

The Making of The Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy in An Anagram Polity 1947-1958

Shamsul Huda Harun



Khawaja Nazimuddin and H.S. Suhrawardy

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In Memory of
My adorable parents

ABBREVIATION

A.M.LJ/A.L	Awami Muslim League / Awami League.
A.P.P	Azad Pakistan party.
B.P.C.	Basic Principles Committee.
C.A.D.(Leg)	Constituent Assembly Debates (Legislature).
C.S.P.	Central Service of Pakistan.
C.P	Communist Party.
G.D.	Ganatantri Dal.
J.I.P.	Jamat-i-Islam Party.
K.S.P.	Krishak Sramik Party.
M.L.	Muslim League.
M.C.A.	Member Constituent Assembly.
M.N.A.	Member National Assembly.
M.P.	Member Parliament .
N.A.D.	National Assembly Debates.
N.I.P.	Nezam-i-Islam Party.
N.A.P	National Awami Party.
P.R.O.D.A.	Public Representatives Official Disqualification Act .
R.P	Republican Party.
S.C.F.	Scheduled Caste Federation
U.P.P.	United Progressive Party.
U.F.	United Front.
Y.L	Youth League.

PREFACE

I began this book with a sense of truism that Political leaders or Charismatic leaders are of paramount importance in the domain of particularly, embryonic polities where democratic institutions have not taken deeper root in the soil. These leaders provide the basic scaffoldings on which their countries may build up tomorrow's political development. For, the cardinal fact of politics has always been the quality of leaders and leadership emanating from the inexorable pressure of great and, sometimes baffling forces. Charisma of a leader lies, what Max Weber would say, in the perceptions of the people he leads.

Hossain Shahid Suhrawardy was one of those amazing leaders, who with consecrated energy rarely vouchsafed upon a mortal, endurance, steadfastness and commitment played, along with others, one of the crucial roles in the formation of a viable opposition party, i.e. the Awami Muslim League – later Awami League – to contain the monolithic and monopoly politics of 'Oligarchic' Muslim League in the former Pakistan and to give 'democracy a chance to function'. In the process of fighting democracy's battle Suhrawardy scored substantial victories at the operational level of the Westminster system of government. Suhrawardy with his splendid record of political struggles, courage and resilience was raised to power 'through the sheer force of democratic pressure and 'not by the dark hand of patronage'. It was an extraordinary democratic fit of elevation from the base up. Suhrawardy handed down to Bangladesh a rich legacy of ideals – ideals of democracy, tradition of struggle and love for the people. He lived for his people, fought for democracy, rule of law, constitutionalism and breathed his last elevating himself like a Greek tragic hero in epic proportion.

However, the book is an attempt to portray only a part – though a very significant one of a vast remarkable career that unfolded over the canvass of two periods, British and Pakistan. One of the purposes of this book was to study political processes putting Suhrawardy on the in-put side of political development. Also an attempt was made to analyze, describe, classify and explain political issues and activities and the values which were given effect to by political decisions. I tried to discern meaning of the disposition, dejection, slipperiness, joy, mood of the time and the stresses of the leader who sought to lead the country.

Relevantly, I have reproduced some chapters from my earlier book Parliamentary Behavior in a Multi-National State, Bangladesh Experience with some renovation as they naturally fitted into the core of the theme. Similarly, I have also used a portion of the primary sources quoted earlier in the book. In view of the growing bulk of the book only a few facsimiles are being appended. However, a book of this nature owes a good deal to the previous studies, not exactly in the present form, of many others and to the

piercing observations of so many practitioners of government and politics. It would be difficult to cite every one by name. I owe general acknowledgement to all by whom I have been befriended. After all, a book is, what in the words of Proust, "a great cemetery" where the "half-effaced names on the graves" cannot be intelligible. Nevertheless, I express my appreciation to those well-wishers who both prompted and inspired me at various stages in the process of writing this book, in respect of advice, suggestion and stimulating comment. Noticeably, Professor Borhanuddin Khan Jahangir did the pruning, checking the fairly long manuscript and helped me to clarify my views. I sincerely hope that those who have rendered succour to me are already aware how indebted I am to them. I would only like to mention few names who featured in my mind very prominently – National Professor Kabir Chowdhury, Professor Salahuddin Ahmed, Professor A. K. Azad Chowdhury and last but not least Professor Harun-ur-Rashid.

The book owes much to the initiative and vision of Professor Muntassir Mamoon whose constant insistence and persuasion have enabled me to accomplish this work. I am deeply indebted to him. I thank my comrades of the press, particularly Ahmed Mahfuzul Haq for facilitating typescript for printing. I should also like to express my deep gratitude to the The Institute of Liberation Bangabandhu and Bangladesh Studies, National University for the publication of the book. Eventually, I owe much to my wife, Shahzadi, who has always been a fountain of inspiration for me. I have also derived incentive from my grand children – Partha and Prateem – representatives of my posterity, who with frolicsome mood loitered around me while the book was in progress.

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CHRYSLIS STAGE

Pakistan started her life with an improvised capital city, with administrative services highly disorganized by the exodus of Hindu officials and some Britons, and with acute economic crisis caused by the Punjab and Bengal communal explosion and the flight of nearly all moneylenders and merchants through whom commerce had been carried on. It has been emphasized that "since the State is in modern times the most significant form of organization of men and embodies the greatest concentration of powers,... there should have been, and should still be, a great and revolutionary struggle to secure a coincidence between State and nation".¹ However, any unkind attempt to assess whether Pakistan in fact qualified automatically as a nation-state might have seemed to the M. L. leaders a political blasphemy, in 1947. But the fact remained that 'Pakistan' as a concept of Muslim nationhood under the M. L. leadership with Jinnah at the apex brought unity of action among its adherents to create it; but it did not bring unity of mind to define it. In juristic parlance it was understandable that Pakistan was to be made a haven for Muslims. But as soon as it was established, its general configuration offered a different picture. Pakistan was achieved, but Pakistanis had to be groomed. Pakistan, for which the M.L. had struggled so fiercely, came into being with an air of suddenness that startled its followers, alarmed its friends and made others sure of its early breakdown. If its survival was miraculous, its working as a government was nearly astonishing. There was a state of pell mell rush into the new state. Pakistan came into being as little more than a vision. When Pakistan was still just a bargaining ideal in the brain of the late Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and a "flame into the hearts of his followers of the M.L.", almost no one else in India or the outside world thought of Jinnah's pet project as anything more than a preposterous suggestion. How, they asked, could you have a workable state divided in two by more than a thousand miles of foreign country? Wrenched out of the Indian economy, how could Pakistan survive on its own?² There lay Pakistan in a welter of ideology, religion, language and regionalism a national dissension which might be termed in Platonic language as a "greater evil".³ These national cleavages on basic issues had to be integrated into one unified polity; for, the Parliamentary government "to be effective depends not merely upon its methods; it depends also upon agreement upon the object to which those methods shall be devoted".⁴ It is appropriate to analyze the workings of Pakistan government, nay of all underdeveloped polities, in the light of British or Western experience. The health of a given government is nourished or atrophied largely according to what extent the political society itself is salubrious. In other words, to create a healthy political society a

¹ Rupert Emerson, *"From Empire to Nation"* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1966) p. 96.

² *New York Herald Tribune*, April 20, 1948.

³ Plato's Republic, Book V, quoted in *Problems of Parliamentary Government in Colonies*, ed. (Hansard Society, London, 1953), p. 39.

⁴ H. J. Laski, *Parliamentary Government in England*, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1950), p. 51.

county, above all, needs to have viable institutions of political, economic and social nature symbolic of peoples consensus or deference. Certainly, the nation-state concept was not automatically consummated in Pakistan with the dawn of independence; for she was yet to see federal strains and ideological angularities resolved into constitutional articles. The practical solution lay with the government interacting and maintaining a dialogue with the people. As a matter of fact, the early governmental activities of Pakistan were mainly clustered around those objects mentioned above. So, we propose to analyze the pattern of governance of Pakistan, the main emphasis of which will be laid on the gradual emergence of 'national consensus' or 'dissension' as had been revealed through the interactions of the government and the governed.

With the chime of 12 o'clock midnight on 15th August, 1947 Pakistan set out on her career as an independent Dominion. Section 8(2) of the Indian Independence Act laid down that the new Dominion "shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935 ... subject to ... omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications ..."⁵ The Independence Act and the India Act of 1935 would, therefore, act as provisional constitution pending drawing up of the permanent constitution by the Constituent Assembly. The executive authority of the Federal Government, in pursuance of the India Act, was vested in the Governor General, who was, also, to be assisted by a 'Council of Ministers'. There was no provision in the India Act requiring the Governor General to accept the advice of his ministers. But in 1948, a tribunal while trying a dismissed Chief Minister of a Province stated that 'aid and advice' of the Ministers as mentioned in the Sections 9 and 15 of the India Act were to bind the "Governor General and the Governor in Federal and Provincial affairs."⁶ The Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order gazetted in September 1947, unlike the Indian Constitution did away with those powers of the Governor General and the Governors which were to be exercised on grounds of "special responsibility", "individual judgment" and personal "discretion". But the Governor General was authorized to promulgate ordinances in cases of emergency. The order did not envisage giving powers to the Governors to assume responsibility in their provinces under Section 93 of the 1935 Act. But Section 51 was amended to give powers to the Governor General to ensure that Provincial Ministries did not exceed their powers. Some of the important posts, e.g. judges of the High Court, Governors of the Provinces, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, etc., were also to be filled by the Governor General. And interestingly the oath of allegiance required for the judges, legislators, etc., was to be sworn to the (provisional) Constitution not to the Crown. But the most important feature of the Order was its making the "Ministers in the Centre and Provinces ... absolutely responsible to the legislature".⁷ In short, the changes which were incorporated in the Indian Act, 1935, to meet the situation obtaining in Pakistan after

⁵ Quoted in G.W. Chowdhury, ed. *Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan*, (Dacca, 1967), p. 7.

⁶ *Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakistan, 1961* (Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi: 1962), p. 6.

⁷ *The Times*, September 3, 1947.

independence, resulted in the introduction of "a type of Government which was undoubtedly Parliamentary"⁸

However, despite a provision in the Independence Act that "the same person may be Governor General of both the new Dominions",⁹ Pakistan chose her founding father, Jinnah, as the first Governor General. Whether the appointment was politically sagacious or not was a matter of some controversy. However, many people were apparently disillusioned to find a constitutional jurist of Jinnah's persuasion playing the role of the Governor General under a parliamentary system. The Governor General in the person of Jinnah served three purposes. Firstly, he introduced in the Pakistan government what in the words of Bagehot might be "semi-filial feelings"¹⁰. This filial appeal of the Head of the State as father could be validated both through the manipulation of the body of myth and the cultural values and perceptions of the mass of the people. From time immemorial, the Kings always loomed larger than life in the folk-culture of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Even in ancient Hindu political thought kings were regarded as "Kalasya Karanam",¹¹ meaning that the king was the maker of the age. And to the Muslims of the subcontinent the memories of the 'Delhi Sultanate' were still fresh. Jinnah combined in himself this sacred symbol of the country's given folk-culture, and thus could elicit from the people deference, devotion and awe toward himself as the source of authority; for it was he who was apparently credited with the creation of Pakistan. So, the 'Charisma' associated with Jinnah for the Muslim renaissance rendered the office of the Governor General in Pakistan, unlike her equivalents in other commonwealth countries, into a mirror which might have reflected the peoples dormant atavistic sentiment for a Sultanate.¹²

The second purpose was supposedly to confer on Jinnah the prerogatives of a constitutional Head of State, i.e. "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn".¹³ But soon these constitutional rights degenerated into the *de facto* powers of the Governor General. Since the unity of pre-independence days could no longer survive the departure of the British, Jinnah wrapped in a mantle of charisma was the only 'prop' to national solidarity. He was still the president of the M. L. the party in power and was subsequently made the President of the Constituent Assembly, the constitution-making body and also the "sovereign body as the Federal legislature of Pakistan".¹⁴ He was dubbed by the Constituent Assembly in the face of opposition from Congress as the Quaid-e-Azam¹⁵ of Pakistan.¹⁶ From this vantage point Jinnah was able

⁸ *Loc. cit.*, Constitution Commission, p. 5.

⁹ Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁰ W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London: 1898), p. 4.

¹¹ "K.M. Panikkar, *The Ideas of Sovereignty and State in Indian Political Thought* (Bombay: 1963), p. 39.

¹² Institution of kingship in Muslim vocabulary.

¹³ Bagehot, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁴ *Statesman*, August 11, 1947.

¹⁵ The great leader.

to give leadership to the state which had to be constructed from its foundations. Given that territorial security is the *sine qua non* of Statehood, Jinnah preoccupied himself with the problems of the frontiers; for Pakistan inherited one of the World's most strategically important frontiers. He made a bold decision in withdrawing a Brigade of 4,700 troops with all its paraphernalia from the fortresses of tribal zones, in order to appease the frontier tribesmen, and eliminate suspicion in the brotherhood of Islam.¹⁷ A loose form of control in the Khyber, Markard, Baluchistan and Waziristan was followed by tribal pledges of full loyalty to the Pakistan government.¹⁸ A series of tribal assemblies comprising Ifridis, Mohamands, Waziris and Mahsuds were brought together for the first time. This was followed by the Governor General's 10-day tour of the N.W.F.P. scoring "more than a personal triumph".¹⁹ The same result was yielded through his attending the Royal Durbar at Sibi, Baluchistan.²⁰ His immense prestige and authority were responsible for separating Karachi from Sindh to make it the Federal Capital of Pakistan, through a fiat called the Pakistan (Establishment of the Federal Capital). The N.W.F.P. Ministry which was still not owing allegiance to Pakistan was dismissed by Jinnah in August 1947, as was the Ministry of Sindh on grounds of corruption in early 1948. In short, Jinnah became the supreme "arbitrator"²¹ in Pakistan affairs, and some of his pre-emptive decisions on issues obviously served the nation well in some ways in the avoidance of early embroilment in conflicts. Still, some of his actions were not nourishing for Parliamentary institutions.

The third purpose was served in a negative way in that the political process began at the wrong end. For political power, to the detriment of the Parliamentary system, automatically gravitated towards the office of the Governor General – the titular head of the state. If we postulate as a hypothesis that either Gandhi or Nehru had become the first Governor General of the new Dominion i.e. India, there would have occurred at once an untoward movement of power in the wrong direction, whether they liked it or not; for, the very stature of their personalities would become a liability to the office. But this did not take place in India. She was lucky to have Lord Mountbatten as her first Governor General who, while behaving properly as constitutional head, let the office of the Prime Minister grow in stature. (Relevantly, *Bangabandhu* took a leaf from the book of the past in that he chose to become the Prime Minister of independent Bangladesh. The author was aware of the benign pressure that was building up to make *Bangabandhu* the first President of the newly emerged sovereign state. But the

¹⁶ See, *C.A.D.*, Vol. I, August 12, 1947, p. 33. The Prime Minister expressed in the House that people were addressing Jinnah as "Badshah (King) of Pakistan...", *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁷ The tribal people were all Muslims.

¹⁸ *Scotsman*, December 18, 1947. Sir G. Cunningham, the then Governor of the N.W.F.P. was a great help to Mr. Jinnah.

¹⁹ *Times*, April 15, 1948.

²⁰ *Manchester Guardian*, February 15, 1948. (Former British Baluchistan. Also, was the exclusive subject of the Viceroy.)

²¹ *Times*, April 25, 1948.

charismatic leader, *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, made a historic decision in declining the titular post and ensured parliamentarianism to flow in the right direction.)

Jinnah would have still wielded the same powers as the Prime Minister of Pakistan as he did as the Governor General, provided he could bring about a balance between the form and essence of the parliamentary system. But he slithered on this vital issue. His holding of portfolios,²² presiding over Cabinet meetings and becoming the Chairman of the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet were not in the Parliamentary tradition. True, some of Jinnah's actions might not be scrupulously constitutional. But prudence stood him in good stead where strict constitutional adherence might not have done. On the dismissal of the Congress Ministry from the N.W.F.P. The Statesman editorialized that "on the methods employed to eject them there will doubtless be lively controversy. But those handling the problem had to take more than technicalities into account..."²³ Similarly, his separating Karachi from Sindh was debated and passed by the Constituent Assembly.²⁴ On one occasion Jinnah withheld his assent²⁵ to a Provincial Ordinance; for, to him it amounted to bypassing the legislature.²⁶ The reason for mentioning these examples is to show that Jinnah also had a sense of constitutional restraint. But the main crux of the issue was that his activities as the Quaid-e-Azam of Pakistan flowed down from the office of the Governor General instead of from the Cabinet responsible to the legislature. Perhaps, all his omissions and commissions might have been rationalized by Pakistan political ethics had he been able to bequeath to the nation viable political institutions imbued with general consensus. Instead, however, he died in harness disillusioned, perhaps, unheeded and neglected.

