. Baxter, 'The People's Party vs. the Punjab "Feudalists"', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, VIII, (1973), pp. 167-169. (For a list of those Muslim families who dominated the political life of the Province see Appendix R.)

⁵⁶⁶ See Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-92, 125.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-5, 7, 13, 23-27, 95.

⁵⁶⁸ The Punjab was politically undeveloped and immature. The absence of political parties in the pre-reform period reflected the fact that the Province lacked an accredited leader. Lajpat Rai was in enforced exile in America, whilst Harkishan Lal was too preoccupied with his industrial and financial concerns to indulge in politics. Also, there was little popular support for political activity; the Punjab was the only province in British India lacking a Congress-organized Provincial Conference. Furthermore the British, by identifying their policy so closely with the interest of the landed elite, had done nothing to encourage the politicization of that traditionally pro-Government loyalist class. See *ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 125.

the political situation in the Province which led him to form a broad-based party to attract non-Muslim adherents. The party he formed was known as the Rural Party, and by promoting agrarian interests. it gained the cooperation of non-Muslim agriculturist Council members, whose participation was essential for Fazl-i-Husain's aims to sustain a majority in the Legislature. Having gained a preeminent position, the Rural Party attempted to emphasize its non-communal rural appeal by adopting and proclaiming a strong pro-rural, anti-urban philosophy:

"The basic principle was to assist and encourage backward areas, backward classes, and backward communities. This principle included protection of the peasantry, particularly against the hated Hindu moneylender, and the extension of beneficent activities by Government to hitherto neglected rural areas ... it means the multiplication of rural dispensaries, primary schools, high schools, intermediate colleges, cooperative societies and rural veterinary dispensaries..."⁵⁷¹

In 1923 the Rural Party was transformed by Fazl-i-Husain into the Punjab National Unionist Party. The use of the word 'Unionist' was clearly intended to signify the multi-communal character of the organization, the importance of which needed special emphasis in the post-1923 election Council, in that a new party had emerged, opposed to the rural grouping. This was the Punjab Swaraj Party, which was a decidedly communal (pro-Hindu) consortium reflecting professional and commercial interests. The combination of this urban faction, however, with the other non-Unionist elements in the Legislature (Khilafists, Hindus and Sikhs) was insufficient to challenge the dominance of the Unionist Party, which had captured all the Muslim seats with the exception of three taken by Khilafists, and had been joined by seven rural Hindus and Sikhs, giving it 39 seats out of a total of 71. Throughout the pre-1937 period the Unionists maintained control over provincial politics, although at the last election held under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in 1930 its combined strength had decreased to 36, of whom only three were non-Muslims, thereby depriving the Party of much of its non-communal character.⁵⁷²

With the passage of the 1935 Government of India Act, the Punjab, in common with the other provinces of British India, began to prepare for the provincial elections scheduled for the opening months of 1937. Fazl-i-Husain, who had been absent from the Punjab for five years (April 1930-April 1935) serving as a member of the Viceroy's Council, returned to the Province to reorganize the Unionist camp in preparation for the polling. In view of the fact that the new legislation (1935 Act) had followed the precedent of the Act of 1919 in denying Muslims a statutory majority, Fazl-i-Husain laid the greatest possible emphasis on attracting multi-communal support. At a press conference, which

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-152.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153, 162, see also *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 18 Oct. 1936.

marked the public launching of his campaign in January 1936, the Unionist leader appealed for communal harmony. In an attempt to further promote communal unity Husain convened a meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference (February 1936) which was addressed by the Aga Khan, whose speech clearly identified with Unionist philosophy as conceived by Fazl-i-Husain, in that whilst it recognized the backwardness of the Muslims, it stressed that they belonged to the larger Indian community, and as such should work in unison with non-Muslims to achieve common political objectives and to alleviate social ills:

"India is now entering a new phase of political life. Indian Muslims are ready to take their due share in developing political life in the best interests of the country. Their political goal is dominion status ... At home Indians must have economic reorganization - there is a wide gulf between different sections of Indians - extreme poverty, hunger and nakedness, emaciated enfeebled bodies and ignorance is the lot of a vast majority of them... The whole economic, social and religious fabric calls for immediate relief - uplift of the weak - economically, intellectually and culturally - so that there may be no one left to be called depressed..."

The Conference further summarized these sentiments in resolution form, stressing the desire of the Muslim community to play its part in Indian life: "the Conference should make a declaration that the Muslims put India first, being as much their motherland as of other races who inhabit India."⁵⁷³

As far as the landed aristocracy of the Punjab was concerned, the Conference's statements contained useful but empty rhetoric. Power was what mattered, not the social upliftment of the masses, nevertheless the sentiments provided a bridge for inter-communal cooperation, as Fazl-i-Husain intended. It is evident that the Unionist leader initially directed the message primarily at 'Congress ears', for he remained preoccupied with the realization that Muslims in the Punjab would be unable to form a ministry without non-Muslim support,⁵⁷⁴ and consequently he was anxious to secure a pre-election agreement with the Congress. Negotiations, which were opened with the Congress Party immediately following the conclusion of the Muslim Conference, were destined to achieve nothing. Despite the heady sentiments expressed at the Conference, Fazl-i-Husain had long been regarded as a communalist in Hindu circles, particularly in the Punjab, where his actions as Provincial Education Minister had been interpreted as an infringement on Hindu rights. Consequently the Hindu press in the Punjab denounced him;⁵⁷⁵ the *Tribune* accusing him of desiring to trick non-Muslims into

⁵⁷³ Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-303.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁵⁷⁵ See *Tribune* (Lahore), 21 April 1936; *Daily Herald* (Lahore) 22 April 1936; *Pratap* (Lahore), 22 April 1936; *Sher-i-Punjab* (Lahore), 7 June 1936, PPA.

acquiescing in the Muslim domination of the Province,⁵⁷⁶ whilst the *Daily Herald* declared that "Muslim leaders propose to administer the cup of poison with sweet mantras of unity...."⁵⁷⁷

Also Fazl-i-Husain's championing of communal cooperation, in spite of the political necessity which inspired it, was not universally accepted within Muslim Unionist ranks. In August 1935 Firoz Khan Noon (Minister of Education, Punjab) had urged that the Party should assume a positive communal complexion, whilst retaining its agrarian appeal, believing that only by such means could it capture the imagination and support of the Muslim masses. In so doing he proposed that a Muslim Zamindara Party should be constituted to contest the elections.⁵⁷⁸ Fazl-i-Husain, however, refused to abandon his non-communal stance, realizing that to have done so would have seriously jeopardized Unionist prospects of forming a majority, which could not be achieved without non-Muslim support.⁵⁷⁹

Forces outside of the Unionist Party had been anxious also to encourage Fazl-i-Husain to adopt a communal stance in respect of the elections. M.A. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, fully realized that his organization, solely dependent on the support of a section of the urban intelligentsia, was totally incapable of challenging and defeating the Unionist forces. He knew that the Unionist Party controlled the rural Muslim constituencies, and he hoped to be able to establish the League in the Province by persuading Fazl-i-Husain to contest the election in concert with, and not in opposition to the League. His confidence in the Unionist Party's ability to emerge victorious from the elections was revealed in a denouncement of the Party made only after he had failed to reach agreement with it: "I fear that there is a caucus that is likely to be effective because it depends on pocket boroughs ... of this caucus the spear-head is the Unionist party."⁵⁸⁰

In an attempt to utilize the influence of the 'caucus', he was later to condemn, Jinnah invited Fazl-i-Husain in January 1936 to preside over the forthcoming session of the All-India Muslim League, in a message which betrayed the depth of his recognition that Husain's support was desperately necessary for the League to succeed in the Punjab:

"I along with many others feel that at this moment no one can give a better lead to the Mussalmans of India than yourself ... it will be a great honor to the League to have you to preside over our deliberations ... I trust that you will accept the call at this moment. I think that you can render the greatest service at this moment and add to your laurels ... We want a man of your caliber and

⁵⁷⁶ *Tribune*, 18 Feb. 1936, PPA.

⁵⁷⁷ *Daily Herald*, 19 Feb. 1936, PPA.

⁵⁷⁸ Firoz Khan Noon to Fazl-i-Husain, 9 Aug. 1935, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E. 352/12, IOR.

⁵⁷⁹ Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

⁵⁸⁰ *Tribune*, 14 Oct. 1936, PPA.

experience, and nobody can well, at this critical moment as far as I can see, perform that duty and render that service to the community as you would be able to...your presence is necessary mainly and solely in the interests of the community... Your refusal will be the greatest misfortune and a terrible disappointment to me personally."⁵⁸¹

This flattering invitation failed to achieve its objective; Fazl-i-Husain refused to associate either himself or his party with the League. The latter was a purely communal body, which under Jinnah's direction sought to attract and control non-League provincial Muslim parties by persuading them to contest the forthcoming elections under the aegis of the League's Central Parliamentary Board. The Unionist leader reasoned that such a political marriage between the Unionists and the League would be impractical. In an attempt to dissuade other Muslim parties, outside the Punjab, from aligning themselves with the League, Fazl-i-Husain in a letter published in *the Civil and Military Gazette* of 7 June 1936 publicly rejected Jinnah's Parliamentary Board proposal. Fazl-i-Husain pointed out that provincial autonomy as conceived by the 1935 Act was synonymous with decentralization, and as such it would be wrong to centralize provincial elections. Also as conditions varied in each province, especially in Muslim minority as compared to Muslim majority provinces, it would be impossible to devise a uniform principle applicable to all. Furthermore Fazl-i-Husain emphasized that in many provinces Muslims, out of necessity, needed to promote non-communal organizations, because as was the case in the Punjab, the Muslim majority was nominal, and it would be "almost impossible to secure a Muslim majority through a separate control of elections." Fazl-i-Husain concluded that in the circumstances a communal central Muslim agency was ill-suited to conduct provincial Muslim elections. In addition he attempted to undermine the League initiative by suggesting that its primary objective was not to further Muslim interests, so much as Jinnah's ambitions: "The initiative and elasticity needed for such purpose [the need for non-communal organizations to secure Muslim coalition ministries] for each province should not be sacrificed for the sake of an All-India leader's aspirations."⁵⁸²

There were other considerations which had contributed to fashion Fazl-i-Husain's reaction. He feared that Jinnah's move would damage Muslim solidarity in the Punjab to the detriment of the Unionist Party, as well as in the other Muslim majority provinces where he had already encouraged the growth of political organizations similar to the Unionist Party.⁵⁸³ In adopting this tactic he had been supported by the Aga Khan who

⁵⁸¹ Jinnah to Fazl-i-Husain, 5 Jan. 1936, Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, Lahore, 1976, pp. 477-478.

⁵⁸² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 7 June 1936.

⁵⁸³ As Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain's son and biographer has explained, his father "was apprehensive that they [members of the Central Parliamentary Board] would disrupt Muslim unity in the Punjab, U.P. and Bengal, and also prevent Muslims in N.W.F.P. and Sindh from standing in combination with non-Muslims to give non-communal organizations to their provinces": Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

approved of the move, and was prepared to offer financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 20,000 to popularize it through the press, and facilitate its success.⁵⁸⁴

There seems little doubt that Husain desired the growth of 'quasi Unionist' political bodies in all the Muslim majority provinces and the U.P., to provide the platform of a national organization willing to promote Muslim interests through economic and political cooperation with non-Muslims, and thereby bypass the League which he believed would harm, rather than benefit Muslim prospects by its prosecution of a communal approach.⁵⁸⁵ It is evident therefore that Fazl-i-Husain regarded Jinnah as an adversary in both the provincial and national spheres, as is evident from the sentiments he expressed to the Aga Khan on 22 June 1936:

"Since last April the Unionist Party has been re-organized and a Unionist political organization of a non-communal type has been set going throughout the Punjab... Jinnah has blundered into this arena very much to our prejudice. He has not been able to obtain any support from any section of the Unionists ... You know perfectly well that the Punjab is the key of the Indian Muslim politics because of the strong attitude we have taken. Sindh is following in our footsteps, North-West Frontier Province is doing the same and to a minor extent Bengal and U.P. are also coming into line. Thus Jinnah's Parliamentary Board is already broken up."⁵⁸⁶

Considering the 'national' ambitions which Fazl-i-Husain nurtured, it is clear that by July 1936 he believed that they were in the process of attaining fruition: "N.W.F. Province and Sindh have definitely decided to constitute Unionist Parties after the pattern of the Punjab Unionist Party and Bengal, specially [*sic*] Eastern Bengal, has also decided to follow them."⁵⁸⁷

In the event, however, Fazl-i-Husain's hopes failed to reach fruition. His death in July 1936 removed the main inspiration for, and driving force whereby such a development might have been achieved. Even had he lived, however, such a development was unlikely. His assessment concerning the growth of Unionist-type parties in the provinces mentioned above was incorrect. Muslim politics at the provincial level were dominated by fierce personal rivalries, whilst communalism militated against cooperation with non-Muslim organizations. Consequently Muslim leaders such as Fazlul Huq in Bengal and the Nawab of Chhatari in U.P. were more concerned with maintaining their respective positions in the provincial spheres, rather than working in unison in pursuit of a non-communal national strategy. In fact Abdoola Haroon in Sindh was the only influential Muslim to organize a party along Unionist lines - the

⁵⁸⁴ Aga Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, telegram, 24 June 1936, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E. 352/19, IOR.

⁵⁸⁵ Fazl-i-Husain to Sikander Hyat Khan, 6 May 1936, Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), pp. 533-535.

⁵⁸⁶ Fazl-i-Husain to Aga Khan, 22 June 1936, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E. 352/19, IOR.

⁵⁸⁷ Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

Sindh United Party. It failed to command a united Muslim following, however, being opposed by the Azad Party of Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, and Ghulam Hussain's Muslim Political Party.⁵⁸⁸

In opposing Jinnah in the Punjab, Fazl-i-Husain had been aided by the attitude of his troublesome lieutenant, and eventual successor, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who was equally determined to prevent the League leader from intruding into the Unionist preserve, or undermining provincial autonomy. Consequently he supported Fazl-i-Husain's rejection of the Parliamentary Board, having informed the Unionist leader in May 1936 that:

"I have ... asked Ahmad Yar [Daultana] to strongly press on him [Jinnah] the advisability of keeping his finger out of the Punjab pie. If he meddles he would only be encouraging fissiparous tendencies already palpably discernible in a section of Punjab Muslims, & might burn his fingers; & in any case we cannot possibly allow 'provincial autonomy' to be tampered with...by anybody, be he a nominee of the powers who have given us this autonomy or a President of the Muslim League..."⁵⁸⁹

Thus Jinnah, as a result of Sikander's stand, was unable to manipulate to his advantage the rivalry which existed between Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander in the pre-election period.

Whilst Jinnah's proposal regarding a Parliamentary Board failed to precipitate disunity amongst Muslim Unionists, factionalism continued to pose the gravest threat which the Party had to face in 1936. It was a condition which had bedeviled the Party from its earliest days,⁵⁹⁰ resulting to a great extent from the presence of three powerful cliques, the continued affiliation of each being essential to party unity. These three groups centered around Sir Sikander Hyat Khan representing the Hyats of Wah, Sir Firoz Khan Noon of the Noon-Tiwana family group of Sargodha, and a loose alliance between Choudhury Sir Shahab-ud-Din of Sialkot and his more influential brother-in-law Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana of Mailsi in Multan District. As a result of the antipathy which existed between the Daultanas and Noons, Daultana supported Sikander in opposition to Firoz Khan Noon, whom Sikander regarded as his main political rival.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁸ See Z.H. Zaidi, 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47', in *The Partition of India*, Eds. C. H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, London, 1970, pp. 248-249, and F.D.Reeves, 'Landlords and Party Politics in the United Provinces, 1934-37', in *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*, Ed. D.A. Low, London, 1968, pp. 267-274.

⁵⁸⁹ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁵⁹⁰ During the 1926-30 period there had been no real cohesion in the Unionist Party. There was a pronounced restiveness amongst the Muslim membership; party whips were disregarded by various feuding groups, and on one occasion a Unionist Minister was openly opposed by his party members in the Assembly. Serious personal rivalries contributed to aggravate the situation. Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 162- 271.

⁵⁹¹ On 29 Oct. 1930 Fazl-i-Husain despondently confided to his diary, "[The] weak position of Muslims in the Punjab [is] due to their mutual jealousies. Firoz Khan Noon Jon our side, Shahabuddin supported in part by Ahmadyar

The British were not unaware of the existence of these opposing factions, which could have undermined their own political standing. Under 'Dyarchy' the provincial British Government had constantly relied on the loyalist Unionist bloc to maintain its majority in the Legislature⁵⁹² and it is apparent that it was clearly in British interests that a united pro-British organization should administer the Punjab following the 1937 elections. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the *Vir Bharat* and *Daily Herald* (Lahore based newspapers) were in part correct in cynically suggesting in May 1936 that both Firoz Khan Noon and Sikander Hyat Khan had been found employment outside the Province, as High Commissioner in London (1936) and Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India in Bombay (1935) respectively, to prevent either of them challenging Fazl-i-Husain's leadership of the Unionists;⁵⁹³ a tactic which helped to preserve the stability of the Unionist Party.

Initially Sikander had not been averse to accepting the appointment. Although he belonged to a substantial land-owning family, heavy financial liabilities had encouraged his involvement with commercial enterprises,⁵⁹⁴ whilst a salary of Rs. 5,500 per mensem.⁵⁹⁵ provided an added inducement for him to join the Reserve Bank. Events soon proved, however, that Sikander was not to be content with a non-political career, particularly as Fazl-i-Husain's ill-health brought the leadership question to the fore. Also Sikander's supporters in the Punjab, notably Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, and Mir Maqbul Mahmud were not prepared to allow Sikander's claim to lead the Unionist Party to perish by default, particularly as it was evident by the Autumn of 1935 that Fazl-i-Husain's poor health would ultimately force his withdrawal from political life. This particular factor was to prove critical in causing Sikander to decide whether or not he should challenge Husain in the immediate pre-election period, as is evident from the fact that Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Sikander's brother-in-law and cousin, attempted to discover from Fazl-i-Husain's physician (Col. Harper-Nelson) how long his patient was expected to live. Although Sikander denied having initiated the distasteful enquiry,⁵⁹⁶ and whilst he repeatedly assured Husain of his personal loyalty and support,⁵⁹⁷ his actions belied his words.

Sikander in fact set out on a tortuous and confused path aimed at securing recognition for himself as the leader designate, and although he conducted negotiations with

[Daultana] on the other side, and Sikander Hyat supported by Ahmadyar on the third. Shahab-ud-Din is at war with both Firoz and Sikander", Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, Lahore, 1977, p. 135; see also C. Baxter, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-177.

⁵⁹² Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁵⁹³ *Vir Bharat* (Lahore), 13 May 1936; *Daily Herald*, 27 May 1936, PPA.

⁵⁹⁴ Sikander was on the Board of Directors of eleven different companies; he was Managing Director of the Wah Stone and Lime Company, and was a managing partner of a mining syndicate: *Report of the Institute of Current Affairs*, 1943, Lahore, 1943, p. 9, PPL.

⁵⁹⁵ Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

⁵⁹⁶ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 27 Nov. 1935, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E. 352/16, ION.

⁵⁹⁷ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 13 Feb. 1936; 13 May 1936; 22 May 1936, copies with Z.H. Zaidi.

possible non-Muslim allies, causing Husain to suspect that he was endeavoring to supplant him, he never directly challenged the incumbent. In April 1936 the *Tribune* reported that Sikander had "expressed his readiness to his non-Muslim friends to take a leading part in the formation of the future provincial cabinet,⁵⁹⁸ though when confronted by Fazl-i-Husain, Sikander had publicly pledged him his support. Implicit in this declaration, which was issued by Husain on Sikander's behalf, was the assertion that the move had been orchestrated by Hindu and Sikh leaders, and not Sikander:

"Leading Hindu and Sikh politicians approached Sir Sikander Hyat with [an] offer of full and strong support in case he decided to offer himself for Chief Ministership under the Reforms. Sir Sikander Hyat is said to have expressed his thanks and gratitude to the Hindu-Sikh leaders ... but [Sikander] expressed his inability to accede to their request as he was now of the same views which he entertained before ... that the nature of the new reforms and condition of the existing atmosphere were such that the experience and knowledge and the political gifts of the leader of the Unionists, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, should be utilized..."⁵⁹⁹

Despite this conciliatory statement, however, Sikander continued to hold discussions with leading non-Muslim politicians, in particular Raja Narendra Nath, the leader of the urban Hindus, with whom he maintained constant contact. It was an association which Sikander refused to abandon, in spite of Fazl-i-Husain's protest that he alone should conduct talks concerning possible political alliances.⁶⁰⁰ On 23 June 1936 the pro-Unionist *Civil and Military Gazette* reported that talks between the Raja and Sikander had been reopened in respect of "the formation of a new political party which would rally the various elements in the province that would keep in check the communal activities of certain Muslim leaders..."⁶⁰¹ The inference clearly constituted an attack on Husain's position, obliquely referring to his communalist tendencies, but Sikander again retreated, refusing to identify himself with so apparent a challenge, and through Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana a denial was published to the effect that no such plans had been discussed and that there had only been social, and not political, contact between the two men.⁶⁰²

His refusal to confront Fazl-i-Husain openly was consistent with his desire to secure the succession, without having to risk the dangers inherent in any overt leadership confrontation. If he had openly contested for it, he would have risked splitting the Muslim Unionist supporters, thereby jeopardizing the prospects for the formation of a future Unionist ministry, and his own position as its possible leader and future Premier

⁵⁹⁸ *Tribune*, 5 April 1936, PPA.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2 April 1936, PPA.

⁶⁰⁰ Fazl-i-Husain to Sikander Hyat Khan, 28 May 1936, Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

⁶⁰¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 June 1936.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*

of the Province. His determination not to precipitate such a split, and his anxiety to succeed to the leadership of a united party, are apparent from correspondence he conducted with Fazl-i-Husain in May 1936, at a time when he had made his ambitions perfectly clear. On 1 May he had guilefully enquired,

"Do you apprehend that the defections from Muslims for personal motives - I do not anticipate many desertions on questions of principle or policy - would be on such a scale as to endanger the solidarity of the party & jeopardize [*sic*] the almost certain prospect (at present) of it being the majority party? If the answer is in the affirmative would it be worthwhile for you to tax your already scanty physical resources, & for me to sacrifice my prospects & a comfortable & if I may say so, from the wider point of view a useful & important post for what? a mess of pottage?"⁶⁰³

Whilst on 13 May he had attempted to assure Husain that he would not campaign to oust him and lead the Party, for fear of destroying Muslim unity, and out of his personal regard for the present leader:

"I can assure you that my not resorting to any of these alternatives [claiming] the leadership from Husain, or forming his own party was deliberate, and was due to my earnest desire to serve the best interests of the Province, to avoid split among Muslim [*sic*] and others and to my personal regard for you."⁶⁰⁴

The last assurance could have offered small comfort to Fazl-i-Husain. From early February 1936, Sikander constantly disregarded his leader's feelings in pursuit of his goal to maneuver Husain into publicly acknowledging his position in terms which would demonstrate that Sikander was deputy leader, and heir apparent. In pursuit of this aim in February 1936 Sikander had attempted unsuccessfully to induce Husain to issue a statement asserting:

"It has been stated ... that I [Fazl-i-Husain] was instrumental in arranging for translation of Sikander Hyat from provincial politics to the Reserve Bank. This is a palpably false allegation. Equally incorrect is the assertion that I am opposed to his return to the Punjab. I shall be only too glad to have him back, and if I find that my health does not permit me to undertake the task [of re-organizing and leading the Unionist Party] single-handed, I could have no better helper to assist me. I will, in that event, do my best to persuade him, in the interests of the province, to relinquish his present important and lucrative job ... There has never been any question of rivalry between us and can speak both for Sikander and myself that there can be none in future either."⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰³ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁶⁰⁴ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 13 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁶⁰⁵ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 15 Feb. 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

Fazl-i-Husain refused to accommodate Sikander: "I have never claimed to be in the exalted position of the leader who has any wonderful claim to the allegiance of all those associated with his work."⁶⁰⁶ This explanation was a mere subterfuge, however, for in reality Husain did not wish to commit himself positively to Sikander at this stage for to have done so would have compromised his own standing within the Party, had the statement, suggested and composed by Sikander, been interpreted as a surrender on Husain's part in the face of pressure from his ambitious lieutenant. Sikander persisted in his endeavor, however, and in May he confronted Fazl-i-Husain with a strongly worded communiqué on the pretext that he intended to release it to the press. Ostensibly this exercise was to secure Husain's approval for its publication, in reality it was meant to convey the definite warning that if his position was not recognized, Sikander, supported by some Muslim and non-Muslim allies, would force Fazl-i-Husain to accept a subordinate position:

"His [Sikander's] friends however continued to press him; Sikh, Hindu and some Muslim friends on the ground that communal tension, mistrust and bitterness was likely to be accentuated with the approach and advent of the new Reforms and would seriously hamper the smooth working of the new constitutional machinery, unless somebody who enjoyed the confidence of all communities and interests was forthcoming to bridge the gulf and to restore harmony and re-establish mutual confidence."

Furthermore

"It was suggested that Sir Sikander should come back to assist in, and if necessary to undertake the whole responsibility for, organizing the party - which was to be non-communal and free from sectarian or class restrictions or prejudices - and that pending his return Sir Fazli should start and carry on the work with the assistance of Sir Sikander's friends."⁶⁰⁷

Husain's reaction was swift, and calculated to undermine Sikander's stance. On 15 May 1936 he offered to resign the leadership,⁶⁰⁸ thereby confronting Sikander with an open breach with the creator of the Unionist Party, caused by his enforced retirement, and the possibility of a bitter and uncertain campaign for the leadership, likely to damage the solidarity of the organization, and thereby frustrate Sikander's maneuver to succeed to a united, strong party. Once again Sikander withdrew, pretending that he neither wished to lead the Unionist Party nor return to the political life of the Punjab, though he offered his continued support for Husain if the latter desired it:

⁶⁰⁶ Fazl-i-Husain to Sikander Hyat Khan, 23 Feb. 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁶⁰⁷ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 13 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁶⁰⁸ Fazl-i-Husain to Sikander Hyat Khan, 15 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

"you are at liberty to utilize my name again if it will help you, and on my part I can assure that I will, as before, not say a word against it. I would, however, request you to make it clear that I never had nor evinced any ambition or pretensions to assuming the leadership of the party and (in view of what has transpired during the past fortnight) I have no intention of returning to the province."⁶⁰⁹

Subsequent events were to demonstrate the falsity of Sikander's assertions. The intriguing continued. In June 1936 Sikander returned to the Province and held meetings with Narendra Nath,⁶¹⁰ which he informed Fazl-i-Husain were intended to gain support of the Hindu leader and his followers, numbering between 30 and 35, for the Unionist cause, and were not in pursuit of his own personal political ends.⁶¹¹ It was a ludicrous and false explanation considering Sikander's obvious ambition, the antagonism which the Punjab's Hindu press had confronted Husain, emphasizing his communalist tendencies,⁶¹² and the fact that Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana revealed unintentionally that a conspiracy was in progress, by dismissing the Sikander-Narendra Nath meeting as being of a purely social nature, whilst Sikander had provided Husain with a totally different interpretation (see above).

Thus by June 1936 the stage had been reached in the relationship between Sikander and Fazl-i-Husain which parodied Shakespeare's impatient Prince Hal trying the Crown whilst the resentful King Henry IV lay on his death-bed - a parody made all the more poignant by the fact that Fazl-i-Husain was a dying man. From 20 June 1936 Husain's health, which had never been robust, deteriorated rapidly, and on 9 July he died.⁶¹³ The death of this veteran Muslim politician, combined with the absence of Firoz Khan Noon in London, preserved the Unionist Party, in the vital period immediately prior to the election, from an internecine scramble for power. Had Fazl-i-Husain lived, Sikander and his supporters would have continued to intrigue against him, and should Noon have still been actively involved in Punjab affairs, he would certainly have challenged Sikander's claim to lead the Party.

Even so it was not the removal of these powerful contenders, important though this factor was, which was primarily responsible for Sikander's succession to the leadership which he was offered and accepted the day following Husain's demise.⁶¹⁴ His appeal lay largely in the fact that he was acceptable to the major participants in the Punjab

⁶⁰⁹ Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 22 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁶¹⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 June 1936.

⁶¹¹ Sikandar Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Hussain, 25 June 1936, copy with Z. H. Zaidi.

⁶¹² *Tajar* (Lyallpur), 15 Feb. 1936, 21 Feb. 1936; *Milap* (Lahore), 16 Feb. 1936; *Ihsan* (Lahore), 23 Feb. 1936; *Sher-i-Punjab* (Lahore), 23 Feb. 1936, 7 June 1936; *Tribune*, 2 April 1936; *Daily Herald*, 22 April 1936; Pratap, 22 April 1936, PPA.

⁶¹³ Azim Husain, *op.cit.*, pp. 352-354.

⁶¹⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 July 1936.

political scene - the Muslim leadership, powerful Hindu and Sikh elements,⁶¹⁵ and not least the British. As a result of ties of blood and marriage, Sikander was related to a large number of extremely influential Punjabi Muslim political figures. These included amongst others Sardar Barkat Hayat Khan, Nawab Sir Liaquat Hayat Khan (brothers), Nawab Muzaffar Khan (cousin and brother-in-law), Ahmad Bakhsh Khan, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan, Mir Maqbool Mahmud, Murid Hussain, Pir Ashiq Hussain, Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz, Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz and Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din. In addition, the strong personal tie which existed between himself and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana assured him the support of a man whose family connections were as extensive as his own.⁶¹⁶

Complementing the Muslim support which these relationships assured him, Sikander was a popular figure amongst the non-Muslims in the Punjab, largely because he was widely regarded as being far less communal than Fazl-i-Husain.⁶¹⁷ Of all the Muslim leaders it was believed that he was the most likely to command Hindu and Sikh confidence,⁶¹⁸ which was essential if a Muslim majority Ministry was to function in the Province. In considering his standing both with the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, *The People* correctly assessed that his popularity and succession to the Unionist leadership reflected his social contacts with all groups and communities.⁶¹⁹ Though this newspaper clearly referred to Indian associations, his succession to Fazl-i-Husain was clearly welcome to the British, and it was essential for any leader aspiring to the premiership to have their sanction and continuing support, as it was the prerogative of the British Governor to invite that person to form a ministry who commanded not only a majority in the Legislature, but who also enjoyed the confidence of the minority communities.⁶²⁰ There was no doubt that Sikander would enjoy British support, for he was considered to be "a pillar of strength" to the British Raj.⁶²¹ His loyalty had been publicly and dramatically acknowledged on two occasions: when he had been invited to officiate as Governor during the illness of Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency in 1932, and the absence of Sir Herbert Emerson in England in 1935.⁶²²

The fact that the succession of Sikander Hyat Khan did not disrupt the stability of the Unionist Party, or lead to the development of embittered feuding factions, assured its victory in the majority of the Muslim constituencies in 1937, because as a united force, none of the other Muslim parties possessed either the means or membership to

⁶¹⁵ These included Chhotu Ram, the co-founder of the Unionist Party, and his rural Hindu Jat supporters, Raja Narendra Nath and his urban Hindu followers, and Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, a scion of the old Sikh landed aristocracy, and the leader of the Sikh Khalsa Party.

⁶¹⁶ C. Baxter, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169, 171-172, 174, 177.

⁶¹⁷ *Tribune*, 23 July 1936; *People* (Lahore) 24 July 1936; *Milap* (Lahore), 1 Oct. 1936, PPA.

⁶¹⁸ *Eastern Times* (Lahore), 24 July 1936, PPA: Civil and Military Gazette, 3 Jan. 1943.

⁶¹⁹ *People*, 24 July 1936, PPA.

⁶²⁰ Note by Clauson, 21 Jan. 1946, L/P&J/8/470, IOR.

⁶²¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 Jan. 1943.

⁶²² Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

successfully challenge it. These organizations - the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the Ittihad-i-Millat, and the Muslim League - were urban based,⁶²³ and there was no real common ground between them, the Ahrar and Ittihad-i-Millat groups being fierce rivals,⁶²⁴ and although the League having been rebuffed by Fazl-i-Husain, attempted to induce both to join it as an anti-Unionist alliance, the move was unsuccessful.

Where the Muslim League had failed in part to gain the support of the Unionists because of its rigidity concerning communal politics, and central control, it failed to reach an understanding with the Ittihad-i-Millat because it was not sufficiently sectarian. Jinnah, in an attempt to reach a compromise with the Unionists, had declared that despite the fact that the League would contest the elections as a purely Muslim body it would be free to form non-communal coalitions following the elections.⁶²⁵ This statement was bound to alienate the extremely communally orientated Ittihad-i-Millat, whilst Jinnah's role as a peacemaker in the Muslim-Sikh controversy over ownership of the Shahidganj mosque in the opening months of 1936,⁶²⁶ was totally opposed to the violent methods advocated by the Ittihad-i-Millat, which was bereft of any political aim or programme, other than securing the return of Shahidganj to Muslim hands.⁶²⁷ It decided to contest the election on that platform independent of the League.⁶²⁸

Although an entente between the Muslim League and the Ahrar Party did occur it was short-lived. The alliance did not result from a genuine desire for political cooperation, but necessity. The Ahrars needed financial support which they believed the League could provide, as by January 1936 they were bereft of funds,⁶²⁹ whilst the Muslim League was desperately in need of allies to enable it to constitute a realistic political force in the Province. Despite a refusal by the Majlis-i-Ahrar in May 1936 to accommodate the League because it anticipated that the latter would not include anti-

⁶²³ This was reflected in the election results, in that the Ahrars and the Ittihad-i-Millat, captured only two seats respectively, all urban, whilst one of the two constituencies gained by the Muslim League was urban; *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, pp. 75-78, Cmd.5589, IOR.

⁶²⁴ *Truth* (Lahore), 29 June 1936, PPA.

⁶²⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 6 Nov. 1936.

⁶²⁶ The mosque had been dedicated in 1762, but with the establishment of Sikh rule in 1772, it was confiscated and converted into a Sikh temple. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to restore the mosque to Muslims in 1854 and 1855. In 1925 with the passing of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act the question of ownership was again disputed, the Anjuman Islamia claiming ownership. A tribunal of investigation refuted the Anjuman's claim, but on 7 July 1935 the Sikhs demolished the building, and refused access to Muslims to worship on the site. Violent unrest resulted; in February 1936 Jinnah during a visit to Lahore attempted to defuse the situation, advising Muslims to abandon civil disobedience and violence as means of protest, and by persuading the Provincial Government to extend a general amnesty to the non-violent agitators. Jinnah's intervention lessened the tension, but no solution acceptable to both Sikhs and Muslims was found. The dispute continued until 1940, when Sikh ownership was confirmed: *Eastern Times*, 23 Feb. 1936, 1 March 1936, PPA; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 30 Jan. 1938. For detailed description of agitation see Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-296.

⁶²⁷ *Truth*, 29 June 1936, PPA.

⁶²⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 June 1936.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, 19 Jan. 1936.

Ahmadi propaganda in its programme,⁶³⁰ the inclusion by the League of a pledge to separate the Ahmadis from the Muslim community,⁶³¹ led to a temporary alliance.

This political honeymoon, however, was destined to failure. The Ahrars, despite their financial insecurity attempted to exploit the weakness of the League and dominate it by putting up their own members in practically every constituency to be contested,⁶³² a move which nearly precipitated the resignation of the Provincial League President, Sir Muhammad Iqbal. The Provincial League attempted to counter the Ahrar maneuver; a sub-committee consisting of six members was appointed, including two Ahrars,⁶³³ to formulate a pledge which the Parliamentary Board's candidates would be required to take, and to recommend conditions governing the choice of candidates and the dissemination of propaganda. Despite the fact that the sub-committee was unanimous concerning the draft pledge requiring all candidates to follow in the Legislative Assembly the directions of the Muslim League, disagreement arose over the amount an adopted candidate should donate to the Parliamentary Board's funds. The Ahrar members favored a payment of Rs. 100, while the rest of the committee insisted on a donation of Rs. 500.⁶³⁴ In reality the provincial Muslim League had maneuvered to prevent Ahrar domination. Whilst it had been successful in ensuring that League policy would be carried out in the Assembly, its attempt to restrict and control the Ahrar membership, was recognized by that body as a ploy to prevent it dominating the provincial League. In consequence the Majlis-i-Ahrar broke its alliance with the Muslim League on 30 August 1936, and established an independent Ahrar Election Board.⁶³⁵

By the autumn of 1936, therefore, Muslim opposition to the Unionist Party was fragmented and weak. Although all the parties produced remarkably similar manifestoes promising social and economic reconstruction,⁶³⁶ in reality the appeal of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and Ittihad-i-Millat was directed solely to extreme religious urban elements, the Ahrars being fanatically anti-Ahmadi, and the Ittihad-i-Millat being totally obsessed with the return of the Shahidganj mosque to the Muslim community.⁶³⁷ Neither possessed the resources necessary to launch a province-wide campaign to either popularize, or capitalize on their respective brands of fanaticism. Furthermore the Muslim League, which both Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander Hyat Khan had believed posed the greatest threat to Muslim solidarity and thereby the unity of the Unionist Party,⁶³⁸ had been rejected by all the existing Muslim parties, including the exceedingly influential Unionist group. In addition it failed miserably to capture the imagination of

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, 13 May 1936.

⁶³¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 25 Aug. 1936.

⁶³² *Ibid.*, 12 Aug. 1936.

⁶³³ Chaudhri Afzal Huq and Maulvi Mazhar Ali Azhar.

⁶³⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 21 Aug. 1937.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1 Sept. 1936.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 18 Oct. 1936; *Eastern Times*, 13 June 1936, PPA.

⁶³⁷ *Truth*, 29 July 1936, PPA; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 25 Aug. 1936.

⁶³⁸ Azim Husain, op. cit., p. 308; Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

the Muslim people. This was reflected in the reaction of the Muslim media to Jinnah's negotiations with Fazl-i-Husain, and his subsequent attitude to the Unionist Party. Two of the most influential Muslim daily newspapers in the Province, the *Eastern Times* (English language) and *Inqilab* (Urdu), with a daily circulation of 4,000 and 7,000 respectively,⁶³⁹ opposed Jinnah's Parliamentary Board, and deprecated his attacks on the Unionist leadership, and what they considered to be the League's determination to subjugate the provincial sphere to its will.

Throughout the latter half of 1936 the *Eastern Times* criticized the League leader, claiming that his communal strategy was misplaced in the Punjab, and injurious to Muslims, provincially and nationally.⁶⁴⁰ It deplored the League's reference to the domination of provincial politics "by reactionary conservative elements in combination with a clique of men whose sole aim is to secure offices and places for themselves", claiming that the real issue was whether provincial politics should be subject to the arbitrary control of a central caucus, organized on communal lines.⁶⁴¹ The *Inqilab* issued similar criticisms, emphasizing that in contrast to the Muslim League the Unionist Party was a non-communal organization, which the League wished to manipulate to enable it to enter the Legislative Assembly.⁶⁴² The stand taken by these two large newspapers was also reflected by the much smaller *Siyasat* (Urdu daily, circulation 1,600),⁶⁴³ which warned its readers that Jinnah had been unable to attract the united confidence of Punjabi Muslims, and as a result he was determined to destroy the Unionist Party, on the false pretext that it consisted of henchmen of the Government.⁶⁴⁴

In answer to these damning attacks, Jinnah and the League were supported by a less influential section of the press. The *Ihsan* and *Nairang* Urdu dailies (circulation 3,000 and 1,000 respectively),⁶⁴⁵ advised their subscribers to support League membership; the *Nairang* interpreted Jinnah's Parliamentary Board as an attempt to establish Muslim League parties in all of the provinces, to promote the protection of the political and religious rights of Indian Muslims.⁶⁴⁶ This argument was repeated by the *Ihsan*, which cautioned that if Muslims desired the continued existence of their community, they should support the League, and shun Unionist politicians whose main interests were geared to securing Ministries, and appointments for themselves and their friends.⁶⁴⁷ The reference to nepotism revealed a pro-urban and anti-rural stance on the part of the *Ihsan*, explaining in part this newspaper's opposition to the Unionist Party, and its support for the League, in that it accused Unionist politicians of being responsible for

⁶³⁹ *Punjab Press Abstract*, Vol. L. 1937, pp. 1, 13-16, PGSL.

⁶⁴⁰ *Eastern Times*, 14 June 1936, 13 Oct. 1936, PPA.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 13 June 1936, 18 Aug. 1936.

⁶⁴² *Inqilab* (Lahore), 13 June 1936, 15 June 1936, 15 Oct. 1936, PPA.

⁶⁴³ *Punjab Press Abstract*, Vol. L., pp. 13-16, PGSL.

⁶⁴⁴ *Siyasat* (Lahore), 16 Oct. 1936, PPA.

⁶⁴⁵ *Punjab Press Abstract*, Vol. L., pp. 13-16, PGSL.

⁶⁴⁶ *Nairang* (Lahore), 17 June 1936, PPA.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ihsan*, 14 June 1936, 15 Oct. 1936, PPA.

crushing the intelligentsia so as to enable the employment by Government of less able and poorly educated zamindars.⁶⁴⁸

Championing the cause of urban as opposed to rural interests, or attempting to raise the issue of the future political security of the Muslim community, or the survival of Islam, had no real appeal to the vast majority of Punjabi Muslims. As such these themes failed to win sympathy for the League. The overwhelming majority of Muslims were rural dwellers, and their natural sympathies were rural biased. Out of a total Muslim electorate of 1,336,311, 1,152,487 (86%) voted in the Muslim rural constituencies.⁶⁴⁹ Also the Muslim community constituted a majority in the Punjab, and the Unionist Party was dominated by Muslims, thus arguments maintaining that Muslim political and religious life was threatened, appeared as unreal and irrelevant. Just as the premises of the pro-Jinnah press failed to excite support for the League, its provincial leadership was equally unable to inspire or influence the electorate. With the exception of Khan Bahadur Zaman Mehdi Khan and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the only two influential landlords to support the League, its membership was drawn from the urban elite⁶⁵⁰ and it possessed no influence in the crucial rural constituencies. Consequently the bulk of the Muslim seats were closed to the League, which because it had failed to gain Unionist cooperation, could field only seven candidates in the provincial election.⁶⁵¹ As a party therefore, it had conceded the election before it was fought.

The absence of a vigorous and united Muslim opposition assured the Unionist Party victory in the forthcoming provincial elections,⁶⁵² particularly as the Congress Party had failed to win either the confidence or support of the Muslim masses or voters. In the Punjab the Congress was an urban capitalist and largely communal organization. It consistently adopted a neutral stance in the Legislature with reference to measures designed to benefit agriculturists, for fear of alienating its urban following.⁶⁵³ Also Nehru's denouncement of the Communal Award,⁶⁵⁴ during a tour of the Punjab in June

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 15 Oct. 1936.

⁶⁴⁹ *Figures and percentages calculated from Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, pp. 75-78, Cmd. 5589, IOR.

⁶⁵⁰ The Provincial Leagues Working Committee and local Parliamentary Board consisted of Sir Muhammad Iqbal (lawyer), Barkat Ali (advocate), Sheikh Akbar Ali (advocate), Mian Abdul Aziz (lawyer), Professor Inayat Ullah, Professor M.F. Qureshi, Abdul Mannon, Pir Taj-ud-Din (lawyer), Sheikh Muhammad Jan (judge), Muhammad Jafri, Muhammad Azim Khan (Municipal Commissioner, Lahore), Malik Nur Elahi, Syed Tassaduq Hussain of Bhera (lawyer), Mohammad Shafi (Sec. Intercollegiate Muslim Brotherhood), Haji Amir-ud-Din Sharaj, Ghulam Rasul (lawyer. Sec. Parl. Board), Nawabzada Muzaffar Ali Khan (lawyer), Abdul Malik, K.B. Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (landlords), Dr. Shuja-ud-Din, K.S. Mohammad Hassan and Hafiz Feroze-ud-Din: Civil and Military Gazette, 17 Oct. 1936.

⁶⁵¹ Z.H. Zaidi, op. cit., p. 253.

⁶⁵² *Zamindar* (Lahore), 19 Feb. 1937, PPA.

⁶⁵³ *Eastern Times*, 31 Dec. 1935, PPA: A.Punjabi, Confederacy of India, Lahore, 1939, pp. 21-25.

⁶⁵⁴ The Communal Award of August 1932 represented a determined effort by Hoare (Secretary of State) and Willingdon (Viceroy) to appease the Muslims, and to reward them for not joining the Congress civil disobedience campaign. Consequently they agreed that separate elections would not be abandoned without the consent of the

1936, further prejudiced Congress chances of attracting Muslim support: the *Eastern Times*, whilst it appreciated the National Congress' socio-political aims to relieve the masses from poverty and debt as outlined in its manifesto, accused the Congress of descending to the extremist level of the Hindu Mahasabha in regard to its attitude to the 'Award',⁶⁵⁵ a view which was reiterated by the *Inqilab*.⁶⁵⁶ The *Zamindar* was the only important Muslim organ (Urdu daily, circulation 6,700)⁶⁵⁷ to plead the National Congress cause, and advocate Muslim support for it,⁶⁵⁸ but its efforts were in vain, as was demonstrated by the fact that the Congress captured only two of the reserved Muslim seats (rural constituencies of Ludhiana and Kasur).⁶⁵⁹

In essence, however, the Unionist Party was strong, and the other Muslim political groups and the Congress were weak because the Unionists enjoyed the monopoly of landlord support.⁶⁶⁰ It effectively preserved the advantage during the electioneering by curbing personal rivalries and thereby ensuring that faction would be contained to prevent it prejudicing Unionist prospects of forming a majority Ministry in combination with non-Muslim allies.⁶⁶¹ To this end no official list of adopted Unionist candidates was published, and in the majority of cases the successful contender was declared to be the official Unionist candidate only after the contest had been decided.⁶⁶² Thus the elections were largely personal combats, and not party conflicts which could have reduced the Unionist majority, consequently the outcome of the election in the rural areas was decided before the polls were conducted, the victors acceding to the Unionist camp. This practice however, on occasion, gave rise to farcical confusion, as in the case

minority community, and that Muslim weightage in Hindu majority provinces would be preserved. For Bengal and the Punjab Hoare adopted the principle laid down in the G. of I.'s reforms dispatch of 20 September 1930: separate electorates should not be capable of yielding Muslim majorities, which should depend on Muslims winning some of the 'special constituency' seats. In taking this decision Hoare was supported by the Punjab Government and the Viceroy. The Congress, however, opposed the Award as separate elections linked with the prospect of provincial autonomy, would wreck its aims to attract a substantial Muslim membership, and to dominate the proposed Federation, if the Punjab and Bengal refused to join it: R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940*, Oxford, 1974, pp. 239, 262-263.

⁶⁵⁵ *Eastern Times*, 6 June 1936; 26 Aug. 1936, PPA.

⁶⁵⁶ *Inqilab*, 28 Aug. 1936, PPA.

⁶⁵⁷ Punjab Press Abstract, Vol. L., 1937, pp. 13-16. PGSL.

⁶⁵⁸ *Zamindar*, 25 Aug. 1936, PPA.

⁶⁵⁹ *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, pp. 75-76, Cmd. 5589, IOR.

⁶⁶⁰ Azim Husain, op. cit., p. 318; 48 of the 75 Muslim Unionist M.L.As elected in 1937 were large zamindars: *Civil and Military Gazette*, 1 July 1938.

⁶⁶¹ The support of Chhotu Ram, the Hindu Jat leader, assured that any future Unionist Ministry would enjoy non-Muslim support. To emphasize Chhotu Ram's commitment to Unionism, and its non-communal creed, the Party engineered his election as President of the Legislative Council in October 1936. As a result of the Jat leader's cooperation, the Unionists were able to capture 13 General rural seats in 1937: *Tribune*, 17 Oct. 1936, PPA; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 Oct. 1936; *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, pp. 73-74, Cmd. 5589, IOR.

⁶⁶² *Times of India*, 13 Jan. 1937.

of the elected member for Ludhiana (Muhammad Hassan), who was variously described as a Congressite, Independent and Unionist.⁶⁶³

The Unionist's electoral tactic made a farce of electioneering through manifestoes, as did the fact that all the parties, including the Unionist, the League and the Congress, issued very similar socio-economic propaganda, promising in the main to improve the condition of the rural masses. Though unlike the Unionist Party and the League, the Congress did propose a restructuring of society, in that the zamindari system was to be abolished, and the feudal power of the princes restricted,⁶⁶⁴ these pledges made little impact in the Punjab. The Unionist Party promised that if elected it would give relief to the masses and poorest sections amongst taxpayers by cutting the cost of the administration. It claimed that industry, particularly cottage industries, would be developed, and that measures would be implemented to protect the agricultural and laboring classes from the crushing burden of debt.⁶⁶⁵ This declaration was meant to epitomize in the minds of rural voters a party determined to protect them from the urban credit machine, and to demonstrate that the Unionists were as concerned as the Congress with the pursuit of social reform. In the event, however, the manifesto's import in securing votes was secondary to the advantage it enjoyed through its landed membership. David Taylor has asserted that the eventual success of the Unionists resulted from the exploitation of the rural elite of feudal loyalty.⁶⁶⁶ Despite the undoubted existence of such loyalty, however, it would be more realistic to describe the electoral triumph which the Party experienced in 1937 as resulting from the exploitation of the large-small zamindar relationship, i.e. a combination of loyalty and feudal economic power and pressure.

In reality, the Unionist pledges were merely a 'window dressing', and were unlikely to convince any but the most gullible. Though the Unionist Party wished to pose as the protector of the poor agriculturists, it had forcibly demonstrated where its true interests lay. In the pre-election Legislative Council 23 of the 31 Unionist supporters had been large landlords, and whilst it was true that the Unionists had initially sponsored two resolutions to aid poor agriculturists - one for the exemption of uneconomic agricultural holdings from taxation, and the other recommending that land revenue should be charged on a sliding scale on the same basis as income tax - both had been defeated because the Revenue Member, the founder of the Unionist Party, did not favor them. Similarly, debt legislation initiated and supported by the Unionist group, ostensibly to safeguard the interests of the masses had been designed in fact to benefit large

⁶⁶³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 Feb. 1937.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 18 Oct. 1936; for details of the manifestos and aims of the Muslim League and the Congress Party see Z.H. Zaidi, *op. cit.*, p. 252 and P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Bombay, Vol. I (1935) pp. 463-465, Vol. II (1947) pp. 11-12, 24, 42. See also Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, Delhi, 1958, pp. 21-22 and H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 31-32.

⁶⁶⁵ Manifesto of the Punjab Unionist Party, Lahore, 1936, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E. 352, Box 3, IOR.

⁶⁶⁶ D.D. Taylor, *'Indian Politics and the Election of 1937'*, Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1972, pp. 208-211.

zamindars, who received benefits as debtors, and as creditors continued to enjoy the freedom to exploit, as the disabilities which attached to non-agriculturists did not apply to agriculturist moneylenders.⁶⁶⁷ Thus the *Mujahid* had solid grounds in asserting that despite its proclaimed economic programme, the Unionist Party would only protect the peasants' rights, so long as they did not encroach upon the interests of the large zamindars who controlled the Party.⁶⁶⁸

Finally in considering the impact of Unionist electoral propaganda, it must be borne in mind that the electorate was chiefly confined to the landed and property-owning groups, with the rural bloc predominating. They were not as susceptible to the Unionist economic package, as the unenfranchised and depressed tenantry and laboring classes would have been. Universal adult suffrage did not exist in British India. In the Punjab only persons who fulfilled the following requirements had the right to vote under the terms of the Government of India Act, 1935: anyone who owned, or was an occupancy tenant of land assessed at not less than Rs. 5 per annum; any holder of a *muafi*, assessed at not less than Rs. 10 per annum; any tenant of agricultural land encompassing not less than six acres of irrigated, or 12 acres of unirrigated land. In the case of landholders' constituencies, voters were restricted to those paying a minimum of Rs. 500 per annum in land revenue. In addition any owner or tenant of immovable property, which included a building valued at not less than Rs. 2,000 or which had a rental value in excess of Rs. 60 per annum, was entitled to vote. This privilege was also extended to any person who during the preceding financial year had been assessed for any direct municipal or direct cantonment tax of not less than Rs. 50, or paid income tax, or any other direct tax levied by the District Boards. Also certain officeholders - Zaildar, Inamdar, Safed-posh, Lambardar (but not Naib or Sarbrah), and retired, pensioned and discharged officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and men of the regular army, the British Indian Police Force, the Auxiliary Force, and the Indian Territorial Forces - were qualified to vote, provided they had accomplished a minimum of four years service. The vote was also extended to those persons who had passed the primary, or any equivalent or higher standard of education. In respect of women voters who were not qualified in their own right as property owners, tenants, etc., the franchise was restricted to the widows or wives of landed or property men, and of those office holders who were eligible to vote. Where a voter had more than one wife, only the senior wife was enfranchised.⁶⁶⁹

The result was that the entire provincial electorate was restricted to 2,686,094 persons, 80% of whom voted in the rural constituencies.⁶⁷⁰ It was predominantly male in

⁶⁶⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 5 Jan. 1937.

⁶⁶⁸ *Mujahid* (Lahore), 24 March 1936, PPA.

⁶⁶⁹ *The Punjab Government Gazette* (Extraordinary Issue), 27 Sept. 1945, 14/14J/472, IOR.

⁶⁷⁰ Total Provincial Electorate - 2,686,094. Total Rural Electorate (including landholders listed in the 'special interest' group) - 2,150,055. Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 73-61, IOR.

composition,⁶⁷¹ thus although in the Province as a whole only 11.4% of the entire population was enfranchised, approximately 54% of all men over the age of 20 enjoyed the vote.⁶⁷² Within these two categories economic qualifications prevailed (see above), thus in comparison to their fellow Punjabis, 66% of whom in the over 20 age group were unenfranchised, the vast majority of voters represented an economically privileged class. Of these the more prosperous landowners, better off tenants and urban capitalists were not conspicuous for philanthropy, thus they were not as susceptible to the Unionist socio-economic manifesto package, as the unenfranchised depressed tenantry, landless laborers, and laboring classes would have been. Also within the electoral elite there were vast differences between the personal wealth and influence of each voter. Small land-owners, regardless of the fact that they had the power to vote, could not afford to ignore the views and wishes of their wealthier brethren. This was a political fact of life, unimpeded by manifesto promises.

The feudal response to demonstrating and perpetuating existing power through an alien semi-democratic machinery, was further exemplified in the irregularities which occurred, especially as in some cases the votes of influential sections of the electorate could be secured more effectively by offering immediate cash gains or preferment, rather than pledging future reform programmes. Complaints, alleging corruption of this nature were reported to the Election Commission in the case of the Muslim rural constituencies of Dera Ghazi Khan North, Bhalwal, Sheikargarh and Karnal (all captured by Unionist adherents), amongst others.⁶⁷³ Such allegations, however, were exceedingly difficult to substantiate. Nevertheless, in the case of Dera Ghazi Khan North, the Election Commission was satisfied that Khwaja Ghulam Murtaza (successful candidate - respondent) had gained the support of an exceedingly influential bloc - the Chiefs of the Khetran tribe - and of important individuals in the constituency by offering bribes.⁶⁷⁴ As a result a by-election was ordered.

The only force in the Punjab which could have seriously undermined the landlords' political control, were the Pirs, the Province's spiritual elite, but in 1937, in contrast to 1946, the Unionist Party did not face any dangerous religious opposition. The Pirs,

⁶⁷¹ David Taylor has demonstrated that male voters predominated throughout British India as a whole, accounting for 85.1% of the entire electorate. Thus although only 11.5% of the national population was enfranchised, 36% of males over the age of 20 had the vote. David Taylor, 'The Reconstruction and Use of the Statistics of the Provincial Elections of 1937', *Bulletin of Quantitative and Computer Methods in South Asian Studies*, 2, March 1974, p. 20.

⁶⁷² Total Population of the Punjab (1931) - 23,580, 852. Male Population (20+) of the Punjab (1931) - 7,906,336 - *Census of India 1931*, Punjab Pt. I, pp. 2-7, Part II, Table VII, p. 70, IOL.

⁶⁷³ Abdul Hameed, *Select Election Petition Cases, 1937-47*, Lahore, 1953, pp. 650-654, 761-773, 775-778, 916-917, PHCL.

⁶⁷⁴ Corroborating evidence was found in the form of signed contracts or agreements between Ghulam Murtaza and those he had sought to influence: *ibid.*, p. 778.

many of whom were large landlords themselves⁶⁷⁵ and had spiritual and family ties with the landed elite,⁶⁷⁶ were content that a Unionist Ministry should govern. Because of its defence of the Alienation of Land Act, and the fact that the Unionist Party was an expression of the existing power structure in the rural areas to which many of the religious elite belonged, it was not opposed by any powerful, dynamic or fanatically orientated religious party.⁶⁷⁷ Fazl-i-Husain, appreciating the influence which the Pirs possessed, was anxious to induce the more important Pirs in the Punjab to issue a statement supporting the Unionist Party.⁶⁷⁸ Other elements in the Unionist organization, however, were wary of actively involving Pirs in the election campaign and thereby exciting religious sentiment in the countryside, fearing that it could prove counter-productive if some of the religious leaders chose to oppose, rather than support, the Party:

"The Ahrars have begun with an awfully vigorous propaganda... Still we don't fear if they do not begin with the villages. Villagers, you know, follow these 'Pirs' blindly... Take care of the 'Firs'. Ask them only to keep silent on the matter of the elections. We don't require their help but they should not oppose us..."⁶⁷⁹

In the event, although the Pir class undoubtedly favored the Unionist Party, the exploitation of religion did not occur on the vast scale as witnessed in 1946⁶⁸⁰ (see Chapter VII below) and it was not a decisive factor in influencing the outcome of the 1937 election. Talbot has argued, however, that "The unionist victory in the 1937 elections owed much to the support it had gained from the leading pirs of the province ..."⁶⁸¹ This is a misconception, which confuses the understanding of the nature of the

⁶⁷⁵ The Pirs of Jalalpur (Jhelum); of Makhad (Attock); of Jahanian Shah (Shahpur); of Rajoa (Jhang); of Shah Jiwana (Jhang); of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan); Pir Ashiq Hussain of Multan, and Pir Budhan Shah of Multan; see C. Baxter, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

⁶⁷⁶ The Hayats of Wah were related to the Quereshis of Multan (Pir Ashiq Hussain), while the maternal grandfather of Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur was the leading Rajput chief of the district, and the Pir's uncle was Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a member of the influential landed Khokar family of Jhelum. Also Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, the father of Khizar Hayat, was the murid (disciple) of Pir Mehr Ali Shah: *Ibid.*, p. 172; D. Gilmartin, 'Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab', *Modern Asian Studies*, 13, 1979, pp. 497, 509.

⁶⁷⁷ The two Muslim religious parties in the Province - the Ittihad-i-Millat and the Majlis-i-Ahrar were urban based; both failed to appeal to the rural peasantry, or exploit their religious sentiments. Also both organizations had alienated the Pirs, the former as a result of the anti-pir, anti-sufi mentality of its leader Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and the latter on account of its pro-Congress stand in the period preceding its abortive union with the Muslim League: Truth, 29 June 1936, PPA; D. Gilmartin, *op. cit.*, pp. 499-501.

⁶⁷⁸ Gurmani, in a letter to Fazl-i-Husain, agreed to the latter's suggestion that the important Pirs of the Province should be induced to issue a statement in support of the Unionist Party: Mushtaq Ahmad Girmani to Fazl-i-Husain, 19 June 1936; Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), *op. cit.*, (Letters) pp. 592-594.

⁶⁷⁹ Mohammad Bashir of Gurdaspur to Unionist Party H.Q., 9 May 1936, D. Gilmartin, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

⁶⁸⁰ Instances of religious persuasion being used in 1936-37 to influence voters were rare, and where such manifestations did occur, it was usually at the instigation of persons other than Pirs, often members of the local ulema - as was the case in the constituencies of Amritsar City, Ambala and Simla; Abdul Hameed, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-471, 550-554, 564, 656-664, 685-692.

⁶⁸¹ I.A. Talbot, 'The 1946 Punjab Election', *Modern Asian Studies*, 14, 1980, p. 81.

method whereby the Party conducted its electoral campaign. In the rural areas, where admittedly the influence of the Pirs was enormous (as demonstrated in 1946), there was no viable opposition to the Unionist Party. By and large candidates fought each other on clan or family considerations, claiming Unionist membership only after the contest had been decided. Thus the active allegiance of the Pirs was not as significant as it would have been had the Unionist Party faced a serious threat to its position, as it was 'Pir support' merely bolstered the already impressive and decisive Unionist landed armory. This hypothesis does not detract from the control which the Pirs were capable of wielding but it is apparent that when these religious leaders did intervene, it was on the side of personality, rather than party. This was dramatically demonstrated in the case of the Muslim constituency of Pind Dadan Khan. It was one of the only five rural Muslim seats which the Unionist Party failed to gain and the successful candidate, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who stood on the Muslim League ticket, though he joined the Unionist Party almost immediately after the elections,⁶⁸² owed his success in a large measure to the support he received from his nephew, Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur.⁶⁸³

Finally in analyzing the Unionist success, the role of government officials as unofficial canvassers for the Party, should not be overlooked. The official class in the rural areas enjoyed wide powers of persuasion, as assessors of land revenue, dispensers of justice, arbitrators in property disputes, and advocates of official recognition for individual merit, through coveted honors. Sikander Hyat Khan blatantly and unashamedly conceded that "the Unionists believe that the officials of the Government [are] working for them in the districts and villages",⁶⁸⁴ though the *Ihsan* was guilty of exaggeration when it attributed the Unionist success solely to the manipulation of official influence.⁶⁸⁵ In reality 'official' backing merely strengthened the appeal which the Unionist Party commanded as a result of its monopoly of zamindar support, reinforced by the absence of any serious and popular religious opposition. The combination of such vital assets resulted in a Unionist landslide in the Muslim constituencies, and the acquisition of a majority of seats in the Province as a whole. Of the 84 Muslim seats in the Province the Unionist Party captured 72, 70 of which were rural constituencies. The other Muslim parties - the Muslim League, the Ittihad-i-Millat, and the Majlis-i-Ahrar - secured only two seats each, the Muslim League losing one of these when Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan defected to the Unionists, lured by a Party secretaryship. In the Punjab as a whole the Unionist Party gained 95 of the 175 seats in the Provincial Legislature, 71 of which (including Ghazanfar Ali's seat) were Muslim rural, two Muslim urban, 13 General rural and nine Special Interest seats, of which three were

⁶⁸² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1937.

⁶⁸³ D. Gilmartin, *op. cit.*, pp. 497-498.

⁶⁸⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 Oct. 1936.

⁶⁸⁵ *Ihsan*, 18 Feb. 1937, PPA.

landholders' constituencies (the remainder representing Anglo-Indian, European, Indian Christian - two seats - and University interests).⁶⁸⁶

A survey of the Unionist elected membership following the 1937 election, however, emphasized that this decisive victory would not have been possible had the Party not been the vehicle of large Zamindar interests. Forty-eight of the Muslim Unionist M.L.A.s were big landlords.⁶⁸⁷ Moreover all the most important landed factions were represented on the Government (Unionist) benches, including the Hayats of Wah Sikander Hyat Khan (Premier, West Punjab Landholders), Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Mianwali South); the Noon-Tiwana family group of Sargodha - Nawabzada Major Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Minister of Public Works, Khushab), Nawab Sir Allah Baksh Khan (Shahpur), Nawabzada Malik Muhammad Habibullah Khan (Sargodha), Nawab Malik Sir Muhammad Hayat Khan Noon (North Punjab Landholders); the Daultanas of Multan District - Nawab Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (Parl. Secretary, Mailsi), Mir Maqbool Mahmood (Amritsar); the Pirs of Shah Jiwana - Syed Mubarak Ali Shah (Jhang Central); the Qizilbash clan of Lahore District - Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash (Lahore); the Kot Ghebas of Attock - Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan (Attock Central); the Mians of Baghbanpura - Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din (Kasur), Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz (Outer Lahore - Women); the Qureshis of Multan - Captain Pir Ashiq Hussain (Multan); the Legharis of Muzaffargarh - Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari (Tumandars); the Khokhars of Attock - Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (Pind Dadan Khan); the Wanbachran family of Mianwali - Captain Malik Muzaffar Khan (Mianwali South); the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh - Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani (Muzaffargarh North); the Chathas of Gujranwala Chaudhri Nasir-ud-Din (Gujranwala North), the Gilanis of Multan - Makhdumzada Haji Sayed Muhammad Raza Shah Gilani (Shusabad) and the Mamdots of Ferozepore Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot (Ferozepore Central).⁶⁸⁸ As such Peter Hardy's contention that in 1937 "Both in the general and in Muslim constituencies, the day of the old conservative and oligarchic landlord politics was, except in the new province of Sindh, nearly done,"⁶⁸⁹ is incorrect. In the Punjab landed oligarchic power remained as viable as ever, and retained the capacity to bend the Province to its political will.

⁶⁸⁶ In the Official 'Return' the Unionists were attributed with 73 Muslim seats. One of these, however, (Pind Dadan Khan), had been captured by Ghazanfar Ali Khan on the Muslim League ticket, though he subsequently joined the Unionist Party: *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, pp. 75-80; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1937.

⁶⁸⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 1 July 1938.

⁶⁸⁸ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 5 April 1937, pp. 1-6, V/9/3456, IOR; C. Baxter, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

⁶⁸⁹ P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 222.

CHAPTER V

SIKANDER HYAT KHAN, JINNAH AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE - THE UNEASY ALLIANCE, 1937-1942

The elections of 1937 had placed the Unionist Party in power in the Punjab and secured the Premiership for Sikander Hyat Khan the Unionist leader. Sikander realized, however, that in order to maintain his own position and Unionist control over provincial affairs, the Party had to be safeguarded against factionalism, a condition which was ever present amongst Muslim Unionists. Accordingly he sought to bolster the stability of his Ministry through the distribution of offices and honors, and to strengthen its following in the Assembly by creating a coalition embracing other political parties. In pursuit of this objective Sikander in October 1937 concluded a pact with Jinnah, the President of the A.I.M.L. Despite the humiliating defeat which the League had experienced at the all-India polls⁶⁹⁰ and in the Punjab, Sikander believed, that if it was permitted to function unchecked in the Punjab, Jinnah would eventually seek to enhance League prospects by exploiting any differences which existed amongst Muslim Unionists to the detriment of party unity.⁶⁹¹ His agreement with Jinnah effectively thwarted this possibility as it placed the Punjab Muslim League firmly under Unionist control. The national League, however, remained independent of Unionist direction, and in order to restrain it from pursuing policies detrimental to Unionism Sikander sought a national role to limit Jinnah's influence, and to effect a dominant measure of control over all-India Muslim politics. This quest inevitably brought him into conflict with the League President, and though Sikander remained the undisputed master of the Punjab until his death in December 1942, he did not achieve any measure of success in respect of his national ambitions. In attempting to undermine Jinnah's leadership he opposed a man whose political dexterity and tactical skills far outshone his own, and he was further handicapped by the fact that the Viceroy, Linlithgow, was committed for strategically reasons to Jinnah's continued domination of the A.I.M.L., and who as a result refused to countenance Sikander's intrusions in the national sphere. In fact the Unionist election victory was not sufficient in itself to maintain the Unionists in power. The Muslim wing of the Party constituted a loose structure of family and landed alliances rather than a dynamic political force, united by a strong ideology. Nor was there a tradition of collective responsibility and strict adherence to party discipline. Its history had been marked by factionalism even in the pre-election period, when Sikander and his associates had challenged Fazl-i-Husain. Sikander, who was only too

⁶⁹⁰ The A.I.M.L. captured only 109 of the 482 seats reserved for Muslims. See Z.H. Zaidi, 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-1947' (in) C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (Eds.) *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, p. 253.

⁶⁹¹ Sikander to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

aware of such rivalries,⁶⁹² feared that they could precipitate a ministerial crisis, or even cost the Party its majority in the Legislature.

That Sikander was determined to reduce this danger, and weld the existing rival factions, such as the Noon-Tiwana clan of Sargodha and the Daultanas of Mailsi, into a moderately cohesive whole is apparent from his judicious distribution of cabinet and parliamentary posts. They were clearly intended to achieve a balance between the Muslim groups in his party, and to secure a commitment from the most influential politicians in each, and thereby their followers, to the survival of his administrations; hence the appointments of Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana as Minister of Public Works and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana as the Unionist Chief whip (Feb. 1937).⁶⁹³ Sikander also supported and secured the election of Chaudhri Sir Shahab-ud-Din, a former rival⁶⁹⁴ as Speaker of the Punjab Assembly.⁶⁹⁵ Similarly Parliamentary Secretaryships were conferred on Sheikh Faiz Muhammad, Begum Shah Nawaz and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, whilst Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Syed Amjad Ali Shah and Nawabzada Muhammad Faiyaz Ali Khan were installed as Parliamentary Private Secretaries.⁶⁹⁶ By these means Sikander secured the cooperation of a cross-section of the most influential Muslim political factions including the Noons and Tiwanas, the Daultanas, the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura, the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh and the Khokhars of Jhelum. In addition the appointment given to Ghazanfar Ali, who abandoned the Muslim League as a result, deprived that organization of the only landed support it possessed in the Assembly.⁶⁹⁷

Also in selecting office bearers Sikander shrewdly rewarded his non-Muslim supporters. Thus whilst the appointments of Chhotu Ram as Minister for Development, and of Tikka Ram and Sardar Gopal Singh as Parliamentary Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secretary⁶⁹⁸ emphasized the non-communal character of the Ministry, they also acknowledged the substantial contribution which the Hindu Jat contingent led by Chhotu Ram had made to the initial Unionist majority of 15 seats, in that they had captured 13 constituencies for the Unionist Party.⁶⁹⁹

Despite the presence of these Hindu Jats, and of four Unionist representatives from the minor communities (one Anglo-Indian, one European, two Indian Christians),⁷⁰⁰ the Party was dominated by the Muslim element, as 78 of the original 95 Unionist M.L.As

⁶⁹² Sikander to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁶⁹³ *Punjab Civil List* (Jan. 1938), pp. 1-8, V/13/1040, IOR.

⁶⁹⁴ See Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, Bombay, 1946, p. 271.

⁶⁹⁵ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 5 April 1937, Vol. 1, pp.10-12, V/9/3456, IOR.

⁶⁹⁶ *Punjab Civil List* (Jan. 1938), pp. 1-8, V/13/1040, IOR.

⁶⁹⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 16 Feb. 1937.

⁶⁹⁸ *Punjab Civil List* (Jan. 1938), pp. 1-8, V/13/1040, IOR.

⁶⁹⁹ *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937*, London, 1937, pp. 73-81, CMD. 5589, IOR.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

were Muslims.⁷⁰¹ Consequently it remained highly vulnerable to the possible development of factionalism. In order to combat this the Premier sought to increase the strength of the Ministry in the Legislature through the inclusion of non-Muslim, non-Unionist parties, to reduce the risk of the Party losing its majority should a split occur in the Muslim wing. In pursuing this objective Sikander was aided by the fact that two influential minority leaders Sir Sunder Singh Majithia and Raja Narendra Nath - were anxious to reach an understanding with the Unionists. Majithia, the leader of the Sikh Khalsa National Board Party, had been instructed by his followers to take whatever action he considered necessary to ensure that their party shared in the formation of the Ministry.⁷⁰² It was a natural desire considering that the Khalsa in common with the Unionist Party was rural based,⁷⁰³ and therefore anxious to pursue in partnership with the Unionist Government an economic programme reflecting the interests of the majority of its members. Sikander welcomed this development for not only were the Sikhs the only important minority community which remained unrepresented on the Unionist benches, but the Khalsa Party was the major Sikh organization in the Assembly,⁷⁰⁴ and it was considered to be far less communal than its main political contender, the Sikh Akali Party. Accordingly on 1 March 1937 Khalsa support for the Unionist Government was assured by the appointment of Majithia as Minister of Revenue⁷⁰⁵ and the accommodation of two of his Khalsa associates, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Jagjit Singh as Parliamentary Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secretary respectively.⁷⁰⁶

The resulting coalition represented, apart from the Premier's tactical motives an alliance of rural economic interests. The merger which took place between the Unionists and Raja Narendra Nath's supporters, however, occurred for completely different reasons. Although the Raja was a wealthy landlord,⁷⁰⁷ he controlled a contingent of ten urban Hindu politicians who had formed themselves into the Punjab Nationalist Progressive Party (P.N.P.P.) in February 1937.⁷⁰⁸ This group desired to work with the Unionist majority in the hope that it would be able to exercise a restraining influence over future Unionist legislation, which was generally expected to favor rural at the expense of urban interests. Sikander for his part was anxious to placate Narendra Nath as he had previously threatened to invoke the special responsibilities of the Governor to protect

⁷⁰¹ Seventy-one rural, two urban and five 'special interest' representatives, *ibid.*, pp. 73-81.

⁷⁰² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 March 1937.

⁷⁰³ Twelve of the fourteen seats captured by the Khalsa Party were rural constituencies, Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 78-81; CMD. 5589, IOR.

⁷⁰⁴ The Khalsa Party had won 13 of the 31 seats reserved for Sikhs, and it had captured one special interest seat - Central Punjab Landholders. Of the remaining Sikh constituencies the Akalis had taken ten seats, the Congress party four seats, Independent candidates three seats and the Socialist Party one seat, *ibid.*, pp. 78-81.

⁷⁰⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 March 1937.

⁷⁰⁶ See *Punjab Civil List* (Jan. 1938), pp. 3-8, V/13/1040, IOR.

⁷⁰⁷ He enjoyed an annual income of Rs. 70,000 from his land. See Azim Husain, 21. *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁷⁰⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 Feb. 1937.

minority affairs if the Ministry exhibited any anti-urban bias.⁷⁰⁹ Thus this political marriage between the pro-rural Unionist-Khalsa coalition and the P.N.P.P., resulting as it did from conflicting motives, was doomed to failure. Although an alliance was concluded in April 1937⁷¹⁰ it was short-lived. The eventual rupture was precipitated in October 1938 by the Government's Registration of Money-lenders Bill.⁷¹¹ In spite of an appeal by Narendra Nath to the Governor the bill became law, consequently the P.N.P.P. joined the opposition benches.⁷¹²

Despite the fact that the association of the P.N.P.P. with the Administration proved to be an uneasy alliance, the inclusion of that Party and the Khalsa group in the Unionist coalition was an achievement on Sikander's part, in that it increased the initial Unionist majority of 15 to 65, as by April 1937, the Premier commanded the allegiance of 120 M.L.As. in a House of 175. Thus the Ministry had been substantially bolstered against the possibility of it losing its overall majority should any Muslim defections occur. The eventual withdrawal of the P.N.P.P. did nothing to damage this stability, because by the time it occurred, the Premier had neutralized the Muslim League in the Province, preventing it from becoming a serious focus for Muslim opposition to the Ministry, or the vehicle for disaffected Muslim Unionists.

Sikander had acted at the Lucknow session of the A.I.M.L. held in October 1937 to contain any future League threat, by concluding a formal agreement with Jinnah, known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. Under the terms of the 'Pact' Sikander undertook to advise all the Muslim Unionist to join the A.I.M.L.; the Provincial League Parliamentary Board was to be reconstituted to function under Unionist control; Muslim Unionist candidates were to contest all future elections on the A.I.M.L. ticket, on the understanding that following such elections they would remain members of the Unionist Party.⁷¹³ The most important commitment, however, from the point of view of Sikander's League strategy, concerned his pledge that Muslim Unionists would support Jinnah in all-India politics, in return for which the A.I.M.L. would refrain from interfering in the provincial sphere - there the position and ascendancy of the Unionist Party would remain unchanged.⁷¹⁴

Penderel Moon, a former I.C.S. officer in the Punjab cadre, has attributed another motive for Sikander seeking a pact with Jinnah. Though he recognized correctly that the Premier was concerned to prevent the A.I.M.L. from fermenting factionalism and

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 14 April 1936.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 14 April 1937.

⁷¹¹ The central provision of the Bill determined that only those moneylenders who were registered and licensed would receive help from the law courts in recovering loans. Also any moneylender who charged interest in excess of the legal maximum, or who did not keep accounts, or who falsified documents would forfeit his license, *ibid.*, 16 Oct. 1938.

⁷¹² GR, Craik to Brabourne, 22 July 1938, L/P&J/5/240, IOR.

⁷¹³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 Oct. 1937; *Ingilab* (Lahore), 18 Oct. 1937, PPA.

⁷¹⁴ GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, 14/P&J/5/238, IOR.

resultant fragmentation amongst Muslim Unionists, he has suggested that there already existed a strong desire on the part of the Muslim membership of the Party for a political accommodation with the League which pressurized the Premier into coming to terms with Jinnah.⁷¹⁵ This interpretation, however, suggests that both Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. enjoyed a much greater degree of support in 1937 amongst Muslim Unionist M.L.As. than was actually the case. This is apparent from the fact that by December 1937 no Muslim Unionist had formally joined the League⁷¹⁶ in protest over the Provincial League's claim that as a consequence of Sikander's agreement with Jinnah the Unionist Party was subordinate to the A.I.M.L.⁷¹⁷ Even those Muslim Unionists who eventually signed League membership forms in February 1938 added the proviso that their affiliation was to remain subject to the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact.⁷¹⁸ Thus it was Sikander and not Jinnah who commanded the loyalty of the Muslim Unionists. In fact Jinnah did not possess any real power in the Punjab, his supporters were limited to a small group of urban Muslim politicians, only one of whom - Barkat Ali - held a seat in the Legislature. Consequently Sikander had not been forced to accommodate Jinnah, rather he had exploited the weakness of the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab to ensure that he could dictate the course Unionist - League relations would follow rather than leave the process to the arbitration of time.

Even so other considerations had shaped Sikander's League policy. He was opposed to the idea of Federation as envisaged by the 1935 Act because he believed that it would lead to the complete domination of the Subcontinent and thereby the Muslims by the Hindu-controlled Congress.⁷¹⁹ The Act had guaranteed to Muslims only 33⅓% of the seats in the Council of State and the Federal Assembly, relegating the community to the position of a permanent minority. The Premier's conviction had been shaped to a great extent by the Congress's treatment of the A.I.M.L. in the immediate post-election period.⁷²⁰ No Congress-League electoral pact had existed, but the A.I.M.L. leaders had produced a manifesto which was in broad accord with the Congress programme. Through this tactic the League leadership hoped to share in government in the Hindu majority provinces, but the Congress Party which enjoyed overwhelming majorities in seven of the 11 provinces in British India was under no political pressure to accommodate Muslim Leaguers, and as such it was prepared to include in its administrations only those Muslims who were Congressites.⁷²¹ The Premier's apprehension, concerning Congress, was further aggravated by Nehru's (Congress President, 1936-37) attitude during his visit to the Punjab during the autumn of 1937.

⁷¹⁵ P. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, London 1961, p. 17.

⁷¹⁶ GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 3 Dec. 1937, L/P&J/5/ 238, IOR.

⁷¹⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 Oct. 1937.

⁷¹⁸ GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 12 Feb. 1938, L/P&G/5/239, IOR.

⁷¹⁹ Lord Zetland, *Essayez*, London, 1956, p. 247; GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 29 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.

⁷²⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 Oct. 1937.

⁷²¹ P. Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

Emerson, the Governor of the Punjab, noted that the outstanding impression created by Nehru had been one of domination and arrogance:

"It is this domineering and arrogant spirit which is causing most bitter resentment and which affected the Muslims most at Lucknow. I think it strongly influenced Sikander in taking the step which he has taken."⁷²²

Sikander reaffirmed this view when he informed Craik, Emerson's successor; in October 1940 that one of the reasons he and his Muslim supporters joined the A.I.M.L. was to consolidate Muslim opinion *vis-a-vis* the Congress, and to impress upon the British that Muslim claims could not be ignored in the framing of any new constitution for India.⁷²³

M. A. H. Ispahani (M.L.A. Bengal; Member, A.I.M.L. Working Committee, 1941-47) an ardent Jinnahite, though aware of Sikander's national concern regarding the Congress, has attempted to interpret the Sikander-Jinnah Pact in the most favorable light for the A.I.M.L., which according to Ispahani had attracted a wide following in the Punjab by October 1937. In fact Ispahani has claimed that Sikander urgently needed League support to counter the mass-contact programme which the Congress had launched in all the provinces.⁷²⁴ Such an explanation, however, is naive and inaccurate; in fact it was Jinnah who was extremely anxious to gain the support of the Muslim Unionist group.⁷²⁵ The 1937 elections had emphasized that the Muslim League was 'all-Indian' in name only. Neither Jinnah nor his organization enjoyed any substantial popularity nor could they seriously claim to represent the Indian Muslims in future negotiations of a national character.⁷²⁶ Its poor performance at the polls clearly revealed that it possessed no real power to challenge the Congress at the all-India level, while in the provincial sphere the Unionist Party had already established its ascendancy over the Congress which had captured only 15 of the seats in the Provincial Assembly.⁷²⁷ Moreover following the election the Congress did not pose any threat to the Unionists as it remained firmly identified with minority urban interests,⁷²⁸ and had failed to wean any non-Muslim, pro-Unionist leaders such as Chhotu Ram or Sunder Singh Majithia to its side. Consequently Sikander did not need the A.I.M.L. to shore up the Unionist political fortress.

In reality the Pact gave substance to the A.I.M.L.'s claim to be a national organization; thus the League, and not the Unionist Party, was its main beneficiary. As Choudhry Khaliqzaman (M.L.A., U.P. 1936-45, Member of A.I.M.L., Working Committee) has

⁷²² GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.

⁷²³ Craik to Linlithgow, 16 Oct. 1940, 14/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁷²⁴ M.A.H. Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him*, Karachi, 1976, pp. 50-51.

⁷²⁵ GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.

⁷²⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 28 April 1944.

⁷²⁷ Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 73-81, CMD. 5589, IOR.

⁷²⁸ A, Punjabi, *Confederacy of India*, Lahore, 1939, pp. 21-25.

conceded. "No one can deny that without this action on the part of Sir Sikander the Muslim League fight would have been confined to minority provinces alone..."⁷²⁹ The Punjab Premier's support for the League precipitated similar declarations by the Muslim Premiers of Bengal and Assam (Fazlul Huq and Sadullah Khan) and as Professor Coupland recorded "The League had thus suddenly acquired a prestige among Moslems throughout India such as it had never enjoyed before..."⁷³⁰

Sikander had been central to the process of rejuvenating the League at the national level, and as such this gave him tremendous power over the organization in the Punjab, which helps to explain why his rapprochement with Jinnah did not unduly alarm his non-Muslim supporters, whom he had prepared for the move through discussions with Chhotu Ram,⁷³¹ and through the columns of the *Civil and Military Gazette*.⁷³² Having concluded the understanding with Jinnah, Sikander used the tremendous advantage he had gained by being instrumental in repairing the fortunes of the A.I.M.L. to achieve his objective of preventing the League from becoming a focus of Muslim anti-Unionist opposition. Jinnah seems to have appreciated and accepted Sikander's strategy, and the provincial implications for the League as a result of the Pact. Subsequent events proved that he was prepared to sacrifice the existing loyal local League, and abdicate control over it in favor of Sikander, in order to sustain the illusion of a united, national Muslim League, the presence of which was essential to substantiate his claims to be the leader of the Indian Muslims. When for instance Barkat Ali, the Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League, issued a statement in October 1937 to the effect that the 'Pact' represented a complete surrender on the part of the Unionist Party to A.I.M.L.,⁷³³ the Jinnah was not prepared to substantiate the claim. Sikander, in a letter of protest over Barkat Ali's assertion, seized the opportunity to impress on Jinnah and thereby the local League, the total dominance of the Unionist Party over League affairs:

"I hope you would kindly inform Sir Mohammad Iqbal [President, Punjab Muslim League] that one of the conditions on which I agreed to advise the Muslim Unionists to join the League was that we should have a controlling voice in the provincial League organizations. Another thing which you might mention ... is that the present Unionist Party will continue and function as at present and that the only change contemplated by us was that the Muslim Unionist members will become members of the Muslim League and Malik Barkat Ali will join the Unionist Party."⁷³⁴

⁷²⁹ Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 290-291.

⁷³⁰ R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement*, London, 1945, p. 183. Also see H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, London, 1969, p. 73.

⁷³¹ GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.

⁷³² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 7 May 1937; 18 July 1937; 7 Aug. 1937.

⁷³³ *Ibid.*, 20 Oct. 1937.

⁷³⁴ Sikander to Jinnah, 3 Nov. 1937, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

Jinnah's failure to refute Sikander's claim, or offer any support to Barkat Ali caused Ghulam Rasul (Financial Secretary, Provincial Muslim League) to complain bitterly to the A.I.M.L. President that the 'Pact' was tantamount to a sell-out of his loyal supporters in the Punjab. He criticized the fact that seven of the 11 seats reserved for Punjab Leaguers on the Central Parliamentary Board had been allotted to Unionists, whilst only three had been given to members of the Provincial League. Neither K.B. Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan, the Deputy President of the Punjab Muslim League, nor Rasul himself figured in the list.⁷³⁵ Iqbal also wrote to Jinnah in similar vein, stressing that if the 'Pact' was allowed to proceed it would place the local League completely at the mercy of the Unionists. Whilst Iqbal was not unduly concerned by the fact that the 'Pact' had permitted the establishment of Unionist control over the Provincial League's Parliamentary Board, he thoroughly deprecated Sikander's desire to orchestrate "a complete change in the office holders of the League..." and to place "the finances of the League..." under the control of "his men":

"All this to my mind amounts to capturing the League and then killing it ... I cannot take the responsibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar and his friends."⁷³⁶

Iqbal, however, had no choice in the matter; his pleas failed to move Jinnah, or, persuade him to protect the 'Old Guard' of the Provincial Muslim League. Jinnah was not in a strong enough position to challenge the Unionists, nor was he prepared to sacrifice his alliance with them. In replying to Iqbal's and Ghulam Rasul's complaints, whilst Jinnah avoided any detailed discussion of the terms of the Pact, he made it perfectly clear that he was prepared to accept Unionist dominance of League affairs in the Punjab, and he virtually ordered Iqbal and his colleagues to resign themselves to it:

"Once the Muslim members of the Unionist Party or any Mussalman who becomes a leaguer [*sic*] and pledges himself to the creed, Policy and Programme, he is no longer anything else but a leaguer ... After that there is no such thing as this group or that group, or that party or this party, because then it really means various cliques."⁷³⁷

Abandoned by Jinnah, the Punjab League was isolated, and completely at the mercy of Sikander. One gesture of defiance remained to it but that proved ineffective. In order to reorganize the Provincial Leagues, and to affiliate them with the central body the A.I.M.L. asked the Local Leagues to furnish by 15 March 1938 the names of all office-bearers and details of their various branches to a sub-committee consisting of Ismail Khan (prominent Muslim Leaguer from U.P.) and Liaquat Ali Khan (Secretary,

⁷³⁵ Ghulam Rasul to Jinnah, 4 Nov. 1937, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁷³⁶ Iqbal to Jinnah, 10 Nov. 1937, quoted by M.A.H. Ispahani, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁷³⁷ Jinnah to Barkat Ali (n.d.), S. Quaim Hussain Jafri, *Quaid-i-Azam's Correspondence with Punjab Muslim Leaders*, Lahore, 1977, p. 48. Jinnah requested Barkat Ali to show this letter to Ghulam Rasul and Iqbal.

A.I.M.L.). The Provincial Leagues were also asked to nominate representatives for the Council of the A.I.M.L.. Accordingly the Punjab Muslim League recommended 19 nominees, none of whom were Unionists, as none of the latter had so far accepted League membership.⁷³⁸

In bypassing the Unionists in this way the Punjab League had hoped to outmaneuver Sikander and establish its independence by placing its own stalwarts on the A.I.M.L. Council. Jinnah, however, could not permit the ruse to succeed, and the local League's recommendations were rejected on the grounds that its constitution was not in accord with that of the Central League.⁷³⁹ Furthermore in April 1938 the A.I.M.L. refused affiliation to the existing Punjab Muslim League, and a committee of 30 members, 22 of whom were to be appointed by Sikander, was empowered by Jinnah to organize a new Provincial League.⁷⁴⁰

Batalwi in recalling these events in his work '*Iqbal ke Akhri do sal*' has claimed that Liaquat Ali Khan, who was very sympathetic to Sikander, was instrumental in engineering this rebuttal,⁷⁴¹ but it could not have been executed without Jinnah's approval. It is certainly true that as a large landholder in the U.P. and the Karnal District of the Eastern Punjab, and the brother of a Unionist M.L.A., Liaquat did possess a vested interest in the Unionist Party, but Jinnah had a greater investment; his credibility as an all-India leader would have suffered immeasurably if he had supported the 'Old Guard' in the Punjab, and thereby forfeited the Unionist alliance. Consequently the Punjab Muslim League ultimately fell victim to Jinnah's ambition and appreciation of political necessities and realities, and Sikander's determination to manipulate the hold he had over Jinnah to thwart Muslim League interference in the Punjab.

Sikander's ascendancy over the Punjab League was established. Dedicated 'old leaguers' were removed from office to be replaced by Unionist sympathizers; Iqbal had been superseded in March 1938 by Nawab Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot, an extremely influential Unionist landlord. The removal of Iqbal, who at the time was critically ill, was reputedly achieved by Mamdot's promise to Barkat Ali of fiscal support for the Provincial League, the finances of which were exhausted.⁷⁴² By June 1939 Unionist adherents had also been appointed to the posts of Secretary (Mian Ramzan Ali), Organizing Secretary (Mahammad Ali Jaafari) and Financial Secretary (Mian Amir-ud-Din). Under Sikander's 'patronage' the local League was allowed to stagnate to the point

⁷³⁸ A.H. Batalwi, *Iqbal ke Akhri do sal*, pp. 606-607, quoted by Imram Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade before Partition*, Lahore, 1975, pp. 27-28.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁷⁴⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 April 1938.

⁷⁴¹ A.H. Batalwi, *op. cit.*, p. 618, quoted by Imram Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁷⁴² A.H. Batalwi, *ibid.*, pp. 604-605, 613, quoted by Imram Ali, *ibid.*, p. 26.

of disintegration; nearly two years after the conclusion of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact there were only six district and city Muslim Leagues in the Province, as compared to 27 district Leagues, and 104 primary branches which had functioned previously.⁷⁴³

Despite Sikander's victory Barkat Ali continued to strive to free the League from the Unionist morass. His criticisms of Sikander's neglect of League affairs helped to give birth, in June 1939, to the Punjab Muslim League Radical Party. This organization publicly declared its intent to "combat the rising influence of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan with the Punjab Muslim League", insisting that

"Neither the Congress nor British Imperialism is the real enemy of the Muslim League movement in the Punjab. The real danger ... is from those who are now dominating it ... under the cloak of friendship."⁷⁴⁴

The emergence of this group, combined with Barkat Ali's continued voluble dissatisfaction, compelled the A.I.M.L. to take note of the unsatisfactory state of the Punjab League, but its impotence in the Province dictated that it adopt a cautious, reconciliatory, and in the final analysis, ineffectual approach to the problem. Especially as urban politicians and movements, as epitomized by Barkat Ali and the 'Radicals' could not intimidate Sikander, because the rural areas, the power-base of provincial politics, remained firmly in the Unionists' grip. Thus although in August 1939 the A.I.M.L. Council considered a resolution calling for the dissolution of the Unionist controlled Punjab League Organizing Committee on account of its incompetence, Liaquat Ali Khan ensured that it would not be carried. He was determined to prevent any action which would cost the A.I.M.L. its Unionist support, consequently at his suggestion Sikander was given until 15 November 1939 to establish a viable League in the Punjab, after which time a sub-committee consisting of the Raja of Mahmudabad (M.L.A., U.P., Member Working Committee, A.I.M.L.), Nawab Ismail Khan and Khaliqzaman would decide whether the new provincial body would be affiliated to the Central League.⁷⁴⁵ The Punjab Premier, confident that Jinnah was unable to act against him, did nothing to repair the fortunes of the Provincial League, an omission which caused Barkat Ali to attempt to launch an organization independent of Unionist control, which he hoped would be recognized by the A.I.M.L. as the official League in the Punjab. Sikander, however, defeated Barkat Ali's maneuver; he informed Khaliqzaman that he had no intention of recognizing Barkat Ali's association, and he alleged that the majority of the branches which the latter had claimed to have founded did not exist. The investigations of the Mahmudabad Committee corroborated the Premier's allegation, as it was discovered that many of the branches cited by Barkat Ali were "totally bogus".⁷⁴⁶ The Committee had no option, therefore, but to accept and

⁷⁴³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 June 1939.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 17 June 1939.

⁷⁴⁵ Imran Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-229.

⁷⁴⁶ Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *ibid.*, pp. 233, 235.

endorse Sikander's continuing control over the Punjab Muslim League. The result was the strangulation of that body; no wonder that it was not until November 1942 that the first annual session of the Provincial League was convened,⁷⁴⁷ and that almost two years after Sikander's death it remained an ineffective body, Mumtaz Daultana (General Secretary, Punjab Muslim League) ruefully admitting in July 1944 that most of the district leagues in the Province "had existence only on paper."⁷⁴⁸

Jinnah was totally unable to reverse this trend. The power which Sikander enjoyed over the League President in the provincial sphere was further demonstrated in March 1940. League opinion had been outraged by Sikander's harsh treatment of the Khaksar movement in the Punjab in March 1940 the khaksars ('humble ones') - a militant Muslim organization founded by Allama Mashriqi in 1931 - had been banned on Sikander's orders following clashes with the police which had resulted in the deaths of 36 Khaksars.⁷⁴⁹ No less than six resolutions condemning the Punjab Premier's action had been tabled for discussion by the annual session of the A.I.M.L. scheduled to convene in Lahore at the end of March. Consequently Sikander warned Jinnah that if as a result any steps were taken to censure either his Government or himself then he and his Muslim followers would resign from the League. Jinnah bowed to Sikander's threat. At the Lahore session of the A.I.M.L. he directed the delegates to accept Sikander's statement, in which the latter claimed that malign forces had attempted to exploit the Khaksar incident in order to discredit him and disrupt League unity, after which Jinnah ruled that no further discussion was necessary on the subject.⁷⁵⁰ Jinnah's compliance in the matter caused the Punjab Governor to observe correctly,

"His [Jinnah's] primary objective was, of course, to preserve unity in the League, and I do not suppose that he was actuated by any particular consideration for Sikander or his Ministry."⁷⁵¹

By the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, therefore, Sikander had expanded the strength of his Ministry in the Assembly, subjugated the Provincial Muslim League and compromised Jinnah. In order to maintain his own preeminence, however, he had been careful also to appeal to and satisfy the personal vanities of many of his Unionist supporters; by the time the New Year's Honors List was announced in January 1939, over one-third of the Unionist M.L.As. had been 'rewarded' with titles.⁷⁵² The importance which Sikander attached to this exercise can be gauged from the fact that two years after first taking office he was forced to work a fourteen-hour day because, as

⁷⁴⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 Nov. 1942.

⁷⁴⁸ Punjab Provincial Muslim League Report for June and July 1944, by Mumtaz Daultana, 28 July 1944, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁷⁴⁹ Craik to Linlithgow, 20 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/89, IOR.

⁷⁵⁰ Craik to Linlithgow, 21 March 1940; 24 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/89, IOR.

⁷⁵¹ Craik to Linlithgow, 25 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/89, IOR.

⁷⁵² *Tribune* (Lahore), 5 Jan. 1939, PPA.

Craik revealed, in addition to conducting the administration, he was obliged to consider requests for patronage from M.L.As. who regarded the acquisition of honors and honorary appointments as legitimate recompense for the expenses they had incurred in contesting the elections.⁷⁵³

In spite of the undoubted ascendancy which Sikander enjoyed in the Punjab as a consequence of his policies and actions, some British commentators have propagated the erroneous view that he exhibited a degree of weakness in his relationship with Jinnah, tantamount to surrender.⁷⁵⁴ In reality Sikander conducted a concerted, though largely unsuccessful campaign against Jinnah at the national level, concurrent with his provincial strategy. Essentially he sought to diminish the A.I.M.L. President's influence to further safeguard his own standing in the Punjab by promoting his own prospects as a contender for the mantle of national Muslim leadership. Broadly speaking the battle Sikander and Jinnah waged centered around two issues - the attitude which the Muslim League should adopt regarding the assistance, if any, it should offer to the British during the Second World War, and their respective concepts of a national policy to protect and promote Muslim interests regarding future constitutional developments. Their views on these matters were irreconcilably opposed, as both advanced conflicting programmes which each believed would strengthen their respective position against the other. Also to begin with Sikander was encouraged in pursuing this quest by the belief that Jinnah's control within the A.I.M.L. was diminishing.⁷⁵⁵ Jinnah, however, was far from being a spent force, and whilst political necessity dictated that he should resign himself for the time being to a subservient role in the Punjab, he could not, and did not, permit Sikander to erode his dominance or damage his prestige in the national sphere.

In resisting Sikander's intrusion at the all-India level Jinnah possessed the tremendous advantage of having concluded a secret understanding with the Viceroy, Linlithgow, a factor which dissuaded the latter from encouraging Sikander's extra-Punjab ambitions at Jinnah's expense. In fact the Viceroy and League President were collaborators, united by their common fear of the Indian National Congress. From the latter half of 1939 Jinnah and the Viceroy sought to protect their respective positions. Linlithgow wished to deny mounting Congress pressure for radical political reforms, which crystallized in October 1939 in a demand for immediate independence for India as the basis for securing the country's willing participation in the war.⁷⁵⁶ Conversely Jinnah needed to destroy the Congress claim to represent all the Indian communities, the Muslims included, in order to maintain an independent identity for the A.I.M.L. The League President was also motivated by his desire to reinforce his position against the intrigues of Sikander.

⁷⁵³ GR, Craik to Linlithgow, 27 Jan. 1939, L/PW5/241, IOR.

⁷⁵⁴ See H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 89 and P. Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39, 273-274, 287.

⁷⁵⁵ Craik to Linlithgow, 10 July 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/88, IOR.

⁷⁵⁶ H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

The foundations for his relationship with the Viceroy had been laid in August 1938 when Jinnah had secretly advocated British-League collaboration to prevent the Congress from embarrassing either party; he suggested to Brabourne (Governor of Bengal, acting Governor-General) that the British 'should make friends with the Muslims by "protecting" them in the Congress Provinces and that, if we did that the Muslims would "protect" us at the Centre.'⁷⁵⁷ In March 1939 in a further attempt to solicit the Viceroy's support Jinnah had confided to Linlithgow that he was not averse to the continuation of British rule. He stated that it was uncertain whether or not the British would leave India, and, in such circumstances, though the Muslims had to show themselves to be as nationalistic as any other community by abusing the rulers loudly and publicly, they might cooperate with the British behind the scenes as long as the latter did not abdicate power.⁷⁵⁸ This expressed preference for British, as opposed to Congress, rule was expanded by Jinnah in May 1939, when he stressed to Linlithgow India's dependence on the British, and his conviction that those who had pressed for political reform had not considered the matter carefully, but had been swept along by a "natural desire for home rule" and an "equally natural objection ... to government by aliens". Jinnah also intimated to the Viceroy his belief that India was not "competent to run a democracy...", and that he could see no solution to the problems facing the country "should the British depart."⁷⁵⁹

When, therefore, in September 1939 Jinnah sought Linlithgow's aid to contain Sikander, and prevent him from disrupting League unity over the contentious issue of Muslim support for the war, the Viceroy already regarded the League President as a potentially useful ally. Sikander in fact had pledged that the Punjab would assist the war effort before the A.I.M.L. had made its views known. Jinnah had hoped to use the issue to exact concessions from the Government of India, having publicly declared in September 1939 that A.I.M.L. assistance would only be forthcoming if Britain took "Muslim India into its confidence through their accredited organization - the All-India Muslim League...", and would agree not to permit any constitutional advance without the consent of the League.⁷⁶⁰ Sikander's pledge, therefore, threatened to undermine Jinnah's strategy. In discussing this conflict with the Viceroy, however, Jinnah was careful not to depreciate Sikander's loyalty, but he pointed out that whilst he privately shared the Punjab leader's sentiments, as a public figure he could not emulate them.⁷⁶¹ It was a valid argument for if Jinnah had endorsed Sikander's pledge he would have exposed himself to an immediate Congress charge that he had betrayed the nationalist cause in support of an imperialistic war.⁷⁶² In spite of the inconsistency between his private

⁷⁵⁷ Brabourne to Zetland, 19 Aug. 1938, Mss. EUR.F. 125/6, IOR.

⁷⁵⁸ Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 Feb./1 March 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/7, IOR.

⁷⁵⁹ Linlithgow to Zetland, 26 May 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/7, IOR.

⁷⁶⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 Sept. 1939; H.V. Hodson, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

⁷⁶¹ Note of interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 4 Sept. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 Sept. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/8, IOR.

⁷⁶² Hostility towards 'imperialistic wars', i.e. conflicts involving Britain and the Empire against foreign powers, had been current in Congress circles from 1936 onwards. See H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, PP- 77-79.

utterances and public declaration, Jinnah had attempted to reassure the Viceroy sufficiently to dissuade him from sponsoring Sikander as a rival spokesman for Muslim India - a role which Jinnah emphasized was beyond the Punjab Premier's capabilities:

"Sikander alone could not, he [Jinnah] assured me [Linlithgow], deliver the goods ... Mr. Jinnah again pressed me to help him with Sikander."⁷⁶³

Linlithgow's desire to cultivate a united League as a counter to the Congress caused the Viceroy to meet Jinnah's request concerning Sikander, and to sustain his contention that the A.I.M.L. should be solely responsible for expressing the Muslim point of view. The degree of understanding which as a result existed between the British and League leaders was apparent from Linlithgow's report of a meeting he had with Jinnah on 5 October 1939:

"he thanked me ... for what I had done to assist him in keeping his party [A.I.M.L.] together and expressed great gratitude for this. I said that it was clearly unsatisfactory that while one of the two great parties was well-organized and well-equipped to pursue its objectives ... that the other, equally of great importance, should be masked ... by any failure to secure an adequate mouthpiece. It was in the public interest that the Muslim point of view should be fully and completely expressed."⁷⁶⁴

Political necessity had driven the Viceroy and Jinnah into each others' arms. Linlithgow was an ardent imperialist in spite of his championing of the 1935 Act, whilst Jinnah despite his emergence as a nationalist leader, preferred the continuation of British rule to the prospect of an independent Hindu-dominated India. In urging Indian leaders to accept Federation and Dominion status as the only possible constitutional goal, Linlithgow sought to harness the deadlock which he knew would persist from the Congress refusal to abandon its quest for complete independence, and its failure to placate Muslim fears of future subjugation. He believed that the inability of the two major nationalist parties to settle their differences would thus ensure the future of the Raj "for many years".⁷⁶⁵

This stratagem contained one flaw, however, the remote possibility that eventually the Congress might agree to the proposed constitution (1935 Act). To prepare for that eventuality, and thereby prevent Congress from accelerating home rule, Linlithgow ensured that no political progress would be possible without the consent of the A.I.M.L. - a development virtually precluded by the latter's opposition to majority rule. In order

⁷⁶³ Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 4 Sept. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 Sept. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/81, IOR.

⁷⁶⁴ Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 5 Oct. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 7 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/18, IOR.

⁷⁶⁵ Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 18 Dec. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/18, IOR.

to secure this objective the Viceroy on 17 October 1939 refused to consider the Congress demand for immediate independence; he reiterated that Dominion Status remained the sole ambition of the British Government, and that that would only be considered following the conclusion of the war, when full weight would be given to the opinions of the minorities.⁷⁶⁶ In inducing the British Government to approve the minority principle Linlithgow drew the attention of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, to the political advantage it would confer by giving Britain considerable room to maneuver:

"I would see advantage in drawing pointed attention in debate to the assurances to the minorities ... that full weight would be given to their views and their interests ... and to the fact that ... agreement between Indians themselves... must be the precondition of constitutional progress."⁷⁶⁷

Zetland, for his part, agreed to the Viceroy's strategy because he believed that any attempt to force a constitution on the Muslims without their consent would lead to civil war.⁷⁶⁸ Assured of the Secretary of State's support Linlithgow proceeded to present Jinnah with a veto on any future constitutional progress; on 1 November 1939 he informed Gandhi and Rajnidra Prasad (Congress leaden from Bihar) in Jinnah's presence that the return to democratic government in the provinces,⁷⁶⁹ and any expansion of the Executive Council would only be contemplated if the Congress and the A.I.M.L. reached agreement.⁷⁷⁰

Jinnah fully appreciated the tremendous service which the Viceroy had rendered to him and the League and he proved amenable to repaying the debt by refusing a request from Gandhi for the Congress and the A.I.M.L. "to get together ... to present a joint claim for the declaration [of immediate independence] that Congress wanted..."⁷⁷¹ He effectively ensured that there would be no future cooperation between his organization and the Congress by insisting on a series of conditions to cement a rapprochement between the two parties which were totally unacceptable to Congress leaders: the establishment of coalition Ministries in the provinces subject to the proviso that the respective Assemblies would refuse to sanction any legislation which provoked the disapproval of two-thirds of the Muslim M.L.As the singing of *Bande Matram* (the Congress anthem) and the flying of Congress flags on public holidays was to be terminated, and the Congress mass-contact programme, in respect of Muslims, was to

⁷⁶⁶ H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁷⁶⁷ Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 22 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/18, IOR.

⁷⁶⁸ Lord Zetland, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-285.

⁷⁶⁹ In October 1939 the Congress Ministries in the provinces had resigned in protest at the Viceroy's action in declaring war on India's behalf without first consulting the nationalist organizations. H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁷⁶⁹ P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 230.

⁷⁷⁰ P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 230.

⁷⁷¹ Note of an interview between the Viceroy and Jinnah held on 4 Nov. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 6 Nov. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/8, IOR.

be suspended.⁷⁷² This outcome clearly satisfied the Viceroy who candidly admitted to Zetland in November 1939 that Jinnah

"had given me very valuable help by standing firm against Congress claims and I was duly grateful. It was clear that if he ... had supported the Congress ... and confronted me with a joint demand for independence], the strain upon me and upon His Majesty's Government would have been very great indeed."⁷⁷³

Linlithgow had good cause, therefore, to value his understanding with Jinnah: "it is ... of real value that at this moment a body representing some 90,000,000 people should offer us cooperation".⁷⁷⁴ For thus assured of Jinnah's help, in whose position he admitted to have "a vested interest"⁷⁷⁵ Linlithgow could brush aside Congress insistence for complete independence.

Sikander, unaware that Linlithgow's 'vested interest' in Jinnah had seriously prejudiced his hopes of success, determined to achieve a national role to resist the League President. In August 1939 in a step towards achieving this goal he published his recommendations for the creation of an Indian Federation. In launching this initiative he hoped to prevent the formulation of extreme demands by the A.I.M.L. As a member of the League committee which had been appointed in March 1936 to consider the question of constitutional reform he was acutely aware of the growing support within the A.I.M.L. for the creation of one or more Muslim States in India.⁷⁷⁶ It was a development which Sikander was determined to thwart having confided to Penderel Moon (Secretary to Governor, Punjab)

"that unless positive proposals such as his were put forward for consideration other people would come out with 'something worse'. The 'something worse' to which he referred was the idea of Pakistan..."⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷² *Secret Quarterly Survey of Political and Constitutional Development in India, for the period 1 Nov. 1939 to 31 Jan. 1940*, pp. 25-26, 32, Mss. EUR. F.125/143, IOR.

⁷⁷³ Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 22/23 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/8, IOR

⁷⁷⁴ Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 4 Nov. 1939, Iv/PO/8/506A, IOR.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁶ As early as December 1930 Iqbal, in his Presidential Address to the A.I.M.L. session at Allahabad, had revealed his conception of a self-governing Muslim State to comprise the Punjab, the N.W.F.P., Sindh, and Baluchistan. In January 1933 Rahmat Ali, the originator of the term 'Pakistan' had proposed the creation of two Muslim States in the north-east and north-west of India, to be known as Pakistan and Bang-i-Islam (comprising Bengal and Assam) respectively. Similar schemes were also framed by Abdoola Haroon President, Sindh Muslim League) and Abdul Latif (author of *The Pakistan Issue*, Lahore, 1943) in 1938 and 1939. See K.B, Sayeed, *Pakistan The Formative Phase, 1857-1948*, London, 1968, pp. 104-106, 108-111.

⁷⁷⁷ P. Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Sikander was opposed to the concept of a Muslim State on two counts; he believed 'Pakistan' would precipitate a communal war in the Punjab,⁷⁷⁸ and he knew that if created it would lead to the political ascendancy of Jinnah at his own expense.

Nevertheless one other consideration had molded his scheme - his determination to protect his co-religionists, particularly those in the majority Muslim provinces, from the prospect of Congress, and thereby Hindu domination.⁷⁷⁹ In order to guard against this eventuality he proposed the creation of a federal structure in which the power of the Central Government would be limited to a few specific subjects - Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs - and in which the provinces would enjoy the maximum autonomy, having virtual control over their own finances. He argued that such a structure would ensure the cooperation of both the Muslim majority provinces and the Princely States, as their integrity and authority would not be diminished.⁷⁸⁰

Though he had attempted to gain official approval for his proposition by providing for the continuation, through Dominion status, of the British connection on "a firm and permanent footing"⁷⁸¹ and by arguing that his proposals would strengthen the British presence at the expense of the nationalist parties by broadening the political spectrum, his ideas failed to impress the British. The Government of India and the India Office deprecated Sikander's blatant attempt to cripple central activities.⁷⁸² Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, condemned the proposals as "a nightmare",⁷⁸³ whilst Linlithgow dismissed them because he believed that Sikander in striving "to prevent a Hindu majority in the all-India Legislature" really intended to "put off Federation", as conceived by the 1935 Act, altogether.⁷⁸⁴ As such its purpose appeared to threaten the Viceroy's concept of the stratagem necessary to prolong British rule: "The moment we weaken in our resolution to push Federation through we shall find ourselves without a policy and without a future."⁷⁸⁵

Similarly Sikander's suggestions neither excited nor won Indian approval or support. Although Congress spokesmen refrained from publicly criticizing them in the hope that they might provide a basis for negotiation with moderate League leaders,⁷⁸⁶ they were clearly unacceptable to the Congress because they denied strong central authority.

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷⁷⁹ Linlithgow to Zetland, 2 June 1938, Mss. EUR.F. 125/5, IOR. (Sikander had revealed the details of his scheme to Linlithgow more than a year before he published them.)

⁷⁸⁰ Sikander Hyat Khan, *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, Lahore, 1939, copy with letter, Sikander to Sir F. Stewart, 26 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689; Note, *Moslem Schemes for Federation* Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's Plan, enclosure, Sikander to Laithwaite, 29 June 1939, 14/P&J/8/689, IOR.

⁷⁸¹ Sikander to Laithwaite, 29 June 1939, 11/P&J/8/689, IOR.

⁷⁸² Note by Sir V. Dawson, 25 July 1939, 14/P&J/8/689; Lewis to Laithwaite, 21 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689, IOR.

⁷⁸³ Minute Paper by Zetland, 28 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689, IOR.

⁷⁸⁴ Linlithgow to Zetland, 2 June 1938, Mss. EUR.F. 125/5, IOR.

⁷⁸⁵ Linlithgow to Zetland, 19 May 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/7, IOR.

⁷⁸⁶ P. Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Conversely Muslim League opinion remained highly suspicious of any form of Federation in concert with the Hindu majority. The A.I.M.L. fulfilling Sikander's fears was in fact moving rapidly towards a formal call for an independent State. On 18 September 1939 it formally resolved to abandon Federation as a political goal and review the situation,⁷⁸⁷ and in the following month Jinnah in an interview with the *Manchester Guardian*, which was widely circulated in the Indian press, categorically stated that Sikander's proposition neither emanated from, nor had any binding effect on the A.I.M.L.⁷⁸⁸ It was in March 1940, however, that Jinnah by demanding the division of India delivered the final *coup de grace* to Sikander's federal plan thereby completely destroying his attempt to pose as an architect of Muslim national policy: the A.I.M.L. at its Lahore session (23 March) insisted that:

"no constitutional plan would be workable ... or acceptable to the Muslims unless ... the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India be grouped to constitute 'independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign...."⁷⁸⁹

In proclaiming this programme the actions of the A.I.M.L., though not the content of the Lahore resolution, seem to have been strongly influenced by Linlithgow. Throughout January and February 1940 the Viceroy had counseled Jinnah that it was essential for the A.I.M.L. to formulate positive proposals to enable it to sustain its opposition to the Congress, and to appeal for public and parliamentary support in Britain.⁷⁹⁰ A point of view which was shared by Zetland.⁷⁹¹ Jinnah appreciated the force of Linlithgow's argument:

"I [Viceroy] again put to him [Jinnah] the familiar arguments for formulating and publishing a constructive policy: and in the light of our discussion he said that he was disposed to think that it would probably be wise for his friends and himself to make public ... the out-lines of their position in good time."⁷⁹²

Not only did Jinnah indicate that he would act on the Viceroy's advice, but according to Khaliqzaman Jinnah, on 5 February 1940,

"informed the Viceroy that the Muslim League in its open session at Lahore on 23 March was going to ask for the partition of the country...."⁷⁹³

⁷⁸⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 Sept. 1939.

⁷⁸⁸ Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 26 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/18, IOR.

⁷⁸⁹ H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁷⁹⁰ Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 6 Feb. 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/135, IOR.

⁷⁹¹ Zetland to Linlithgow, telegram, 16 Jan. 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/19, IOR.

⁷⁹² Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 6 Feb. 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/19, IOR.

⁷⁹³ Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

Linlithgow who personally did not agree with the Lahore demand, nevertheless welcomed it as a further means of thwarting the Congress: "There is much that could be said in criticism of Jinnah's partition ideas and we clearly could not accept or endorse them", but he refused to condemn the Lahore resolution because "I think ... it preferable to quote it as illustrating the extent to which the gulf has widened between the parties..."⁷⁹⁴ His whole purpose in spurring Jinnah into defining a political goal had been engineered to undermine the Congress, and now that he had achieved that end he refused to abandon the advantage he believed it afforded him:

"I think it important to bring out ... that with the best will in the world to reach Dominion Status as early as possible His Majesty's Government cannot ... override the views ... of the minorities, particularly the Muslims ... these ... recent developments have brought out more clearly than ever the lack of any substance for the Congress claim to be ... the mouthpiece of India...."⁷⁹⁵

The Lahore development, though clearly welcome to the Viceroy, was completely unacceptable to Sikander. The resolution had greatly added to Jinnah's prestige, increasing his standing as the accredited national Muslim leader.⁷⁹⁶ Furthermore it had seriously compromised Sikander, not only as a provincial Muslim leader whose political philosophy was firmly wedded to inter-communal cooperation,⁷⁹⁷ but as a contestant to Jinnah in the national orbit. Evidently that had been one of Jinnah's intentions, for he had been careful to associate Sikander with the drafting of the Lahore resolution, though the latter's suggestions which closely mirrored his federal scheme, had been drastically amended.⁷⁹⁸ Thus by association if not by deed Sikander had been seen to lend his support to the proceedings, especially as he had not criticized the partition demand: he admitted to Malcolm Darling (former Financial Commissioner, Punjab, retired 1939) that had he done so he would have forfeited his Muslim following, if not in the Punjab Assembly, certainly outside it.⁷⁹⁹

Ever sensible of the dangers of openly opposing the creation of a Muslim homeland, he attempted to resolve the issue by publicly calling on the leaders of the major political parties to meet and devise a common programme for constitutional advance. He urged Linlithgow to assist the process through the appointment of a small representative body, to meet under the chairmanship of the Viceroy; Sikander suggested that 30 people representing all sections of Indian life and including all the provincial Premiers

⁷⁹⁴ Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 6 April 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/19, IOR.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁶ Craik to Linlithgow, 25 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/89, IOR.

⁷⁹⁷ Sikander, having frequently expressed his commitment to inter-communal cooperation, was widely regarded as being non-communal, Civil and Military Gazette, 13 Jan. 1937.

⁷⁹⁸ See Sikander's statement to the Legislature, Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 11 March 1941, Vol. XVI, p. 550, V/9/3699, IOR.

⁷⁹⁹ Darling to Laithwaite, 25 April 1940, L/P&J/8/506B, IOR.

should serve on it.⁸⁰⁰ Sikander in fact had sought to broaden the political spectrum to enable him, in concert with his fellow Muslim Premiers, to formulate a solution to the constitutional impasse independent of Jinnah and the A.I.M.L.. In an attempt to gain Congress acceptance of, and participation with the enterprise Sikander met with the Congress President, Abul Kalam Azad, on 13 June 1940 to discuss his proposals.⁸⁰¹ Jinnah, realizing that Sikander was attempting to outmaneuver him, acted decisively to frustrate the move. On 16 June 1940, Jinnah censured the Punjab Premier for seeing Azad without his authority, and he ensured that no future discussions would occur between Sikander or any other prominent Leaguer and the Congress, without his sanction. Accordingly the A.I.M.L. Working Committee resolved that in order to avoid any misunderstanding

"no member of the Working Committee should enter into any negotiations ... with the Congress leaders regarding the question of [a] Hindu [-] Muslim settlement ... without the permission of the President."

It was also resolved that Jinnah alone was entitled to conduct negotiations with the Viceroy on behalf of the A.I.M.L.⁸⁰² By these actions Jinnah established and demonstrated his dominance over Muslim national politics; Sikander had been effectively isolated, and his political initiative disposed of.

In an attempt to retrieve the situation Sikander counter-attacked to erode Jinnah's position from within the League, by fermenting unrest over the League President's attitude to the War. Jinnah had offered cooperation with the war effort on condition that the British Government would not make any declaration concerning the constitutional future of India "without the previous approval of Muslim India"; that Muslims would be guaranteed "an equal share in the authority and control..."⁸⁰³ of any governments which were established in the provinces and at the Centre, and that the A.I.M.L. would be invited to serve in such administrations even if the Congress refused to.⁸⁰⁴ In order to ensure unanimity amongst Leaguers concerning these demands the A.I.M.L. Working Committee on 16 June 1940 forbade any of its members to serve on the war committees which were being established in the provinces.⁸⁰⁵ This order was opposed by Sikander; he had already pledged the support of the Punjab for the war effort⁸⁰⁶ and he would have suffered considerable loss of face had he obeyed the League's directive, especially as he was the leader of the major recruiting province in

⁸⁰⁰ Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 27 May 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁸⁰¹ Note of interview between G. Laithwaite and Sikander Hyat Khan held on 26 June 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁸⁰² India News Agency telegram No. 37(5), 17 June 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR: P. Hardy, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁸⁰³ H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁸⁰⁴ Craik to Linlithgow, 6 Aug. 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁸⁰⁵ Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁸⁰⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 5 Sept. 1939.

India.⁸⁰⁷ Consequently he deliberately misinterpreted the League's ruling, claiming that it had exempted Muslim Ministers from the Punjab and Bengal. It was a blatantly false proposition, for Jinnah had unequivocally stated both to Mamdot and Nazimuddin (Bengal member A.I.M.L. Working Committee) that the ban included all Leaguers, Ministers included.⁸⁰⁸ Despite Jinnah's denial Sikander refused to comply, confident that the overwhelming support he enjoyed in the Punjab on the issue would restrain Jinnah from moving against him: of the 38 Muslim Unionist M.L.As. who had formally joined the Provincial War Board (established 18 June 1940) only one - Mamdot reluctantly resigned in response to the A.I.M.L.'s June resolution.⁸⁰⁹

Having openly flouted Jinnah's authority in the Punjab Sikander attempted to solicit similar defiance in Bengal. There he found a ready ally, in that the Premier, Fazlul Huq, was equally concerned to limit Jinnah's influence. A Unionist propagandist, Amjad Ali, was dispatched to Bengal in July 1940 to court support for Sikander's stance, and to gain acceptance of the principle that Muslim Ministers were free to serve on war committees. In spite of the fact that a section of Bengal Leaguers, led by Huq were "only too happy to join hands with Sikander..." the move failed, because Nazimuddin and Ispahani were able to convince the majority that it would have been suicidal for national Muslim interests if Bengal encouraged a rift between the Punjab and Central League leadership.⁸¹⁰

Angered by Sikander's revolt both Barkat Ali⁸¹¹ and Ispahani requested Jinnah to bring Sikander to heel. The latter warning that "If a halt is not called ... it is best that Sikandar and his counterpart in Bengal are made the dictators of the Muslim League."⁸¹² Jinnah, however, could do nothing. Though Jinnah claimed Sikander and Huq had given him written undertakings to resign as Premier if requested to do so,⁸¹³ he doubted whether either would honor their promises, and thus he felt unable to use the resignations to compromise the two Premiers, and force them to acknowledge the validity of the League's June directive.⁸¹⁴ Also he was restrained from confronting Sikander by the knowledge that such action would cost him the affiliation of the Unionist controlled

⁸⁰⁷ By 1 January 1941 the Indian Army consisted of 418,000 persons, of whom 155,000 (37%) were Muslims. Of the total the Punjab contributed 201,000 men (48%) of whom 96,000 (48%) were Muslims, 51,000 (25%) were Sikhs, and the remainder Hindu Dogras and Jats. Note by Major-General Lockhart, 25 Feb. 1942, L/P&O/6/106B, IOR.

⁸⁰⁸ Jinnah to Barkat Ali, 24 June 1940, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 215, p. 39; Jinnah to Ispanahi, 24 June 1940, Z.H. Zaidi (ed) *M. A. Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence 1936-1948*, Karachi, 1976, pp. 145 -147.

⁸⁰⁹ Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot to Jinnah, 24 June 1940, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 353, p. 8; Craik to Linlithgow, 24 Sept. 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/89, IOR.

⁸¹⁰ Ispahani to Jinnah, 1 Aug. 1940, Z.H. Zaidi (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.

⁸¹¹ Barkat Ali to Jinnah, 23 June 1940, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 215, p. 36.

⁸¹² Ispahani to Jinnah, 21 June 1940, Z.H. Zaidi (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 143.

⁸¹³ This claim concerning Sikander's written resignation has been corroborated by a report of the Central Intelligence Officer, Lahore, dated 30 September 1939, Craik to Linlithgow, 7 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F. 125/88, IOR.

⁸¹⁴ Jinnah to Ispahani, 24 June 1940, Z.H. Zaidi (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 145-147.

Punjab League: Sikander had threatened that Jinnah's attitude, if not modified, would precipitate such a split.⁸¹⁵

Secure in his knowledge that his opposition to Jinnah over the war committee issue would not endanger his standing in the Punjab, and aware of a core of dissatisfaction in Bengal, Sikander appealed to the Viceroy to assist him to overthrow Jinnah. Through the mediation of the Punjab Governor, Sikander informed Linlithgow on 6 August 1940 that he was confident of being able to attract an all-Indian Muslim following if the Viceroy broke off negotiations with Jinnah, and recognized him as "the representative of Muslim opinion generally". In return for viceregal recognition Sikander undertook to rally Muslim support for the war effort and to negotiate a Muslim settlement with the Viceroy on the basis that Muslims would be invited to join governments at the Centre and in the provinces even if the Congress refused to participate.⁸¹⁶

The Viceroy ignored this overture. Two days after receiving it he announced the 'August Offer', which further entrenched Jinnah in power by insisting that the A.I.M.L. had a *de facto* veto on any future constitutional reform:

[The British Government] "could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities ... to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they [H.M.G.] be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government."⁸¹⁷

Linlithgow's continuing commitment to Jinnah was further revealed on 8 October 1940 when he deliberately concealed from Amery (Zetland's successor) that there were elements in the A.I.M.L. - notably Sikander and Huq - who were dissatisfied with Jinnah's leadership. He informed the Secretary of State that the solidarity of the League combined with the unanimous loyalty which Jinnah enjoyed, precluded any split occurring in League ranks which the Government of India could exploit. In addition Linlithgow made it perfectly clear that even if it had been possible to orchestrate such a rupture, to do so would have been prejudicial to British interests as it was essential to continue to counter the Congress by preserving

"some authoritative mouth-piece of general Muslim opinion ... particularly in view of possible post-war constitutional discussions. Nor do we war, at a time

⁸¹⁵ Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁸¹⁶ Craik to Linlithgow, 6 Aug. 1940, LOW/8/507; Craik to Linlithgow, telegram, 12 Aug. 1940, Mss. EUR.F. 125/89, IOR.

⁸¹⁷ India and the War: Statement issued with the authority of His Majesty's Government by the Governor-General on 8 August 1940, CMD. 6219 (Vol. X, 1940), IOR.

when we may have to take the Congress on⁸¹⁸ ... to antagonize the main organization of [the] second largest party and community in this country."⁸¹⁹

The 'August Offer' combined with the Viceroy's failure to respond positively to Sikander's advance led to a brief rapprochement between the Punjab Premier and Jinnah. The primary object of the British announcement (8 Aug.) had been to define future reforms: Dominion Status was to be granted at the conclusion of the war subject to the approval of the major Indian political parties; the composition of the Viceroy's Executive Council was to be expanded to allow for greater Indian participation, and a body was to be established to associate the Indian public more closely with the conduct of the war.⁸²⁰ Thus a critical juncture had been reached in the constitutional history of India. It was imperative, therefore, for the A.I.M.L. to present a united response to the British proposals, especially as the Congress in rejecting them (22 Aug. 1940) whilst deprecating the British refusal to grant immediate full independence, had laid special emphasis on the fact that the "issue of the minorities..." had been employed as "an insuperable barrier to India's progress..."⁸²¹ To ensure League solidarity, therefore, the League Working Committee on 31 August 1940 bowed to Sikander's demand concerning the war effort by reversing its decision of 16 June and allowing "those Musalmans who might think that they could serve any useful purpose by associating themselves with the War Committees free to do so."⁸²²

Having thus fortified the A.I.M.L. Jinnah proceeded on 28 Sept. 1940 to denounce the 'August Offer', because it had failed to meet his claim for an equal share of power for Muslims at the Centre and in the provinces, and had not offered them a position of parity on the War Advisory Committee which the Viceroy hoped to organize.⁸²³ Jinnah judiciously associated Sikander with this action, thus ensuring that he could not capitalize from it by attempting to reach a compromise with the Congress or the British independent of the League. A sub-committee including Jinnah, Sikander, Nazimuddin, Nawab Ismail Khan, Khaliqzaman and Barkat Ali was authorized to draft the formal rejection.⁸²⁴ To ensure Sikander's collaboration Jinnah privately assured him that the action would not prohibit Leaguers from assisting the war effort.⁸²⁵ In accepting this undertaking Sikander was guilty of considerable naïveté, especially considering Jinnah's refusal to cooperate with the proposed War Advisory Council. Later events proved that he had been duped.

⁸¹⁸ Reference to the threatened Congress civil disobedience campaign.

⁸¹⁹ Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 8 Oct. 1940, 4/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁸²⁰ Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁸²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁸²² Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 248, 254.

⁸²³ Text of A.I.M.L. Working Committee Resolution of 28 Sept. 1940, enclosure, Jinnah to Linlithgow, 30 Sept. 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁸²⁴ Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 30 Sept. 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

⁸²⁵ Craik to Linlithgow, 16 Oct. 1940, Mss. EUR F. 125/89, IOR.

Initially the Punjab Premier failed to grasp this fact. The extent of his error was soon realized. In February 1941, despite the fact that the A.I.M.L. had supposedly revised its position concerning War Committee membership, it expelled three prominent Unionist supporters - Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Sikander's cousin), Nawabzada Khurshid Khan and Sir Muhammad Nawaz of Kot - for disobeying its mandate of June 1940 forbidding such association.⁸²⁶ In the same month Jinnah requested Sikander to deny reports that had appeared in the *Bombay Chronicle* and the *Times of India* that he was opposed to the Lahore resolution,⁸²⁷ and in a move to commit the Punjab League to the 'Pakistan' ideal, the A.I.M.L. resolved that 23 March would be observed annually by all local Leagues to canvass the support of the Muslim masses. In addition a 'Muslim League Week' was to be organized at three-monthly intervals to disseminate League propaganda, and to enroll new members.⁸²⁸

Realizing the enormity of his mistake by being a party to the League's rejection of the 'August Offer', which appeared to infer his commitment to an independent Muslim State, Sikander acted decisively to restore the situation, and to frustrate any further attempts by Jinnah to impose his authority in the Punjab. In a speech to the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941 Sikander stated that no Pakistan scheme had been passed at Lahore, in that the term had not been used, but that politicians, Jinnah included, realizing the appeal it had for the Muslim masses had adopted the "catch-phrase". In spite of that development, however, Sikander declared in unequivocal terms "If Pakistan means unalloyed Muslim Raj in the Punjab, then I will have nothing to do with it." He reaffirmed his own commitment to the creation of a loose Federation in which the provinces would enjoy the maximum autonomy as the surest means of protecting all the communities in the Punjab. In developing this theme Sikander demonstrated considerable skill, for he claimed that if his ideas were given substance whilst the Muslim community would enjoy a predominant position in provincial affairs free from the dictates of a powerful Congress-dominated central government, the Hindus and Sikhs would continue to receive a fair share in government independent of communal disabilities, or the authority of a Muslim State. In this respect he made a special appeal to the Sikhs, reminding them that as a small all-Indian minority they could not expect to achieve any more than a two percent representation at the Centre, whilst in the Punjab they would continue to possess "a 20 percent share as equal partners in a purely Punjabi concern". In order to gain support and approval for his stance Sikander concluded his speech with a powerful exhortation for provincial loyalty and communal unity:

"I visualize for the Punjab - freedom for Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, Christians and others as Punjabis ... let us ... show the rest of India that we in the Punjab stand united and will not brook any interference from whatever quarter ... Then

⁸²⁶ Craik to Linlithgow, 10 Feb. 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/90, IOR.

⁸²⁷ Jinnah to Sikander, 3 Feb. 1941, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Islamabad, File No. 353, p. 43.

⁸²⁸ Text of A.I.M.L. Working Committee Resolution of 22 Feb. 1941, 1/P&J/8/690, IOR.

and then only will we be able to tell meddling busybodies from outside; 'Hands off the Punjab'.⁸²⁹

Despite these strong words Sikander knew that he could only prevent Jinnah from exploiting the 'Pakistan' theme to gain Muslim support in the Punjab, if he could induce the British, the Congress and moderate Leaguers to lend their support to a national settlement which would lay to rest Muslim fears of Hindu domination, and thereby obviate the demand for a separate Muslim State. Thus in May 1941 he attempted to launch a fresh initiative to solve the constitutional deadlock. He urged the Viceroy to adopt a bold programme of reform, and in order to attract Congress cooperation with it, he suggested that the Viceroy's Executive Council should be radically reconstructed to allow all portfolios to be held by Indians, the British presence being limited to that of the Viceroy and one other official to allow for the continuity of the administration. This Executive would then be treated as an independent Dominion Government, responsible solely to the Legislature. Also coalition Ministries would be established in the provinces, whereupon the Viceroy would invite the Provincial Premiers and Executive members to join a committee to formulate a new constitution.⁸³⁰ In an attempt to attract Muslim acceptance of his ideas, he counseled Congress leaders to pledge that maximum autonomy would be granted to the provinces, compatible with the country's defence needs.⁸³¹

Sikander's recommendations, which were endorsed by Fazlul Huq, posed a grave embarrassment to Jinnah; in effect the leaders of the two major Muslim majority provinces had rejected the League's demand for partition as the only solution to the constitutional deadlock.⁸³² It was the intervention of Linlithgow, however, which prevented any serious repercussions developing in the League: he refused to consider Sikander's proposals on the grounds that they envisaged changes in the character of the Executive beyond those contemplated by the 'August Offer'.⁸³³ There can be little doubt that his action was also intended to frustrate any possibility of a rapprochement between the Congress and moderate Leaguers and to ensure the continuing unity of the A.I.M.L. having previously informed Craik in March 1941 that although

"I have myself strong views as to the arguments against Pakistan ... there seems a good deal to be said against any unavoidable split in the Muslim League ... any such split would be a great encouragement to the Congress..."⁸³⁴

⁸²⁹ Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 11 March 1941, Vol. XVI, Pp. 348-352, 354-355, 359-362, V/9/3707, IOR.

⁸³⁰ Note on the formation of a National Government and Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's alleged modified version of it (n.d.), L/P&J/8/508, IOR; P. Moon, op. cit., p. 26.

⁸³¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 15 May 1941.

⁸³² *Ibid.*, 15 May 1941; 23 May 1941.

⁸³³ Memo by P.J. Patrick, 14 May 1941, L/P&J/8/508, IOR; P. Moon, op. cit., p. 26.

⁸³⁴ Linlithgow to Craik, telegram, 1 March 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/90, IOR.

It was for this very reason that in May 1941 he declined Amery's advice to invite Sikander to join his Executive Council.⁸³⁵

In spite of Sikander's lack of success his sortie into the all-India sphere had seriously compromised Jinnah. The latter had candidly admitted in March 1941 the key importance of the Punjab for the realization of the Lahore resolution,⁸³⁶ thus he could not permit Sikander to continue to deviate unchecked from the Lahore principle, especially as in April 1941 the demand for a Muslim State had been formally incorporated into the A.I.M.L.'s constitution.⁸³⁷ Jinnah awaited an appropriate occasion to publicly discipline Sikander and demonstrate his authority over him. The formation of a National Defence Council (N.D.C.) by Linlithgow Jinnah the opportunity he sought.

In July 1941 Linlithgow, as a consequence of the 'August Offer', had enlarged his Executive Council to include eight Indians, but he had failed to recruit any active members from the Congress and the A.I.M.L.. In an attempt to offset this disability, Linlithgow proposed to employ the N.D.C. as a ploy to involve some important leaders, including the Muslim Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal (Faziul Huq), Sindh (Allah Baksh Muhammad Umar Soomro) and Assam (Muhammad Saadulla), in a demi-official capacity with the war effort; it was a propaganda exercise to demonstrate India's support for the war.⁸³⁸ But the Secretary of State approved of the maneuver principally because he hoped that it would provide a means of undermining the two main nationalist parties.⁸³⁹ Linlithgow, however, did not share this ambition in respect of the A.I.M.L.:

"I made it clear ... that one must ... avoid starting a campaign against Jinnah, or allowing it to be thought that we were taking sides in the internal political affairs of the League."⁸⁴⁰

The Viceroy wanted the presence of the Muslim Premiers on the N.D.C. mainly to illustrate that Muslims were aiding the prosecution of the War, and hence he calculated that Jinnah would be forced to accept the situation: "there seems a general feeling that if we can get these four to play they would represent something too substantial for Jinnah to take on."⁸⁴¹ Furthermore Linlithgow hoped that once Jinnah was confronted with the fact that the Premiers were willing to serve, he would be tempted to officially nominate League representatives to the body.⁸⁴²

⁸³⁵ Linlithgow to Amery, 7 May 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/10, IOR.

⁸³⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 March 1941.

⁸³⁷ H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁸³⁸ Linlithgow to Amery, 9 July 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/10, IOR.

⁸³⁹ Amery to Linlithgow, 16 May 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/10, IOR.

⁸⁴⁰ Linlithgow to Amery, 31 July/1 Aug. 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/10, IOR.

⁸⁴¹ Linlithgow to Amery, 25 June 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/10, IOR.

⁸⁴² Linlithgow to Glancy, 20 June 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/90, IOR.

Sikander was the 'main piece' in Linlithgow's game. The Viceroy believed that once Sikander agreed to serve the other Muslim Premiers would follow his example.⁸⁴³ In July 1941 Sikander accepted the Viceroy's invitation, thereby fulfilling his expectations. In taking this step Sikander was probably influenced by a number of motives. As a constant advocate for Muslim cooperation with the war effort, and as the head of the premier recruiting province in India, the N.D.C. gave him the opportunity to publicly associate himself at the Centre with the conduct of the War. Membership of the body also allowed him to pursue the role which he continued to court in the national sphere. But he hoped to achieve the last objective without a clash with Jinnah. In order to minimize the possibility of such an occurrence he counseled the Viceroy to invite the Premiers to participate in their capacity as heads of government, rather than as Muslim leaders.⁸⁴⁴

Linlithgow raised no objection to this proposal,⁸⁴⁵ assuring Sikander that he would be asked to cooperate as Premier of the Punjab,⁸⁴⁶ but in order to pressurize Jinnah he caused the latter to believe that the Premiers' presence on the N.D.C. would be as Muslims, and not provincial representatives. Accordingly he instructed Lumley (Governor of Bombay) to inform Jinnah that the Viceroy "regarded it as essential that the great Muslim community should be represented on that council by persons of the highest prominence and capacity."⁸⁴⁷ Lumley conveyed this message to Jinnah in writing on 20 July 1941, and in accordance with Linlithgow's instructions he advised Jinnah that the Viceroy would have asked him to offer suggestions as to possible Muslim personnel for the Council, if Jinnah's unsympathetic attitude had prevented such action.⁸⁴⁸ Even so this communication implied that if Jinnah changed his mind, any suggestions he made would be sympathetically received.

Jinnah, however, refused to be complaisant. The episode gave him the opportunity to confront Sikander and crush his national ambitions, and he exploited it to the full. He accused the Viceroy of attempting to destroy the unity of the A.I.M.L. by ignoring its ruling of 16 June 1940 forbidding participation with war committees.⁸⁴⁹ Although he stated his opposition to the scheme, however, he did nothing to dissuade the Premiers from joining the N.D.C.. He waited until the third week of July, by which time all of the Premiers had accepted nomination to the Council before he acted; he publicly announced that the A.I.M.L. Working Committee would convene at Bombay on 24 August to take disciplinary action against those Muslim Leaguers who had joined the

⁸⁴³ Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 27 June 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/20, IOR.

⁸⁴⁴ Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 2 July 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/21, IOR.

⁸⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁴⁶ Sikander to Glancy, 24 Aug. 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/90, IOR.

⁸⁴⁷ Linlithgow to Lumley, telegram, 11 July 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/55, IOR.

⁸⁴⁸ Lumley to Jinnah, 20 July 1941, enclosure, Irwin to Laithwaite, 22 July 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/55, IOR.

⁸⁴⁹ Jinnah to Lumley, 21 July 1941, enclosure, *ibid.*

N.D.C.⁸⁵⁰ By allowing a month to elapse before Sikander and company were to be brought to book, Jinnah had hoped that during the interval Muslim opinion throughout India would crystallize in condemning the Premiers' action.⁸⁵¹ He was not to be disappointed. Abdoola Haroon, the President of the Sindh Muslim League, noted a growing antipathy throughout India towards the Premiers.⁸⁵² An observation which was corroborated by Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim (prominent Muslim Leaguer) in Bombay.⁸⁵³ Even Mamdot ruefully conceded that Muslim opinion was divided over the activities of Sikander and the other Premiers, and he feared that if the issue was not resolved it would jeopardize Muslim solidarity.⁸⁵⁴

In order to avoid such an eventuality Mamdot secured the assistance of Haroon to attempt to settle the matter amicably. Haroon in effect became an intermediary between the Punjab Muslim leadership and Jinnah, though he faithfully reflected the stance of the A.I.M.L. President. Haroon's attitude, therefore, was uncompromising and in order to avoid a confrontation he insisted that Sikander and the other Premiers should publicly announce that they had joined the N.D.C. as a result of "a bonafide mistake in the interpretation of the Bombay Resolution [31 Aug. 1940]..." which allowed individual cooperation in the war effort. Also the Premiers were required to issue a statement to the effect that their action did not reflect any dissatisfaction with the A.I.M.L.'s policy regarding the War, or with "the latest Creed of the League...or...Pakistan". Once these conditions had been met they were to inform the Viceroy that they would resign from the N.D.C. if Jinnah ordered them to and "that he [Linlithgow] must enter into negotiation with Mr. Jinnah and come to some...settlement with him."⁸⁵⁵ Haroon in effect had demanded the total surrender of Sikander, and at the time it appeared that his harsh mediation would not succeed. In fact Sikander's position in the Punjab seemed to be unassailable in that 60 of the 76 Muslim Unionists had given the Premier their written pledges to resign from the A.I.M.L. if Jinnah forced a confrontation, and as a sign of their approval for Sikander's continued presence on the N.D.C.⁸⁵⁶ Outside the Province Sikander's principal ally, Fazlul Huq, remained similarly defiant. On 8 August 1941 he informed Haroon that he did not even intend attending the scheduled meeting of the Working Committee, and he denied that he and the other Premiers had flouted the authority of the League.⁸⁵⁷

The stage seemed set for a disastrous rupture of League unity, but in the event Sikander capitulated, and the other Premiers followed suit. Khaliqzaman who witnessed the

⁸⁵⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 Aug. 1941; Jinnah to Niazi, 17 Aug. 1941, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 393, pp. 13-14; Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 254; K.B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁸⁵¹ Jinnah to Niazi, 17 Aug. 1941, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 393, pp. 13-14.

⁸⁵² Haroon to Mamdot, 12 Aug. 1941, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁸⁵³ Currimbhoy Ebrahim to Haroon, 13 Aug. 1941, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁸⁵⁴ Mamdot to Haroon, 10 Aug. 1941, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁸⁵⁵ Haroon to Mamdot, 12 Aug. 1941, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁸⁵⁶ Sikander to Laithwaite, 16 Aug. 1941, L/P&J/8/5418, IOR.

⁸⁵⁷ Fazlul Huq to Haroon, 18 Aug. 1941, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

proceedings, has provided, to an extent, an understanding of the debacle. He has recalled that when Sikander was told either to resign from the N.D.C. or face expulsion from the A.I.M.L. he (Khaliquzzaman) attempted to assist the Punjab Premier by reminding the Working Committee that as a result of the A.I.M.L.'s resolution of 31 August 1940 Leaguers had been granted the freedom to serve on war committees. Before any discussion could ensue, however, Jinnah intervened stating "Let us hear what Sir Sikander has to say...", whereupon Sikander replied "I am in the hands of this Committee and will abide by its decision...". As a result when ordered by the Working Committee to resign from the N.D.C. he agreed to comply.⁸⁵⁸

It seems evident that Jinnah had prevailed upon Sikander to abandon the N.D.C. before the Working Committee met on 24 August, hence his invitation to Sikander to explain his position, thereby preventing Khaliquzzaman's relevant observation from being discussed. It is also significant that Sikander declined to use the August [1940] compromise as a basis for his defence. Jinnah, always a superb tactician, would only have invited Sikander to state his case at such a juncture had he been assured of a reconciliatory response. In explaining his climb-down to Glancy, Governor of the Punjab, Sikander claimed that he had been forced to submit to Jinnah on account of Lumley's letter which referred to his presence on the N.D.C. as a Muslim representative.⁸⁵⁹ Despite the fact that Fazlul Huq corroborated this exposition,⁸⁶⁰ it is not convincing. Sikander had known in advance that at Bombay Jinnah would challenge his association with the N.D.C. on the grounds that he had been nominated as a Muslim and not a provincial representative. It was to frustrate such a move that Sikander had obtained written resignations from his Muslim supporters, believing that they would dissuade Jinnah from threatening to expel him. In fact by the time of the A.I.M.L. meeting convened at Bombay Sikander had collected 73 such undertakings.⁸⁶¹ It is apparent, therefore, that when he failed to intimidate Jinnah by threatening to end the association of his Unionist followers with the A.I.M.L. Sikander lost his nerve. Though he continued to enjoy the unquestioned support of the vast majority of Muslim M.L.As. in the Province, when faced with the stark choice of an open break with Jinnah and the League, he capitulated because he appreciated that, in demanding 'Pakistan' a movement had been conceived which in time would overwhelm all Muslim opposition to it. Hence his admission to Penderel Moon in August 1941 that

⁸⁵⁸ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.

⁸⁵⁹ Sikander to Glancy, 24 Aug. 1941, Mss. EUR.F. 125/90, IOR.

⁸⁶⁰ Fazlul Huq to Governor of Bengal, 25 Aug. 1941, L/P&J/8/541B, IOR.

⁸⁶¹ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

"unless he [Sikander] walked warily and kept on the right side of Jinnah he would be swept away by a wave of fanaticism and, wherever he went, would be greeted by the Muslims with black flags."⁸⁶²

Sikander's surrender over the N.D.C. issue effectively and publicly proclaimed Jinnah's dominance in the national orbit, but it did not herald a League take-over in the Punjab. There the large Unionist landlords, who controlled the Muslim politics of the Province, remained loyal to Sikander, many of them deeply resenting Jinnah's victory, and the publicity campaign which they believed the League had orchestrated against the Punjab Premier.⁸⁶³ The latter as a realist, however, feared that despite the fidelity which he continued to enjoy in the Assembly Jinnah's championing of [Pakistan] could eventually cost him the allegiance of his Muslim colleagues and the Muslim populace in the Punjab. In order to insure against either eventuality he sought to broaden still further the non-communal appeal of the Unionist Party and to discredit 'Pakistan'. The first objective was achieved in June 1942 when he concluded an alliance with the Sikh Akali Party. Under the terms of the agreement, known as the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact, Baldev Singh was admitted to the Cabinet as Minister for Development in succession to Sunder Singh Majithia who had died in April 1941, and the Akalis undertook to support the Ministry.⁸⁶⁴ Though both the Premier and the new Minister issued press statements to the effect that their agreement emanated from a mutual desire to promote communal harmony, and present a united front in support of the war effort,⁸⁶⁵ in reality both had acted to strengthen their respective position against Jinnah.⁸⁶⁶ Sikander remained determined to resist Jinnah, whilst the Akali Party, which had emerged as the dominant Sikh organization in the Province,⁸⁶⁷ was eager to bolster the Premier against Jinnah; they in common with their fellow Sikhs were vehemently opposed to Jinnah's demand for a Muslim State which threatened to engulf the whole of the Punjab - viewed by the Sikhs as their homeland, and which encompassed their lands, properties and religious shrines.⁸⁶⁸

Having expanded his Ministry, Sikander sought to limit the appeal of 'Pakistan' amongst his fellow Punjabi Muslims. 'Pakistan' remained undefined, and as such it augured all things to all shades of Muslim opinion: to the pious it promised an Islamic State, to the entrepreneur, civil servant and professional classes the curtailment of Hindu and Sikh competition, to the rampant communalist the opportunity to humiliate,

⁸⁶² Moon recalls that Sikander made this statement just before he was posted to Amritsar. Moon was appointed Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar on 21 August 1941: P. Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 38; *History of Services: Punjab, 1943*, p. 77, V/12/347, IOR.

⁸⁶³ Ghazanfar Ali Khan to Jinnah, 3 Oct. 1941, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 346, pp. 3-6.

⁸⁶⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 27 June 1942; P. Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32, 36-37.

⁸⁶⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 June 1942.

⁸⁶⁶ Linlithgow to Amery, 15 June 1942, Mss. EUR.F. 125/11, IOR.