This last point needs a little elucidation. Jinnah's 'charisma' had functional and operational value up to a point, i.e. the carving out of Pakistan from the subcontinent. And the 'charisma' to continue required readjustments to the new values which crept into the body politic of the new state; for, after all leadership is situational not eternal. On this premise, there is evidence, contrary to widespread belief, that there was 'something rotten in the State of Denmark'. Jinnah was not as omnipotent as he appeared to be. The Governor General's order separating Karachi from Sindh was followed by the Sindh M.L. Council's deploring the move. The Council called upon the Sindhi Ministers and members of the Constituent Assembly to resign and seek re-election on the issue of Karachi.²⁷ His choice of Premiership in Sindh which "puzzled

²² Frontier States, tribal areas, Baluchistan, Kashmir, etc. were his exclusive subjects.

²³ Statesman, August 25, 1947. "...apparently a week elapsed without the Ministers taking an oath of allegiance to the new State, and on independence day they conspicuously absented themselves from the flag hoisting ceremony in Peshawar ... positive proof of disloyalty..." See, the same issue.

²⁴ See C.A.D., Vol. III, May 22, 1948.

²⁵ Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. told the writer that despite his request Jinnah refused to suggest names of Ministers to his Cabinet.

²⁶ K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan, the Formative Phase* (Karachi: 1960), p. 265.

²⁷ Statesman, June 11, 1948.

everyone including his own followers,²⁸ was sidetracked. His upholding of Urdu as the sole state language of Pakistan in Dacca public meeting did not go unchallenged,²⁹ and on the occasion of his official birthday there were adverse comments on the expense of the illuminations when 400 refugees died of cold and exposure in Lahore Walton Camp.³⁰ Initially Jinnah was opposed to the building of a high wall around the Government House where he lived because he was "with" his "people", but in early 1948 he asked his military secretary, Col. Birnie to "start building" the wall "immediately".³¹ Dr. Chowdhury's judgment that party leadership was separated from government leadership only after Jinnah's death and so long he was alive "he was the final authority... in the party",³² is inaccurate. In fact, Jinnah resigned from the M.L. as its President following a decision of the party in March 1948; a decision which provoked a comment "that Jinnah is no longer the dictator that he was when Pakistan was founded".³³ A sense of resignation overtook Jinnah when he confessed to his doctor at Ziarat, a month before his death that he had "wanted to live. Now, it does not matter whether I live or die."³⁴

However, having cited these instances we wish to suggest that though Jinnah as the Governor General appeared to be at the zenith of his power, nevertheless his leadership was in practice vulnerable since many of his utterances on vital issues tended to be enigmatic, presumably for fear of being resisted.³⁵ Perhaps no Pakistanis could openly say that their Quaid at any time was subjected to severe challenges by his people, but one may well bear in mind, that people of this part of the world have a knack of first loving, then worshipping and finally assassinating their leaders. The net result of Jinnah's 13-month Governor Generalship was that he gave the country a 'glacial stability, consolidating tempo and a continuity of purpose, but failed in the correct institutionalization process, i.e. the establishment of consensus based socio-politico and economic institutions.

²⁸ *Manchester Guardian*, May 3, 1948.

²⁹ There were murmurs of protest in that meeting. Years later the writer was told by Mr. Youssouf Ali Chowdhury, the then General Secretary of East Pakistan M.L. that Jinnah, according to his suggestion, had to send Mohammad Ali, one of the agitators of Bengali language movement, to Burma as ambassador, to contain the movement.

³⁰ *Statesman*, January 8, 1948.

³¹ H. Bolitho, *Jinnah* (London: 1954), p. 210.

³² G.W. Chowdhury, *Democracy in Pakistan*, (Dacca: 1963), p. 43.

³³ "*Saturday Evening Post*" quoted in K.L. Gauba, *Inside Pakistan* (Delhi: 1948), p. 318. See also, Z.A. Suleri, *Politicians and Ayub*, (Lahore: 1964), p. 21.

³⁴ Bolitho, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

³⁵ Raja of Mahmoodabad, one of the closest associates of Jinnah and one-time prominent member of central executive committee of all - India M.L., told the writer that Jinnah had said to him in early 1948 that he was "surrounded by traitors" in Pakistan.

POST-NATAL CARE

Cabinet Government began to emerge after the death of Jinnah on September 11, 1948. Sir Nazimaddin who was then the Premier of East Pakistan became the new Governor General—a sop to East Pakistanis. Though there was no mention of the term Cabinet in the Constitution Act³⁶ it was but natural that the Pakistan government was to be fashioned after the British system since the politicians were most familiar with that pattern. At the outset the members of the Cabinet were the holdovers of the early M.L. nominees who had worked in the composite government of undivided India. Apparently, the Cabinet gave an impression of unobtrusiveness and remoteness, not because what it was doing but in its personnel. The Prime Minister apart, the Cabinet was composed partly of former outstanding civilian administrators and league politician of whom only one³⁷ could be described as having significant popular contacts. This feature could only create among those Muslim Leaguers who could not 'get in', a sense of jealousy.

Now that the political process assumed an appearance of parliamentarianism, Liaquat Ali Khan³⁸ "who was to Jinnah what Sir John Anderson was to Winston Churchill"³⁹ broadened the representativeness of his Cabinet by increasing the numbers of Ministers up to 14⁴⁰ of whom 10 had Cabinet rank.⁴¹ That a movement towards genuine parliamentary practice had begun was evident when a government press note was couched in parliamentary language viz. "on the advice of the Prime Minister, His Excellency is pleased to appoint", etc., etc.⁴² A Cabinet Secretariat was formed to prepare the agenda and circulate memoranda on the subjects to be discussed in the Cabinet. The Memoranda, though was prepared by the Ministry concerned, were subject to consultation as required with other Ministries. The general pattern followed was in keeping with the British. Because of the small size of the Pakistan Cabinet, there was no formal "inner Cabinet". To deal with "various specialized subjects", special Cabinet Committees were appointed but, ultimately their reports "were considered by the whole Cabinet". The Ministers of State, though not formally members of the Cabinet were entitled to sit in the Cabinet.⁴³ Bold leadership in respect of administration and

³⁶ The Pakistan Provisional Constitution.

³⁷ Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.

³⁸ The Prime Minister. Earlier, he was eclipsed by the personality of the Quaid-i-Azam.

³⁹ *Times*, September 19, 1948.

⁴⁰ Four were Ministers of State.

⁴¹ *Statesman*, April 23, 1951.

⁴² Pakistan Acts, September 22, 1948, quoted in Masud Ahmed Khan, *The Failure of Parliamentary System of Government in Pakistan with special reference to the Governor General and the President* (Dissertation for the Degree of M.A.), Manchester University, 1965, p. 36.

⁴³ Information based on letter written to the writer by a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, dated 3.12.68. See Appendix, I.

legislation anticipates a corporate cohesion in the Cabinet which in turn depends largely on the potency of the Prime Minister the king-pin of Cabinet government. Liaquat Ali⁴⁴ measured up fairly significantly in his conduct with the Cabinet, parliament and people. His was the great advantage arising from his non-identification with any particular province, but ironically this was his disadvantage, as well. For, he had to accommodate to the demands of provincial politicians, in order to stay in power. He was very much involved in gerrymandering the electoral districts of Karachi, so that he could be safely returned by the refugees in elections, when they were properly rehabilitated.⁴⁵ Two developments, however, strengthened the Prime Minister's hold on the country's politics. First, historically, the subcontinent had been subject to strong executive role. This was still so in Pakistan, since the central government had to deal with problems like refugee, Kashmir, her administrative set-up, the organization of the army, finance, etc., etc., that came up in the wake of independence. Added to it the physical remoteness of the two geographical halves of Pakistan, i.e. East and West Pakistan. The central government was prone to undertake action that had boomerang effect. This distance also reduced the parliament into an *ex post facto* ratifying machine. Furthermore, to mobilize the scarce resources of the country for economic development and the creation of social over-head capital on which political development also depended central executive initiative was imperative; for, the positions of the economically backward countries "decree that Government must generally play an extremely important role".⁴⁶

Second, Mr. Liaquat Ali took the rein of the Presidency of the M.L., the party in power having set aside by an amendment, the former rules which prohibited Ministers from holding ranks in the party. He was also made the Chairman of the M.L. parliamentary party. Now, with a strong executive base and the party caucus behind him, the Prime Minister was well poised to lead the country. This prompted H.S. Suhrawardy the founder president of the All Pakistan Awami Muslim League—the formative opposition party—saying that Pakistan was fast becoming a totalitarian state where a political party, the Ministry, the government and the state were identified with one another. He feared that the Prime Minister assumed leadership of the party to stifle criticism within the party as well as outside it.⁴⁷

At this juncture the author relevantly refers to the name of H.S. Suhrawardy. Who were the possible successors after the demise of Md. Ali Jinnah, the architect of Pakistan? The choice certainly fell on Liaquat Ali Khan. But then there were other eminent

⁴⁴ He basked under the sunshine of Jinnah's popularity for a long time. He was the General Secretary of the All-India M.L., representative in the United Province Legislative Council from 1926 to 1940, member, India Central Legislature in 1940 and deputy leader of the M.L. party there in 1943. His budget, during the period of interim government of undivided India in 1947, known as "a poor man's budget", extorted grudging admiration even from Congress members.

⁴⁵ This was revealed to the writer by the former Premier of the N.W.F.P.. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan.

⁴⁶ W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: 1960). p .25.

⁴⁷ See *The Hindu*, October 19, 1950.

personalities worth being considered. Among them the name of H.S. Suhrawardy, *inter alia*, featured prominently. The English Daily, *Dawn*, the Pravda of Pakistan, had once this to say, "Suhrawardy's contribution to the struggle for Pakistan was far greater than the combined contributions of all those who constitute the central government of today".⁴⁸ Suhrawardy, a man of higher intelligence, dominating, truculent and above all a 'touch politician' now fell upon the thorn of political life. For, he went into a period of steep political decline after the partition of Indian subcontinent and he was harshly opposed by Liaquat Ali Khan, the political successor to the Late Md. Ali Jinnah. After the independence, Suhrawardy, instead of going to Pakistan, toured Indian part of West Bengal with Mahatma Gandhi and tried to stop the bloody partition riot between the Hindus and Muslims. In the most trenchant language, Suhrawardy talked about Hindu-Muslim amity and tried to sell the idea of charter of minorities to both the countries, India and Pakistan. His political rivals accused him of not making up his mind whether he wanted to be a Pakistani or an Indian. But the fact remains, Suhrawardy was audacious enough to stay back on the eve of bloody partition, to look after the Muslim minorities. Hence, he was branded by his political foes as a pro-Indian traitor.⁴⁹

The height of Suhrawardy phobia of the ruling M.L. Junta could be well gauged in its attempt to bring about a contentious amendment in the Rules of Procedure of the Constituent Assembly evidently to disqualify Suhrawardy from its membership—an incident which had an import of great political significance. Promptly, a friend of Suhrawardy in East Pakistan transferred his property in Suhrawardy's name to meet the requirements of the Nationality law. But luck would have it, Suhrawardy "was prevented by *force majeure* from entering East Pakistan and settling there".⁵⁰ The irony had it, that scarcely had Suhrawardy publicly revealed that he would settle permanently in West Pakistan on and from the 5th March, 1949, than Liaquat Ali Khan terminated his membership by an adroit move in the Constituent Assembly on the 26th February, 1949 on the technical count that Suhrawardy was not a permanent resident of Pakistan. This was a highly tendentious move. Speaking on the amendment, Suhrawardy in an apparently sarcastic vein, observed that ... "it is not given to everyone in this life to be present at one's obsequies, or to participate in an oration at his own funeral".⁵¹

He urged the Constituent Assembly not to frame a citizenship rule while the populations were still in a state of flux and asked Pakistan government to turn its attention to drafting a charter of minority rights.⁵²

⁴⁸ *Dawn*, March 19, 1954, (Editorial) "The Awful majesty of the peoples' will."

⁴⁹ See *The New York Times*, December 6, 1963; *Scotsman*, November 19, 1947; *Sunday Times*, June 6, 1954.

⁵⁰ *Memoirs of Husyn Shahid Suhrawardy*, edited by Mohammed H.R. Talukder, (The University Press Limited), p. 53.

⁵¹ *C.A.D.*, Vol. III, May 18, 1948, p. 31. Also *Statesman*, May 18, 1948.

⁵² See *Dawn*, May 19, 1948.

As soon as Gandhi was slain Suhrawardy's stay in India become vulnerable. Besides, in 1949 Suhrawardy was served with a huge crippling tax bill by the Indian government. Having returned to Pakistan he comported himself as a political maverick. From now onward his was the *Herculean* task to build up an opposition party in juxtaposition to the M.L. party. He also made a statement urging that the M.L. be made into an organization of masses. His was the view that the growing volume of opinion in all parts of Pakistan was the desirability of making it a mass organization at once, instead of making it a party of oligarchs.⁵³ Although, Suhrawardy was now without any official position, but people at large, according to a foreign correspondent, thought a person of Suhrawardy's stature and competence would carry him one day into the leadership of the people of Pakistan one day.⁵⁴ He certainly was a potential challenge to the leaders of the M.L. This self-made role at this juncture was to create a Political scaffolding and a viable opposition political party in Pakistan.⁵⁵

Amid occasional vociferous voices of the opposition only H.S. Suhrawardy, who was to acclimatize himself politically in Pakistan, with his newly floated political party, could be taken seriously, as he poured in a broadside indictments at public meetings or through the press against the ruling coteries. Suhrawardy was of the opinion (like that of the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah) that the M.L. should not have outlived its utility, now that Pakistan was a reality. He implored upon Chowdhury Khalikuzzaman, the president of the M.L. to make the M.L. a mass organization and to open its doors to any citizen who wanted to become a member without making it a restrictive organization and packing it up with sheer ministerial group.⁵⁶

Suhrawardy showed a Promethean urge towards building up an opposition party as an alternative to the monolithic M.L. To this end, he stumped up and down the country tirelessly. He braved through between the *scilla* of Pakistan Security Act and *charybdis* of restrictive orders and ban on public meetings to pave the way for freedom of expression and democratic milieu. In short, he was chased—so were his party workers—by the government in both the wings of Pakistan.⁵⁷ In the obtaining situation power and patronage were ominously concentrated and buttressed by much authoritarian weapons as the public safety ordinances and control over the press.⁵⁸

Having presented Suhrawardy on the input side of Pakistan political development, we now revert back to earlier theme.

⁵³ *Dawn*, April 10, 1949.

⁵⁴ *Scotsman*, November 19, 1947.

⁵⁵ *Statesman*, August 13, 1949.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, April 10, 1949.

⁵⁷ See for details, *Statesman*, April 19, 1950; September 14, 1950, *The Hindu*, December 28, 1950; March 23, 1950; July 22, 1950; February 27, 1950; *Statesman*, December 24, 1951.

⁵⁸ See, *The Times*, September 12, 1950.

However, we will first evaluate Liaquat's leadership in the light of general governance, institution-building and nation-building, as well.

Liaquat Ali finally dispelled a long suspense by formally indicating the Principles on which the country's future constitution was to be framed, when he presented the *Objectives Resolution*⁵⁹ before the Constituent Assembly on 7th March, 1949. The resolution struck a non-secular tone in that it incorporated into it few clauses surcharged with religious sentiment. Talk of Islamism was in the air before and after the establishment of Pakistan awaiting an incisive articulation. The Congress members reasoned that "reason and faith" must "grow to its fullest maturity separately", failing which politics might result in "the deification of the State that the preamble implies". B.K. Datta thought that had this resolution been brought before the Constituent Assembly "within the lifetime of the great creator of Pakistan, the *Quaid-e-Azam*, it would not have come in its present shape".⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, Jinnah while addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947 had categorically stated that "we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state (loud applause). We should keep that in front of us as our ideal that in the course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense but in the political sense as citizens of the nation (Loud Applause)".⁶¹ To the minorities this statement was a *Magna Carta*. The government spokesman, on the other hand, maintained that *Quaid-e-Azam* had given pledges to the minorities but that *Quaid-e-Azam* had also given pledges to the majority.⁶² In the quest for national consensus the name of the departed leader⁶³ was to be quoted invariably by the differing groups as a matter of ritual.

Being aware of the minority sensibilities Liaquat argued on the resolution by maintaining that "In the technical sense, theocracy has come to mean a government ordained by priests ... such an idea is entirely foreign to Islam when we use the word 'democracy in the Islamic sense, it pervades all aspects of our life. It relates to our system of Government, to our society with equal validity, because one of the greatest

⁵⁹ See *C.A.D.*, Vol. V. March, 7, 1949, pp.1-2.