⁸⁶⁷ This had been demonstrated by the Akalis' capture of the majority of the seats on the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandak Committee, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 Jan. 1941.

⁸⁶⁸ P. Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32, 36.

if not brutalize non-Muslims, and to the Muslim masses the allure of belonging to the ruling race.⁸⁶⁹ In an effort to confront Punjabi Muslims with reality, therefore, Sikander determined to impress upon them that 'Pakistan' would certainly result in the partition of their Province. In order that Muslims should be left in no doubt of this fact he requested the Viceroy to establish a convention whereby if no less than 75% of the membership of the Punjab Legislative Assembly passed a resolution in favor or against joining the Indian Union, the Muslim and non-Muslim populations would not be forced into submission to any State - Hindu or Muslim - against their will. In short he asked that both groups should be assured that ultimately they would be free to express their views through separate plebiscites. If the results determined that non-Muslims were not prepared to accept Pakistani rule or the Muslims Indian rule, then the Province would be divided to accommodate their wishes.⁸⁷⁰

Sikander, who was as opposed to the possibility of partition as he was to the idea of 'Pakistan', hoped that his proposal would not result in the division of the Punjab. On the contrary he calculated that by acknowledging the fact that failure to reconcile Muslim and non-Muslim views on the question of a Muslim State would precipitate the break-up of the Province, and by making constitutional provision for it, that the 'Pakistan' idea would lose its attraction for Muslims. Linlithgow who had been appraised of Sikander's real intentions,⁸⁷¹ refused to sanction the Premier's formula. He rejected it on the grounds that it closely resembled the Cripps offer which had failed to appease the Indian parties,⁸⁷² and because he was "profoundly skeptical as to the probability of its showing up effectively the impossibility of Pakistan".⁸⁷³ Also though Linlithgow continued to refuse to discredit the Lahore resolution for tactical reasons, when Stafford Cripps (Leader of the House of Commons, leader of Cripps' Mission) revealed in March 1942 that the British Government accepted the right of any province to stand out of the constitution to be framed after the war Linlithgow was horrified. The Viceroy was opposed to the provincial option clause because it represented a tacit acceptance of 'Pakistan' with regard to the Muslim majority provinces, and as such he feared that it would have had a disruptive effect in the Punjab, particularly amongst the Sikhs, thereby disrupting the war effort.⁸⁷⁴ Therefore Linlithgow who had been greatly relieved when the Cripps initiative failed, had no intention of helping Sikander to

⁸⁶⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 20, 22.

⁸⁷⁰ Glancy to Linlithgow, 10 July 1942, L/P&J/8/510, IOR.

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷² The Cripps' Offer (March 1942) had given the right to any province to refuse to join the proposed Indian Union. The Congress rejected it, strongly objecting to the option clause, and the fact that it proposed to grant the Princes' representation at the Centre, whilst refusing to establish the democratic principle in the Princely States. Conversely Jinnah condemned it as being unfair to Muslims in that it obliged them to participate in a constitution-making body, the main object of which was the creation of an Indian Union, even though the provinces were at liberty to stand out of it if they so wished. H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 102.

⁸⁷³ Linlithgow to Glancy, 17 July 1942, L/P&J/8/510, IOR.

⁸⁷⁴ H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

resuscitate it by pleading the right of a province not only to decide its future national status, but also to agree on partition if a consensus did not exist concerning the matter. Sikander's formula also failed to engender the response he had hoped for in the Punjab. On 9 November 1942 the partition proposal was rejected by a joint meeting of the non-Muslim M.L.As.⁸⁷⁵ Thus for the time being the specter of the division of the Punjab was buried, consequently the Punjabi Muslims were not confronted with the immediate threat of their Province's division. Even so non-Muslim opinion remained firmly opposed to the creation of 'Pakistan' and Sikander had made it perfectly clear that he would not be a party to imposing a Muslim State on the whole of the Punjab against their will. Also, as Glancy (Governor of the Punjab) informed the Viceroy, Sikander had demonstrated the weakness of the Lahore resolution in that in demanding self-determination for the Muslims in India, Jinnah could not logically deny that right to the non-Muslim majority areas in the Punjab. Consequently the Premier had issued a challenge to the League President which the latter could not afford to deny.⁸⁷⁶ Glancy's appreciation proved correct. During a tour of the Punjab in mid-November 1942 Jinnah attempted to dispose of Sikander's partition ideas by pouring ridicule on them; he avoided any discussion concerning the effect which the creation of 'Pakistan' would have on the future unity of the Province, merely insisting that its realization remained the A.I.M.L.'s principal objective, and that therefore Sikander's proposed formula was irrelevant:

"Who is the author of this formula? ... Either it is colossal ignorance or a case of those who see it, know it and understand it, but will not see it and don't want to understand it. All these slogans about dividing mother India and the scheme being against the interests of the Mussalmans themselves have now ceased to have any value for us. If the Pakistan scheme is against our interests, let us stew [in] our own juice, but this nonsensical propoganda must cease."⁸⁷⁷

Sikander, however, refused to abandon the premise that ultimately non-Muslim Punjabis would have to decide their own future,⁸⁷⁸ but further resistance to Jinnah was prevented by the Premier's sudden death from a heart-attack on 26 December 1942.⁸⁷⁹ He had died attempting to develop a theme which possessed the potential to seriously compromise the League President. Also, although Jinnah had up until that time decisively outmaneuvered him in the national sphere, Sikander had remained the undisputed master of the Punjab, in spite of his fears for the future as a result of the effect he believed 'Pakistan' would have in winning the allegiance of the Muslim masses for the A.I.M.L. Jinnah could only have engineered Sikander's total destruction if he had been able to destabilize his provincial power-base. That posed an impossible task, and

⁸⁷⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 Nov. 1942.

⁸⁷⁶ Glancy to Linlithgow, 10 July 1942, L/P&J/8/510, IOR.

⁸⁷⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 17 Nov. 1942.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 13 Dec. 1942.

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 27 Dec. 1942.

though Jinnah had been compelled to gamble the unity of the League in order to force Sikander to comply with the League's mandate concerning the N.D.C., and to establish his own unquestioned ascendancy in national Muslim affairs, once he had achieved those aims he was unable to press home his advantage because he lacked the necessary support in the Punjab. 1941-1946.

As Ispahani has conceded Jinnah was unwilling to further risk the solidarity of the A.I.M.L. by seeking total domination over the Punjab Premier.⁸⁸⁰ Thus when confronted by angry Muslim Unionists concerning his disparaging remarks concerning Sikander's views on the possible partition of the Province Jinnah, out of deference to the unquestioned loyalty Sikander continued to command, denied that he had been referring to him.⁸⁸¹ The battle for the Punjab was to be fought with the new Premier, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, and it took Jinnah four years to achieve a successful outcome - such was the legacy which Sikander bequeathed to his Unionist successor.

⁸⁸⁰ M.A.H. Ispahani, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁸⁸¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 18 Nov. 1942.

CHAPTER VI

THE PREMIERSHIP OF KHIZAR HAYAT KHAN TIWANA AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE: THE YEARS OF CONFRONTATION, DECEMBER 1942 TO DECEMBER 1945

The demise of Sikander Hyat Khan ushered in a new phase in the politics of the Punjab. The late Premier's passing, combined with the deaths of Fazl-i-Husain (July 1936), Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (August 1940), Sunder Singh Majithik (April 1941) and Nawab Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot (March 1942),⁸⁸² had deprived the Unionist Party of an extremely influential section of its senior members, and the Ministerial coalition of an important non-Muslim ally (Majithil). Also a second generation of Muslim Unionists had emerged including Shaukat Hyat, Nawab Iftikhar Husain of Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana,⁸⁸³ who were young, untried, and hungry for power. Consequently they were determined to use the Muslim League, the political potential of which had increased dramatically as a consequence of the Lahore Resolution (March 1940), as a vehicle to achieve their provincial ambitions. Fate appeared to have presented them with an excellent opportunity for Sikander, a seasoned and experienced champion of the Unionist cause, had been succeeded by a comparatively inexperienced politician - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana - as a result of which Jinnah and his provincial allies believed that they were in a much stronger position to establish the League as the repository of Muslim political power in the Punjab.⁸⁸⁴ In conducting their campaign to subject the Unionist Ministry to League control, they underestimated the tenacity of the new Premier, and the degree of support which he would receive from the majority of his Muslim Unionist Colleagues. As a result the League failed to achieve its principal objective, but it did entice a number of very powerful landlord-politicians from the Unionist benches, which gave it access to the rural constituencies, thereby enabling it to court the support of the Muslim voters in the countryside. The Tiwana Ministry, therefore, was engaged in a continual rearguard action to resist the League's attempts to undermine it, and destroy its majority in the Assembly.

Although Jinnah had outmaneuvered Sikander in the national orbit, the latter had prevented him from establishing an effective Muslim League organization in the Punjab. Furthermore British determination not to permit elections to be held in India for the duration of the War had deprived him of the opportunity to appeal to the Muslim

⁸⁸² *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 10 July 1936; 24 Aug. 1940; 2 April 1941; 10 March 1942; 29 Dec. 1942.

⁸⁸³ These were the sons of Sikander Hyat Khan, Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot, and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana.

⁸⁸⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 March 1943; Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to the Viceroy, to the Private Sec. to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.

electorate on the issue of 'Pakistan', and to attempt to defeat the Unionist Government through the ballot-box. Jinnah's national ambitions, however, could not tolerate the continuation of a Muslim dominated Ministry in the Punjab independent of League control. He desperately needed to gain ascendancy over the Provincial Government to enable him to execute the plan he had conceived to resuscitate the League at the provincial level, and to strengthen his national position in order to extract the maximum concessions from the British. Jinnah confidentially outlined the tactics he hoped to adopt to his Working Committee, which included Mamdot,⁸⁸⁵ in April 1943. Jinnah's stratagem envisaged the A.I.M.L. confronting the British Government with the Pakistan demand immediately the War ended. He calculated that then would be the most opportune time; he had a vision of a post-war Britain, exhausted by the conflict, whose imperial presence would be challenged throughout the Islamic world, particularly in Palestine, Iran, Egypt and Iraq, and who as a result would be unable to ignore Indian Muslim aspirations. But for the A.I.M.L. to secure the advantage he envisaged he emphasized that it was vital that it should establish its authority over the Ministries in the Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab, Bengal, Sindh, and the N.W.F.P.), so that they could be used as platforms to disseminate League propaganda and to popularize the organization and its creed. Also Jinnah calculated that once the A.I.M.L. had realized its provincial goals, he would hold the destinies of the local governments in his hands, giving him the means to compromise the Government of India, and to dramatically demonstrate the power of the A.I.M.L., in that he would be able to order the Ministries to resign, or cause them to fall by withdrawing League support. Hence his exhortation to his Working Committee colleagues:

"Let us use this opportunity to consolidate our position in the Provinces. Let the Ministries function in such a manner that...they popularize the League among the masses ... Collect funds. Consolidate the National Guards⁸⁸⁶ ... Let us exploit these Ministries so that when we attack, the very fact that we are giving up our seats in the Government...to launch such an attack will add to our prestige... In December [1943] we meet in Sindh. In April [1944] we meet in the Punjab. There we decide when to strike, where to strike and how to strike."⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁸⁵ The Punjab membership of the A.I.M.L. Working Committee consisted of Mamdot, Karamat Ali and Mian Bashir Ahmed, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 May 1943.

⁸⁸⁶ At the 1937 session of the A.I.M.L. it had been decided to raise a volunteer corps to perform acts of social service. Its members known as Muslim League National Guards were required to wear uniforms and participate in regular drilling. It was claimed that the purpose of their activity was not to create a paramilitary organization but "to create in them [Guards] a spirit of service and sacrifice and to make them a disciplined body of enthusiastic selfless workers for the social, economic and political uplift of the masses." Z.H. Zaidi, 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47', in C.M. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (Eds) *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, pp. 259, 269-271.

⁸⁸⁷ Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to the Viceroy, to the Private Sec. to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/ 692, IOR.

Thus it was essential for Jinnah that the Unionist Ministry should be under League domination before April 1944, especially as control of the Punjab, the premier recruiting province in India, would greatly increase his bargaining powers whilst the War lasted, in that any threat to disrupt the Government there would have posed a serious problem for the Central Government, preoccupied as it was with maintaining recruitment and the war effort in general.

There is evidence to suggest that Jinnah had already attempted to prepare the ground for a League takeover in the Punjab. Within days of Sikander's death, Mamdot, the President of the Punjab Muslim League, sought "an urgent interview" with Glancy, the Governor of the Province, to discuss the succession to the Premiership. Glancy, convinced that the request had been made on Jinnah's orders, suspected the existence of a plot to engineer a pro-League successor to Sikander. As a result he delayed seeing Mamdot until after 30 December 1942, the day on which Khizar was formally invited, and accepted, to serve as Premier, fearing that "the solidarity of the [Unionist] party might have been seriously undermined if any suggestion of the necessity for Muslim League approval had been allowed to come to the fore."⁸⁸⁸

It was the prerogative of the Governor to invite the person he believed would be capable of commanding the confidence of the Ministry to lead it.⁸⁸⁹ In Glancy's opinion there was only one suitable candidate - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana. Khizar's claim was strengthened by the fact that all his Cabinet colleagues were willing to serve under him. Also he did not face any serious opposition from Muslim contenders. The only politician who could seriously challenge him - Firoz Khan Noon - had declined to seek the office, as he already held a responsible position as Defence Member on the Viceroy's Executive Council, and because he realized that it would have been impracticable for a Noon and a Tiwana to serve in the same Cabinet as the two families were closely connected,⁸⁹⁰ without disrupting the balance between the various Muslim factions. Also although the influential Hayats of Wah were anxious to retain the Premiership for one of their number, having campaigned for the appointment of either Liaquat Hyat Khan or Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Sikander's brother and cousin), Glancy considered both to be unsuitable: Liaquat had been absent from the Punjab for twenty years and was not an M.L.A., whilst Muzaffar Khan was not acceptable to many Unionists.⁸⁹¹

There can be little doubt that Glancy had other reasons for wishing Khizar to succeed Sikander. The Empire was still at war, Rangoon had fallen to the Japanese on 8 March 1942 and India was threatened with invasion.⁸⁹² It was imperative, therefore, that the Punjab should be entrusted to a leader whose

⁸⁸⁸ Glancy to Linlithgow, 2 Jan. 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁸⁸⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 June 1943.

⁸⁹⁰ In fact Firoz Khan Noon and Khizar were cousins.

⁸⁹¹ Glancy to Linlithgow, 2 Jan. 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁸⁹² See W.S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. IV, London, 1951, p. 190.

loyalty was beyond question, and who would endeavor to ensure that the Unionist Ministry remained committed to total and unconditional support for the war effort, and who commanded the necessary following in the Provincial Assembly to prevent the Government from being deviated from that objective. Events proved that Khizar satisfied these requirements. He was personally determined to aid the prosecution of the War,⁸⁹³ and his succession as Premier was supported by an overwhelming majority of Unionist M.L.As on 23 January 1943, 69 Muslim Unionists passed a vote of confidence in his leadership, which was endorsed by the Unionist controlled Provincial Muslim League, and on the same day 86 Unionist M.L.As, including Muslims and non-Muslims, recorded their approval of the new Premier.⁸⁹⁴

Confident that he possessed united Unionist allegiance, and that the local League remained nothing more than a Unionist mouthpiece, Khizar seized the initiative to attempt to ensure that the A.I.M.L. President would continue to honor the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Province. In March 1943 Khizar met Jinnah at the A.I.M.L. Council meeting at Delhi to discuss future Unionist-League relations. Jinnah sensible of the fact that Khizar's position was secure in the Punjab for the moment, agreed to ratify the 'Pact' on the condition that the Punjab Premier undertook to reorganize the League in the Province. This was no compromise on Jinnah's part, however, for although he opposed Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni's resolution calling on Punjabi Muslim M.L.As to form a League Assembly Party independent of the Unionists, he impressed upon Khizar that he was no longer prepared to endure the mismanagement of League affairs in the Punjab as had occurred in Sikander's time:

"The main object of the resolution [Badauni's] is that a Muslim League party in the Punjab Legislature should be set up. As explained by Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, a party already exists. It is a different question whether it has been functioning efficiently or not. But now a definite assurance has been given that efforts will be made to make the party worthy of the prestige and honor of the ... Muslim League. Therefore, might we not wait and see what efforts are really made."⁸⁹⁵

In effect Jinnah had issued Khizar with a guarded ultimatum - the Punjab Muslim League had to be transformed into a viable organization. Khizar who was anxious to avoid an open breach with Jinnah and prevent him from manipulating factionalism in the Unionist structure,⁸⁹⁶ attempted to placate him by promising reforms, whilst at the same time ensuring that the Provincial League would remain in reality an impotent

⁸⁹³ See Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁸⁹⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 Jan. 1943.

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9 March 1943.

⁸⁹⁶ Glancy to Linlithgow, 17 April 1943, MSS. EUR.F. 125/92, IOR.

appendage of the Unionist Party. Accordingly following his return from Delhi the Premier convened a meeting of the Punjab Muslim League Assembly Party, which in reality meant the Muslim membership of the Unionist Ministry. They undertook to improve the efficiency of the local League, but by a majority of 51 votes to seven they adopted the Sikander-Jinnah Pact as their guiding principle,⁸⁹⁷ proclaiming thereby the doctrine of non-interference on the part of Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. in the internal political affairs of the Province.

The enunciation of the Pact, and the support which it engendered in Unionist ranks did not deflect Jinnah from his aim of gaining control of the Ministry, though it caused him initially to employ caution rather than confrontation. Also to begin with Jinnah was content to allow the situation to develop and to observe the outcome. This relatively passive attitude was encouraged by the fact that for the first time there existed a small nucleus of important Unionist M.L.As., centred around Mamdot and Daultana, who were anxious to promote the interests of the League, and to harness its political potential to challenge Khizar's leadership.⁸⁹⁸ In addition the 'old Guard' of the pre-Pact Punjab League, personified by Barkat Ali remained equally determined to frustrate the Premier, and destroy the Unionist hegemony. The pro-Jinnah elements in the local League, under the direction of Mamdot, seized the opportunity afforded to them by the holding of a 'League Week' from 12 to 18 April 1943, to try to extricate the organization from the political morass of Unionist domination. A campaign was launched in the provincial press advocating the creation of an independent Muslim League Party in the Assembly. Also League propagandists sought to embarrass the Ministry and enlist public support by focusing attention on the socio-economic backwardness of the Muslim community in general, and the trading classes in particular; special reference being made to the low number of Muslims engaged in the sugar and *ata* (whole meal flour) trade,⁸⁹⁹ which were subject to Government license. The inference being that the Unionist Ministry should actively protect and promote Muslim interests in these areas; it was a programme which the multi-communal coalition could not undertake and survive.

In the same month Jinnah, encouraged by these developments, added to the Unionists' discomfiture. During a speech to the A.I.M.L. Working Committee he referred to the Punjab Government as a Muslim League Ministry. He based the observation on the fact that under the terms of his pact with Sikander the Muslim majority in the administration had joined the A.I.M.L. Though the claim elicited a strong denial from Chhotu Ram, devout Leaguers, including Sheikh Karamat Ali (Punjabi delegate to A.I.M.L. Working Committee) and Barkat Ali applauded the A.I.M.L. President's stand. The latter going so far as to state that if Khizar opposed Jinnah's interpretation he would be committing political suicide: "No Muslim Premier can ever dream of having a

⁸⁹⁷ Unpublished manuscript by Khizar, 'Repudiation of Pact', Ch. XI, p. 59, *Khizar Tiwana Papers*, copy with author.

⁸⁹⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 March 1943.

⁸⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 21 March 1943.

clash with the Quaid-i-Azam.⁹⁰⁰ Mr. Huq's end [in Bengal]⁹⁰¹ is a clear lesson.⁹⁰² This inference was not lost on Khizar, who fully appreciated that the battle for League control had begun. The opening shots, however, had been muted. Jinnah, cheered by the knowledge that a pro-League faction had emerged on the Unionist benches, had succored their disaffection to test the political temperature in the Province, in order to engineer a takeover from within the Ministry, rather than launching an outright assault against it.

In pursuit of these tactics Jinnah had acquired the covert allegiance of a member of the Unionist Cabinet, in that he had extracted a secret undertaking from Shaukat Hyat Khan, who had replaced Khizar as Minister for Public Works on 13 February 1943,⁹⁰³ to the effect that he would resign his office whenever Jinnah ordered him to.⁹⁰⁴ Thus Jinnah possessed the means to promote League interests at Ministerial level, or even to disrupt the Cabinet, and seriously compromise the Premier if he chose to. Ironically Khizar had unwittingly assisted Jinnah's designs, in that he had supported Shaukat Hyat's appointment. Khizar's elevation to the Premiership had necessitated the appointment of a further Muslim Minister. Political considerations dictated that the appointment should come either from the Multan Division or the late Premier's family in order to maintain the balance between the various powerful Muslim factions on the Unionist benches.⁹⁰⁵ Three contenders had put themselves forward for consideration - Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari, an extremely wealthy Tumandar (tribal chief) from Dera Ghazi Khan, Major Ashiq Hussain, a Pir and scion of the influential Quershi family of Multan, and Shaukat Hyat, the eldest son of the late Premier. Khizar strongly favored the last candidate, and he was able to achieve Glancy's compliance in the matter. Although the Governor acknowledged that Shaukat's appointment would be open to criticism in that he was a serving army officer and was neither on the electoral roll nor an M.L.A., he believed it would be politically advantageous to acquire his services in that it would ensure the allegiance of the Hayats of Wah, and Sikander's former supporters (the Khattar faction) for the Ministry. Also Glancy reasoned that Shaukat's war record would prove useful in promoting the Punjab's war effort. Having

⁹⁰⁰ The title Quaid-i-Azam, or Great Leader, was conferred on Jinnah by his followers.

⁹⁰¹ Following the 1937 election Fazl-ul-Huq, the leader of the Bengal Proja (Peasant) Party formed a coalition Ministry in the Province with the support of the Bengal Muslim League, the Scheduled Caste Party, and a small number of non-Congress Hindus. His resistance to Jinnah's interference in Bengal led to his expulsion from the A.I.M.L. in 1941. Consequently the Provincial League withdrew its support from Huq's Government, and the latter was forced to conclude a settlement with the followers of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, one of the leaders of the Bengal Hindu Mahsabha, to maintain his majority. The resulting coalition proved unstable, and in March 1943 it fell. Whereupon Khwaja Nazimuddin, the leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party was invited by the Governor to form a Ministry. See K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase 1857-1948*, London, 1968, pp. 213-214.

⁹⁰² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 1 May 1943.

⁹⁰³ GR, Glancy to Linlithgow, 13 Feb. 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.

⁹⁰⁴ Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Private Sec. to the Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.

⁹⁰⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 6 Jan. 1943.

committed himself to the Premier's choice Glancy dismissed the other candidates as unsuitable: Leghari on account of the fact that he enjoyed only an insignificant following amongst Muslim M.L.As., and had been disloyal to Sikander, and Ashiq Hussain because the support he commanded in the Assembly had been effectively neutralized by party faction.⁹⁰⁶

Unknown to either the Premier or the Governor, their preference had established a 'viper' in the Unionist 'bosom'. As Shaukat was not an M.L.A. he had to seek election to the Assembly within six months of being appointed.⁹⁰⁷ Under the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact he was required to contest the election as a Muslim League candidate. Jinnah used this condition to gain control over the new Minister; he stipulated that Shaukat would only be awarded the League ticket if he placed his written resignation from the Unionist Government in his (Jinnah's) hands. Shaukat agreed to the demand, but on account of his late father's association with the British and his own with the army he asked to be released from the obligation if the A.I.M.L. engaged in open rebellion against the Government of India.⁹⁰⁸ In complying with Jinnah's terms Shaukat had not been motivated by the fact that he was a convinced 'Jinnhite', 'Leaguer' or 'Pakistanist', or considering his request regarding the British, a true nationalist. Rather Shaukat appreciated that Jinnah's ascendancy over Muslim national politics had been established - his father's experience bore testimony to that - and he sought to secure his own political future against the day when the A.I.M.L. should finally emerge as one of the principal successors to the Raj.

Khizar at the time was ignorant of Shaukat's duplicity; the latter had been able to mislead the Governor, and thereby the Premier, into believing that Jinnah had opposed his secondment to the Cabinet, and had been reluctant to offer him League support.⁹⁰⁹ Nevertheless Khizar appreciated that the A.I.M.L. President's claim concerning the status of his Ministry combined with the actions and statements of Mamdot and Barkat Ali (see above) proclaimed the determination of the Central League to seize control over the Unionist Government. Also despite the fact that Jinnah possessed only a small number of committed supporters, the Premier realized that he faced a dangerous adversary, whose real power lay in the popular appeal generated by the Pakistan demand. In an effort, therefore, to prevent Jinnah using the slogan to encroach into the provincial sphere, and in order to destroy the attraction 'Pakistan' held for the Muslim masses, Khizar appealed to the Viceroy for assistance. He asked Linlithgow to use his influence to persuade the British Government to compel Jinnah to define exactly what the Pakistan scheme entailed so that if it proved unacceptable, as Khizar clearly hoped

⁹⁰⁶ Glancy to Linlithgow, 24 Jan. 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* In May 1943 Shaukat Hyat contested and won the North Attock Muhammadan constituency by a majority of 3,176 votes, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 29 May 1943.

⁹⁰⁸ Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.

⁹⁰⁹ Glancy to Linlithgow, 17 April 1943, MSS. EUR.F. 125/92, IOR.

it would, it could be formally rejected. In making this request the Premier warned that if such steps were not taken to contain the enthusiasm which the Muslim populace felt for 'Pakistan', he feared that he would be unable to maintain his position in the Punjab. The Viceroy, however, though he appreciated "that Pakistan, that simple slogan which the meanest intelligence can understand, is taking very deep root among Muslims", refused Khizar's supplication. Linlithgow remained preoccupied with the need to counter the Congress through the presence of a united A.I.M.L., and as such he remained committed to preserving the doctrine that the British should remain aloof from the Pakistan controversy, insisting that it was a matter for the League and the Congress to settle between themselves.⁹¹⁰

Denied British assistance to debunk the Pakistan idea, Khizar's only line of defence lay in promoting the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and maintaining a pretence of support for the A.I.M.L., which he did by pledging a donation of Rs. 7,000 to the League funds, on condition that his gift was not publicized.⁹¹¹ The Premier's stance and largesse failed to satisfy either Jinnah or his lieutenants in the Province. At the beginning of June 1943 Mamdot announced that the Pact had ceased to have any significance, in that it had achieved its purpose - the formation of a Muslim League Party in the Assembly. Furthermore, the Nawab pronounced that the League Party consisted of all the Muslim Unionists, and was subject to the discipline and control of the Punjab League Parliamentary Board, of which he was the President. This statement drew immediate objections and denials from staunch Muslim Unionists. Shaikh Faiz Mahomed (Parliamentary Secretary) pointed out that if the Pact had indeed ceased to exist, then those Muslim M.L.As. who had become Leaguers as a result of it would cease to belong to the A.I.M.L.⁹¹² 'Muhhaqqaq', a Unionist propagandist, writing to the *Civil and Military Gazette* on 20 June 1943, further reasoned that Mamdot's assertions, which amounted to a claim that the Muslim League enjoyed the dominant position in the Unionist coalition, could not be substantiated:

"The simple fact is that the only primary creed of a ministerial party is the creed which commands the confidence of the House... It goes without saying that till now such a creed in the Punjab Assembly is the Unionist creed and not the creed of the League. Hence if any parliamentary party can claim to be primary it is the Unionist Party and not the Muslim League group."

Also 'Muhhaqqaq, refuted *Dawn's*⁹¹³ allegation that Khizar had been invited as the leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party to form a Ministry, by testifying correctly

⁹¹⁰ Linlithgow to Amery, 2/4 May 1943, MSS.EUR.F. 125/12, IOR.

⁹¹¹ Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/69 SCR.

⁹¹² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 4 June 1943.

⁹¹³ English-language daily newspaper founded (1938) by Jinnah in Delhi to give expression to Muslim League interests.

that the Governor had asked him to serve as Premier in the knowledge that he commanded the support and confidence of his Cabinet colleagues and the Unionist Party.⁹¹⁴

Throughout the acrimonious debate which followed, the validity of 'Muhhaqqaq's' observations could not be denied. Mamdot, however, was not concerned with constitutional niceties but with the acquisition of power. As a member of the A.I.M.L. Working Committee he was aware of Jinnah's stratagem to establish the authority of the Muslim League in all the Muslim majority provinces, and as such he determined to further those ends. Nevertheless Imran Ali, in his work *Punjab Politics In The Decade Before Partition*, has suggested that it was Mamdot who orchestrated the conflict concerning the status of the Ministry in the Punjab in order to use the A.I.M.L. as a "vehicle in what was essentially a factional struggle within the Unionist Party...."⁹¹⁵ This interpretation, however, is too limited, for it was Jinnah who had urged such action on his confederates in the Province, and who had declared in April 1943, prior to Mamdot's campaign, that the Unionist Government constituted a League Ministry. There can be little doubt, therefore, that Jinnah had inspired Mamdot's actions. Even so during June 1943 Jinnah refused to be drawn on the issue, and he refrained from endorsing Mamdot's assertion, which led 'Critic', in his column in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, to shrewdly comment that the Pact controversy would continue to rage until there was "an edict from the League President [Jinnah] one way or the other...", and that Jinnah would not commit himself openly to opposing the Unionists until he was certain of success.⁹¹⁶

Subsequent events proved the validity of 'Critic's' judgment. Mamdot, embarrassed by the absence of any public encouragement from Jinnah, had been forced to issue a press statement on 15 June 1943 to the effect that it resulted because the A.I.M.L. President "did not find it necessary to correct me in my interpretation of the situation" and not because Jinnah disagreed with him.⁹¹⁷ This claim, though just, did not reveal the reality of the situation. In fact Jinnah's silence occurred for tactical reasons; he was merely waiting for the most propitious moment to strike. Jinnah knew that the Punjab League remained largely under Unionist domination; that even his own followers in the Province were divided, and that the influence of the League in the Assembly was minimal. From the opening months of 1943 the Provincial League had been subjected to an internal power contest. The League 'Old Guard' resenting the influence of Mamdot, Daultana and their adherents, had attempted to oust the new League leadership in the Punjab. On 24 January 1943 a Muslim League Workers Board had been established in Lahore with Maulana Zafar Ali Khan as President, and Barkat Ali and Rashid Ali as Vice-President and General Secretary respectively. Mamdot who had not been consulted about its formation, and recognizing that the move constituted an attempt to

⁹¹⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 June 1943.

⁹¹⁵ Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade before Partition*, Lahore, 1975, p. 42.

⁹¹⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 June 1943.

⁹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15 June 1943.

isolate and bypass him, opposed the development.⁹¹⁸ Jinnah, not wishing to forfeit the allegiance of such influential landlords as Mamdot and Daultana, blocked the attempted coup by refusing to recognize the Muslim League Workers Board; on 15 May 1943, in a strongly worded letter to Rashid Ali, he censured the latter for interfering in Mamdot's sphere of work, and advised him to change his attitude.⁹¹⁹ Mamdot, anxious to justify Jinnah's confidence in his leadership of the local League assured the A.I.M.L. President on 19 May 1943 that "nobody has the guts to say anything against the League", and he insinuated that the Muslim Ministers in the Unionist Cabinet would not oppose League policies: "none of them will [*sic*] the courage to say 'no'."⁹²⁰

It was an exaggerated assessment which did not fool Jinnah, the latter observing on 23 June 1943 "that the position of the Muslim League in the Punjab is very sad indeed".⁹²¹ Consequently Jinnah, who by nature was a cautious man, and in the knowledge that the Punjab League could not affect the takeover of the Unionist Ministry which he desired, bided his time so that he could judge the reaction of the Muslim public concerning the Unionist - League controversy. Only when it had been established that Muslim public opinion, and important sections of the Muslim media were rallying to the League's standard did he openly declare his support for Mamdot. Two inter-connected events influenced Jinnah in this respect. On 15 July 1943 Shaukat Hyat, who was anxious to fortify the position of the League within the Unionist Party, and because he believed that "complete subservience to Jinnah" would guarantee "him the best chance of a successful career",⁹²² stated in a speech to the Sheikhpura District Muslim League that there could be no conflict between the League and the Unionist Ministry. He claimed that all those Muslim M.L.As. who owed allegiance to the A.I.M.L., were required to obey its mandate, and support the call for 'Pakistan' even if it meant withdrawing from office and boycotting the Legislature.⁹²³ Mamdot naturally applauded the Minister's stand, and in an interview to the press on 19 July he claimed quite erroneously that all the Muslim Ministers agreed with Shaukat's interpretation.⁹²⁴ Khizar, driven by the necessity to disprove this claim, forced Shaukat to capitulate.⁹²⁵ The latter, fearing no doubt that resistance to the Premier would cost him his Cabinet appointment, issued a retraction in the press on 20 July 1943; he emphasized his support for the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and the provincial policy pursued by his late father, claiming that his Sheikhpura speech had been misinterpreted.⁹²⁶

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 26 Jan. 1943. See also M.R. Afzal, *Malik Barkat Ali*, Lahore, pp. 59-60.

⁹¹⁹ Jinnah to Rashid Ali, 15 May 1943, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File no. 344, p. 83.

⁹²⁰ Mamdot to Jinnah, 19 May 1943, *ibid.*, File no. 372, p. 9.

⁹²¹ Jinnah to Barkat Ali, 23 June 1943, *ibid.*, File no. 215, p. 38.

⁹²² Glancy to Linlithgow, 21 July 1943, MSS. EUR.F. 125/92, ICH.

⁹²³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 July 1943; Glancy to Linlithgow, 20 July 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹²⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 July 1943.

⁹²⁵ Glancy to Linlithgow, 20 July 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹²⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 21 July 1943.

The damage, however, had been done. Whilst the Hindu press delighted in the Minister's apparent confusion, the *Milap* observing "The young Minister in his enthusiasm for the League went up like a rocket but came down like a stone", pro-League Muslim newspapers eagerly sought to exploit the situation. The *Zamindar* called for the rejection of the 'Pact' "lock, stock and barrel". It was an important development, the significance of which would not have been lost on Jinnah, for this Muslim daily had traditionally been opposed to him and Mamdot. The deliberations of the *Shahbaz*, however, posed a far more ominous sign for the Unionists, considering that it was owned by Syed Amjad Ali, the Premier's Parliamentary Secretary. The *Shahbaz* had reported that Muslim public opinion was rallying around Mamdot's demand for giving the 'Pact' a decent burial, a development which it welcomed, believing that it would lead to the abandonment of the Unionist nomenclature, and thereby remove any misunderstanding which existed concerning the true complexion of the Ministry, which in its opinion was Muslim League and not Unionist.⁹²⁷

These events appear to have convinced Jinnah, who avidly followed the provincial press,⁹²⁸ of the existence of disenchanted elements within the Unionist Party, and of the sympathy and support of influential sections of the Muslim media. The situation was clearly ripe for exploitation, and on 27 July 1943 Jinnah sanctioned Mamdot's stand, in the full realization that confrontation was required to bend the Unionist Party to the League's will. In an open letter to Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan (Unionist M.L.A., Attock Central Muhammadan Rural) dated 27 July 1943, Jinnah declared "There is not the slightest doubt that immediately after the Sikander-Jinnah Pact the Unionist Party in the Punjab was no more."⁹²⁹

Weak though the Punjab League undoubtedly was in the Assembly⁹³⁰ Jinnah's intrusion disturbed Khizar. In order to dissuade the A.I.M.L. President from intensifying his efforts to subvert the Ministry, the Premier determined to publicly demonstrate that the majority of Muslim Unionists would not tolerate the abandonment of the 'Pact' or the loss of Unionist independence to the League. In pursuit of this objective Khizar on 8 November 1943 convened and chaired a full meeting of the Unionist controlled Muslim League Assembly Party, including Mamdot, which unanimously ratified the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. It was also decided by a majority vote to incorporate the 'Pact' in the constitution of the League Party. Having thus ensured recognition for, and acceptance of Sikander's original agreement with Jinnah, the League Party unanimously accepted an amendment proposed by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, whereby the League Assembly

⁹²⁷ Opinions of *Milap*, *Zamindar* and *Shahbaz* quoted in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 July 1943.

⁹²⁸ This was evident from the following correspondence: Jinnah to Barkat Ali, 23 June 1940; Jinnah to Daultana, 23 May 1944; Jinnah to Mamdot, 12 July 1944; Jinnah to Daultana, 10 Oct 1944, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File nos. 215, p. 38; 257, p. 4; 372, p.18; 1102, p. 569.

⁹²⁹ Jinnah to Muhammad Nawaz Khan, 27 July 1943, published in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 27 July 1943.

⁹³⁰ By April 1943 Jinnah commanded the support of only 12 Unionist Muslim M.L.As., Glancy to Linlithgow, 17 April 1943, MSS.EUR. F.125/92, IOR.

Party was to be subject to the control and discipline of the Central and Provincial Muslim League Parliamentary Boards.⁹³¹ Khizar's acquiescence in the matter was clearly intended to pacify Jinnah, but it was a ludicrous compromise, as the 'Pact' motion and the Raja's amendment were diametrically opposed. Nevertheless the fact that the 'Pact' had been re-adopted underlined the impotency of the 'Jinnahites' in the Unionist-League consortium.

The proceedings did not satisfy Jinnah, they merely stiffened his resolve to destroy the hold which the Unionist Party continued to exercise over Muslim politics in the Province. Until the Autumn of 1943 Jinnah, in keeping with the tactics he had outlined to his Working Committee the previous April, had hoped to capture the Provincial Government from within, and use it as a tool to further the policy of the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab. Once it became clear that Khizar would not accommodate his wishes, Jinnah modified his tactics. He still hoped to be able to engineer a takeover by wooing Muslim M.L.As. to his side, but if that proved to be impossible he had ordered Mamdot in September 1943 to create an independent Muslim League Party in the Legislature, independent of the Unionists:

"I hope that a satisfactory solution may be found by agreement between you [Mamdot and Khizar]. But one thing is certain that the Muslim League Party in the Assembly must be established on a sound and proper footing..."⁹³²

Jinnah appreciated that the creation of a genuine League Assembly Party committed to the programme of the A.I.M.L. would deprive him of the pretence of a united Muslim following in the Punjab Legislature, as it would force the League into opposition. Even so he calculated that in the long run such an occurrence could work to his advantage, for if the League Party attracted sufficient Muslim adherents from the Unionist benches it would cause the fall of the Ministry and precipitate a constitutional crisis, in that it was unlikely that any other Party or coalition would be able to command a stable majority, particularly as the Sikh and Hindu groups in the Assembly, because of their opposition to 'Pakistan' and distrust of the A.I.M.L.'s interference in the Punjab's affairs, had rejected League overtures in May and June 1943 which had aimed at securing their cooperation to oust the Unionists.⁹³³ Also it was improbable that the Congress would lend its support to a Unionist rump. The result would be the imposition of Governor's rule, which in Jinnah's opinion would rally Punjabi Muslims to the A.I.M.L., as it would no longer be restricted by the presence of a Muslim dominated Government in the Province.⁹³⁴

⁹³¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 Nov. 1943.

⁹³² Jinnah to Mamdot, 11 Sept. 1943, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File no. 372, pp. 11-12.

⁹³³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 May 1943; 7 May 1943; 3 July 1943; Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of July 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.

⁹³⁴ Glancy to Linlithgow, 16 Sept. 1943, MSS. EUR.F. 125/92, IOR.

In considering such a course of action and its possible repercussions Jinnah was probably encouraged by the cracks which had appeared in the Muslim wing of the Unionist Party. Mamdot and Daultana had openly declared in his favor; Shaukat Hyat had also pledged his allegiance, though by somewhat tortuous means, and for dubious reasons. Also a further influential Unionist landed politician, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, had joined the Jinnah camp in August 1943.⁹³⁵ The support which the Raja gave to the A.I.M.L., however, was suspect. Elected on the League ticket in 1937, the allure of a Parliamentary Secretaryship had been sufficient to attract him to the Unionist benches. Having abandoned the Muslim League he posed as a staunch supporter of Sikander, stoutly proclaiming the supremacy of the Unionist Party in provincial matters following the inception of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact:

"There is no doubt that the position of the parties in the Legislature remains entirely unaffected. The alliance with the League will not influence in any way the understanding which exists between the Unionist Party and the other groups which ... from [*sic*] the Ministerial Party".⁹³⁶

Six years later he had again changed his position, claiming for the League the primary position in the Unionist coalition.⁹³⁷ Like all 'political weather-vanes' Ghazanfar Ali had judged the way the prevailing 'winds of power' were blowing.

Despite the questionable personal motives which had caused these members of the landed elite to offer their allegiance to Jinnah, the latter had gained powerful allies, who in time would spearhead the destruction of the Unionist Party. As early as July 1943 the Government of India appreciated that the 'writing was on the wall' for the Unionist Government, in that it predicted that if Khizar continued "to insist that his is a Unionist Ministry opposition from Moslem Leaguers in Punjab (?will) in course of time overwhelm him."⁹³⁸ Khizar shared this apprehension, and consequently he was reluctant to continue to oppose Jinnah. Thus in September 1943 he had bluntly asked the Viceroy to reveal to him what course future British policy was likely to follow, so that he could act accordingly. In short he wanted to know if 'Pakistan' was likely to be conceded. Linlithgow, however, dismissed the Premier's request as naive, observing to Amery that for a Provincial Premier to imagine that he would be privy to such confidential information was "rather a depressing reflection on the political capacity and on the imagination of even the best meaning of these people."⁹³⁹ Had Linlithgow not been so condescending he might have recognized that such a question revealed the terrible plight of the Punjab Premier, for the latter was obstinately resisting Jinnah out

⁹³⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 Aug. 1943.

⁹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 22 Aug. 1943.

⁹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 20 Aug. 1943.

⁹³⁸ G. of I. to Sec. of State, telegram, -29-July 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹³⁹ Linlithgow to Amery, 10 Oct. 1943, MSS.EUR.F.125/12, IOR.

of a sense of duty to the British,⁹⁴⁰ at a time when it was recognized that the A.I.M.L. would eventually dominate Muslim politics in the Province.

Refused the advice he sought, Khizar informed Glancy in April 1944 that he was seriously considering capitulating to Jinnah. He pointed out that the Unionist Party existed in name only, it possessed no finances and little organization in the Province, and that its disappearance would cause little regret. Also he explained that though he did not believe in 'Pakistan', he knew that the slogan would gain momentum and would prove to be a decisive factor in the next elections, particularly as he expected Jinnah to employ Maulvis and Mullahs to harness Muslim fanaticism. In view of the significance of the religious factor Khizar concluded that many of his Muslim allies would be drawn into the A.I.M.L. camp. Finally Khizar opined to the Governor that he believed that there would only be two parties of any importance in the near future, the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, and that

"if he defies Jinnah and persuades his staunch adherents to adopt this course, he fears that in a comparatively short time they will all be relegated to political oblivion. He anticipates that the landlord class or "loyalists", as he often calls them, though in any case ultimately doomed, may be sacrificed before their time if he decides to hold out."⁹⁴¹

Unable to reconcile his fears for the future, Khizar, who by his own admission was an Empire loyalist, agreed to maintain his opposition to Jinnah if the Governor gave him an informal order to do so as "his duty as a loyal subject..." Although Glancy was anxious to manipulate Khizar's undoubted loyalty, he balked at ordering it, informing Wavell (succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, October 3.943), that

"I have told Khizr that I am not in a position to give him any kind of an order in this regard. I can only tell him as a friend what I would do in his place and it is my considered opinion that he will have no peace hereafter, nor will he be serving the interests of the Province or of India or of Muslims or of the Empire if he gives way to Jinnah and places himself in his power."⁹⁴²

This argument convinced Khizar of the need to frustrate Jinnah's Punjab designs. In proffering his counsel, Glancy's main aim was to prevent the disruption of the Unionist Ministry, which he believed would weaken the solidarity of the Province, and thereby undermine its war effort. Wavell, who shared Glancy's concern in this respect, applauded the Governor's action, informing the latter that,

⁹⁴⁰ See Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁴¹ Glancy to Wavell, 14 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁴² *Ibid.*

"It is of the greatest importance that until the end of the war against Japan there should be stable administration in the Punjab, and the dissolution of the Unionist Ministry and the substitution for it of a Muslim League Ministry, such as Jinnah wants, would be a disaster."⁹⁴³

Jinnah's initial attempted coup in the Punjab, therefore, very nearly succeeded. That it failed ultimately was not the result of a weak Punjab League, or because the Punjab Premier was ardently anti-League or anti-Pakistan, or possessed any hope of ultimate success in opposing Jinnah, but because in safeguarding British interests Glancy, with viceregal approval, was able to exploit the Premier's imperial sentiments and sense of duty. Jinnah had already put Khizar's fidelity to the test. On 18 March 1944 Jinnah had arrived in the Punjab to continue his anti-Unionist campaign in person; two days later he claimed that the Sikander-Jinnah Pact was a misnomer, that neither the A.I.M.L. nor himself had been a party to it, and that Sikander had conceived it purely to demonstrate Punjab support for the League.⁹⁴⁴ Though it was an untruthful exposition, Khizar, in an attempt to contain the situation, responded by posing as a determined 'Pakistanist' and Unionist. Speaking for the first time from a Muslim League platform, the Premier declared on 23 March 1944 that the Pakistan demand was just, and stood for the freedom of Muslims, but he judiciously added that the minority communities would be treated generously in the Muslim State, particularly in the Punjab.⁹⁴⁵ The fact that Khizar was opposed to the notion of 'Pakistan',⁹⁴⁶ demonstrates the unease he felt, and the lengths he was prepared to go to publicly to appease Jinnah and prevent him from isolating him by mustering popular Muslim feeling against his Ministry, for it was becoming increasingly apparent that if Muslim Unionists persisted in their opposition to Jinnah they would be labeled as traitors to Islam.⁹⁴⁷

Jinnah, sensing Khizar's dilemma and encouraged by his reconciliatory remarks concerning 'Pakistan' increased the pressure on the Premier to force him to submit his Government to League control. On 4 April 1944 Jinnah publicly announced that the Muslim League Assembly Party was now subject to the control of the A.I.M.L., and that Muslim M.L.As owed no obligation to the Unionist Party, and were not bound by its programme. Also he declared that as the League Party constituted the largest group supporting the Ministry, in that all Unionist Muslims belonged to the A.I.M.L., then the name of the Coalition Government would have to be changed to reflect that fact. He proposed, therefore, the adoption of the title Muslim League Coalition Party: "A change of label cannot, and does not, affect the continuance of the present coalition, so long as the parties concerned desire to maintain it."⁹⁴⁸ Khizar, however, refused to comply; on

⁹⁴³ Wavell to Glancy, 15 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁴⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 21 March 1944.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 24 March 1944.

⁹⁴⁶ Unpublished manuscript by Khizar, 'Repudiation of Pact', Ch. XI, p. 60, *Khizar Tiwana Papers*, copy with author.

⁹⁴⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 7 April 1944.

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 2 April 1944.

21 April 1944 the Premier during a meeting with Jinnah insisted on the continuation of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and the retention of the Unionist name.⁹⁴⁹ In explaining his motives to the Pakistani Foreign Minister almost twenty-five years later, Khizar claimed that two considerations had molded his response. The first being that his non-Muslim colleagues refused to accept the change in the Ministry's title as advocated by Jinnah, and secondly that even if he had sanctioned it, the result would have been the collapse of the Government and the imposition of Governor's rule: "But for these reasons, I would have had no objection at all personally to calling the Ministry by whatever nomenclature the Quaid-i-Azam wanted."⁹⁵⁰ Though this explanation was valid to some extent it concealed the Premier's overriding consideration, which as he admitted to Glancy was to sustain the British war effort in the Province:

"Khizr has told me many times that he would much prefer to resign rather than expose himself to attacks from his fellow-Muslims, and that he is only resisting Jinnah ... because he is ready to carry on the war effort..."⁹⁵¹

In fact Glancy had again been instrumental in harnessing Khizar's pro-British sentiments, thereby encouraging his continued resistance to Jinnah, as is evident from the entry Wavell made in his journal on 10 June 1944:

"I had a talk with Glancy this morning, he seemed a bit harassed, he had a very difficult time putting enough backbone into Khizar and his [Muslim] Ministers to stand up to Jinnah. Although Jinnah is a most unorthodox Moslem (to say the least of it) he seems to be able to wave the banner of religion and frighten them all to heel with it."⁹⁵²

Not only did the Governor fire Khizar's recalcitrance, he also conceived the strategy with which the Premier finally confronted Jinnah.⁹⁵³ On 24 April 1944, Glancy informed Wavell that it had been decided that Khizar should accommodate Jinnah's insistence that he and his Muslim Unionist colleagues should owe direct allegiance to the A.I.M.L., but in return Jinnah would have to agree to the retention of the Unionist label by the Punjab Government, and give a written undertaking endorsing the compromise, and pledging not to interfere further with the working and programme of the Ministry. Glancy believed that this formula would be rejected by Jinnah, but he thought that it was essential that Khizar should pursue the tactic to prevent his followers from assuming that he had been intimidated by Jinnah's demands, and thus dissuade them from defecting to what would appear to be the winning side: "Khizar has come to

⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 22 April 1944; Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁵⁰ Khizar to Pirzada, 7 Sept. 1967, Khizar Tiwana Papers, copy with author.

⁹⁵¹ Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁵² P. Moon (Ed.), *Wavell The Viceroy's Journal*, Karachi, 1973, entry 10 June 1944, p. 74.

⁹⁵³ Note by P.J. Patrick, 12 May 1943, 1, P&J/8/662, IOR.

realize that this effect is being brought about to an increasing extent and that the time has arrived for him to make a firm stand."⁹⁵⁴

On 25 April 1944 Khizar put the proposal to Jinnah, and in an attempt to induce his acceptance of it he pointed out that it would be impossible to form a League coalition under any other circumstances as the rural Hindus, the Mahasabha, the Akali Party and the Congress would refuse to support it. He conceded that the League could engineer a small majority with the assistance of a few Sikh, Hindu and Depressed Class M.L.As, but he cautioned Jinnah that the Governor would probably refuse to sanction such a government as it would certainly prove to be unstable, and would thus adversely affect the war effort. If on the other hand Jinnah accepted the formula Khizar proposed, the Premier assured him that he would possess a united League Ministry, in all but name, offering full support for 'Pakistan'. Whilst, Khizar concluded, if the League went into opposition, it would function as a small minority, and the all-India front for 'Pakistan' would be broken.⁹⁵⁵

Jinnah, however, was neither convinced nor intimidated by Khizar's prognosis, and he rejected Khizar's offer. As stated previously Jinnah considered the creation of a genuine Muslim League Party accountable to himself and the A.I.M.L. preferable to the continuation of Unionist control over the Punjab League, and he was not averse to the imposition of Governor's rule. Also had Jinnah accepted the Premier's proposition he would in effect have submitted himself to an agreement far more binding than the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, which would have ensured that the Punjab Muslim League remained ineffectual as Khizar intended, his real purpose being "to curb intrigues and factions maneuvering within the Muslim League Party".⁹⁵⁶ Also in refusing to meet Khizar's conditions there is evidence to suggest that Jinnah had been persuaded to disregard the Premier's claim that influential non-Muslim M.L.As would refuse to cooperate with a League Ministry. Whilst amassing biographical material in 1967 Khizar recalled that "some of the clever men in the Party" had assured Jinnah that the non-Muslim Ministers in the Unionist coalition would, in order to retain their offices, agree to serve in a Muslim League Government, and that the Premier had exaggerated their supposed reluctance as a ploy to frustrate the A.I.M.L. President's designs.⁹⁵⁷ Though Khizar did not identify these "clever men" it is evident that he was referring to the Mamdot-Daultana-Shaukat Hyat caucus whom Sheikh Faiz Ahmed (Unionist Parliamentary Secretary) had openly criticized in May 1944 for misleading Jinnah regarding the true state of political affairs in the Punjab.⁹⁵⁸

⁹⁵⁴ Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, 1-/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁵⁵ Unpublished manuscript by Khizar, 'Repudiation of the Pact', Ch. XI, pp. 63-65, *Khizar Tiwana Papers*, copy with author.

⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁹⁵⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 May 1944.

Acting on the assurances of his cohorts Jinnah persisted in his demands concerning the status and title of the Ministry, and on 26 April 1944 he met with Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh to solicit their compliance in the matter, having been promised by Khizar that if they agreed to the changes Jinnah wanted, then he would follow their example.⁹⁵⁹ The two non-Muslim Ministers, however, had no intention of accommodating Jinnah. They merely used the meeting to attempt to compromise him on the Pakistan issue. The Hindu Jat and Sikh leaders offered to consider cooperating with a Muslim League coalition if the creation of such an administration represented part of an all-Indian agreement, and on condition that the Pakistan idea was abandoned for the duration of the War. Also in order that the merits of 'Pakistan' could be judged, Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh demanded from Jinnah a precise definition of its political, constitutional and geographical implications. In addition they insisted that the A.I.M.L. should pledge unconditional support for the war effort.⁹⁶⁰ They were impossible demands; Jinnah could not reverse the attitude of the A.I.M.L. concerning the war without suffering considerable loss of face, and more importantly he could not risk subjecting his conception of a Muslim State to close public scrutiny, particularly if it became apparent that its territory in all probability would be limited solely to Muslim majority areas, and would not include the Punjab in its entirety. As a result he refused to meet the conditions sought by the two Ministers, though in doing so he judiciously avoided any discussion of 'Pakistan', rather he rejected them on the following grounds - the creation of a Muslim League Ministry in the Punjab could not be considered from a national point of view; 'Pakistan' was an all-Indian question, and as such irrelevant for the purpose of forming a coalition in the Punjab; the A.I.M.L. war policy had already been defined and was not a subject for discussion with groups in the Punjab Assembly. This summary dismissal ended any hope of a reconciliation, and on 27 April 1944 in a joint press communiqué Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh criticized Jinnah's response, implying that his attitude concerning 'Pakistan' was totally unrealistic and irresponsible:

"Mr. Jinnah's comments can offer no comfort or satisfaction to anybody. In fact they seem to be visibly evasive and suggest a complete reluctance to face the issues inherent in Pakistan."⁹⁶¹

Jinnah refused to permit the Ministers' condemnation to deflect him from his course, and on 27 April 1944, he reiterated his objectives to Khizar in writing: the Muslim League Assembly Party was to declare sole allegiance to the A.I.M.L., the Unionist nomenclature was to be abandoned whereupon the coalition would adopt the Muslim League title.⁹⁶² Khizar refused to acquiesce, claiming that Jinnah's repudiation of his

⁹⁵⁹ Unpublished manuscript by Khizar, 'Repudiation of the Pact', Ch. XI, pp. 65-68, *Khizar Tiwana Papers*, copy with author.

⁹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶² Jinnah to Khizar, 27 April 1944, *Khizar Tiwana Papers*, copy with author.

'Pact' with the late Premier was a breach of faith, and as such he was not prepared to condone any action "involving interference in provincial affairs and the inner workings of the Ministerial Party formed under the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. This would be contrary to the accepted democratic principle that the wishes of the electorate and the legislature should prevail."⁹⁶³ Jinnah, however, dismissed Khizar's argument, by insisting that the A.I.M.L. had never given an assurance of non-interference in the provincial sphere.⁹⁶⁴

Thus deadlock reigned, but Jinnah possessed a 'trump card' of immense political value, which had he been able to play it would have intensified the pressure on Khizar. This concerned the commitment Jinnah had extracted from Shaukat Hyat to resign from the Unionist Cabinet when ordered to. The time was clearly ripe for such a development, for had Shaukat relinquished his office at this time, ostensibly in support of Jinnah, his action would have had a significant impact on the Muslim public. Shaukat's secret promise to Jinnah, however, had been discovered by a secret service agent in May 1943,⁹⁶⁵ and was thus known to the Viceroy and the Punjab Governor. When it became apparent, therefore, that Jinnah was determined to capture the Unionist Ministry, Glancy acted decisively to prevent the A.I.M.L. President from manipulating Shaukat to make political capital at Khizar's expense. In the last week of April 1944 the Governor decided to dismiss Shaukat for ministerial misconduct. In seeking the Viceroy's approval for such a course, Glancy frankly admitted that the Minister's disloyalty to Khizar necessitated his dismissal from office, and that Khizar and his staunch Unionist stalwarts believed that it would dissuade other Unionists, particularly the influential Khan of Kot, from deserting the Party and joining Jinnah. Nevertheless in Glancy's opinion it was imperative that in disposing of Shaukat "it would be better to avoid removing him on political grounds and there are other reasons which entitle him to dismissal." The "other reasons" concerned Shaukat's unfair treatment of Durga Parshad, an Indian-Christian Inspectress of schools, who had been sacked on the Minister's orders in April 1943 on an unproven charge of corruption.⁹⁶⁶ Shaukat had in fact arranged the removal of Parshad to prevent her from holding an enquiry into the conduct of Ruqiyah Begum, a teacher who had been suspended by the Chief Officer of the Lahore Corporation for refusing to obey a transfer order.⁹⁶⁷ Even so, despite the undoubted illegality of the Minister's action, the incident was used as an excuse for getting rid of Shaukat, and did not occasion it. Glancy, in commending the maneuver to the Viceroy, admitted the subterfuge, but he argued that it was necessary to employ such tactics to protect Khizar and his Government as "larger issues are at stake - the tranquility of the Province and the continuance of the War effort". Also Glancy

⁹⁶³ Press statement by Khizar, 27 April 1944, *Khizar Tiwana Papers*, copy with author.

⁹⁶⁴ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of April 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁶⁵ Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to the Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.

⁹⁶⁶ Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁶⁷ Shaukat had taken this action following an appeal from Ruqiyah Begum's husband, the latter having asked the Minister to use his position to protect his wife. *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 8 March 1945, Vol. 24, pp. 419-422, V/9/3821, IOR.

reminded the Viceroy that Khizar's continued resistance to Jinnah had been spawned out of his loyalty to the British, consequently the Governor considered that it was incumbent on him to protect the Premier in this instance:

"I shall come in for a certain amount of criticism in the Press ... It will no doubt be represented that the reason for Shaukat's dismissal is his political activities and that the Governor has acted in an improper manner. All the same it seems to me that, unless Your Excellency sees any objection, I should be prepared to face this development. Khizr ... is only resisting Jinnah ... because he is ready to carry on the war-effort at the risk of his political extinction ... I cannot deny that he is taking ... risks. This being so, it is not going to have a good effect if I decline to take any ... risk myself."⁹⁶⁸

Wavell, who was as anxious as Glancy that Khizar should continue to thwart any encroachment by the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab, approved the Governor's plan.⁹⁶⁹

There is no doubt, however, that Shaukat Hyat was thoroughly corrupt. In addition to the Durga Parshad affair it was later established that he had misused his position as the Minister responsible for the Lahore Improvement Trust to acquire land for himself by dubious means and at less than its full market value from Muslim agriculturists. He had borrowed money from a Hindu capitalist to finance the venture, in appreciation for which he had conferred on his benefactor a commanding position in the formation and control of a transport combine in Lahore.⁹⁷⁰ But his removal from the Cabinet had been engineered because his continued presence was unacceptable to the interests of the Unionist Ministry and the British - a fact which the Statesman pertinently appreciated:

"If Mr. Jinnah had not happened to be striving to subvert the Ministry's Party structure, would the alleged injustice ever have been righted? Alternatively, would Shaukat Hyat at this particular time have been brusquely deprived of office because of it?"⁹⁷¹

Glancy, who had anticipated the exposure of his ploy, did not allow such observations to dissuade him from rendering further assistance to the Unionist Ministry. Having arranged the departure of Shaukat he presented the Premier with a suggestion which he believed would strengthen and stabilize the Government in the wake of the sacking. He reasoned that the ex-Minister's expulsion necessitated the appointment of two new Muslim Ministers, as such a maneuver would secure the allegiance of their combined followings in the Assembly.⁹⁷² Accordingly Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari of Dera

⁹⁶⁸ Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁶⁹ Wavell to Amery, 26 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁷⁰ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 23 May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁷¹ New Delhi Bureau of Public Information to India Office, telegram, 3 May 1944, WPW/8/662.

⁹⁷² Glancy to Wavell, 8 May 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

Ghazi Khan district and Nawab Ashiq Hussain from the Multan district were duly elevated to cabinet rank in the second week of May 1944. This exercise certainly achieved the Governor's purpose, for until that time Leghari had been posing as an enthusiastic Jinnhite,⁹⁷³ and Wavell estimated that his inclusion in the Cabinet, together with that of Hussain had reduced the number of probable desertions from the Unionist benches from 30 to 18.⁹⁷⁴ Moreover both men were extremely wealthy landlords who exercised a considerable degree of power in the Multan Division, which traditionally had been the Unionist stronghold.⁹⁷⁵ Whilst Ashiq Hussain possessed the additional advantage of being an influential Pir; as a descendant of the famous Muslim saint Ghaus Bahawal Huq of Sindh he commanded a very large number of *murids* (disciples) amongst the Muslim peasantry.⁹⁷⁶

Mamdot and Daultana, alarmed that the Unionist Ministry had retained the allegiance of these important Muslim leaders, sought to neutralize the beneficial effect their support would have on Unionist fortunes in the Multan Division by attempting to recruit other important members of the landed aristocracy - Raza Shah, Wilayat Hussain and Mian Yar Daultana - for the League.⁹⁷⁷ They failed, however, either to destabilize the Ministry, or to achieve a crippling defection of Muslim M.L.As from the Unionist fold. As a result the League leadership, both at the provincial and national levels, concentrated their attacks on the Premier, determining to isolate him and to break his hold over the Muslim Unionist membership. The Punjab Muslim League had prepared the ground for such an assault at its second annual session held from 28 to 30 April 1944. It had reiterated Jinnah's demands respecting the Ministry, and had censured Khizar for refusing to accommodate them.⁹⁷⁸ Subsequently in May 1944 Liaquat Ali Khan (General Sec., A.I.M.L.) accused the Premier of betraying the aims and objects of the A.I.M.L., in that the latter refused to acknowledge the right of the League to involve itself in provincial affairs. The Premier was given until 12 May 1944 either to explain his actions to the A.I.M.L. Committee of Action, or face probable expulsion. Khizar refused to be intimidated, replying that he had not violated the League's mandate, as he had always acted in accordance with the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact.⁹⁷⁹

The Committee of Action refused to accept the relevance of the Premier's response. On 27 May 1944 it ruled that the Pact was "nothing more than a statement which the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan made at a meeting of the All India Muslim League Council at Lucknow in October 1937", and as such it was decided to expel Khizar from the A.I.M.L.

⁹⁷³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 May 1944.

⁹⁷⁴ Wavell to Amery, 16 May 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

⁹⁷⁵ Mamdot to Jinnah, 7 June 1944, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File no. 372, p. 15.

⁹⁷⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 May 1944.

⁹⁷⁷ Daultana to Jinnah, 31 May 1944, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File no. 257, pp. 5-8.

⁹⁷⁸ Resolutions I - V, passed at the Second Annual Session of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, 28-30 April 1944, enclosure, Daultana to Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 2 May 1944, VFW/8/5292, IOR.

⁹⁷⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 May 1944.

as he had "contravened the policy and programme of the Muslim League and violated its constitution, rules, aims and objects".⁹⁸⁰ In reaching this decision, the Committee had been influenced by the actions and declarations of Jinnah, rather than by the terms of the 'Pact' which had clearly provided for "the continuance of the present Coalition Unionist Party". No objection had been raised to this clause at the 1937 Lucknow meeting at which the agreement had been concluded between Sikander and Jinnah. Furthermore the Committee of Action in conducting its 'enquiry' did not reject the membership forms of those Unionist Muslim M.L.As. who had joined the A.I.M.L. under the 'Pact' proviso that their affiliation was to be "subject to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact".⁹⁸¹ Khizar in a rejoinder to his expulsion offered to refer the issue of the 'Pact's' validity for arbitration by a Muslim judge of either the Federal Court or any High Court in India, on condition that such an adjudicator was mutually acceptable to himself and the A.I.M.L.⁹⁸² But the A.I.M.L. declined, insisting that the issue had been adjudged already by the Muslim "nation".⁹⁸³ Evidently the League was not as confident concerning the decision an unbiased judge might have delivered.

The A.I.M.L.'s tactics, inspired by Jinnah, in arbitrarily redefining, and eventually denying the 'Pact's' existence was crude, and lacked conviction. Though the stratagem eventually proved effective, its immediate effect was not dramatic. Khizar's Muslim cabinet colleagues (Mian Abdul Haye, Mohammad Jamal Khan Leghari, and Ashiq Hussain) resigned from the A.I.M.L. in his support,⁹⁸⁴ and only eighteen Muslim M.L.As. left the Unionist benches to join the Muslim League Assembly Party.⁹⁸⁵ The vast majority of Muslim Unionists, therefore, continued to support the Ministry, thereby automatically, if not formally, abdicating from the A.I.M.L., as its creed prohibited membership to any persons owing allegiance to political parties other than the League.⁹⁸⁶

Confronted by an undefeated and unrepentant Ministerial Party, the Punjab League under the direction of Mamdot, Daultana and Shaukat Hyat, changed the emphasis of its attack. Although the Provincial League leadership did not entirely abandon their objective of undermining Unionist Muslim solidarity, they decided to concentrate their efforts on revitalizing the Muslim League outside of the Assembly, by appealing for the support of the Muslim populace at large⁹⁸⁷ - tactics which they believed would pave the way for their eventual acquisition of political power in the Province. In keeping with this strategy it was decided on 28 May 1944 to appoint two Punjab League committees, one of which would continue to pressurize those Muslim M.L.As. who had failed to

⁹⁸⁰ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁸¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 30 May 1944.

⁹⁸² Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of June 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁸³ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of July 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁸⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 June 1944.

⁹⁸⁵ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁸⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 April 1944.

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 17 June 1944.

enter the A.I.M.L. fold, and the other to supervise the dissemination of the League's creed and policies. To facilitate the spread of such propaganda the Provincial League divided the Punjab into five zones, in each of which divisional Supervisors and Convenors were appointed to supervise the operation, which was to be executed by paid League workers, and a sum of Rs. 60,000 was sanctioned to finance the operation. To augment the strength of the local organization, all League branches in the Punjab were instructed to recruit five percent of their members to serve as Muslim National Guards. The latter were to be exempt from parading and wearing Paramilitary uniforms, but were to engage in performing acts of social service.⁹⁸⁸

On 17 June 1944 Mamdot revealed these intentions to the provincial press. It was a maneuver aimed at unsettling the Ministry, particularly as Mamdot also disclosed that the A.I.M.L. Committee of Action had been invited to transfer its offices to Lahore for a six month period, and that in response to the preliminary efforts of the Provincial League 90 Punjab Leaguers, including the 18 M.L.As. who constituted the Punjab League Assembly Party, had been elected to serve on the A.I.M.L. Council. In reality, however, the local League did not possess the resources to realize its grandiose programme, and as such it was anxious to draw on the aid and expertise of the parent body, which was requested to furnish Muslim leaders from other provinces to recruit and train Muslim League activists in the Punjab.⁹⁸⁹ To begin with therefore the Punjab League's campaign achieved few positive results. Although Daultana claimed that as a result of their endeavors public opinion was steadily uniting behind the League,⁹⁹⁰ in that by the end of July its policies and aims had been conveyed to over 1,000,000 Muslims during the course of 50 conferences held in 19 districts,⁹⁹¹ Government reports for the June-July (1944) period indicate a much lower level of activity. The Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government observed that during June the Provincial League had organized several propaganda tours; the meetings had not elicited any great displays of enthusiasm and audiences had been comparatively small. The most significant gathering, organized by the Muslim Students, Federation in Rawalpindi, had failed to attract more than 1,500 persons in spite of the fact that it had been attended by prominent Leaguers from the N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and Sindh.⁹⁹² In reality League activity had been confined largely to urban areas, where it had achieved some success in creating the impression amongst members of the Muslim intelligentsia that the rights of their co-religionists would be best protected by a Muslim League Government. By comparison League efforts to penetrate the villages were confined mainly to distorted tours by "peripatetic members of the Muslim Students' Federation", who confined their energies to distributing pamphlets and contacting village officials. Their activities, however, in spite of the Islamic appeal behind them - in some places mosques were

⁹⁸⁸ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁰ Daultana to Jinnah, 31 May 1944, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File no. 257, pp. 5-8.

⁹⁹¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 Aug. 1944.

⁹⁹² Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of June 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

used to transmit the Pakistan slogan on the grounds that politics and religion according to Islam were indivisible - made little impact to begin with on the Muslim peasantry. For the most part Muslims in the rural areas were initially more concerned with economic issues,⁹⁹³ whilst the fact that Khizar had publicly pledged his support for 'Pakistan' the previous March, initially prevented League propagandists from exploiting the demand to the detriment of the Premier.⁹⁹⁴

Daultana in spite of his exaggerated claim that "Big demonstrations, huge meetings and boundless enthusiasm have greeted us everywhere",⁹⁹⁵ was aware of the reality of the situation. In July 1944 he candidly admitted that in the rural districts the Muslim League was moribund. He believed that in order to reverse this trend it was essential for the organization to adopt and promote radical economic policies, to enable it to court Muslim allegiance in the Province, and to break the stranglehold which the landed politicians, who continued to sustain the Unionist Party, enjoyed in the rural constituencies: "It is now becoming clear that in view of the determined Government opposition our basic strength must come not from the landlords or the zaildar-lumberdar⁹⁹⁶ class but from the broad masses of the Muslim people." To achieve that objective Daultana stressed that "Apart from the appeal of Pakistan, the League must formulate a more concrete and immediate programme which is suited to the local needs of the Province..."⁹⁹⁷

Jinnah responded positively to this advice. Up until this time, although he had acknowledged in vague terms that Punjabi Muslims should organize themselves in every sphere of provincial life - social, economic, educational and political - his main argument had been gauged to religious sentiment. Thus in June 1944 he had emphasized that the Punjab was the "cornerstone" of Pakistan, and as such the future of Muslim India lay in the hands of Punjabi Muslims "who are the custodians of the honor, prestige and reputation of Islam."⁹⁹⁸ During a visit to the Punjab in August, however, he advocated far more forcibly the socio-economic uplift of the Muslim community, particularly in the rural areas.⁹⁹⁹ Later in November 1944 Jinnah proclaimed that the purpose of the A.I.M.L. was to raise the general standard of living enjoyed by the Muslim masses, rather than encouraging the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few privileged individuals. The League's ideal, he stated, was not to be capitalistic but

⁹⁹³ *Ibid.*; Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of July 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

⁹⁹⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 22 June 1944.

⁹⁹⁵ *Punjab Provincial Muslim League Report for June and July 1944*, by Mumtaz Daultana, 28 July 1944, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁹⁹⁶ Lambardars were village headmen, whilst Zaildars were revenue and administrative officials in charge of a zail or group of villages. See DG, Ludhiana, 1904, pp. 170-173, IOR.

⁹⁹⁷ *Punjab Provincial Muslim League Report for June and July 1944*, by Mumtaz Daultana, 28 July 1944, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

⁹⁹⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 June 1944.

⁹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 5 Aug. 1944.

Islamic, in that it sought to serve the interests and welfare of the Muslim people.¹⁰⁰⁰ Thus whilst Jinnah had projected an economic appeal, he Shrewdly explained it in a religious context.

Daultana and Mamdot heartened by Jinnah's stance, circulated at the beginning of November 1944 a list of the reforms which the Provincial League proposed to augment when 'Pakistan' was realized. Broadly speaking these contemplated the nationalization of key industries, banks and all utility services. Private enterprise, subject to State supervision, would be encouraged to develop the wealth of the Province, and to provide for the progressive employment of the surplus population. Unemployment would be reduced; agriculture was to be improved to benefit the small zamindars in particular, and debt eliminated through the provision of cheap credit facilities financed by the State. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act was to be further amended to prevent the acquisition of land by rural moneylenders. Medical facilities were to be extended to the rural areas, and the burden of taxation was to be transferred from the poorer to the wealthier sections of society. The entire educational system was to be overhauled, to facilitate the introduction of compulsory religious learning, though the rights of the minority communities were to be safeguarded to allow for their own religio-cultural traditions. The Punjab League also undertook to abolish forced labor and to provide for security of tenure, the levying of fair rents, and decent housing conditions. Minimum wages, shorter working hours for industrial laborers, the strict enforcement of factory legislation, the right of collective bargaining through trade unionist activity, and unemployment and sickness benefits through insurance, were also promised.¹⁰⁰¹

In essence this package consisted of a conglomeration of ambitious and deliberately inflated promises, the realization of which was beyond the capacity of any future government. An empty sham, directed at a largely ignorant and unsophisticated populace, conceived by two members of the landed gentry, the privileges of which it supposedly sought to curtail. Its sole purpose was to secure eventual power for its authors. Also the emphasis which Mamdot and Daultana had placed on social and economic reform did not eradicate the cruder religious appeal of the League, nor was it intended to. Despite the fact that both men had publicly pledged that the customs of the minorities would be respected in a Muslim State,¹⁰⁰² during the latter half of 1944 League spokesmen, including Daultana, continued to exploit religious fears and prejudices through the slogan 'Islam in Danger'.¹⁰⁰³ Similarly towards the close of the year, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, the leader of a group of Muslim zealots, toured the western Punjab on behalf of the A.I.M.L. inciting Muslim fanaticism against the Unionist Ministry. He placed no reliance on economic indoctrination, his favorite theme being the revival of the Caliphate, which possessed a special appeal for the conservative

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 10 Nov. 1944.

¹⁰⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 8 Nov. 1944; Manchester Guardian, 15 Nov. 1944.

¹⁰⁰² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 8 Nov. 1944.

¹⁰⁰³ *Ibid.*, 24 June 1944.

Muslim peasantry in the rural areas.¹⁰⁰⁴ Significantly the Muslim response to League propaganda, whilst appreciating the promised economic advantages, constituted a typical communal reaction, as was noted by the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government in August 1944:

"Ordinary Muslims believe that with *Pakistan* they will get the best jobs, the best houses, most of which are owned by rich Hindus, and most of the business now in the hands of the Hindus. This anti-Hindu feeling is probably partly responsible for the unexpressed but undoubted sympathy felt by a majority of Muslim officials for the League."¹⁰⁰⁵

Of all the League's propaganda - social, economic and religious Khizar realized correctly, as later events were to prove, that its religious appeal was the most potent, and therefore posed the greatest threat to the Unionist position. Thus in June 1944 he had asked the Viceroy to bar *maulvis* (religious teachers) from the U.P. from entering the Punjab. The latter were doing so under Jinnah's direction to agitate against the Ministry. Wavell, however, refused the request, on the grounds that the Provincial Government "have all the powers they need but ... Khizar does not feel strong enough to use them."¹⁰⁰⁶ This evaluation, however, was not entirely correct. The Punjab Premier, despite the fact that he retained the support of the majority of the Muslim M.L.As., knew that he was fighting a losing battle against Jinnah. In spite of this realization he had grimly consented to frustrate Jinnah's Punjab ambitions out of regard for the British war effort. For him to have restricted the entry of the *maulvis* on his own authority would have given rise to the charge that he was anti-Muslim, thereby further strengthening Jinnah's position. Also such action would probably have undermined the resolve of his followers in the Assembly to continue to resist League advances. Wavell's assessment of the situation was further limited by his failure to appreciate fully the change which was occurring in the Punjab. Though feudal landlord politics were destined to survive in the post-independence Punjab,¹⁰⁰⁷ the 1940's witnessed the reemergence of an ever more potent force - religion - against which the landed gentry who opposed the A.I.M.L. could not stand fast. Provincial politics no longer constituted in the main a series of contests between influential personalities, with the landed elite commanding the arena as Wavell imagined: "Odd that these big Punjab landlords should be so dominated by a down-country lawyer like Jinnah."¹⁰⁰⁸

Refused viceregal assistance to combat religious propagandists, and unable to employ similar tactics because of the multi-communal composition of the Ministry, the

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 2 Dec. 1944.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug; 1944. L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Wavell to Amery, 20 June 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

¹⁰⁰⁷ See C. Baxter, 'The People's Party Vs. the "Punjab Feudalists"', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, VIII, 1973, pp. 166-188.

¹⁰⁰⁸ P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, journal entry 24 July 1944, p. 81.

Premier's opposition to the League was restricted to socio-economic issues. In the Autumn of 1944 Khizar, in a move to emphasize that the Unionist Party was as socially conscious as the Punjab Muslim League, committed the Ministry to a programme of reconstruction. The various schemes, which it was calculated would cost Rs. 150 crores¹⁰⁰⁹ included the expansion of public health and educational facilities, the construction of roads in rural areas, the electrification of the villages, and the increased industrialization of the Province.¹⁰¹⁰ Furthermore, the Government undertook to sink 3,000 additional tube-wells, and to reserve 70,000 acres of agricultural land, and practically all the permanent vacancies which occurred in the Government service for ex-servicemen.¹⁰¹¹ In order to promote this propaganda, and check League activities in the rural areas, Khizar also resurrected the Zamindara League.¹⁰¹² Its new creed was designed to appeal to all sections of the population, in that non-zamindars were not precluded from membership.¹⁰¹³ Although it claimed to stand for complete independence and strong provincial autonomy, on the basis of inter-communal cooperation to be achieved through the pursuit of common economic goals,¹⁰¹⁴ it lacked a constructive programme to combat communalism. Zamindara League members remained free to join any other political or communal organization, with the right to support such bodies whenever the communal rights and interests of their communities were involved.¹⁰¹⁵ As Wavell noted, it was an impracticable compromise, as Muslim and non-Muslim interests concerning 'Pakistan' were diametrically opposed.¹⁰¹⁶ As such the Zamindara League could never constitute a realistic ideological alternative to the A.I.M.L., being nothing more, with the exception of the independence clause, than a reaffirmation of Unionism.

As 1944 drew to a close, therefore, the battle for the control of the Punjab had been carried from the confines of the Legislative Assembly to the districts of the Province. The reins of government, however, remained firmly in Khizar's hands, though the number of Muslim M.L.As. supporting the Muslim League Assembly Party had increased from 18 to 22¹⁰¹⁷ But with the death of Chhotto Ram in January 1945 the Unionist cause sustained a severe blow which in the long run proved to be a disaster. The veteran politician had held the eastern Jat dominated districts of the Punjab against Congress incursions for many years.¹⁰¹⁸ His successor, Tikka Ram, whose selection as

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 Dec. 1944.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 26 Sept. 1944.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid.*, 13 Oct. 1944.

¹⁰¹² The Zamindara League had been founded by Unionist leaders, notably Chhotu Ram and Sikander Hyat Khan to popularize Unionism amongst the zamindar community in the Province. As such it had functioned as a propaganda and fund-gathering agency for the Unionist Party.

¹⁰¹³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 Sept. 1944.

¹⁰¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 3 Nov. 1944.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3 Nov. 1944.

¹⁰¹⁶ Wavell to Glancy 3 Oct. 1944, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰¹⁷ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Dec. 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

¹⁰¹⁸ Wavell to Amery, 23 Jan. 1945, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

leader had deeply divided the Jat community, was unable to continue the task as he enjoyed neither the confidence nor the loyalty which his predecessor had inspired.¹⁰¹⁹ Thus as the 1946 election approached he failed to sustain either Jat solidarity, or their united support for the Unionist Party. The Congress exploited the situation, eventually capturing 20 of the 26 eastern constituencies, including the late leader's former seat of Jhajjar.¹⁰²⁰ The loss of Chhotu Ram, however, was by itself not solely responsible for this outcome. The elections of 1946 witnessed a polarization of communal sentiment on the part of all the communities which worked to the advantage of the principal all-India parties. Even so there can be little doubt that had Chhotu Ram lived, considering the widespread popularity he enjoyed, the Congress would have faced a more daunting task in the eastern Punjab, and the Unionist Party would have been served by a sounder champion.

In the short term, however, the Unionist Party appeared to have suffered no ill-effects, in that it maintained its supremacy in the Legislature by a comfortable majority during the March (1945) Assembly session, and it suffered no further defections to the Muslim League.¹⁰²¹ One reason for the Ministry's stability was the inability of the Punjab League to function effectively as an opposition party in the Assembly, largely because it had been severely weakened by the development of factionalism. In November 1944 the ever ambitious Shaukat Hyat had attempted to seize the leadership of the League Assembly Party from Mamdot. The latter together with Daultana had been alarmed and intimidated by the challenge, because Shaukat's supporters, led by Abu Saeed Anwar, had threatened to disrupt the League Party if Shaukat's aim was not realized.¹⁰²² Consequently on 27 November Daultana had informed Jinnah of the necessity for a change of leadership, a recommendation he repeated on 1 December 1944. Jinnah, in response, refused to permit such a move, because he did not trust Shaukat.¹⁰²³ The ex-Minister's ambitions, however, were not to be easily thwarted, and in February 1945 despite Jinnah's continued disapproval, he secured the leadership of the Assembly Party through blackmail, in that he stated that if his wishes were not accommodated he would withdraw his support from the League.¹⁰²⁴ In order to consolidate his victory, however, it was essential for him and his followers, who included Ghazanfar Ali Khan,¹⁰²⁵ to capture the Punjab Muslim League Council. This proved to be an impossible task for them, for at the Council elections conducted in May 1945 both

¹⁰¹⁹ Wavell to Amery, 30 Jan. 1945, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

¹⁰²⁰ Of the remaining six seats, the Unionists retained only three, the others being captured by Independent candidates, Govt. of India Press Information Bureau, The General Elections 1945-46, Delhi, 1946, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹⁰²¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 March 1945; 21 March 1945; GR, Glancy to Wavell, 7 April 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰²² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 Nov. 1944; 28 Nov. 1944.

¹⁰²³ *Ibid.*, 28 Nov. 1944; 3 Dec. 1944.

¹⁰²⁴ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 20 Feb. 1945, 11/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰²⁵ Ghazanfar Ali, who had been elected as deputy leader of the League Assembly Party, acted as Shaukat's chief defender following the dismissal scandal. See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 8 March 1945, Vol. 24, pp. 433-438; 9 March 1945, Vol. 24, p. 465; V/9/3821 and V/9/3822, IOR.

Mamdot and Daultana retained their positions as President and General Secretary respectively. Shaukat's failure in this area resulted from a number of causes. It was known that he did not enjoy Jinnah's confidence. Whilst in March 1945 the Premier had publicly humiliated him in the Assembly by furnishing details of his misdeeds as a Minister, thereby exposing him as a man devoid of integrity and honesty,¹⁰²⁶ a factor which made a significant contribution in preventing him from mobilizing support in his favor in the district League organizations to unseat Mamdot and Daultana.¹⁰²⁷ The Provincial League thus plagued by internal divisions was unable to pose any real threat to the Ministry during the first half of 1945. This combined with the fact that the Premier, deprived of the allegiance and counsel of Chhotu Ram, had proved equal to the task of leading the Government alone,¹⁰²⁸ had had an adverse effect on the morale of League supporters in the Assembly, three of whom (Rai Faiz Khan, Talib Hussain, Rai Shahadat Khan) returned to the Unionist benches.¹⁰²⁹

The disruptive effect of the Provincial League's internecine struggle, combined with the majority which the Ministry continued to command in the Legislature, did not cause Khizar to be either complacent or over-confident. The Premier, in common with Firoz Khan Noon and Baldev Singh, appreciated that the political situation in the Province remained extremely fluid. Consequently they each sought to impress upon Wavell that if any national agreement was concluded which resulted in the A.I.M.L. sharing power at the centre, such a development would place the Unionist Ministry in jeopardy, in that it would encourage Muslim Unionists to switch their allegiance to the League in the belief that by so doing they would be protecting their future interests.¹⁰³⁰ Wavell, convinced that Glancy had inspired their collective nervousness, rejected their prognosis in the mistaken belief that "a strong common feeling..." existed amongst all Punjabis, and that given strong leadership, the Unionist Government would survive irrespective of political events at the all-India level.¹⁰³¹ Thus in attempting to promote a national settlement in the summer of 1945 to encourage cooperation between the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, Wavell in effect confronted Khizar with the possibility of political ruin.

The Viceroy considered that it was essential for Britain to achieve an understanding with the major political parties before the end of hostilities with Japan, in order to contain extremist nationalist elements, and to retain India in the British Commonwealth: "if we want India as a Dominion after the war, we must begin treating her much more like a Dominion now."¹⁰³² As a step towards achieving this Wavell

¹⁰²⁶ See *ibid.*, 8 March 1945, pp. 419-422, 424-431, V/9/3821, IOR.

¹⁰²⁷ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰²⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 21 March 1945; Punjab Chief Sec.'s Report Punjab, second half of March 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰²⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 March 1945.

¹⁰³⁰ Wavell to Amery, 5 Feb. 1945, L/P&J/8/622, IOR.

¹⁰³¹ *ibid.*

¹⁰³² Wavell to Churchill, 24 Oct. 1944, P.Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

launched an initiative on 14 June 1945 to solicit the participation of the Congress and the A.I.M.L. in a provisional national government, in which Muslims and Caste Hindus would enjoy parity, and which would include some minority representatives drawn from the Sikh and Scheduled Caste communities. This administration was to be created through the reorganization and Indianisation of the Viceroy's Executive Council. All portfolios, including 'Defence', 'Home', 'Finance' and 'Foreign Affairs' were to be held by Indians, only the posts of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief being reserved for British personnel. Once inaugurated the provisional government was to commit itself to promote the war effort, and to devising a new and permanent constitution for India.¹⁰³³ To facilitate the creation of such a government the Viceroy invited nominees of the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, and other prominent Indian leaders¹⁰³⁴ to attend a conference to convene in Simla in June 1945 to discuss his proposals, in the hope that they would prove acceptable to the major nationalist organizations. Wavell's ideas, however, had offended the imperialistic sentiments of the British Prime Minister, and it was only after protracted negotiations with the British Cabinet in April and May 1945, that the Viceroy had secured Churchill's reluctant permission to proceed, which the latter gave only because he had been assured by his Cabinet's India Committee that the Viceroy's initiative would not succeed.¹⁰³⁵

In the event the prediction proved to be correct. The Simla Conference failed to achieve a positive result, largely because Jinnah and the Congress failed to agree on the question of Muslim representation in the provisional government. Jinnah demanded that all the Muslim members should be appointees of the A.I.M.L.. Conversely the Congress claimed the right to nominate two Muslims out of the Muslim quota (5).¹⁰³⁶ The situation was further complicated by Khizar's insistence that the provisional government should also include a Unionist Muslim out of deference to the traditional loyalty of the Punjab, and the fact that there had been a Punjabi Muslim on the Viceroy's Executive Council since 1919. The Premier's arguments, however, belied the true motive behind them, this was revealed by Glancy who strongly supported Khizar in the matter. The Governor bluntly told the Viceroy that if a Unionist Muslim was not

¹⁰³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

¹⁰³⁴ These included Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President; P.N. Banerjee, Leader of the Nationalist Party in the Central Assembly; Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly; Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Premier of Sindh; Hossain Imam, Leader of the A.I.M.L. in the Council of State; M.A. Jinnah; Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of the N.W.F.P.; B.G. Kher, ex-Premier, Bombay; Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana; Liaquat Ali Khan, Deputy Leader of the A.I.M.L. in the Central Assembly; G.S. Motilal, Leader of the Congress in the Council of State; Nazimuddin, ex-Premier, Bengal; Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, ex-Premier, U.P.; Maharaja of Parlakimedi, ex-Premier, Orissa; C. Rajagopalchari, ex-Premier, Madras; Sir Henry Richardson, Leader of European Group in the Central Assembly; Sir Muhammad Saadulla, Premier of Assam; Rao Bahadur Siva Raj, Scheduled Caste representative; Sri Krishna Sinha, ex-Premier, Bihar; Master Tara Singh, Sikh representative. Though Gandhi refrained from formally attending the conference on the grounds that he was not a member of the Congress Party, he remained in Simla to be available for consultation. P. Moon(Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

¹⁰³⁵ *Ibid.*, journal entry 31 Aug. 1945, p. 168.

¹⁰³⁶ *Ibid.*, journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 149.

offered a seat then the Ministry in the Punjab would fall.¹⁰³⁷ The Viceroy, however, in agreeing to such an inclusion was not swayed by Glancy's prediction; Wavell believed that the enormous contribution the Province made to the agricultural production and defence of India merited it.¹⁰³⁸ Despite Wavell's compliance in the matter, Jinnah refused to concede Khizar's claim on the grounds that the "Unionist Party were traitors to the interests of the Muslims...",¹⁰³⁹ and did not truly represent Muslim opinion in the Punjab which, according to him, was firmly behind the A.I.M.L.¹⁰⁴⁰ In opposing the involvement of non-League Muslims, whether Unionist or Congressite, Jinnah had other more urgent motives. He believed that unless all the Muslim nominees were Leaguers it would undermine the A.I.M.L.'s claim to be the only legitimate representative organization of the Indian Muslims. So anxious was he to prevent such an occurrence, that on 9 July 1945 he had implored the Viceroy not to disrupt League unity over the issue with the words "I ask you not to wreck the League."¹⁰⁴¹ Also the A.I.M.L. President realized that even though Muslims had been offered parity with Caste Hindus in the proposed government, because of the presence of Sikh and Scheduled Caste representatives they would be relegated to the position of a permanent minority and that for the League to make any impact it was essential that it should control all the Muslim votes.¹⁰⁴² In order to further offset the disadvantages Muslims would experience, Jinnah also stipulated that any measure which the Muslim group in the government opposed should be rejected if it failed to secure a two-thirds majority. This condition was totally unacceptable to the Viceroy, but in an attempt to placate Jinnah's fears to an extent Wavell on 11 July offered to permit a Muslim quota consisting of four Leaguers and one Unionist. Jinnah, however, rejected the compromise, refusing to abandon his original stance. As a consequence Wavell realized that the Simla effort to negotiate a meaningful settlement had failed.¹⁰⁴³

Considering Jinnah's strong objection to a place being given to a Unionist Muslim it could be argued that Khizar, in making the claim, had played a major part in wrecking the talks, and that that had been his main purpose, for he had opposed the Conference from the outset, having accused the Viceroy on 23 June of "handing over power to the enemy...", stating that his "approach to [the] Congress and the League was a slap in the face for all cooperators."¹⁰⁴⁴ It is certainly true that the Punjab Premier concerned that the presence of the A.I.M.L. at the Centre would place his government in jeopardy, had been openly relieved when the Conference failed,¹⁰⁴⁵ but he was not the cause of the break-down. Also, although Jinnah's attitude had contributed in large measure to the

¹⁰³⁷ *Ibid.*, journal entry 23 June 1945, p. 144.

¹⁰³⁸ *Ibid.*, journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 149.

¹⁰³⁹ *Ibid.*, journal entry 24 June 1945, p. 146.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 146.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*, journal entry 9 July 1945, p. 153.

¹⁰⁴² *Ibid.*, journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 149.

¹⁰⁴³ *Ibid.*, journal entry 11 July 1945, p. 154.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, journal entry 23 June 1945, p. 144.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, journal entry 12 July 1945, p. 154.

negative outcome, it was not solely responsible for it. Even if he had been content to accept Wavell's formula for Muslim representation (see above), the Viceroy knew that the Congress would have been unlikely to agree to it, as that organization had determined to achieve complete domination at the Centre.¹⁰⁴⁶ In the final analysis, therefore, the Simla Conference fell victim to the diametrically opposed philosophies of the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, neither of which totally reflected reality; the former insisting that it had the sole right to speak for the Indian Muslim community, the latter posing as the political arbitrator of all India's peoples.

Jinnah, however, had no intention of admitting this fact. He was anxious to avoid any condemnation for the Conference's collapse,¹⁰⁴⁷ and he shrewdly turned the episode to his own advantage by publicly berating Khizar for torpedoing the Viceroy's initiative, and by portraying his stance on the Unionist Muslim issue as being detrimental to Muslim interests.¹⁰⁴⁸ Whilst at the same time he successfully cultivated his own image as the champion of Islam.¹⁰⁴⁹ Jinnah's propaganda, despite the inaccurate nature of the allegations, had an adverse effect on the fortunes of the Unionist Party. The previous June the Provincial Muslim League had penetrated the Premier's home district of Sargodha. A meeting of the District Muslim League had been convened presided over by the Sajjadanashin Sahib of the 'gadi' of Sial Sherif, and attended by Nawabzada Azizullah Khan, the son of the largest Tiwana landowner, Nawab Major Mumtaz Khan. The proceedings, patronized by two such influential members of the district's religious order, had been a great success in that it had attracted crowds of between 12,000 and 20,000 at each of its three sittings. The theme of the meetings had been set by Shaukat Hyat who had raised the emotive slogan of 'Islam in Danger' and had pledged himself "to shed his last drop of blood in the defence of Islam"¹⁰⁵⁰ The emotional appeal of the League portrayed so visibly on the Premier's 'back door' had an unsettling effect on the senior Tiwanas. To begin with Khizar had been able to contain the situation and retain the allegiance of his kinsmen by assuring the leading members of his tribe that he would formulate future policy towards the A.I.M.L. in consultation with them.¹⁰⁵¹ In the wake of the Simla Conference, however, Khizar's efforts faltered. Viewed by many as a traitor to the Muslim cause, he could no longer command the united loyalty of the Tiwana tribe. At the beginning of October 1945, Nawab Mumtaz Khan, a former pillar of the Unionists, announced his decision to quit the Party and support the League, claiming that the attitude of the Premier and the Congress at Simla had demonstrated that the Hindus were committed to keep the Muslims in perpetual servitude, and that the Unionists were aiding their design.¹⁰⁵²

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, journal entry 14 July 1945, p. 155.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, journal entry 9 July 1945, p. 153.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 17 July 1945, 16 Aug. 1945.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug. 1945, 4/3/1/105, TOR.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 5 June 1945.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 3 Oct. 1945.

¹⁰⁵² *Ibid.*, 4 Oct. 1945.

During the Autumn of 1945 other influential Muslim leaders had also joined the A.I.M.L. at the expense of the Unionist Party, although it was the surrender of Japan on 14 August 1945 coupled with the Viceroy's policy statement of 19 September 1945 which made the most significant contribution in encouraging their actions. In his announcement Wavell reaffirmed the British Government's commitment to "full self-government in India", and he confirmed that the elections, delayed by the war, would be held during the coming cold weather (December 1945 - February 1946). Once the results were known, Wavell revealed that he would hold talks with representatives from the provinces, and invite members drawn from "the main Indian parties" to serve on the Viceroy's Executive Council, as preliminary steps to encouraging the Indian leaders to formulate an agreed constitution for India.¹⁰⁵³

It was evident therefore that the A.I.M.L. would play a major role in deciding the future of India, and that the Pakistan issue would dictate the outcome of the electoral contest in the Punjab.¹⁰⁵⁴ The more astute Muslim politicians in the Province sensing that the A.I.M.L. would emerge victorious, sought to guarantee their own political fortunes by aligning themselves with it. on 22 September 1945 Chaudhry Ata Ullah, the only elected member from the Punjab on the Council of State embraced the League, declaring Pakistan to be the "sheet-anchor" of the Muslim nation.¹⁰⁵⁵ Two days later Major Mubarak Ali Shah, a member of the Pir family of Shah Jiwana (Jhang District) and Malik Sardar Khan Noon, who belonged to the extremely powerful Noon family, deserted the Unionist benches in the Punjab Assembly, the former stating that as the future constitution of India depended on the outcome of the forthcoming elections no honest Muslim should withhold support from the League.¹⁰⁵⁶ The following month four more ex-Unionists followed their example.¹⁰⁵⁷

Also in August and October 1945 Firoz Khan Noon (Khizar's cousin) and Begum Shah Nawaz, both former prominent Unionists, publicized their intentions of contending the elections on behalf of the A.I.M.L.¹⁰⁵⁸ This development was a severe setback for Khizar on account of the influence their respective families (the Noons of Shahpur and the Arain Miens of Baghbanpura) commanded in the Province. Ironically neither of these politicians had previously exhibited any great enthusiasm for Jinnah or his cause - political realities and necessities had driven them into the League camp. Until the prospect of an election forced his hand, Noon had carefully avoided offending either Jinnah or Khizar, as Wavell had observed: "Firoz Khan Noon...has really very few political principles ... He tries to trim between Jinnah and Khizar, and is I think trusted

¹⁰⁵³ H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 129-130.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug. 1945, 4/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 Sept. 1945.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 25 Sept. 1945.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of Oct. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 30 Aug. 1945; 4 Oct. 1945; P.Moon (Ed.). op. cit., journal entry 20 Aug. 1945, p. 164.

by neither.¹⁰⁵⁹ Privately Noon actually disagreed with the Pakistan demand, confiding to Glancy in October 1945 that he regretted that the term "Pakistan" had ever been invented.¹⁰⁶⁰ Yet driven by the desire to preserve his political future Noon in November 1945 resigned from the Viceroy's Executive Council and publicly and enthusiastically championed the Pakistan cause.¹⁰⁶¹ His conversion to Muslim nationalism appeared all the more suspect in view of the fact that only the previous April he had assured the British and Commonwealth Premiers that the peoples of India were united in their desire to remain in the Empire.¹⁰⁶² Similarly the Begum's realignment with the League occurred not from conviction but political motivation. She had been expelled from the A.I.M.L. in 1941 for refusing to obey Jinnah and resign from the National Defence Council.¹⁰⁶³ Though she had resigned from the Unionist Party in May 1944, she remained in the Provincial Assembly as an independent member;¹⁰⁶⁴ significantly it was not until October 1945 following the election announcement that she rehabilitated herself with Jinnah and the A.I.M.L., by resigning from the Defence Council.¹⁰⁶⁵ Both Noon and the Begum had been creatures of the British, but their appreciation that the 'old order' was changing caused them to attach themselves to the 'rising star' of Muslim nationalism, as personified by the A.I.M.L., abandoning British Imperialism and the Unionist Party both of which were clearly in the descent. Noon even admitted as much. In a press interview given in September 1945 he claimed that the Unionist Party had outlived its usefulness, as at its conception the possibility of the end of British paramountcy had not existed, but as that process was now imminent the continuation of the Unionist Party independent of the A.I.M.L. was harmful to Muslim interests.¹⁰⁶⁶

The defections of these former stalwarts of the Unionist Party reinforced Glancy's conviction that the Ministry could not survive the forthcoming elections if the outcome was to be decided by the call for 'Pakistan'. Previously the Governor had desired the survival of the Unionist Government to protect the British war effort in the Province, but even though the War had been won Glancy remained committed to Unionism, and he determined to use his influence to bolster it against the A.I.M.L. The Governor's motives in pursuing such a course arose from two main convictions. In the first place he feared that if the League emerged triumphant from the imminent electoral contest, it would be practically impossible for Britain to find a satisfactory solution to the constitutional problems, as the A.I.M.L. would be in an even stronger position to demand 'Pakistan' - the very concept of which was an anathema to the Congress. Secondly he believed that once "Pakistan becomes an imminent reality" the Punjab would be submerged in civil war: 'we shall be heading straight for bloodshed on a wide

¹⁰⁵⁹ P. Moon (Ed), *op. cit.*, journal entry 28 June 1945, p. 150.

¹⁰⁶⁰ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 27 Oct. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰⁶¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 Nov. 1945.

¹⁰⁶² P. Moon (Ed), *op. cit.*, journal entry 4 April 1945, p. 121.

¹⁰⁶³ Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, *Father and Daughter*, Lahore, 1971, pp. 174-175.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Wavell to Amery, 9 May 1944, IA/PM/8/662, IOR.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 4 Oct. 1945.

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 16 Sept. 1945.

scale; non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, are not bluffing, they will not submit peacefully to a Government that is labeled "Muhammadan Raj".¹⁰⁶⁷

Thus Glancy considered that the Government of India should do all in its power to prevent the defeat of the Unionist Government in the Punjab not only to protect British interests but to save the Province from an internecine struggle. Aware that the Ministry was incapable of successfully contesting the League's demand for 'Pakistan', and its manipulation of religious sentiment, the Governor had already urged the Viceroy in August 1945 to "deflate the theory of Pakistan...",¹⁰⁶⁸ by impressing Muslim voters with the fact that if a Muslim homeland was conceded it would involve the partition of the Punjab, resulting in all probability in the loss of the Divisions of Jullundur and Ambala and the District of Amritsar - all of which were non-Muslim majority areas:

"Action on these lines would at least provide the Unionist Party with a rallying cry against Pakistan - something on which the elector could definitely bite. No Punjabi, however uninformed, would contemplate with equanimity so shattering a dismemberment of the Province..."¹⁰⁶⁹

In confronting the Viceroy with this analysis Glancy failed to achieve his main objective, the destruction of the Pakistan appeal prior to the elections. There was much in the Governor's prognosis which Wavell agreed with, but he refused to jeopardize what he considered to be the principal British and all-Indian interests merely to attempt to resolve the Unionist dilemma. In forwarding Glancy's views to Pethick-Lawrence (Amery's successor as Secretary of State for India) the Viceroy recorded the following observations and recommendations. Whilst he accepted that "there is much to be said for the Governor's view that the crudity of Jinnah's ideas should be exposed..." and that "it seems to follow that some enquiry into the possibilities of Pakistan is a necessary preliminary to any further constitutional discussion..."¹⁰⁷⁰ he insisted that it was imperative for the British Government to formulate concrete counter-proposals before taking such a step. He cautioned that the Muslim community was determined to resist Congress control, thus it was incumbent upon the British to present them with a plausible and acceptable alternative. He urged, therefore, that the Home Government should consider either the creation of a loose form of Federation consisting of all the provinces and Princely states "in which Central powers would be reduced to a minimum, and Muslims would be given equality with all other communities in the Central Executive", or "a Federation of a tighter kind ... with provision for Provinces and States to come in or stay out ... if they so desired."¹⁰⁷¹ The last suggestion, therefore, did not preclude Pakistan, but Wavell insisted that in order to avoid civil strife in the

¹⁰⁶⁷ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁰ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁷¹ Viceroy's Memorandum, enclosure, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Aug. 1945, 4/3/1/105, IOR.

Punjab the British Government should deny Jinnah's insistence that a solely Muslim plebiscite would decide the future of the Muslim majority provinces: "I am clear ...that the Punjab cannot be included in Pakistan as it stands...on a Muslim plebiscite. Jinnah's plan is unjust...and its acceptance would lead to something like civil war."¹⁰⁷² Wavell realized, however, the grave dangers inherent in any attempt to modify the Pakistan demand on account of its "wide popularity... among Muslims" resting as it did on "its Islamic appeal" and "a genuine dread of Hindu domination...", and he impressed on the Secretary of State that Government action would, out of necessity, have to be cautionary and extremely well planned: "The Muslims are too numerous and too influential in India as a whole to be disregarded, and our handling of them is vital to a settlement of the Indian problem."¹⁰⁷³

Wavell's interpretation of the situation and the remedies necessary to resolve the constitutional deadlock precluded the immediate action prescribed by Glancy. Also the Viceroy did not share the Punjab Governor's fears of a Muslim League victory at the polls. Wavell was convinced that a League triumph was inevitable, and that if the Government of India attempted to discredit 'Pakistan' such action would strengthen rather than weaken Jinnah's appeal to the Muslim electorate. In addition the Viceroy considered that if the League was victorious in the Punjab it would eventually work to Jinnah's disadvantage as it would demonstrate the impracticability of 'Pakistan', in that a Muslim League Government, bereft of non-Muslim support on account of its championing of a Muslim State, would be unable to sustain a stable administration in the Province:

"In the Punjab, successive Muslim leaders ... have realized that stable government is possible only if there is a genuine partnership between considerable sections of the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims inevitably dominate the Cabinet, and have much to gain by such a partnership. On the other hand, they have much, perhaps everything, to lose by advertising their strength, for a united Hindu-Sikh opposition aided by a few Muslim renegades could make orderly government impossible."

Thus:

"educated Muslim opinion may gradually appreciate the impracticability of Pakistan in its crude form ... In this matter time is on the side of common sense, and if there is an interval during which the Muslim League are in office in the Punjab ... I think the experience might be valuable."¹⁰⁷⁴

¹⁰⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷³ *Ibid.* See also letter Viceroy to Sec. of State, 20 Aug. 1945.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Viceroy's Memorandum, enclosure, 21 Aug. 1945, 4/3/1/105, IOR. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence.

In presenting this synopsis and proposals for the formulation of policy in respect of 'Pakistan' the Viceroy had attempted to persuade the British Government to adopt a constructive approach to the problem. His advice, however, fell on deaf ears. The British Cabinet, influenced primarily by Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade) refused to abandon or modify the Cripps Offer of 1942, despite Wavell's warning that it would not satisfy either the Congress or the A.I.M.L.. Cripps, supported by Attlee (British Labour Prime Minister following Churchill's defeat in the General Election of July 1945) refused the Viceroy's counsel, claiming that he had been assured by Birla, Gandhi's 'unofficial spokesman', and Shiva Rao, the Delhi correspondent of the *Hindu* and the *Manchester Guardian*, that the Congress would agree to his original offer, insisting that it remained the official policy of the British Government.¹⁰⁷⁵ Muslim aspirations and the obstacles and dangers they held for future constitutional advance were disregarded. Against such opposition, Wavell made little headway, ruefully reflecting in his journal that Cripps and Attlee, who were in constant communication with Congress propagandists "are taking all they say as gospel",¹⁰⁷⁶ and "are obviously bent on handing over India to their Congress friends as soon as possible".¹⁰⁷⁷

Unable to initiate any positive planning in respect of the Pakistan issue Wavell attempted to persuade the Cabinet to combat the A.I.M.L.'s plebiscite claim. Here too he failed to obtain a satisfactory response. Although the Cabinet's India Committee agreed on 11 September 1945 that the decision of a province to vote itself out of any future Indian Union would not be based on the votes of a single community, but on the collective voting of all the communities,¹⁰⁷⁸ no directive was issued in this regard. Wavell insisted that a statement to that effect should be announced on his own authority if misunderstanding persisted in India concerning the Muslim plebiscite.¹⁰⁷⁹ But as a result of the Cabinet's reluctance to face the issue, and Menon's (Reforms Commissioner, G. of I.) fears that such action by the Viceroy would give rise to allegations that the British Government was attempting to exploit the communal wrangle,¹⁰⁸⁰ no pronouncement was made as to the role which the various communities would play in deciding the geographical boundaries of the proposed Muslim State. In defining British policy in a speech on 19 September 1945, Wavell merely reiterated that it was the intention of the British Government to convene a Constitution-making Body following the conclusion of the elections, and to encourage inter-party cooperation in a new Executive Council, which was to be appointed to govern India during the interval preceding the implementation of the new constitution.¹⁰⁸¹

¹⁰⁷⁵ P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, journal entry 29 Aug. 1945, p. 167.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, journal entry 3 Sept. 1945, p. 169.

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, journal entry 4 Sept. 1945, pp. 169-170.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 25 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Menon to Jenkins, 20 Oct. 1945, 4/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Abell to Jenkins, 22 Sept. 1945, W3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸¹ P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171, 173.

Glancy, frustrated that his original request had not been met, repeated his plea in October 1945 for an official statement indicating that the Divisions of Ambala and Jullundur would not be forced to accede to Pakistan against the will of the majority of their inhabitants:

"I still think very strongly that an authoritative statement of this kind would provide a most timely, and surely an entirely unexceptionable, corrective to the fanatical and highly dangerous doctrine of "Islam in danger" that is now being preached by advocates of the League ... to prevent the coming elections being fought blindly on a false issue."¹⁰⁸²

This request was supported by Evan Jenkins, the Viceroy's Private Secretary. Jenkins, who did not regard the creation of a "Muslim home-land" to be a viable possibility¹⁰⁸³ was as anxious as the Punjab Governor to limit its appeal. As a result he drew Wavell's attention to the fact that whilst

"The Muslim League assertion that Pakistan is to consist of certain Provinces as they stand is not contrary to the terms of the [1942 Cripps] Declaration ... On the other hand, the claim for a Muslim plebiscite is ridiculous, and ... it is fairer to Jinnah to deny it now than let him assume its validity throughout the elections and tell him afterwards that we are quite unable to accept it."¹⁰⁸⁴

Influenced by Jenkins, Wavell once again advised the Secretary of State of the necessity for the British Government to dismiss the idea that provinces would be permitted to enter any new constitution on the vote of a single community. He suggested that such an announcement could take the form of an answer to "an arranged question in Parliament", as "A reply of this kind does not commit us...to any definition of the boundaries of Pakistan. It merely states that we do not intend that the constitutional future of any Province should be determined by any one of the communities."¹⁰⁸⁵

Pethick-Lawrence refused totally to concede the Viceroy's point. He was concerned that if a question and answer syndrome was initiated in Parliament, it would lead to embarrassing questions being posed which were beyond the control of the Government. He was also of the opinion that Jinnah would be unable to legitimately accuse the British of permitting him to propagate a false assertion regarding the plebiscite issue, as the Cripps Offer had not provided for a solely Muslim referendum, an omission which had caused Jinnah to reject it. Furthermore the Secretary of State claimed that it would be a fundamental mistake for the British Government, having made provision for future discussions to ascertain how the 1942 proposals could be modified to produce an

¹⁰⁸² GR, Glancy to Wavell, 27 Oct. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹⁰⁸³ Jenkins to Wavell, 17 Oct. 1945, 4/3/V105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Jenkins to Wavell, 22 Oct. 1945, 4/3/V105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 25 Oct. 1945, 4/3/1/105, IOR.

agreed constitution, to make any pronouncement on the plebiscite provision Of that offer which would further alienate the A.I.M.L.. In addition Pethick-Lawrence believed that any announcement which implied that the provincial option remained a British intention, despite the fact that the Cripps formula guaranteed it "will greatly increase the difficulties of discussing any alternative to it which might be more acceptable to the Congress, such as an option exercisable by smaller areas."¹⁰⁸⁶

Pethick-Lawrence's response epitomized the total confusion of the Attlee Government in respect of future Indian policy. The Cripps Offer remained the basis for future talks, therefore nothing could be said to increase League prejudice against it. At the same time no action was permissible which would bind the British Government to realizing the terms of the Offer in respect of the provinces' option clause, for fear of offending the Congress. What is ironic, in view of Glancy's wishes, was the fact that the Westminster Government had clearly decided that if 'Pakistan' was to be sanctioned, its frontiers were to be determined to placate Congress objections, and not to meet League aspirations, but the Secretary of State refused to admit this publicly!

Wavell realized that further discussion on the subject was futile, and events in India caused him to drop the matter. In November 1945 Jinnah officially defined his conception of 'Pakistan', laying claim to all the Muslim majority provinces and Assam. Up until that time the Congress had been reticent in its handling of the Pakistan demand.¹⁰⁸⁷ Once Jinnah had broadcast his objective, however, Nehru and Patel (Chairman of Congress parliamentary sub-committee appointed to conduct the 1946 election campaign) formally denounced it. This caused Menon to persuade the Viceroy to refrain from pursuing the plebiscite issue on the grounds that the stance adopted by the Congress leaders had reassured the Sikh minority in the Punjab, and that in view of the continued intransigence of the Congress towards Britain, it would have been foolhardy for the Viceroy to persist in a course which would also turn the A.I.M.L. against the British.¹⁰⁸⁸ In accepting this advice, Wavell was also influenced by his own assessment that the Government of India would face serious difficulties in conducting any future discussions with the Congress and the A.I.M.L. if it now became a party to the dispute by attempting to delimit 'Pakistan'. He sensed that such action could precipitate civil strife, particularly as it was apparent that the Congress would only accept a demarcation which would render partition worthless to the A.I.M.L., whilst Jinnah would reject any proposition which detracted from the existing provincial boundaries.¹⁰⁸⁹

¹⁰⁸⁶ Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 9 Nov. 1945, 4/3A/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸⁷ It was the opinion of Clow, the Governor of Assam, that this reticence resulted from the Congress realization that the Nationalist Muslims did not possess sufficient influence to effectively oppose 'Pakistan', and its fear that total opposition to a Muslim State would weaken its own claim to represent all the communities, Muslims included. Twynham, Governor of the Central Province, to Wavell, 25 Sept. 1945, 4/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Menon to Abell, 20 Nov. 1945; Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 Nov. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 20 Nov. 1945, 4/3/V105, IOR.

In spite of Wavell's change of heart, in the final analysis it was the unrealistic attitude of the Attlee Government, and its virtual abdication of responsibility which caused the 1946 elections in the Punjab being contested in part on a totally erroneous issue, thereby reducing still further the already tentative appeal of the Unionist Ministry. 'Pakistan' as epitomized by League propagandists, constituted a powerful exhortation to Muslim provincial and communal pride, as well as provoking their religious fears and prejudices. The Muslim electorate was presented with a vision of the Punjab in which they would be the masters, not only of their own destiny, but also of that of the non-Muslims. They were led to believe that in future all Punjabis, irrespective of their faith, would be subject to Islamic law,¹⁰⁹⁰ thereby symbolizing the promised Muslim supremacy. It was a total rejection of the Unionist philosophy dedicated to its destruction. The fact the A.I.M.L. refused to consider or admit the likelihood of the partition of the Province, increased its popular appeal. Jinnah and the League, sensing victory, presented a vision of a united Punjab as the 'cornerstone' of Pakistan, in which Muslims would dominate, whilst the indolence of the British Government fostered rather than discouraged the hallucinatory socio-political intoxication of Punjabi Muslims, and in so doing contributed to the subsequent political annihilation of the Unionist Party.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105; G.R.Glancy to Wavell, 27 Oct. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

CHAPTER VII

PUNJABI MUSLIMS AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1946 - A TRIUMPH FOR FEUDALISM AND THE PIRS

The elections of 1946 witnessed a resounding win for the Muslim League in the Punjab. This result, however, was not solely a victory for the League and thereby 'Pakistan' but it also reflected the triumph of the Muslim landed and religious elites in the Province. The majority of the most influential Muslim zamindari families, and an overwhelming number of the Pirs had allied themselves with the League and the Pakistan demand, though in many cases such action had not occurred for ideological reasons, but had been dictated by the desire to protect and enhance their political and economic interests. Thus by 1946 the Muslim League had replaced the Unionist Party as the repository of feudal power and privilege; it was a significant development for it contributed greatly to ensuring that the League would enjoy the support of the mass of the rural dominated Muslim electorate (75 of the 84 Muslim constituencies were in rural areas), whose actions were greatly influenced, if not determined, by the large landlords and Pirs. Even so other factors also helped to shape the response of the Muslim voters - the communally charged atmosphere which had enveloped both Punjabi and national politics in the pre-election period; widespread corruption and bribery which were employed by Unionists and Leaguers alike to enhance their respective prospects; the prevailing economic depression which caused widespread dissatisfaction with the Unionist Ministry, and the propagandizing activities of student activists on behalf of the League. In the final analysis, however, the decisive victory which the League gained resulted primarily from the fact that it commanded the allegiance of the extremely powerful religio-feudal elite who controlled the political life of the Province.

The composition of the electorate in the Punjab in 1946 was governed by the same rules which had been in force in 1937.¹⁰⁹¹ though the number of those entitled to vote had increased from 2,686,094 in 1937 to 3,514,749 by 1946.¹⁰⁹² Thus approximately 12.6% of the entire population was enfranchised. As at the previous election males accounted for the majority of voters; approximately 46% of all men over the age of twenty enjoyed the vote. In respect of the communal franchise there were 1,619,691 voters in the Muslim constituencies, 848,744 in the General (Hindu) and 659,396 in the Sikh; the remaining voters belonging to the special constituencies (Women, Anglo-Indian, Labor, University, European, Indian Christian, Commerce and Industry and Landholders).¹⁰⁹³ In terms of male voters over the age of twenty, approximately 38% of adult Muslim

¹⁰⁹¹ *The Punjab Government Gazette* (Extraordinary Issue), 27 Sept. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹⁰⁹² *Times of India* (Bombay), 13 March 1946. It should be noted that there was some discrepancy over the actual number of electors in the Punjab. Menon calculated the number to be 3,398,419. Menon to Sec., Political Dept., India Office, 24 Jan. 1946, II/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹⁰⁹³ *Times of India*, 13 March, 1946.

males, 40% of adult Hindu males, and 63% of adult Sikh males were enfranchised (see Appendix S.).

Thus a relatively small electorate was involved in the election. That factor, however, did not detract from the League's performance. Out of a total of 84 seats reserved for Muslims, the League gained 72, in addition to which it captured three special constituencies - two Women and one Labor. By contrast the Unionist Party forfeited its commanding position. It retained only 12 Muslim,¹⁰⁹⁴ five General, three Landholders and one Indian Christian seat. Its majority had been decimated, as it commanded only 21 seats in an Assembly of 175. Conversely the Congress, though it failed to take any Muslim seats, emerged as the second largest party in the Legislature as a result of successes in 51 constituencies - 36 General (including six Scheduled Caste), nine Sikh, two Women (one Hindu and one Sikh), one Commerce and Industry, one Landholder, one Labour and one University. Of the remainder the Panthic Sikhs gained 23 seats (22 Sikh and one Landholder), and five (one Scheduled Caste, one Indian Christian, one Labour, one Anglo-Indian and one European) were captured by independent candidates.¹⁰⁹⁵

The majority of the 18 special constituencies in theory had joint electorates, but the four seats allotted to women were divided between the communities - two Muslim, one General and one Sikh. Also the five landholders constituencies were in practice communal seats, in that Muslim voters predominated in three of them (N. Punjab, W. Punjab and Tumandars), and Hindus and Sikhs respectively in the remaining two (E. Punjab and Central Punjab). Similarly Muslim voters were in a majority in one of the Labor seats (N. Punjab) and non-Muslims in the other two (Trade Union and E. Punjab).¹⁰⁹⁶ These communal divisions had been clearly evident in the voting pattern. Also the Congress capture of the Commerce and Industry and University seats reflected the fact that Hindus controlled both these spheres of Provincial life. Conversely the retention by the Unionist Party of three of the four landholders constituencies resulted from the fact that the successful Unionist candidates - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Jamal Khan Leghari (Unionist Minister) - were able to use their personal influence, and

¹⁰⁹⁴ Craig Baxter has claimed incorrectly that the Unionist Party captured 20 Muslim seats. See C. Baxter, "The People's Party' vs. The Punjab 'Feudalists'", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, VIII, 1973, p. 180.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Viceroy to Secretary of State, telegram, 5 March 1946, L/PW/8/472. Following the election there was some initial confusion concerning the respective strengths of the Parties in the Punjab, as is apparent from the Table below, produced in the *Times of India*, 13 March 1946.

	Nominations	Unopposed	Won	Total Returned	Lost	Forfeited Deposit
Congress	83	9	42	51	32	12
League	86	2	71	73	13	-
Panthic Sikhs	30	-	22	22	8	-
Communists	23	-	-	-	23	14
Ahrars	15	-	-	-	15	6
Independents	225		9	9	216	186
Unionists	101	3	17	20	81	18
Total	563	14	161	175	388	236

¹⁰⁹⁶ *Times of India*, 13 March 1946.

in Khizar's case official interference, to ensure that they did not forfeit the support of the relatively small number of votes included. Khizar captured both the North Punjab and West Punjab Landholders seats, possessing electorates of 886 and 1,066 respectively, whilst the Tumandar seat held by Leghari consisted of only nine voters.¹⁰⁹⁷

Personal influences aside, the vital issues confronting the Punjab at the time of the elections regarding its future role in the post-independence period resulted in the manifestation of a greater degree of political awareness than had been the case in 1937. There were no contests in only 14 constituencies with an aggregate electorate of 348,816. The effective voters therefore numbered 3,165,933 of whom 2,076,207 exercised their franchise.¹⁰⁹⁸ A relatively larger proportion of Hindus voted (69%) than was the case for either Muslims (64.5%) or Sikhs (64%).¹⁰⁹⁹ Whilst it could be argued that this demonstrated a greater degree of political consciousness on the part of the Hindu electorate, it probably occurred because a larger proportion of Hindu voters were located in urban areas than was the case for either Muslims or Sikhs,¹¹⁰⁰ which made the franchise marginally more accessible to Hindu voters. Most significant of all, however, the Hindus were under tremendous psychological pressure to register their votes. As a minority community dominating the professional and commercial spheres of provincial life, and possessing a vast investment in the Province, they stood to bear the greatest loss from a League victory heralding 'Pakistan'. Similarly the Sikh land holdings in the central Punjab were also threatened, which suggests that the comparatively low Sikh turnout at the polls in contrast to that of the Hindus, resulted from the fact that all but two of the Sikh constituencies were in the more inaccessible rural areas.

In respect of Muslim voters, of the 1,044,158 who exercised their vote, 679,796 (65.10%) voted for the League, though this in reality meant that only 42% of all enfranchised Muslims (i.e. all who were entitled to vote, irrespective of whether they voted or not) had in fact supported the League. Even so this did not detract from the League victory, because the Unionist Party, which had posed the greatest threat to the Muslim League in the Punjab secured only 26.81% (279,967) of the Muslim votes cast, representing only 17.28% of the entire Muslim electorate. An analysis of the total Muslim vote is given in Table I below:

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Khizar stood for three constituencies in all, a practice which was not prohibited by the election rules in the Punjab. The third seat which he successfully contested was the Muslim rural constituency of Khushab. He was accused of misusing his position as Premier to ensure the victory through the employment of Government officials to intimidate the electorate. *Punjab Government Gazette*, 4 October 1946, pp. 917-919, PGSL.

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Times of India*, 13 March 1946.

¹⁰⁹⁹

	Effective Voters	Total Polled
General Constituencies	848,744	588,099
Muslim Constituencies	1,619,691	1,044,158
Sikh Constituencies	659,396	420,001

Times of India, 13 March 1946.

¹¹⁰⁰ Of the 34 General Constituencies, 8 were in urban areas. By comparison there were 9 urban and 75 rural Muslim constituencies, and 2 urban and 29 rural Sikh constituencies. *Ibid.*

Table I - Total Votes Polled in the Muslim Constituencies					
League	679,796	65.10%	Congress	6,480	0.62%
Unionist	279,967	26.81%	Independent	30,180	2.89%
Ahrar	41,608	3.99%	Invalid	6,127	0.59%
(From information contained in the <i>Times of India</i> , 13 March 1946)					

In the rural areas the League gained 50% and more of the votes polled in 55 constituencies, but it is interesting to note that it received the support of 50%, and over, of the entire Muslim electorate in only 8 constituencies (Karnal, Ambala and Simla, Chunian, Gurdaspur East, Shandara, Montgomery, Okara and Jhang Central - see Appendix T). Three of these seats - Karnal, Ambala and Simla, and Gurdaspur East were situated in the eastern part of the Province where Muslims were in a minority. The high polls, and large measure of League support, recorded in each, were symptomatic of the unease and vulnerability the Muslim community experienced in Hindu majority areas. A similar phenomenon was evident in respect of the eastern urban constituencies. The heaviest polling, and the League's most convincing urban victories occurred in the North East Towns and South East Towns seats (see Appendix T). With regard to those constituencies where the League experienced its greatest successes - Chunian, Shandara, Montgomery, Okara, and Jhang Central all were in majority Muslim areas. The fact that each of them contained canal colony lands influenced the high turnout and the eventual result. There was a widespread belief amongst Muslim voters that a League victory would materially benefit their community at the expense of the non-Muslims.¹¹⁰¹ Student propagandists acting on behalf of the Muslim League fostered the belief that colony lands held by Hindus and Sikhs would be redistributed amongst Muslim tenants and demobilized soldiers.¹¹⁰² Three of the constituencies (Montgomery, Okara and Jhang Central) were situated in the Multan Division, which had traditionally been the Unionists' most important stronghold. The Unionist monopoly had been destroyed, however, by the defection to the League of the powerful Multan based Hayat and Daultana families, and the power which these groups commanded in the Division was reflected in the degree of success the League experienced there.

It had been essential for the League to achieve a convincing victory in the Province as a whole, however, in order to establish the credibility of its Pakistan claim. This it had done. The inclusion of the Punjab was vital to the concept of an independent Muslim State. The provincial elections therefore assumed national significance. Woodrow Wyatt (M.P., Aston Division, Birmingham, Member, Parliamentary Delegation to India, 1946) emphasized this when he declared to the House of Commons on 6 December 1945,

¹¹⁰¹ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug. 1944; GR, Glancy to Wavell, 23 Aug. 1944, L/PW/5/247, IOR.

¹¹⁰² The students' promises were recalled by villagers during a series of interviews conducted by the author (March - April 1977) in the countryside around Lahore, Lyallpur, Chiniot and Okara.

"It is in the Punjab that the issue of whether or not the Moslem League can press their claim to Pakistan is to be decided. If the Moslem League can obtain the greater majority of the Moslem seats, they have got a clear case to go forward in India ... It is in that Province that we will have the issue of whether there are to be one or two Indias."¹¹⁰³

It was understandable therefore that the League leaders had sought to impress the Punjabi Muslim electorate with the fact that 'Pakistan' constituted the most vital issue in the elections. In January 1946 Jinnah had emphasized

"We must realize the stakes for which we are fighting. This is a question of life and death for Mussalmans. Failure to achieve Pakistan would mean our national extinction."¹¹⁰⁴

It was a theme which Provincial League leaders had exploited to the full. On 9 November 1945, at an election rally at Jhelum Firoz Khan Noon had warned his audience that

"No religion can survive without State protection and patronage. If you want to follow freely the true creed of Islam, you shall have to struggle for an independent State of your own, otherwise under Hindu domination Islam will be finished as a religious force in India."¹¹⁰⁵

The championing of Muslim nationalism and Islam by the League leadership gave them an immediate advantage over the Unionist Party. This was enhanced by the fact that to many Muslims 'Pakistan' appeared as a panacea to their worldly problems, in addition to preserving and asserting their religious rights. As early as August 1944, it had been evident to Glancy that the promise of a Muslim state was proving to be a highly attractive inducement to Punjabi Muslims:

"the attraction of Pakistan to the uninformed Muslim lies largely in the belief that within a given area it will place him at an advantage as against his non-Muslim neighbor in the matter of personal preferment and material wealth."¹¹⁰⁶

The Muslim League, aware of the potency of its Pakistan creed, was careful not to commit itself to any definition of it which could have detracted from its appeal. Consequently League leaders purposely projected 'Pakistan' in a vague and nebulous

¹¹⁰³ House of Commons, Official Report of Proceedings, 6 Dec. 1945, pp. 269-270, L/P&J/8/470, IOR.

¹¹⁰⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 12 Jan. 1946.

¹¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 10 Nov. 1945.

¹¹⁰⁶ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 23 Aug. 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

form.¹¹⁰⁷ The hesitancy of Jinnah and the League to define 'Pakistan' could have provided the Unionist Party with an opportunity to neutralize the popularity of the scheme by forcing the Muslim electorate to consider all the practicalities involved in augmenting a Muslim State, including the partition of the Province. The British Government, however, by refusing to grasp the nettle, and issue any authoritative statement on the Muslim League's objective for a sovereign state, deprived the Unionist Ministry of the opportunity to discredit the Pakistan demand. As a result the Unionists, realizing the potency of 'Pakistan' as an election issue, strove to reassure the Muslim electorate that if they were successful at the polls they too would support the demand for a Muslim homeland. Khizar in April 1944, following the breakdown of his talks with Jinnah, had emphasized that the Lahore Resolution of 1940, "popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, is the sheet anchor of Muslims in the Punjab as elsewhere," and he claimed that "I have on countless occasions declared my faith in it and I propose to stand by it."¹¹⁰⁸ As the 1946 elections approached, Khizar continued to emphasize Unionist support for Pakistan. He appealed to the electorate on the basis that there was no difference between the Unionist Party and the League on constitutional matters. He constantly reiterated Unionist approval for Pakistan, but he cautioned the Muslim electorate to remember that it was unfeasible to imagine that a purely Muslim Government could hold power in the Punjab,¹¹⁰⁹ therefore inter-communal cooperation would continue to be essential to allow for the pursuit of common economic interests.¹¹¹⁰

Khizar's strategy in supporting the 'Pakistan' idea proved to be a grave political blunder. By following such a course he destroyed the credibility of the Unionist Party as a non-communal organization, whilst at the same time his plea for inter-communal cooperation alienated Muslim opinion which viewed 'Pakistan' as a symbol of Muslim supremacy, and not as a venture to be launched in equal partnership with non-Muslims. Furthermore the Premier's stance was totally unrealistic given the political climate of the time, and the Muslim League had no difficulty in discrediting it. Ghazanfar Ali, through the medium of the press, questioned in October 1945 whether the Premier and his Muslim followers in the Assembly would, in view of their approval of 'Pakistan', vote in accordance with the decisions of the A.I.M.L. when questions arose in the Legislature concerning the framing of the new constitution. Also he queried how the Premier and his fellow Muslim Unionists, if they decided to obey the League mandate, would retain the allegiance of the non-Muslim members of the Unionist Party,

¹¹⁰⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 18 Jan. 1946.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 16 Sept. 1945.

¹¹⁰⁹ Khizar constantly argued that even if the League captured 90 seats in the Legislature, including all the 86 Muslim reserved seats and some special interest constituencies, that number would be reduced to 89 on the appointment of the Speaker, and it would be impossible for the League to form a stable Ministry without non-Muslim cooperation, and none of the non-Muslim groups in the Legislature were prepared to work with the League. Thus a Muslim League victory would result in a weak, unstable Ministry, which would lead inevitably to the imposition of Governor's rule. *Ibid.*, 3 Jan. 1946.

¹¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 28 Oct. 1945.

for the latter had constantly repeated that they were opposed to the creation of 'Pakistan'.¹¹¹¹

In fact Ghazanfar Ali had demonstrated succinctly the awkwardness of Khizar's position by pointing out that it was inconceivable for Muslim Unionists to support 'Pakistan' in an alliance with non-Muslim Unionists who were opposed to it. Glancy, however, believed that Unionist support for 'Pakistan' would not disturb its Hindu and Sikh adherents, as it was widely accepted that the Unionist view of 'Pakistan' was not the crude variety advocated by the League,¹¹¹² but the Governor's confidence was misplaced. Tika Ram, the Unionist Hindu leader, in an election speech at Sanipat in November 1945, refuted the suggestion that 'Pakistan' constituted an electoral issue at all. He stated that the question did not arise so far as the Punjab was concerned, as the Divisions of Ambala and Jullundur, and half of the Lahore Division, had Hindu and Sikh majorities, which meant that it would be impossible to constrain such a large population in a State based on a purely communal concept.¹¹¹³ The incident revealed the invidious position of the Unionists; in order to placate the Muslims the Premier had given lip service to the concept of Pakistan, whilst at the same time a senior Hindu cabinet colleague had declared that the development of an independent Muslim State including the Punjab in its entirety was not feasible.

A clash of this nature, underlining the inevitable incompatibility of communal interests within the Unionist ranks exemplified the unrealistic course which the Premier had adopted. Khizar's naivety was further exemplified when he publicly acknowledged the divergence of opinion which existed between Muslims and non-Muslims in his ministerial coalition, claiming that it would not disrupt the sound administration of the Province, as each group was to be permitted to support the communal organization of their choice at the national level.¹¹¹⁴ Such a compromise was untenable, particularly as the League's concept of an independent Muslim homeland was irreconcilable with the Congress's determination to achieve an independent and united India. By attempting to accommodate the Pakistan ideal to retain Muslim support, the Premier adopted a course of action which was doomed to fail. 'Pakistan' was the political creation of the Muslim League, which conducted an unabashed communal and fanatical campaign to achieve its objective. In contrast Khizar's somewhat confused stance of support for the same cause, constrained as it was by the complexities of maintaining and promoting an inter-communal coalition, appeared as lukewarm and unrealistic. Whilst the adoption by the Unionist Party of a banner identical to that of the Muslim League - green, bearing the Muslim legend of a crescent - which was flown at Unionist election rallies,¹¹¹⁵ failed

¹¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 30 Oct. 1945.

¹¹¹² GR, Glancy to Wavell, 27 Oct. 1945, IJP&J/5/248, IOR.

¹¹¹³ Civil and Military Gazette, 16 Nov. 1945.

¹¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28 Oct. 1945; 28 Nov. 1945.

¹¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7 Feb. 1946.

to benefit the party, or convince the Muslim electorate that it was as 'Islamic' as its Muslim League rivals!

The adoption of Islamic symbolism by the Muslim parties, and in particular by the Muslim League, together with the Congress exploitation of Hindu values and signs intensified communal feeling in the Punjab and throughout India. Yet the utilization of religion for political ends was as much a symptom of, as a cause for the communal orientation of the electoral struggle, for the reaction of the entire Indian electorate demonstrated a near total communal polarization. In the Central Legislative Assembly all of the 30 Muslim seats went to the League, which had attracted 86.6% of the votes cast in Muslim constituencies.¹¹¹⁶ The Punjab clearly identified with this national pattern. The Province's response to the election had been inevitable, almost in spite of the politicians' manipulation of religious sentiment, for by 1900 communalism was clearly recognized to be the dominant form of identity in the Province, commanding greater loyalty than any form of secular social stratification.¹¹¹⁷ The elections proved to be an extension of the existing communal conflict. In August 1947 the retiring British Governor, Evan Jenkins (succeeded Glancy 8 April 1946) reflected:

"the General Election of 1945-46 ... was fought on the most bitter communal lines ... in which practically all Muslims were on one side of the fence and practically all non-Muslims on the other ... A country with thirty million inhabitants was sucked into the vortex of all-India politics; Punjabis ceased to be Punjabis and became Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs."¹¹¹⁸

Thus the elections merely provided the opportunity for the Province's ingrained communalism to reach its ultimate and most conclusive climax, thereby suggesting that the different religious groups could never be totally compatible. British officials, Jenkins and Moon amongst them, have judged this to be a regrettable and retrograde occurrence, born out of the collapse of the Unionist Party.¹¹¹⁹ Once the British had decided to leave India, however, this outcome became unavoidable. The severing of the imperial connection linked with the demand for 'Pakistan' forced the majority community in the Punjab to assert its political dominance in its own right, unencumbered by those communal considerations which had restricted the Unionist Party. In turn this Muslim assertion, which assumed an aggressive and fanatical form, triggered a counter-reaction, which was equally determined on the part of the minority communities, and the actions of each drew support from and depended on the existing communal sensibilities of the religious groups. The success of the Unionist Party at the polls in 1937 had occurred in spite of communalism, and did not mark its demise. The

¹¹¹⁶ R. Hunt and J. Harrison (Eds.), *The District Officer in India, 1930-1947*, London, 1980, p. 230.

¹¹¹⁷ K.W. Jones, "Communalism in the Punjab - The Arya Samaj Contribution", *Journal of Asian Studies* (1), 1968, p. 54.

¹¹¹⁸ Memorandum by Sir Evan Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p.4, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. Also see P. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, London, 1961, pp. 286-287.

Assembly remained divided on largely communal lines, though a ministerial majority, including Hindus and Sikhs, had been secured through the pursuit of a pro-rural economic programme at the expense of urban interests. Despite its long years in office, however, the Unionist Ministry proved to be a fragile structure, because crude communalism exercised a far greater influence on politician and peasant alike, than contrived economic alliances.

The intense communal atmosphere in which the election was conducted in the Punjab, although it did not result in outbreaks of communal violence¹¹²⁰ was bound to favor a communally orientated party such as the Muslim League. The Unionist Party in an effort to strengthen its campaign, and neutralize the religious appeal of the League, attempted to enhance its election prospects through the unconstitutional use of Government officials. The strategy was a failure, however, because the League attracted far more support from this class than the Ministry. Nevertheless, the adoption of these tactics by the Unionist Party initially alarmed Provincial League leaders, because they were aware of the tremendous influence Government servants possessed, particularly in the rural areas.¹¹²¹ Both Ghazanfar Ali and Feroz Khan Noon condemned the practice,¹¹²² and the accusation that the Unionists were promoting their electoral chances through the manipulation of Government servants had emerged by the close of 1945 as a major issue in the League's campaign.¹¹²³ In December 1945 League leaders in the Province contacted Woodrow Wyatt in order that their complaints should be aired in the British Parliament, and ostensibly to achieve an impartial enquiry into Unionist malpractices and parliamentary supervision of the elections.¹¹²⁴ Wyatt, who was sympathetic to the League, raised the matter in the House of Commons, and suggested that in order to combat official interference, instructions should be issued to the effect that provincial officials should refrain from taking sides. Also he asked the India Office to consider importing Government servants into the Punjab from other Indian provinces to supervise the election.¹¹²⁵ In pressing these demands the M.P. received unsolicited support from two British army officers serving in India, who, on learning of his efforts through the press, sought to confirm that the League's accusations were sound. On 12 December 1945 Captain Banning Richardson, residing in New Delhi (he had stood as a Labour candidate in Britain, was on the staff of the *Weekly Commentary* pending his demobilization from the Army)¹¹²⁶ alleged in a letter to Wyatt that

¹¹²⁰ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹¹²¹ "The Bureaucracy is the most powerful party in the Province committed to fight ruthlessly against us if it is to survive in its present naked and autocratic form. The entire machinery of Government repression has been launched against the League and every State official is being impressed as an agent of the Unionist Party." Punjab Provincial Muslim League Report for June and July 1944, by Mumtaz Daultana, 28 July 1944, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

¹¹²² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 13 Sept. 1945; 6 Nov. 1945; 27 Dec. 1945.

¹¹²³ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of Sept. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, TORT, GR, Glancy to Wavell, 29 Sept. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹¹²⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 Dec. 1945.

¹¹²⁵ India Office Note (undated) L/P&J/8/470, IOR.

¹¹²⁶ Wyatt to Henderson, 24 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

"Glancy, the Governor is actively participating to try and defeat the Muslim League and Government officials throughout the province are being made use of for the same purpose."

He claimed that his information was common knowledge, referring to it as "an open secret..."¹¹²⁷ Similarly Major E.O.F. Stocker (serving with 25/2 Punjab Regiment stationed at Allahabad) had informed Wyatt that

"A friend of mine had a letter from his brother stating that Khizar [*sic*] Hyat Khan (Unionist P.M.) had asked him to stand as[a]Unionist candidate and had offered him (a) as much money as he needed (is there no legal limit?) (b) the cooperation of the police, district magistrate and deputy commissioner!"

Stocker concluded,

"If the results in the Punjab go against the League we can be quite certain that it will have been due to unionist malpractices."¹¹²⁸

Both the India Office and the Under Secretary for State, Henderson, in spite of these corroborative statements, refused to sanction Wyatt's suggestions, or treat the Muslim League's complaints seriously. The India Office took refuge behind the Punjab Premier's statement to the effect that it would be improper for Government officials to involve themselves in the electioneering. Also, it refused to consider the deployment of Government servants from other provinces on the grounds that it would dislocate the administration of the provinces concerned, and would cause strong resentment in the Punjab.¹¹²⁹ With regard to the allegation leveled by Richardson concerning the conduct of the Governor, Henderson dismissed it on the grounds that it was unthinkable that Glancy would involve himself improperly in the electioneering.¹¹³⁰ In essence the India Office was convinced that the complaints in reality represented an intricate part of the Muslim League's campaign strategy against the Unionists, and as such did not merit serious investigation.¹¹³¹ The dismissal by the India Office of these complaints was unmerited as a serious accusation had been made by a serving British army officer, against the most senior servant of the Crown in the Punjab, and it deserved further examination. Glancy was certainly pro-Unionist, in that he had a very close personal relationship with the Premier, but in the light of available evidence it appears that his friendship with Khizar did not cause him to commit unconstitutional acts as suggested by Richardson. Even so, Glancy adopted a dubious attitude towards the question of

¹¹²⁷ Banning Richardson to Wyatt, 12 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹¹²⁸ Stocker to Wyatt, 9 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹¹²⁹ India Office Note (undated), L/P&J/8/470; Henderson to Wyatt, 29 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹¹³⁰ Henderson to Wyatt, 29 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹¹³¹ *Ibid.*

official preferment, which was known to occur,¹¹³² and he certainly turned a 'blind eye' to it. When questioned by the Viceroy on the seriousness of the League's allegations in October 1945, he replied by arguing that as the elections were not due to begin until January 1946 any accusations made before that date could be discounted as nothing more than threats, or as preparations to excuse defeats.¹¹³³ It was a totally unsatisfactory response, because electioneering was in progress and officials were involved. Also he refused to agree to the Provincial League's request to issue a communiqué assuring voters that the elections would be free from official interference, on the grounds that his own non-partisan attitude was already well known.¹¹³⁴ In reality Glancy was determined to avoid making any statement which could have been construed as a recognition of the League's complaints. Finally in January 1946 Glancy categorically refused to discuss the matter further with the Provincial League, even though such a meeting had been advised by Professor Richards, the leader of the Parliamentary Delegation which visited the Punjab in that month.¹¹³⁵

Despite the denials of the Premier and his Muslim supporters, the recalcitrant attitude of the Governor, and the refusal of the India Office to involve itself in the controversy, there can be no doubt that many officials were deeply involved in the campaigning, both on behalf of the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. It had already been recognized in the highest British Indian quarters that official interference would be a feature of the electoral contest. In a letter to Pethick-Lawrence, written in September 1945, the Viceroy had informed the Secretary of State that the attitude of the average Indian politician to the elections was similar to that which had prevailed in Britain in the eighteenth century. It was generally accepted that the Government in power possessed influence, and would exploit it. Whilst Wavell believed that the majority of officials were honest, he acknowledged that Ministers would undoubtedly put pressure on their subordinates which would result in corrupt practices, as it was much more difficult for Indian than for British officials to remain unaffected by such advances. Also the Viceroy confirmed that the employment of officials for electioneering purposes was not confined solely to the Ministerial party, as the opposition was equally guilty of the practice. He admitted that the Unionist Government had attempted to combat the League manipulation of officials by arranging postings so as to keep officers with known Muslim League affinities out of the key districts. The Unionist Government, the Viceroy reasoned, could defend its actions by claiming that such moves in personnel

¹¹³² Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Sept. 1945, L/P&J/8/472; GR, Glancy to Wavell, 1 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹¹³³ Glancy to Wavell, 5 Oct. 1945, 144J/8/472, IOR.

¹¹³⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 Dec. 1945.

¹¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 15 Jan. 1946. In November 1945 the British Government decided to dispatch a Parliamentary Delegation to India to assess the situation through meetings with Indian leaders, and to impress upon the latter that the British were sincere in wishing to confer independence on India. The Delegation arrived in the country on 5 January 1946; educative though it was for its members it had no measurable effect on the subsequent course of events. See P. Moon (Ed.), *Wavell the Viceroy's Journal*, London, 1973, journal entries 23 Nov. 1945, 5 Jan. 1946, 1 Feb. 1946, pp. 186, 202-203, 208. See also H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, London, 1969, p. 130.

occurred as a matter of routine, and that if the League objected, then they would risk the allegation that their interest in particular officials was improper.¹¹³⁶

Also at least one I.C.S. officer who served in the Punjab has admitted that some Government servants were involved in the campaign. Azim Husain, the son of Fazl-i-Husain, has recalled,

"Though I avoided political topics, nevertheless, I found myself making speeches all over the province in support of the Government..."

Husain asserted, however, that although some individuals acted differently, generally British and Indian I.C.S. officers did not involve themselves with politics, and they made strenuous efforts to act impartially between the different parties and communities.¹¹³⁷

Though the corrupt involvement of I.C.S. officials in the 1946 campaign was, according to Husain, negligible, the same could not be said of Muslim officers serving in the Provincial Civil Service, and their activities were directed chiefly against the Unionist Party, and in support of the Muslim League. The Punjab administration had suspected as early as August 1944 that most Muslim officials supported the League.¹¹³⁸ As the election campaign drew to its climax many Muslim officials openly demonstrated pro-League sympathies. The Muslim Deputy Commissioner for Lyallpur in an appreciation of the situation in his district written towards the close of 1945 reported:

"nearly 80 percent of the subordinate Muslim staff, both revenue and District Board, has active League sympathies and a large number of them have been used as instruments by the League for submitting false and forged applications [for voting rights].... It may truly be said that official support in spite of Government instructions regarding neutrality on the matter is largely on the side of the League rather than of the Unionist Party."¹¹³⁹

The Deputy Commissioner's assessment was certainly applicable in respect of the degree of official support which the League received in the majority of Muslim districts and constituencies in the Province. This is evident from the findings of a survey encompassing 56 Muslim seats; preferment on the part of officials, often resulting in illicit voting, was reported to the Election Commission in 39 of these constituencies, and the League was the principal beneficiary, as the respondent in 29 of the cases was the Muslim League candidate (see Appendix U).

¹¹³⁶ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Sept. 1945, I/NJ/8/472, IOR.

¹¹³⁷ Azim Husain, I.C.S. Papers, p.21. Mss.EUR.F.180/68, IOR.

¹¹³⁸ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug. 1944, L/P&J/5/ 247, IOR.

¹¹³⁹ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 1 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

A number of factors had contributed to ensure that the Muslim League should be the major beneficiary from corrupt communal preferment. In essence the actions of those Government officials, who used their influence in support of the League represented a response to the Islamic appeal of that organization, coupled with the fear that failure to support it would court social ostracism and divine retribution.¹¹⁴⁰ Also Muslim civil servants faced the prospect of serving under a Muslim League Government in the near future, and any official who backed the Unionist Party would be in an unenviable position once the elections were over.¹¹⁴¹ Firoz Khan Noon had made it clear that the Muslim League would deal severely with those who had used their positions in support of Unionist candidates threatening to "bring them to book when we come into power in the Punjab."¹¹⁴² Though this threat was couched as a warning to all officials to avoid interfering in the elections on the side of any party, its real message was clear - those who opposed the League would have to be prepared to face the consequences, for no one could have taken Noon's non-partisan posture seriously. It was common knowledge amongst those who subscribed to the Press that the League was making extensive use of Government servants: the civil service in Sindh was deeply involved in canvassing for the Muslim League, whilst when the Governor of Bengal had ordered all officials to refrain from party politics, Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin, the ex-Premier and leader of the League Party in the Province had criticized the Governor's action.¹¹⁴³ Also when in October 1945 Noon had been confronted with the accusation that the League was employing officials in its campaign, he had not disputed it, but had merely responded rather unconvincingly that two wrongs did not make a right,¹¹⁴⁴ In addition in analyzing the causes for official corruption preceding and during the 1946 elections, it is evident that some officials were influenced by their personal relationships with the candidate. This was the case in Muzaffargarh North, where Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani (Director of Resettlement, Govt. of India) and Captain Mahboob Ali Gurmani (Asst. Recruiting Officer, Multan) were accused of using their official positions to aid their nephew, Mian Muhammad Ghulam Gilani, the Muslim League candidate.¹¹⁴⁵ Finally, bribery also featured as a strong inducement for official corruption. The Muslim League claimed that Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Burq, who was returned as the Unionist member for Alipur owed his success to the fact that he had misused his position as an Honorary Magistrate, and had won the support of local officials, including the returning officers, members of the police force, zaildars and lumbardars, by promising that the Unionist Government would reward them with land in return for their services.¹¹⁴⁶

¹¹⁴⁰ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 26 March 1946, vol. XXV, p. 127, IOR.