⁶⁰ *C.A.D.*, Vol. V, March 8, 1949, pp. 14-15.

⁶¹ *Statesman*, August 12, 1947.

⁶² *C.A.D.*, Vol. V, March 10, 1949, p. 62.

⁶³ Mr. Jinnah when he died left behind him an aura of paradoxical speeches relating to the role of Islam in Pakistan polity. At Karachi Bar Association he said, "Islamic Principles ... are as applicable to life today as they were 1,300 years ago". At Chittagong Public Meeting: "... Pakistan should be based on sure foundations of social justice and Islamic Socialism - not other ism." At the opening ceremony of the State bank of Pakistan: "... an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice". See, *Statesman*, January 25, 1948; *Ibid.*, March, 27, 1949, and *Dawn*, August 28, 1948. But the vital point was that he spoke on the broad principles of Islam. No less a person than Shree Prakasha, the first Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan convinced himself, having studied the speech delivered by Jinnah on August 31, 1947 that nowhere in the speech had the word "Islamic State" occurred, though the word "Muslim State" was there. See, Shree Prakasha, *Pakistan: Birth and early Days* (Meerat: 1965). p. 58.

contributions of Islam has been the idea of the equality of all men."⁶⁴ On another occasion the Prime Minister maintained that the sacred mission for which Pakistan was created was to convince the afflicted world through a pragmatic way that this Islamic via media between the two conflicting courses of communism and capitalism, could alone save it from catastrophic annihilation.⁶⁵ The debate, however, continued for five days during which two potential socialists, who were still members of the government party lent support to a congressite argument that the main battle in time would be "between Hindu have-nots and Muslim have-nots on the one hand and Muslim and Hindu upper classes on the other".⁶⁶ When the Resolution was passed and a committee (usually known as B.P.C.) appointed to report on the future constitution based on the *objectives resolution*, the Congress members did not appear to be very hostile at that point of time.

The next step towards the making of the constitution took place on 28th September, 1950, when the B.P.C. submitted its interim report to the Constituent Assembly. The report sparked controversies. It offended the *Ulema* as the Islamic controls in the Report fell short of their expectations aroused earlier in the Objectives Resolution.⁶⁷ But the main onslaught came from East Pakistan. She thought the Report envisaged a strong unitary government and if its principles were adopted the position of East Pakistan would be reduced "into a colony of Pakistan".⁶⁸ Under the vanguard of the East Pakistan A.M.L. party a Central Committee of Democratic Federation comprising all shades of opinion (which included also disenchanted Muslim leaguers) was formed to draw up alternative basic Principles for the Constitution of Pakistan. It climaxed in the observance of 'Protest Day' throughout the Province with the Communist Party, on the one hand, discovering in the B.P.C. Report features of "exploitation by the Zamindars and the capitalists" and the Prime Minister's immediate issuance of a warning against "these activities",⁶⁹ on the other. Eventually the Prime Minister dashed to East Pakistan and received deputations of A.M.L. and Central Committee of Democratic Federation.⁷⁰ What really angered the East Pakistanis were the inclusion of subjects in the Federal list that could have been left to the Province, the failure to ensure representation in the federal legislatures on the basis of population and last but not least the imposition of Urdu as the only state language instead of both the main languages, e.g. Urdu and

⁶⁴ *C.A.D.*, Vol. V, March, 1949, p.3. Mr. Liaquat having been brought up in the cultural milieu of Lucknow (now in India) had some Islamic obsessions. M.A.H. Ispahani, a prominent Pakistan diplomat politician told the writer that he had warned while dining together to be aloof from Ulema (religious people). In reply he said that he could not eschew Ulema since they were a help to the creation of Pakistan, but he thought that he would be able to contain Ulemacracy. Liaquat, in short, was an Islamic Hamlet agonized in the ambivalent attempt to reconcile his deep spiritual urge with that of western tradition in which he was educated.

⁶⁵ See *Statesman*, February 7, 1950.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, March 10, 1949, p. 54.

⁶⁷ *C.A.D.*, Vol. VIII, November 21, 1950, p. 184.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁶⁹ *Dawn*, October 30, 1950.

⁷⁰ *Hindu*, December 27, 1950.

Bengali.⁷¹ Criticizing the B.P.C. report, the Democratic Action Committee, maintained that it had ignored the Lahore Resolution of the M.L. and an all powerful centre was proposed and the provinces were relegated to the position of Municipalities. The committee spokesmen namely Aaur Rahman Khan and Kamruddin Ahmed, had this to say in respect of the B.P.C. report vis-à-vis East Bengal: "Her language, her population and her mental set-up make her a complete separate unit from the rest of Pakistan and, as such, East Bengal cannot be treated as a mere province like any other."⁷² Admittedly, the division of the sub-continent took place completely on religious lines the full-blooded slogan of Pakistan movement. No other logic was considered in truncating India. No tangible methods were reckoned with to maintain geographic contiguity. As a natural corollary, Pakistan crystallized as a bifurcate nation. Virtually, there were two Pakistans—East and West separated from each other by a thousand miles of *territory* comprising India. Liaquat succumbed to the adverse protest and postponed considering the report to enable the B.P.C. to consider any "definite suggestions that may be sent by the people with regard to the basic principles of the constitution".⁷³ Meanwhile he had the interim report of the Committee on Fundamental Rights of the citizens of Pakistan and on matters relating to minorities passed on October 6, 1950 with the concurrence of the opposition.⁷⁴

Turning to other issues the Liaquat Cabinet had had a tough test, *inter alia*, in its financial policy. When India devalued her currency in 1949⁷⁵ Pakistan did not follow suit. Whether this 'non-devaluation' decision was unanimous had never been revealed. But the rumor had it that it was not, and moreover, the Finance Minister stated in London prior to the meeting of the I.M.F. that this issue should be examined "in a detached scientific manner" devoid of "sentiments of prestige and politics",⁷⁶ which was probably meant to help to prepare the public for devaluation of Pakistan's currency. But whatever his mental reservations the Finance Minister did not let this interfere with his sense of collective responsibility of the Cabinet due to the Parliament; for, he always defended the non-devaluation policy in the House.⁷⁷ Of course, the Finance Minister of East Pakistan, the area which was hit the hardest appeared to be in disagreement with 'the non-devaluation' policy of the Central Government and ultimately resigned saying in the provincial legislature that he left the government "disillusioned".⁷⁸ Dissensions on issues among colleagues in à Cabinet under a Federal Political System⁷⁹ have always

⁷¹ See Interim Report, Clause 30(1) (2); Annexure III and Clause 120 as printed in *C.A.D.*, Vol. III, September 28, 1950, pp. 12-57.

⁷² *Statesman*, November 5, 1950.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, & November 6, 21, 1950, p. 181.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII & October 3, 6, 1950, p. 162.

⁷⁵ Britain did the same.

⁷⁶ *Times*, September 6, 1950.

⁷⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, March 13, 1950.

⁷⁸ *Statesman*, December 5, 1949.

⁷⁹ The anti-labour Cabinets of Australia during 1939-41 were anything but united. See: L.F. Crisp, *The Parliamentary Government of Australia*, (London: 1949), p. 208.

been, after all, an occupational hazard. But on this particular issue Liaquat had the backing of the entire Cabinet and could say boldly "that the present value of our rupee is the right value. We see no reason for altering it."⁸⁰

But the aftermath of this policy was, however, both positive and negative. It was positive in the sense that the Pakistan government had to look for alternative sources, e.g. the U.K., France and Poland, for coal supplies when they were stopped by the Indian Government as a retaliation against the Pakistan policy of non-devaluation.⁸¹ Pakistan entered into trade pacts with Japan, West Germany and Czechoslovakia for processing her jute without sending it to India.⁸² Finally, it might have been the hope of the Central government to solve the problem of East Pakistan jute by establishing jute mills from the foreign exchange as obtained from the export of raw materials supported by non-devaluation policy. In fact, the biggest jute mill in Asia was set up in East Pakistan, i.e. The Adamjee Jute Mill.

From the negative angle, the developments were uneconomic in that there was a danger of jute prices rising to a level when the buyers might look for a synthetic substitute—a potential threat to the Jute trade. After all, India was Pakistan's natural customer for Jute. Though the Central government itself entered into the jute market as a buyer, having fixed a minimum price for the jute, this proved to be inadequate in the face of India's total refusal to buy jute so long as the Pakistan currency remained undervalued. As a result East Pakistan was "in a state of siege",⁸³ providing ammunition for attacks by the opposition. Meanwhile Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in India (Calcutta) and the same occurred in East Pakistan in February 1950. Causes were, as usual, ascribed to the fanatic utterances of the Communalists, but the fact remained that India's ban on the import of Pakistan jute also caused huge unemployment in the communist stronghold of Calcutta, India's main centre of jute trade. A subtle communist hand in the riots was a strong possibility. The riots, however, brought the two countries "within a hair breadth of war".⁸⁴ Amid murmurs of war cry, Liaquat undertook an audacious journey to India and signed a pact (known as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact with the Indian Prime Minister on 8th April, 1950 to solve inter-Dominion problems.⁸⁵ Soon agitation petered out.

Having so achieved a stature of statesmanship he immediately responded to an invitation of President Truman,⁸⁶ and visited the United States⁸⁷ and also Canada to

⁸⁰ *Financial Times*, September 11, 1950.

⁸¹ *Pakistan News*, January 27, 1950. See: Hindu, November 15, 1949.

⁸² *Scotsman*, February 7, 1950.

⁸³ Richard Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan", *Far Eastern Survey*, Volume 28 (April, 1959), p. 50.

⁸⁴ Ian Stephens, *Horned Moon* (London: 1953), p. 53.

⁸⁵ *Dawn*, April 9, 1950.

⁸⁶ The Soviet Russia had earlier invited him for a State Visit. He was officially not committed to either of the invitations for a long time.

⁸⁷ April, 1950.

project Pakistan's image, and of himself, on an international stage. The visit resulted, among others in Pakistan getting \$600,000 under Truman's Point Four Programme.⁸⁸ The recent point four agreements between the United States and Pakistan fetched dollar aid to India and Pakistan on a *pro rata* basis. Pakistan rather felt as though they were treated as junior partners. This feeling was not, however, cushioned by what the Pakistan government thought to be the United Nations Security Council's relinquishment from duty in not compelling India to disarm in Kashmir.⁸⁹ The Pakistan Government was very obsessed, from the very beginning with the Kashmir⁹⁰ problem. It steered a cautious foreign policy without being committed itself formally to any bloc, to gain international support for Kashmir Cause.⁹¹ Embittered on the Kashmir issue Liaquat once threatened that "Pakistan must not be taken for granted: Pakistan is not a camp-follower of the Commonwealth."⁹² But beneath the apparent neutrality of foreign policy Liaquat sought to forge closer relations with the Muslim world. For he thought that "If the Western democracies can enter into pacts ... if the Communist countries can form a bloc ... why cannot the Muslim people get together ... they have an ideology and a way of life."⁹³ This sentiment found eloquent expression in the support Pakistan held out to all and sundry Muslim causes.⁹⁴ But none of this solved the Kashmir issue. Meanwhile Sir Owen Dixon mediator of the Kashmir dispute – announced his failure to bring India and Pakistan together only to be followed, later on, by India's massing of troops on Pakistan borders. Suddenly, on the 9th March, 1951 there was a bolt from the blue. The Prime Minister unearthed a conspiracy (known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy) which plotted to shoot him, seize the Governor General and finally establish "a communist dictatorship"⁹⁵ in the country. (Noticeably, this took place on the eve of the Punjab provincial election). The conspirators included, among others, the Sandhurst-trained Pakistan Chief of the General Staff, General Akbar Khan (who won the D.S.O. during the Burma Campaign in the Second World War), Brigadier Latif (who won M.C. in the Second World War) and Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a poet, the then editor of the Pakistan leftist newspaper, the *Pakistan Times*. He was awarded the O.B.E. during the last war while serving as a Lieutenant-Colonel, and had since been awarded a Lenin Peace Medal. Prominent communist workers, progressive writers and journalists including the General Secretary of the Pakistan Communist Party, Sajjad Zahir and 10

⁸⁸ *New York Times*, December 12, 1950.

⁸⁹ See *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 23, 1952.

⁹⁰ Kashmir was one of the former major Princely States. Its ruler was a Hindu king, but a majority of the population was Muslim. Despite Pakistan's wishes, the king acceded his State to India. There began one of the world's most difficult problems. Both India and Pakistan had fought in a small scale during 1947-48, prior to the large scale war fought in Kashmir at the end of 1965. Kashmir is to India and Pakistan what Berlin, in a different way, had been to the West and Russia. The U.N. has yet to solve the Kashmir problem.

⁹¹ The government recognized Red China on 4th January, 1950.

⁹² The Round Table, Vol. XXIX, 1948-49, quoted in K. Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: 1957), p. 320.

⁹³ Aslam Siddique, *Pakistan Seeks Security* (Lahore: 1960), p. 95.

⁹⁴ Pakistan signed Treaty of Friendship with Iran on 18.2.50; Iraq on 26.2.50, Syria on 29.8.50; Turkey on 26.7.51 and Egypt on 28.8.51. See Chronology of Pakistan, 1947-57, (Karachi: 1957).

⁹⁵ The Round Table, Vol. XXIX, 1948-49, quoted in K. Callard, *Pakistan: A political Study* (London: 1957), p. 320.

more important army and air officers were also arrested, along with the ringleaders, to be tried secretly by a special tribunal consisting of three High Court judges.⁹⁶

The abortive coup brought the simmering discontents of a section of the people to the fore. An analysis of this reveals three distinct patterns of politics, e.g. personal ambition, regionalism and extreme patriotism, current in Pakistan. First, General Akbar probably aspired for the post of the C-in-C considering his previous record, plus his recent "exceptional" performances in the Joint Services Staff College in England.⁹⁷ In addition, he happened to be the son-in-law of an influential lady, Begum Shahnewaz, M.C.A. belonging to an equally powerful family of Bhagabanpura in the Punjab.⁹⁸ But General Ayub was preferred to General Akbar which might have aroused personal jealousy.

Secondly the pride of the Punjabis lay in their being, formerly, the backbone of the Army and administration in the British period. This fact also had a boomerang effect on them when Pakistan emerged. Psychologically they did not enjoy seeing key posts going to the "foreigners"⁹⁹ i.e. the migrants from the U.P now in India.

The third pattern probably smacked of diverse motivating forces. The *Times* drew an analogy between the attempted coup in Pakistan with that of the coup which took place in Syria in the same year, since in both cases the prominent soldiers and intellectuals appeared to be impatient with the existing government policies vis-à-vis certain issues, namely 'Kashmir' in the former case and in the latter "in the Levant over Greater Syria".¹⁰⁰ General Akbar in the mask of "General Tariq" fought with the help of tribal people in Kashmir during 1948 and was resentful of Liaquat's softer policy on Kashmir; for, to the General wars were not "always determined by statistics"¹⁰¹ Liaquat shunned extreme paths and submitted "all Pakistan's differences with India. in arbitration ... brought world opinion slowly but surely to the side of Pakistan in this dispute ... a magnificent achievement"¹⁰² This attitude certainly did not find favor with the people of Azad Kashmir's movement. Similarly, Liaquat scrupled to bring about any drastic change in the land tenure systems of Pakistan beyond speaking about its desirability.

⁹⁶ Aslam Siddique, *Pakistan Seeks Security* (Lahore: 1960), p. 95.

⁹⁷ *Scotsman*, March 13, 1951.

⁹⁸ The writer was told by General Mirza, the then Defence Secretary of Pakistan who conducted the prosecution and went into the secret documents, that General Akbar's wife wanted to be the Queen of Pakistan. True, there were thinly veiled rivalries for social prestige among Pakistan's two respected ladies, e.g. the wife of Liaquat and sister of Jinnah. To what extent prominent Pakistani ladies were able to inject feminine charm into politics is an unknown quantity. But the possibility of "Lady Macbeths" on Pakistan soil could not be ruled out altogether. The writer, however, wonders if General Mirza's charmingly imperious wife had any extra-conjugal influence on him.

⁹⁹ *Scotsman*, March 13, 1951.

¹⁰⁰ *Times*, March 15, 1951. The analogy, however, held on emotional grounds only. The claim to 'Kashmir' had, at least, a legal basis, whereas 'Greater syria' had none.

¹⁰¹ *Observer*, March 11, 1951.

¹⁰² *Economist*, October 27, 1951.