¹¹⁴¹ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 Nov. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹¹⁴² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 7 Oct. 1945.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 13 Jan. 1945.

¹¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 12 Oct. 1945.

¹¹⁴⁵ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June, 1946, pp. 326-328, PGSL.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 9 Aug. 1946, pp. 619-632.

The involvement of Government officials, primarily as supporters of the League, was a feature of the elections. The question arises, therefore, as to the motives of the Provincial League in turning the subject of official interference into an election issue in the Punjab, and by confronting the British authorities (both in India and Great Britain) with complaints of preferment by Government servants. These tactics appear to have resulted from two distinct strategies. Initially the League, which had been consistently suspicious of the influence exercised by Government officials, and the support which they would proffer to the Ministry,¹¹⁴⁷ genuinely regarded pro-Unionist activity on their part as being likely to prejudice the prospects of the League in the rural constituencies. Later, as the campaign advanced, and the true strength of the League became apparent, continued criticism of Unionist malpractice regarding civil servants, provided a crude, but nevertheless useful, smoke-screen for similar indiscretions by pro-League officers.

In fact corruption, both on the part of officials and non-officials, including candidates and party workers, was one of the dominant characteristics of the election in the Punjab. It was a 'dirty', and most undemocratic contest from which few successful League or Unionist candidates emerged with 'clean hands'. In addition to the interference by officials, candidates and their party workers resorted to bribery, violent intimidation and coercion to secure votes. In an article which began "Mammon apparently smiles his golden smile at electors to the Punjab Legislative Assembly", the *Civil and Military Gazette* revealed that in some constituencies voters were richer by practically half a year's income for having exercised their franchise in favor of the highest bidder. It reported that during the first week of polling the price of a vote in a number of seats (not named) had risen twenty times, whilst in some cases entire villages had bartered their aggregate vote through their headmen, such communities receiving Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 2,000 according to the number of votes each commanded. Votes were also pledged in return for gifts of food and medical supplies.¹¹⁴⁸ The Provincial Muslim League Working Committee, in October 1945, had alleged that the Unionist Ministry was preparing to distribute 20,000 acres of land in return for support at the polls,¹¹⁴⁹ but the League more than countered the threat which this posed by resorting to similar malpractices. In 24 of the 56 constituencies previously surveyed (see Appendix U) complaints relating to bribery were brought to the attention of the Election Commission, 19 of which implicated Muslim League candidates and their supporters, and in the remaining five Unionist were accused. (see Appendix V).

Amongst those who were incriminated was M. Ghulam Muhammad, who had been elected unopposed on the Muslim League ticket for the East Jhang Muslim constituency. It was reported that Ghulam Muhammad had procured the withdrawal of the three opposing candidates - M. Ghulam Abbas, M. Allahyar Khan and N. Nawazish

¹¹⁴⁷ Punjab Provincial Muslim League Report for June and July 1944, by Mumtaz Daultana, 28 July 1944, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 7 Feb. 1946.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3 Oct. 1945.

Ali - by offering them financial and other inducements. Ghulam Muhammad and his father were accused of having promised to withdraw a Civil appeal - K.B. Sarad Hussain Shah versus Roshnai Bibi and M. Ghulam Abbas - pending in the Lahore High Court. The dispute involved immovable property of very great value; M. Ghulam Abbas was the Defendant Respondent in the case; whilst A. Allahyar Khan was the second Defendant Respondent, and Ghulam Muhammad's father was the Appellant. As the result of the withdrawal both M. Ghulam Abbas and M. Allahyar Khan agreed not to contest the election. Similarly N. Nawazish Ali had been persuaded to 'retire' from the hustings in return for a grant of land.¹¹⁵⁰

Coercion and intimidation also proved to be valuable assets in gaining success at the polls. Out of the 56 constituencies examined (listed in Appendix U), forceful persuasion of this nature occurred in 18 of them; of these the League was cited in 11 instances and the Unionist Party in the remaining seven (see Appendix W). Coercion and intimidation had long been two of the most potent weapons in the landlords' political armory, and it was no coincidence that two of the Punjab's leading Zamindars, Ashaq Hussain (Unionist Minister) and the Nawab of Mamdot (President of the Punjab Muslim League) were numbered amongst the offenders. One zamindar, Sayed Ghulam Qasim Shah of Sher Shah, who had refused to support the Unionist cause in Ashaq Hussain's constituency (Multan), was removed from the Debt Conciliation Board as a result.¹¹⁵¹ No doubt this served as a poignant example to others who might have considered resisting ministerial advances. In Mamdot's case, the treatment afforded opponents was even cruder, for in Ferozepore Central, the Nawab's seat, the politics of the 'big stick' truly prevailed. The Election Commission was informed that the Nawab had threatened important supporters of the Unionist candidate (M. Mohammad Sarwar)¹¹⁵² who were his lessees with eviction, and that he had served notices of ejection on six of them¹¹⁵³ - S. Wali Muhammad (Chak Hameed Saideke), Bagh Ali (Chak Rumwala), Muhammad Shafee (Chak Sotaria), Julal Din (Bhodipura-Jalalabad), Muhammad Hussain (Chak Pannawali) and Bader-ud-Din Khan (Jalalabad) - all of whom were from the Muktsar Tahsil. It was also reported that beatings were inflicted on electors to ensure their support. In fact so much terror and panic was caused in Basti Tankanwali by Mamdot's agents that the District Magistrate, in an attempt to restore order, placed the area under section 144.¹¹⁵⁴ Also complaints of assault were lodged against Mamdot's agents at the Ferozepore cantonment Police Station.¹¹⁵⁵ Even the Premier was not above resorting to coercion. Abdul Ghafur Khan, a member of the Tiwana tribe, complained that Muslim

¹¹⁵⁰ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, pp. 321-322, PGSL.

¹¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 347-348.

¹¹⁵² *Times of India*, 13 March 1946.

¹¹⁵³ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 5 July 1946, pp. 393-398, PGSL.

¹¹⁵⁴ District Magistrates were charged to maintain law and order during elections, and if necessary they were empowered to invoke section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code or section 30 of the Police Act. These measures were intended primarily to be a safeguard against outbreaks of communal rioting. Homein to all Provincial Governors and Chief Commissioners, 12 Oct. 1945, II/P&J/8/470, IOR.

¹¹⁵⁵ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 5 July, 1946, pp. 393-398, PGSL

League agents and supporters were forcibly prevented from canvassing, and that officials played a leading role in inciting mobs to disrupt, and prevent League meetings from being held.¹¹⁵⁶

The reason that intimidation, either through direct acts of violence, threats of the same, eviction or official pressure, was rife and practicable in the Punjab, was largely the result of the method of voting employed there which was unique in British India, and which afforded the elector no protection. An official sat behind a table in the voting booth, surrounded by representatives of the various parties. The voter, often illiterate, entered the booth, and an official indicated the names of the candidates on the voting-paper before him. Thus both the returning officer and the party workers witnessed the choice the voter made, which placed the latter in an exceedingly vulnerable position, and meant in effect that a free election was impossible. In all other provinces each party was represented by differently colored ballot-boxes; the voter cast his vote behind a screen, and could not be viewed by anyone.¹¹⁵⁷ Woodrow Wyatt, fearful that the method of voting practiced in the Punjab would invite widespread intimidation attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the British Parliament of the necessity for making the system in the Punjab more private. The Punjab Government, however, was opposed to any change, ostensibly because the existing practice had operated satisfactorily in 1937, and for earlier elections to the Legislative Council (voting by these means had been used in the Punjab for fifteen years), and was understood and appreciated by the electorate.¹¹⁵⁸ Consequently Henderson (Under Sec. of State, India) refused to challenge the Provincial Government's stance, or support Wyatt, claiming that it would be impractical to alter the existing system.¹¹⁵⁹

The refusal of the Provincial Government to contemplate operating a secret ballot certainly arose from the belief that the existing indiscreet and public practice would favor the Ministry. The League clearly shared this opinion, for it was anxious to eliminate the supposed Unionist advantage, through the inauguration of a more discreet procedure incorporating colored ballot boxes, which would reduce the risk of corrupt official interference and intimidation.¹¹⁶⁰ Despite its fears, however, the retention of the old system, far from prejudicing its prospects, clearly benefited the League far more than the Unionist Party.

In addition to the widespread corruption and intimidation which occurred, the prevailing economic depression which had gripped the Province following the outbreak of war, contributed to the Unionist Party's loss of support. It had caused deep

¹¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 4 Oct. 1946, p. 919.

¹¹⁵⁷ House of Commons, Official Report of Proceedings, 6 Dec. 1945, p. 2699, L/P&J/8/470, IOR.

¹¹⁵⁸ India Office Note (no date), L/P&J/8/470, IOR.

¹¹⁵⁹ House of Commons, Official Report of Proceedings, 6 Dec. 1945, p. 2699, IIP&J/8/470, IOR.

¹¹⁶⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 13 Sept. 1945; 16 Sept. 1945; Punjab Muslim League Parliamentary Board to Sec. of State, 1 Dec. 1945, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

dissatisfaction with the Ministry, which was increasingly portrayed by its opponents as being devoid of any feeling of responsibility towards the Province's poor. It was a charge which the Unionist Party's record supported rather than refuted. It had never possessed the inclination to introduce a programme for social welfare based on a planned economy.¹¹⁶¹ 'Critic' in commenting on these failings in the *Civil and Military Gazette* in July 1945, observed that the Party had never been over-burdened with "constructive vision" or "reformist zeal".¹¹⁶² He further condemned Unionism over its neglect of the urban poor and the peasantry: except for two pieces of legislation - the Rent Act and the Trade Employees Act¹¹⁶³ - the Unionist Government had done practically nothing for the urban poor, whose wages and standard of living had not improved during Unionist rule, and who had experienced tremendous hardships, as a result of the Government's refusal to introduce price controls and rationing to combat the effects of the War upon the economic life of the Province. In similar vein, 'Critic' exposed as a "travesty" the Unionists' claim to be a peasant party: it had ignored the needs of that group; neither land-revenue nor water-rates had been reduced, and all that Unionist agrarian legislation had achieved was the deliverance of the peasants from the clutches of the *bania* and to put them at the mercy of the large landlords. The Unionist Party, 'Critic' concluded, thrived on professional antagonism. It had showed feverish legislative activity as long as the urban rich had constituted its target, but it had done nothing to restrict the power and privileges of the rural rich, or protect the small exploited tenants and farmers.¹¹⁶⁴ 'Critic's' description of the Party was accurate. When in December 1938 there had been an attempt to afford some protection to the tenantry of the Province through legislation to establish their right to hold land for a minimum of four years, Ghazanfar Ali (a faithful Unionist at the time) had secured the rejection of the measure, claiming that it was "obnoxious", "thoroughly bad" and "highly unfair".¹¹⁶⁵ Thus in the words of Sardar Sohan Singh Josh (Communist M.L.A.), the Punjab

¹¹⁶¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 5 Jan. 1943.

¹¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 11 July 1943.

¹¹⁶³ The Urban Rent Restriction Act (1941), applied only to urban areas. It provided for the establishment of a standard rent rate, and it also decreed that if the landlord carried out any improvements to his property, the rent he received could not be increased by more than 6% per annum. Furthermore no landlord could recover from his tenants the amount of any tax he was required to pay on the buildings he owned. In addition no court order would be granted ordering an eviction for the recovery of property if the tenant paid, or was willing to pay the agreed rent, or had not been found guilty of causing annoyance to his neighbors. When a court issued an order to vacate, six months' notice had to be given to the tenant. The Trade Employees Act (1940). The central provisions of this Act forbade the employment of children under 14 years of age in any business or commercial establishment no person (adult) could be employed in such establishments for more than ten hours each day, or fifty-four hours each week. Any employee working overtime was to receive remuneration at double the normal rate, all salaries were to be paid at least once a fortnight, and all employees were to enjoy rest intervals of not less than an hour per day. Any person who had been in continuous employment for not less than one year was entitled to fourteen days' leave with full pay. No employee could be dismissed without sufficient cause, and until one month's notice had been given, or one month's pay in lieu thereof. See Punjab Acts 1939-1942, V/8/210, IOR.

¹¹⁶⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 8 March 1944.

¹¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 2 Dec. 1938.

possessed "a Government of the landlord, by the landlord and for the landlord".¹¹⁶⁶ It was an observation, the validity of which was beyond dispute.

The Provincial Muslim League added its voice to the chorus of discontent. In November 1944 it issued its election manifesto in which it accused the Unionist Ministry of blatantly neglecting the rural peasantry:

"It is in the poverty and degradation of the peasantry that we see the most poignant failure of the present administration and a criminal betrayal of the grandiose promise [to protect the peasants] which had to come to nought because it emanated from a party which had nothing in common with the people and which flourished on their exploitation."

Also whilst the manifesto embraced the national campaign of the A.I.M.L. and pledged itself to establish "free Muslim States in a free and fully independent India", in which the "legitimate claims" of non-Muslims would be respected, it sought to project the League as being dedicated to the material betterment of the Muslims. It undertook to transport the community from "poverty, degradation and darkness into a new world of plenty..." in that it pledged "that the relative backwardness and poverty of our own nation [the Muslims] shall form the foremost concern of all our efforts." To these ends the administration was to be reformed into "a genuine instrument of service to the people..."; the salaries of the lower paid government servants would be increased; backward areas and communities would be developed; industries would be encouraged; industrial labor was to be protected, and the welfare and standard of living of the rural populace enhanced. To achieve the latter, the Muslim League promised to eliminate debt and its causes; the Land Alienation Act was to be further amended to protect rural debtors from the rapacity of large-landlords and agriculturist money-lenders; maternity centers were to be provided within easy access of all villages; drinking-water supplies and irrigation were to be improved; roads and communal granaries would be constructed; a large proportion of Crown lands would be set aside for the use of small cultivators and demobilized soldiers, and not leased to the highest bidder; and waste land would be distributed free of charge to the "poorest peasants". Taxation was to be "progressively placed" on those most able to bear it, and opportunities in industry, "nationalized" transport and on State collective farms would be created to secure employment for demobilized soldiers.

The signatories of the manifesto, Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana (respectively the President and Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League) claimed that the schemes outlined in it amounted to a "radical national reconstruction..."¹¹⁶⁷ In reality it consisted of extravagant, largely impossible, promises,

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 8 March 1944.

¹¹⁶⁷ Manifesto of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, Delhi, 1944, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

which could only have been construed as truly radical had they envisaged a dramatic reconstruction of society. The large landlord, and all the economic and social powers. he commanded, was to remain inviolate. Ghazanfar Ali had been careful to reassure the Province's landed, political elite on this issue; in June 1944 whilst he had emphasized the Muslim League's commitment to the peasants of the Punjab, he had been careful to emphasize that the League had no intention to abolish landlordism.¹¹⁶⁸ The post-independence period, during which the League landlords ruled West Punjab, exposed the hollowness of the manifesto's claims, as the peasantry remained an exploited and disregarded section of Pakistan society.

Future failings, however, had no relevance in the three years immediately preceding the election, and the criticisms which had been current in those years, combined with the publication of the League's promised reforms constituted an unpleasant embarrassment for the Ministry. Prior to the circulation of the Muslim League's manifesto, however, Chhotu Ram had initiated a propaganda campaign in the press to refute the damaging charges. He had focused attention on the fact that in 1937 a land revenue committee had been appointed to examine various methods of providing relief to poor farmers. On the advice of the committee Rs. 55 lakhs had been set aside in every normal year to provide for a 'Peasant's-Welfare Fund', which by the close of 1943 was expected to have amassed Rs. 150 lakhs.¹¹⁶⁹ It was planned, the Minister claimed, to use the Fund to finance cheap credit, promote cottage industries, cooperative marketing, land reclamation and improve village communications, with the view of improving the living conditions of the small farmers and peasants.¹¹⁷⁰ Unfortunately a capital of Rs. 150 lakhs was insufficient to finance Chhotu Ram's schemes, or provide any lasting solution to the problems facing the peasants.¹¹⁷¹ By November 1945 the Fund had grown to Rs. 210 lakhs,¹¹⁷² but the sum remained pitifully inadequate in respect of the grandiose schemes it was expected to achieve. In reality Muslim League leaders, to enhance their leadership claims and prospects at the forthcoming elections, had adopted a false and hypocritical concern for peasant welfare, which the Unionist Party attempted to counter with equally questionable sentiments, and redundant policies. To the poor of the Province, however, promises, regardless of whether they were to prove genuine or not, were far more appealing at the time than a programme which had been seen to fail.

Concurrent with the pretence of anxiety which both Leaguers and Unionists exhibited for the peasantry, the Province, particularly from 1944 onwards, began to experience the full rigors of the economic depression. Up until 1943 a succession of good harvests, the receipt of a large income from military service, and the increases in the price of grain had afforded agricultural proprietors and tenants adequate protection from the rise in

¹¹⁶⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 June 1944.

¹¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 8 Sept. 1943.

¹¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 5 Sept. 1943.

¹¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 8 Sept. 1943.

¹¹⁷² Chief Secretary's Report, Punjab, June and second half of Sept. 1943, I/P&J/5/246, IOR.

the cost of consumer goods. The relative prosperity of the rural population was reflected in the fact that there had been a large increase in the number of mortgages which had been redeemed, and that many agriculturists were engaged in the purchase of bullion. Initially, therefore, it was the urban poor and persons on fixed incomes (e.g. Government servants) who were the hardest hit by the price rises.¹¹⁷³ Instead of implementing measures to alleviate their deprivation the Government appeared to aggravate the problem. In a speech, which epitomized the motivating force behind the Unionist political philosophy, the Minister of Revenue (Chhotu Ram), during a tour of the Province in December 1942, had exhorted wheat producers to withhold their produce from the markets to enable them to capitalize on further price increases. This irresponsible and partisan behavior directly contributed to "the tendency to blame Government for failure to check inflation and profiteering".

Resentment against the Ministry was aggravated rather than mollified, particularly as prices at the end of 1942 had risen even further as a consequence of the shortages of goods which the Province was subjected to. There was a scarcity of salt in four districts, sugar in six, fuel in ten and food grains in thirteen, and the chief sufferers were the poor.¹¹⁷⁴ Inflation was rampant: by January 1943 rice had risen from Rs. 6 a maund in 1939 to Rs. 15 a maund,¹¹⁷⁵ and from a pre-war index of 100, by 1944 ghee had risen to 329, bajra to 262, gram to 281, maize to 273 and wheat to 368.¹¹⁷⁶ Furthermore as from September 1944 cereal producers and agriculturists in general were no longer cushioned against inflation because the value of agriculture produce fell, and as a consequence was unable to keep pace with prices demanded for consumer goods.¹¹⁷⁷ The situation in the rural areas, by the opening months of 1946, had deteriorated even further as a result of the poor quality of the Rabi crop, which Anderson (Financial Commissioner, Revenue) described as the worst which he had encountered in thirty-five years of service in the Punjab.¹¹⁷⁸

The inevitable outcome of the hardships and suffering caused by the recession, aggravated as it was by high prices and shortages, was a feeling of resentment and disillusionment with the Government, particularly amongst the most deprived sections of society. This in itself, however, did not cause the Unionist Government to lose valuable support. The setbacks which the Ministry suffered as a consequence of the economic situation, resulted not from its failure to safeguard the poor from the recession, but because it was unable to maintain the high prices which the comparatively rich zamindars and tenants had been able to demand for their stocks until the end of 1943. The vast majority of the urban and rural poor possessed no means

¹¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, first half of Dec. 1942, L/P&J/5/245, IOR.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 Jan. 1943.

¹¹⁷⁶ R.S. Nakra, *Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab Villages During the War*, Lahore, 1946, p. 15, PPL.

¹¹⁷⁷ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 20 Sept. 1944, WP&J/5/247, IOR.

¹¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 2 Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

whereby they could register their dissatisfaction with Government through the ballot-box, for they were not enfranchised. The vote was restricted primarily to the property-owners and in particular the landed classes who were far less vulnerable to the austerity caused by the economic depression than the landless. It was only when the Unionist Party was forced to abdicate its traditional role of safeguarding the interests of the exploiting, land-owning, grain selling class that it suffered a serious decline in popularity, which could be translated in vote form, and which in turn enhanced the election prospects of the League.

In response to the terrible suffering in Bengal caused by the famine of 1943, the Government of India decided that it was essential to control the supply and price of wheat from the Punjab, the 'granary of India', to prevent it reaching more profitable markets, notably in the U.P., at the expense of the starving Bengalis. The move was fiercely resisted by the Zamindari Ministry in the Punjab. It was denounced by Chhotu Ram¹¹⁷⁹ who had not only encouraged hoarding but who had also assured the zamindars in June 1943 that it was unlikely that wheat would be subjected to any form of price control.¹¹⁸⁰ In October 1943 fifty members of the Ministerial Party moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly expressing the deep resentment of the Province's cereal producers at the Government of India's proposal to impose price restrictions on grain. It was carried without a division.¹¹⁸¹ The opposition parties in the Assembly, in spite of previous League and Congress pretensions of sympathy for the poor, and pledges to support them, in recognition of the importance of the 'landed vote', joined the Government in opposing the Central Government.¹¹⁸² The Unionist Ministry was placed in the most unenviable position, for it was clear that the Government of India would force it to concur with its wishes, at a time when Unionist supporters were demanding that the Provincial Government should resist Imperial pressure.¹¹⁸³ The Viceroy (Linlithgow), however, was adamant that the Punjab's desire for profit would not increase the suffering in Bengal. Despite the fact that Glancy had pointed out that the Unionist Ministry would lose valuable agriculturist support,¹¹⁸⁴ and that it would probably resign if the price control measures were enforced,¹¹⁸⁵ Linlithgow refused to relinquish the position which he had adopted in August 1943. He had informed the Governor then that

"the procurement of the necessary surplus wheat from the Punjab is more important than any political considerations, any interests of the Ministers, and

¹¹⁷⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 Oct. 1943.

¹¹⁸⁰ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of June 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.

¹¹⁸¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 Oct. 1943.

¹¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 20 Oct. 1943.

¹¹⁸³ GR, Glancy to Linlithgow, 30 Oct. 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.

¹¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 30 Sept. 1943, MSS EUR. F.125/92, IOR.

¹¹⁸⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 17 Oct. 1943.

even, in the last resort, the continuance of Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab."¹¹⁸⁶

The following month he emphasized in the strongest terms that it would be impossible for him to defend the Punjabi cultivators from the inevitable charge that would be leveled at them, that they were prepared to blackmail starving Bengalis in order to maintain their profits.¹¹⁸⁷

Consequently in December 1943 the Government of India imposed restrictions on the price of wheat in the Punjab, to be followed by similar controls on other grains, rice, bajra, etc., and the introduction of rationing by 1 March 1944.¹¹⁸⁸ The failure of the Unionist Government to save the zamindars from the consequences of the Government of India's actions, led the former to take matters into their own hands, by resorting to the 'black market', where high prices could be demanded. This in turn caused further friction between the Ministry and its traditional supporters, as it fought to combat the illegal marketeering. By the end of 1945 food grains, including wheat, maize and gram, had as a result of the growers' actions, all but disappeared from the open market.¹¹⁸⁹ The Provincial Government responded by seizing and requisitioning stocks whenever it could locate them. More than any other action, this marked the complete reversal of all previous Unionist policies and sentiments. The once munificent Unionist Party, the 'bulwark' of landed privilege and vested interest had been forced to turn on the 'exploiters', the very class it had represented, and which had guaranteed it power. In February 1946, at the very time Unionism 'was fighting for its political survival, anti-Government resentment spilled over, and agitation against its requisitioning tactics broke out in the districts of Ludhiana, Ferozepore and Hoshiarpur.¹¹⁹⁰

The prevailing economic climate and the unpopular measures which the Ministry had been forced to adopt, provided the Muslim League with the opportunity to capitalize on the situation. In opposing the fixing of price control for grain (see above) the League had avoided offering any offence to the most important section of the electorate, whilst by distributing medical supplies and cloth in rural areas, and by championing the need to increase ration allowances to the villagers,¹¹⁹¹ the League was able to project the image of a humanitarian and caring party eager to serve the poor and needy of the Province. In analyzing the League victory in the Punjab, Talbot has drawn the conclusion that it resulted primarily from its manipulation of the economic grievances of the peasantry, and the promise of solutions to solve the crisis:

¹¹⁸⁶ Linlithgow to Glancy, 17 Aug. 1943, MSS. EUR. F.125/92, IOR.

¹¹⁸⁷ Linlithgow to Glancy, 27 Sept. 1943, MSS. EUR. F.125/92, IOR.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 4 Dec. 1943.

¹¹⁸⁹ D.M. Malhotra (Ed.), *Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, Annual Review of Economic Conditions in the Punjab, 1945-46*, Lahore 1946, pp. 6-7, PBRL.

¹¹⁹⁰ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of Feb, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹¹⁹¹ I.A. Talbot, "The 1946 Punjab Elections", *Modern Asian Studies*, 14, 1 (1980), p. 74.

"The League's ability to provide answers to the economic dislocation of the countryside caused by the War was the key to its success in winning over the Punjabi villagers. Votes were traded off for immediate material benefits and for the promise that Pakistan's creation would solve their social and economic difficulties."

He has concluded,

"The League's demand for Pakistan was certainly legitimized in the minds of the Muslim voters by its religious appeal ... But its potency lay in the fact that it was a systematic expression of the Muslim peasants' interests."

In support of this hypothesis, that the importance of interests out-weighed ideas in mobilizing peasant societies in Asia, he has used as an example Jeffrey Race's argument that the Communist Party's successful takeover of Long An Province in Vietnam was not the outcome of the Communists' ideological appeal but the pragmatic way in which it developed bonds of loyalty between the individual and itself on the basis of its ability to realize concrete local issues of importance in the peasants' lives.¹¹⁹²

There can be no doubt that the recession and the shortages current in the Province made the peasant and villager alike very susceptible to the League's arguments and pledges, but the evidence does not support Talbot's sweeping conclusions. To begin with only a very few individuals, comparatively speaking, could have benefitted from the League's distribution of commodities tactics. The Punjab League was virtually bankrupt by 1946, and had been forced to borrow heavily in order to conduct its campaign. In January 1946 alone it sought and received a loan of Rs. 350,000 from the All-India body.¹¹⁹³ It was in no position to finance action on a scale sufficient to offer "immediate material benefits" to even a small proportion of the electorate. Also economic factors, though important, could only be truly decisive, in the way suggested by Talbot, in an election based on adult suffrage, encompassing all economic strata of society, and which had been conducted along free democratic lines. The elections of 1946, as held in the Punjab, fulfilled none of these requirements. Even so Talbot's argument that Punjabi villagers and peasants were attracted to the League on account of the material benefits it promised them is sound, but it was not the decisive factor in ensuring a League victory, because the villagers and peasants *in toto* did not decide the election. As pointed out previously, only 38% of all Muslim adult males, representing the bulk of the enfranchised Muslim populace, possessed the vote. The resulting electorate was principally confined to those who had a vested property interest in the Province. Thus it was not the vision of a 'welfare State' to be established principally to serve the needs of

¹¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹¹⁹³ Jinnah to Mamdot, 17 Jan. 1946; Jinnah to Amiruddin, 29 Jan. 1946, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File no. 257, pp. 8-9, File no. 224, p. 4.

the peasantry, which swung the landed proprietors and tenantry to the League, but the fact that the Unionist Party had failed, over the issue of price controls and rationing, to safeguard their economic interests. Furthermore there was the knowledge that the landlord elite who controlled the League would do nothing to prejudice those interests, as its opposition to the imposition of a price ceiling on grain had proved.

The League's election victory was not primarily the result of its economic appeal; it was achieved because the League had the support of the majority of the Province's Muslim feudal and religious leaders. The rural Punjab in 1946 constituted a reactionary, paternalistic and feudal world, in which 81% of the land was owned by only 19% of the population.¹¹⁹⁴ The monopolization of the land resources of the Province by this relatively small group, combined with the almost slavish obedience which the Muslim peasantry offered their religious leaders, meant that the squirearchy and the Pirs reigned supreme. Consequently the electoral contest between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party was a thinly disguised battle for power between feudal forces, conducted in an imposed, totally unrealistic, and broken 'democratic' arena. The rural voters were little more than pawns in a game which was decided by their masters, as votes were, more often than not, cast in accordance with the wishes of the landed and religious elites. The great majority of the Muslim seats were situated in the rural areas of the western Punjab, where the landlord and Pir enjoyed tremendous power. In describing the authority which these two groups exercised Malcolm Darling included in his study on the *Punjab Peasant* a description of feudalism in the Alipur Tahsil of Muzaffargarh, which was applicable to the majority of the western districts of the Punjab, and also those areas of the eastern Punjab where large estates, such as those enjoyed by the Mamdot family,¹¹⁹⁵ existed:

"Every five miles or so is the house of a tribal or religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers to enforce his influence on his poorer neighbors, and to conduct his feuds with his equals. The poor man pays blackmail for his cattle to these local chieftains and for his soul to his pir, who may or may not live in the neighborhood, but visits his followers yearly to receive his dues. As would be expected, the bulk of the land is held by the rich men, who are increasing their possessions. Peasant proprietors exist on the outskirts of the small towns: elsewhere the small lord less man cannot hold his own. If he attempted to do so, his cattle would be driven, his women folk carried off, himself *chalaned* (prosecuted) before an honorary magistrate on a charge of cattle theft, and in a short time he would be glad to hand over his land and secure protection on any terms. Society then in the main consists of the land-holding squires, whose local authority is only limited by their mutual jealousies, and of their retainers and

¹¹⁹⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 28 Nov. 1943.

¹¹⁹⁵ The Mamdot estate in Ferozepore comprised 54,381 acres, of which 48,079 acres were cultivated - Report on the Administration of Estates under the Court of Wards in the Punjab, for the year ending 30 Sept. 1907, Lahore, 1908, Statement No. I, p. ii, L 5 VI, IOR.

tenants, who, holding no share in the land which they till, and knowing that an appearance of wealth will lead to exaction from their feudal or spiritual masters, are content to lead a hand-to-mouth existence."¹¹⁹⁶

Whilst Darling has provided an excellent account of the means landlords employed to maintain their hold over the peasantry and the impotence of the latter in resisting exploitation, the passage is misleading in one respect. The Punjab in spite of the prominent position of the large landlords, was a Province where the small peasant proprietor predominated. The holdings of this group, however, were very small, the majority (58%) being under five acres.¹¹⁹⁷ Many of these cultivators were obliged to acquire additional land as tenants in order to supplement their incomes. Also in the western part of the Province, the small proprietors were scattered, there were few large communities, and this factor, together with the small acreage, and consequent lack of viability of the average holding, afforded this group no real protection from the rapacity of the large, powerful landholders. Even in the prosperous canal colonies the power of the landlord class was evident, as the Government had effectively protected its interests. This resulted from the implementation of a policy designed to create a socio-political elite in the colony areas, on the model of the western Punjab; in order to achieve its object the Provincial Government had ensured that the landlord class was well represented in colony areas.¹¹⁹⁸

The grip which the leading Muslim feudal families, particularly of the western Punjab, had on the politics of the province, and their ability to maintain their dominance has been effectively demonstrated by Craig Baxter. He has revealed that from the inception of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) up to Partition (1947) the Muslim politics of the Punjab was controlled by approximately 34 landed families, five of whom enjoyed additional 'Pir' status. In the period 1919 to 1947 these families held no fewer than half the seats allotted to all the communities in the Legislative Council (84 seats)¹¹⁹⁹ and over 50 in the Legislative Assembly (116 seats) at each election. Following the 1937 election, and until 1944-45 the political affiliation of this elitist party was Unionist. By the time of the 1946 elections, however, their corporate allegiance to the Unionist Party had been

¹¹⁹⁶ M.L. Darling, *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*, London, 1925, pp. 112-113.

¹¹⁹⁷ K.T. Shah, *Industrialisation of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1941, p. 33. In 1928 Calvert had estimated that 56% of the holdings in the Province were under five acres - H. Calvert, *Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, The Size and Distribution of Cultivators' Holdings in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1928, pp. 14-17, PPL.

¹¹⁹⁸ F.C. Bourne, *Final Settlement Report, Lower Bari Doab Canal Colony, 1927-35*, Lahore, 1936, pp. 3-5, (9) 5761, IOR.

¹¹⁹⁹ These families included the Awans of Attock, the Chathas of Gujranwala, the Dastis of Muzaffargarh, the Drishaks of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Dahas, Daultanas, Gardezis and Gilanis of Multan, the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh, the Hyats of Wah, the Daranpur Janjuas, the Kalabagh family of Mianwali, the Khaggars of Multan, the Khokars of Jhelum, the Kot Ghebas of Attock, the Legharis and Mazaris of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Bhagbanpura Mians and the Mokuls of Lahore, the Noons and Pirachas of Shahpur, the Qizilbash family of Lahore, the Qureshis of Multan, the Qureshis of Shahpur, the Sials of Jhang, the Tiwanas of Shahpur, and the Wanbachran family of Mianwali. The Pir families included the Pirs of Jahanian Shah (Shahpur), the Pirs of Jalalpur (Jhelum), the Pirs of Rajoa (Jhang), the Pirs of Shah Jiwana (Jhang), and the Pirs of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan). See C. Baxter, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

shattered. This was reflected by the number of Muslim M.L.As who withdrew from politics in 1946, or campaigned for the League. Of the 79 Muslim Unionists who had been elected in 1937 (or those who had been elected at subsequent bye-elections) only 45 contested the elections - 17 for the League, 26 as Unionists and two as Independents. Whereas all the League candidates were successful, as were the two Independents, only eight of the original Muslim Unionists were returned.¹²⁰⁰

The single major contributory factor in causing the desertion of Muslim M.L.As. from the Unionist ranks, and the change of allegiance from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League on the part of the rural aristocracy and landed elite was the decision of the British to leave India. In effect that development rendered the Unionist Party redundant as the effective means of guaranteeing political authority to the Muslim elite in the Punjab; individuals from that class, Firoz Khan Noon amongst them realized that with British withdrawal and the likelihood of Pakistan inter-communal cooperation, as personified by Unionism, was no longer a prerequisite for power in the Province. Similarly with the termination of British rule the Unionist Party would cease to be the repository of patronage, and the guardian of the rural elite's economic interest. Muslim leaders had to decide therefore how best to protect those political and economic areas vital to ensure their continuing dominance. The Muslim League proved the most attractive alternative, for it was evident that in the post-independence era that Party would assume the role previously held by the Unionist Party. These considerations, together with the desire to further personal ambitions had led to the defection of members of the most important feudal families, in political terms - Mamdot, Daultana, Shaukat Hyat, Firoz Khan Noon - to the League in the pre-election period. These families had traditionally provided the Muslim leadership of the Unionist cause, and their exodus precipitated similar action on the part of their personal adherents and political followers, many of whom had blood ties with them. For example those M.L.As who belonged to the Khatwar clan - Mian Nurullah, Allah Yar Khan Daultana, Sheikh Mohammad Amin Khan, Mian Abdul Aziz, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan and Mian Amir-ud-Din followed Shaukat Hyat to embrace the League.¹²⁰¹

The change of allegiance which occurred at this elitist level was not as a consequence of current economic factors, though as has been argued they were in part responsible for the decline in popularity which the Unionist Party suffered amongst the rural proprietors and tenantry generally. The Unionist hold over the Muslim leadership of the western Punjab had begun to disintegrate prior to the rural areas being badly affected by the economic depression.¹²⁰² By December 1944 approximately 30 Muslim

¹²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

¹²⁰¹ Mumtaz Daultana also belonged to this group, though he had declared his allegiance to the League before Shaukat's defection - *Civil and Military Gazette*, 20 April 1944; 3 Dec. 1944.

¹²⁰² Mamdot and Daultana had demonstrated their support for the League by March 1943, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 March 1943. Whilst Shaukat Hyat had secretly declared his allegiance to Jinnah in February 1943, and Ghazanfar Ali had joined the League camp the following August, see pp. 217-218, 223.

M.L.As. had left the Unionist benches to sit with the Muslim League Assembly Party.¹²⁰³ The real significance of this development was not that it gave the League opposition a voice in the Legislature, but that it guaranteed it access, via these leaders and their followers, into the rural areas of the Punjab. Whilst the Unionist Party had remained united it had effectively prevented the League from penetrating the countryside. Up until June 1944 most District Leagues had existed on paper only.¹²⁰⁴ The capacity of the rural gentry to effectively prevent the establishment of Muslim League centers outside of the urban areas was, ironically enough, demonstrated by Mamdot. Although he was President of the Provincial League he refused to permit primary League branches to function on his Ferozepore estates.¹²⁰⁵ Once the Unionist monopoly on the loyalties of the land-owning elite had been broken, however, and a significant number of Muslim League leaders had entered the League's ranks the countryside was thrown open to Muslim League overtures, and even Sargodha, as a result of the change of political allegiance on the part of senior members of the Tiwana clan, did not remain immune from such advances. In this context, whilst Muslim students, particularly from Aligarh, played an important role in conducting propaganda on behalf of the League,¹²⁰⁶ their activities would have been seriously impaired if they had not had the consent and protection of the large landlords in whose districts they operated. Thus it is evident that the support which the feudal aristocracy gave to the League was of the greatest significance in securing for it the landslide victory of 1946. If the rural elite had opposed the League in large numbers there is no doubt that it would not have achieved the spectacular result which their support had guaranteed it, for as the *Civil and Military Gazette* had predicted in September 1945:

"The party which chooses a better set of candidates, keeping in view the local alliances and clannish feelings, will, of course, have a tremendous advantage."¹²⁰⁷

The 'local alliances' and 'clannish feelings' referred to in the article, were symptoms of the landed elite's power to manipulate their followers, dependents and the local peasantry. The League, in addition to the advantage it possessed through the allegiance of this class had the support of the religious leaders of the Province. The combination of landlord and Pir amounted to an irresistible force, against which it was totally impossible for Unionism to succeed, or even survive as a major political entity. Whilst the landlords possessed the resources to influence the electorate through physical and economic intimidation, and by exploiting the loyalties of their clan members and tenants, the Pirs held a potentially more potent weapon - jurisdiction over their

¹²⁰³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 Dec. 1944; 5 Dec. 1944.

¹²⁰⁴ Punjab Provincial Muslim League Report for June and July 1944, by Mumtaz Daultana, 28 July 1944, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

¹²⁰⁵ I.A. Talbot, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

¹²⁰⁶ Talbot has recounted that during the peak of student activity (the 1945 Christmas vacation), there were 1,550 members of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation and 250 Aligarh students conducting propaganda in the Province on behalf of the League - *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹²⁰⁷ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 4 Sept. 1945.

followers' souls. Almost all Punjabi Muslims, aristocrat and peasant, particularly in the western Muslim majority areas of the Province, were the *murids* (disciples) of a Pir, the *Multan District Gazetteer*, 1923-24, recording that "Practically every Muhammadan in the district has his pir".¹²⁰⁸ The *murids* made their devotions at the tombs or shrines of the original saints, whose religious leadership was provided by a Sajjada Nashin, the saint's successor. The Pirs and Sajjada Nashins owed their awesome authority to the belief that as the descendants of Muslim saints - the Sufi divines whose endeavors from the eleventh century had made a major contribution to the proliferation of Islam in the Punjab - they had inherited *baraka* (religious charisma) from their holy ancestors, and were intermediaries who could intercede on behalf of the 'faithful' for God's favor. The bond which existed between Pir and *murid* did not require the latter to adhere to any rigid spiritual discipline, but merely to acknowledge the authority of the Pir, and to seek *baraka* in return for payments or offerings.¹²⁰⁹ In practical terms, the sanctity with which the Pirs were supposed to be blessed was often debased, but their power to command the obedience of their *murids* remained undiminished. In recalling the Pirs (not named) who had influence in Dera Ghazi Khan, Slater (I.C.S., Punjab Commission 1938-47) has written:

"As a wilderness the district had in the past attracted holy men intent on mortifying the flesh, and though their successors were mostly scoundrels, an aura of Islamic purity remained. This, coupled with the gullibility of a generally backward people, made the district a worthwhile target."¹²¹⁰

Irrespective of the personal failings or attributes of the individual Pirs, the hereditary devotion and respect which they attracted made them figures of great influence in the political as well as the religious sphere of provincial life. Both the Mughals and the British, as well as the Unionist and League Parties, recognized that it was essential to accommodate and reconcile the religious leadership of the Province with their administrations and political ambitions. The Gilani Syeds of Multan had been appointed as Governors of Multan during the Mughal period.¹²¹¹ The British also were careful to associate Pirs with their rule. Sajjada Nashins were given appointments as honorary magistrates, *zaildars*, and members of District Boards, whilst the custodians of the shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj at Pakpattan (Montgomery District) were honored as *dabaris*.¹²¹² In order to bolster their electoral prospects in 1937 the Unionist

¹²⁰⁸ DO, Multan, 1923-24, p. 120, IOR.

¹²⁰⁹ D. Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab", *Modern Asian Studies*, 13 (1979) pp. 486-487; I.A. Talbot, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

¹²¹⁰ R.M.K. Slater, 'District Officer's Memoirs (Punjab 1938-47)', pp. 28-30, MSS. EUR. F.180/69, IOR.

¹²¹¹ Nawab Sayyad Yahiya and Nawab Sayad Musa Pak Din were Governors during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan respectively. This family provided the custodians for the shrine of Musa Pak Shahid - L.Griffin and C.F. Massey, *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, Vol. II, Lahore, 1910, p. 324.

¹²¹² Khan Bahadur Makhdum Pir Sadr-ud-din Shah (Syed family of Musa Pak Shahid, Multan District) - Provincial Dabari: Ghulam Yasin Shah and Syad Ghulam Mustafa Shah (sons of the above) Honorary Magistrate and Extra Assistant Commissioner respectively: Diwan Muhammad Ghaus (Syed family of Jalalpur Pirwala, Multan District) -

Party had contemplated seeking the support of the Province's leading Pirs,¹²¹³ but as the 1946 elections approached, however, it was the Muslim League which captured and capitalized from the allegiance of the Punjab's religious leaders.

The Provincial Muslim League's determination to utilize the influence of the Pirs and Sajjada Nashins emerged as one of the dominant and most rewarding tactics of the election. In November 1945 the Chief Secretary's Report to the Viceroy commented on the continuing success which the League was experiencing in attracting religious leaders to its ranks.¹²¹⁴ In fact by September of that year practically all the important Pirs in the Province, including the Sajjada Nashins of the famous shrines of Tonsa, Golra, Alipur, Sialsharif and Jalalpur, had allied themselves with the League,¹²¹⁵ and were actively involved in conducting propaganda in favor of 'Pakistan'.¹²¹⁶ A number of contributory factors had combined to ensure the almost total support of the Punjab's religious leadership for the League. Some Pirs were large landholders, and as a consequence were already involved in the political sphere - the Pirs of Jahanian Shah (Shahpur),¹²¹⁷ Jalalpur (Jhelum), Rajoa (Jhang), Shah Jiwana (Jhang) and Taunsa Sharif belonged to this category. There were others also who, on account of the substantial grants of land which had been awarded to their shrines by the Government, enjoyed the status of powerful landlords. The shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj (Pakpattan) possessed an estate comprising 43,000 acres,¹²¹⁸ whilst that of Sheikh Baha-ud-Din Zakariya in Multan enjoyed a jagir of nine villages worth Rs. 1,780 annually, eight wells and a garden worth Rs. 150 per annum.¹²¹⁹ Similarly the Sajjada Nashins of the shrines

Provincial Dabari: Khan Bahadur Makhdum Hussain (Koreshi Pir, Multan District) had precedence over all other unofficial viceregal Dabaris in the district, "and is thus the premier peer of Multan" - Senior Vice-President, Multan Municipal Committee, Honorary Magistrate: DG, Multan, 1923-24, pp. 105-106, 109, IOR. Khan Sahib Makhdum Muhammad Hassan (Sayyid family of the Makhdum of Sitpur, Muzaffargarh District) - Provincial Dabari, Honorary Magistrate: Ghulam Haidar Shah (Syed family Kot Adu Tansil, Muzaffargarh District) - Zaildar of Alidaha: - DG, Muzaffargarh, 1929, pp. 75-76, IOR. Muhammad Ghaus and Bahadar Shah (Sayyids of Rajoa, Jhang District) - Zaildars: Gul Muhammad (Sayyid of Uch, Jhang District) - Zaildar: Muhammad Shah of Shah Jiwana and Allayar Shah of Kot Isa Shah (Shah Jiwana Sayyids, Jhang District) - Zaildars: - DG, Jhang, 1908, pp. 59-60, IOR. Dewan Said Mohammad (son of Fateh Mohammad Chisti, Sajjada Nashin of Baba Farid Shakar Ganj Shrine at Pakpattan) - Provincial Dabari: - DG, Montgomery, 1933, pp. 108-109, IOR.

¹²¹³ Fazl-i-Husain had been anxious to court the support of the following: the Diwan Sahib of Pak Pattan, the Sajjada Nashin of Mahar Sharif (Bahawalpur State), the Sajjada Nashin of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan), the Sajjada Nashin of Sial Sharif (Shahpur), Khawaja Ghulam Nizam-ud-Din of Taunsa Sharif, the Pir of Golra Sharif (Rawalpindi), Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur (Jhelum), Pir Lal Badshah of Mukhad (Attock), the Sajjada Nashin of Sultan Bahu (Jhang), the Pir of Pir Kot, Mukhdum Murid Hussain Qureshi of Multan, Makhdum Saddar-ud-Din Shah Gilani of Multan, Pir Mohammad Husain Shah of Sher Garh, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah Sahib of Alipur Sharif (Sialkot) and the Pir of Maira Sharif (Rawalpindi): Mushtaq Gurmani to Fazl-i-Husain, 19 June 1936, Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), *Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, Lahore, 1976, pp. 592-594.

¹²¹⁴ Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Nov. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

¹²¹⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 4 Sept. 1945.

¹²¹⁶ Glancy to Wavell, 13 Sept. 1945, A/3/1/105.

¹²¹⁷ The Pirs of Jahanian Shah held an estate of approximately 7,000 acres, see C.S. Chopra, *Chiefs And Families Of Note In The Punjab*, Lahore, 1910, pp. 306-307.

¹²¹⁸ AR, Pakpattan Tahsil (Montgomery District), 1921, pp. 5, 17-18, P/11372, IOR.

¹²¹⁹ L.Griffin and C.F. Massey, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-307.

at Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu and Sharkot (Makdum Nazar Husain, Mian Habib Sultan, Mian Ghulam Jilani and Faqir Ghulam Yasin), in Jhang District, were all large landlords.¹²²⁰ As with the landed elite in general, the imminence of the British departure, heralding as it did a redistribution of the power balance, acted as a decisive incentive to cause many of the Pirs controlling large estates to seek a continuance of the patronage and privileges they enjoyed by openly aligning themselves with the party which appeared to be the most likely successor to the British - the Muslim League. Also some of the Pirs were doubtless encouraged to adopt a similar course out of family considerations. In this respect, Hazrat Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur, the nephew of Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, was extremely active in furthering his uncle's campaign in the Pind Dadan Khan constituency.¹²²¹

So far as the mainstream of the Chisti revivalist Pirs were concerned, Talbot has argued that their pro-League activity was a direct result of the fact that during the 1940's the shrine of India's premier Sufi saint - the Dargah of Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti of Ajmer had become closely connected with the Muslim League. Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg, the Vice-President of the Dargarh Committee, which administered the shrine's affairs, was President of the Ajmer Muslim League. Unfortunately Talbot has not revealed the motives which induced Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg to promote the cause of the League.¹²²² Surely it is evident that in addition to wishing to secure the landed grants and possessions which many Pirs held in the Punjab, the religious leaders of the Province, of all orders, were excited by, and attracted to the prospect of an Islamic State in which they expected to exercise influence and power, and that provided the principal motivating cause for their support for the League. The Provincial Muslim League, through such spokesmen as Feroz Khan Noon, had pledged that a League victory and the birth of 'Pakistan' would achieve such a state, which would be organized according to the tenets of the Quran and the Shariat.¹²²³ The creation of a nation based on these principles was the unique vision of the Muslim League. The Unionist Party despite its 'lip service' to 'Pakistan' remained wedded to an inter-communal philosophy, and it was thus unable to counter the League's 'hot gospelling'. The mythology of an Islamic State presented the Pirs and Sajjada Nashins with practically unlimited scope for the extension of their religious and secular authority, and this guaranteed to the League an almost total commitment from the Province's religious hierarchy. This phenomenon was recognized by Doctor Mahommed Alam, the defeated Unionist candidate who had contested the Rawalpindi Division Towns constituency (urban) in opposition to Feroz Khan Noon:

"The Pirs, Sajjada Nishins and Mushaikhs and Ulemas of Islam in the Punjab and outside Punjab seeing in the achievement of their goal by the Muslim League, an

¹²²⁰ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, pp. 329-342, PGSL.

¹²²¹ *Ibid.*, 26 July 1946, pp. 512-515.

¹²²² I.A. Talbot, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

¹²²³ *Dawn* (Karachi), 11 Nov. 1945; 10 Jan. 1946; 11 Jan. 1946.

opportunity of the revival of their temporal [sic] power besides the extension of their spiritual or *sharai* power upon an unfrequented [sic] scale, were exhorted by the All-India Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam ... to mobilize all the forces of Islam in support of the muslim [sic] League."¹²²⁴

It would be extremely cynical, however, to interpret the collective actions of those Pirs, who were sympathetic to the League, solely in terms of the desire to protect their existing vested interests, or to increase their religious and political authority. As Gilmartin has commented in respect of the Chisti Pirs of Taunsa, Sial, Golra and Jalalpur,

"The thrust of their concern had always been to influence the political leaders and their followers to regulate their lives according to religious injunctions ... The idea of a state in the hands of such leaders was for them perfectly natural, for in the establishment of such a state based on the Shariat, they could see the projection of their local religious work into a larger political arena."¹²²⁵

Also there were religious leaders who were inspired by the concept of Muslim nationalism, as epitomized by the Muslim League, and who considered it to be their patriotic duty to campaign for 'Pakistan'. Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani, the President of the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam, interpreted his pro-League sentiments as an extension of his personal patriotism:

"I shall prefer to be called a communalist, but it shall be tragic for me in this world and the life hereafter if my own nation calls me a traitor."¹²²⁶

Irrespective of the various motives and impulses which led the Pirs of the Punjab to support the League, the outcome of their action was the massive, unprecedented and almost total involvement of the religious hierarchy as propagandists for the Muslim League. Out of 57 constituencies which have been surveyed (see Appendix U), pro-League Pirs were active in 36 of them (see Appendix X). By comparison the Unionist Party could claim the cooperation of religious leaders in only two of the seats. In Shahpur, which the Unionists retained, Sultan Ali Mian (successful Unionist candidate) was able to gain the support of Pir Ghulam Qasim, the Rais of the Multan District. This Pir's family possessed a great deal of land in the Shahpur Tahsil, and he had numerous *murids* there. In the pre-election period Ghulam Qasim had supported the League, but on the eve of the elections his step-mother died, and he became involved in a mutation dispute. It was alleged on behalf of the defeated League candidate, Nur Hussain, that Sultan Ali Mian had secured the Pir's collaboration as a consequence of Manzoor Ali, the Tahsildar of Shahpur, exerting his influence on the Pir's behalf in the pending

¹²²⁴ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 2 Aug. 1946, pp. 589-590, PGSL.

¹²²⁵ D. Gilmartin, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

¹²²⁶ *Dawn*, 1 Jan. 1946.

inheritance case, and that the intervention of the religious leader had been decisive in realizing a Unionist victory.¹²²⁷ Similarly in the Attock South ward, it was reported by Miran Bakhsh, a League supporter, that the prospects of that Party had been adversely affected by the fraudulent claims of the successful Unionist candidate, M. Mohiu-Din Lal Badshah Mukhad, that he was the official League candidate, and that his candidacy had been sanctioned by influential spiritual leaders. A publication, allegedly written by Faqir Maulvi Abdullah, the Sajjada Nashin of Maira Sharif, had been circulated to this effect, and despite the fact that the Faqir subsequently denied authorship of the pamphlet, the confusion caused amongst his numerous *murids* in the constituency, resulted in a Unionist victory.¹²²⁸

The overwhelming majority of Pirs who entered the political arena, however, did so as advocates for the Muslim League (see Appendix X). They preached the politics of the 'Old Testament', and not of the new socialism. Men and women were exhorted to vote for the League, not to secure a better standard of living, but to escape damnation. They spoke a language which the Muslim electorate understood and feared, thereby transforming the election into a 'Holy Crescentade', a battle for Islam, waged by the true followers of the Prophet against the Unionist Kafirs. It was the religious sentiments which the Pirs evoked, and the ignorant fears which they manipulated so effectively, which helped to secure the massive League electoral triumph, not the 'bread and butter' politics emphasized by Talbot. The *Civil and Military Gazette* correctly portrayed the true atmosphere of the election when it acknowledged in January 1945 that religion remained the League's most potent weapon, in spite of the efforts of 'leftists' within its ranks who stressed the socio-economic problems experienced by the masses.¹²²⁹

Religious intimidation was widespread throughout the Province, and *fatwas* threatening excommunication from Islam were issued by, amongst others, Pir Mohammad Fazal Shah of Jalalpur Sharif,¹²³⁰ and Pir Jamaat Ali Shah of Alipur.¹²³¹ In the Muslim constituency of Jhang West the Sajjada Nashins of the shrines of Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu and Shorkot informed their *murids* that whosoever amongst them voted against the League would by that act acquire Kafir status, and that Divine wrath would descend upon them.¹²³² Similarly in Lyallpur a convention of Maulvis under the presidentship of Ali Muhammad warned that,

"It is the commandment of God and the prophet that like the sepoy of Imam Hussain you should join the file of [the] Muslim League. If you do not vote for

¹²²⁷ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 6 Sept. 1946, pp. 814-820, PGSL.

¹²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 28 June 1946, pp. 343-346, PGSL.

¹²²⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 27 Jan. 1945.

¹²³⁰ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 26 June 1946, pp. 353-356, PGSL.

¹²³¹ 'Nawa-i-Waqt', 27 Oct. 1945, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, pp. 325-326, PGSL.

¹²³² *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, pp. 329-349, PGSL.

the League candidate you will be held Kafirs for all time. The wrath of God will fall upon you and the curses of all saints and Pirs"¹²³³

Also Muslim voters were confronted with other awesome inducements. Towards the end of October 1945 Pir Sayed Jamaat Ali Shah, who claimed to have over one million followers in the Punjab, instructed his *murids* and Muslims in general to withhold the right of Muslim burial from those who did not support the League.

"If a Muslim does not vote for the Muslim League do not say his funeral prayer and do not bury him in the graveyard of the Muslims."¹²³⁴

By comparison the Sajjada Nashin of Darbar Ghausia, Japranwali cautioned that any of his disciples who failed to vote for the League would cease to be his *murids*.¹²³⁵ Whilst Muslim electors in Lyallpur and the Rawalpindi Division Towns wards were told that if they abdicated their responsibility towards the League their marriages would no longer be considered as sanctioned or valid.¹²³⁶

The *Zamindar*, in reporting warnings and threats of this nature, emphasized that failure to respond positively to them would render the offenders liable to social and religious ostracism.¹²³⁷ The Pirs, however, exceeded mere threats of social boycott in their fervor to support the Muslim League. They vowed that refusal to adopt the League's cause in this world, would lead to the culprits' eternal damnation in the next. Again Pir Jamaat Ali Shah was prominent in spreading this particular 'incentive'.¹²³⁸ Khizar Hayat, as the chief villain opposed to the Muslim League, was singled out for particular condemnation. Jamaat Ali Shah predicted that Khizar's opposition to the League would be punished by his descent into Hell, and he counseled the Unionist leader to seek salvation through reconciliation with the League.¹²³⁹

Religious leaders outside of the mainstream of Islam, also induced their followers in the name of religion to assist the League. His Holiness the Khalifa of Qadian ordered the Ahmadia community to vote for the League, and Ahmadia spiritual leaders in the constituency of S.W. Gujrat, where there was a large concentration of their co-religionists, proclaimed that those who failed to obey the order would become

¹²³³ *Ibid.*, 13 Sept. 1946, p. 843, PGSL.

¹²³⁴ '*Nawa-i-Waqt*', 27 Oct. 1945, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, p. 326. PGSL.

¹²³⁵ '*Nawa-i-Waqt*', 27 Jan. 1946, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 597. PGSL.

¹²³⁶ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 13 Sept. 1946, p. 844; 26 July 1946, p. 528, PGSL.

¹²³⁷ *Zamindar*, 7 Dec. 1945, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 5 July 1946, p. 411. PGSL.

¹²³⁸ '*Nawa-i-Waqt*', 5 Jan. 1946; Ehsan, 27 Jan. 1946, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 590. PGSL.

¹²³⁹ '*Nawa-i-Waqt*', 5 Jan. 1946, quoted in *ibid.*, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 590, PGSL.

Kafirs.¹²⁴⁰ This sect was regarded by orthodox Muslim opinion as heretical. The Ahmadia leadership in championing the League had attempted to ensure the sect's future by joining rather than opposing the demand for 'Pakistan' for not only would opposition to the movement have been futile, it could have proved fatal for so small and vulnerable a minority.¹²⁴¹ Not all the Pirs, however, were content merely to rely on their own authority in directing the orthodox Muslims to embrace the League. At least one, Pir Walayat Shah, the Sajjada Nashin of Darbar Sharif (Pind Dadan Khan) claimed to have received instruction on the matter through mystical communion with the Prophet:

"My followers from the Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan, etc., have been inquiring about which of the present Political Parties is on the right path, so as to deserve their support. I took to meditation for a considerable time, during which I experienced visitations of the Prophet. He told me that only the Muslim League was on the right path, and was a Muslim party in the real sense. He also said that whoever did not want Pakistan, was not a Muslim. I am ready to say all this before a crowd of millions and under the oath of the Quran - about whatever I have seen and heard from the Prophet ... I have arranged a deputation, which will tour the villages and inform them."¹²⁴²

A similar supernatural experience, which favored the League, was widely circulated in the Southern Towns constituency. Syed Mahmud Shah, who had stood unsuccessfully as an Independent candidate related to the Election Commission that,

"At a meeting of the Muslim [League] held at Kathal during the election days, a dream was related in which it was said, that Mr. Jinnah was seen sitting by the side of the Holy Prophet and the Holy Prophet said, pointing out to Mr. Jinnah 'he [*sic*] is my representative on earth now. Those who will not follow him will not be of me."¹²⁴³

The exploitation of Islam as an electioneering tactic, naturally aggravated communal divisions, enhancing still further the cause of the League, and its claim to be the sole protector of the Muslim faith. In Gujranwala North, the successful League candidate, Chaudhri Salah-ud-Din, described the Unionist Party not only as the enemy of Islam, but he asserted that it had accepted Gandhi in the Prophet's place as its spiritual and

¹²⁴⁰ The Ahmadia leaders were Syed Riaz Hussain, Nawazish Hussain of Jhira wali, Pir Fazal Shah of Julia, Pir Sharif Ghulam Hussain Totha, Master Mirza Khan of Pindi Lala, Hafiz Mohd. Hussain of Senthall, Mian Khan of Chak, and Master Ghulam Haider Sohawa Warrchan. *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 5 July 1946, pp. 403-405, PGSL.

¹²⁴¹ Over 95% of the Muslim population in the Punjab were Sunni (14,276,642) and more than half the remainder were Shia (338,779). The 'Reformers' sects accounted for only 1.6% (241,418) of the total, the Ahmadis numbering 55,908 (0.4% of total Muslim population). *Census of India*, 1931, Punjab, Part I, p. 313, IOR.

¹²⁴² '*Nawa-i-Waqt*', 16 Jan. 1946, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 26 July 1946, p. 539, PGSL.

¹²⁴³ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 16 Aug. 1946, pp. 706-708, PGSL.

religious guide.¹²⁴⁴ Similarly, Firoz Khan Noon through the auspices of the Zamindar declared:

"In the coming elections your vote is for the prophet [sic] ... On one side are khiziri Muslims. Votes for Khizar are votes for Gandhi, they are not for Muhammad the Holy prophet [sic]"¹²⁴⁵

Whilst the Muslim voters of Muzaffargarh North were encouraged, by League agents to believe that if the Unionists won the election the Quran would be re-written in Hindi.¹²⁴⁶

Crude indoctrination along these lines, together with the *fatwas* and directives of the Pirs, was intended to alienate the Unionist Party completely, and there can be no doubt that the measure succeeded. The *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Ehsan* and *Zamindar* newspapers each played a prominent role in ensuring that the Muslim electorate of the Punjab was acquainted with the religious aspect of the election, and the fate that would befall those who ignored their spiritual guides.¹²⁴⁷ In order that illiteracy should not prove a barrier to the dissemination of this propaganda, League agents were employed to read the respective *fatwas* and newspaper articles at League election rallies throughout the Province,¹²⁴⁸ (for an example of a typical League election poster see Appendix Y).

The Unionist Party, unable to muster any influential religious leaders to defend it, or to sanction its opposition to the Muslim League, attempted to combat the latter's manipulation of religious sentiment by scurrilously hinting at improper and un-Islamic behavior on the part of prominent Leaguers, and by attempting to ban religious appeals. With regard to the first tactic, a two-leaf folder containing two photographs was widely circulated. One picture was of Jinnah, taking the salute from a squad of Muslim girl volunteers, and the other featured Lady Noon (the European wife of Firoz Khan Noon) watching a cricket match in the company of a number of Sikh chiefs. In view of the importance of *purdah* in Islam, the publication was intended as a rebuke for the League, which represented itself as the champion of Islamic tenets. The pamphlets were sold by hawkers outside the election booths, to the cry of "Pakistan for four annas".¹²⁴⁹ In respect of the Ministry's attempt to prevent religious orientated electioneering, the Premier, in a press statement issued in January 1946, emphasized that it was a criminal offence to influence the electorate through threats of divine displeasure.¹²⁵⁰ Despite this warning the Government had not been enthusiastic in

¹²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 26 July 1946, pp. 548-553, PGSL.

¹²⁴⁵ *Zamindar*, 9 Jan. 1946, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 591, PGSL.

¹²⁴⁶ *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, pp. 326-328, PGSL.

¹²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 21 June 1946, pp. 286-287, PGSL.

¹²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 26 July 1946, pp. 537-538, PGSL.

¹²⁴⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 22 Jan. 1946.

¹²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 22 Jan. 1946.

accepting responsibility for a direct ban, and it suggested that the Governor should issue the necessary ordinance to achieve the objective. Glancy, however, realizing that such action would inflame the situation refused to meet the request. The Ministry, therefore, was forced to resort to its own resources, and orders were issued authorizing sub-Divisional Magistrates to register all complaints relating to religious intimidation.¹²⁵¹

As Glancy had foreseen, the Unionist attempt to muzzle the Pirs, and prohibit the use of religion as an inducement for support, was a tactical mistake, for it reinforced, rather than reduced the religious appeal of the Muslim League. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam conference held in Lahore in January 1946, which had attracted an attendance of 20,000, including Pirs and *ulema* from the Punjab, Delhi, U.P. and N.W.F.P., condemned the Unionist measure, and urged Muslims to oppose it by resorting to individual civil disobedience.¹²⁵² Pir and politician alike responded to the appeal for defiance. Chan Pir, the son of the leading Sajjada Nashin of Montgomery District, declared:

"If it is against the law to invoke divine displeasure for the Holy cause of Islam and Pakistan, I defy the law. I asked my followers to vote only for the League Candidates to defend Islam and Pakistan ... Those voting for Unionists are black sheep and hypocrites. I give my *fatwa* and openly say that posterity will curse them..."¹²⁵³

In similar vein Firoz Khan Noon condemned the Ministry:

"This action is mainly aimed at Muslim League workers including the Pirs, our spiritual leaders who have served selflessly in awakening [the] Muslim masses The present Government make it a crime for us to mention the name of God and Islam to the electorate. How can we divorce the Muslim League from Islam. Islam is inherent in what we preach from the Muslim League platform."¹²⁵⁴

Begum Shah Nawaz also announced her intention to defy the bar on invoking divine displeasure.¹²⁵⁵

Thus the Ministry's maneuver was interpreted as an attack, not only upon the League, but on Islam, and the rights of the Pirs to direct the actions of their *murids*. Whilst it is evident that the Unionist Ministry had acted from desperation, the course it chose to follow did nothing to alleviate its difficulties, for it was represented to the Muslim community by the League as a sign of the Unionist Government's contempt for their

¹²⁵¹ GB, Glancy to Wavell, 2 February 1946, 1/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁵² Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of Jan. 1946, 1/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁵³ *Eastern Times*, 31 Jan. 1946, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 26 July 1946, p. 540, PGSL.

¹²⁵⁴ *Dawn*, 27 Jan. 1946.

¹²⁵⁵ *Statesman* (Calcutta), 28 Jan. 1946.

religion, and its intention to destroy it. The *Nawa-i-Waqt* in particular fabricated and encouraged these misconceptions: "Under Malik Khizar Hayat's rule, it will be considered a crime to mention the name of God and his Prophet".¹²⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the futile attempt to neutralize the religious impact which the League had enjoyed emphasized the Unionist Party's recognition of the acute danger it posed to its continuing political survival. In fact as the defection of the landlords had foreshadowed the disintegration of the Party's majority, the condemnation heaped upon it by the Pirs, ensured its total destruction as a political force in the Province. Glancy had, in part, recognized the consequences for Unionism posed by the intrusion of religious fanaticism into the election campaign, when he predicted to the Viceroy in February 1946,

"there seems little doubt that the Muslim Leaguers, thanks to the ruthless methods by which they have pursued their campaign of "Islam in danger," will considerably increase the number of their seats and that Unionist representatives will correspondingly decline."¹²⁵⁷

The Governor's prediction proved to be correct, though its tone suggests that Glancy had failed to realize fully the dramatic and sweeping results which the exploitation of religion, particularly by the Pirs, would achieve. The verdict, recorded by Dawn in March 1946, however, fully appreciated and formally recognized, the crucial impact which the religious leadership had had in deciding the election in the Punjab:

"What are the factors that have brought about the Revolution in Pakistani Lands? What has made the great change possible? ... the greatest praise must be lavished as far as the Punjab is concerned on the Pirs and Mashaiks, who when they saw the Pakistani nation in mortal danger, emerged from their cells, and enjoined upon their followers the duty to resist evil and vote for the League and Pakistan ... Among the Pirs the most creditable work has been done by the Pir of Sial, the Pir of Golra, Pir Jamat Ali Shah, the Gilani Pirs of Multan, Chan Pir of Montgomery, and scores of others who deserve equal praise."¹²⁵⁸

Dawn, in expressing its recognition of the role played by the spiritual leaders, attributed the massive victory the League had achieved in the Punjab to their intervention. There is no doubt that this appreciation was sound, for had the religious leadership of the Punjab refrained from committing themselves to the contest with such intensity and in such strength, the election would have been decided largely by the feudal landed factions. The evidence suggests, because of the defections which had occurred from the Unionist to the League ranks by powerful elitist feudal groups that the Muslim League

¹²⁵⁶ *'Nawa-i-Waqt'*, 20 Jan. 1946, quoted in the *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 26 July 1946, p. 539, PGSL.

¹²⁵⁷ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 2 Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁵⁸ *Dawn*, 26 March 1946

would have captured a majority of Muslim seats, but the combination of landlord and Pir gave it an almost total victory, resulting in the annihilation of the Unionist Party.

Peter Hardy, in commenting on the 1946 elections, has concluded that,

"In the Panjab ... the Muslim League gained its electoral victory by making a religious appeal over the heads of the professional politicians."¹²⁵⁹

This analysis, though it has stressed the importance of the League's manipulation of religion, is clearly open to question. Muslim politics in the Punjab remained the almost exclusive reserve of a powerful landed oligarchy, and it was this class which furnished the Province's professional politicians', as personified by Mamdot, Daultana, Shaukat Hyat and Noon. In reality these political representatives of landed interest, in unison with the religious hierarchy of the Punjab, ensured the continuation of landed dominance in the political sphere. In effect they harnessed religious fears and fanaticism to ensure the victory of their chosen vehicle, the Muslim League, which they had fashioned as a repository of feudal power to challenge, and eventually to destroy, the Unionist Party. Their successful manipulation of that potent force was recognized and condemned by Khizar, when following the election he bitterly declared,

"Call me whatever names you like. I can say that I have not duped people in the name of religion nor have I exploited the name of religion for my personal ends."¹²⁶⁰

His inability to do so, in conjunction with the desertion of powerful landed elements, had cost the Unionist Party the election, but the feudal elite to which Tiwana belonged had been the beneficiaries, not the victims of the Unionist reversal. Intimidation, coercion, corruption and bribery, in themselves the hallmarks of feudal politics had each contributed to the eventual result, as had the prevailing economic situation, but essentially it was feudalism which had triumphed, ensuring that the League success represented a victory for the landlord and the Pir.

¹²⁵⁹ P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, p. 238.

¹²⁶⁰ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 28 March 1946, Vol. XXV, p. 211, V/9/3836, IOR.

CHAPTER VIII

A HOUSE DIVIDED - PUNJAB NEMESIS, MARCH 1946 to AUGUST 1947

The election of 1946 had conclusively endorsed the Muslim League's claim to represent Indian Muslims. Despite its capture of the majority of the Muslim constituencies, however, it was able to form ministries in only two provinces - Bengal and Sindh.¹²⁶¹ In the Punjab its attempts to create a government were frustrated. As in the pre-election period no single communal party could control the Legislature, or hope to form a stable Ministry. Whilst the Muslim League had emerged as the largest single party following the election, its exploitation of religious fanaticism, and its determination to realize its national goal had alienated the minority parties, who consequently refused to coalesce with it in the Assembly. Their opposition to the League was aided by the continued alienation of Khizar and the Muslim Unionist 'rump', and the unwillingness of the British Governors (Glancy and Jenkins) to commit the administration of the Province to the League. Unable to assume power in the Punjab, the Provincial Muslim League initiated a campaign of civil disobedience to overthrow the Congress-Sikh-Unionist Government which was formed under the premiership of Khizar Hayat in March 1946. As a direct consequence of the League's strategy communal tension in the Province mushroomed, forcing the Punjab to the precipice of internecine warfare, and precipitating the imposition of Governor's rule. The suspension of provincial autonomy, and the failure of the political parties, and the British, to resolve the situation, combined with the acceptance of the major national leaders, including Jinnah, that Pakistan could only emerge as a consequence of territorial division, made the partition of the Punjab inevitable.

The attempt of the Provincial Muslim League to form a Ministry following its election victory was doomed to failure as it was unable to endorse any compromise over the vital issues of 'Pakistan', its claim to be the sole representative of the Muslim community, and the Sikh demand for an independent State. The inability of the League to make vital concessions was a direct consequence of the election campaign it had conducted, and the expectations it had nourished amongst the Muslim electorate. Wavell, in an appreciation of the situation recorded on 3 December 1946, referred to this dilemma:

"The Muslim League leaders raised the cries of Pakistan and Islam in danger originally to enhance their prestige and power and thus their bargaining values as a political party. They have now so inflamed their ignorant and

¹²⁶¹ P. Moon (Ed.), *Wavell The Viceroy's Journal*, London, 1973, p. 221.

impressionable followers with the idea of Pakistan as a new Prophet's Paradise on earth and as their only means of protection against Hindu domination, that it will be very difficult to satisfy them with anything else."¹²⁶²

The League, however, was not only constrained by the necessity of not appearing to betray the expectations of its supporters, but also by the fears which its religiously orientated electioneering, especially its pledge to found a Quranic State, had aroused amongst the non-Muslim minorities. An unnamed 'Unionist' gleefully portrayed the invidious position of the League in an article published in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, commenting that, "by resorting to Hitlerian and Fascist methods and by invoking the threat of divine displeasure..." the League having once worked up communal hatred and contempt, was unable to create a coalition Ministry.¹²⁶³

This was particularly true in the case of the Sikhs, whom the League approached in February 1946 in an attempt to gain their support. Although the Provincial Muslim League leadership had agreed to the Panthic Sikh group's demand of a 25 percent share of all Ministerial and Service appointments,¹²⁶⁴ negotiations had collapsed over the Provincial League's blunt refusal to define the position which Sikhs would occupy in a Muslim State.¹²⁶⁵ Denied Sikh cooperation the League approached the Congress Party, through Azad (Congress President) and Bhim Sen Sachar (Congress Provincial leader) on 2 March 1946. Azad tacitly agreed to permit the Provincial Congress Party to form an alliance with the League, and the Akali Party, subject to the League's acceptance of three conditions. Firstly, a programme acceptable to the three parties in the proposed coalition had to be formulated; secondly, the scope of the coalition would be limited to administration, and not involve itself with all-India issues; thirdly, there would have to be parity in the Cabinet between the Muslim League on one side, and the Congress and Akali parties on the other.¹²⁶⁶ Although the second condition was completely unrealistic, as the Punjab could not be divorced from a national settlement, the Congress-League talks were disrupted over the issue of Cabinet appointments. Azad refused to undertake not to nominate a Congress Muslim for a Ministerial post,¹²⁶⁷ and Jinnah fearing that such an appointment would disrupt Muslim solidarity in the Punjab Legislature and would endorse Congress claims to represent all communities, rejected Azad's terms.¹²⁶⁸

In view of Azad's insistence on having the right to include a nationalist Muslim (i.e. Congress Muslim) Minister, when the issue had previously caused the breakdown of

¹²⁶² Note by Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence and A.V. Alexander, 3 Dec. 1946, *ibid.*, p. 387.

¹²⁶³ *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 5 May 1946.

¹²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 3 March 1946.

¹²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1 March 1946; GB, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/ 57250, IOR.

¹²⁶⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 6 March 1946.

¹²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 6 March 1946; 7 March 1946.

¹²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 7 March 1946; 21 March 1946; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 19 L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Wavell's Simla initiative it is evident that the Congress had no genuine desire to accommodate the League for the purpose of forming a provincial Ministry. In fact the Congress had been exploring the possibility for the formation of a combined opposition to the League from the beginning of January 1946;¹²⁶⁹ the failure of the nationalist Muslim and Ahrar candidates, and the virtual elimination of the Unionist Party, had intensified rather than lessened its resolve in this respect.¹²⁷⁰ The attitude of Khizar was vital to Congress ambitions, especially as following the election, and the failure of the League to coalesce with either of the other major parties (Congress and Akali), the Unionist 'rump' held the balance of power in the Assembly between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups.¹²⁷¹ The Congress Party, through Azad, had contacted the Premier in February 1946 to seek his support. By mid-February Khizar had informed the Governor that he was considering a political alliance with the Congress to oppose the League,¹²⁷² and despite the denial of Gopichand Bhargava (leading Congressite in Punjab, M.L.A., and Member of Partition Committee), in response to a *Civil and Military Gazette* article (24 Feb. 1946) which named him as the Premier's intermediary with the Congress High Command, that he had played such a role, Khizar admitted at the end of the month that he had been holding talks with Azad. Khizar maintained, however, that he had sought the Maulana's influence to restrain students sympathetic to the Congress from committing disturbances.¹²⁷³ This explanation, however, was completely erroneous, the real reason for the discussions had been to prevent the Muslim League from taking office.

In his report to the Punjab Boundary Commission, Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir claimed that Khizar had been tempted by Azad to join forces with the Congress on being assured the Premiership.¹²⁷⁴ This assessment, however, born out of the utter contempt with which the Muslim community in general regarded Khizar's actions, was incorrect. It was not the love of office which had secured the Premier's continued opposition to the League, but his determination to continue Fazl-i-Husain's policy of inter-communal cooperation.¹²⁷⁵ "I had the foolishness or die-hardness not to have changed color. I was a Unionist and I am a Unionist."¹²⁷⁶ Also it is evident that Khizar hoped that 'Unionism', despite the crushing defeat it had suffered at the polls, would still have a part to play in Punjabi affairs, and that in spite of the League victory 'Pakistan' might not materialize. In November 1946 he told Wavell that he believed that the British would be compelled to remain in India,¹²⁷⁷ and that,

¹²⁶⁹ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of Jan. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, second half of Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁷¹ Muslim League - 73 seats, Congress - 51 seats, Akali - 22 seats, Independents - 9 seats, Unionist - 20 seats: *Times of India* (Bombay), 13 March 1946.

¹²⁷² P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, journal entry, 14 Feb. 1946, p. 211.

¹²⁷³ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 28 Feb. 1946.

¹²⁷⁴ *Proceedings and Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission*, vol. III, p. 95, PGRC.

¹²⁷⁵ *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 23 March 1946, vol. XXV, p. 53, V/9/3832, IOR.

¹²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 25 March 1946, vol. XXV, p. 93, V/9/3833, IOR.

¹²⁷⁷ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

"in fact he did not see how they could leave, that Pakistan was nonsense ... that Jinnah's policy was all wrong; and that the Punjab would get of perfectly well by itself if only it was left alone."¹²⁷⁸

In this context he urged that the Province should be granted Dominion status under the Crown.¹²⁷⁹ Khizar's confidence that the Punjab could survive independently of 'Pakistan' had received encouragement from Attlee in August 1946, when the latter had assured him that he would not permit the 'Balkanistan' of India, or the break-up of the Punjab. Following the end of British rule and Partition, Khizar ruefully admitted that "I believed as long as Attlee was there, there would be no partition of Punjab or India."¹²⁸⁰

Thus Khizar's continued opposition to the League, in concert with the Congress Party, reflected his complete inability to interpret or appreciate the course which Indian history was pursuing. In spite of the overwhelming League electoral victory in the Punjab, and in India generally, he stubbornly maintained a provincial, as opposed to a nationalistic outlook, fired by the totally misplaced optimism that the British could ignore the verdict of the Muslim electorate, and that they retained the power to deny 'Pakistan'. Even so he had no illusions concerning the Congress Party, he regarded cooperation with it as a necessary evil, bluntly informing the Cabinet Delegation¹²⁸¹ that Britain should not consider withdrawing from India until they could transfer power to something much better than the Congress.¹²⁸²

The Unionist-Congress alliance, as such, was a 'political marriage of convenience', born of their mutual opposition to the League, but the maneuver could not have succeeded without Sikh aid. The failure of the League to reassure the Sikh leadership propelled it to join the opposition which was forming around the Congress Party. Nevertheless the Sikh Akali leaders, particularly Master Tara Singh and Gilani Katar Singh, were suspicious of the Congress, which they regarded primarily as a Hindu organization which could not be trusted to safeguard Sikh interests.¹²⁸³ In March 1946 Azad was able to gain their support, however, by virtually conceding the Panthic claim to be the sole representative of the Sikh community, in so far as the practical business of Cabinet-making was concerned. Out of a proposed Cabinet of six the Panthic Party was allotted the seat reserved for Sikhs, though the office of Deputy Speaker and two Parliamentary Secretaryships were awarded to nationalist (i.e. Congress) Sikhs.¹²⁸⁴ Azad's refusal to

¹²⁷⁸ P.Moon (Ed.), ta.cit., journal entry 20 Nov. 1946, p. 379.

¹²⁷⁹ GR, Jenkins to Colville, 30 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Jan. 1947, 11110/5/250, IOR.

¹²⁸⁰ Undated Note on the Tiwanas by Khizar Hayat, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

¹²⁸¹ The British Government in January 1946 decided to send a Cabinet Delegation to India in an effort to solve the problems inherent in British withdrawal and the transfer of power. It consisted of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander.

¹²⁸² P. Moon (Ed.), op. cit., journal entry 5 April 1946, p. 238.

¹²⁸³ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of March 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁸⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 6 March 1946.

offer a similar concession to the League, concerning the composition of the Cabinet, emphasized the true purpose of the Congress strategy, which was to prevent the League assuming responsibility in the Punjab. The Unionist-Congress-Akali coalition, therefore, coalesced simply to deprive the Muslim League of Ministerial power, as was emphasized by the mutual undertaking to limit their co-operation solely to provincial administration, each group retaining its individual identity outside the Legislative Assembly.¹²⁸⁵

Despite the accord which existed amongst the coalitionists, Mamdot requested the Governor on 6 March 1946 to invite him to form a Ministry, on the grounds that the Muslim League Party was the largest single party in the Legislature, in that he commanded the support of 87 Muslim and non-Muslim M.L.As (78 Muslims, 2 Hindus, 4 Scheduled Caste, and 2 Indian Christians, 1 Sikh). The Governor, however, refuted his claim as intelligence reports indicated that only one Scheduled Caste and one Indian Christian was prepared to support the League, giving it an Assembly strength of 80. By comparison Glancy estimated that the Coalition controlled 90 M.L.As (15 Unionist, 50 Congress, 23 Panthic, 1 Independent and 1 Indian-Christian),¹²⁸⁶ and whilst he recognized that it was an "ill-assorted conglomeration and there is no saying how long it will last", the fact that it commanded a majority compelled the Governor to request Khizar, as the leader of the group, to form a Ministry.¹²⁸⁷

Glancy's decision was bitterly resented by Provincial League leaders, despite the fact that the Governor believed that Mamdot was not over anxious to assume responsibility for the Ministry:

"I was left with the impression, though I cannot vouch for its correctness, that the Nawab was *personally* not particularly anxious to form a Ministry in the circumstances in which he was placed."¹²⁸⁸

Provincial League leaders interpreted the Governor's reluctance as symptomatic of anti-League bias on his part; Mamdot alleged that as the leader of the largest Party commanding a majority in the Assembly, it had been incumbent upon Glancy to ask him to form a Ministry, but he had failed to do so because he was determined to install Khizar as Premier.¹²⁸⁹

There is no doubt that the Governor possessed a high personal regard for the Unionist leader, but there is no evidence to suggest that he had been a party to a Congress-Unionist-Akali intrigue to frustrate the League, or that he had acted unconstitutionally.

¹²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁶ Note by Glancy, 7 March 1946, enclosure Abell to Clauson, 11 March 1946, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹²⁸⁷ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 15 March 1946, II/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹²⁸⁸ Note by Glancy, 7 March 1946, enclosure Abell to Clauson, 11 March 1946, L/P&J/8/462, IOR.

¹²⁸⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 March 1946; *Times of India*, 7 March 1946.

In February 1946, at a time when he believed that the League and the Congress would control 60 and 50 seats respectively in a House of 175, which made it imperative for either side to seek political allies, he had been opposed to the creation of a Unionist-Congress coalition, considering such a move to be unwise as it could have prevented the League from adopting a moderate approach.¹²⁹⁰ But once the tripartite alliance had assumed form, the Governor could not ignore it, or deny it the right of assuming the administration of the Province if it enjoyed a majority. In the original talks which Mamdot had with Glancy on 6 March, the former had been unable to substantiate his claim concerning the support he professed to enjoy. In the course of the interview the Governor established to the satisfaction of Mamdot that the two Hindu Unionists whose adherence he claimed had decided to remain in the Unionist Party,¹²⁹¹ and Mamdot finally admitted that he was confident of the support of only one of the two Indian Christian M.L.As. he had listed. Also when questioned by Glancy on the true political affiliation of the Scheduled Caste members Mamdot had cited, the Nawab replied that it was impossible to verify their support for the League "as they had left Lahore either of their own account or under persuasion..."¹²⁹² Thus Mamdot's allegation that the Governor had blatantly disregarded his claim to possess a majority was totally false. Also the Nawab's contention that the Governor was required to invite him as the leader of the largest single party to form a Ministry was incorrect. The only statutory obligation imposed on a Governor was

"to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgment is most likely to command a suitable majority in the Legislature those persons ... who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the Legislature."¹²⁹³

The Provincial Muslim League, having failed to reach an agreement with either the Congress or the Akali Party, or to provide concrete proof of its ability to command a majority in the Legislature, was in no position to enjoy such consideration.

The exclusion of the Muslim League and the installation of the Coalition Government, relegated the Muslim community, as represented in the Assembly, to a position of permanent opposition. The Unionist-Congress -Akali alliance, in spite of the inclusion of the small number of Muslim Unionists (11)¹²⁹⁴ was a Government of the minority

¹²⁹⁰ P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, journal entry 14 Feb. 1946, p. 211.

¹²⁹¹ Glancy confronted Mamdot with a letter signed by the two Hindu M.L.As. expressing their decision to continue as students - Note by Glancy, 7 March 1946, enclosure Abell to Clauson, 11 March 1946, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

¹²⁹² *Ibid.*

¹²⁹³ Note by Clauson, 21 Jan. 1946, L/P&J/8/470, IOR; *Times of India*, 7 March 1946.

¹²⁹⁴ Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Premier Khushab), Nawab Malik Sir Allah Bakhsh Tiwana (Sargodha), Mian Bagh Ali (Fazilka), Maulana Daud Ghaznavi (East Punjab - Labour), Fazal Illahi (Gujrat North), Khan Sahib Mir Muhammad Abdullah (Mianwali South), the Hon. Mian Muhammad Ibrahim (Alipur), Lt. Col. Sardar Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan (Attock Central), Mian Muhammad Rafiq (Outer Lahore - urban), the Hon. Nawab Sir Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash (Lahore), Mian Sultan Ali Nangiana (Shahpur) - *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 21 March 1946, vol. XXV, pp. 1-5, 7-9, V/9/3830, IOR.

communities. This development, following an election campaign which had been conducted on fanatical religio-communal lines, was fraught with danger, and destined to contribute to a further deterioration of the communal situation. In an attempt to justify the existence of the Ministry, and demonstrate to the Muslim public in particular, that its complexion was the result of Muslim League intransigence, and that the only possible alternative to it would be the imposition of Governor's Rule (under section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935), Khizar publicly invited Mamdot to join the coalition on 8 March 1946.¹²⁹⁵ The Premier knew that it would be impossible for the Punjab league leader to accept the invitation, for the issues which had prevented cooperation between the Muslim League and the Hindu and Sikh parties remained unresolved. Also Jinnah, in a speech in Calcutta on 8 March had decreed that he would brook no compromise with the Punjab Coalition, declaring,

"we have already won the battle of Pakistan in the ... Punjab by carrying away 90 percent of the Muslim seats ... If the Congress wishes to work the Constitutions of 1919 and 1935, it is welcome to do so. We want to put a speedy end to the present Constitution and establish Pakistan."¹²⁹⁶

Nevertheless in pursuing the propaganda exercise, Khizar attempted to project the sincerity of the offer by stressing that it was essential for all the political parties in the Punjab to work together to combat the grave economic problems facing the Province, and in order to facilitate the political rehabilitation of the League the Premier offered to retire from public life:

"I should like to make it clear that if the offer I am making to you is accepted, I would personally be prepared to stand aside and to seek no office. I trust that this will clear the way for you to recommend to your Party the acceptance of the invitation..."¹²⁹⁷

This gesture, however, was insincere and intended purely for public consumption. Khizar had no intention of relinquishing the influence he enjoyed at this juncture, as the proposed settlement with the League was subject to certain secret conditions: in the event of the Premier's resignation and the formation of a Muslim League Government, the latter would include a nominee of Khizar's in the Cabinet, whereupon the Unionist leader would advise his Muslim followers to join the League.¹²⁹⁸ Had Khizar intended honoring this undertaking it would have represented a total *volte-face* on his part. It represented nothing more than a measure of insurance to protect his position in the

¹²⁹⁵ Khizar to Mamdot, 8 March 1946, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 March 1946.

¹²⁹⁶ *Times of India*, 8 March 1946; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 9 March 1946.

¹²⁹⁷ Khizar to Mamdot, 8 March 1946, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

¹²⁹⁸ Note by Khizar, enclosure, Khizar to Mamdot, 8 March 1946, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

unlikely event of the Muslim League agreeing to join the Coalition, and as the largest single party, consequently gaining control of the Government.

Having attempted to establish the legitimacy of the Coalition, Khizar planned to popularize it through the inauguration of a socio-economic reform programme. In June 1946 the Government committed itself to achieving an extension of the electricity supply, the introduction of industrial planning, the improvement of village life, and urban working conditions, and to combating corruption amongst officials.¹²⁹⁹ As a public relations exercise, however, it was a failure as the Government did not possess the resources to finance the various schemes, in addition to which materialism was no substitute for the religious euphoria which had seized the mind of the Muslim masses. Also the failure of the Ministry to meet the expectations of demobilized soldiers in respect of land grants, completely negated any advantage which the Coalition might have enjoyed through the dispensation of largesse. The Unionist Party, in an attempt to gain the service men's votes during the election, had promised that as a class they would be amongst the major beneficiaries of post-war economic reconstruction.¹³⁰⁰ The result was that of the 600,000 Punjabis who had seen war service, the majority who were agriculturists, expected to be rewarded with land. The Coalition Ministry, however, possessed the resources to satisfy no more than 8,000 men.¹³⁰¹

The almost total Muslim resentment against the Coalition, however, was the result of its communal composition, rather than its economic policy. It was regarded as a highly artificial structure, which through the 'Quisling'-like behavior of an unrepresentative minority of Muslims, had usurped the rightful position of the Muslim League to govern the Province.¹³⁰² As a Government, it was a total disaster, its only *raison d'être* being the mutual detestation each of the coalition groupings felt for the League. Bereft of any social ideology or policy, it was controlled by a cabinet of largely incompetent, and incompatible elements. The Premier's influence on the Muslim community did not extend beyond the boundaries of his estates,¹³⁰³ whilst the years of confrontation with the League had taken their toll, leaving him mentally exhausted.¹³⁰⁴ Quizilbash (Muslim Minister of Revenue) although experienced in local administration¹³⁰⁵ was a person of low reputation who lived in constant fear of assassination, relying on constant police protection.¹³⁰⁶ Muhammad Ibrahim Burq (Muslim Minister of Education) originated from the remote district of Muzaffargarh, and he possessed little worthwhile experience. Bhim Sen Sachar (Minister of Finance) and Chaudhri Lahri Singh (Minister of Public Works), the Congress contingent retained a deep-seated dislike for Unionism,

¹²⁹⁹ Civil and Military Gazette, 27 June 1946.

¹³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 15 May 1945.

¹³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 3 Aug. 1946.

¹³⁰² *Dawn* (Karachi), 6 March 1946.

¹³⁰³ Note by Turnbull of interview with J.B. Morton (Indian Police, retired), 20 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁰⁴ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 30 Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁰⁵ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 April 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁰⁶ Note by Turnbull of interview with J.B. Morton, 20 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

and both lacked any administrative knowledge.¹³⁰⁷ Baldev Singh (Minister of Development), the Akali nominee, had been brought up largely outside of the Punjab, and as an industrialist with large investments in Bihar he had very little in common with his rural co-religionists, and practically no influence over them.¹³⁰⁸ In addition, the Congress, which was the largest single party in the Coalition could not claim to represent any substantial Muslim opinion,¹³⁰⁹ and it was split by internal divisions. Overlapping the orthodox Congress Party was the Congress Socialist Party, which was closely connected with the Congress High Command. Its leaders, notably Jai Parkash Narain, were political extremists, committed to a programme of violent revolution - Narain toured the Punjab advocating the seizure and burning of police stations and public buildings, and the murder of government officials.¹³¹⁰ In the face of such blatant provocation, Congress coalitionists refused to act responsibly or prosecute the offenders to the chagrin of the Muslim community and the Governor:

"if they fail to deal with Congressmen who defy the law, they cannot decently treat members of the Opposition differently. Muslims in the Rawalpindi district are already saying that if having tolerated Jai Parkash Narain and his like, the Ministers prosecute the more violent Muslim speakers, it will be quite clear that their motives are communal."¹³¹¹

The Congress Party, however, consistently refused to support the introduction of firm and impartial measures necessary to maintain law and order,¹³¹² and their coalition partners were unable and unwilling to implement strong government. Congress intransigence, however, was a symptom of, as much as a cause for the inherent weakness of the Ministry. The three parties formed an uneasy alliance, co-existing in the knowledge that any political re-alignment on the part of any one of the coalition partners would cause the fall of the Government,¹³¹³ and their mutual 'timidity to control excesses resulted from a collective desire to retain power, even at the cost of abdicating responsibility. By August 1946, as a result of Ministerial inertia, the provincial press was openly and bitterly communal, private armies existed free from restriction, and the administration of the Province had all but collapsed. The Governor, highly alarmed by the existing state of affairs, informed the Viceroy that "Authority in the Punjab has never been at a lower ebb."¹³¹⁴ The total decay of Government incentive was reflected in the fact that Ministers lacked either the confidence or the will to combat

¹³⁰⁷ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 April 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁰⁸ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁰⁹ The Congress had failed to capture any Muslim seats in the election. Also out of a Provincial Congress Committee of 147 in May 1946, there were only 16 Muslims - Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of May 1946, 11/PW/5/249, IOR.

¹³¹⁰ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, i/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹³¹² *Ibid.*

¹³¹³ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 April 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³¹⁴ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

the inevitable corruption which flourished in the absence of firm central control. Despite irrefutable evidence that Abdur Rahim (I.C.S.), the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur had misappropriated large sums of money from the Pachotra of village headman,¹³¹⁵ Qizilbash refused to agree to the Governor's demand that the officer should be suspended pending a formal departmental enquiry.¹³¹⁶

The most dangerous failing the Ministry was guilty of, however, concerned its refusal to face the Muslim League in the Legislature, for it caused the practical suspension of the constitutional process,¹³¹⁷ eventually forcing its League protagonists to adopt unconstitutional methods to express their opposition to the Government. The Coalition's reluctance to allow Assembly debates reflected the insecurity of its Muslim membership which had started to diminish once the Unionist 'rump' entered the Government. In April 1946 two Unionist Muslim Ministers - Jamal Khan Leghari and Nawab Ashiq Hussain, joined the League; Leghari's defection having been prompted by Azad's refusal to admit his claim to the Premiership.¹³¹⁸ By July 1946 only five Unionist Muslims, including Khizar and Qizilbash, remained in the Coalition,¹³¹⁹ the others having fallen victim to the Muslim League's far from subtle coercion and victimization tactics: March had witnessed the celebration of 'traitors' day' in Lahore during which the mock funeral of the Premier had been conducted.¹³²⁰ Veiled threats of this nature eroded the resolve of those Muslim M.L.As. who remained outside the League, but it was the awareness that Unionism as a political force was dead, and that no real alternative existed to the Muslim League as the arbitrator for Muslim interests, which caused the final disintegration of the Unionist Muslim element.¹³²¹ Under the circumstances, the Government was reluctant to expose its dwindling Muslim supporters to the vitriolic attacks which the League mounted against them in the Assembly. In commenting on the Ministry's failure to accommodate the League in the Legislature, whilst Jenkins (succeeded Glancy as Governor, 8 April 1946) stressed the timidity of the Ministers, he failed to give the underlying cause for it, but nevertheless he accurately described the effect which the Coalition's maneuver achieved:

"The Ministers were terrified of the Legislature, and when, in July 1946, a Session became inevitable for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, they used their small majority to secure the adjournment as soon as the obligatory business was over. They were most ingenious in avoiding legislation, thus depriving the Opposition of opportunities of constitutional combat ... the tactics and conduct of the Coalition Ministry were intensely annoying to the Muslim League, and with

¹³¹⁵ The money was devoted to Muslim charities.

¹³¹⁶ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 June 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³¹⁷ Note by East, 6 Feb. 1947, enclosure GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 30 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³¹⁸ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 15 March 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³¹⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 21 July 1946.

¹³²⁰ GR, Glancy to Wavell, 15 March 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³²¹ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

some reason. The largest single party had been shut out of office, and might have to wait indefinitely for its turn."¹³²²

The League, however, was not prepared to wait indefinitely, though initially two factors combined to prevent it launching a programme of agitation against the Unionist-Congress-Akali 'cabal'. In the first place attempts to subvert the Muslim-controlled police force (70 percent of cadre were Muslims) had failed,¹³²³ and the majority of the Muslim glistist families were reluctant to adopt any course of action which could ultimately bring them into conflict with the British.¹³²⁴ Jenkins firmly believed that, but for the stabilizing effect of the traditional Muslim rural leadership, the Punjab would have been subjected to serious political disturbances:

"We must not forget that the Muslim leaders are on the whole people who for generations have been friendly with the Government of the day and with British officials. If they had been professional agitators of the Congress type, we should have had trouble before now."¹³²⁵

The reluctance of the landed class to endorse unconstitutional activity could offer only a temporary respite from the inevitable conflagration. The knowledge that the British were determined to relinquish their dual role of ruler and 'fountain head' of patronage caused the largely 'loyalist' landed elite to associate with the League, which remained the only viable successor to the Raj in the Punjab.¹³²⁶ Also the continued spectacle of a non-Muslim Government at the helm of provincial affairs exerted a greater influence on the Muslim masses in general, than the memories of old loyalties, and the League was quick to respond to and exploit the resulting Muslim resentment. In reporting this development to the Viceroy, the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government noted:

"It has ... come to notice that in certain rural areas the message is being passed from mouth to mouth that the Hindus are in power, that Muslims have been betrayed, that Islam is in danger and that Muslims must fight. The result of all this is an increase in Muslim determination and disregard of consequences."¹³²⁷

League propagandists operating through newspapers (notably *Dawn*), public meetings and mosques sought to sanction the conflict it sought by pro-claiming '*jihad*'; that this was not an exercise in empty rhetoric was emphasized by the fact that the League made

¹³²² Memorandum by Jenkins, p. 5, 4 Aug. 1947, g/3/1/89, IOR.

¹³²³ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 April 1946; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 May 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³²⁴ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³²⁵ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, I/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³²⁷ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

strenuous efforts to recruit the services of Muslim army personnel who were on leave in the Punjab.¹³²⁸

The Muslim League was not the only community preparing for an armed struggle, for although the strength of the Muslim National Guards had been estimated at over 10,000 in December 1945, that of the militant Hindu Rashtriya Swayyam Sewak Sangh had passed 28,000 by July 1946.¹³²⁹ The expansion of these organizations reflected the serious deterioration which had occurred in communal relations in the Province, but it was political activity at the national, rather than at the provincial, level which led to a worsening of the situation, and the growth of a 'civil war' atmosphere in the Province.¹³³⁰ In August 1946, in spite of Jinnah's refusal to participate, the British inaugurated an Interim National Government, and installed the Congress in office. The Muslim community in the Punjab were alarmed and angered by the move, which they regarded as an unconditional surrender of power to the Hindus. Muslim resentment was further fired by the knowledge that when the situation had been reversed during the War, and Congress had proved uncooperative, the Muslim League had been refused the opportunity to govern. In many Muslim quarters, the apparent eagerness of the British to accommodate the Congress at this juncture was interpreted as proof of a plot between the two to frustrate the League. Such fears were intensified in the Punjab as a direct consequence of the impolitic and irresponsible attitude of Nehru and the provincial Congress leaders. The former, in answer to Jinnah's call for 'direct action' to demonstrate Muslim opposition to the Interim administration, had warned that such activity would be forcibly suppressed, whilst in the Punjab, as Jenkins reported to the Viceroy on 31 August 1946, there was unconcealed Hindu jubilation at the exclusion of the League at the Centre:

"The Hindus are jubilant - they are bad winners, and will do all they can to taunt and humiliate the Muslims. They are foolish enough to believe that here in the Punjab they will be able to suppress the Muslims once and for all with British aid, and loose talk to this effect is going on amongst Congress leaders ... nothing is more likely to bring about a physical conflict..."¹³³¹

Furthermore Jenkins impressed upon the Viceroy his belief that such conflict could not be avoided:

"We have here the material for a vast communal upheaval. The hard core of the Muslim case - that the stage is set for the suppression of the Muslim community - is so nearly true that it cannot be answered with sincerity or conviction. The

¹³²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³²⁹ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of July 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³³⁰ Memorandum by Jenkins, p. 5, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹³³¹ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

Muslims are ill-organized, but they will fight sooner than submit to dictations from the Congress High Command."¹³³²

In spite of the inflammatory conditions prevailing in the Province, the manifestation of Muslim solidarity, organized by the Provincial League as 'Direct Action Day' (16 August 1946) was "conducted with moderation and an apparent absence of mischievous intention to disturb the communal situation".¹³³³ In deference to Jinnah's instructions that the observations were to be peaceful,¹³³⁴ the Provincial League Committee had appealed to its members "to avoid all unlawful activity and communal incitement", but Muslims were left in no doubt that its purpose was to prepare them for the coming struggle.¹³³⁵

"In mosques, the righteousness of the Muslim League cause is undoubtedly being increasingly proclaimed and Muslims are being exhorted to be prepared, not for a political campaign, constitutional or otherwise, but for a *Jihad*."¹³³⁶

Also although Jinnah had appealed for moderate behavior, previous statements made by him and other League leaders had left the Muslim community throughout India in no doubt that if Congress rule was forced upon them they would resort to violence. At the Muslim League Legislators Convention held in New Delhi from 7 to 9 April 1946, Jinnah had declared that "Muslim India would never ... accept the constitution of an interim Government before the principle of Pakistan was accepted..." and that,

"If any attempt is made to force a decision against the wishes of Muslims, Muslim India will resist it by all means and at all costs. We are prepared to sacrifice anything and everything, but we shall not submit to any scheme of Government prepared without our consent."

Other speakers echoed Jinnah's sentiments; Begum Shah Nawaz opining that "Muslim women would call upon their husbands and sons to take up arms for Pakistan, if the British tried to establish Akhand Hindustan...", and Shaukat Hyat threatening that the Punjab Muslim martial class in its determination to establish Pakistan would resort to rebellion if necessary:

"we shall show you a rehearsal now when the British army is still there [In the Punjab]. You will see the reactionary Government which is ... in the Punjab with the help of the Hindus and Muslim Quislings thrown overboard."

¹³³² *Ibid.*

¹³³³ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³³⁴ *Ibid.*, first half of Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³³⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 15 Aug. 1946.

¹³³⁶ Chief Sec's Report, Punjab, second half of Aug. 1946, I/P&J/5/249, IOR.

Whilst Khan Abdul Qayum Khan (Muslim League leader, N.W.F.P.) threatened that if any attempt were made to frustrate the emergence of 'Pakistan' "Muslims will have no other alternative but to take out the sword and rebel..."¹³³⁷ Jinnah had made no effort to restrain his cohorts, and in July 1946 he endorsed their threats when he publicly cautioned the British and the Congress that if 'Pakistan' was denied the Muslims would take up arms: "If you seek peace, we do not want war. If you want war we accept it unhesitatingly."¹³³⁸ This was the atmosphere in which Direct Action Day was held, and as such it was remarkable that no dangerous disturbances erupted in the Punjab, but other parts of India were not so fortunate. In East Bengal and Bihar widespread slaughter resulted.¹³³⁹

The decision of the A.I.M.L. to join the Interim Government in October 1946 did little to diffuse the situation in the Punjab, where communal hatred had intensified greatly in response to the communal butchery which had been unleashed in Bengal and Bihar in the wake of Direct Action Day. Considering that Jinnah's purpose, despite his call for peaceful observation, had been to establish once and for all that Muslims in India were determined to achieve an independent homeland free from Hindu domination, in the final analysis it is apparent that he could not have failed to realize that such demonstrations would run the risk of erupting into inter-communal warfare. Thus it would seem that Jenkins was unduly harsh in principally condemning the Congress leaders of the Punjab and the provincial Hindu press for the intensification of ill-feeling between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities:

"The prominence given by the Hindu Press to what appears to be one-sided and exaggerated accounts of the disturbances in East Bengal is wicked, and I am afraid that Congress and Mahasabha leaders are largely responsible for it."¹³⁴⁰

In reality spokesmen for both the Punjabi Hindus and Muslims gave vent to their feelings by attempting to portray the opposite community in the worst possible light. The Hindus accused the Muslims of Calcutta of being entirely responsible for the killings which occurred there, whilst Muslim opinion retaliated by attempting to implicate the Congress and the Mahasabha in the massacre of Muslims in Bihar, claiming that it had been organized by the Prime Minister of Bihar. The lesson, they declared, was clear - Muslims would be annihilated in a Hindu controlled India.¹³⁴¹

¹³³⁷ *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I (January-June 1946), pp. 192, 197-198, IOR.

¹³³⁸ *Times of India*, 30 July 1946.

¹³³⁹ The 'Great Calcutta Killing' lasted from 16 to 20 August leaving approximately 6,000 killed and 15,000 wounded; in its wake massacres occurred in Bihar and the Noakhali district of Bengal, resulting in the deaths of 7,000 Muslims and a similar number of Hindus. For details of the Calcutta massacre, and the aftermath, see L. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, London, 1961, pp. 34-40 and L. Collins and D. Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*, London, 1975, pp. 20, 28-29.

¹³⁴⁰ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Oct. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁴¹ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

The prevailing atmosphere succored both the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh in the Punjab, the size of each force had grown to 22,000 and 46,000 respectively by the close of 1946.¹³⁴² As well as becoming stronger, both organizations increased in popularity, and they were more active and far more belligerent. A further symptom of the collapse of reason as an alternative to violence in the Province, was the increasingly militant student activity in the towns and cities, particularly Lahore, and the fact that their extreme behavior was encouraged by their teachers "to whom age has given no wisdom". Student plans to organize 'Bihar Days' and 'Noakhickli Days' were made without restraint in the full knowledge that their execution would provoke excitement and possible violence.¹³⁴³ Only one spark was required to ignite the 'communal powder keg'. In his appreciation of the situation written in mid-November, Jenkins warned the Viceroy that the slightest incident would provoke serious disorders in the cities, and that the grave danger existed of the trouble spreading to the villages.¹³⁴⁴

As the religious communities in the Punjab approached the abyss of internecine warfare the Governor determined to induce the Coalition Government to face the situation responsibly. It proved a difficult task, and was not accomplished without a certain amount of guile. Jenkins was under no illusions that the Ministry was sorely inadequate to face the challenge of communal violence. At the end of August he wrote to the Viceroy that there was nothing in the Ministry's record to suggest that it was capable of firmness,

"and unless it is determined (and appears) to be both firm and impartial, the administrative machine may well crumple up ... the Congress Ministers are still more interested in securing the release of law breakers of their own party ... and in sniping at officials generally, than in dealing with the very serious situation which now confronts them ... and my power to insist upon the action I believe to be necessary is limited."¹³⁴⁵

Jenkins' concluding remark was borne out the following month when he failed to persuade his Ministers to declare both the Muslim League National Guards, and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh to be unlawful associations, and to attempt to disperse them. His efforts were largely frustrated by Qizilbash, who claimed that the two "private armies" were too poorly organized to invite effective radical action being taken against them.¹³⁴⁶ Faced with a weak and vacillating Cabinet, and anxious to prevent the Punjab's decline into chaos, Jenkins, without the knowledge of his Ministers, drafted the

¹³⁴² Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Dec. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁴³ Ibid., first half of Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁴⁴ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 13/14 Nov. 1946, LOW/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁴⁵ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁴⁶ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Sept. 1946, L/PW/5/249, IOR.

Punjab Public Safety Ordinance of 1946. Although he informed the Premier of his action, he refrained from discussing it with him in detail.¹³⁴⁷

By informing Khizar of the Ordinance's existence, Jenkins, by implication, revealed his intention to invoke it should the situation require it. It proved an astute maneuver, for as the prospect for communal disturbances increased, the Premier, supported by his ministerial colleagues, requested the Governor to promulgate the measure, in exercise of his special powers under the Government of India Act of 1935, in order to bypass the necessity of placing the measure before the Legislature. Jenkins was only too anxious to comply, as he believed that it would have been impossible to convert the Ordinance into an Act in the face of opposition from the Muslim League and extreme elements on the Government benches: "I had always intended to use section 89, and it was fortunate that the Premier and his colleagues agreed with me."¹³⁴⁸

The Ordinance, which came into force on 19 November 1946, initially had a sobering effect,¹³⁴⁹ in that it endowed the Ministry with drastic powers to combat communal disturbances. In effect the Government could order arrests without warrant, detain persons on suspicion, enforce its control on educational institutions, control the press, prohibit drilling, public meetings and processions, and order the banning of quasi-military organizations, and the wearing, or display of military uniforms and emblems. In relating the measure to the 'Press', MacDonald (Home Sec., Punjab Govt.) emphasized that all District Magistrates had been ordered to use the special powers without hesitation or regard for the status of the offenders concerned.¹³⁵⁰ As if to emphasize that no one would be immune from the measure, the Governor personally interviewed Shaukat Hyat, and warned him to desist from making speeches which appeared to advocate the murder of the Premier. Jenkins cautioned the ex-Minister that the authorities would deal firmly with all leaders, Muslim and Hindu, who advocated violence, though he attempted to reassure him that the Ordinance would not be used to suppress any political party.¹³⁵¹

In spite of the Governor's assurance, and the insistence of the Ministry voiced by Swaran Singh (succeeded Baldev Singh as Minister of Development on the latter's appointment to the Interim Government) that

"The emergency Ordinance is honestly meant to ensure civil liberties by maintaining peace and communal harmony, essential for [the] orderly national progress of the country at this critical juncture",

¹³⁴⁷ GR, Jenkins to Colville, 30 Nov. 1946, VFW/5/249, IOR.

¹³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵⁰ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 22 Nov. 1946.

¹³⁵¹ GR, Jenkins to Colville, 30 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

and that it did not represent an anti-League maneuver,¹³⁵² the Ministry foolishly used its new powers to intimidate League members. As a result a fresh wave of Muslim resentment was engendered against the Coalition, and as Jenkins observed, allegations of unfairness, amounting at times to persecution, were common, "and I fear that some of them are true."¹³⁵³ One of the most glaring examples of the Ministry's misuse of the Ordinance for purely political ends occurred in Dera Ghazi Khan in January 1947. Both the Muslim League and the Unionist Party were contesting a by-election in the district (Dera Ghazi Khan North). Khizar, acting against the advice of the local Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, ordered a ban on all political meetings. The order was not, in the opinion of the local officers, necessary for the maintenance of order,¹³⁵⁴ and was clearly intended to intimidate League supporters and prevent visiting League speakers, including Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, from appealing for Muslim support.¹³⁵⁵ In addition local dignitaries, who were known League supporters, were placed under arrest. Both the sons of Nawab Jamal Khan Leghari (ex-Unionist Minister) were detained in this manner, one of whom, Mohammad Khan, was an Honorary Magistrate. In executing the Premier's orders, Slater (District Officer, DGK) admitted that the latter "may have been more active in the cause than was proper for an Honorary Magistrate and a recipient, as his father's deputy, of Government monies", but nevertheless he found the task distasteful, particularly as he and the Nawab's son were on good terms:

"He was not surprised and may indeed have welcomed the opportunity to acquire political merit. ye drank a glass of whisky together and off he went."¹³⁵⁶

The interference and resultant intimidation ironically cost the Unionist candidate much support,¹³⁵⁷ and certainly contributed to the League victory. The defeat of the Unionist Party incensed the Premier, and caused him to further abuse his power, punishing his opponents through the abolition of the *jirga* system and the withdrawal of magisterial powers from all the tumandars and their relatives.¹³⁵⁸

It was totally unrealistic to expect honorary office holders, and recipients of Government grants to adopt a non-political posture, especially as that class had traditionally been involved in politics as Unionist supporters, and as Khizar had refused to adopt a non-partisan attitude in distributing land, jagirs and other rewards; the Premier having consistently refused to award those who opposed him politically.¹³⁵⁹ Furthermore, the entire administrative sub-structure had been designed to operate under an irremovable Government of the Imperial model. Below the Legislature, the

¹³⁵² *Civil and Military Gazette*, 4 Feb. 1947.

¹³⁵³ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁵⁴ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁵⁵ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 Feb. 1947.

¹³⁵⁶ R.M.K. Slater (Punjab Commission 1938-47), '*District Officer's Memoirs*', pp. 28-30, MSS. EUR.F. 180/69, IOR.

¹³⁵⁷ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁵⁸ R.M.K. Slater, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30, MSS. EUR.F. 180/69, IOR.

¹³⁵⁹ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Ministry, and the Secretariat, there was no effective organization of independent local authorities which reflected broadly the political opinion of the day. Local authorities, as such, were relatively unimportant, and Government really operated at the district level through permanent officials, and non-official assistants (e.g. members of the National Home Front, Honorary Magistrates, Zaildars), many of whom held honorary positions. This non-official element in particular had largely failed to appreciate their position in light of the changed political conditions wrought by democratization, and they resented the interference of the Premier that as a class they should refrain from criticizing the Ministry, or supporting the Opposition.¹³⁶⁰

The misuse of the Public Safety Ordinance, coupled with the refusal of the Ministry to face the Assembly contributed to the widespread belief amongst Muslims that the Ministry was determined to persecute Leaguers, and deny them their democratic rights. When, therefore, the Government ordered the banning of the Muslim League National Guards on 24 January 1947, the Muslim leadership interpreted the action as proof of the Coalition's intention to crush the Muslim League in the Province. The ban, which also applied to the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, had long been urged by Jenkins,¹³⁶¹ and the Government ostensibly took the action because, in the light of the continued growth of communal tension which had been intensified by the reports of Muslim brutality against Sikhs in the Hazara district of N.W.F.P.¹³⁶² the existence of private armies posed a grave threat to the peace of the Province.¹³⁶³

There is no doubt at all that both militant organizations were preparing for armed conflict, intelligence reports revealed that they had both initiated training programmes for combat with knives and *lathis*, and approximately 2,000 steel helmets were subsequently found in the Muslim League National Guards headquarters in Lahore.¹³⁶⁴ The situation clearly warranted firm handling, but the previous conduct of the Ministry did not lend credence to the Premier's claim that it did not intend to attack the Muslim League: "Nothing is further from the thought of my Government ... and I wish to do everything I can to remove any such misunderstanding."¹³⁶⁵ Whilst the evidence does suggest that the Premier had ordered the banning out of what he considered to be the Province's best interests, as both Jenkins and P.J. Patrick (Asst. Under-Secretary, India Office) at the India Office testified,¹³⁶⁶ such firm resolve of following months of inactivity, and petty sniping at League supporters, failed to reassure, or appeal to the Muslim public. In addition the League leadership in the Province, determined to create the impression that the Government's real purpose was the destruction of the League,

¹³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶¹ Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁶² Chief Sec's Report, Punjab. first half of Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁶³ *Ibid.*, second half of Jan. 1946, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁶⁴ Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁶⁵ Extract from the *Daily Telegraph*, 27 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁶⁶ Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Jan. 1947; Note by P.J. Patrick, 25 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

provoked the Ministry to take action against them. The issuing of the ban had been accompanied by a police search of the Muslim League National Guards' offices, which the provincial League leaders attempted to obstruct, thereby courting arrest.¹³⁶⁷ Amongst those taken into custody were Feroz Khan Noon, Mian Iftikhar ud Din (former President of the Punjab Congress), Begum Shah Nawaz, the Nawab of Mamdot (President -Provincial Muslim League), Mumtaz Daultana (Sec., Provincial Muslim League), Syed Amir Hussain Shah (Provincial leader of the Muslim League National Guards) and Shaukat Hyat Khan.¹³⁶⁸ These detentions, though made unavoidable by the leaders' actions, appeared to substantiate the allegation, voiced by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (Muslim League, Minister of Communications, Interim Government) and Amir Hussain Shah (man of private means, M.A. Punjab University, first general manager *Pakistan Times*), that the Coalition was determined to crush Muslim nationalism and constrain the civil liberties of the Muslim community.¹³⁶⁹

In an effort to combat this propaganda, and to remove the impression amongst the Muslim community that the Ordinance was aimed specifically against the League, the Premier, following consultation with his cabinet colleagues, withdrew the declaration against the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, and ordered the release of the imprisoned Muslim Leaguers. In view of the prevailing communal tension, however, the Government declared its intention to retain the powers guaranteed to it under the Ordinance, particularly with regard to public meetings and demonstrations.¹³⁷⁰ The withdrawal of the ban, however, was interpreted by the Provincial League leadership as a sign of Government weakness, and they determined to press their supposed advantage by demanding the cancellation of all restrictions, and the abrogation of the Ordinance, and by initiating a civil disobedience campaign to achieve these objectives, and thereby force a confrontation with the Government. Although the stance which the Provincial League leaders adopted was in keeping with the objectives of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee, passed in resolution form at Karachi on 31 January 1947, the decision to defy the Provincial Government had not occurred at Jinnah's instigation, though he approved of the action.¹³⁷¹ The claims of Mamdot and Jinnah that the movement was not intended to cause the fall of the Ministry by unconstitutional means, and was designed purely to defend Muslim civil liberties¹³⁷² was a total fabrication. Jinnah regarded it as an

¹³⁶⁷ Chief Sec's Report, Punjab, second half of Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁶⁸ Reuter telegram, 24 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; *Dawn*, 25 Jan. 1947; *Times of India*, 27 Jan. 1947.

¹³⁷⁰ Jenkins to Sec. of State, 29 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Jan. 1947, L/PW/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁷¹ The All-India Muslim League had demanded the removal of the ban imposed on meetings and processions in the Punjab, the withdrawal of all restrictive measures on political activities, and no misuse of the special powers conferred by the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance, and the release of all detainees - Jinnah to Mamdot, 25 Feb. 1947, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 372, pp. 24-27.

¹³⁷² Press Information Bureau, New Delhi to India Office, Telegram No. B 100, 3 Feb. 1946, L/PW/5/250; Mamdot to Jenkins, 14 May 1947, R/3/1/177, IOR.

essential maneuver to deprive the Coalition of the powers it received from the Ordinance, and to force it to seek alternative safeguards from the Legislature,¹³⁷³ thereby giving the Provincial League the opportunity to meet and possibly defeat the Government in the Assembly. The League clearly had abandoned, under extreme provocation, constitutional opposition in the Punjab, as Liaquat Ali Khan (General Sec., A.I.M.L., Finance Member - Interim Govt.) admitted in New Delhi on 13 March 1947, when he observed that the civil disobedience campaign against the Punjab Ministry was "something new in India; the Muslim League has never done anything before by unconstitutional means."¹³⁷⁴ The question of 'civil liberties' merely provided a convenient pretext to rouse Muslim opinion against the Government. At the same time the campaign represented the climax of Muslim resentment which had been forming from the moment the Ministry took office. This was confirmed by the admission of Nazim-ud-Din (ex-Premier, Bengal) to the Governor in February 1947, when he admitted that the 'civil liberties' issue was not the real '*casus belli*', the underlying grievance being the conduct of the Coalition Ministry since assuming power.¹³⁷⁵

Even so, for the Ministry to have complied with the Provincial League's demand would have amounted to its unconditional surrender, as it would have deprived it of the power to act swiftly and effectively in an emergency, thereby increasing the danger for communal strife.¹³⁷⁶ The intervention of the Governor, acting as an intermediary between Khizar and Mamdot failed to persuade the Provincial League leadership to desist from making the demand, or directing civil disobedience against the Coalition.¹³⁷⁷ The Ministry correctly interpreted the refusal as marking the beginning of a League campaign to secure its overthrow by exploiting the 'civil liberty' question, and by possible recourse to violence,¹³⁷⁸ as was indicated by the anti-Government, pro-League agitation which broke out in Lahore on 28 January 1947.¹³⁷⁹ Khizar, who had anticipated the challenge, delivered a 'premeditated' counter attack on the night of the 28-29 January; all the important League leaders Mamdot, Iftikar ud Din, Noon and Daultana, were detention centers outside the city, and a press in Lahore, including seized and committed to stoppage was imposed on all news relating to the agitation. From the 29 to 31 January, wide-spread disorders and demonstrations occurred, though there was no general recourse to violence, and no loss of control by the forces of Government. The removal of the Muslim League leaders and organizers, who had also been arrested, combined with the concessions which had been granted in respect of the Muslim League National Guards, acted initially to diffuse the situation and contain a possible widespread Muslim revolt.¹³⁸⁰ But in the long run the Government's tactics worked to

¹³⁷³ Jinnah to Mamdot, 23 Feb. 1947, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 372, pp. 24-27.

¹³⁷⁴ I and B Departmental Note, 14 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁷⁵ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁷⁶ *The Times* (London), 7 Feb. 1947.

¹³⁷⁷ Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁷⁸ Chief sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/ 250, IOR.

¹³⁷⁹ Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 29 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁸⁰ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/ 250, IOR.

its disadvantage, as they appeared to confirm the claims of the Central League - which had been widely circulated through the national press - that the Coalition was determined to smash the League organization in the Punjab.¹³⁸¹

Thus the imprisonment of the League leaders did not mark the end of the troubles, it heralded the beginning of a fairly widespread, though at times despondent, Muslim movement. Although the great majority of the Muslim middle class refrained from participating in the anti-government demonstrations, the portrayal of the agitation by Congress Socialists as "a suburban circus performance staged by ex-knights, their wives, sons and nephews"¹³⁸² was far from accurate. Even so the agitation was not as successful as represented by the Muslim League, serious disturbances were confined to only half-a-dozen districts - notably Lahore, Gujrat, Amritsar and Jullundur.¹³⁸³ "Dawn" published a great many lies, and one American correspondent from Delhi was under the impression that at least half the police had mutinied and been arrested - a story which had no foundation at all. In fact, in Jenkins' opinion, it had been the "exemplary conduct" of the police which had contributed to containing the situation.¹³⁸⁴

The myth has persisted, however, that the movement by itself forced Khizar to meet the League's demands. Imran Ali has claimed, "The movement succeeded in having the Public Safety Ordinance repealed to a large extent, and even in bringing down the Khizr Ministry."¹³⁸⁵ Neither of these assertions is correct. Khizar's settlement with the League was precipitated by the British decision (announced on 20 February, 1947) to leave India in June 1948 and not as a result of intimidation by the League! In fact by mid-February 1947 the Provincial League leadership was divided over the question of maintaining the anti-government movement. Jenkins believed, with some justification, that they had over-estimated their own strength, and underrated that of the Ministry, by assuming incorrectly that the British, and especially Muslim officials and police, would not support a government which was opposed by the Muslim community.¹³⁸⁶ Noon and Mamdot, in particular, were anxious for a settlement on the terms offered by the Ministry. The latter had agreed to cancel certain of the bans in force relating to public

¹³⁸¹ See *Dawn*, 27 January 1947; *Times of India*, 25 Jan. 1947, 27 Jan. 1947.

¹³⁸² Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first and second halves of Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁸³ By mid-February one Muslim demonstrator had died in Lahore as the result of a brick falling or being thrown on him in a Hindu majority locality. 10 February was marked by a complete *hartal* in the city. Outside of the capital there was comparatively little disturbance in the majority of districts, though events in Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Sargodha gave rise to anxiety. The number of persons goaled in connection with the agitation stood at 1,500, but there had been remarkably little violence, and only two deaths had occurred (one in Simla, one in Jhang) as a result of clashes with the police. Towards the end of the month the movement became more militant; on 24 February a clash between police and a large Muslim crowd in Amritsar resulted in 50 police casualties, 110 demonstrators were injured, and one killed. Trouble in Jullundur on the same day also resulted in a number of injuries. On 25 February the only serious upheaval occurred in Ambala, two rioters died when police fired on the mob - GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁸⁴ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁸⁵ Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade Before Partition*, Lahore, 1975, p. 52.

¹³⁸⁶ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

meetings if the agitation were abandoned, though he had refused to consider the League's request that he should submit the Ordinance for approval by the Legislature.¹³⁸⁷ In an attempt to precipitate a League acceptance, Firoz Khan Noon wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (14th or 15th February) intimating that he and Mamdot were ready to accept the compromise.¹³⁸⁸ Acting on this correspondence Jenkins, in the role of intermediary, visited the League leaders in Kasur gaol, only to discover that Mamdot and Noon did not have the unanimous support of their Provincial League colleagues, and that they were powerless therefore to act without Jinnah's sanction. It is apparent from Jenkins' account of the meeting that it was the intervention of Daultana which prevented Mamdot and Noon from committing themselves to an agreement. Daultana had demanded a meeting of the complete Council of Action, which had been formed in January 1946 to direct the opposition to the Government, and following the Premier's permission that it could meet at the gaol, the Council had decided to seek the guidance of Jinnah.¹³⁸⁹ Mamdot, in pursuit of his original intention, attempted to cajole the A.I.M.L. leader into acquiescing to a truce. On 22 February he informed Jinnah of Noon's approach to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, stating that it had occurred without his consent or knowledge. Whilst he half-heartedly assured Jinnah that the Provincial League would continue the struggle should the latter order it, he clearly wished Jinnah to agree to its suspension. Using Noon's letter as a pretext, he argued that it had weakened the Provincial League's position, and would certainly be used by the Premier to embarrass the organization should the negotiations fail: "We could carry on but for this unfortunate incident." Also as a further inducement he opined to Jinnah that the Premier would not agree to meet the Assembly, preferring a continuation of the confrontation.¹³⁹⁰

Jinnah, however, was not moved by Mamdot's arguments, which he suspected arose from the sobering effects of detention:

"We must be firm and determined and take consequences, but we should not be a party to any compromise which is discreditable, in order to avoid further suffering, once having gone in for them."

He insisted, tactfully but firmly, that the Provincial League should adhere to its original demands - the removal of the ban imposed on public meetings and processions, the withdrawal of all restrictive measures on political activities, the release of all detainees - supplemented with the insistence that the Ordinance should be placed before the Legislative Assembly:

¹³⁸⁷ Viceroy to Sec. of State, telegram, 13 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁸⁸ Mamdot to Jinnah, 22 Feb. 1947, *Quaid -Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 372, pp. 22-23.

¹³⁸⁹ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁹⁰ Mamdot to Jinnah, 22 Feb. 1947, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, Islamabad, File No. 372, pp. 22-23.

"You and the prominent leaders of the Punjab started this movement and I think, rightly as it was becoming intolerable, especially when the Muslim National Guards organization was declared unlawful ... it is for you now to come to a settlement which should be as honorable and as creditable not only so far as the Mussalmans of the Punjab are concerned but the All-India Muslim League ... Honorable defeat, if it is to be, is better than a compromise which is discreditable...."

In addition Jinnah pointedly countered Mamdot's assertion that Khizar would not agree to submit the Ordinance to the Legislature, stating,

"it is a matter of very great principle and I cannot advise you to give it up because, now that you have raised this point, if you give it up, then it can only mean your acceptance on acquiescence in the present Ordinance rule continuing indefinitely."¹³⁹¹

This interchange of views between Mamdot and Jinnah which occurred on 22 and 23 February 1947, clearly demonstrated that neither expected Khizar to submit. Their opinion was also shared by the Viceroy, who only the day before the announcement of British intentions on 20 February (see above) had informed the Secretary of State that: "I do not think the Punjab Government have any intention of capitulating."¹³⁹² Furthermore Jinnah had clearly decided to accept defeat in the matter, preferring it to compromise. In arriving at their personal estimations and conclusions, Jinnah, Mamdot and Wavell had been influenced by the situation prevailing in the Province, and had not allowed for the impact of the British declaration (to transfer power by June 1948) on the Punjab Premier. Even though the violence of the demonstrations had increased towards the end of February,¹³⁹³ the Provincial Government had never been in danger of losing control. The largely Muslim police force had remained loyal; the men, with very few exceptions, had stood up to the agitation, and as Jenkins recorded, they had never failed to obey orders, or to follow their officers when drastic action was required. The conduct of the force had never been in question, and the Inspector General of Police had assured the Premier that if he would sanction 'drastic action' the agitation could be crushed within the space of approximately three weeks. It was the British announcement of 20 February which restrained the Premier from acting on the advice of his Chief of Police. Initially Khizar had been inclined to regard the statement as nothing more than a "threat", but on being assured by Jenkins that it represented the British Government's firm intention, and that "it would be most unsafe for him to act or plan on any assumption other than H.M.G. meant what they so clearly said",¹³⁹⁴ the Premier realized that further opposition to the League would be futile and dangerous. Even though he

¹³⁹¹ Jinnah to Mamdot, 23 Feb. 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 24-27.

¹³⁹² Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 19 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹³⁹³ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/250, IOR.

¹³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

and the Governor believed that repressive measures could be successfully undertaken, though Jenkins personally favored a negotiated settlement¹³⁹⁵ the Premier decided against repression, informing the Governor that it would not have facilitated the peaceful transfer of power at the end of the allotted sixteen month period.¹³⁹⁶ In essence the British had appeared to the 'loyalist' Premier as both a buffer and protector, as their presence had enabled him to resist and frustrate the League in the Punjab and to foster ambitions for an independent Punjabi Dominion, administered on the Unionist principle of multi-communal cooperation. The prospect of imminent national independence, however, forced him to face reality, and accept the inevitable, that it was no longer practicable or wise to exclude the League from Provincial affairs. Having been thus persuaded to bring to an end the political isolation of the League, Khizar agreed to its terms, including the crucial demand that the Assembly should meet to consider the legislation necessary to replace the Ordinance and to maintain the peace of the Province.¹³⁹⁷

The resignation of Khizar and the Coalition Ministry (3 March 1947) followed the Premier's decision to end the confrontation with the League. Once again Khizar's action was a direct consequence of the 20 February announcement, and was not as a result of the Muslim agitation. The Muslim League, however, anxious to portray the collapse of the Coalition as the successful conclusion to their anti-Government movement, deliberately nurtured the belief that their action was solely responsible for the event.¹³⁹⁸ Contemporary and recent commentators have been guilty of perpetuating this misconception. Justice Muhammad Munir, in his report to the Punjab Boundary Commission, claimed:

"Unable to cope with the agitation but on the pretext that in the intended transfer of power, the Muslim League Party ... should receive its share Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana resigned."¹³⁹⁹

Similarly, Sardar Bahadur Mohan Singh, a former adviser to the Secretary of State, informed P.J. Patrick in March 1947 that the Premier had been frightened out of office.¹⁴⁰⁰ In recent years, both Imran Ali (see above) and Penderel Moon have recorded similar conclusions; the latter stating, "The impotence of the Punjab Government in the face of a Muslim League challenge was thus starkly revealed and on 3 March Khizar submitted his Cabinet's resignation."¹⁴⁰¹

¹³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/250, IOR.

¹³⁹⁶ Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 25 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/250, IOR.

¹³⁹⁷ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹³⁹⁸ *Dawn*, 4 March 1947.

¹³⁹⁹ *Proceedings and Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission*, vol. III p. 96, PGRC.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Note by P.J. Patrick, 15 March 1947, enclosure, GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁰¹ P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 425-426.

The Punjab Government, prompted by Jenkins' willingness to promulgate the Ordinance, did not exhibit impotence in meeting the League's challenge. Khizar's decision to leave office, as Jenkins informed the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, on 2 March 1947, and as Khizar later admitted, resulted from his appreciation of the post-20 February situation. He accepted that the formation of a coalition Government, including the Muslim League, was essential for the safety and peace of the Punjab, and he believed that it could not be achieved if the Unionist bloc continued to act as a buffer between the League and the minority parties.¹⁴⁰² Before his resignation he had continually warned the Government that in the Punjab parliamentary majorities were of little importance, and that what really mattered was the strength of the "sanctions" behind a Ministry, and that no Government could be stable unless it commanded the allegiance of a majority in each of the major communities.¹⁴⁰³ In spite of this appreciation, however, up until 20 February Khizar had been prepared to carry on. The British decision to quit India demolished that resolve and totally disillusioned the Premier. The "bombshell" as he called it, had caught him totally unawares,¹⁴⁰⁴ and he bitterly resented the decision, which he considered to be the "work of lunatics".¹⁴⁰⁵ Khizar, by breeding and inclination, was essentially an Empire loyalist, and he could not conceive of playing a role in any situation in which the British did not hold the balance of power. Those who knew him recognized these sentiments, and attempted to exploit them in order to induce his resignation in order to pave the way for the League's assumption of power. On 24 February 1947 Maqbool Mahmud (former Unionist M.L.A.), claiming the privilege of an old friend, exhorted the Premier to resign:

"there are occasions when you must force circumstances. Such a situation has now hatched [*sic*]. This is the zero hour. Attlees [*sic*] statement gives you the opportunity. Seize it. Smaller persons might hesitate. You are big enough, I know ... Settlement of Punjab League tangle is a step in the right direction. Turn it to a bigger account ... A big gesture is needed ... Do not hesitate. Help to bring in the League in office with Congress or even other-wise ... Attlees [*sic*] statement adds to your responsibility to Muslims & to Punjab...."¹⁴⁰⁶

The Congress High Command were naturally dismayed by Khizar's decision, for it spelt the end of Congress participation in the administration of the Province, and they attempted to exploit the situation to their own advantage, by denying that the retirement of the Premier had been precipitated by his acceptance of the urgent necessity to include the League in the Government of the Punjab, by blaming the Governor for his actions. Dewan Chaman Lall (Congress leader, M.L.A. 1937-1944),

¹⁴⁰² Jenkins to Sec. of State and Viceroy, telegram, 2 March 1947. R/3/1/176, IOR: Undated Note on the Tiwanas by Khizar Hayat Khan, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

¹⁴⁰³ Jenkins to Wavell, 3 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Undated Note on the Tiwanas by Khizar Hayat Khan, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

¹⁴⁰⁵ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Maqbool Mahmud to Khizar, 24 Feb. 1947, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

informed Nehru that Jenkins had attempted to persuade the Premier to join the League, in order to form a more stable Ministry in the Province, and that Khizar, rather than follow the advice, had preferred to resign.¹⁴⁰⁷ Whilst it is a fact that Jenkins considered that "The situation might have been saved by a genuine coalition between the Muslim League on the one hand and the Congress or the Panthic party on the other",¹⁴⁰⁸ there is no evidence to support Chaman Lall's accusation. The allegation was strongly denied by Abell (Private Secretary to the Viceroy)¹⁴⁰⁹ and the Viceroy, who stated "that he knows it to be quite untrue that the Governor brought any pressure on Malik Khizar Hyat Khan to join the Muslim League."¹⁴¹⁰ Despite this denial, which was conveyed to Nehru by Abell,¹⁴¹¹ the *Hindustan Times* echoed Chaman Lall's claim, stating that the situation had not merited the resignation of the Cabinet, and therefore by inference that Muslim League participation in the provincial administration was not essential.¹⁴¹² *The Statesman*, in particular, emphasized this theme when it opined that it was an extraordinary event that an administration

"supported by a Nationalist Coalition which is still in a majority should be dissolved and attempts should be made to set up an administration of purely communal character which by itself does not commend [*sic*] a majority."¹⁴¹³

The real anxiety behind the Congress objections was that if the League succeeded in forming a Ministry, it would use the advantage afforded to it to seize the whole of the Punjab for 'Pakistan'. This was revealed by Nehru who explaining to the Viceroy the basis of Hindu and Sikh fears noted,

"This apprehension and conflict are obviously due to the fact that the Muslim League openly want to make the whole of the Punjab a Pakistan area and wish to use a League Ministry to that end."¹⁴¹⁴

Jenkins had charged Mamdot on 3 March 1947 with the responsibility of forming a Ministry, having advised him to seek an understanding with the Hindus and Sikhs, as any administration which did not have the support of those communities could not survive. In spite of this advice, however, the Governor initially was prepared to accept a League Government regardless of its composition in the hope that it would prompt the League to seek a rapprochement with the other major parties, particularly the Sikhs.¹⁴¹⁵ Consequently he advised the Viceroy that even if the League was able to secure the

¹⁴⁰⁷ Dewan Chaman Lal to Nehru, Note, 10 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Minute by G.E.B. Abell, 11 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴¹⁰ Abell to Nehru, 11 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹² *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 13 March 1947.

¹⁴¹³ *The Statesman* (Calcutta), 9 March 1947.

¹⁴¹⁴ Nehru to Wavell, 9 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴¹⁵ Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 25 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663; Jenkins to 'Wavell', 3 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

support of only the Scheduled Caste and Anglo-Indian representatives in the Assembly, it should be allowed to assume responsibility, though failing a Hindu and Sikh inclusion, he recognized that a situation in which 'Governor's Rule' (section 93) would have to be imposed would not be long delayed, as there would be an immediate and possibly violent reaction by the Sikhs.¹⁴¹⁶

Jenkins proposal concurred with the views of both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. Wavell instructed Jenkins to proceed along the lines which he had indicated; Turnbull (Asst. Secretary Political Department) at the India Office noting that if the League could form a Ministry which:

"commands or has a chance of commanding a majority, they must surely be put into office and kept there until voted out by the Legislature or until an impossible law and order situation has arisen."¹⁴¹⁷

These sentiments had been conveyed to the Viceroy by Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State for India) on 5 March.¹⁴¹⁸ The collective decision to support the Governor and permit the League to assume control in the Punjab, reflected the British determination to avoid any accusations of partiality being leveled at them by the League,¹⁴¹⁹ for as Abell noted, if the League was denied the opportunity to govern in the Punjab, "They will claim that they are being robbed by a British-Congress alliance of the power to which they are entitled as the majority community."¹⁴²⁰ Both Abell and Turnbull in reaching their conclusions agreed with Jenkins, that if the League assumed control with only the support of insignificant minority elements, a declaration of section 93 would be inevitable.¹⁴²¹ Thus the British clearly desired that any League failure to hold office in the Punjab should reflect the League's inability to secure the cooperation of the other major communities, rather than appearing to be the consequence of British designs to frustrate Muslim ambitions.

On the same day (5 March) that the Secretary of State had informed the Viceroy of his approval for a League Government, Jenkins abandoned his original posture, insisting that the League should only be permitted to assume office if it could provide proof that it would command a stable Ministry, which from necessity would have to include Sikh and Hindu support.¹⁴²² In arriving at this '*volte face*' Jenkins had reacted to the degree of

¹⁴¹⁶ Jenkins to Wavell, 3 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴¹⁷ Turnbull to Under Sec. of State, Note, 5 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴¹⁸ Sec. of State to Viceroy, telegram, 5 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴¹⁹ The British Government was extremely anxious to avoid any action which would appear to support the accusation that it was anti-Muslim League, especially as during the disturbances in the Punjab which had occurred in February 1947 it had been reported in the national press that British troops had fired on Muslim demonstrators in Amritsar - an action executed solely in order to disperse the crowd. See *Times of India*, 25 February 1947.

¹⁴²⁰ Memo on Punjab Situation by G.E.B. Abell, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴²¹ *Ibid.*; Turnbull to Under Sec. of State, Note, 5 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴²² Jenkins to Viceroy, telegram, 5 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

anti-League feeling which greeted the prospects of a Muslim government, and the implications it posed for the paramount power should civil strife occur. On the evening of 3 March both the Congress and the Panthic Sikhs had held a large meeting in Lahore, at which extremely violent anti-League speeches had been delivered, whilst on 4 March rioting had broken out in the city.¹⁴²³ Jenkins, as a consequence of these developments, believed that if the League was installed it would precipitate a communal war spearheaded by a Sikh rising supported by the Hindus, and that if that situation arose, then he as the Governor, together with the police and the army would be compelled to support the Muslim League, as the current Government, in what would amount to a 'civil war' for possession of the Punjab. In order to prevent such an occurrence the Governor now urged the Viceroy to sanction the imposition of Section 93.¹⁴²⁴ In soliciting Wavell's approval for 'Governor's Rule', Jenkins revealed that Mamdot had failed to substantiate his claim to possess a parliamentary majority as all but one of the Muslim Unionists whose support he had cited were unlikely to join the a result it appeared that only one non-League Muslim Caste members would support the League.¹⁴²⁵

Jenkins' revised appreciation of the situation, repudiation of Mamdot's profession of control in the Wavell to reluctantly agree to 'Governor's Rule', on that every endeavor would be made to secure a coalition in the Province.¹⁴²⁶ The Government of India was clearly dismayed at the declaration of Section 93 in the Province, and the belief still persisted in some quarters that if the League had been, or was given the opportunity to govern the Punjab, it would be conducive to a Muslim - non-Muslim rapprochement. Abell argued that the League should still be given the responsibility of forming a Government, though it would be necessary to temper the invitation with the warning that the Province would not be allowed to dissolve into disorder, and that to prevent such an occurrence the Governor would assume control if necessary. Such a proviso according to Abell would tempt the League to form a multi-communal coalition, as it clearly needed non-Muslim support in order to rule the whole of the Punjab, failing which it would face the alternative of controlling only the Muslim majority districts.¹⁴²⁷ In the face of Jenkins' warning, however, and the effect which it had on India Office policy, Abell's theory was never put into practice. Turn-bull, who had previously supported the idea of allowing the League to assume office, even if it lacked Hindu and Sikh support (see above), completely revised his stand. As a result he considered that to promote the type of compromise envisaged by Abell would involve too great a risk as it would court a Sikh-Hindu rebellion, and thereby create a crisis at the centre, should the League seek military assistance to crush the revolt.¹⁴²⁸ The Secretary of State, acting on

¹⁴²³ Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴²⁴ Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 5 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴²⁵ Mamdot failed to produce a list of the names of his supporters as requested by the Governor - *Ibid*.

¹⁴²⁶ Sec. of State to Viceroy, telegram, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89; Wavell to Jenkins, 6 March 1947, 1/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴²⁷ Memo by G.E.B. Abell, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴²⁸ Note on Punjab situation by F.F. Turnbull, 7 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

Jenkins and Turnbull's interpretation of the situation, echoed the latter's sentiments, when on 7 March he informed the Viceroy that he considered Governor's Rule preferable to a League Ministry possessing a majority, but which failed to include a genuine representative of at least one of the important minority parties, for if the British became involved in supporting the Muslim League in the suppression of a Hindu-Sikh revolt "is it not likely that serious situation would arise at once between yourself your Government over use of troops for this purpose."¹⁴²⁹

Thus as a result of Jenkins' apprehension, and the misgivings it fostered, particularly at the India Office, the door was firmly to maintain that the League had never possessed a majority,¹⁴³⁰ League leaders interpreted the Governor's action as partial, and encouraged the belief that its purpose was to deliberately deprive the organization of power in the Punjab.¹⁴³¹ There is no doubt that Jenkins personally was opposed to the idea of 'Pakistan', and the possible partition of the Punjab.¹⁴³² In addition he believed, following discussions with Noon and Daultana, that the League's determination to assume control originated not from the local Muslim leaders, who were extremely apprehensive about the Sikh reaction to such a move, but resulted from Jinnah's strategy to use a League Government to lay claim to the entire Province for 'Pakistan',¹⁴³³ and his total control over his provincial minions who "will act under instructions from Jinnah who knows little and cares less about the real interests of the Punjab."¹⁴³⁴ Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the Governor's decision to oppose a League Government, though it may have reflected these views, arose primarily from his desire to prevent a civil war between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, which would have necessitated British intervention. Also the League in conducting an extreme religiously orientated election campaign, and by resorting to agitation to oppose the Coalition Ministry, had seriously prejudiced its own prospects for assuming power in the Punjab.

Whilst the League's movement had not precipitated violence between the communities,¹⁴³⁵ it had been decidedly communal in character as both Muslims and non-Muslims believed that its objective was the establishment of a 'Muslim Raj'; the

¹⁴²⁹ Sec. of State to Viceroy, telegram, 7 March 1947, 14/P6J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴³⁰ Memorandum by Jenkins, p. 8, 4 August 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8; Mamdot to Jenkins, 14 May 1947, R/3/1/177, IOR.

¹⁴³² Mountbatten to Jenkins, 5 May 1947, R/3/1/178; 'The Punjab Problem', Memorandum by Jenkins, enclosure Jenkins to Wavell, 7 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴³³ Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 10 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴³⁴ Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 25 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴³⁵ The absence of violence was due to a number of contributory factors - the restrictions imposed in the Punjab on the press forbidding inflammatory statements, the exemplary conduct of the police, and the established tendency of communities not directly concerned with an attack on the Government refraining from participating. The situation had also been contained by Jinnah's instructions that the movement should be peaceful - GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, 1/P&J/5/250; Press Information Bureau, New Delhi to India Office, Telegram No. B.100, 23 Feb. 1943, L/PW/8/663, IOR.

latter had not relished boasts about the impending establishment of Muslim rule, nor had they appreciated having their cars forcibly decorated with Muslim League flags.¹⁴³⁶ Hindu and Sikh sentiments had been further outraged by the celebration of 'Victory Day' by the League to mark the settlement with the Coalition, for as the Chief Secretary (Punjab Govt.) remarked,

"in affording evidence of Muslim solidarity and arrogance, they [Muslims.] intensified the fears and hatred of the other communities and increased their determination not to be subjected to unwanted domination."¹⁴³⁷

In view of the total commitment by the League to 'Pakistan', and the reaction which it evoked from Hindu and Sikh alike, no real basis existed for compromise between the communities. Even so the Provincial League in maintaining its quest to form a provincial administration attempted to entice Sikh co-operation through an offer of near parity in an envisaged Muslim-Sikh Cabinet (five Sikh seats in a Cabinet of 11). The initiative, however, was rejected by the Sikh leadership, as it remained convinced that the League was intent on seizing the whole of the Province, thereby placing the rights of the minority communities in jeopardy.¹⁴³⁸ The fears and suspicions held by the Akali leaders, including Master Tara Singh and Swaran Singh, were fully shared by the Congress leadership. Their total abhorrence to the prospect of League control had been expressed by Gopi Chand Bhargava in February 1947, when he had urged Khizar to use all the force at his command to crush the anti-Government movement:

"The events of Ella past few months show that the League is trying to overawe the minorities by adopting Fascist methods ... Pakistan has not been defined by Quaid-i-Azam. If this what we see is foretaste of it, it shall be resisted even at cost of life. Therefore two courses are open to you. Either suppress this with all force at your command ... Or allow us to take law into our hands and protect ourselves."¹⁴³⁹

Furthermore on 9 March the Working Committee of the All India Congress Committee expressed its total opposition to Muslim designs on the Punjab, and thereby the notion of League-Congress collaboration in the Province, by demanding, in resolution form, the partition of the territory. The resolution was accompanied by a joint Congress-Akali statement, which effectively voiced the mutual determination of both parties to shun the League and oppose its national goal:

¹⁴³⁶ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴³⁷ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of March 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR. Also see Civil and Military Gazette, 5, 6 and 8 March 1947.

¹⁴³⁸ GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of March, 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴³⁹ Gopi Chand Bhargava to Khizar, 11 Feb. 1947, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

"In no circumstances are we willing to give the slightest assurance or support to the Muslim League in the formation of a Ministry, as we are opposed to Pakistan in any shape or form."¹⁴⁴⁰

The entry of the All-India National Congress into the provincial arena in this way was symbolic of the fact that there could be no settlement of the provincial situation, unless accompanied by agreement at the national level.¹⁴⁴¹ The prospects for such an occurrence were remote, as Jinnah continued to demand a 'Pakistan' which remained undefined,¹⁴⁴² but which was accepted to envisage the absorption of the Punjab, a Province which the Congress refused to concede in its entirety. The dispute could not fail to have serious communal repercussions in the Punjab. The stage was set, the birth or abortion of 'Pakistan' would necessitate the rupture of the Punjab womb, and Muslim and non-Muslim alike, intoxicated with communal fears, prejudices and jealousies, were prepared to spill blood to achieve their respective ends.