His feudal past¹⁰³ and present feudal associates in the rank and file of the M.L. Party halted any action to that end. Then the question of foreign policy and particularly of Pakistan's remaining within the British Commonwealth was controversial with at least a section of the people. To this group of people Pakistan's foreign policy was subservient to the western bloc and the undefined neutral policy of the Liaquat government was a camouflage. Sir Firoze, a prominent Pakistan member of the Constituent Assembly said in the Parliament that he was asked in America as to why the Pakistan press reacted coldly to Liaquat's accepting Truman's invitation and conversely hailed Stalin's invitation visit Russia, which was turned down.¹⁰⁴ Added to this, Liaquat supported the Western Korean policy contrary to "ninety-nine percent of Pakistan's newspapers"¹⁰⁵ views. And surprisingly a day before Faiz Ahmed Faiz's arrest, he published an editorial fiercely attacking the "bellicose and anti-peace policies of the Anglo-American bloc"¹⁰⁶ Likewise, the Prime Minister could not escape the accusation that this was an election maneuver to stifle the mounting democratic opposition to the Government of Liaquat Ali Khan. These indigenous causes were dovetailed into an abortive conspiracy. But its failure should not preclude us from making certain implications for Pakistan politics.

First, leftist elements were a factor from the very beginning in Pakistan politics. They were able to bring about an uneasy alliance with the disgruntled soldiers through indoctrination, as many shared a common belief in firm government. That the Pakistan leftists were not without the support of their fellow travelers both home and abroad could be ascertained by the amount of sympathy they received.¹⁰⁷

Second, Liaquat's insulation of the M.L. governments, both Central and provincial, from the criticism of opposition parties through restrictive policies, led the growth of dark politics. Unwise repressive measures on the part of the government always gave rise to formation of politics in curbs, not in straight lines. Political life in Pakistan could be likened to a torpid situation. It was in a chrysalis stage, for, a new Muslim League with a new set of programmes was yet to crystallize. The old M.L. having established Pakistan 'lived too much to the past to be virile for the 'future". Frankly, there was as yet in Pakistan no opposition in the ideological sense to the present regime. Political

¹⁰³ He was landlords' representative in the U.P. Legislative Council from 1926-40. During this period he even, went to England to represent landlords. See: The Straits Times, May 4, 1950.

¹⁰⁴ C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. II, January 19, 1950, p. 601.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, October 11, 1950, p. 484.

¹⁰⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, March 9, 1951.

¹⁰⁷ Thirteen political parties and cultural associations of Pakistan from India (All-India Trades Union Congress, All-India Students Federation, The Progressive Writers' Association, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, etc.); from Australia (Clerical and Metal Workers' the Berlin Youth Festival demanded an open trial. See: Daily Worker, dated 11.7.51 and 29.9.51. Also, the Chinese Peoples' Committee for World Peace and American Aggression, the All-China Federation of Literature and Arts Circles, Federation of Labour, Democratic Workers' Federation and the Asian and Australian Liaison bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions protested. See *New China News Agencies*, 26.9.51; 28.12.51.

conflict was more often than not a matter of personal faction and feud. Whereas in India an invigorating opposition party outside the Congress was already in existence. Meanwhile, a modicum of criticism of the Pakistan government's activities emanated ineffectually from the parliamentary opposition of the East Pakistan Congress party led by C.C. Chakravarty. Besides, a few Bengali inquisitive members, a couple of vigorous West Pakistani members of the parliament (Mian Iftikheruddin and Mian Abdul Bari) were critical of the government. But the real opposition was virtually a will-of-the-wisp. The political ineptness was not only in the parliament but also extant in the country. There had been one or two spurts caused by G.M. Syed and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. But they were immobilized and repressed into quietitude. The M.L. was suffering from deficiency devoid of resilience and fresh thought. Initiation left to the care of the Government and any kind of agitation and opposition was branded as anti-state activities or treachery. From the very inception, the leaders of the M.L. the party in power psychologically thought Pakistan to be in a state of fragility and was threatened from all sides. Hence, the party was viewed synonymous with that of the state. The Prime Minister himself was on record saying that anybody criticizing the M.L. would be dealt with severely.¹⁰⁸

Third, the Pakistan Army, was on the verge of being politicized or indoctrinated, in the Middle Eastern style. Although, a few *prima donnas* of the Army could not frustrate the greater loyalty of the entire army which it still owed to the nation. But the fact remained, a military coup, however, abortive, was unearthed in that growth of interest in politics was demonstrated. This was ill-omened politically, for; according to a foreign critic, "two winds have stirred this situation a communist breath and soldierly ambitious puff".¹⁰⁹ The overriding military bias, significance, and importance could be gauged when Ghulam Mohammad, the Finance Minister, disclosed in the parliament that Pakistan would spend about half of her total revenue or \$533,000,000 for defense in 1951-52.¹¹⁰

However, an element of assassination was injected in the body politic of Pakistan on October 16, 1951, when during a Rawalpindi M.L. – sponsored public meeting Liaquat was slain.¹¹¹ To a great extent the incident epitomized the prevailing style of underdeveloped politics. Both Asia and Africa were in ferment (as they still are); and what happened in Pakistan had been paralleled in Siam, Burma, Palestine, The Yemen, Lebanon, Iran and Jordan.¹¹² The combination of the ultra nationalism, religious fanaticism, regional and personal ambitions and brooding hatreds for anything Western

¹⁰⁸ "Sher kuchal Denge", meaning the person criticizing the party will be beheaded. See Dawn, August 29, 1949.

¹⁰⁹ See Observer, Rawly Kno, March 11, 1951. "facts behind Pakistan Plot".

¹¹⁰ See *New York Times*, March 20, 1951.

¹¹¹ The assassin, perhaps conveniently, was torn to pieces on the spot.

¹¹² *Johannesburg Star*, October 17, 1951.

led to political assassination.¹¹³ And it was the *moderation* in Liaquat which was assassinated. In him Pakistan lost what Nehru characterized as a "great steadying influence"¹¹⁴ and The Times "one of the few statesmen".¹¹⁵ What is more, Suhrawardy who was always at daggers drawn with him politically, had to eulogize Nehru-Liaquat pact which was responsible for turning away both India and Pakistan from an imminent flash point and also envisaging Hindu-Muslim security across the Indian sub-continent.¹¹⁶

The Liaquat years were not barren. The view that he could not give a final touch to the institution-building when "the iron was hot to be struck into any shape",¹¹⁷ cannot be substantiated, for, if the hot iron of public opinion was really in this condition then the founder of the nation, Jinnah would have struck it first. Liaquat offered the Interim Report for public discussion—a step towards the formation of opinion. He flared for popular endorsement behind his policies—an urge he regularly fulfilled, in the absence of pervasive mass media, by speaking directly to the people in public meetings. He tried to consolidate his position first—the excess of which discouraged the growth of opposition—before he could carry the nation with him. For, after all, his eminence as the Prime Minister could aid him, like any other Prime Minister "up to a point and only up to a point".¹¹⁸ His Cabinet as an offshoot of parliament gave a good account of itself in the parliamentary tradition unimpeded by the Head of the State Sir Nazimuddin who was always in his element in the performance of titular duties. Cabinet government in a Federal Polity is often difficult, particularly when strong personalities enter into it. But the Liaquat Cabinet despite occasional bickering by the Press neither suffered any open split nor took any decisions by majority vote as alleged.¹¹⁹ A knowledgeable authority maintained that "the mode of arriving at a decision was one of discussion until a general consensus was reached. I do not remember a single occasion when it was necessary to take votes."¹²⁰

In the task of converting a stagnant economy into a dynamic one, the Liaquat government recognized the importance of planning. Financial institutions were created. Early in 1948 the government declared its industrial policy, reflecting its desire of owning enterprises like arms, hydro-electric power, railways, communications, industries, etc., and giving the rest to the care of private enterprise. Foreign capital was

¹¹³ Liaquat's assassin was identified as a member of the Khaksars movement - a nearer version of the Secret Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Its leader, Allama Mushriqui met Hitler during the 1920s. The German Military Attaché in London (1939) had full knowledge of this Khaksari movement in the Indian subcontinent. See: *Manchester Guardian*, October 17, 1951.

¹¹⁴ *New York Times*, October 17, 1951.

¹¹⁵ *Times*, October 17, 1951; editorial "Liaquat Ali Khan".

¹¹⁶ See *Hindu*, September 18, 1950.

¹¹⁷ Z.A. Suleri, *Politicians and Ayub* (Lahore: 1964), p. 26.

¹¹⁸ H. Morrison, *Government and Parliament* (Oxford: 1954), p. 38.

¹¹⁹ See: Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 336; Chowdhury, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹²⁰ Mohammed Ali's letter, *op.cit.*

welcome provided that in all major industries 51% of all share capital and 30% in lesser industries were owned by Pakistan nationals.¹²¹ A Development Board was established early in 1948 with the Economic Council under the Presidency of the Prime Minister at the apex to examine and correlate official and private schemes. The first plan was officially initiated in July 1951. To augment the development process further, the government set up a public corporation (P.I.D.C.) which provided industrial leadership and equity financing that resulted in the industries showing "encouraging" progress.¹²² But along with this went an emotional drive towards Islamization of Pakistan economies. To solve ideological problems vis-à-vis modern economies a research organization with economists versed in Islamic principles was envisaged by the Pakistan State Bank authorities.¹²³ The International Islamic Economic Conference consisting of 18 Muslim nations as held on 25th November, 1951 formed an International Federation of Islamic Chambers of Commerce and Industry to evolve a uniform Islamic economic pattern among the fraternizing countries.¹²⁴ The Islamic Economic Conference with the Islamistan project of Chowdhury Khaliquzzaman would be a prototype of Atlantic Pact embracing all countries of the Middle East from Pakistan to Turkey. Broadly speaking, the conference had two results, the formation of plan for augmenting the wealth of the Moslem countries and the expounding of certain ideals based on Islamic teachings.¹²⁵

The Liaquat period also saw a drive towards Pakistanization. By May 1951 full nationalization of the Pakistan Army was complete although not yet that of the Navy and Air Force.¹²⁶ The Gubernatorial posts of four provinces out of five held by Britons during Jinnah's time were replaced by the Pakistanis. In short, Liaquat's period was notable for his remarkable postnatal care to the nascent state, initiating institution-building, following moderate socio-economic and foreign policies, ostensibly Islamic and, finally, his being disdain for the opposition parties. Evidently, government considered opposition as disruption and opposition to the party in power was held equivalent to treachery to the nation.¹²⁷

¹²¹ *Observer*, April 9, 1948.

¹²² *Statesman*, February 6, 1951.

¹²³ *Financial Times*, January 22, 1950.

¹²⁴ *Pakistan Chronology*, op.cit., p. 51.

¹²⁵ *The New York Times*, March 20, 1951.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, May 2, 1951.

¹²⁷ See Suhrawardy's statement *Statesman*, December 7, 1951.

STATE AT CROSSROADS

Statesmen-politicians were a scarce commodity in Pakistan, particularly in the rank and file of the M.L. party after the demise of Jinnah and Liaquat. Circumscribed by limited choices, the 'ruling group' picked up, rather unconventionally, Nazimuddin, the Governor General as the new Prime Minister, and Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance Minister, as Governor General. An influential newspaper hailed the new Prime Minister¹²⁸ as "the right man called "into the breach".¹²⁹ Apparently, in a given situation, he was the automatic choice. In Churchillian language, however, he might be characterized as a "boneless wonder". It was more the aristocratic concept of "natural leaders of the soil" which helped him short-circuit the higher echelons of status than any self-initiated struggle from the base upward. Born in the purple of the *Nawab* family he turned curiously puritan, pietist, teetotaler, unobtrusive, but accidentally, an appreciator of sumptuous dishes. In short, he was not dynamic but conservative.

Apparently, the tale of Pakistan was 'apocryphal' revealing miraculous aspect of the state. The rumor had it that a confirmed atheist visited Pakistan and after having visited Pakistan exclaimed: "By all rights the state should have vanished upon its creation. There must be a God who keeps it going".¹³⁰ Five years of hard-slogging nation-building exercise transformed Pakistan for an idealistic blueprint into a kind of brittle political foundation. But it was not yet clear exactly what kind of political structure the Pakistan were evolving. Even, she could regress from its early unity. It was equally possible that she could develop a new form of democracy which could combine the political processes of the west with the ancient tenets of Islam. That the country was ambivalent was mainly owing to the fact that the nascent nation was orphaned of proper and resilient leadership. Besides, there were diverse pulls of contending forces which were coeval with the birth of Pakistan. Religious fanaticism, the deadlock with India over Kashmir issue, geographical contiguity with Soviet Russia, longing for solidarity with the Muslim Middle East, and the historical affiliation with the British Commonwealth and thereby the broad likings for the West, were among others, featured very much in Pakistan politics. Besides, the western wing of Pakistan situated as she was to the Arabian sea appeared to have felt greater historical affinity with the countries of the Middle East. While the Eastern part of Pakistan located along the coast

¹²⁸ Sir Nazimuddin had a record of nearly 20 years of experience as politician-administrator. He was a member in the Governor's Council of Bengal under the diarchy System in the 20s, Premier of Bengal, 1943- 45. The most important criterion of his selection as the Prime Minister was due to his playing Casabianca, since 1935, to the father of the M.L. organization, Jinnah, and never left the ship of the organization.

¹²⁹ *Dawn*, October 18, 1951.

¹³⁰ See *Christian Science Monitor*, September 23, 1952.

of Bay of Bengal had historical linkage with the south and south East Asian countries in terms of trade, commerce and culture.¹³¹

No sooner had he become the Prime Minister than he addressed a mammoth gathering at Karachi defining the broad lines of his policy on home and foreign affairs. The essence of this was that he intended to follow the policy of his predecessor – an indirect public admission that he was not his own man. Liaquat pursued policies with circumspection. The danger was that the same policies might evoke disagreeable results if handled rather aggressively. And what was a tentative approach in Liaquat's time towards Islamisation tended to be a positive one during Nazimuddin's.

The personnel of the new Cabinet were the same except for two important additions and one significant omission.¹³² Sardar Nishtar, the Governor of the Punjab, and Chowdhury Mohammed Ali, the key man of the executive side of the central government were included in the Cabinet. The latter case marked the first departure from the principle laid down by Jinnah "that officials should not be promoted as Ministers".¹³³ In the new administration there were four ministers from East Pakistan in a Cabinet of 10 members. They held equally important portfolios, viz. Defence, Interior, Commerce, Economic Affairs, Education and Labor – a potential stimulus to Federal jealousies. However, having assumed office formally Nazimuddin embarked upon a countrywide tour to get himself politically acclimatized. It was rather a drive towards Pakistanization.¹³⁴ While speaking at the *Paltan maidan*, the Hyde Park of East Pakistan, in January 1952, the Prime Minister committed the *faux pas* of stressing the desirability of Urdu being the only state language of Pakistan.¹³⁵ Once Jinnah, as the *Quaid-e-Azam*, had pronounced: "The state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language". Liaquat, as the *Quaid-e-Millat*,¹³⁶ stipulated the same in the Interim Report and had to shelve it. Urdu is a mixture of Persian, Arabic and Hindustani. Broadly speaking, the prevailing sentiment in Pakistan on language issue was on the fore. The Western wing dismissed Bengali as alien to the spirit of Pakistan, while Urdu had the all – harmonizing effects of creating a unified Pakistan. Likewise, the Eastern wing held the view that Bengali represented the aspirations of the majority of the people. Besides, Bengali was not a dialect. It was a language with a history deeper and greater than that

¹³¹ *The Strait Times*, August 14, 1952. See *Christain Science Monitor*, August 15, 1952, dispatch by Omar Qurishi.

¹³² Chowdhury Nazir Ahmed, a secularist. But Nishtar was an old leaguer and Islamic in outlook. Chowdhury Mohammed Ali had a similar outlook on Islam. But his strength lay in his thorough knowledge of the administrative apparatus of the country. If the late Prime Minister "at all permitted any single individual to keep his conscience that person was Mohammed Ali". See *Dawn*, October 24, 1951, "Editorial", The New Cabinet.

¹³³ *Manchester Guardian*, October 24, 1951.

¹³⁴ Pakistanization would generally mean rendering of the social, economic and individual lives of the majority of the people inhabiting Pakistan into Islam oriented ones.

¹³⁵ *Dawn*, January 28, 1952. Nazimuddin's own family language was Urdu, though he managed to speak pidgin Bengali.

¹³⁶ He was also honored with this title meaning 'leader of the nation'.

of Urdu.¹³⁷ Obviously neither Urdu nor Bengali could replace English as the official language of Pakistan in the near future, the process of which needed an evolutionary spontaneity.

A common lingua franca provides an all-embracing unity. Blessed are those nations who are attuned to one harmonious mode of communication. While the many-tongued countries, though luxuriate in a mosaic of cultures are vulnerable to one point when linguistic identity threatens a rupture in the established polity. It happened in Belgium (French vs. Flemish), Canada (French vs. English), Malaysia (Malay, Chinese and Indian Languages), Ceylon (Sinhales vs. Tamil), East Africa (Swahili vs. Bantu), and in India (Hindi, Bangla, Tamil, etc.). As far as Pakistan was concerned the ruling leaders labored under a theory which was a priori, namely that kinship of Islam was at once a cementing and transcending factor between the two wings of Pakistan. But they failed embarrassingly and at once, miserably to appreciate the implications of the political geography of Pakistan, i.e. the essence of "area differentiation".¹³⁸ Islam did not help the ottomanisation process in the Arab world when the Turkish rulers imposed the Turkish language on the Arabs who mutinied during the First World War against their mentor. Similarly, the Persian conversion to Islam in early days did not immediately influence its rich literature which was sensuously pagan. Historically, a rich language has always occupied a unique position in the lives of people.

However, the language issue of Pakistan offered a new dimension contrary to the usual pattern. Usually, it is the language of the majority that tends to be foisted on the minority speaking different languages. But the reverse was the case in Pakistan. The spoken Urdu was confined mostly to the people who had migrated from India whose percentage was insignificantly small compared to the largest bloc of entire population of Pakistan, whose mother tongue was Bengali and who resided in the Eastern wing. The rationale of the proposition that Urdu was a supra-regional language lay in its script being *Arabicized* and not confined to any particular region. But the fact remained that Urdu could be easily mastered by the Western half of Pakistan because of its natural intelligibility, syntactical and semantic nearness to these languages, e.g. Punjabi, Sindhi and Pushtoo. However, the majority of the people living in the East, whose mother tongue was Bengali, the script of which written in a slightly variant form of *Deva Nagari*,¹³⁹ would be at a disadvantage. So, the reactions were automatic. Mussalmans in general could not be oblivious of the recent past when suddenly they became speechless when the Persian language (the then official language) gave way to English.¹⁴⁰ So, to dispel Bengalees' apprehension there deserved considerations of

¹³⁷ *Christian Science Monitor*, March 20, 1954.

¹³⁸ Saul B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a Divided World* (London: 1964), p. 6.

¹³⁹ Sanskrit.

¹⁴⁰ W.H. Hunter, *Our Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen* (London: 1871), p.53.

"certain facts, as distinct from the fundamental truth of Islamic oneness".¹⁴¹ An institutional apparatus grows and flourishes like an organic plant sustained and developed by the exigencies and requirements of time and space. A purely mechanistic development in the final analysis fails in binding the people to the imposed institutions, unless it is steeped in some such organismic image' which synthesizes and adapts the ideas by linking them with an indigenous past. This 'image' "tends to stress the influence of the past, the environment, and the vast complex and slow-changing aspects of the actions and expectations of millions of people".¹⁴²

Arguably, this synthesizing process was already there. Apart from the people with "pictures in their head"¹⁴³ who smelt Hinduism in Bengali, there had been a slow but genuine transformation in the Bengali language rendering it more flexible, absorbent, receptive and literally natural. Despite its Sanscritic script the Bengali language under the aegis of Muslim rulers of Bengal received a distinct Muslim stamp. The recrudescence of modern Bengali owes its origin greatly to the patronages of the Muslims. What was more, the predominantly Muslim area of East-Bengal in contrast to West Bengal developed a Muslim-oriented dialect bordering on "religious literature".¹⁴⁴ As a result, the Bengali language has become a composite one through naturalization process that continued for ages. Basically, the Bengali language is replete with the two most important elements – Indo-Sanskritic and Indo-Islamic. And the Islamic context of the language become more accentuated as the new forces were introduced following the emergence of Pakistan. We do not suggest that this process would have ended in Bengali's being ultimately replaced by Urdu, but at least, other things being equal, the former could have erected a spiritual bridge with the latter ensuring a workable *modus vivendi*. After all, Bengali is a rich language, not a mere regional dialect. Otherwise, how could a people under any political conjuring—who through centuries communicated, lyricised producing incantation, dramatized, novelized, danced, sang, loved and despised through the vehicle of such an elegant language as was Bengali opt for an uncertain alien mode of communication? National integration does not follow from the issuance of a fiat of an executive order. Multi-ethnic societies, such was Pakistan, would anticipate conflicts. If the government was of opinion that the state of Pakistan and nation were synonymous and anything was imposed on other ethnic group having different culture and speaking different languages, it was sanguine that dissent would be forthcoming. Certain "overarching parties", building of integrative institutions, fellow feeling, ubiquitous modern communication lubricating coordination of political life over wide and disparate geographic units of Pakistan, developing empathy, mutual migration of people creating mobility of both physical and psychic nature, development

¹⁴¹ *Dawn*, February 25, 1952. Editorial "For Pakistan's integration, wanted a brains trust".

¹⁴² Karl W. Deutsch, *Nation-building*, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Fottz (New York: 1966). p. 3.

¹⁴³ The term used by Walter Lippman to indicate how men's behaviors are conditioned by their preconceived notions.

¹⁴⁴ Hunter, *op.cit.*, p.152.

of new socio-economic skills, political style of leaders, so and so forth would have gone a long way towards integrating a peculiar nation like Pakistan.

The monolithic integrating formula was rashly suicidal and far ahead of East Pakistan public opinion. A convulsive, though spontaneous agitation, engulfed every nook and corner of the entire province. The provincial government misjudged the seriousness of the agitation and was still not ready to acquiesce. Far back in March 1948 the Congress member – Dharendra Nath Dutta (opposition) in a formal resolution in the Constituent Assembly with Jinnah on the chair, maintained that "out of six crores and ninety lakhs of people inhabiting this state, 4 crores and 40 lakhs of people speak the Bengali language ... I consider that Bengali language is a lingua franca of our state ... I voice the sentiments of the vast millions of our state..."¹⁴⁵ Since Bengali was not accorded the position of *lingua Franca* of the state of Pakistan by the Constituent Assembly the student community of Dhaka observed general strike, demonstration and protest meetings. The police let loose reign of terror on the students. Consequently, about a thousand students were arrested. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Shamsul Huq, Wali Ahad, Shawkat Ali, Kazi Golam Mahboob, among other, were, arrested.¹⁴⁶ This was followed by Congress demanding the same in the Legislature of East Pakistan in April 1948, when Nazimuddin, the then Premier of East Pakistan, himself moved a resolution making Bengali the only official language of East Pakistan.¹⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, the Congress did voice the sentiments of the millions minus the ruling junta. However, following the disastrous public statement of the Prime Minister – Khaza Nazimuddin the people of East Pakistan, particularly the student community was provoked into serious action. An All-Party Language Committee was formed later on to spearhead the Bengali-language cause. The protagonists and sympathizers of this 'cause' were duly gaoled.

Noticeably, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the embryonic *Bangabandhu* who would later on, throw off the yoke of Bangladesh subjugation had been still in the prison since March 1949. From 16th February onward, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was observing fast as a protest, among others, in solidarity with the language movement and maintaining linkage with the burning issue from the very difficult zone, dungeon.¹⁴⁸ A political Titan who suffered expulsion from the Dhaka University and imprisonment for the cause of the fourth class employees of the Dhaka University, as he had chosen not to pay fine and give undertaking to authority for future conduct. Undoubtedly, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did have participated in the strike, protest meetings and demonstrations called in Dhaka in 1948 by the student community, as symbol of dissent

¹⁴⁵ C.A.D., Vol. 2, 1948, p. 16. In the same sitting Liaquat reacted with the following words: "Pakistan is a Muslim State and must have its lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation", the Urdu. And Nazimuddin said, I am sure that the overwhelming majority of the people are in favor of... Urdu as the state language... pp. 17-20.

¹⁴⁶ See, Rafiqi Islam, *Bangladesh Shadhinatha Sangram*, (Agami Prakashoni, 1996), p. 35.

¹⁴⁷ *Statesman*, April 8, 1948

¹⁴⁸ Government secret intelligence Report also corroborates that fact.

he was thrown into prison, along with other student leaders. This was the blossoming of language movement as a reponse against the Constituent Assembly's decision in not making Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan.

However, the containment policy further resulted in the imposition of Section 144 preventing assemblage of more than five persons in the streets of the capital, Dacca. Meanwhile, public rage was already manifest in many a destructive outlet. Even, troops were called out in support of police to quell the outbreak of violence witnessing banning of English Daily, *The Pakistan Observer* and burning of an another English Daily, *The Morning News Office*. It was not until then when a few killings—instantly transformed into martyrs due to police firings on the 21st February, 1952,¹⁴⁹ drove the government into passing a resolution in the East Pakistan legislature in favor of Bengali as one of the state languages. The Prime Minister himself, beaten by his own province, recanted saying that the "Bengali language has great emotional support of the people of East Pakistan."¹⁵⁰

Pertinently, the position of Suhrawardy in the language movement warrants observation. Suhrawardy's involvement in language movement was more vicarious than direct. Circumstantial evidence would not show that he had a fine frenzy for Bengali language right from the inception.¹⁵¹ He was all reticence, cautious and circumspection. Being a native of Bengal from where he drew political sustenance historically, he could not be averse to the vital interest or problem of Bengal. He chose to be unswayed on the tactical count. Suhrawardy, despite his efforts to acclimatize himself to the political atmosphere of, particularly West Pakistan, was yet to achieve that status as a national figure, which was undoubtedly his overdue, but which his close affiliations with East Bengal appeared to mitigate against. His was the strategy at the national level whatever might have been his dormant feelings. (The subsequent pages will reveal more of it). A close scanning will, certainly, point to the fact that a good many promising young people who happened to be the camp followers of Suhrawardy at Calcutta took active part in the language movement and bore the main brunt of governmental wrath. They also formed part of initial Awami Muslim League after having decamped with the Muslim League. Besides, Suhrawardy would very often move *Habeas Corpas* before the court to get release of the student leaders who at the initial period acted as vanguards of socio-political movement against the incumbent Muslim League government.

It was a novel device of political recruitment that Suhrawardy with his forensic brilliance would move writs before the courts of both the wings of Pakistan for obtaining releases of prominent political detainees who later on become Suhrawardy's

¹⁴⁹ *Dawn*, February 22, 1952.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, April 12, 1952, Editorial "Wise Decision".

¹⁵¹ Incidentally, through the good offices of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Suhrawardy eventually issued a statement from Karachi showing solidarity with the language movement. Source: Badruddin Omar.

protégés. However, as the Awami Muslim League gradually become organizationally viable and the issue of Bengali language occupied a crucial position in the political arena, Suhrawardy minced no words supporting the cause of Bengali language. By 1953 he came out into the open insisting on the recognition of Bengali language as one of the state languages of Pakistan.¹⁵² In November of the same year he reiterated on the language issue declaring that the wishes of the 4.5 crores of people be respected.¹⁵³ Again, scarcely had he arrived at Karachi following the signal victory of the UF than he assertively avowed before a massive throng of people that Bengali must be one of the state languages of Pakistan.¹⁵⁴ The language issue, however, influenced politics in several directions.

Firstly, The 21 February would go down to the almanac of Bengal as the most memorable and eventful day. For, a nationalistic urge and commitment was for the first time given vent to. Martyr's blood was spilt, symbolizing Bengali nationalism. It was an extraordinary occurrence in Bengali public or political life worthy of being endowed with the quality of a myth. This heroic action of 21st February expressing the fundamental values of Bengali culture, would, in the words of Levi-Strauss "Timeless, it explores the present and the past as well as the future".¹⁵⁵ Surely, the Omar Ekhushey is a timeless pattern which can be discerned in the contemporary independent Bangladesh. The *Omar Ekhushe* has entered into glorious legendary past which scattered to the four winds the idea of freedom to the Bengali race. What a *locus standi* that the international community in recognition of *Omar Ekhushe*, from now onward, will observe the day in splendor.

Secondly, the prestige of the M.L. government was tarnished grievously. The government had seen in the language demand only an attempt of the opposition and subversive elements to discredit the government and had applied coercion. A good many members of the M.L. party decamped and joined the opposition.

Thirdly, having eventually acceded to the demand the provincial M.L. party put itself into an awkward position of lobbying its central parliamentary party in the Constituent Assembly for enacting the Bengali as one of the state languages.¹⁵⁶ Worse still, it split opinions of parties and associations of both the 'wings' into opposite directions,¹⁵⁷ despite the commonness of party affiliations.

¹⁵² *Dawn*, May 10, 1953.

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, November 22, 1953.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, May 14, 1954.

¹⁵⁵ Claude Levi Strauss, "The structural study of Myth. *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 68 (Oct.-Dec., 1995), p. 430.

¹⁵⁶ See, *Dawn*, April 12, 1952.

¹⁵⁷ See, *Ibid.*, March 6, 1952; March 23, 1952 and March 31, 1952.

Fourthly, the language issue brought an era of political socialization at a given moment, among East Pakistanis. It smoothed cleavages among Hindu-Muslim and other communities producing an all-embracing, united participation for a common cause. Nothing could better provide political education for the masses in an under-developed polity than the politics of tongue next to food in importance. Bengalis devotion to mother tongue was uniquely strong and transcended all barriers of race and creed. Instilled with a sense of time-honored passionate loyalty for the cause of mother tongue Bengalis laid down their lives which had a cumulative snowballing effect on the subsequent political events.

Fifthly, Communist elements infiltrated into the language movement and this time in East Pakistan. Originally and essentially the language movement was patriotic but the turn of events obscured the atmosphere—a Communist ideal. Usually, the Communists are *par excellence* supporters of linguistic autonomy'. The principle of a "multinational and hence multilingual state",¹⁵⁸ fitted into the language movement of East Pakistan. The communists were there conspicuously identifying themselves with the issue and influencing it accordingly. The Premier of East Pakistan, Nurul Amin, quoted, while speaking in the legislature, from the '*Swadhinata*'—a Calcutta daily and the mouthpiece of the Communist Party dated March 10 and 11, 1952, excerpts indicating how the Communist Party in East Pakistan had assisted in forming all party language committees turning the issue into a united mass movement and inciting people against the government on other issues.¹⁵⁹ Worse still, when the government brooded over the situation, not wholly unjustifiably, how "a *Mahasabite* and *Communist* in India, on arriving here, becomes a communist but both work for the same end—the destruction of Muslims and disintegration of Pakistan."¹⁶⁰

Sixthly, the syndrome of political idiosyncrasy haunted the ruling junta, namely the bogey of communist or Indian engineering was thought to be the signal cause. Likewise, another surcharged slogan would be, as a rule, raised, as though Islam was in jeopardy. These were the hackneyed exclamations the Pakistan rulers would take recourse to identify scapegoats for their failures or malfeasance. The government claimed to have evidence of the existence of a plot to subvert law and order situation. Comment was made of fomentation by communists and other agents of foreign partner of which euphemism meant India. According to the *Manchester Guardian*, there seemed to be no sign of it. *The Dhaka University* which was the main focus of the language movement was by no means "riddled with communism".¹⁶¹ However, there might have been some infiltration or outside fanning or winking. But that was not, by any means, the pivotal

¹⁵⁸ Rupert Emerson, *op. cit.*, p.135.

¹⁵⁹ *Dawn*, March 25, 1952. See also *Dawn*, 4.3.52; 5.3.52 and 8.3.52.

¹⁶⁰ *The East Pakistan Governor's letter to the Prime Minister* (Top secret: D.O. No. 101/PS) dated 21st June, 1954, p. 3. Appendix 11. See also Mr. Nurul Amin's speech broadcasted on 3rd March 1952, Published in *Mahe Now*, 1st ed. April 01, 1952.

¹⁶¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, April 19, 1952.

factor. The influential Dawn, the mouthpiece of Government, editorialized saying that the students sacrificed "their young lives for a cause they passionately believed in ... they were actuated by sincere convictions and acted in their own light ... there must have been elements mingled with them ... But ... out of these grievous happenings has emerged the final knowledge of how deeply our people ... in East Pakistan feel on the language issue".¹⁶²

However, having burnt his fingers in the language controversy, Nazimuddin picked up the thread of institution-building left by his predecessor. The public opinions formulated around the postponed Interim Report were duly expressed in the shape of recommendations¹⁶³ based on which a comprehensive report (B.P.C.) was finalized. The Prime Minister presented the B.P.C. Report to the Constituent Assembly on December 22, 1952. The Report was positively committed to giving an ideological basis to the State and setting up constitutional mechanisms for the governance of the country. The report envisaged an *Islamic Democracy* where the Muslims would be able to cultivate their faith adequately while remaining consistent with the requirements of modern life. The interests of the minorities would be safeguarded. The state would be a federal one comprising the existing Provinces, acceding states, Baluchistan and the Federal areas of Karachi, the Federal Capital. A bicameral legislature—an upper House with 120 members and a house of the people with 400—was proposed. In the composition of the Houses parity was sought between the representatives of East and West Pakistan, though some compensating weightage was given to the smaller provinces. Financial Bills would originate only in the House of the People. The Head of the State must be a *Muslim* to be elected at a joint sitting of both Houses of the Federal Legislature. No legislation should be enacted which was repugnant to the *Quran*, and as a safeguard a *Board of Ulema* consisting of five persons versed in Islamic law would be appointed to intercept unislamic legislation. *Albeit*, the final authority in passing any law was given to the majority of the members sitting in the Federal legislature.¹⁶⁴ Ostensibly, the Report provided a compromise between those who demanded an unalloyed Islamic polity and those who preferred to see Pakistan find her proper place among the modern nations. But could this report really embody an even marriage between modern political needs and religious anachronism? What rationale did work for the incorporation of obscurantist ideas in the draft constitution? Why was it that "the spirit soared to the lofty heights reached in Omar's time, but eyes are fastened on the Spires of Westminster."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² *The Dawn*, February 23, 1952, Editorial "Dhaka Tragedy".