The riots and communal clashes, which began on 4 March 1947 and continued until the following August, began as an anti-League protest by Hindus and Sikhs determined that there should be no League Government in the Province. The Muslim community retaliated, determined to plunge the Punjab into civil war if necessary, to secure domination.¹⁴⁴³ Thus the disturbances were initiated by the communities against each other in the presence of an administration which was to transfer power to an undeclared successor not later than June 1948, the object of each group being to secure a more favorable position for their community when Britain surrendered responsibility. This was apparent from the fact that in the Rawalpindi Division the underlying idea was to eliminate the non-Muslim 'fifth column', whilst in Lahore Muslims desired to purge the district of the non-Muslim element in the population.¹⁴⁴⁴ As Jenkins reflected in analyzing the conflict in August 1947,

"We are faced not with an ordinary exhibition of political or communal violence, but with a struggle between the communities for the power which we are shortly to abandon. Normal standards cannot be applied to this communal war of succession...."¹⁴⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴⁰ *The Statesman*, 9 March 1947; R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁴¹ Ralph Izzard, the *Daily Mail's* correspondent in Lahore, emphasized the importance of a national understanding in precipitating a provincial settlement - *Civil and Military Gazette*, 13 March 1947.

¹⁴⁴² Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, during discussions with Jenkins on 18 and 19 February 1947, had "admitted candidly that he did not know what Pakistan meant, and that nobody in the Muslim League knew, so that it was very difficult for the League to carry on long-term negotiations with the minorities" - GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁴³ Chief Sec.'s Report. Punjab, second half of March 1946, L/P&J/5/250; Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p. 13, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p. 13, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The battle for the Punjab served the purpose of the national politicians of every major complexion, even though all were unanimous in their condemnation of violence, but their actions encouraged, rather than dissuaded, its continuance. Broadly speaking the League interpreted the Hindu and Sikh atrocities as a movement designed to prevent their democratic right to rule the Province, whilst the Congress and the Sikh parties regarded Muslim excesses as conclusive proof that non-Muslims could not tolerate Pakistani rule. Whilst the internecine conflict was waged, Nehru, Patel (leading national Congress figure, regarded as the 'strong man' of the movement), and Baldev Singh visited the Punjab as members of the Central Government. In reality, of the three only Nehru behaved responsibly, though to the best of Jenkins' knowledge not one of them made any contact of importance with Muslims:

"Nehru was balanced and sensible; but Baldev Singh on at least two occasions went in for most violent communal publicity, and Patel's visit to Gurgaon was used to make it appear that the Hindus in that district were the victims of Muslim aggression, whereas broadly the contrary was the case. Similarly when Liaquat Ali Khan or Ghazanfar Ali Khan visited the Punjab, they did so not to assist the administration, but to assist the Muslims."¹⁴⁴⁶

Whilst it is apparent that these national figures, and Mamdot and Sachar did not personally publicly incite murder and arson, certain local leaders encouraged violence. The Sikh leaders, particularly Master Tara Singh, whipped Sikh feeling to a fever pitch and Akali regiments were raised in preparation for a defensive attack upon Muslims,¹⁴⁴⁷ and Shaukat Hyat, in order to curry favor with the Muslim farmers of Lyallpur, actively encouraged them to take revenge on those Sikh farmers who remained in their midst.¹⁴⁴⁸

Also the actual campaigns of violence were directed and controlled by men connected with the major party organizations, and were in receipt of funds to pursue their respective ends.¹⁴⁴⁹ The Governor was convinced that,

"there is very little doubt that the disturbances have in some degree been organized and paid for by persons or bodies directly or indirectly under the control of the Muslim League, the Congress, and the Akali party."¹⁴⁵⁰

In addition recruitment to the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, the Muslim League National Guards, and the Akal Sena had been maintained, and although by May 1947

¹⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of March 1947, first and second halves of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁴⁸ In recalling Shaukat's extreme behavior Belcher has revealed that A.A. Hamid, the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur, attempted unsuccessfully to prevent Shaukat's endeavors, eventually resigning in frustration and disgust. Later the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, took Hamid into the service of his Secretariat at Karachi - R.H. Belcher, 'Recollections of the I.C.S.: Punjab 1939-47', p. 41, MSS. EUR. F.180/64, IOR.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p. 3, 11/3/1/91, IOR.

none of the organizations had been equipped with modern weapons,¹⁴⁵¹ their continued existence did not suggest that they were merely expected to fulfill a spectator role; there was strong evidence implicating the Swayam Sewak Sangh as the instigator behind the Hindu excesses.¹⁴⁵²

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the joint appeal issued by Gandhi and Jinnah in April 1947 for a cessation of the internecine strife, was discounted as being insincere, for as Akhter Hussain (Chief Sec., Punjab Govt.) reported:

"The joint appeal ... has not brought about the improvement for which so many fervently hoped. This is due to the unfortunate fact that many felt that one or both had been persuaded to a line of combined action which neither individually would have prompted ... [these doubts] might have been overcome if the provincial followers of the principals had acted in a way which provided practical acceptance of the published wishes of the leaders."¹⁴⁵³

It was not until the following June that the Province's communal leaders - Mamdot, Sachar and Swaram Singh - agreed under pressure from the Governor, to cooperate in stopping the troubles, but none of them went further than uttering pious statements, and no real effort was made, either through private pressure, or the withholding of funds, to end the conflagration.¹⁴⁵⁴

Moreover the Punjabi leaders' attitude was really an extension of the political temper which had gripped the respective communities reason having been submerged in a wave of communal hatred. Compromise was neither genuinely sought nor desired, as was reflected by the provincial press. The entire Hindu press, including the *People*, *Hindu* and *Milap*, was clamoring for partition, whilst extremist Hindu and Sikh publications (notably *Ranjit*, *Khalsa Sewak* and *Sakh Jiwan*) openly preached violent opposition to Pakistan. In retaliation the Muslim press (notably *Dawn* and the *Eastern Times*) united in its condemnation of the proposed division of the Punjab, and neither the Muslim or non-Muslim media was prepared to endorse Gandhi and Jinnah's plea for moderation, and forego the inherent urge of sniping at their opposite numbers, or to make political capital from the move. Hindu and Sikh newspapers rejected Jinnah's stance as insincere, arguing that he had refrained from abandoning similar agitation in Assam and N.W.F.P., and the League press which received the appeal with some favor, could nevertheless resist using it as a propaganda lever for the two-nation theory.¹⁴⁵⁵

¹⁴⁵¹ GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 15 May 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁴⁵³ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, 11/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

In such an atmosphere the protagonists of all persuasions reached for knives, rather than reason. Terrible atrocities were committed by all communities. The massacre by Muslims of non-Muslims in the districts of Attock, Jhelum and Multan in March 1947 was answered by the retaliatory slaughter of Muslims in Gurgaon in May.¹⁴⁵⁶ The plight of refugees seeking sanctuary amongst their co-religionists, helped to spread the tales of horror, increasing the anger, and the desire for revenge on the opposite communities.¹⁴⁵⁷ Whole villages entered the carnage, which as Williams (I.C.S. officer, served in Punjab 1932-47) recalled was made all the more effective, and thereby terrible, due to the sporadic involvement of serving army officers (Indian) who responding to their inherent communal instincts, directed the slaughter:

"In the countryside the entire religious community of one village would take part in the wholesale slaughter of those of an opposite religion, and cases were known of Indian army officers on leave organizing mass attacks of this kind."¹⁴⁵⁸

By August 1947, following six months of communal warfare, the Governor estimated that 5,000 persons had been killed and 3,000 seriously injured, of the latter 1,200 and 1,500 respectively were Muslims and non-Muslims. In respect of the damage done to property no accurate estimate was made, but in Lahore the Deputy Commissioner assessed that up to 28 July 1947, of the 20,256 houses,¹⁴⁵⁹ 1,120 (5.5%) had been destroyed, whilst outside the walled city, of the 50,519 dwellings, 225 (0.4%) had been leveled.¹⁴⁶⁰

When national and provincial leaders did intervene, it was purely to attempt to secure political advantage. On 10 March Nehru suggested to Wavell that tranquility in the Punjab might be restored by the inauguration of two Ministries - one for the western, the other for the eastern part of the Province. The Congress leader claimed, quite unconvincingly, that the measure was not intended to prejudice the partition issue, but merely to facilitate the continuance of the administration.¹⁴⁶¹ The shallowness of the ploy was immediately recognized by Wavell's advisors, Abell cautioned that the Muslim League would strongly object to such a proposal "which is based on the Congress claim that the non-Muslim areas of the Punjab (and of Bengal) must be kept from Muslim domination."¹⁴⁶² Nehru's advice was rejected on these grounds, and because the scheme was not practicable, as it was not considered appropriate at the time to divide the police force into two separate groups with allegiances to two

¹⁴⁵⁶ Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, pp. 2, 8, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁵⁸ R. Hunt and J. Harrison (joint editors), *The District Officer in India 1930-1947*, London, 1980, p. 235.

¹⁴⁵⁹ The term 'house' was misleading as it referred to any building ranging from a large hotel or office to a thatched hut - Memorandum by Jenkins, p. 11,"4. Aug. 1947, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁴⁶¹ Note by Wavell of interview with Nehru, 10 March 1947, Re/3/1/89 IOR.

¹⁴⁶² Note by Abell, 10 March 1947, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

governments, and as the work of Central Departments, e.g. Irrigation, Buildings and Roads, and Agriculture could not be reorganized quickly on a regional basis.¹⁴⁶³

In contrast to Nehru's initiative, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, determined that the partition of the Punjab should not occur, requested a fresh general election to establish beyond doubt the League's claim to the entire Province, in the belief that a majority League Ministry would emerge. His views, however, were not received with enthusiasm by some of his provincial colleagues or the Governor. Both Daultana and Mamdot appeared to be resigned to acceptance of the fact that a League Government would be unable to function in the face of non-Muslim agitation, especially on the part of the Sikhs.¹⁴⁶⁴ Although it was accepted by the Governor's staff that there was little doubt that an election would result in the League capturing approximately ninety seats, and thereby control of the Assembly,¹⁴⁶⁵ Jenkins rejected Ghazanfar Ali's plea on the grounds that it would precipitate further bloodshed, and that following the outbreak of the disorders and atrocities "neither I nor any other British officer..." would have anything to do with a purely communal Ministry.¹⁴⁶⁶ The new Viceroy (Mountbatten succeeded Wavell on 24 March 1947) whom the Raja had also petitioned, endorsed the Governor's decision. Mountbatten regarded the Province, with its large minority populations, as a microcosm of the Indian problem, and he informed Ghazanfar Ali that he had no intention of prejudicing the issue of India as a whole, by giving a precipitate decision over the Punjab.¹⁴⁶⁷

The rebuttal which the League received intensified rather than diminished Jinnah's determination to install a League Ministry in the Province. Mamdot, acting under the latter's instructions, and against his own apparent convictions (see above), persistently petitioned the Governor in April and May to be allowed to form an administration on the grounds that the League possessed a parliamentary majority. The move was intended to establish League domination in the Province on a constitutional and democratic basis to use the forces which would be at its command to combat the non-Muslim opposition and so strengthen the negotiating power of Jinnah at the national level.¹⁴⁶⁸ Jenkins remained determined that the League should be deprived of the opportunity to establish its will in the Province believing that it would cause an escalation of the violence. In expressing his views to Mountbatten, Jenkins again emphasized the implications the installation of a League Ministry would have for

¹⁴⁶³ Other objections were also cited, in that presumably there would still be only one Legislature, that there could only be one budget and finance department and that such a decision to appoint two Ministries could only be decided by the British Government - *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Jenkins to Wavell, 20 March 1947, R/3/3189; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 March 1947, I/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Abbott considered that the League would capture all the 86 Muslim constituencies, plus the Tumandars, N. Punjab Landholders, West Punjab Landholders and the Non-Union Labour seat, all of which had mixed communal electorates in which Muslims predominated - Abbott to Abell, 4 April 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Jenkins to Wavell, 20 March 1947, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Note of interview between the Viceroy and Ghazanfar Ali Khan, 31 March 1947, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Jenkins to Mountbatten, 15 May 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

British personnel. He reported that the non-Muslims were concerned, with some justification, that not only would Mamdot use the police and armed troops, which would be at his disposal, to crush them, but that he would withdraw the criminal proceedings which were pending against Muslims accused of committing atrocities in the Rawalpindi Division and Multan. Consequently the civil services would divide along communal lines, and the task of British officials operating in civil war conditions would become impossible, which the Governor considered would result in a number of them, including several senior police officers, resigning. In seeking Mountbatten's approval to refuse the League's request, Jenkins further urged the Viceroy to consider the effect which internecine strife between a League Ministry and non-Muslim opponents would have on the national negotiations pending between himself and the national leaders. If the Viceroy agreed, Jenkins proposed opposing Mamdot's claim on the grounds that a multi-communal administration was necessary to meet the Provisions of the 1935 Government of India Act (that the major communities should be represented in the Ministry). Though Jenkins continued to doubt Mamdot's ability to control a majority in the Assembly, he considered that it would be tactically wrong to oppose him on that point, as by so doing he would automatically commit himself to accepting a communal Ministry if the existence of a majority was proved. Also Jenkins further requested Mountbatten to attempt to secure Jinnah's concurrence, in order to diffuse the tension in the Province.¹⁴⁶⁹

Mountbatten agreed completely with the Governor's suggested strategy,¹⁴⁷⁰ and on 26 April, during a meeting with Jinnah, the Viceroy informed the Muslim leader that Mamdot's request would be rejected.¹⁴⁷¹ Mountbatten reiterated Jenkins' argument that the immediate outcome of the League assuming office would be further civil strife, and he reinforced the warning by revealing that both Tara Singh and Kartar Singh had given him the impression that a League Ministry would face armed opposition from the Sikhs. Furthermore the Viceroy counseled that it would be irresponsible to precipitate further violence in the Punjab at a time when official discussions were in progress concerning the transfer of power, particularly in view of "the great probability that Pakistan would emerge with a partition of the Punjab", and as such it would be pointless to impose a government on the Province, which would be resisted at the cost of bloodshed, merely to permit a Muslim League Ministry to operate for only a brief period. In seeking, without success, Jinnah's acceptance of the argument, Mountbatten concluded:

"One day you will be thankful to me for saving you from getting into this mess that you would like to get into in the Punjab; it is mainly in the interests of the

¹⁴⁶⁹ Jenkins to Mountbatten, telegram, 24 April 1947, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Mountbatten to Jenkins, telegram, 25 April 1947, 11/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁷¹ Extract from note of interview between Viceroy and Jinnah, 26 April 1947, R/3,4/89, IOR.

Muslim League that I am making this decision, and I am sorry not to have your agreement."¹⁴⁷²

It was a naive and deceptive explanation with which to confront Jinnah. Mountbatten possessed an antipathy towards the Muslim leader, whom he considered to be mentally deranged:

"I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic case; in fact until I had met him I would not have thought it possible that a man with such a complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down so powerful a position."¹⁴⁷³

Also the Viceroy's concern for the League was minimal, if it existed at all, his primary motivation not unnaturally was to commit no act which would involve British troops in a confrontation between a majority League Ministry and non-Muslim Punjabis, and to avoid a further escalation of the violence, which could have destroyed the possibility of a peaceful British withdrawal from India. If Jinnah had endorsed the Viceroy's declared intentions in opposing a League Ministry in the Punjab, he would have given, in effect, his tacit approval for the division of the Province, having publicly determined to oppose it. As a result the Provincial League, acting in accordance with Jinnah's wishes, refused to abandon its ministerial ambitions and continued to seek office, though in view of what Mountbatten had told him, Jinnah could have been in no doubt that Mamdot would not be successful. Nevertheless a united Punjab remained a vital bargaining counter, not to be lightly discarded. In the Province the apparent British reluctance to permit the League to enjoy its democratic rights, combined with the insistence of the League leadership to be granted office, maintained the tempo of the agitation by increasing Muslim frustration and bitterness, as it was widely though incorrectly believed that British policy reflected the anti-Muslim bias of Jenkins, who desired, in the words of Liaquat Ali Khan, to "suppress", "intimidate" and "coerce" Muslims.¹⁴⁷⁴ It was an unfair and groundless denunciation of the Governor, for Jenkins had responded to the situation out of concern for the Punjab and British interests, in that he desired to contain the violence and loss of life, and prevent if possible British personnel abandoning their non-partisan stance, as they would have been forced to do, had a League administration faced rebellion.¹⁴⁷⁵ In order to achieve his objectives, however, it had been necessary to frustrate the League's political ambitions, and in the tense and violent atmosphere which prevailed in the Punjab from March 1947 onwards, the Governor's stance was seen as partisan and anti-Muslim, and as such appeared to merit extreme resistance.

¹⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷³ Viceroy's Personal Report No. 3, p. 4, 17 April 1947, L/P&J/433, IOR.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten, 15 April 1947, 1/3/3190, IOR.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Note by Jenkins on letter, Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten, 15 April 1947, 16 April 1947, R/3/1/90, IOR.

The Muslim desire to rule the Punjab as a prerequisite to its total absorption into 'Pakistan' and the non-Muslim determination, intensified by the Rawalpindi massacres which had occurred in March 1947,¹⁴⁷⁶ to resist such domination at all costs presented the British (now desperately and sincerely attempting to extricate themselves from India) with a potentially explosive dilemma. In view of the highly inflammable atmosphere prevailing in the Province, the continued existence of a united Punjab had become a liability which the British were no longer prepared to countenance, as any settlement conceding the whole of the Province to 'Pakistan' would have plunged the territory, and possibly India, into civil war, thereby preventing a peaceful British withdrawal from the sub-continent. Both Nehru and Gandhi had accepted early in 1946 that 'Pakistan' would become a reality, but both insisted that its birth would not be at the expense of Hindu dominated areas. Nehru had admitted to Woodrow Wyatt on 10 January 1946 that he believed that the British Government would be forced to concede 'Pakistan', but that there would have to be territorial readjustments to prevent the absorption of Hindu districts by the Muslim State. If such a concession was not granted, then Nehru warned that the Government of India would face a Congress mass movement which would eclipse all of its predecessors.¹⁴⁷⁷ Similarly Gandhi, in a conversation with, Abell in March 1946, had opined that 'Pakistan's' boundaries could include only genuine Muslim areas.¹⁴⁷⁸ Even Jinnah accepted that in view of Congress opposition, 'Pakistan' would never include the whole of Bengal or the Punjab, but he was careful not to publicize his opinions. In a private meeting with Wyatt in early February 1946, he told the M.P. that he was resigned to the exclusion of the Burdwan Division of Bengal, but that he was determined to secure Calcutta,¹⁴⁷⁹ and in the same month the Aga Khan confided to Wavell that the League leader was prepared to concede Amritsar and Ambala in the Punjab.¹⁴⁸⁰

Jinnah's public attitude, however, hardened considerably following the League's sweeping victories at the polls, and the British declaration that independence would be granted in June 1948. The Muslim electorate and masses had been encouraged to believe that 'Pakistan' would include large non-Muslim areas, and it became incumbent upon Jinnah to attempt to realize their expectations, even though they differed from his own. Jinnah, who was a superb negotiator, knew that it would be sheer folly to concede too much too soon, if he was to achieve any measure of success in countering Congress objections. Nevertheless his private utterances proved a grave error, for they created the impression amongst the British that he would accept far less than his public posturing suggested.¹⁴⁸¹ This belief was further enhanced by an unguarded plea which Jinnah made to Wavell in November 1946: "He thought we should give them their own bit of

¹⁴⁷⁶ GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 March 1947, I/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Viceroy to Sec. of State, 15 Jan. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Viceroy to Sec. of State, telegram, 15 March 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Note by Abell, 5 Feb. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Note by Wavell on conversation with the Aga Khan, 21 Feb. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

¹⁴⁸¹ Note by Abell, 5 Feb. 1946, R/3A/105, IOR.

country, let it be as small as we liked, but it must be their own, and they would live on one meal a day."¹⁴⁸²

Thus it was Jinnah's apparent willingness to make concessions, binned with Congress and Sikh opposition to the inclusion of non-Muslim areas, and their determination to violently oppose absorption by 'Pakistan' which helped to spawn Partition. Nevertheless great bitterness still exists among many Pakistanis who insist that the division of the Punjab and Bengal resulted from a concentrated Congress-British intrigue to cripple the new nation at birth. Unfortunately this belief has received great impetus from the pro-Congress sentiments of the last Viceroy, and the fact that as a private citizen following his retirement from public affairs, he did not attempt to conceal the contempt he felt towards Jinnah. Also it is a view which Campbell-Johnson's sycophantic exercise of glorification, *Mission with Mountbatten*, has encouraged. The author's portrayal of Jinnah's coldness and aloofness in his relationship with Mountbatten, is in marked contrast to the warmth and affection which Campbell-Johnson stresses existed between the Viceroy and Gandhi. In addition, the narrative contains scornful references designed to belittle the Muslim leader.¹⁴⁸³

Jenkins, in the belief that the division of the Punjab would be a social and economic disaster, had hoped to elicit support for an initiative to produce a truly representative multi-communal Government for the Province, in order to replace Section 93, and to avoid the Province's break-up,¹⁴⁸⁴ but his endeavors were doomed to failure. His conception of the Punjab's political requirements was totally out of step with the communal temper of the times, the declared wishes of the Sikhs and the Congress, the expectations of the Viceroy, at least one of his senior advisors, and of the senior officials at the India Office. On 11 March 1947 Baldev Singh had impressed upon Wavell the necessity of dividing the Punjab in order to create a new province "embracing the contiguous area where non-Muslims form a clear majority as a whole and have larger property interests".¹⁴⁸⁵ Following meetings between Sikh leaders and Nehru in Lahore in the second week of March 1947, the Congress adopted the Sikh demand in resolution form, though as is evident from the opinions expressed by Nehru and Gandhi in the opening months of 1946 (see above) Mountbatten was wrong to conclude in June 1947 that the Congress action had been precipitated "mainly at the request of the Sikh community..."¹⁴⁸⁶ In fact the actions of both the Congress and the Sikhs represented a

¹⁴⁸² P. Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, journal entry 19 Nov. 1946, p. 378.

¹⁴⁸³ Campbell-Johnson has drawn pointed attention to the fact that Jinnah, whilst in the company of the Viceroy and the Vicereine, referred to Lady Mountbatten as "a rose between two thorns", when in fact it was Jinnah himself who was in the centre of the group. Also, a photograph of Jinnah's phallic 'doodlings' is reproduced to indicate the Muslim leader's megalomania. See A. Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten*, London, 1951, pp. 50-63, 101-102.

¹⁴⁸⁴ 'The Punjab Problem', Memorandum by Jenkins, enclosure, Jenkins to Wavell, 7 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Baldev Singh to Wavell, 11 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

¹⁴⁸⁶ *Proceedings and Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission*, Vol. III, pp. 96, 100, PGRC.

response to the overwhelming Provincial League victory at the polls, and its insistence that 'Pakistan' should include the whole territory. The League success also convinced Menon (Reforms Secretary, Govt. of India) that partition was inevitable,¹⁴⁸⁷ and it was a view with which Wavell concurred. Similarly, the consensus of opinion at the India Office favored partition, in that it afforded Britain the least dangerous option. Turnbull, whilst he considered Jenkins' desire to maintain the unity of the Province was no doubt right for the Punjab, nevertheless refused to support it as

"this matter is a crucial issue in the all-India situation and ought to be viewed in that light and in the light of H.M.G.'s policy. So viewed I think that partition is the only way."¹⁴⁸⁸

Turnbull was broadly supported by Patrick (Asst. Under Sec. of State),¹⁴⁸⁹ and Monteath (Permanent Under Sec. of State); the latter strongly recommended the formulation of a scheme for the separation of the Punjab on the supposition that it was an 'inevitable feature' of the all-India problem of handing responsibility to more than one authority.¹⁴⁹⁰ Only one of their senior colleagues dissented. Croft (Deputy Under Sec. of State) regarded the move as premature, favoring the preservation of a united Punjab.¹⁴⁹¹

Croft's desire to preserve the unity of the Province, however, failed to dissuade his associates, or influence the Secretary of State, who agreed with the majority view. Pethick-Lawrence was obsessed with realizing one over-riding objective - a peaceful British withdrawal, and consequently he deprecated any developments which might prejudice that aim. On 3 April he conveyed his views to the new Viceroy. He stressed that whilst he appreciated the motives behind Jenkins' move, he considered that the creation of a multi-communal coalition would achieve nothing in the long run, and might cause serious problems for the British Government. He argued that as it was probable that Britain would be obliged to transfer power to more than one recipient, a local coalition government in the Punjab would be bound to disintegrate as the Punjab Muslim League would wish to join with Sindh and N.W.F.P. to create 'Pakistan' whilst the non-Muslims would support union with India. If the government collapsed following the British departure, Pethick-Lawrence realized that it would be disastrous for India, but if it happened prior to independence, he feared that it would prove particularly embarrassing for the British Government, and in order to avoid either eventuality he concluded,

¹⁴⁸⁷ P.Moon (Ed.), 21.cit., journal entry 6 Feb. 1947, p. 418.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Note by F.F. Turnbull, 26 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Note by Patrick, 27 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Note by Monteath, 1 April 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴⁹¹ Note by Croft, 27 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

"the partition of the Punjab to such degree and in such form as will satisfy the rival nationalisms in the Province is really unavoidable from the political point of view of the transfer of authority in June 1948."¹⁴⁹²

Thus at the outset of Mountbatten's viceroyalty the inevitability of partition was an accepted fact, and on 17 April 1947 the new Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that he agreed with his analysis, and in the event of the Cabinet Mission plan continuing to prove unacceptable to all parties, partition would be practically unavoidable.¹⁴⁹³ This plan, published on 16 May 1946, had envisaged the creation of a three-tiered Indian Union, consisting of three groups of Provinces - Section A to include Madras, Bombay, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces and Bihar; Section B comprising N.W.F.P., Punjab and Sindh; and Section C, incorporating Bengal and Assam. Each group would be free to decide upon the constitution for each of its constituent provinces, as for the section as a whole, and to define which subjects would fall under the control of the section governments. This constitutional formula also proposed the creation of an Interim Government at the Centre, representing the major political parties. Jinnah on 6 June 1946 accepted the proposal, subject to the subsequent proviso, which Wavell accepted, that if the Congress rejected it, the League would still be able to join the Interim administration. Ispahani in explaining Jinnah's acceptance, has argued that in effect it guaranteed 'Pakistan' in fact, if not in name, as there were sufficient safeguards to protect the Muslim Provinces from interference from the Union Government, whose powers were limited to foreign affairs, defence and communications. Also any constitution agreed upon under the Plan would be revised at the end of a ten-year period, which implied that Provinces or Sections would be free to secede from the Union if they so desired. The Indian National Congress initially agreed to the compromise, but it refused to join an Interim Government, and on 10 July 1946 Nehru repudiated the notion of the compulsory grouping of the Provinces into sections. Prior to that development the Cabinet Mission had informed Jinnah that should the Congress refuse to cooperate in the Interim Government, then the League would not be permitted to participate. As a result Jinnah withdrew his acceptance of the scheme.¹⁴⁹⁴

Any desire which Mountbatten entertained concerning the resuscitation of the Cabinet Mission formula, however, was quickly dispelled by Jinnah. The Muslim leader was no longer prepared to place his trust in the proposed formula. The revocation of Wavell's undertaking concerning League participation at the Centre, coupled with Nehru's objections to the compulsory grouping of Provinces, convinced him that he had been betrayed by the British, and that he would suffer a similar fate at the hands of the Congress, in that the latter would use their permanent majority at the Centre to destroy

¹⁴⁹² Pethick-Lawrence to Mountbatten, 3 April 1947, 1/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴⁹³ Mountbatten to Pethick-Lawrence, 17 April 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁴⁹⁴ M.A.H. Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him*, Karachi, 1976, pp. 221-222. See P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 248-249.

'Pakistan'.¹⁴⁹⁵ In view of Jinnah's fear, Mountbatten realized that any attempt to enforce the Cabinet Mission solution would invite an armed Muslim rebellion,¹⁴⁹⁶ and as such the only apparent alternative was an independent and sovereign 'Pakistan', which because of the extreme opposition of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus, would of necessity have to be limited in the Punjab to the Muslim majority districts. In reacting to this situation, the Viceroy, during the course of six meetings, held with Jinnah in mid-April 1947, defined the 'Pakistan' which would emerge if Jinnah persisted in insisting on separation:

"I pointed out that the most he could hope for from me was to allow Provinces, and where applicable halves of Provinces, to decide whether they wished to join Pakistan. I pointed out that at this rate it looked as though he would get Sindh and Western Punjab for certain; the N.W.F.P. would be a doubtful starter (and if he got it would cost him 3½ crores a year to keep the tribes quiet). In the east I pointed out that he would get the most useless part of Bengal, without Calcutta, and if he wished it he could have Sylhet back from Assam."¹⁴⁹⁷

In view of the antipathy Mountbatten felt for Jinnah, and his distaste for the League,¹⁴⁹⁸ there can be little hope that the stark prospects with which he confronted Jinnah, caused him little regret. Nevertheless he was not the Muslim nation's architect, so far as the Punjab was concerned. He had known at the time of his arrival in India that the Secretary of State had decided that division was the only plausible alternative, and it had been made abundantly apparent to him by the Sikhs in particular that Muslim national aspirations could only be satisfied at the expense of the unity of the territory. Tara Singh and Baldev Singh, in the last week of April 1947 had bluntly told the Viceroy that their co-religionists would fight to the 'last man' if placed under Muslim domination: "Any hopes that I still entertained of being able to avoid the partition of the Punjab if Pakistan is forced upon us were shattered at this meeting..."¹⁴⁹⁹ Faced with irreconcilable communal elements, and in the knowledge that Britain had no desire to resort to arms to impose a settlement, Mountbatten accepted, and in no sense engineered, the Province's break-up:

"I realize that all this partition business is sheer madness... No-one would ever induce me to agree to it were it not for this fantastic communal madness that has seized everybody and leaves no other course open."¹⁵⁰⁰

¹⁴⁹⁵ Viceroy's Personal Report, No. 5, p. 9, 1 May 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 5, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 4, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁴⁹⁸ On 5 May 1947 Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins, "I know I do not need to assure you that I am not pro-Muslim League..." - Mountbatten to Jenkins, 5 May 1947, R/3/3/1/178, IOR.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Viceroy's Personal Report, No. 4, p. 4, 24 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 5, p. 8, 1 May 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

On 2 June 1947 the fate of the Punjab and India was formally disclosed to the Indian national leaders by the Viceroy, Jinnah bowing to the inevitable with a nod of his head.¹⁵⁰¹ Although he had publicly maintained his opposition to partition of the Punjab until the end,¹⁵⁰² he had known from mid-April that it would occur. He was powerless to prevent it, the refusal of the Viceroy to consider the division of the Indian army,¹⁵⁰³ deprived him of the opportunity to use the presence of pro-Pakistani troops as a bargaining factor. His only alternative could have been the incitement of a Muslim rising; such a course, however, was contrary to his constitutional character, and could not have guaranteed success. Jinnah at heart was not a political gambler, but a cautious strategist, and as such even a 'moth-eaten Pakistan' was preferable to the risks involved in attempting to forge a nation through war or revolution.

On 3 June 1947 Mountbatten announced that the Assemblies in those Provinces which were to be partitioned would be required to vote to signify their acceptance of the scheme, and that the actual details of the divisions would be formulated by a Boundary Commission, to be advised by a Committee appointed by the leaders of the respective communities. Significantly, the Viceroy also revealed that the Fourth Infantry Division, at the unanimous request of his Cabinet, would be stationed in those areas of the Punjab subject to division to prevent further bloodshed:

"that is the reason and the only reason why the Defence Member, Sardar Baldev Singh, announced last night the transfer of additional troops.... I do not need to tell you that this is not a British move."¹⁵⁰⁴

The process of withdrawal had reached a critical stage for the British, the deployment of troops was bound to heighten tension if interpreted as a move to coerce any particular section of Punjabi society, and the eventual award of the Boundary Commission could not fail but to leave all the communities disappointed and more embittered, particularly as the Muslims had been denied a united Punjab, the Sikhs were entertaining hopes for a Sovereign State bordered by the Chenab and the Jamna, and the Hindus hoped to gain Lahore.¹⁵⁰⁵ Mountbatten considered that the clash of interests could precipitate civil war, and in order to reduce the risks of a British involvement, he advanced the date for independence to 15 August 1947.¹⁵⁰⁶

Irrespective of the Viceroy's 'divide and quit' announcement Jenkins faced the onerous task of attempting to contain the communal violence which continued to plague the Province. The national leaders, sobered by the prospect of inheriting political

¹⁵⁰¹ P. Hardy, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

¹⁵⁰² See *Dawn*, 1 May 1947.

¹⁵⁰³ Viceroy's Personal Report, No. 3, p. 4, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁵⁰⁴ *Proceedings and Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission*, Vol. III, pp. 98-101, PGRC.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁵⁰⁶ A.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, London, 1969, pp. 289, 293-294, 319-320, 404.

responsibility at the end of a six-week period, were all anxious to secure the tranquility of the Punjab, and thereby avoid the escalation of a full-scale communal war between the two successor States. Jinnah complained to the Viceroy that the Governor had adopted a weak attitude, declaring that "I don't care whether you shoot Moslems or not, it has got to be stopped."¹⁵⁰⁷ Similarly Nehru also believed that strong action was necessary, and he favored a declaration of martial law in all the troubled areas, including Lahore and Amritsar, although this suggestion did not meet with the approval of Liaquat Ali Khan.¹⁵⁰⁸ The Governor, however, despite the fact that Mountbatten favored strong action,¹⁵⁰⁹ refused to yield to extreme methods. From the time of the collapse of the Coalition Government, Jenkins had been determined to avoid any move which would lead to an escalation of the disturbances and the subsequent involvement of British soldiers. It was his considered opinion, which he shared with Bruce (Inspector General of Police, Punjab) and Brigadier Cazenore (the Lahore area Commander), that the deployment of troops could not succeed in combatting the agitation, as they would not be faced with widespread rioting but numerous bouts of terrorism of a 'cloak and dagger' nature. As such, Jenkins feared that having failed to crush the violence, the army, to the acute embarrassment of Britain, would become bogged down in attempting to combat a continually deteriorating situation. Furthermore he was opposed to the use of Indian troops, because he did not wish them to be exposed to the type of communal attacks to which the provincial police had been subjected.¹⁵¹⁰ Also Jenkins was highly suspicious of the true motives behind the Congress call for martial law, being convinced that "When a Hindu leader talks about 'utter ruthlessness' or 'martial law', he means that he wants as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand."¹⁵¹¹

In view of these objections, particularly concerning the involvement of the army, and the almost total disintegration of the services, the morale of which had been seriously undermined by communalism,¹⁵¹² and the near exhaustion of the police, the Governor reasoned that the only way to stop the destruction and killings, was by persuading the provincial political leaders to use their influence to secure that objective, "not by press statements but by contacts which they unquestionably possess with violent elements".¹⁵¹³ The Viceroy appreciated the logic of Jenkins' arguments, and in spite of Nehru's continued insistence, he refused to allow the imposition of martial law. It was agreed instead that the Governor should be permitted to seek the cooperation of the local leaders to join a Standing Security Committee to work with the Governor for the

¹⁵⁰⁷ Extract of interview between Viceroy and Jinnah, 23 June 1947; Mountbatten to Jenkins, telegram, 24 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Mountbatten to Jenkins, 24 June 1947; Private Sec., Governor, Punjab, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵⁰⁹ Extract of interview between Viceroy and Jinnah, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵¹⁰ Jenkins to Mountbatten, Secraphone Message, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵¹¹ Memorandum by Jenkins, pp. 2-3, 4 August 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR

¹⁵¹² GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, 1/P&J/5/250, IOR. 255.

¹⁵¹³ GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, 1/P&J/5/250, IOR. 255. Jenkins to Mountbatten, Secraphone Message, 25 June 1947, W3/3/89, IOR.

restoration of peace and that at Patel's suggestion the provincial officials in Lahore should be replaced by men who enjoyed the confidence of all the communities.¹⁵¹⁴

Jenkins readily agreed to Patel's innovation - "If by permitting the poachers to select their own game-keepers we can stop them poaching, so much the better" - and on 26 June he secured the participation of all three communal leaders - Mamdot, Bhim Sen Sachar and Swaran Singh - on the Security Committee.¹⁵¹⁵ In spite of the apparent desire of these men to restore order,¹⁵¹⁶ the Committee disintegrated on 3 July as a result of Mamdot's resignation. The Muslim leader attempted to portray his withdrawal as a protest against the anti-Muslim activities which were being condoned in the Province, having complained to the Governor on 2 July of the "vindictive" and "outrageous" manner in which the administration had used all its powers to oppress and victimize the Muslim public of Lahore, by organizing searches solely in Muslim areas, and by using the Special Staff, which had been brought into existence under the supervision of the D.I.G. of Police to extort false statements from Muslims. He also claimed that the communal partiality of that organization was reflected by its overwhelmingly non-Muslim composition.¹⁵¹⁷ In fact Mamdot's claims were largely spurious. The personnel employed on the Special Staff amounted to 20 officers, 9 of whom were Muslims, the remainder including 3 Britons, 6 Sikhs and 2 Hindus, and up to the 2 July 1947 37 people had been interrogated, of whom 20 were Muslims, 12 were Hindus and 5 were Sikhs. The Governor denied that any improper methods had been used in questioning suspects at any time, emphasizing that the presence of a multi-communal staff provided adequate safeguards against excesses being directed against the members of any particular community, but he did admit that of the 419 arrests and searches which had occurred in Greater Lahore from 23 June to 2 July, 285 (68%) had involved Muslims.¹⁵¹⁸ Even so it would appear that although the figures seem to suggest a degree of anti-Muslim bias, in all probability they reflected the fact that so far as the Lahore area was concerned the activities of Muslim terrorist groups justified such a high degree of surveillance. For in reality the Muslims of Lahore in order to strengthen their claims on the Provincial capital had perpetrated a deliberate campaign to drive as many non-Muslims as possible from it. The success of their endeavors can be measured by the fact that by the beginning of July 1947 there was a large and continuous exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from the city.¹⁵¹⁹ Mamdot knew of their endeavors, and he was not prepared to be publicly associated with any genuine, concentrated effort to curtail them. For this reason, prior to his resignation, he had offered his continued cooperation on the condition that all 'repressive' and 'oppressive' measures would immediately cease, and

¹⁵¹⁴ Personal Sec. to Viceroy, Governor, Punjab, telegram, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91; Viceroy's Personal Report, No. 10, p. 2, 27 June 1947, 11/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁵¹⁵ Jenkins to Mountbatten, 26 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵¹⁶ GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁵¹⁷ Mamdot to Jenkins, 2 July 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵¹⁸ Jenkins to Mountbatten, 3 July 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵¹⁹ Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

would only be employed following full consultation with the Council.¹⁵²⁰ It seems evident that if the concession had been granted, Mamdot would have used it to attempt to prevent the further investigation of potentially dangerous Muslim areas.¹⁵²¹

Mamdot's retirement from the Security Committee effectively destroyed the last hope of diffusing the highly tense situation in the cities and rural areas of the Punjab. The murders, maimings and out-breaks of arson continued unabated, and as a result the Province's last weeks of geographical unity were marked by mounting fear and chaos. The Assembly had voted on the partition issue on 23 June 1947, formally sanctioning the Punjab's division, the eight former Muslim Unionists, including Khizar having supported the transfer of the territory to 'Pakistan'. An attempt by Mamdot to retain provincial unity was defeated by M.L.As from the Eastern Punjab, by 50 votes to 22.¹⁵²² The drama was almost over, only one act remained, and that was to culminate in tragedy. Whilst Mountbatten was not responsible for the decision to break the Punjab into two, his failure to ensure that the division was made as humanely as possible, contributed greatly to the mass slaughter which occurred. In April 1947 Jinnah had told the Viceroy "You must carry out a surgical operation; cut India and its army firmly in half and give me the half that belong to the Muslim League."¹⁵²³ Under Mountbatten's direction, however, the 'surgical operation' degenerated into sheer butchery. At the Viceroy's insistence the period to achieve the transfer of power had been dramatically reduced, a decision which whilst it relieved Britain of any long-term commitment, sealed the fate of the Punjab and condemned it to certain mayhem, for as Jenkins observed:

"It would be difficult enough to partition within six weeks a country of 30 million people which has been governed as a unit for 98 years even if all concerned were friendly and anxious to make progress."¹⁵²⁴

The Punjab, however, had tottered on the precipice of civil war for six months, its communities were actively engaged in committing atrocities, and exhorting reprisals against each other, and the mutual fears which the acts of violence had bred, had precipitated mass migrations from the east of Muslims, and from the west of non-Muslims.¹⁵²⁵ The situation was considerably aggravated at the district level, particularly those which fell in the border areas, by the transfer of many senior Indian officials either to the Indian or Pakistan territories. This development, in the opinion of Belcher (I.C.S.

¹⁵²⁰ Mamdot also demanded that Muslims should be granted parity with the other communities on the Council, and on the 'Special Staff' - Mamdot to Jenkins, 2 July 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

¹⁵²¹ Viceroy's Personal Report, No. 11, p. 2, 4 July 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁵²² Report by Reuter's Indian Service, 23 June 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

¹⁵²³ Viceroy's Personal Report, No. 3, p. 3, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

¹⁵²⁴ GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

¹⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Officer, served in the Punjab 1939-1947), increased the flood of refugees and the resultant chaos:

"A consequence of the requirement that senior Indian officials on each side of the border should be of the 'right' community on Independence Day; it followed from this that at the very moment when minorities were feeling most vulnerable and in need of reassurance they found that senior District officials of their own community who might have given them that reassurance had themselves disappeared over the border."¹⁵²⁶

Also no adequate measures were taken for the protection of the evacuees; a totally inadequate 'Border Patrol Force' was appointed to police the frontier areas but it represented nothing more than a token gesture. The force, comprised of only two divisions, was overwhelmed by the continuous tide of human despair and misery which confronted it.¹⁵²⁷

It was a serious error of judgment on the part of Mountbatten which ensured that the withdrawal of British power in the Punjab would take place amongst widespread suffering and carnage. Even so the Viceroy was not the only villain of the piece. The Home Government acquiesced in the Viceroy's action. But the key members of Attlee's Ministry had little knowledge of India. For example until December 1946, of the Prime Minister's senior colleagues, Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, was ignorant of the fact that the Sikhs originated from and inhabited the Punjab, whilst Ellen Wilkinson, the Education Minister, was surprised to learn that only approximately five hundred British officials were stationed in the Province.¹⁵²⁸ Mountbatten, however, knew of the situation and dangers which prevailed in the Punjab, and as the man who sanctioned the largely ill-prepared and unsupervised partition he must bear the brunt of the blame for what occurred. The disgust which his actions engendered was not confined solely to the victims, but has been expressed by at least one British I.C.S. officer who served under him. Cowley (served in the Punjab 1939-47) has written:

"It was murder. This precipitate decision by the Labour Government which Wavell had refused to carry out, cost over a million lives."¹⁵²⁹ There are some members of the Punjab

¹⁵²⁶ R. Hunt and J. Harrison (Joint Eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 239.

¹⁵²⁷ Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of the Punjab*, Patiala, 1972, p. 107; the Punjab Boundary Force consisted of "55,000 Indians with a few British among their officers...." - H.V. Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

¹⁵²⁸ P.Moon (Ed.), *op. cit.*, journal entry 11 Dec. 1946, p. 395.

¹⁵²⁹ Estimates relating to the number of deaths which occurred as a result of the partition of the Province vary. Whilst Cowley's estimate appears to have been exaggerated, it is clear that no consensus of opinion exists as to the exact amount. As Hodson has recorded: "It is impossible to be sure, even within a wide margin, how many people were killed in the communal war of August to November 1947. In the earlier stages there was no effective civil authority to report the widespread deaths; with the vast refugee movement, local records were destroyed or rendered useless. The figure of a million was popularly bandied about. The truth was probably around 200,000 men, women and children, a terrible enough total, even seen against India's 400 millions." - H. V.Hodson, *op. cit.*, p. 418. Other estimates which have been recorded are as follows:

I.C.S. who think it was correct ... The majority share my view that it was a disastrous error. Wavell himself had a plan for a two-tier withdrawal, retaining control of the disputed areas until some reasonable solution could be reached. This would have been sensible ... Nothing could have been worse than the plan adopted and the timing and method of its adoption. I have the greatest admiration for Mountbatten as a Supreme Commander. No doubt as Governor General of the new independent India he was a success. But for the Punjab ... he was a disaster."¹⁵³⁰

Though the actual act of partition was brutal, the causes for the division emanated from a provincial society comprised of irreconcilable elements. The growth of nationalism had divided the communities even further, especially as neither Muslims nor non-Muslims were willing to accept the rule of any community other than their own. Whilst the Unionist party had flourished until 1943, its multi-communal nature and philosophy could only survive so long as the British held the actual power in the Punjab and in India. The decision of the British to relinquish control in August 1947 created a power vacuum which multi-communal political philosophies could not fill, as fears and hatreds on both sides, having been aroused, particularly by the elections of 1946, totally prejudiced the prospects for co-operation between the communities following the transfer of power. In agreeing that the Punjab should be divided to satisfy the nationalist ambitions of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, the Viceroy accepted the inevitable, though he did little to prevent the catastrophe which followed.

No. of deaths	Source
500,000	I. Stephens, <i>Pakistan</i> , London, 1963, p. 80.
180,000 to 200,000	P. Moon, <i>Divide and Quit</i> , London, 1961, p. 293.
400,000 to 500,000	G.D. Khosla, <i>Stern Reckoning</i> , New Delhi, 1950, pp. 298-299. (This figure included non-Muslim casualties in Sindh and N.W.F.P.)
600,000	M. Edwardes, <i>The Last Years of British India</i> , London, 1963, p. 223.
59250 (W. Punjab only)	Mountbatten to Mudie, 25 July 1962, quoted by Kirpal Singh, <i>The Partition of the Punjab</i> , Delhi, 1972, pp. 105-106.
500,000	<i>The First Year: Pakistan 14 August 1947 to 14 August 1948</i> (Pakistan Government Publication) Karachi, 1948, p. 131.

¹⁵³⁰ Bill Cowley, *Peacocks Calling: One Man's Experience in India. 1939-47*, pp. 174-175, MSS. EUR. F. 180/66, IOR.

CONCLUSION

The course which Muslim politics pursued in the Punjab in the decade before Independence, heralding as it did the suppression of provincialism and the destruction of Unionism as political philosophies and the triumph of a separatist Muslim nationalism, made the partition of the Province unavoidable. This process was particularly bloody and horrific, and it has spawned a legacy of bitterness which in turn has clouded the interpretations of the pre-Partition history of the region. Broadly speaking the protagonists who have debated the issue fall into two main camps, 'Pakistani historians' arguing that the creation of an independent Muslim state necessitating the break-up of the Punjab and India was occasioned by the fact that the intrusion of Islam into Hindustan had generated the development of a Muslim 'nation', which ultimately responded to nationalist pressures by demanding and winning a geographical expression of its nation-hood in the form of Pakistan.¹⁵³¹ 'Indian commentators' generally deny this assertion, opining that on the whole India's Muslims and Hindus were indistinguishable at the masses level, and that separatist tendencies resulted from the fact that Muslim leaders were willing to exploit religious fanaticism to establish a power-base for political power in the country independent of the Indian National Congress, and that the British actively encouraged that process in pursuit of their 'Divide and Rule' policies.¹⁵³²

Both the Pakistani and Indian hypotheses appear to contain elements of truth, but neither in isolation can adequately explain the course which Indian history followed in the years 1936 to 1947, or the effect which it had on Muslim politics in the Punjab. There can be little doubt that the Muslims of the Punjab, whether as members of the educated or economic elites or of the peasantry, regarded themselves as different from other non-Muslim Punjabis. This was not the outcome of a divisive British-inspired plot, but the consequence of rigid religio-social practices which prevented inter-marriage and other intimate social intercourse (e.g. communal eating and drinking) between Muslims and caste Hindus. Even so the British were not slow to realize the advantages which this gave them in attempting to prolong their role in India by manipulating the

¹⁵³¹ See Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, Washington, 1963; I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi, 1965; K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan, A Study in Nationalism*, London, 1967; K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase, 1857-1948*, London, 1968.

¹⁵³² J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, Bombay, 1962, pp. 382, 467-471. Uma Kaura has attempted to chronicle the destructive role the British played in Hindu-Muslim relations, having claimed that British Viceroy from Minto (1905-1910) to Linlithgow (1936-1943) seized every possible opportunity to encourage separatist tendencies on the part of Muslim leaders in order to drive a wedge between them and the Congress - Uma Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism*, New Delhi, 1977. See also B.R. Nanda, 'Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1935-47', and M. Mujeek, 'The Partition of India in Retrospect', in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (Eds.), *The Partition of India*, London, 1970.

incompatibility between Muslim and non-Muslim leaders, as was witnessed by the use Linlithgow made of Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League. But Muslim leaders had not been forced by the British to adopt a separatist communal philosophy, though the latter clearly welcomed it.¹⁵³³

Muslim leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century's, notably Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan and Moshin-ul-Mulk, anxious to avoid the prospect of Congress and Hindu domination had actively sought British help to frustrate such a development.¹⁵³⁴ What of the Muslims of the Punjab, however, did they feel similarly threatened in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century? The answer would seem to be that Punjabi Muslims did not believe their culture to be under threat, not until that is League propagandists made 'Islam in Danger' an issue of the 1946 election, but in the case of economics and politics they considered their position to be vulnerable. As has been pointed out in Chapter I, the average Muslim was more economically depressed than his non-Muslim counterpart, and as such endured a greater degree of poverty. He lived in a Province in which Muslims were in the majority, yet everywhere were the signs of the greater affluence and influence of the Hindus and Sikhs. Consequently the prevailing atmosphere, particularly regarding the non-Muslim control of the credit machine, provided a constant reminder to Muslims of their subordinate social status, and often of their economic dependency upon and exploitation by the non-Muslims. The response of the Muslim elites took a different form. Educated Muslims resented their inability to break the Hindu monopoly of the professions and in particular the bureaucracy, whilst the economic elite, personified by the wealthy zamindar class, were not prepared to countenance any measure of Hindu control over their political future. The large zamindars, who represented the Muslim political leadership of the Punjab, were the least vulnerable of all the Muslim groups. So long as the British maintained their rule in India they were prepared to accept the *status quo* because it afforded them protection from the possibility of a Hindu-dominated central government. Once it became apparent, however, that the British were sincerely considering handing over power, and that the Indian National Congress in all probability would emerge as a major beneficiary, complacency on their part was replaced by apprehension. Even a staunch Punjabi provincialist like Sikander Hyat Khan, vehemently opposed to Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League, and to whom the concept of 'Pakistan' was an anathema, never the less bitterly resented any political initiative which would place the destiny of Muslim India and thereby the Punjab in the hands of the Hindu-controlled Congress. Such politically orientated alarm was conveyed down through the various strata of Muslim society, and in each it found a responsive audience as the activities of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab, an organization which had supplied some of the most

¹⁵³³ Uma Kaura, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-19.

¹⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-16; K.B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-20; Francis Robinson has claimed that in part the motivating force behind Sir Sayid's and Moshin-ul-Mulk's efforts was the desire to protect the Urdu-speaking elite of the U.P., to which they both belonged, from the erosive effect of Hindu revivalism. See F. Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 33-84.

active members of the Punjab Congress, had been interpreted by many Muslims as heralding the "virtual establishment of a Hindu raj".¹⁵³⁵ Muslim trepidation in the Punjab was further increased by the refusal of the Congress following the 1937 elections to brook any cooperation with the Muslim League other than on their own terms.

Disquiet over the possibility of a Congress-ruled India, combined with the socio-economic ascendancy of the Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab provided the seeds for the growth of Muslim separatism and nationalism in the Province. To begin with, however, the Muslim zamindar leaders of the Punjab were equally concerned with preventing intrusions into the provincial sphere by any nationalist organization, Congress or Muslim League. Yet the Punjab could not be isolated from national events, Without the Province there could be no 'Pakistan' and failing the agreement of the Muslim leadership to accept absorption by an independent India there could be no sovereign Indian Union encompassing all of the Province, including the Muslim majority districts. In the final analysis the interests of the Muslim religious, economic and political elites could be more closely identified with the creation of a Muslim state, which would guarantee their continued political ascendancy in provincial affairs, and the curtailment of Hindu and Sikh competition in the economic, educational, professional and civic spheres, than union with India. Hence the fact that from the mid-1940's onwards many of the most influential zamindari personalities, together with large sections of the educated middle classes began to embrace the Muslim League. By the time that the 1946 elections were conducted in the Punjab, therefore, the League had largely replaced the Unionist Party as the repository of landed interest and power. It only needed the election results to proclaim that reality. Thus it is no exaggeration to claim that the zamindars' switch of allegiance from Unionism to the Muslim League greatly benefitted the latter, as it not only gave League candidates and propagandists access to the rural Punjab - the power house of Muslim provincial politics - but it guaranteed them the victories which it enjoyed in the great majority of those constituencies. In support of its impressive 'landed armory' the League also enjoyed the confidence and active support of the Punjab's religious leaders. Their involvement as canvassers for the League and 'Pakistan' contributed greatly into turning the League success into a massive land-slide victory, for no other political organization in the Province enjoyed the resources to resist a combination as powerful as the landlords and the Pirs.

All the available evidence, therefore, suggests that the eventual triumph of the Muslim League in the Punjab was achieved largely through its association with these two sections of Muslim society. That, however, does not necessarily militate against the popular appeal 'Pakistan' had for ordinary Muslims, whether enfranchised or not. As early as 1940-1941 Sikander Hyat Khan had realized correctly that the Muslim masses would fall victim to the allure of 'Pakistan'.¹⁵³⁶ Thus whilst it is the contention of this

¹⁵³⁵ K.W. Jones, 'Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 27, 1968, p. 59.

¹⁵³⁶ Darling to Laithwaite, 25 April 1940, L/P&J/8/506B, IOR; P. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, London, 1961, p. 38.

thesis that the conversion of the Muslim Punjab from a Unionist to a Pakistanist philosophy was due in large measure to the fact that the Province's Muslim landed and religious elites spearheaded that change, there can be no doubt that they espoused a cause which had considerable attraction for their tenants, *murids*, and constituents. The failure of the Indian National Congress to reassure Muslim leaders and the Muslim masses in general that their interests would be inviolate in a united India, and of the British or any other interested party to devise an acceptable realistic alternative to an independent Muslim state made the division of India and the Punjab unavoidable given the conditions prevailing in 1947. Thus Partition and thereby Pakistan had not one 'architect' but many; Muslim self-interest and fears, League intransigence, Congress obduracy and British deviousness to name but a few. The Muslim desire for separatism at whatever level, however, was not an illusion, it was a fact which found expression in the establishment of a sovereign state and the destruction of the 'unity' which the British had imposed on India.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.

1931	Total	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh
Earners	6,957,062	3,895,947 56%	2,128,245 31%	932,870 13%
Working Dependents	1,772,247	624,040 35%	915,090 52%	233,117 13%
Nonworking Dependents	15,125,173	9,117,806 60%	3,952,753 26%	2,054,614 14%
AGRICULTURE				
Income from Rent of Land	112,104	54,733 49%	39,204 35%	18,167 16%
Cultivation of All Kinds	3,273,175	1,781,174 54.40%	849,284 26%	642,717 19.60%
Agents and Managers of Landed Estates; Planters; Forest Officers and their Clerks; Rent Collectors &c.	16,465	10,010 60.80%	5,223 31.70%	1,232 7.50%
Field Labourers and Woodcutters, &c.	444,161	242,772 54.70%	148,527 33.40%	52,862 11.90%
Raisers of Livestock, Milkmen and Herdsmen	316,237	235,037 74.30%	72,385 22.90%	8,815 2.80%
Fishing and Hunting	4,752	3,134 66%	928 19.50%	690 14.50%
EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS				
Owners, Managers, Clerks, &c.	1,336	923 69%	333 25%	80 6%
Labourers	10,483	5,487 52.30%	3,656 34.90%	1,340 12.80%
INDUSTRIES				
Owners, Managers, Clerks, &c.	5,247	2,723 52%	2,148 41%	376 7%
Labourers and Artisans	511,680	318,189 62.20%	136,553 26.70%	56,938 11.10%
TRANSPORT				
Owners, Managers, Clerks, &c.	22,367	10,361 46.30%	10,764 48.10%	1,242 5.60%
Labourers, Boatmen, Carters, Palik Bearers	152,616	87,771 57.50%	42,417 27.80%	22,428 14.70%
TRADE				
	504,877	128,551 25.50%	339,618 67.30%	36,708 7.20%
ARTS AND PROFESSIONS				
Religious	97,056	42,532 43.80%	50,308 51.80%	4,216 4.40%
Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers	48,644	23,187 47.70%	21,399 44%	4,058 8.30%
PERSONS LIVING ON THEIR INCOME				
	26,934	11,987 44.50%	9,780 36.30%	5,167 19.20%
DOMESTIC SERVICE				
	372,488	178,758 48%	161,607 43.40%	32,123 8.60%
CONTRACTORS, CLERKS, CASHIERS, &c.				
	15,053	6,996 46.50%	6,814 45.30%	1,243 8.20%
LABOURERS UNSPECIFIED				
	188,182	127,511 67.80%	50,260 26.70%	10,418 5.50%
BEGGARS, PROSTITUTES, CRIMINALS AND INMATES OF JAILS AND ASYLUMS				
	280,169	211,868 75.60%	56,566 20.20%	11,735 4.20%

Source: Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Vol.XVII, Part II, Lahore, 1933, pp. 219-227. IOR.

APPENDIX Bi.

Communal Categorization in Respect of the Number of Landowners, the Acreage Held, and the Land Revenue Paid in the Districts of the Punjab Listed Below

District	A	B	Land Owners			Total Area Held in Acres			Land Revenue Assessment		
			Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs
Lahore	1947	60.60%	93,660	Not Given	78,477	511,797	214,623	936,349	581,235	145,312	1,113,579
						31%	13%	56%	32%	8%	60%
Amritsar	1947	46.50%	62,397	Not Given	124,828	207,988	37,816	713,046	338,364	89,045	1,364,285
						22%	4%	74%	19%	5%	76%
Gurdaspur	1947	51.10%	101,435	Not Given	62,841	405,022	374,748	363,385	668,694	477,439	758,727
						35%	33%	32%	35%	25%	40%
Sialkot	1947	62%	135,661	Not Given	35,907	507,175	171,957	276,183	811,398	281,115	469,237
						53%	18%	29%	52%	18%	30%
Gujranwala	1947	70.40%	62,774	Not Given	22,152	874,551	171,408	382,438	965,762	205,424	540,683
						61%	12%	27%	56%	12%	32%
Sheikhupura	1947	63.60%	63,569	Not Given	27,806	734,384	108,380	511,981	1,382,446	227,204	1,230,399
						54%	8%	38%	49%	8%	43%
Lyallpur	1947	62.84%	103,544	Not Given	38,102	1,074,019	104,490	562,998	5,436,870	477,642	3,638,323
						62%	6%	32%	57%	5%	38%
Montgomery	1947	69.10%	100,340	Not Given	20,142	1,332,928	388,315	436,062	2,865,588	295,846	1,064,933
						62%	18%	20%	61%	7%	23%
TOTAL			723,380		410,255	5,647,864	1,571,737	4,182,442	13,050,357	2,199,227	10,180,166
						49%	14%	37%	51%	9%	40%

SOURCE: Report by Mr. Justice Munir, Punjab Boundary Commission Report, Vol. III, p.20. PGRC.
A Years of Assessment; B Muslim Percentage of Total Population.

APPENDIX Bii

Communal Categories in Respect of the Number of Landowners and Shareholders, the Acreage Held, and the Land Revenue Paid in the Districts of the Punjab Listed Below

District	A	B	Land Owners				Total Area Held in Acres				Land Revenue Assessment (rupees)			
			Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Not Goven	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Not Goven	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Not Goven
Gurgaon1	1941-1943	33%	59,358	88,925		3,655	371,119	769,465			239,257	860,642		15,003
			39%	59%		2%	32%	66.5%			22%	77%		1%
Gujrat	1913-14 1927	86%	167,763	22,462			167,726	104,731			1,526,106	119,853		
			88%	12%			94%	6%			93%	7%		
Attock	1925-1926	91%	58,181	10			2,113,954	83,005			469,494	35,336		
			85%	15%			96%	4%			93%	7%		
Dera Ghazi Khan	1918-1919	87.71%	152,102	32,880		15,104	2,620,293	291,200		69,082	381,773	105,536		20,460
			76%	16%		8%	8%	10%		2%	75%	21%		4%
Ambala2	1917-1919	30%	44,079	32,768	44,882	31,135	285,642	249,745	219,150	79,573	334,586	311,996	360,557	102,248
			29%	22%	29%	20%	34%	30%	26%	10%	30%	28%	33%	9%
Jullundur	1915-1916	45%	68,659	53,564	21,420	18,201	304,286	235,236	121,633	37,910	523,262	530,830	239,311	64,710
			43%	33%	13%	11%	44%	34%	17%	5%	39%	39%	17%	5%
Hoshiarpur	1912-1914	31%	57,615	103,479	2,812	7,832	343,743	659,282	13,865	17,106	515,954	799,587	26,517	24,90
			33.50%	60%	13%	4.5%	33%	64%	1%	2%	38%	58%	2%	2%
Ferozepore	1912-1914	44%	37,454	36,992	90,508	16,279	769,660	845,950	686,963	141,630	339,189	374,512	393,934	67,509
			21%	20%	50%	9%	31%	35%	28%	6%	28.8%	31.8%	33.5%	5.7%
Ludhiana	1910-1911	34%	32,606	28,749	50,979	17,030	321,138	214,468	355,481	51,195	244,014	281,788	516,513	57,083
			25%	22%	40%	13%	34%	23%	38%	5%	22%	26%	4700%	5%
Rohtak	1907-1909	16%	18,114	144,382		9,391	172,225	1,322,354		62,647	142,876	1,351,874		38,788
			10.50%	84%		5.5%	11%	85%		4%	9%	88%		3%
Karnal	1907-1909	28%	18,615	37,871	1,203	9,770	162,215	353,210	16,057	81,280	126,025	301,997	12,195	60,040
			28%	56%	2%	14%	27%	57%	3%	13%	25%	60%	1%	12%
Mianwali	1902-1906	87%	54,647	10,578			651,604	44,632			166,492	25,696		
			84%	16%			94%	6%			87%	13%		
TOTAL			769,193	603,041	211,804	128,217	9,796,605	5,173,278	1,413,149	557,937	5,008,997	5,099,647	1,539,027	450,831
			45%	35.2%	12.4%	7.4%	58%	31%	8%	3%	41%	42%	13%	4%

A - Years of Assessment; B - Muslim Percentage of Population at Time of Assessment

1 - Revenue figures for Ballabgarh and Ferozepur-Jhirka Tahsils not given; 2 - Does not include Morai Hill Tract, Naraingh Tahsil (23,757 acres)

SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in the following:

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

GURGAON DISTRICT, Rewari Tahsil, 1941, p. 10, Statement No. V, p. 11; Nuh Tahsil, 1941, pp. 13-15, Statement No. V, p. 11; Ferozepur-Jhirka, 1942, pp. 14-15, Statement No. V, p. 15; Gurgaon Tahsil, 1942, p. 15, Statement No. V, p. 21; Palwal Tahsil, 1943, pp. 14-15, Statement No. V, p. 12; Ballabgarh Tahsil, 1943, p. 13, Statement No. V, p. 11. GUJRAT DISTRICT, Phalia Tahsil, 1891, p. 44, Statement No. V, p. 30; Gujrat Tahsil, 1913, p. 10, Statement No. V, p. vi; Kharian Tahsil, 1914, p. 9, Statement No. VI, p. vii; Irrigated Tracts of Gujrat and Kharian Tahsils, 1927, pp. 5-6, Statement No. V, p. ix; Phalia Tahsil, 1927, p. 7, Statement No. V, pp. ix-xx. ATTOCK DISTRICT, Tallagang Tahsil, 1925, pp. 10-11, Statement No. VI, p. xii; Attock Tahsil, 1925, pp. 17-19, Statement No. VI, p. xxviii; Fatehjang Tahsil, 1926, pp. 18-20, Statement No. VI, p. xxx; Pindigheb Tahsil, 1926, pp. 14-16, Statement No. VI, p. 30. DERA GHAZI KHAN DISTRICT, Sanghar Tahsil, 1918, p. 8, Statement No. V, p. xi; Rajanpur Tahsil, 1919, p. 14, Statement

No. V, pp. viii-ix; Jampur Tahsil, 1919, Statement No. V, p. xi; Dera Ghazi Khan Tahsil, 1919, Statement No. V, p. xi. AMBALA DISTRICT, Rupar Tahsil, 1917, pp. 7, 19-20, Statement No. V, p. vi; Kharar Tahsil, 1917, p. 18, Statement No. V, p. vii; Ambala Tahsil, 1918, pp. 5, 11, Statement No. V, p. vi; Naraingarh Tahsil, 1918, pp. 2-8, Statement No. VI, p. ix; Jagadhri Tahsil, 1919, pp. 11-12, Statement No. V, p. ix. JULLUNDUR DISTRICT, Nakodar Tahsil, 1915, p. 9, Statement No. V, p. vii; Jullundur Tahsil, 1915, p. 10, Statement No. V, p. vii; Phillour Tahsil, 1916, pp. 11-12, Statement No. V, p. v; Nawasahr Tahsil, 1916, p. 12, Statement No. V, p. v. HOSHIARPUR DISTRICT, Hoshiarpur Tahsil, 1912, pp. 9-10, Statement No. V, p. x; Dasuya Tahsil, 1913, p. 15, Statement No. V, p. xiii; Una Tahsil, 1913, pp. 7,13, Statement No. IV, pp. viii-ix; Garshankar Tahsil, 1914, pp. 5,13, Statement No. V, p. x. FEROREPORE DISTRICT, Moga Tahsil, 1912, pp. 12-13, Statement No. V, p. vii; Ferozepore Tahsil (East), 1912, pp. 11-12, Statement No. V, p. viii; Mamdot Jagir, 1913, pp. 13-14, Statement No. V, pp. vi-vii; Zira Tahsil, 1913, pp. 10-11, Statement No. V, p. v; Muktsar Tahsil, 1913, pp. 3, 8-9, Statement No. V, p. v; Fazilka Tahsil, 1914, pp. 3-4, 9, Statement No. V, p. viii. LUDHIANA DISTRICT, Jagraon Tahsil, 1910, p. 9, Statement No. VI, p. ix; Samrala Tahsil, 1910, pp. 14-15, Statement No. VI, p. vi; Ludhiana Tahsil, 1911, pp. 11-12, Statement No. VI, pp. viii-ix. ROHTAK DISTRICT, Gohana Tahsil, 1907, Statement No. IV, p. v; Sampla Tahsil, 1908, Statement No. V, p. vi; Jhajjar Tahsil, 1908, p. 17, Statement No. V, p. vii; Delhi District North (transferred to Rohtak in 1911 as Sonapat Tahsil), 1909, p. 15, Statement No. VI, Pt. I, pp. xx-xxi; Rohtak Tahsil, 1909, Statement No. IV, p. vi. KARNAL DISTRICT, Kaithal Tahsil, 1908, p. 5, Statement No. IV, p. xx; Panipat Tahsil, 1908, p. 10, Statement No. IV, p. x; Thanesar Tahsil, 1908, Statement No. IV, pp. x-xi; Karnal Tahsil, 1907-1909, p. 27, Statement No. VI-A. p. lvii. MIANWALI DISTRICT, Bhakkar Tahsil and the Sadat Miani villages of the Mianwali Tahsil, 1902, pp. 31-32, Statement No. V, pp. x-xi; Mianwali and Isakhel Tahsils, 1906, pp. 20-21, Statement No. VIII, pp. xxxvi-xlii. IOR & PBRL

DISTRICT GAZETTEERS

Gurgaon, 1904, Vol. IVB, Table 15, pp. xxiv-xxix; Gurgaon, 1910, Vol. IVA, pp. 59-66; Gujrat, 1892-93, pp. 56-72; Gujrat, 1912, Vol. XXV-B, Table 15, pp. xxiii-xxv; Gujrat, 1921, Vol. XXV-A, pp. 41-50; Attock, 1930, Vol. XXIX-A, pp. 75, 79-119; Attock, 1933, Vol. XXII-B, Table 15, pp. xxxiv-xxxvii; Dera Ghazi Khan, 1883-84, pp. 57-75; Dera Ghazi Khan, 1912, Vol. XXXV-B, Table 15, pp. xxx-xl; Ambala, 1892-93, pp. 46-50; Ambala and Kalsia State, 1912, Vol. VII-B, Table 15, pp. xxvi-xxlv; Jullundur and Kapurthala State, 1904, Vol. XIV-A, pp. 61-126, 128-130; Jullundur and Kapurthala State, 1912, Vol. XIV-B, Table 15, pp. xxx-xxxviii; Hoshiarpur, 1904, Vol. XIII-A, pp. 44-65; Hoshiarpur, 1904, Vol. XIII-B, Table 15, pp. xxv-xxxii; Ferozepore, 1888-89, pp. 50-51; Ferozepore, 1915, Vol. XXX-A, pp. 71-111; Ferozepore, 1913, Table 15, pp. xxi-xxx, Ludhiana, 1888-89, pp. 77-89; Ludhiana and Maler Kotla State, 1912, Table 15, pp. xxiv-xxxv; Rohtak, 1883-84, pp. 56-69; Rohtak and Dujana State, 1912, Vol. III-B, Table 15, pp. xxvii-xxxiv; Karnal, 1892, pp. 105-123; Karnal, 1912, Vol. VI-B, Table 15, pp. xxx-xxxix; Karnal, 1918, Vol. VI-

A, pp. 91-102; Mianwali, 1912, Vol. XXX, Table 15, pp. xxv-xxxiii; Mianwali, 1915, Vol. XXX-A, pp. 58-64; Mianwali, 1935, Vol. XXIII-B, Table 15, pp. xl-xlv. IOR & PBRL.

SETTLEMENT REPORTS

Gurgaon, 1938-43, p. 9; Attock, 1923-27, pp. 5-6; Jullundur, 1913-17, pp. 6, 25; Hoshiarpur, 1914, p. 5; Ludhiana, 1908-1911, pp. 2-3; Rohtak, 1905-1910, pp. 10-11; Karnal, 1909, p. 19. IOR & PBRL.

APPENDIX Biii.

The Number of Owners and-Shareholders; and the Amount of Land Held by Members of the Various Communities in the Districts of Jhelum, Jhang and Shahpur, and the Gujjar Khan and Rawalpindi Tahsils.

District	A	B	Land Owners and Shareholders				Total Area Held in Acres			
			Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Not Given	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Not Given
Jhelum	1941	89%	147,646	14,760			1,111,952	55,231		
			91%	9%			95%	5%		
Jhang	1923-1925	82%	50,285	17,933		1,781	830,298	128,566		21,868
			72%	26%		2%	85%	13%		2%
Shahpur (Khushab Tahsil not included here)	1923-1924	83%	24,872	2,126	679	2,375	630,778	51,379	19,409	25,186
			83%	7%	2%	8%	86.8%	7%	2.7%	3.5%
Rawalpindi* (Gujjar Khan & Rawalpindi Tahsils only)	1904-1906	86%	67,058	6,061		25,276	381,550	18,951		61,304
			68%	6%		26%	83%	4%		13%
TOTALS			289,861	40,880	679	29,432	2,954,578	254,127	19,409	108,358
			83.30%	11.3%	0.2%	8.2%	88.6%	7.6%	0.6%	3.2%

* Cultivated land only. In the case of the Murree and Kahuta tahsils no information was given in respect of the actual acreage cultivated by the various tribes or communities, consequently these tahsils were not included in the above Appendix. Though land revenue assessment figures demonstrate that as in the case of the Gujjar Khan and Rawalpindi tahsils, the bulk of the land was in Muslim hands, in that Muslims accounted for approximately 88% (38,348) of the proprietary body and they paid 90.4% (Rs. 100,202) of the revenue charged.

A - Years of Assessment; B - Muslim Percentage of Population.

SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in the following:

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

JHELUM DISTRICT, Pind Dadan Khan Tahsil, 1941, pp. 17-18, Statement No. VI, p. 13; Jhelum Tahsil, 1941, pp. 13-14, Statement No. VI, p. 11; Chakwal Tahsil, 1941, p. 13, Statement No. VI, p. 9. JHANG DISTRICT, Shorkot Tahsil, 1923, p. 15, Statement No. VI, p. xx; Chiniot Tahsil, 1923, pp. 13-14, Statement No. VI, p. 18; Jhang Tahsil, 1925, pp. 17-18, Statement No. VI, p. xxiii. SHAHPUR DISTRICT, Bhalwal Tahsil, 1923, p. 7, Statement No. XVII, p. xx; Sargodha Tahsil, 1923, p. 6, Statement No. XVI, pp. xx-xxiii; Shahpur Tahsil, 1924, p. 3, Statement No. XIV, p. xiv. RAWALPINDI DISTRICT, Gujjar Khan Tahsil, 1904, pp. 32-34; Rawalpindi Tahsil, 1905, pp. 16-18. IOR & PBRL.