¹⁶³ See: Memorandum on the Basic Principles Committee (Confidential: Governor General's Press, 1951) and Statement showing consolidations of similar suggestions received from the public on the basic principles committee report (Confidential: The Times Press: n.d.).

¹⁶⁴ *Report of the Basic Principles Committee* (Government of Pakistan Press, 1952), pp. 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 14 and C.A.D. Vol. XII, December 2, 1952, pp. 86, 89, 159.

¹⁶⁵ K. Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (New York: 1957), p. 201.

Obviously, this was an index of political *schizophrenia*—a crisis of mind and spirit. In historical perspective the Muslims of the subcontinent had been subject to an intermittent brooding i.e. whether or not they belonged to the soil they lived in, heart and soul. The Indo-Islamic polity of the medieval India had in it some dyarchic elements in that the *Sultan* (Muslim king) had to pay allegiance to an institution outside of the subcontinent, Baghdad's *Khalifa*.¹⁶⁶ So prestigious was the institution of the *Khalafat* that the Indian Sultan "to buttress his position ... procured a robe of honor from the *Khalifa* of Baghdad."¹⁶⁷ This extra-territorial commitment both on the part of the Delhi *sultan* and his subjects caused also, psychologically, a sense of rootlessness despite their time-honored inhalation of Indian air. The ties of extra-territorial loyalties were sundered by *Sher Shah*, the founder of the *Sur dynasty*. *The Mughals* followed suit and during Akbar's rule a sense of belongingness was kindled among the Muslims of India through the Emperor's dynamic eclectic approach. This process did not continue unhaltingly before the British finally undertook the reign of the country. And after the eclipse of Muslim rule it was the *Ulema group* (religious doctors) which kept the torch of the Islamic heritage burning. When the Turks revived the *Kalafat* in the 18th century Indian Muslims again accepted "the existence of one *Caliph* for the entire Muslim world".¹⁶⁸ Through the vehicle of indigenous religions revivalist movements (both moderate and extreme) the national consciousness of the Muslims as a distinct entity with a glorious past was being resuscitated.¹⁶⁹ The height of religious fervor could be discerned when thousands of Muslims literally left the subcontinent in keeping with a *Fatwa* (religious decree) which described India as *Dar-Ul-harb*,¹⁷⁰ meaning land of infidels. After the war Kamal himself drove the last nail in the coffin of *Khalafat*—an incident that cut the Muslims of India to the quick.

In the foregoing passages we have tried to silhouette the schism of Muslim minds of the subcontinent against a historical background. The Islamic zeal was singularly kept alive by the religious group. And when the Muslim secular minded politicians of the then India were yielding less dividends in the constitutional nerve-war, they cried 'Islam in danger', and *Ulemas* reactions came in the best tradition of the Pavlovian *condition-reflex formula*. Now that Pakistan was an accomplished fact the *Ulema* wanted to cash in the Islamic cheque in full.

Was Islamic Democracy a viable modern proposition? The sense of religious values have found ample expressions in some of the constitutional government of the modern¹⁷¹ world. Broadly speaking, the heritage of Judeo-Christianity has not been

¹⁶⁶ The spiritual head of the Muslim World (Amirul Mumanim, the Commander of the Faithful).

¹⁶⁷ H.N. Sinha, *The Development of Indian Polity* (London: 1963), p.423.

¹⁶⁸ Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1963), p. 21.

¹⁶⁹ Edward Shiels "The intellectuals in political development" in John H. Kantsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, pp. 195- 234.

¹⁷⁰ Hafeez Malik, *op.cit.*, p. 343.

¹⁷¹ Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece, Argentina, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, etc.

swept under the carpet by the governments of the Western World. But the fact remained that after the Reformation, religion lost its distinct political character. Islamic Jurisprudence is steeped in metaphysics resembling the medieval notion of law as "the will of God".¹⁷² Islam is vulnerable to higher synthesis unless the immutability of the orthodoxy yields to rationality. It is the "embodiment of God's direct government in the earth".¹⁷³ This view was maintained by the Board of Talimati-i-Islamia (appointed to advise the B.P.C. on Islamic aspects of the constitution) which rejected the saying, i.e. "give unto God what is God's and unto Caesar what is Caesar's";¹⁷⁴ for, to them God was imminent in the polity, *albeit*, transcendent, as well—an admission that the legal and political sovereignty of the people would operate within the confinement of metaphysical determinism.

In essence, the governing laws of Islam are found mainly in the following sources e.g. the *Quran* (the revealed sayings of God), *Sunna* (traditions of the prophet Mohammed), *Isma* (consensus of the religious doctors) and *Q'iyas* (judgements of the Islamic jurists). And controversy crept in when these laws threatened to claim "immutability and eternal applicability",¹⁷⁵ regardless of time and space. True, the early Islam promulgated laws that were more advanced and more humane than its contemporary world. And in modern times when "Christians have been talking in terms of a social gospel; Islam has been a social gospel from the beginning".¹⁷⁶ Those laws were implemented to the letter in the early, formative Islamic days of halcyon but in modern times their wholesale recrudescence would be anything but Quixotic. That is one of the reasons that "Islamic history has never been Islamic in the ideal sense—life is too complex for that".¹⁷⁷

However, dogmaticism resulted in the emergence of liberal, rational and democratic schools of the thought viz. *Mutazilites*, *Mawandi*, *Kharistes etc.*¹⁷⁸ which emphasized the role of *Iztihad* (reason) in interpreting Islamic laws. As a result, from 800 to 1100, maintains Horten, Professor of Semitic philosophy at the University of Bonn, there arose nearly one hundred systems of theology.¹⁷⁹ In the same vein, further testimonies can be cited to prove the elasticity of Islamic thought. So Islam was put to the test of a 'choice' i.e. a choice between reason and slavish adherence to dogma. And as far as the subcontinent was concerned it was Shah Waliullah of the 18th century who, first, set in the reorientation process of Islam and made himself "to Pakistan what Martin Luther is to Germany".¹⁸⁰ His spiritual heirs were Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Dr. Iqbal in the recent past. Sir Iqbal—the spiritual dreamer of Pakistan just as Jinnah was its political

¹⁷² H.J. Laski, *The State in theory and practice* (London, 1956), p.32.

¹⁷³ Windrow Sweetman "Viewpoints in Pakistan", *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVII (April, 1957), p.112.

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.117.

¹⁷⁵ Leonard Birder., *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (University of California Press, 1961), p.23.

¹⁷⁶ W.C. Smith, *Pakistan as an Islamic State* (Lahore, 1951), p.23.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.33.

¹⁷⁸ A.K. Sen, *The Islamic State* (Calcutta, 1950), pp.20-35.

¹⁷⁹ For details, see A.K. Brohi, "Thoughts on the future constitution" *Dawn*, September 21, 1952.

¹⁸⁰ Malik Hafeez, *op. cit.*, p.139.

architect—attacked the orthodox *Ulemas* for holding out a false reverence to an archaic past and thwarting the inner impulses of Islam.¹⁸¹ It was his school of thought which stressed the need of *Iztihad* (reason) and *Izma* (consensus) being instituted in the modern legislature, so that Islam could be recreated through dynamic elaboration. Hence, the viability of Islamic democracy would be less anathematic if those two (mentioned above) institutions are recognized fervently.

However, presenting the draft constitution in an enlarged edition of Liaquat's Objectives Resolution as he did, the Prime Minister turned apologist for the proposed Islamic democracy and claimed to have brought "about a synthesis" of Islamic fundamentals "and the requirements of progressive democracy ... of the 20th century".¹⁸² It came under heavy fire both from within the Constituent Assembly and without. The Congress opposition subjected the Report to searching criticism on intellectual and ethical grounds. The provision making the Head of the State compulsorily a Muslim seemed to make a mockery of democracy. This was tantamount to rendering non-Muslim minorities permanently disabled for the highest post of the state.¹⁸³ Moreover, other disability provisions viz. the institution of separate electorates, *Ulema Board*, etc., would go a long way to reducing minorities to a perennial status of political minorities. That this practice was maintained among "some of the foremost democracies of the world"¹⁸⁴ could be explained on historical ground. After all, the European monarchs have been by and large, reduced to a position of reigning rather than ruling. Even the personal laws of the minorities might incur repugnancy for their being either divergent from or opposed to *Quranic* injunctions. What was more, Macaulay's penal code would have to be revised, if punishments for, say, theft, adultery, etc., were to be awarded as stipulated in the *Quran*.

Suhrawardy addressing Jinnah Awami League convention at Lahore made scathing attack on the B.P.C. report what according to him "the same dread of one section of the people, which assumed the shape of communalism as between Muslims and Hindus and led to the division of India on communal lines, is being imported in Pakistan in another shape, and is being applied to the provinces".¹⁸⁵

Similarly, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the General Secretary of Awami Muslim League criticized the "provision of theologians, which appears to have been invented for the

¹⁸¹ Sir Iqbal's Book, "*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*" (London, 1934) quoted in the Manchester *Guardian*, Editorial, "Mullah Raj", January 13, 1953.

¹⁸² Documents and speeches on the constitution of Pakistan, *loc. cit.*, p.62.

¹⁸³ Maulana Osmani, known as the Archbishop of Pakistan, declared in the Constituent Assmebly that non-believers under an Islamic policy could not be "entrusted with the responsibility of framing the general polity of the state". See C.A.D., Vol. V, March 9, 1949, pp.44-46.

¹⁸⁴ Documents and speeches, *loc. cit.*, p.64.

¹⁸⁵ *Dawn*, December 27, 1952.

sake of throwing dust in the eyes of our *Ulemas*. It is almost certain that the report of the Committee will be rejected by the people of East Pakistan".¹⁸⁶

The Congress members apart, thirty nine Muslim leaguers spoke in support, rather apologetically, of the Islamic provisions, with the A.P.P. group denouncing the government for hoodwinking the people in the name of Islam.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, the Press and outside public with secular orientation reacted vigorously to Islamic provisions.¹⁸⁸ The situation was now pregnant. The opinions relating to Islamic state had now been formed broadly into two groups, e.g. Modernist-Islamist—who would pin faith in *Iztihad* and democratize *Izma* by institutionalizing it in the popular legislature¹⁸⁹—and the more holier groups—who would entrust the religious expertise (*Ulema* and *Mujtahids*) alone to discover the truth "that lies in the Holy Book and the books of Hadith".¹⁹⁰ The *Ulemas* were not appeased with the provisions provided in the draft constitution and hungered for more, the result of which was the submission of amendments to the draft constitution by a group of 33-strong *Ulema* totally given to the idea of an Islamic state. Having done so the *Ulema* betrayed their inner impulse of intolerance in that they suggested that *Qadianis* (a protestant group of Muslims who differ from the predominantly Sunni group in some tangible ways) be declared "a minority altogether."¹⁹¹ What was more, in the so-called convention of All-Muslim Parties, a decision to launch 'direct action' was taken to force the government to ostracize *Qadianis* from the *Sunni* community and dismiss Sir Zafrullah (a *Qadiani*), the Foreign Minister from the Cabinet.¹⁹² A reign of fanaticism with its corollary attendants was let loose in Karachi to bend further an already-bent Prime Minister, religious to his fingertips before the demands. The general expectations were, from the beginning, that the government "would be prepared to face a showdown with the Mulalhs".¹⁹³

This was a situation that raised a vital question i.e. the *Summum bonum* of public administration and public policy. Was it advisable that a consequential movement like religion—still, in many a form a part and parcel of Pakistan lives—ought to be dealt with from the political platform as contemplated under a parliamentary form of government or left entirely to the care of the services? Away in the Ministry of Defence (the Prime Minister held the Defence portfolio) General Mirza, the Defence Secretary—a personage coming from the early British political services soon to become progressively the most powerful man in Pakistan politics—found his patience and administrative

¹⁸⁶ See *Ibid*, December 29, 1952.

¹⁸⁷ See C.A.DII, December 22, 1952, Also *Manchester Guardian* December 23, 1952, *Hindu*, December 23, 1952.

¹⁸⁸ *Statesman*, December 23, 1952. See *Dawn* (Editorial) "Ulemacracy", January 24, 1953.

¹⁸⁹ Leonard Binder "Pakistan and Modern Islamic- Nationalist Theory" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 12, 1958. See also Dr. I.H. Qureshi, *Pakistan, An Islamic Democracy*, (Lahore: n.d.), p.27.

¹⁹⁰ *Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, (Lahore, 1954), p.208. (Usually known as the Munir Report).

¹⁹¹ Documents and speeches, *loc.cit.*, p.997. See *Dawn*, 27.12.1952.

¹⁹² *Dawn*, February 27, 1953.

¹⁹³ *Manchester Guardian*, December 23, 1952.

restraints wearing thin in the face of political maelstrom. Passionately forcefully, Mirza wrote to the Prime Minister:

"the problems created by your personal enemies including Mullahs, if not dealt with firmly and now will destroy the administration and the country ... the prestige of the government in Karachi is at its lowest ebb ... will be the feeling in the whole country tomorrow ... I am not a very religious man, I have the greatest respect for your religious beliefs and realize your hesitation ... for vigorous action. No administration can exist on basis of fear specially if it has got to rule Muslims ... There are people who will stand by you till the last. I guarantee the Armed Forces will carry out any directive you may choose to give. For God's sake become a courageous leader and take decisive action. Once you do this, the whole country with the exception of rascals will rally round you and the prestige of Pakistan will go up ..."¹⁹⁴

The Prime Minister was still in a quandary.¹⁹⁵ When the Karachi agitation was contained with the arrests of *Ulema*, Lahore became the bastion of this movement manifesting itself in the slaughter of police, public and the conversion of *Mosques* (religious temples) into crime cells.¹⁹⁶ In an eleventh hour cabinet meeting including also provincial representatives it was decided that the "challenge must be met",¹⁹⁷ and martial law was promulgated in Lahore on March 6, 1953. Peace was restored.

But why was it that the anti-Qadiani movement could not be fought from the parliamentary platforms despite the fact that the majority of the ruling members of both central and provincial governments and legislatures were modernist-Islamist? Because, the Prime Minister's weakness apart, some of the prominent politicians used the movement however contrary to their convictions, as a lever against regional interests. It is to be recalled how the Interim Report was rejected by East Pakistan. Now it was the turn of the West Punjab, the pugnacious *Prussia* of Pakistan. The present report brought in a parity of representation between East and West Pakistan in the parliaments. But the Punjab (West) thought the proposed parity heralded a *Balkanization* process in West Pakistan; for, nine units had been carved out of the western part and representation was assigned according to size and population of the respective units.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ Letter to the Prime Minister (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence) Top Secret Personal D.O. No. 52/PS, dated Karachi, February 26, 1953. See Appendix II, General Mirza held the religious leaders in the highest contempt. He reminisced before the writer how, during the Second World War, he extracted a religious decree in favor of British in lieu of money.

¹⁹⁵ The soft corner Nazimuddin had for *Ulema* was still not waning even after the religious storm. He observed in the Parliament: "I will be the last person to impute any motives to any *Ulema*..." See *C.A.D. (Leg.)* Vol. I, March 19, 1953, p. 374.

¹⁹⁶ See *Dawn*, March 5, 1953 and March 16, 1953.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, March 21, 1953 (Editorial) "Only half way".

¹⁹⁸ See B.P.C. Report, loc.cit., pp.11-14.

Apparently, there was logic in the arguments. East Pakistan would always come as a compact bloc in the parliaments whereas the West would be in "perpetual inequality and discord to confront the solid east".¹⁹⁹ But behind the arguments, perhaps, lay the Punjabi fear of being dominated by East Pakistan. Since any alliance with any units of West Pakistan would give East Pakistan parliamentary superiority on numerical grounds.²⁰⁰ The Chief Minister of the West Punjab, Mumtaz Daultana, minced no words in showing his disfavor to the Federal proposals. The Punjab press was mobilized fully to discredit the B.P.C. Report while the Punjab provincial M.L. was growing restive. The Prime Minister rushed to Lahore to attend an extraordinary meeting of the Punjab Provincial M.L. and was told to postpone consideration of the Report.²⁰¹

It was ironic, however, that the other units of West Pakistan e.g. Sindh, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, etc.²⁰² were committed to the constitutional proposals, in their entirety. Comradeless, the Punjabi politicians, no lovers of extreme Holier groups, found in the anti-Qadiani movement a welcome weapon to avenge provincial grudges upon the central government. The premier of the West Punjab, Daultana, came in the best tradition of *Machiavellianism*,²⁰³ when his words and deeds were analyzed in Juxtaposition, vis-à-vis the movement.²⁰⁴ As a result, the 'issue' could not be tackled in terms of politics because the politicians failed to meet the challenge. Steeped in regionalism the politicians were oblivious to wider considerations and unwittingly paved in a short army rule in one of the premier provinces of Pakistan which could be self-defeating on larger parliamentary considerations.²⁰⁵ Was not the hitherto unpublished letter, that tunneled beneath the parliamentary earth to the desk of the Prime Minister where the *Defence Secretary was guaranteeing* army support to his boss, the *Defence Minister* – also an omen?

However, simultaneously with these events was a deterioration of the national economy. Granted that a policy of non-devaluation presupposes a planned economy, the government given to temporary complacency failed in that direction, for in the absence of any precautions an overrated 'Rupee' led to reckless buying spree in foreign markets. The irony was that the mass of consumers were deprived of the benefit of the "full value of the Pakistan rupee",²⁰⁶ by the speculators and commercial tycoons. Pakistan's economic and financial health was dependent upon two export commodities,

¹⁹⁹ Suleri, *op.cit.*, p.48.

²⁰⁰ See *Times*, January 21 (Editorial)"Karachi and Lahore".

²⁰¹ *Dawn*, January 16, 1953.

²⁰² East Pakistan was not happy either, for the language issue was hushed up. But she kept quiet, relatively.

²⁰³ Munir Report, *op.cit.*, p.235.

²⁰⁴ Shawkat Hyat Khan, a Punjabi M.C.A. (APP Group) stated in Parliament that *Qadiani* movement was financed by the Punjab government and fanned by the highly placed persons. People arrested in Karachi in this connection was sent by Daultana. It was not done by the *Ulema*. See *Dawn*, March 18, 1953.

²⁰⁵ There were politicians and intellectuals who were suspicious of army rule in the West Punjab. See *Dawn*, March 16, 1953; May 14, 1953 and *C.A.D. (Leg.)* Vol. 1, March 28, 1953, p. 901.

²⁰⁶ *Financial Times*, March 13, 1953 (Article) Sir Percival Griffiths "Pakistan's Economy".

i.e. jute and cotton, and the heavy falls in the prices of those commodities (the Korean boom was over) in foreign markets affected the economy which seemed to have been "well entrenched behind steady demand for jute and cotton".²⁰⁷ On top of it, the government frittered away foreign exchange under the heading of "Government Accounts". As a result, the gold, dollar and sterling reserves were severely depleted. And government cash balances were augmented through advances from the State Bank of Pakistan.²⁰⁸ The position was further exacerbated when shortage of food threatened near-famine²⁰⁹ conditions in certain areas of the country. Suhrawardy did not have much liking for him and had an observation "whatever he has touched he has destroyed".²¹⁰ And pressure was brought to bear upon the already severely strained financial resources when the Defence Services, alone, were allotted Rs. 60.10 crores out of the total revenues of Rs. 98.60 crores of the 1953-54 budget. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Food strenuously looked for money to buy food. For, after all, the Finance Minister sought to go down to history for maintaining an unbroken pattern of balanced budgets and, at the same time, mark the "transition from a wholly agricultural economy to a partly industrialized economy",²¹¹ no matter if that meant borrowing foreign capital or robbing Peter to pay Paul. Nervously, the government totally cancelled the O.G.L. (Open General License) Policy to halt the drainage of foreign exchange and appointed an Economic Appraisal Committee to enquire into the economic malaise,²¹² which resulted only in unsettling the market in the former case and pigeon-holing the report in the latter.

True, the government had no control over some factors, viz. the state of the foreign markets, the stoppage of canal water by India, drought, etc., but the capacity of the Cabinet had also something to do with it.²¹³ Its constitutional position apart, the Cabinet also was a functional team—an organization that was to unite efforts to a common purpose. If we are to view "coordination, the first principle"²¹⁴ of any organized body, then the Cabinet from a strictly functional point of view must organize itself through orderly distribution of portfolios and the arrangement of group efforts for the seeking

²⁰⁷ *Times*, October 13, 1952. See also *New York Times*, March 18, 1953 (Editorial) "Pakistan's difficulties".

²⁰⁸ "State Bank's Weekly Statements" quoted in *Dawn*, December 21, 1952 (Article), Hussain Imam "The Economic Crisis".

²⁰⁹ It was a (historic) pity that whenever Sir Nazimuddin assumed power some unforeseen disagreeable events were always there to discredit him. To mention one, his assumption of Bengal's Premiership in 1943 saw the tragic stalking of famine all over the Province. His name, unfortunately, prompted a sense of foreboding among the people. This, however, was carefully nurtured by the opposition.

²¹⁰ See *Dawn*, October 27, 1952.

²¹¹ *C.A.D. (Leg.)* Vol. I, March 19, 1953, p. 392.

²¹² *Dawn*, March 13, 1953.

²¹³ The Pakistan Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industries in an extraordinarily written memorandum to the Prime Minister analyzed total consuming populace in terms of per capita consumption. Taking everything together, the memorandum maintained that instead of shortage of food there ought to have been surplus to the tune of

24,77,034 tons of grain, See *Dawn*, March 20, 1953.

²¹⁴ Joseph A. Litterer, *Organizations: Structure and Behaviour* (London, 193), p. 39.

of common goals. There was never an occasion when portfolios were assigned to ministers in terms of proper workability any more than federal politics would allow Ministers to hold the minimum possible portfolios. There were overworked Ministers responsible for more than one important subject. After all, even genius is defined as '90 percent perspiration and 10 percent inspiration'. In trying to maintain "a mathematical balance between East and West"²¹⁵ in the Cabinet Nazimuddin also introduced a coordinating imbalance. While the country was facing an economic crisis several vital and interrelated subjects e.g. commerce, industries, economic affairs, food and agriculture were separately held by individual Ministers making prompt coordination in an intra-Ministerial level much more difficult. Obviously the Finance Minister was not comfortable without the portfolio of Economic Affairs,²¹⁶ which was held by the Commerce Minister, who was also the Education Minister. The Finance Minister was not, psychologically, able to take the initiative when he was not responsible for the economy as a whole nor would Fazlul Rahman part with his prestige portfolio, Economic Affairs. The Food Minister—a very distinct person in food crises—was at a loss to discover the appropriate sources of funds. And a blinding situation arose when various subjects pressed the respective Ministers for immediate attention. Simultaneously the Commerce and Economic Affairs Minister was now also to give an account of his being an Education Minister. Students in their thousands dinned the air of Karachi with their demand for the reduction of student fees which resulted in the Interior Minister's Cadillac being burnt, a number of students being killed and injured by police firing and finally the army's taking over the troubled areas of the Capital. The humble Prime Minister came to the rescue of his colleague and addressed himself to the students as their "loving father".²¹⁷ Perhaps one might sympathize with the economic difficulties of the Nazimuddin government when it was faced by a world-wide economic recession. But equally justifiably, Nazimuddin could be held responsible for organizing his Cabinet unwisely, and pursuing "a wholly unrealistic policy",²¹⁸ in respect of food and economic policies. It was understandable that he was compelled to follow public opinion vis-à-vis constitution-making. But in matters of policy affecting the everyday lives of millions of people he could bind the Cabinet to a policy having preemptively declared earlier.²¹⁹ But he certainly lacked the stature of "a Sun around which planets revolve".²²⁰ On the contrary, some of his colleagues were much more in the limelight.²²¹ The best proof of this was that despite failures of policies in respect of

²¹⁵ H. Tinker, *Indian and Pakistan: A Short Political Guide*. (London, 1966), p.78.

²¹⁶ Sir Winston Churchill once defended the retention of allied subjects under one Ministry by having wittily replied that, after all, "Fish and Chips" had historic links, to a question in the House of Commons which asked separation of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture from the Fisheries.

²¹⁷ *Dawn*, January 9, 1953.

²¹⁸ *Financial Times*, April 20, 1953.

²¹⁹ As a matter of fact his predecessor did on Korean affairs.

²²⁰ Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 200.

²²¹ Sir Zafullah, Chowdhury Md. Ali, Fazlul Rahman, Sardar Nishtar and K. Shahabuddin. The latter was his cousin a proverbial clever politician, more by instinct than education, who survived all regimes, including the present one. He was to Nazimuddin what Chowdhury Md. Ali had been to Liaquat.

certain Ministries (Food, Economics, Home), no Ministers or officers required to relinquish their jobs. In short, the Nazimuddin government was in the midst of a political and economic crisis of the first magnitude.

Suddenly, the Governor General's *satrapy* moved. The whole nation was taken aback when the Governor General claiming as he did as the last residual power of the State sent the Nazimuddin government packing on account of its inadequate grappling "with the difficulties facing the country"²²² and asked Mohammed Ali²²³ to form a new Cabinet. Was the Governor General's action justifiable constitutionally? Had he the right to dismiss the Cabinet when it was still enjoying the confidence of the Parliament? Was not the M.L. Parliamentary – the major party body the right parliamentary forum for bringing in changes in the leadership? It is a sad commentary on the role of the M.L. which second fiddled slavishly to the Governor General's behest and turned subservient to the newly appointed Prime Minister – Bogra Mohammed Ali – instead of asserting its position. How could the Governor General adduce that the economic policy of the dismissed government was the *heal of Achilles* when he had characterized the economic crisis as merely "pangs of growth"²²⁴ and had himself been associated with the country's economic policy right from the beginning? Ostensibly, the Governor General based his action on the provisions of Section 10 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted in Pakistan by the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947. The Governor General was no doubt to be aided by a council of Ministers under Section 9; but under Section 10, Ministers were chosen and summoned by him and held office during his pleasure. In fact, the Cabinet under the Pakistan Provisional Constitution did not occupy a juristic position.²²⁵ And the contention that the Governor General could not dismiss except by the advice of his Ministry could not be defended even in the courts of law. Because, under Section 10 (4) of the Act maintained that advice tendered by the Ministers to the Governor General could not be enquired into by any court.²²⁶

A mechanistic interpretation – *albeit* debatable – of the letter of the Constitution might lend some support to the Governor General's actions but surely it was not in the spirit of the Constitution. Pakistanis had to consider whether the Parliamentary ethos was a means towards an end or an end in itself? To find an answer to this question a pure formal – legalistic approach would be unrealistic this is an approach which is meaningful in a society where consensus-based institutions have taken deep root allowing a degree of the luxury of disagreement – in the plane of a developing polity such as Pakistan, "for, the transitional socio-politico-economic institutions were an

²²² Press Communiqué quoted in *Dawn*, April 18, 1953.

²²³ The same person who was sent to Burma in Jinnah's time, as ambassador. Since then he gradually rose to the position of Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S.; and retained this post until he was called upon to form a new Ministry. He was a former M.C.A. and had worked under Suhrawardy's Cabinet of undivided Bengal (1946-47) as the Finance Minister.

²²⁴ *Dawn*, April 10, 1953 (Editorial), "Pangs of Growth".

²²⁵ The British Cabinet's legal position was also not clear at the outset. The conventions developed into legalism.

²²⁶ *Dawn*, April 19, 1953.

inconstant 'variable' unlike the Western ones".²²⁷ The violation of the constitutional spirit was, no doubt, costly in terms of parliamentarianism but a dogged adherence to it would have threatened the very parliamentary system itself in Pakistan. The way in which the Prime Minister was influenced by the religious groups whose aggressive designs found eloquent expression in the anti-Qadiani movement made it doubtful if the country could have been ever emancipated from the clutches of the extreme *Ulema*, short of the Governor General's controversial action.²²⁸ The *Ulema*-initiated religious renaissance in Pakistan found the Nazimuddin government permissive enough to carry the movement further into other Muslim states crying for the revival of *Khilafat*²²⁹ the vanished institution. And, from Pakistan's point of view if the anti-Qadiani movement succeeded in reducing the Qadianis to minority, the Shias, another dissident sect of Muslim, would have been the next target.²³⁰ That was why the *Economist's* characterization of the Governor General's action as "courageous, timely ... dramatic ... realistic"²³¹ found similar echoes in Pakistan.

Are we then to suppose that the Governor General's action was solely inspired by secular impulses? Obviously no: The action ingenuously fulfilled a number of objectives, namely (a) regional, (b) opposition, (c) centripetal, (d) 'modernist-Islamist' and (e) Pro-western foreign policy. Thus, the constitutional shock received by the people was cushioned by the thought of finding new alternatives worth trying. For, essentially the country was in a process of winnowing. The parliamentary hospitality to be determined not to the neglect of the country's given social anthropology or psychology. Did not the opposition group of the Weimar Republic conveniently employ freedom and liberty to sabotage the very Republic? So, the Pakistani Governor General's action was a classic piece of astuteness where under the camouflage of the general approval of his performance he also lent himself to be an accomplice to certain deeds the political effects of which were disagreeable, eventually.

We now examine the purposes served by the dismissal.

(a) It has been mentioned earlier how the Punjabis were opposed to the B.P.C. Report. They used the anti-Qadiani movement as a lever, but could not oust the central government. On the contrary the Punjabi premier had to go out of office at the behest of Nazimuddin.²³² The last hope was the Governor General alone, who happened to hail from the Punjab. He watched carefully how Nazimuddin's

²²⁷ D.A. Rostow, "New Horizons in the Study of Comparative Politics", *World Politics IX* (1956-57), p. 531.

²²⁸ No less a person than Maulana Maudoodi, the most influential religious leader, characterized the Governor General's action, during an interview with the writer, as "Ek Bندوق se dou shikar hui" meaning, killing both religion and democracy with one gun shot.

²²⁹ See *Dawn*, May 13, 1953 (Editorial) "Sloganism vs. Realism".

²³⁰ See Percival Spear. "The Political Evolution of Pakistan: A study in Analysis", in Saul Rose (ed.) *Political evolution in Southern Asia* (London, 1963), p. 40.

²³¹ *Economist*, May 8, 1953.

²³² *Times*, March 26, 1953.

popularity ebbed away in the language controversy, and the submission of the B.P.C. Report. In the performance of what Sir Ivor thought of Prime Minister's "extra-parliamentary"²³³ role, Nazimuddin, unlike his predecessor failed utterly. He made enemies in the ruling party hierarchy and quarreled with some prominent provincial politicians.²³⁴ Added to it was the entry of Youssuf Haroon in Pakistan politics who was lately the High Commissioner of Pakistan in Australia. The Prime Minister did not want him to resign the post, but to no purpose.²³⁵ He came back to become the vice-president of the M.L. Party whose president was the Prime Minister himself, and remained invisibly important in Pakistan politics (particularly in Karachi politics) causing anxiety to the Nazimuddin government. Besides, what the Defence Secretary wrote to the Prime Minister saying that "such a thing as loyalty and team work does not exist in your government, both in the centre and the provinces",²³⁶ – a fact that was not beyond the intelligence of the Governor General. Thus the final blow was struck by the Governor General with the full knowledge of Nazimuddin's weakness and full consent of the Punjabi politicians Firoz Khan Noon, Mamtaz Daultana and Khan of Mamdot – who happened to be in Karachi conferring with him.²³⁷ Thus ended an "era" which "had only just begun to emerge", because of "regional jealousies ... the long-standing grudge of Lahore",²³⁸ Capital of the Punjab.

(b) The dismissal caused euphoria among the opposition parties; for, any action humiliating the M.L. governments – central or provincial – meant an additional feather in their caps. For, were they not demanding wholesale resignations of M.L. Ministries and dissolution of legislatures (including the Constituent Assembly) for the holding of general elections? Suhrawardy, the rising opposition leader, epitomized the mixed feelings of the opposition parties when he commented on the dismissal by saying that "this small but welcome encroachment on strict democratic proprieties seems to have opened the floodgate of undemocratic procedure".²³⁹

(c) The assassination of Liaquat witnessed a sliding of the reality of power into centrifugal directions. The all-Pakistan leadership could not be handily symbolized in one person after the exit of Jinnah and Liaquat. Hard reality of federal polity came up to the fore. Hence, the provincial politicians flourished on the issues of language, religion and regionalism. To augment central powers and divert issues the central government used to 'cry wolf' i.e. the menace of the

²³³ Jennings, *op.cit.*, p.188.