DISTRICT GAZETTEERS

Jhelum, 1904, Vol. XXVII -A, pp. 88 -126; Jhelum, 1904, Vol. XXVII -B, Table 15, pp. xxiii-xxv; Jhelum, 1934, Vol. XX -B, Table 15, pp. xxxi-xxxvii; Jhang, 1912, Vol. XXXII -B, Table 15, pp. xxiv-xxvii; Jhang, 1934, Vol. XXVI -B, Table 15, pp. xxxv-xxlii; Shahpur, 1897, PP. 94-112; Shahpur, 1912, Vol. XXVI-B, Table 15, Pp. xxviii -xxxix; Shahpur, 1917, Vol. XXX -A, pp. 83 -100. TOR & PBRL.

SETTLEMENT REPORTS

Jhelum, 1937-41, p. 7; Jhang, 1928, pp. 19-21. IOR.

APPENDIX Biv

Agricultural Land Held by the Various Communities in the Districts of Hissar, Kangra, Multan, Muzaffargarh, the Khushab Tahsil of Shahpur District, and the Lower Chenab Colony (Jhang).

District	A	B	Land in Acres				
			Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Christians	Not Given
Hissar	1908-1910, 1921	26%	574,145	2,011,122	244,193	197,092	233,574
			17.5%	62%	7.5%	6%	7%
Kangra	1919	5%		1,066,136			
				100			
Shahpur (Khushab Tahsil only)	1915-1916	83%	1,115,971	41,556	24,626		43,549
			91%	3%	2%		4%
Chang (LowerChenab	1923	82%	218,452	9,359	274		1086
			95.3%	4.1%	0.1%		0.5%
Multan	1919-1920, 1923	82%	1,955,200	630,950	84,827		
			73%	24%	3%		
Muzaffargarh*	1923-1924	87%	539,540	179,847			
			75%	25%			
TOTALS			4,403,308	3,938,970	353,920	197,092	278,209
			48%	43%	4%	2%	3%
* Cultivated land only.							
A - Years of Assessment: B - Muslim Percentage of Population at Assessment.							

SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in the following:

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

HISSAR DISTRICT, Bhiwani Tahsil, 1908, p. 15, Statement No. II, p. iv; Hansi and Hissar Tahsils, 1909, Statement No. III, p. vii, Statement No. VI, p. xi; Fatehabad Tahsil, 1910, Statement No. III, pp. viii-ix; Sirsa Tahsil, 1921, pp. 8-9, Statement No. VI, p. x. KANGRA DISTRICT, Kulu Subdivision, 1911, pp. 30,33; Dera and Hamirpur Tahsils, 1911, p. 4; Palampur Tahsil, 1914, p. 7, Statement No. II, p. ii; Kangra Tahsil, 1915, Statement No. II, p. ii; Nurpur Tahsil, 1917, p. 7, Statement No. II, p. ii. SHAHPUR DISTRICT, Khushab Tahsil, 1914, p. 14, Table IV-B, p. xiv. JHANG DISTRICT, Lower Chenab Colony, 1923, pp. 5-7. MULTAN DISTRICT, Mailsi Tahsil, 1919, p. 14; Kabirwala Tahsil, 1919, pp. 18-20; Multan and Shujabad Tahsils, 1920, p. 18; Lodhran Tahsil, 1920, pp. 12-13; Khanewal Tahsil (Lower Bari Doab Colony), 1933, pp. 5-6. MUZAFFARGARH DISTRICT, Alipur Tahsil, 1923, pp. 7-8; Leiah Tahsil, 1924, pp. 19-20; Muzaffargarh Tahsil, 1924, pp. 10-11; Kot Adu Tahsil, 1924, pp. 13-16. IOR & PBRL.

DISTRICT GAZETTEERS

Hissar, 1904, Vol. II-A, pp. 72 -98; Hissar, 1912, Vol. II -B, Table 15, pp. xxvi-xli; Hissar and Loharu State, 1915, Vol. II-A, pp. 77 -103, Kangra, 1912, Vol. X -B, Table 15, pp. xxx-xxxix; Kangra, 1924-25, Vol. VII -A, pp. 147 -197; Multan, 1936, Vol. XXVII-B, Table 15, pp. lxxxv-xciv; Muzaffargarh, 1929, Vol. XXXIV -A, pp. 71 -81. IOR & PBRL

SETTLEMENT REPORTS

Kangra, 1913-19, pp. 3-5, Appendix I, p. i; Jhang, 1928, pp. 19-21; Chenab Colony, 1915, pp. 36-47; Multan, 1917-21, pp. 6-7; Muzaffargarh, 1920-25, p. 7. IOR.

APPENDIX C.

TOTAL ACREAGE PRIVATELY OWNED AND SUBJECT TO USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE IN MUSLIM MAJORITY (LAND) DISTRICTS

	Total Area acres	Area Mortgaged		
Sialkot	879,535	(A)	205,448	
		(B)	50,779	
Gujranwala	1,340,317	(A)	101,549	
		(B)	45,557	
Sheikhupura	1,273,512	(A)	91,341	
		(B)	40,887	
Gujrat	1,215,226	(A)	98,948	
		(B)	45,428	
Shahpur	1,593,703	(A)	69,461	
		(B)	55,434	
Jhelum	1,199,854	(A)	39,383	
		(B)	23,552	
Rawalpindi	875,503	(A)	24,573	
		(B)	18,461	
Attock	2,023,887	(A)	95,503	
		(B)	50,643	
Mianwali	1,848,766	(A)	184,437	
		(B)	76,661	
Montgomery	1,380,314	(A)	39,074	
		(B)	43,197	
Lyallpur	1,510,052	(A)	97,729	
		(B)	59,092	
Jhang	1,577,743	(A)	46,495	
		(B)	133,965	
Multan	2,528,389	(A)	36,264	
		(B)	213,491	
Muzaffargarh	2,248,361	(A)	99,292	
		(B)	204,111	
Dera Ghazi Khan	2,983,631	(A)	142,574	
		(B)	153,943	
Jullundur	781,740	(A)	82,885	
		(B)	10,837	
Totals		(A)	1,454,956	-6%
		(B)	1,226,038	-5%
Grand Total	25,260,533		2,680,994	-11%
(A) By members of notified agricultural tribes.				
(B) By non-agriculturists.				

Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report. 1936, Statement No. III, pp. iii, v-vii. IOR.

APPENDIX D.

Communal Categorization of Land-Owners in the Punjab Paying Land Revenue Charges of and in Excess of Rs. 5 Per Annum in 1932

	Total	Muslim		Non-Muslim		Sikhs	
Land-Owners Paying Rs. 25 and upwards	350,000	169,000	-48%	76,000	-21%	105,000	-30%
Land-Owners Paying Rs. 10 to Rs. 25	530,000	245,000	-46%	144,000	-27%	141,000	-27%
Land-Owners Paying Rs. 5 to Rs. 10	518,000	258,000	-50%	152,000	-29%	108,000	-21%
Total Number of Land-Owners	1,398,000	672,000	-48%	372,000	-27%	354,000	-25%

SOURCE: G. of I., *Indian Franchise Committee Report*, Calcutta, 1932, Vol. III, p. 53, V/26/261/48, IOR.

APPENDIX E.

TAXES PAID IN THE DISTRICTS OF LYALLPUR, GUJRANWALA AND SIALKOT IN THE YEAR 1945-46

LYALLPUR				
Urban Immovable	Muslim		NonMuslim	
Property Tax	Rs. 22,900	14%	Rs. 140,300	86%
Sales Tax	Rs. 17,000	5%	Rs. 308,000	95%
Income Tax	Rs. 500,000	8%	Rs. 5,950,000	92%
GUJRANWALA				
Urban Immovable	Muslim		NonMuslim	
Property Tax	Rs. 13,000	17%	Rs. 65,000	83%
Sales Tax	Rs. 12,500	6%	Rs. 201,765	94%
Income Tax	Rs. 50,000	7%	Rs. 700,000	93%
SIALKOT				
	Muslim		NonMuslim	
Sales Tax	Rs. 25,311	16%	Rs. 132,870	84%
Income Tax	Rs. 310,000	21%	Rs. 1,155,142	79%
Source: Punjab Boundary Commission Proceedings and Report, Vol. I, pp. 467-468, PGRC.				

APPENDIX F.

PERCENTAGE OF HINDU AND MUSLIM STUDENTS IN VARIOUS LEVEL OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Year	Total		Intermediate		Degree		Post-Graduate		Research	
	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim
1919-20	60%	23%	----- NOT GIVEN FOR THIS YEAR -----							
1924-25	58%	24%	55%	25%	65%	20%	70%	15%	NIL	NIL
1930-31	55%	26%	55%	25%	56%	27%	57%	28%	74%	10%
1935-36	51%	30%	49%	31%	52%	28%	62%	23%	70%	20%
1937-38	50%	30%	50%	30%	50%	30%	53%	26%	64%	27%
1939-40	49%	31%	47%	32%	51%	28%	56%	28%	65%	23%
1941-42	50%	29%	50%	30%	50%	28%	59%	25%	60%	27%
1943-44	52%	28%	51%	29%	53%	26%	59%	23%	67%	22%
1944-45	51%	28%	50%	28%	51%	27%	61%	20%	63%	31%

Compiled from information given in *Punjab Education Reports*:

1919-20, Table III, pp. x-xl; 1924-25, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xx-xxiii; 1930-31, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv; 1935-36, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv; 1937-38, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv; 1939-40, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv; 1941-42, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xvi-xix; 1943-44, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xiv-xvii; 1944-45, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xiv-xvii. IOR.

APPENDIX G.

Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933.

Department or Office.	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.
Department of Agriculture.	347	184	149	5
Veterinary Department.	231	142	99	3
Co-operative Society Department	216	94	57	3
P.W.D.(Buildings and Road Branch)	207	273	56	10
Excise Department.	58	67	27	4
Education Department.	1,185	1,030	326	132
Medical Department.	413	795	223	107
Public Health Department.	56	69	15	
Office of the Joint Secretary to the Punjab Govt., Transferred Departments.	12	2	2	
Central Museum.	1	7	1	
Department of Industries.	172	181	39	11
P.W.D.(Hydro-Electric Branch).	117	104	34	4
Office of the Secretary to the Govt., Punjab Electricity	6	1		1
Registration Department.	26	10	17	
GRAND TOTALS.	3,048	2,959	1,045	280
PERCENTAGES.	42%	40%	14%	4%

Source: Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities Serving in the Different Departments of the Punjab Government as it stood on 1st Jan., 1933, pp. 12-23, enclosed with letter, C.C. Garbett to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, S&G. 4093/1933, 1,/S&G/7/30. IOR.

APPENDIX H.

Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the Reserved Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933.

Department or Office	Muslims.	Hindus.	Sikhs.	Others.
P.C.S.(Executive Branch).	95	82	36	3
P.C.S.(Judicial Branch).	63	80	30	5
Police Dept..	2,906	1,119	458	8
P.W.D.(Irrigation Branch).	2,270	3,035	810	12
Forest Dept..	488	629	67	5
Land Revenue Dept.	5,082	4,403	831	4
Jails Dept..	1,366	454	218	16
Reclamation Dept.	25	25	8	3
Criminal Tribes Dept.	46	39	35	22
High Court.	572	801	95	13
Punjab Civil Secretariat.	80	77	22	4
Office of Director of Information.	6	3	1	
Punjab Government Printing Office.	338	130	10	8
Central Jail and Borstal Presses.	20	12	2	
Office of Financial Commissioners.	32	33	12	1
Office of Director of Land Records.	12	9	2	
Industries Department (Factory and Boiler Inspection).	1	6	5	
Ambala Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).	177	256	25	7
Jullundur Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).	182	244	35	3
Lahore Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).	321	233	81	4
Rawalpindi Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).	285	50	40	4
Multan Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).	292	252	17	3
Nili Bar Colony Establishment.	10	11	3	1
Deputy Commissioner's Office, Lyallpur Colony Branch.	3	5	1	
Law Department.	17	22	5	
GRAND TOTALS	14,689	12,010	2,849	126
PERCENTAGES	49.50%	40.50%	9.60%	0.40%
Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities as in Appendix G.				

APPENDIX I.

Showing Representation of the Various Communities Serving at Different Levels in Some of the Reserved and Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933.

Department	A				B				C			
	M.	H.	S.	O.	M.	H.	S.	O.	M.	H.	S.	O.
P.W.D. Irrigation Branch	48	81	14	2	270	355	166	2	329	513	69	4
Police Department	21	11	10	-	2,860	1,054	440	7	47	54	8	1
Forest Department	4	11	8	-	433	541	53	-	51	77	6	5
Jails Department	49	56	27	2	1,313	379	190	14	4	19	1	-
Industries Dept. Boiler Inspection	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	1	5	2	-
Commissioner's Offices and District Offices in the Divisions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,257	1,033	198	21
Department of Agriculture	19	11	11	-	220	87	110	2	108	86	28	3
Veterinary Department	15	7	4	-	199	106	87	2	17	29	8	1
Co-op Soc. Department	13	6	4	-	71	32	20	2	132	56	33	1
P.W.D. Building and Roads Branch	6	27	6	-	98	96	27	6	102	150	22	8
Education Department	42	50	15	14	1,007	870	283	118	137	110	28	-
Medical Department	45	84	31	7	320	619	177	97	45	92	16	3
Public Health Dept.	11	20	9	-	23	31	3	-	20	18	3	-
Dept. of Industries, Hydro Electric Branch	1	4	-	-	161	138	36	11	10	39	3	-
P.W.D. Hydro Electric Branch	6	8	4	1	55	41	19	-	53	49	11	3
Totals	280	377	145	26	7,030	4,350	1,611	261	2,376	2,330	436	50
Percentages	34%	45.5%	17.5%	3%	53%	33%	12%	2%	46%	45%	8%	1%
Included Specialist Posts and Temporary Gazetted Officers.												
M - Muslims, H - Hindus, S - Sikhs, O - Others. A - Provincial Services, B - Subordinate Services, C - Clerical Establishments												
Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities... As in Appendix G.												

APPENDIX J.

The Number of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh Officers in the Punjab Public Services, in the Departments and Offices Listed Below

	1936				1947				
	A.	B	C.	D.	A.	B	C.	D.	E.
Secs., Under Secs. and Asst. Secs. to Govt.	7	3(43%)	4(57%)	-	52	15(29%)	29(56%)	8(15%)	-14%
Superintendents, H.Q. Offices	30	14(47%)	13(43%)	3(10%)	41	9(22%)	27(66%)	4(10%)	-25%
I.C.S. Officers in Punjab Commission	45	18(40%)	21(47%)	5(11%)	58	27(47%)	22(38%)	7(12%)	7%
Punjab Commission, Superior Appointments	32	13(41%)	16(50%)	3 (9%)	45	20(44%)	21(47%)	4 (9%)	3%
Judicial Dept.	68	17(25%)	40(59%)	9(13%)	110	36(33%)	53(48%)	21(19%)	8%
District and Sessions Judges	17	7(41%)	8(47%)	2(12%)	19	9(47%)	7(37%)	3(16%)	6%
Provincial Civil Service (Executive Branch)	420	174(41%)	152(36%)	92(22%)	481	213(44%)	153(32%)	114(24%)	3%
Police Officers (Inspectors and senior sub-steps)	193	105(54%)	54(28%)	32(17%)	216	114(53%)	54(25%)	47(22%)	-1%
Subordinate Education Service (Headmasters)	79	45(57%)	22(28%)	12(15%)	74	40(54%)	20(27%)	14(19%)	-3%
Medical Officers	207	65(31%)	103(50%)	35(17%)	261	130(50%)	78(30%)	50(19%)	19%
Dept. of Public Health	59	17(29%)	31(52%)	10(17%)	66	25(38%)	32(48%)	9(14%)	9%
Officers, Public Works Dept. (Roads, Rail, Electricity and Irrigation)	286	66(23%)	173(60.5)	47(16.5%)	720	257(36%)	328(46%)	131(18%)	13%
Canal Supervision and Maintenance Branch (P.W.D.)	180	49(27%)	106(59%)	25(14%)	426	154(36%)	179(42%)	93(22%)	9%
Dept. of Agriculture	68	28(41%)	16(24%)	24(35%)	125	52(42%)	25(20%)	48(38%)	1%
Dept. of Industries	24	5(21%)	14(58%)	5(21%)	42	17(41%)	19(45%)	6(14%)	20%
Tahsildars	145	78(54%)	37(25%)	30(21%)	179	101(56%)	32(18%)	46(26%)	2%
Excise Dept.	38	16(42%)	13(34%)	8(21%)	37	11(30%)	22(59%)	3 (8%)	-12%
Income Tax Dept.	53	17(32%)	26(49%)	9(17%)	109	40(37%)	53(48%)	16(15%)	5%
Posts and Telegraph Dept.	29	8(27%)	17(59%)	4(14%)	53	27(51%)	21(40%)	5 (9%)	24%
N.W. Railway Dept.	109	33(30%)	61(56%)	14(13%)	163	54(33%)	93(57%)	16(10%)	3%
TOTAL	2089	778(37%)	927(44%)	369(18%)	3277	1351(41%)	1268(39%)	645(20%)	4%

In order to fit the table into the space available, the following abbreviations have been used as column headings:

- A - Indians (includes Parsis and Indian Christians)
- B - Muslims
- C - Hindus
- D - Sikhs
- E - Differential in Muslim Employment

Source: **Punjab Civil List, Jan. 1936**, Parts II, pp. 6-8; II-A, pp. 9-10; III, pp. 11-20; IV, pp. 21-23; VIII, pp. 27-32; IX, pp. 35-51(a); XI, pp. 53-68; XII, pp. 88-90; XIII, pp. 91-109; XIV, pp. 110-113; XV, pp. 114-144; XVII, pp. 148-151; XXI, pp. 110-161; XXV, pp. 165-171; XXVI, pp. 172-173; XXVIII, pp. 174-177; XXX, pp. 179-182; XXXV, pp. 193-207; XXXVII, p. 213; XLII, p. 236; XLVI, pp. 240-252;

Punjab Civil List, Nov. 1946, Parts II, pp. 9-11(b); II-A, pp. 13-14(a); III, pp. 15-26(a); IV, pp. 27-30; VIII, pp. 35-41; IX, pp. 42-70; XI, pp. 72-90(a); XII, pp. 116-119; XIII, pp. 120-142(c); XIV, pp. 143-146; XV, pp. 147-186; XVII, pp. 191-194; XXI, pp. 204-205(a); XXV, pp. 210-218(b); XXVI, pp. 219-220; XXVIII, pp. 222-225(g); XXX, pp. 227-231; XXXV, pp. 246-261; XXXVII, p. 267; XLII, pp. 290-291; XLVI, pp. 295-309(g), PGSA.

(The religion of each officer was determined on the basis of the individual's name.)
PGSL.

APPENDIX K.

Showing the Communal Composition of the All-India Services on 31st December of each of the Years 1925 and 1932

	Year	Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs
I.C.S.	1925	15%	3.40%	0.30%
	1932	25%	5.80%	0.50%
Indian Police	1925	5.80%	4.70%	0.60%
	1932	10.80%	6.90%	0.80%
Indian Forest Service	1925	19.70%	3.80%	1.90%
	1932	27.40%	6.60%	2.40%
Indian Service of Engineers	1925	28.00%	4.00%	1.50%
	1932	34.70%	4.00%	2.40%
Indian Medical Service (Civil)	1925	10.70%	2.30%	0.80%
	1932	18.10%	4.40%	3.40%
Superior Engineering, Telegraph and Wireless Branches	1925	24.20%	-	4.80%
	1932	40.40%	1.90%	3.80%
Indian Audit and Accounts Service	1925	48.90%	4.30%	-
	1932	62.40%	9.70%	1.10%
Imperial Customs Service	1925	20.60%	5.90%	-
	1932	26.60%	10.00%	-
Military Accounts Dept.	1925	18.50%	1.50%	-
	1932	27.10%	8.50%	-
Indian Railway Service of Engineers	1925	20.90%	1.30%	0.90%
	1932	25.60%	5.00%	2.00%
Senior Revenue Establishments	1925	8.30%	4.60%	0.20%
	1932	17.80%	4.70%	1.20%

Source: Statement Showing Communal Composition of the All-India Services on 31 Dec. of each of the years 1925-32, enclosed with letter, C.M. Trivedi to F.W.H. Smith, Sec., S&G Dept., Oct., 1933, S&G/5415/1933, L/S&G/7/18. IOR.

APPENDIX L.

I.C.S. Examinations Held in India, 1924-40

Year	A					B*				C*				D*				E*				F*			
	Total	M	H	S	O	M	H	S	O	M	H	S	O	M	H	S	O	M	H	S	O	M	H	S	O
1924	98	7	86	1	4	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	2	11	1	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1925	95	9	81	2	3	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	3	18	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1926	130	25	99	2	4	1	2	Nil	Nil	5	18	1	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil
1927	113	18	86	4	5	Nil	8	1	Nil	7	9	3	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	1	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1928	147	31	101	6	1	Nil	6	Nil	Nil	13	6	6	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	4	Nil	1	Nil	2	Nil	1	Nil
1929	180	52	117	3	8	2	6	Nil	Nil	15	9	2	1	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	1	2	Nil	Nil	1
1930	174	65	99	5	5	1	7	Nil	Nil	23	7	5	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	6	Nil	Nil	Nil	3	Nil	Nil	Nil
1931	177	68	83	16	10	6	4	Nil	1	21	10	14	1	2	Nil	Nil	1	1	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil
1932	230	83	120	6	21	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	31	15	5	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	3	Nil	1	Nil	1	Nil	1	Nil
1933	210	66	122	8	14	1	3	Nil	Nil	23	11	8	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1934	196	50	126	10	10	1	3	Nil	Nil	18	12	8	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1935	131	29	87	7	8	2	2	Nil	Nil	11	7	6	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil
1936	184	54	120	8	2	1	2	Nil	Nil	31	14	7	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	4	Nil	1	Nil	2	Nil	1	Nil
1937	264	99	146	9	10	1	3	Nil	1	47	21	8	1	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	7	Nil	Nil	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	Nil
1938	393	130	238	12	13	2	1	1	1	49	40	9	3	1	1	Nil	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil
1939	369	126	215	17	11	1	4	Nil	Nil	57	40	14	4	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	4	Nil	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil
1940	467	151	268	25	25	1	7	Nil	Nil	78	50	22	3	1	1	1	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil
Totals	3558	1,063	2,194	141	160	20	73	2	3	434	298	121	17	9	8	1	1	49	Nil	6	4	21	Nil	5	1
Percentage %	29.9	61.7	3.9	4.5	20.4	74.5	2	3.1	50	34	14	2	47	42	5	5	83	Nil	10	7	78	Nil	18	4	

M - Muslims
H - Hindus
S - Sikhs
O - Others

A - Candidates who took I.C.S. Exam. in India. B - Successful Candidates (All India). C - Candidates from the Punjab. D - Successful Candidates from the Punjab. E - Nominated Candidates (All India). F - Nominated Candidates from the Punjab.

Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records, L/S&G/7/234 - L/S&G/7/250. * See Column A above for full headings.

APPENDIX M.

I.C.S. Examinations Held in London, 1924-40

Year	Successful Candidates - All-India				Successful Candidates - Punjab			
	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	Others	Muslim	Hindu	Sikh	Others
1924	Nil	7	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1925	1	14	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil
1926	2	8	1	Nil	Nil	1	1	Nil
1927	2	17	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1928	Nil	14	1	1	Nil	Nil	1	Nil
1929	1	14	Nil	2	1	1	Nil	Nil
1930	1	21	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1931	1	8	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1932	3	10	Nil	3	1	Nil	Nil	Nil
1933	2	11	Nil	5	Nil	Nil	Nil	1
1934	1	10	Nil	3	1	1	Nil	Nil
1935	1	13	1	Nil	1	Nil	1	Nil
1936	Nil	19	1	1	Nil	2	1	Nil
1937	Nil	8	Nil	5	Nil	1	Nil	1
1938	Nil	8	Nil	3	Nil	1	Nil	Nil
1939	1	3	Nil	3	Nil	1	Nil	1
1940	Nil	6	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	Nil
Total	16	191	4	32	4	10	4	3
Percentages	6.6%	78.6%	1.6%	13.2%	19%	48%	19%	14%

Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records, 1/S&G/7/131 - L/S&G/7/145, L/S&G/7/160, L/S&G/7/172, 1./S&G/7/173, L/S&G/7/192.

Appendix N.

Candidates who Sat I.C.S. Delhi Examinations 1930-1940, Grouped in Relation to Fathers' Occupations

Committees	A	B		C	D	E	F				G	H	I
		a	b				a	b	c	d			
Total K	62	3	9	199	1	3	8	21	10		32		2
%	18	0.8	2.5	57	0.3	0.8	2	6	3		9		0.6
Total L	11	4	4	91		6	12	30	12	1	33	2	1
%	5	2	2	44		3	6	14	6	0.5	16	1	0.5
Total M	15	2	3	45				9	4	1	8	1	1
%	17	2	3	50.5				10	4.5	1	9	1	1
Total N				6					5			2	
%				46					39			15	
Grand Total	88	9	16	341	1	9	20	60	31	2	73	5	4
Overall %	13.4	1.4	2	52	0.2	1.4	3	9	5	0.3	11	0.7	0.6

Abbreviations:

- A - Agriculture, Zamindars, Landlords, Jagirdars
- B - Mixed Incomes: (a) Land and Trade and/or Businesses
(b) Land and Professional and/or Government Service
- C - Government or State's Service
- D - Military Service
- E - Government Contracting
- F - The Professions: (a) Medicine, (b) Law, (c) Teaching, (d) Accounting.
- G - Commerce, Banking, Industry, Business
- H - Private Service
- I - Honorific Positions
- K - Muslims
- L - Hindus M - Sikhs
- N - Others
- % - Percentage

Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Record Files L/S&G/7/240 - L/S&G/7/250.

APPENDIX O.

Successful Candidates from the Punjab who appeared at the London Examinations, 1924 to 1940

Exam Year	Name of Candidate	Religion	Father's Occupation
1924	Nil		
1925	Gopal Das Kholsa	Hindu	District & Sessions Judge
1926	Prem Nath Thaper	Hindu	Landowner & Banker
1927	Nil		
1928	Nawab Singh	Sikh	Government Servant
1929	Ghulam Mueenuddin	Muslim	Zamindar, Departmental Supt. Police
	Dharma Vira	Hindu	Chief Engineer, Irrigation Branch
1930	Nil		
1931	Nil		
1932	S.F. Hassan	Muslim	Punjab Police
1933	Arthur Samuels Lall	Indian Christian	Professor of Mathematics
1934	N. Sen	Hindu	Government Service
	S.O. Ali	Muslim	Supt. Post Offices
1935	M. Ayub	Muslim	Merchant, Dairy owner, Contractor
	B.S. Grewal	Sikh	States' Service
1936	T. Singh	Sikh	Asst. Commissioner, Income Tax, Bombay
	K.C. Chowdhry	Hindu	Government Service
	H. Lal	Hindu	Professor
1937	P.G. Nair	Hindu	Barrister
	J.S. Lall	Indian Christian	Professor of Mathematics
1938	Raghu Pati Kapur	Hindu	Tahsildar
1939	K. Chand	Hindu	Landlord
	R.F. Isar	Indian Christian	Provincial Civil Service
1940	Narottam Sahgal	Hindu	Chief Engineer, B & R Branch, Sec. Govt. of Punjab.

Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records, L/S&G/7/132 - L/S&G/7/145, L/S&G/7/160, L/S&G/7/172, L/S&G/7/173, L/S&G/7/192.

APPENDIX P.

Successful Candidates from the Punjab who appeared at the Indian Examinations, 1924 to 1940

Exam Year	Name of Candidate	Religion **	Place and date of Birth	Father's Occupation
1924	Nil			
1925	Balwant Rai Tandon	H	Jullundur, 8/10/1903	C.I.E. & I.S.P
	Sisir Kumar Sen	H	Jessore, Bengal* 3/2/1903	Not Given
1926	Sheikh Abdur Rahman	M	Wazirabad, Gujranwala 4/6/1903	Contractor
1927	Nil			
1928	Nil			
1929	Hafiz Abdul Majid	M	Kasur, 17/10/1907	Silk Merchant
1930	Dharm Pal Bhandari	H	Lahore, 28/9/1908	Punjab Civil Service
1931	Pir Ahsanud-Din	M	Ludhiana, 7/9/1909	Acting Comm., Lyallpur
	Mohammad Ikram	M	Ledharanwala, 10/9/1908	Employed in Office of Dir. of Agriculture Lahore
	Parvez Mohammad Ismail	I.C.	Jagraon, 27/5/1908	Professor
1932	N.N. Wanchoo	H	Satna (Baghelkhand C.I. Agency)* 1/5/1910	Supt. to Punjab States
1933	Nil			
1934	Nil			
1935	Agha Abdul Hamid	M	Sialkot, 2/8/1912	E.A.C., Dir. of Agri., Multan
1936	Ali Asghar	M	Ferozepur, 15/7/1914	Advocate
1937	Nazir Ahmed	M	Murree, 10/2/1914	Cloth Merchant
1938	Basir Ahmad Khan	M	Quetta, Baluchistan,* 1/12/1914	E.A. Commissioner
	Gursaran Das Kalia	H	Jagraon, Ludhiana, 22/2/1915	Manager, British Auto & Eng. Co., Govt., Police Transport Contractors
	Kewal Singh Chaudhary	S	Lyallpur, 1/6/1915	Landlord
1939	Saroop Krishen	H	Ludhiana, 18/1/1915	Barrister
	Ranjit Rai Bahl	H	Hoshiarpur, 16/8/1915	Landlord
1940	Sandve Vohra	H	Lahore, 5/7/1917	Businessman
	Maqbul Mohammad Niaz	M	Hoshiarpur, 5/11/1917 Advocate	Advocate

* Though these candidates were born outside of the Punjab they were of Punjabi parentage and were classed as Punjabis in the application forms and result lists.

** M - Muslim, H - Hindu, S - Sikh, I.C. - Indian Christian.

Source: Compiled from information contained in files L/S&G/7/235-250. IOR.

APPENDIX Q.

Nominated Punjabi Candidates from Indian Examinations, 1924-1940

Exam Year	Name of Candidate	Religion **	Place and date of Birth	Father's Occupation
1924	Nil			
1925	Nil			
1926	Shamsher Singh Dulat	S	No information given	No information given
1927	Nil			
1928	Nasir Ahmad	M	Karnal, 14/6/05	Surgeon
	Aziz Ahmad	M	Lahore, 24/6/06	Sub-Divl. Officer, Railway Service
	Tarlochan Das Bedi	S	Kaparthala State, 25/12/05	Tahsildar
1929	Muhammad Hadi Hussain	M	Gujranwala, 15/1/06	Not given
	Nazir Ahmed Faruqi	M	Gujar Khan, 15/12/06	Asst. Surgeon
	S.M. Burke	I.C.	Sheikhupura, 3/7/06	Teacher
1930	Niaz Md.Khan Barakzai	M	Gurdaspur, 12/6/07	Sub-Inspt. Police
	Khwaja Abdur Rahim	M	Amritsar, 1/9/08	Sub-Judge
	Mohammad Khurshid	M	Rawalpindi, 8/12/07	Not given
1931	Kapar Singh	S	Lyalpur, 2/3/09	Agriculturist
1932	Abdulla Khalid Malik	M	Govali, 7/7/10	Not given
	Mohindar Singh Randhawa	S	Zira, 2/2/09	Tahsildar
1933	Nil			
1934	Nil			
1935	Sheikh Nazrul-Bakar	M	Gujranwala, 21/12/13	General Merchant and Contractor
1936	Muhammad Azim Husain	M	Gurdaspur, 5/10/13	Lawyer
	Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan	M	Lyalpur, 8/1/14	Hon. Army Lieut., (Agriculturist)
	Gyan Singh Kahlon	S	Gurdaspur, 13/3/13	Headmaster
1937	Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf	M	Lahore, 13/11/13	Suptd. High Court, Lahore
	Mirza Muzaffar Ahmad	M	Qadian, 23/2/13	Agriculturist
	S. Ata Muhammad Khan Leghari	M	Dera Ghazi Khan, 1913	Agriculturist M.L.C
	A.S. Wazir	M	Jammu Kashmir *23/2/14	Lecturar
	Ashgar Ali Shah	M	Ludhiana, 3/4/14	Dept. Post Master
1938	Syed Ghias-ud-Din Ahmed	M	Abbaspur, 1/6/15	Agriculturist
	Mohd. Hussain Sufi	M	Gujranwala, 13/2/14	Agriculturist
1939	Sheikh Anwaral Haq	M	N.W.F.P.* 11/5/17	Stationmaster NWFP
	Muhammad Masud	M	Lahore, 25/6/16	Doctor
1940	Qudrat Dllah Shahab	M	Gilgit, Kashmir* 26/2/17	Agriculture and Service

Source: Compiled from information contained in the files L/S&G/7/236-250. IOR

* As in Appendix P. ** M-Muslims, H-Hindu, S-Sikh, I.C.- Indian Christian.

APPENDIX R.

THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP OF THE PUNJAB IN THE 1919-1947-PERIOD

The families who dominated Muslim politics included the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura (Sir Muhammad Shafi, *Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz*, *Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz*, *Mian Iftikharuddin*, *Mian Bashir Ahmad*), the Mokul family (*Sardar Habibullah*), and the Qizilbash clan (*Nawab Sir Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash*) of Lahore District; the Chathas (*Riasat Ali*) of Gujranwala; the Janjuas of Darapur (*Talib Mehdi Khan*, *Khair Mehdi Khan*, *Lahrasab Khan*), the Pirs of Jalalpur (*Nawab Sir Mehr Shah*) and Khokars (*Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan*) of Jhelum; the Pirs of Makhad, the Kot Ghebas (*Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan*), the Hyats of Wah (*Sir Sikander Hyat Khan*, *Nawab Muzaffar Khan*, *Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan*), and the Shamasabad Awans (*Nawab Muhammad Amin Khan*) of Attock; the Noon-Tiwana family group (*Sir Muhammad Hayat Khan Noon*, *Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon*, *Malik Sardar Khan Noon*, *Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana*, *Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana*, *Sir Allah Bakhsh Khan*, *Nawabzada Malik Muhammad Habibullah Khan*), the Qureshis (*Nawab Muhammad Hayat*, *Mian Saeed*, *Mian Zakir*), Pirachas (*Sheikh Fazle Haq*, *Sheikh Fazal Ilahi*) and the Pirs of Jahanian Shah (*Syed Ghulam Muhammad*) of Shahpur; the Wanbachran (*Malik Muzaffar Khan*) and the Kalabagh (*Malik Amir Muhammad Khan*) families of Mianwali; the Pirs of Rajoa (*Syed Ghulam Abbas*) and of Shah Jiwana (*Syed Mubarik Ali*, *Syed Abid Husain*) and Sials of Jhang (*S. Muhammad Amin*); the Daultanas (*Nawab Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana*, *Mian Allah Yar Khan*, *Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana*), the Gilanis (*Mustafa Shah and Muhammad Hussain*), Dahas (*Khan Haibat Khan*), Qureshis (*Murid Hussain*, *Ashiq Hussain*), Gardezis (*Syed Ali Husain Shah*) and Khaggas (*Pir Budhan Shah*) of Multan; the Gurmanis (*Mushtaq Ahmad*, *Muhammad Ghulam Jilani Gurmani*) and Dastis (*Abdul Hamid Khan*) of Muzaffargarh; the Legharis (*Sir Jamal Khan*), Drishaks (*Allah Khan*, *Bahadur Khan*), Mazaris (*Balakh Sher*, *Sher Baz*) and the Pirs of Taunsa Sharif of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Mamdots (*Nawab Shawaz Khan*, *Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan*) of Ferozepore.

The names underlined signify membership of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in the 1937-47 period.

Sources: C. Baxter, 'The People's Party Vs. the Punjab "Feudalists"', *Journal of Asian Studies*, VIII (1973), pp. 168-175; *Lists of Members and Constituencies, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937, 1946*; Punjab Legislative Assembly Library, Lahore.

APPENDIX S.

THE PUNJAB ELECTORATE (1946)

Total Population	27,955,450
Total Male Population (+ 20)	7,642,950
Total Number of Voters	3,514,749
Percentage of Total Population Enfranchised	12.50%
Approximate Percentage of Total Adult Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised	46%
Total Muslim Population	15,913,450
Total Adult Male Muslim Population (+ 20)	4,260,600
Total Number of Muslims Enfranchised	1,619,691
Percentage of Muslim Population Enfranchised	10%
Approximate Percentage of Adult Muslim Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised	38%
Total Hindu Population	7,414,850
Total Adult Male Hindu Population (+ 20)	2,114,850
Total Number of Hindus Enfranchised	848,744
Percentage of Hindu Population Enfranchised	11.40%
Approximate Percentage of Adult Hindu Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised	40%
Total Sikh Population	3,770,850
Total Adult Male Sikh Population (+ 20)	1,040,400
Total Number of Sikhs Enfranchised	659,396
Percentage of Sikh Population Enfranchised	17.50%
Approximate Percentage of Adult Sikh Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised	63%

SOURCE: *Census of India, 1941, Punjab*, Table XI, p. 68; *Times of India*, 13 March, 1946.

The above population figures provide an approximation rather than an absolute truth. The 1941 Census of India was conducted in difficult wartime conditions, as a result of which the standard of accuracy declined.

APPENDIX T.

THE PATTERN OF VOTING IN THE MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES

Details of abbreviations used given at end of Appendix.

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:						
Hissar	19,870	10,218	ML.	7,840	77%	40%
		51.42%	U.	2,375	23%	
			I.	3	0.00%	
Rohtak	10,983	6,157	ML.	5,150	84%	47%
		56%	U.	991	16%	
			Inv.	16	0%	
N.W.Gurgaon	15,018	9,794	ML.	4,193	43%	28%
		65%	U.	3,022	31%	
			Inv.	2,579	26%	
S.E.Gurgaon	12,775	8,347	ML.	3,821	46%	30%
		65%	U.	1,763	21%	
			Inv.	2,763	33%	
Karnal	19,068	11,461	ML.	10,072	88%	53%
		60%	C.	1,189	11%	
			Inv.	200	1%	
Ambala and Simla	19,324	11,952	ML.	10,141	85%	53%
		62%	C.	1,061	9%	
			Inv.	750	6%	
Kangra and E. Hoshiarpur	16,549	11,729	ML.	7,803	67%	47%
		68%	U.	3,895	33%	
			C.	31		
Hoshiarpur West	19,669	12,503	ML.	5,815	46%	30%
		64%	U.	4,077	33%	
			Inv.	2,611	21%	
Jullundur North	23,986	15,718	ML.	11,390	73%	48%
		66%	A.	4,296	27%	
			Inv.	32		
Jullundur South	24,414	14,583	ML.	8,428	58%	34.5%
		60%	I.	3,417	23%	
			Inv.	2,738	19%	
Ludhiana	20,360	13,087	ML.	8,927	68%	44%
		64%	U.	2,707	21%	
			O.	1,453	11%	

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:						
Ferozepore Central	17,291	12,880	ML.	7,205	56%	42%
		74.5%	U.	3,549	28%	
			O. & Inv.	2,126	16%	
Ferozepore East	12,503	7,275	ML.	5,067	70%	40.5%
		58%	U.	2,167	30%	
			O. & Inv.	41		
Fazilka	13,138	8,994	U.	5,549	62%	42%
		68.5%	ML.	3,441	38%	
			Inv.	4		
Lahore	13,594	10,104	U.	5,405	53.5%	40%
		74%	ML.	4,656	46%	
			O. & Inv.	43		
Chunian	23,618	15,148	ML.	11,761	78%	50%
		64%	U.	2,699	18%	
			O. & Inv.	688	4%	
Kasur	14,493	9,389	ML.	6,969	74%	48%
		65%	U.	2,118	23%	
			O. & Inv.	302	3%	
Amritsar	10,407	7,372	ML.	5,151	70%	49.5%
		71%	U.	2,209	30%	
			I.	12		
Tarn Taran	8,210	5,779	ML.	3,399	59%	41%
		70%	U.	2,217	38%	
			O.	163	3%	
Ajnala	11,300	7,222	ML.	5,326	74%	47%
		64%	U.	1,476	20%	
			O.	420	6%	
Gurdaspur East	16,590	9,207	ML.	8,609	94%	52%
		55.5%	U.	573	6%	
			O. & Inv.	25		
Batala	22,730	16,161	ML.	6,266	39%	27.5%
		71%	U.	5,651	35%	
			O. & Inv.	4,244	26%	
Shakargarh	12,889	9,015	ML.	4,516	50%	35%
		70%	U.	3,779	42%	
			O. & Inv.	720	8%	
Sialkot North	19,793	12,366	ML.	9,080	73%	46%
		62.5%	U.	2,874	23%	
			O. & Inv.	412	3%	

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:						
Sialkot Central	17,496	10,958	ML.	6,353	58%	36%
		63%	A.	4,514	41%	
			O. & Inv.	91	1%	
Sialkot South	20,349	13,225	ML.	8,351	63%	41%
		65%	U.	3,983	30%	
			O. & Inv.	891	7%	
Gujranwala North	21,906	14,420	ML.	7,872	55%	36%
		66%	U.	6,332	44%	
			O. & Inv.	216	1%	
Gujranwala East	21,562	16,172	ML.	8,185	51%	38%
		75%	U.	7,905	49%	
			Inv.	82		
Hafizabad	18,003	11,476	ML.	8,290	72%	46%
		64%	U.	3,168	28%	
			O. & Inv.	18		
Sheikhupura	30,875	14,823	ML.	11,363	77%	37%
		48%	U.	3,394	23%	
			O. & Inv.	66		
Nankana Sahib	15,125	10,566	ML.	5,576	53%	37%
		70%	U.	4,862	46%	
			Inv.	128	1%	
Shahdara	14,714	10,119	ML.	7,573	75%	51.5%
		69%	U.	2,402	24%	
			Inv.	144	1%	
Gujrat North	19,161	12,512	ML.	8,742	70%	46%
		65%	U.	3,743	30%	
			Inv.	27		
Gujrat East	15,665	10,432	U.	6,876	66%	44%
		67%	ML.	3,556	34%	
S. E. Gujarat	22,409	13,154	ML.	10,838	82%	44%
		59%	U.	2,316	34%	
N. W. Gujarat	18,141	11,191	ML.	8,253	74%	45.5%
		62%	O. & Inv.	2,942	26%	
S. W. Gujarat	15,235	9,717	ML.	6,794	70%	45%
		64%	U. & Inv.	2,923	30%	
Shahpur	32,282	25,039	U.	14,553	58%	45%
		78%	ML.	10,411	42%	
			O. & Inv.	75		
Khushab	26,457	18,870	U.	10,654	57%	40%
		71%	ML.	8,182	43%	
			O. & Inv.	34		

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:						
Bhalwal	32,159	22,043	ML.	12,732	58%	40%
		68%	U.	9,219	42%	
			O. & Inv.	92		
Sargodha	27,394	19,752	U.	10,316	52%	38%
		72%	ML.	9,093	46%	
			O. & Inv.	343	2%	
Jhelum	20,059	12,077	ML.	9,887	82%	49%
		60%	U.	2,167	18%	
			O. & Inv.	23		
Pind Dadan Khan	17,487	7,411	ML.	7,106	96%	41%
		42%	U.	263	3.5%	
			O. & Inv.	42	0.5%	
Chakawal	18,656	11,133	ML.	8,444	76%	45%
		60%	U. & Inv.	2,689	24%	
Rawalpindi Sadr	17,822	10,480	ML.	5,624	54%	31.5%
		59%	I.	3,271	31%	
			O. & Inv.	1,585	15%	
Gujjar Khan	20,220	10,387	ML.	8,956	86%	44%
		51%	U.	883	9%	
			I. & Inv	548	8%	
Rawalpindi East	20,931	12,397	ML.	10,380	84%	49.5%
		59%	U.	2,008	19%	
			O. & Inv.	9		
Attock North	21,820	14,999	ML.	7,639	51%	35%
		69%	U.	7,238	48%	
			O. & Inv.	122	1%	
Attock Central	21,094		U.	Unopposed		
Attock South	19,926	125,445	U.	8,342	66.5%	42%
		63%	ML. & Inv	4,203	33.5%	
Mianwali North	19,657	12,409	ML.	8,310	67%	42%
		63%	U. & Inv.	4,099	33%	
Mianwali South	29,710	19,864	U.	10,049	51%	34%
		67%	ML. & Inv	9,815	49%	
Montgomery	28,851	17,746	ML.	14,754	83%	51%
		61.5%	ML. & Inv	2,888	16%	
			I. & Inv	104	1%	
Okara	22,657	15,164	ML.	13,324	88%	59%
		67%	U.	1,840	12%	
Dipalpur	16,093	10,180	ML.	6,882	68%	43%
		63%	U.	3,190	31%	
			O. & Inv.	108	1%	

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:						
Pakpattan	20,812	13,222	ML.	8,353	63%	40%
		63.5%	U.	4,867	37%	
			Inv.	2		
Lyallpur	23,812	14,701	ML.	10,412	71%	44%
		62%	U.	4,256	29%	
			O. & Inv.	33		
Samundri	24,387	16,203	ML.	10,233	63%	42%
		66%	U.	5,906	37%	
			O. & Inv.	64		
Toba Tek Singh	37,743	23,570	ML.	11,492	49%	30%
		62%	U.	10,294	44%	
			O. & Inv.	1,784	7%	
Jaranwala	13,139	12,282	ML.	8,038	66%	47%
		72%	U.	4,203	34%	
			O. & Inv.	41		
Jhang East	21,491		ML.	Unopposed		
Jhang Central	21,817	14,380	ML.	10,855	76%	50%
		66%	U.	3,490	24%	
			I. & Inv	35		
Jhang West	18,502	6,176	ML.	5,571	90%	30%
		33%	U.	600	10%	
			I.	5		
Multan	20,291	14,384	U.	7,415	52%	36.5%
		71%	ML.	6,759	47%	
			O. & Inv.	210	1%	
Shujabad	12,716	8,788	ML.	5,405	62%	42.5%
		69%	U.	3,358	38%	
			O. & Inv.	25		
Lodhran	18,200	10,606	ML.	8,204	77%	45%
		58%	U.	2,384	23%	
			Inv.	18		
Mailsi	27,826	17,694	ML.	13,304	75%	48%
		64%	U.	4,315	24%	
			Inv.	75		
Khanewal	21,096	13,705	ML.	9,827	72%	47%
		65%	U.	3,832	28%	
			O. & Inv.	44		
Kabirwala	20,509	13,278	ML.	9,193	69%	45%
		65%	U.	4,060	31%	
			Inv.	25		

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:						
Muzaffargarh Sadr	17,437	11,736	ML.	6,093	52%	35%
		67%	U.	2,983	25%	
			O. & Inv.	2,660	23%	
Alipur	12,136	8,729	U.	3,961	45%	33%
		72%	ML.	3,597	25%	
			O. & Inv.	1,171	23%	
Muzaffargarh North	18,725	11,644	ML.	7,524	65%	40%
		62%	U.	3,741	32%	
			Inv.	379	3%	
Dera Ghazi Khan North	9,105		ML.	Unopposed		
Dera Ghazi Khan Central	10,236	6,650	U.	3,655	55%	36%
		65%	ML.	2,986	45%	
			Inv.	9		
Dera Ghazi Khan South	14,414	9,431	ML.	3,237	34%	22.5%
		65%	U.	3,133	33%	
			O. & Inv.	3,061	32%	

	No. of Voters	Votes Polled	Parties' share of votes cast		Percentage of votes cast	Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
URBAN CONSTITUENCIES:						
Southern Towns	17,102	8,870	ML.	8,627	97%	50%
		52%	I.	215	2%	
			Inv.	28		
South Eastern Towns	23,498	15,405	ML.	12,072	78%	51%
		65.5%	A.	3,269	21%	
			O. & Inv.	64		
Inner Lahore	20,413	11,349	ML.	9,802	86.5%	48%
		56%	I.	1,422	12.5%	
			Inv.	125	1%	
Outer Lahore	36,650	13,414	ML.	13,053	97%	33%
		34%	I. & Inv	361	3%	
Amritsar City	28,130	17,241	ML.	11,172	65%	40%
		61%	A. & Inv	6,069	35%	
N.E. Towns	29,948	24,116	ML.	14,813	61%	49%
		80.5%	A.	9,077	38%	
			O. & Inv.	226	1%	
Rawalpindi Div. Towns	30,424	17,134	ML.	14,728	86%	48%
		56%	U.	2,346	14%	
			O. & Inv.	60		
Multan Div. Towns	30,402	17,024	ML.	12,905	76%	42%
		56%	A.	4,112	24%	
			O.	7		
Abbreviations: ML. - Muslim League U. - Unionist C. - Congress A. - Ahrar I. - Independent O. - Others Inv. - Invalid SOURCE: <i>Times of India</i> , 13 March, 1946						

APPENDIX U.

The Incidence of Official Interference in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Election.

Out of a total of 56 Muslim constituencies which were examined, official interference was reported in 39 of them.

Constituencies Surveyed	Party Illegally Employing Government Officials
Dera Ghazi Khan North	Muslim League
Chakwal	Muslim League
Dipalpur	Muslim League
Mianwali North	Muslim League
Muzaffargarh North	Muslim League
Jhang West	Muslim League
Attock South	Unionist Party
Multan	Unionist Party
Kabirwala	Muslim League
Sheikhupura	Muslim League
Shakargarh	Muslim League
Gurgaon	Muslim League
N.W. Gurgaon	Muslim League
Montgomery	Muslim League
N.E. Towns	Muslim League
Rohtak	Muslim League
Tarn Taran	Muslim League
Dera Ghazi Khan South	Muslim League
Gujranwala North	Muslim League
Jullundur North	Muslim League
Sialkot Central	Muslim League
Alipur	Unionist Party
Ludhiana	Muslim League
Rawalpindi East	Muslim League
Sargodha	Unionist Party
Fazilka	Unionist Party
Hissar	Muslim League
Southern Towns	Muslim League

Constituencies Surveyed	Party Illegally Employing Government Officials
Batala	Independent Candidate
Shahpur	Unionist Party
Lahore	Unionist Party
Lyallpur	Muslim League
Gujrat North	Muslim League
Hafizabad	Muslim League
Gujranwala East	Muslim League
Rawalpindi Down Towns	Muslim League
Mianwali South	Unionist Party
Khusab	Unionist Party
Toba Tel Singh	Muslim League

No cases of official interference were reported in East Jhang, S.E. Gujrat, N.W. Gujrat, Pakpattan, Ferozepore Central, Muzaffargarh Sadr, Outer Lahore, S.W. Gujrat, Hoshiarpur West, Khanewal, Pind Dadan Khan, Nankana Sahib, Attock North, Bhalwal, Samundri, Jhang Central and Sialkot South.

Source: *Punjab Government Gazette*, Part III, 21 June 1946, pp. 286-289, 293, 301; 28 June 1946, pp. 321-374; 5 July 1946, pp. 385-392; 12 July 1946, pp. 424-463; 19 July 1946, pp. 473-486; 26 July 1946, pp. 506-561; 2 Aug. 1946, pp. 587-606; 9 Aug. 1946, pp. 615-650; 16 Aug. 1946, pp. 670 -708; 23 Aug. 1946, pp. 724-748; 6 Sept. 1946, pp. 802-838; 13 Sept. 1946, pp. 839-887; 4 Oct. 1946, pp. 918-928; 26 March 1947, pp. 240-241; 11 April 1947, pp. 155-177, 211-213; 18 April 1947, pp. 226-237, 255-258; 25 April 1947, pp. 299-302, PGSL.

APPENDIX V.

The Incidence of Bribery in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Elections. Out of a total of 56 Muslim constituencies which were examined (see Appendix U) bribery was alleged to have occurred in 24 of them.

Constituencies	Name of Candidate on whose behalf Bribes were offered	Party
East Jhan	M. Ghulam Muhammad	Muslim League
Chakwal	Raja Mohd. Sarfraz Ali Khan	Muslim League
Dipalpur	Syed Ashaq Hussain	Muslim League
Multan	Major Ashiq Hussain	Unionist
Kabirwala	Nau Bahar Shah	Muslim League
Sheikhupura	Mahammad Hussain	Muslim League
Muzaffargah Sadr	K.S. Abdul Hamid Khan	Muslim League
S.E. Gurgaon	Mihtab Khan	Muslim League
N.W. Gurgaon	M. Ahmad Jan	Muslim League
Montgomery	M. Khan of Kot	Muslim League
Khanewal	Pir Buddan Shah Khagga	Muslim League
Pind Dadan Khan	Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan	Muslim League
Gujranwala North	Chaudhri Salah-ud-Din	Muslim League
Jullundur North	Mahammad Abus Salam	Muslim League
Sialkot Central	Safraz Khan	Muslim League
Ludhiana	Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Khan	Muslim League
Hissar	K.S. Chaudhry Sahib Dad Khan	Muslim League
Bhalwal	Sheikh Fazal Huq	Muslim League
Samundri	Mohammad Khan	Muslim League
Shahpur	Sultan Ali Mian	Unionist
Lahore	Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash	Unionist
Gujranwala East	Zafrulla Khan	Muslim League
Mianwali South	Mohd. Abdullah Khan	Unionist
Khushab	Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana	Unionist

Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Part III, 21 June 1946, pp. 286-289, 293-301; 28 June 1946, pp. 321-374; 5 July 1946, pp. 385-418; 12 July 1946, pp. 424-463; 19 July 1946, pp. 473-486; 26 July 1946, pp. 506-543, 548-561; 2 Aug. 1946, pp. 587-606; 9 Aug. 1946, pp. 615-650; 16 Aug. 1946, pp. 670-708; 23 Aug. 1946, pp. 724-748; 6 Sept. 1946, pp. 802-838; 13 Sept. 1946, pp. 839-887; 4 Oct. 1946, pp. 918-928; 26 March 1947, pp. 240-241; 11 April 1947, pp. 155-177, 211-213; 18 April 1947, pp. 226-237, 255-258; 25 April 1947, PP. 299-302. PGSL.

APPENDIX W.

Incidence of Coercion and Intimidation Which Occurred in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Election.

Out of 56 Muslim constituencies surveyed (for full list of constituencies see Appendix U), the irregularities referred to above occurred in the following:

Constituency	Candidate	Party
Mianwali North	Khan Abdul Sattar Khan	Muslim League
Attock South	M.Mohi-ud-Din Lal Badshah Mukhad	Unionist
Multan	Major Ashiq Hussain	Unionist
Ferozepore Central	Nawab of Mamdot	Muslim League
S.W. Gujrat	Ghulam Rasul	Muslim League
N.E. Towns	K.B.Karamat Ali	Muslim League
Pind Dadan Khan	Raja Ghazanfar Ali	Muslim League
Dera Ghazi Khan South	Sardar Bahadar Khan	Muslim League
Nankana Sahib	Shahadat Khan	Muslim League
Sargodha	Sir Malik Allah Bux Khan Tiwana	Unionist
Fazilka	M. Bagh Ali	Unionist
Hissar	K.S.Chaudhry Sahib Dad Khan	Muslim League
Shahpur	Sultan Ali Mian	Unionist
Gujrat North	Fazal Ilahi	Muslim League
Gujranwala East	Zafrulla Khan	Muslim League
Mianwali South	Mohd. Abdullah Khan-	Unionist
Khushab	Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana	Unionist
Toba Tek Singh	Mian Nur Ullah	Muslim League

Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Pt. III, 28 June 1946, pp. 325-326, 343-348; 5 July 1946, pp. 393-398, 403-418; 19 July 1946, pp. 478-482; 26 July 1946, pp. 512-521, 553-558; 2 Aug. 1946, p. 601; 16 Aug. 1946, pp. 676-706; 6 Sept. 1946, pp. 814-820; 13 Sept. 1946, pp. 879-887; 4 Oct. 1946, pp. 918-928. PGSL.

APPENDIX X.

Pirs and Religious Leaders Who Supported the Muslim League Listed According to the Constituencies they Visited, or in which Fatwas were issued in their names

S.E. Gujrat

Maulvi Mohd. Abdullah Sulemani of Kurjab, Qazi of the Ilaqa. Haji Syed Pir Yaqub Shah of Majra (Gujrat Tahsil). Pir Nawazish Hussain (Gujrat Tahsil). Riaz Hussain of Jehran Wali (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Said Karim Shah (son of Murtza Shah of Mugho Wal, Gujrat Tahsil). Hafiz Fazal Hussain of Rajeki. Maulvi Mohd. Alam (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Mahmud Shah (son of Wilayat Shah, President of the Sunni Conference, Gujrat). Syed Malang Shah of Suq Kalan (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Fazal Shah of Khepra Wala (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Gul Hussain Shah of Majoki (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Nur Shah of Majoki (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Akhar Shah of Bhidana (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Shekooor Shah of Bukan (Gujrat Tahsil). The Pirs of Jheran Wali. Syed Mahmud Shah (son of Syed Wilayat Shah of Gujrat). The Khalifa of Qadian (Ahmadia Spiritual Head). Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur (Sialkot District).

Mianwali North

Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur. Also local Pirs who were not named confronted electors at the polling stations.

Muzaffargarh North

Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur and local Pirs.

Jhang West

Makhdum Nazar Husain. Mian Habib Sultan. Mian Nur Hussain. Mian Faiz Sultan. Mian Ghulam Jilani. Faqir Ghulam Yasin. The Sajjada Nashins of Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu of Shorkot. Maulana Fazal Shah, Qureshi Mufti. Pir Abdul Rahman. Maulana Faiz Mohd. Awan. Maulana Pandit Lekh Ram. Maulana Azan Husain.

Sheikhupura

Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur. Pir Kutab Shah. Pir Imdad Hussain Shah of Hujra Sharif. Maulvi Mohd. Hussain of Amenabad. Pir Ashgar Ali Shah. Ali Husain Shah, Sassad Nashin of Khangah Dogran.

N.W. Gujrat

Pir Mohd. Fazal Shah of Jalalpur Sharif (Jhelum District). Sufi Mohd. Din (President of the Jama Masjid Committee). Pir Sayed Arif Hussain of Partab Pura. Faqir Sayed Imdad Ali Shah Jilani. Hazrat Pir Syed Jama't Ali Shah. Syed Fazl Shah. Malik Sufi Mohd. Din (Municipal Commissioner, Mandi Bahauddin). Mian Shah Mohd. (Manager, Islamia High School). Wara Allam Shah (Phalia Tahsil). Maulvi Ghulam Mohd. (Imam of Jama Masjid, Mandi Bahauddin). Pir Hayat Shah of Nurpur Piran (Phalia Tahsil).

Shakargarh

Pir Ali Akbar. Pir Qutab Nisar. Pir Aslam Shah.

Ferozepore Central

Hazrat Pir Syed Jamat Ali Shah. Hazrat Pir Badan Din. Diwan Sayyed Al-o-Rasul.

Muzaffargarh Sadr.

Maulvi Din Mohd., Shah of Muzaffargarh. Maulvi Ghulam Qasim of Basti Lunda. Diwan Abdulla Shah of Mahal Khaki. Churab Ali Shah of Jal koala. Mubarak Shah of Pir Jagi.

S.W. Gujrat

Syed Riaz Hussain. Nawazish Hussain of Jhiranwali. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalla. Pir Sharif Ghulam Hussain Thatha. Master Mirza Khan of Pindi Lala. Hafiz Mohd. Hussain of Senthall. Mian Khan of Chak. Master Ghulam Haider Sohawa Warranchan. The Khalifa of Qadian.

S.E. Gurgaon

Maulvi Mohd. Daud (Shakrawa). Maulvi Abdul Jahhar (Sakhpuri). Maulvi Abdul Shakur (Bisru). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Bayed Arif Hussain (Jullundur District). Pir Haji Yaqub Ali Shah of Majra Sharif. The Pir of Sayal Sharif (Shahpur District).

N.W. Gurgaon

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. The Pir of Sayal Sharif. Pir Sayad Arif Hussain of Pratappur (Wazila, Jullundur District). Pir Yaqub Ali Shah of Majra Sharif.

Khanewal

Sayyed Ghulam Nabi Shah Gilani. Sayyed Imam Shah of Qatalpur. Sayyed Ahmad Shah of Rahim Shah. Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Makhdum Mehr Hussain Shah. A further 28 minor religious leaders were also active in the constituency.

N.E. Towns

Maulvi Mohammad Ibrahim. Maulvi Jaundat of Rampur. Pir Jamat Ali Shah.

Rohtak

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Mahboob Ellahi (Gen. Sec. Rohtak District Muslim League). Hazrat Khawaja Aziz-ul-Rehman Madzallahu, Sajjada Nashin of Kot Abdul Khaliq. Ch. Zaferyab Khan of Rohtak.

Pind Dadan Khan

Hazrat Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur (nephew of Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Muslim League candidate - Pind Dadan Khan). Pir Amir Shah. Maulvi Said Rasul of Bhochal Khurd. Maulvi Faiz Mohammad Khan of Makhial. Mohammad Shah (nephew of Pir Fazal Shah). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Walayat Shah. Maulvi Noor Muhammad of Baghancala.

Gujranwala North

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir of Sial Sharif (Shahpur District). Saadat Azam (Jullundur District). Pir Sayeed Arif Hussain (Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Amir Badshah (Gujrat). Faqir Sayid Imdad Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra Shariff. Sayed Fazal Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Jalalpur Shariff. Hazrat Pir Sayed Yaqub Ali Shah, Majra Shariff. Sajjada Nashin Sambaryal. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Shariff, Sahotra (Pindadan Shah Tahsil). Pir Sayed Muhammad Hussain Sahib Zaffar Bukhari (Gurdaspur District). Pir Mugarab Hussain Shah (Jullundur District). Syed Pir-ud-Din Daryai, Shah Daula Shah (Gujrat District). Pir Sayed Muhammad Yakub Shah (Gujrat District).

Nankana Sahib

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Hazrat Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Pir Imdad Hussain of Hujra Sharif. Maulvi Khair Din. Hazrat Pir Sayed Yaqub Ali Shah of Majra Sharif.

Jullundur North

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur.

Sialkot Central

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sayed Zahur Ali Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Chaura Shariff. Shaibzada Muzaffar Hassan Vadalvi. Rana Mohammed Amir Vadalvi. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur.

Attock North

Pir Ashaq Hussain of Hassanabad. Pir Lal Hussain Shah of Hassanabad. Maulvi Abdul Haq of Pind Sultani.

Ludhiana

Pir Jamat Ali Shah.

Hissar

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Pir Sayed Yaqub Ali Shah of Majra Shariff.

Southern Towns

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Mahboob Elahi.

Bhalwal

Maulvi Muhammad Harif (Kot Momin). Maulvi Habibur Rahman of Bhalwal.

Batala

Mahammad Hussain, Abdur Rahman, Zahur Ahmad (Ahmadia leaders). Pir Sayyed Hussain Ali Shah.

Samundri

Syed Iqbal Hussain.

Jhang Central

Syed Karamat Hussain. Farid Kaplana. Syed Abid Hussain.

Lyallpur

Maulvi Ali Mohd.. Maulvi Asmat Ullah. Pir Mohammad Hussain. Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Mohd. Sharif Zahoor Ali Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Chura Sharif. Pir Khadam Hussain Shah. Master Khushi Mohammad. Saadat Uzaam (Jullundur District). Pir Syed Afar Hussain Shah (Jullundur District). Hazarat Khawaja Mohd. Amir Badshah (Gujrat District). Faqir Said Imdad Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra Sharif. Said Fazal Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir Yaqub Ali Shah, Majra Sharif. The Sajjada Nashin, Sambraial. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Sharif (Pind Dadan Khan). Pir Said Mohd. Hussain Zafar (Gurdaspur District). Pir Mukarab Hussain Shah (Jullundur District). Said Pir-ud-Din Dariai (Gujrat District). Pir Said Haji Mohd. Yaqub Shah (Gajrat District). Maulana Pir Said Mohd. Hussain (Gurdaspur District).

Gujrat North

Syed Hulk Ali Shah of Shakrila. Syed Hafiz Fazal Shah of Qazi Bakar. Mian Nur Ilahi, Imam Majjid of Bhagnagar. Mian Fazal of Baulvi Sharif. Syed Sardar Shah of Fatehpur (Jammu State). Syed Shah of Kolta Sandan. Syed Mohsan Shah of Abhial. Syed Fazal Hussain of Jandowla. Qazi Mohammad Shafi of Wadaichanwala. Maulvi Akhtar Ali (Bahawalpur State). Syed Mahmud Shah of Gujrat. Maulvi Ibrahim (Zamindara College, Tanar). Hafiz Ghulam (son of Sheikh Fatah Hakim of Guliana).

Sialkot South

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sadat Azam, Khantora Sharif (Jullundur District). Pir Arif Hussain Sahib (Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Mohd. Amir of Chura Sharif (Gujrat District). Faqir Sayed Imdad Ali Shah Gilani, Hujra Sharif. Pir Syed Fazl Shah of Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir Syed Yaqub Ali Shah, Majra Sharif. Pir Vilaiat Shah of Sahotra (Pind Dadan Khan Tahsil). Pir Muhammad Hussain. Zaffar Bukhari (Gurdaspur District). Pir Muclarrab Hussain Shah of Jullundur. Syed Pir-ud-Din Daryai Shah Daula Sahib (Gujrat District). Pir Syed Mohd. Yaqub Shah (Gujrat District).

Hafizabad

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Maulvi Pir Hayat Shah. Pir Ishrad Hussain.

Gujranwala East

Maulvi Sayeed Ahmad (Mokhal village). Maulvi Nur Mohammad (Eminabad village). Maulvi Sharif Ahmad (Gakerke village). Maulvi Niaz Ahmad (Talwandi Musekhan village). Maulvi Ghulam Mahommad (Ferozewala village). Maulvi Abdul Aziz

(Talwandi Musekhan village). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. The Pir of Sial Sharif (Shahpur). Sadat-i-Uzzam of Khanora Sharif (Jullundur District). Pir Sayyed Araf Hussain Sahib, Partap Pura (Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Mohammad Amir Badshah (Gujrat District). Faqir Sayyed Imdad Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra Sharif. Sayyed Fazal Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir Sayyed Yaqub Ali Shah, Majara Sharif. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Sharif, Sahotra (Find Dadan Khan Tahsil). Pir Mugarab Hassain Shah (Jullundur District). Sayyed Pir-ud-Din Daryai, Shandaula Sahib (Gujrat District). Pir Sayyed Haji Mohammad Yaqub Shah (Gujrat District). Sayyed Mohammad Hussain Qadri Ulkmari, Sajjada Nashin, Shergarh (Montgomery District). Chan Pir (son of the leading Sajjada Nashin, Montgomery District).

Rawalpindi Division Towns

Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sayed Mohammad Hussain (son of Pir Jamat Ali Shah). Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani (President, Jamiat-ul-Ulemari-Islam). Syed Sardar Hussain (Toba Tek Singh Tahsil). Zafar Ahmad Thanwi. Abdul Raoof. Mohammad Ibrahim Sialkoti. Pir Sahib Syal Sharif. Khawaja Ahmad Yar, Sajjada Nashin, Chora Sharif. The Sajjada Nashin, Dargah Bu-ali-Qalandar. Maulana Ghulam Mohammad, Sajjada Nashin, Karor (Leiah Tahsil). The Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Ghaunsia, Japuranwali. Chan Pir (son of Pir Jamat Ali Shah). Syed Mohammad Fazl Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Jalalpur Sharif. Maulana Razvi (all-India Ulema-i-Islam Conference). Pir Ghulam Abbas, Sajjada Nashin, Shergah. Pir of Sayal.

Toba Tek Singh

M. Muhammad Amir (son of Chogate Khan of Maghiana). Sayed Faqir Shah of Tolamba. M. Shakur Ahmad. M. Muhammad Ismail. M. Ghulam Raza Khan. Syed Muhammad Iqbal Hussain. The Pir of Sial Sharif. Pir Arif Hussain Shah. Hazrat Khawaja Mohammad Amir Badshah, Shora Sharif. Faqir Syed Imdad Ali Shah. Syed Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Pir Syed Yaqub Ali Shah. The Sajjada Nashin, Sambrial. Pir Walaiyat Ali Shah. Syed Pir Muhammad Hussain of Gurdaspur. Pir Mukarrab Hussain Shah of Jullundur. Syed Pir-ud-Din Daryai Shah (Gujrat District). Pir Sayed Muhammad Yaqub Shah of Gujrat. Sajjada Nashin, Jhamra. Pir Abdullah Shah. Khawaja Hafiz Sayed Badar-ud-Din. Imam Bakhsh Khan. Makhdum Nazar Hussain Shah. Sajjada Nashin of Quranga (Kabirwala Tahsil). Sayyed Ghulam Nabi Shah Gilani (Multan District). Sayyed Imam Shah of Multan. Sayyed Ahmad Shah of Rahim Shah (Multan District). Sayyed Nur Shah of Rahim Shah (Multan District). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sayyed Mohammad Hussain Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Shergarh. Hazrat Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani. Khan Abdul Ghafoor Khan Sahib (Leader, Ifghan Jirgha). Hafiz Zahur Ali Shah Sahib, Sajjada Nashin, Chura Sharif. Pir Hazrat Pir Mohammad Saddiq Azad, Sajjada Nashin, Gujranwala. Hazrat Haji Pir Sardar Ali Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Fatehpur. Hazrat Maulana Abdul Wafa Sanna Ullah Sahib (Amritsar District). Pir Makhdum

Mehr Hussain Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Karor Lal Isan. Hazrat Maulana Maulvi Mohammad Ibrahim Sahib (Sialkot District). Hazrat Maulana Maulvi Mohammad Abdul Hamid Sahib (Lahore District). Makhdum Hamid Mohammad Said Naubahar Shah Qibla, Darbar Uchh Shari!. Khawaja Aziz-ur-Rehman, Sajjada Nashin, Kot Abdul Khaliq. Hazrat Pir Abdul Hamid Sahib (Ludhiana District). Hazrat Sultan Mohammad Hassan Sahib, Sajjada Nashin, Sultan Bahu. Hazrat Sayyed Ghauns Shah (Gujranwala District). Hazrat Sayyed Altaf Hussain Sahib, Sajjada Nashin, Musa Khel. Hazrat Allama Ghulam Murshid Sahib (Lahore District). Makhdum Pir Sadar Din Shah, Qibla Gillani (Multan District). Hazrat Sajjadah Nashin Sahib (Shah Jewana Tahsil).

Dera Ghazi Khan South

Syed Jamiatali Shah. Syed Fazal Shah. Pir Nasir-ud-Din. Maulana Fazal Shah Sahib Qazi Baqravi. Sahibzada Mian Yusuf Shah, Taunsa Sharif. Pir Jamat Ali Shah. The Pir of Syal Shari!. Sadat-i-Uzzam, Khandwa Shari! (Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Amir Badshah, Chora Sharif (Gujrat District). Faqir Syed Ahmed Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra Sharif. Pir Syed Arif Hussain Sahib (Jullundur District). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Syed Fazal Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir Haji Syed Yakub Ali Shah, Majwa Sharif. The Sajjada Nashin, Sambarial. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Sharif (Find Dadan Khan Tahsil). Pir Mukarrab Hussain Shah Sahib (Jullundur District). Pir Syed Muhammad Hussain Sahib (Gurdaspur District). Hazrat Sahib Pir Nasir-ud-Din (Multan District). Hazrat Sahib-ul-Sair, Sajjada Nashin, Hajjpir Sharif. Sahibzada Mian Yusuf Shah, Taunsa Sharif. Pir Syed Nabhan Shah. Maulvi Abdul Karim. Syed Zain-ul-Abudin. Chan Pir (son of the leading Sajjada Nashin, Montgomery District).

Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Pt. III, 21 June 1946, pp. 293-296; 26 June 1946, pp. 325-342, 350-356; 5 July 1946, pp. 385-405, 407-417; 12 July 1946, pp. 431-439; 19 July 1946, pp. 473-484; 26 July 1946, pp. 512-520, 537-540, 548-561; 2 Aug. 1946, pp. 588-600; 9 Aug. 1946, pp. 615-618, 633-650; 16 Aug. 1946, pp. 703-708; 23 Aug. 1946, pp. 724-748; 6 Sept. 1946, pp. 802-813; 13 Sept. 1946, pp. 843-844, 856-857, 879-887; 26 March 1947, pp. 240-241; 18 April 1947, pp. 255-258. PGSL.

The style of names, titles, and localities have been reproduced as they appeared in the *Punjab Government Gazettes*, which on occasions has given rise to discrepancies.

APPENDIX Y.

Example of Election Poster Distributed by The Muslim League

RELIGION		WORLDLINESS
1	On one side Pakistan.	On the other side Kufirstan
2	On one side there is [the] auspicious personality of Mohammad (may the blessings of Allah be on his posterity) "and" Ali (may God be pleased with him).	On the other side are Baldev Singh and Khizar Hayat.
3	On one side the question is of organizing the people of the Kalima.	On the other side there is idol worship, brotherhood and [the] caste system.
4	On one side the Honour of the green flag.	On the other side there is the Government of the Khiziri Ministry.

(Translation)

Source: *Punjab Government Gazette*, Pt. III, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 589. PGSL.

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