²³⁴ Mamtaz Daultana (Punjab), Ayub Khuhro and Kazi Fazlullah (Sindh).

²³⁵ See *Dawn*, May 25, 1953. Besides, Youssuf Harun himself told this to the author during an interview.

²³⁶ Defence Secretary's letter, *loc.cit.*

²³⁷ *Hindu*, April 18, 1953.

²³⁸ See *Times*, April 20, 1953 (Editorial) "Pakistan".

²³⁹ *Hindu*, May 28, 1953.

Indian threat. Suhrawardy epitomized the situation by saying: "I find that the old technique of bringing to the fore our dispute with India in trenchant terms is again being utilized to arouse a sense of fear, in the hope that this will induce them to rally round the government".²⁴⁰ But, in reality the central power was weakening. The Governor General dammed up the tide by making the central government reflect the substance of political power in the country. The abortive *Rawalpindi conspiracy*, the alleged communist activities²⁴¹ as supposed to have been reflected in the language movement and the prospect of their further involvement in the coming general elections of East Pakistan, and, finally the anti *Qadiani* flare-up were, perhaps, some imponderables which received the Governor General's immediate attention. Having achieved the *centripetal* goal, the Governor General, coming as he did from the early Audit and Accounts Services, instilled a new trend, recognizably *bureaucratic*, in the Cabinet. The accent was on the depreciation of politics. We note in the new Prime Minister's broadcast a significant passage which emphasized his "foremost endeavor to ensure *a clean and efficient administration* which would serve the people of Pakistan with devotion."²⁴² The Prime Minister did not aspire for 'clean politics'.

(d) The Governor General's action gave a direction towards centrally-focused politics, in that the modernist-Islamist group came in sharp contrast with that of the Rightists (*Ulema*) and *leftists* (*secularist*). Since that period, religious militancy petered out with corresponding strength in the rank of the modernist. The new Ministry rebuffed the *Mullah* (same as *Ulema*) by keeping 'Sir Zafrullah, a *Qadiani*, in the Ministry. What was more, the newly-sworn law Minister, A.K. Brohi "an intellectual and a modernist"²⁴³ –challenged the *Ulema* to come out with a formula of a state based on the *Quran*.

(e) Hitherto, Pakistan had been pursuing an undefined neutral foreign policy with an implied pro-western tendency which was now to receive its quietus at the hand of the new Ministry and to be replaced by unequivocally committed one of whose effects on politics persisted till 1958, even beyond.

²⁴⁰ See *Dawn*, February 21, 1953.

²⁴¹ Far back in 1948 there was a Conference held in Karachi including Pakistan Home Ministers, Directors of Information and Inspector Generals of Police to formulate policy in respect of communists who were reportedly arriving in Pakistan from India. See *Statesman*, May 16, 1948.

²⁴² *Dawn*, April 18, 1953.

²⁴³ *Manchester Guardian*, April 23, 1953.

IN QUEST OF SECURITY

The dynamics of today's international politics have linked nations with varying role-status to operate globally. The politics of the early nineteen fifties in the international arena were bipolarized. In essence, the battle of politics was fought by the American and Russian gladiators in defence of their respective ideologies e.g. Western democracy and Communism. Under the new dispensation we would analyze how the Mohammad Ali Government committed Pakistan to a certain foreign policy by associating her with the Western bloc and in particular America. Why did the alignment take place?

Reflecting on the present global politics Morton Kaplan maintained that "in the 'balance of power' system, groupings will depend primarily upon the interests of nations in particular situations".²⁴⁴ As far as America was concerned her transcending objective was to contain the potential communist threat which was both military and ideological in nature. As NATO was set up to deter Soviet expansion in the western world, corresponding arrangements were warranted in the Asian defence perimeter. Strategically, both India and Japan were key centres of importance in Asia, and the loss of either country to the communist bloc would be a "threat to the American interest ... to the Free World".²⁴⁵ The long term foreign policy rationale of American, after all, was "to preserve a world environment within which its chosen form of democratic society can persist; and to match the ideological and political balance of power in Eurasia with "the military balance of power"²⁴⁶ in the same area. This 'balance of power' manifesting itself within a multiple-state system took a perceptible shape in the direction of alliances; for "alliances are a necessary function"²⁴⁷ of the system.

Before the advent of the Korean war (1950) American interests were mainly Europe-oriented. The communist proselytisation process claimed China entirely, sparked a war in Korea, and inflicted a Dien Bien Phu on the French in Indo-China. These events jolted the U.S. into an awareness of the danger of communist expansionism in Asia. The 'containment policy' of the U. S. in Asia was pronounced when the Republican Party came to power in 1953. The new administration succeeded in entering into bilateral defence pacts and organizing regional defence arrangements with the newly emerged independent countries of Asia. This resulted in the welding of a large part of the world into a closely knit system of interlocking military treaties.

²⁴⁴ Morton Kaplan, "System and Process in International Politics", in Stanley H. Hoffmann (ed.). *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Prentice-Hill, Inc., N.J. 1960), p. 107.

²⁴⁵ W.W. Rostow, "The United States in the World Arena", in Harry Howe Ransom (ed.) *An American Foreign Policy Reader* (New York, 1966), p.69.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.69.

²⁴⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York, 1966), p.181.

How did Pakistan appeal to America? The Trumann administration was neutral vis-à-vis Indo-Pakistan disputes. It was not overenthusiastic about Pakistan. The U.S., at the outset, looked at the subcontinent as " a unit not as two separate states in the game of world politics. No interest was shown in developing Pakistan's strength, nor was it regarded as a factor to be reckoned with in world politics."²⁴⁸ The sudden importance of Pakistan felt by the U.S. was matched by her equally sudden feeling of urgency vis-à-vis communism. No less responsible was Nehru's fastidious foreign policy which prevented America from taking India for granted. Nehru's policy was an irritant to the State Department, instead.²⁴⁹ So, it was the best of a bad bargain for America to work with an eager Pakistan rather than with a coy India. Karachi's seaport and airport, which was the largest in Asia serving 15 international airlines, was a strategic factor in American considerations. For, it was the closest of all the air bases of the free Asian countries to the Russian border.²⁵⁰ Considering the geographic halves of Pakistan and their respective approximation to Middle East and South East Asia, Pakistan appeared to be an ideal eastern bastion of the American defence line against communism. Then, what was the motivating force of Pakistan relating to alliances? Modern history has witnessed a maneuvering of states, great or small alike, for the attainment of appropriate places in the distribution of world power. This process is further determined by a country's given 'stresses and strains'. When Pakistan sought the U.S. alliance three considerations were uppermost in her mind.

First, the geographical location of Pakistan offered a tempting proposition to potential aggressors. West Pakistan had a common boundary with Iran, Afghanistan and Russia and China from the Pakistan side of Kashmir. Similarly, East Pakistan was surrounded on three sides by India and had a common border with Burma. As a matter of fact, the safety of the whole subcontinent "depends in a frightening degree on the stability of Pakistan; because Pakistan confronted "the first impact of all North West Defence problems of the Old India".²⁵¹ In the early days, Pakistan government looked upon India and Afghanistan with suspicion. Russian threat was implied, though real on historical perspectives. "For Russian in the 20th century an outlet in the Indian Ocean was the sole still untried possibility, was not Karachi a tempting bait to dangle before the eager Russian eyes".²⁵² Afghanistan was inimical to Pakistan right from the beginning. She neither voted in favor of Pakistan's admission to the U.N. nor recognized the *Durand* line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the contrary, Afghanistan fueled the agitation for the creation of *Pakhtoonistan* on the Pakistan side of the border. The very issue of *Pakhtoonistan* was, to

²⁴⁸ J.W. Spain, "Military Assistance", *American Political Science Review*, September, 1954, p.748.

²⁴⁹ "A new U.S. policy, treating Nehru as India's spokesman but not Asia's is called for. America's allies will be asked to support the U.S. in this stand. American aid to Pakistan can be the first in this policy". Source: *U.S. News and World Report*, December 25, 1953.

²⁵⁰ *New York Times*, April 19, 1953.

²⁵¹ Sir Olaf Caore, former Governor of N.W.F.P. said in London. Source: *Statesman*, April 6, 1949.

²⁵² A. Toynbee, *A study of History* (London, 1954), p.691. One still remembers how Stalin in the Yalta Conference tried to grab Maritime Provinces in the search for warm waters.

a great extent, responsible for driving the provincial government of the N.W.F.P. to curb parliamentary expressions.

As far as India was concerned, according to the official version, the Muslim League government of Pakistan had been smarting under a constant fear of Indian aggression. Other things being equal, the Chief opposition leader, Suhrawardy was of the view that "it is in the interest of Pakistan to make as much common cause as possible with *Bharat*".²⁵³ Both India and Pakistan had already a brief round of fighting on Kashmir in late 1947 and early 1948.²⁵⁴ So, fear had its functional value for Pakistan in that she had the drive for overcoming her deficiencies. The partition arrangements did not favor Pakistan to receive her due share of military equipments. The Pakistan army did not have modern equipment. Similar was the plight of the Pakistan Navy and Air Force. Despite financial limitations, the defence of Pakistan claimed the best attention even at the expense of other pressing requirements. But the efforts to build up a fighting machinery exerted "a heavy strain on Pakistan's economy",²⁵⁵ and the ready alternative was found in the United States' willingness to grant military aid. This was thought to be the available course for Pakistan in her quest for security to obtain a position in the alliances (or balance of power system) under the aegis of America. For, Pakistan being one of the small states could not individually hope to erect a bulwark of defence "to balance, much less overbalance" her "great power neighbors".²⁵⁶

No less was the desire for economic assistance associated with the military. At independence Pakistan was one of the poorest countries in the world shorn of significant mineral and industrial resources. It was a pastoral economy where investment of private capital both internal and external were at a low level. The urge for rising expectations was not suppressed by poverty. By 1953, Pakistan was put in a quandary of meeting defence requirements, an acute food shortage, consumer wants and the growing economy's need for capital goods and industrial raw materials. So, an alliance with the United States meant a short-circuiting of economic difficulties, for Pakistan.

Second, practicing the parliamentary type of democracy as she did, it was but natural that Pakistan chose to associate with those countries whose political and intellectual values she shared. Far back in 1947 Jinnah, while receiving the first U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, eulogized the Pakistan-American link: "The historic fight for self-government by your people and its achievement by the constant teaching and practice of democracy in your country has acted as a beacon light and has in no small measure served to give inspiration to nations ... like us."²⁵⁷ Obviously, it was a deliberate choice made by the

²⁵³ See *Dawn*, February 21, 1953.

²⁵⁴ They fought on Kashmir fiercely in late 1965.

²⁵⁵ Aslam Siddique, *Pakistan Seeks Security* (Lahore, 1960), p.56.

²⁵⁶ Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York, 1962), p.89.

²⁵⁷ Montague, George L., "The Pakistan-Afghan Debate", *Asian Survey*. (Vol. III, No. 12, December 1963), p.520.

Pakistan government. Otherwise, was not Russia geographically close enough to deliver 'aids' to Pakistan more quickly?

Third, fear of clandestine communist activities in Pakistan expedited her decision to join the alliances. The burgeoning influence of communists in Calcutta and other areas of India and neighboring countries was a premonitor to East Pakistan politics. Nature made East Pakistan a Gangetic delta, but man also made it a *delta of problems* the exploitation or solution of which was a challenge to both communist and non-communist adherents. With the prospect of general elections in East Pakistan drawing on apace, the M.L. government was apprehensive at growing activities of the opposition parties ranging from centre left to far left. The central government was in need of strength.

However, when the contributing causes of Pakistan American Alliance are analyzed, they will reveal, strictly speaking, that there were no identical interests between Pakistan and America in the sense of the Anglo-American alliance. At best it was an alliance "serving complementary interests".²⁵⁸ For America the containment of communism was the essential feature of the entire arrangements, whereas to Pakistan political, military and economic considerations were no less important. The seeds of conflict were already there awaiting tests. Foreign policy added a new dimension to the parliamentary politics of Pakistan.²⁵⁹ Mohammad Ali, a journeyman pro-American, now in his capacity as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan "touched on plans for the early implementation of American political and cultural ideas".²⁶⁰ The Americanization of the Prime Minister symbolized in his loud attire matched with bright necktie, the idea of introducing a decimal currency system, a right hand traffic rule of the road, television and his *Roosevelt-style fireside* chats through radio broadcasts were facts rather too early for the people and particularly the politicians who were more familiar with British reticence. Indeed, Pakistani swing to America ensued in Mohammad Ali's time. While trying with the idea of a 'brain trust' of non-political figures to be imported from foreign countries he chuckled with the pressmen: "I am very friendly with America. They are a very friendly people".²⁶¹ The Prime Minister formed a Cabinet of 11 men of whom six were hold-overs of the previous government. This again proves that the Governor General's action was aimed at certain persons of the previous Cabinet not the entire Ministry. All ministers coming from the Punjab were retained. And the Economic Affairs portfolio, formerly retained by an East Pakistani, was given to the Finance Minister, a Punjabi. The government's immediate task was the tidying up of the economic crisis. As a part of the Colombo Plan Canada and Australia granted 100,000

²⁵⁸ Morgenthau, *op.cit.*, p.184.

²⁵⁹ One knows how foreign policy dominated the internal politics of former West Germany, particularly the extent in which it had determined the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two main parties, i.e C.D.U., S.P.D.

²⁶⁰ *New York Times*, April 19, 1953.

²⁶¹ See *The New York Herald Tribune*, April 24, 1953.

and 45,000 tons of wheat respectively to Pakistan.²⁶² A further huge grant of wheat came from America²⁶³ to the tune of 1,000,000 tons to overcome food crisis, and a British loan of £10,000,000 was used to buy capital goods to modernize and expand Pakistan's agriculture.²⁶⁴ As a result of American foreign aid the Pakistan government was able to transform the shortage of food into a surplus, and the foreign exchange thus released could be channelized into development areas. By May 1954, the Prime Minister was able to broadcast to the nation that Pakistan had gained an overall recovery of Rs. 99 crores in balance of payments with other countries.²⁶⁵ On top of this, the Prime Minister, having arrived back from the U.S. to Pakistan, declared that economic aid to the tune of \$105,000,000 had been successfully negotiated with the U.S. government.²⁶⁶

Perhaps the most significant turn took place in the planning of economic development. A new Planning Board was established replacing the earlier Development Board which was working on a 6-year developmental plan as embodied in the Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development in Southeast Asia, to assess the resources of Pakistan and prepare a 5-year national plan of development beginning April 1, 1954.²⁶⁷ The newly constituted Planning Board was different from its predecessor in that it was given powers to advise on all aspects of economic development. The Ford Foundation was to provide experts to assist the Planning Board in its task.²⁶⁸ And, by August 1953, the Pakistan Economic Council, the supreme sanctioning authority under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister approved 30 schemes aiming at the overall development of the country.²⁶⁹ While the American aid stood Mohammad Ali government in good stead in giving a new lease of life to the Pakistan economy, it did not ensure political prosperity. The opposition forces were warming up to the fray the consequence of which would be an ushering of a new era of parliamentary life in Pakistan. The testing ground was the ensuing general election in East Pakistan fixed for early 1954—a provincial electoral exercise that would challenge the status quo of national politics. Earlier, the Prime Minister had urged upon his one-time political mentor, Suhrawardy to rejoin the Muslim League for retrieval of the prestigious organization which was credited for the creation of Pakistan. But Suhrawardy rebuffed him by maintaining that "democracy needs a true opposition". What is more, he continued, that the extant M.L. could hardly be considered a legitimate successor of the old organization to which all of them belonged; for, the M.L., trunk, branches, leaves and tendrils were all nominated by the ruling party, the Ministry—who would pledge

²⁶² Prime Minister's disclosure at the Press Conference: *Dawn*, May 22, 1953.

²⁶³ The resolution calling on the U.S. government to send wheat to Pakistan was introduced in the House of Representatives within 48 hours after the appointment of Mohammad Ali as the Prime Minister. See *Hindu*, April 30, 1953.

²⁶⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 8, 1953.

²⁶⁵ *Dawn*, May 1, 1954.

²⁶⁶ *New York Times*, October 24, 1954.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, July 19, 1953.

²⁶⁸ *Financial Times*, July 20, 1953.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, August 27, 1953.

support to the ruling clique to the exclusion of the persons of independent views.²⁷⁰ The electioneering fever gripped the M.L. parliamentary party which postponed constitution making and adjourned the Constituent Assembly until the general election was over in East Pakistan."²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ See *Dawn*, October 23, 1953.

²⁷¹ *New York Times*, November 16, 1953.

UNITED FRONT

Professor Ludwig Erhard once remarked that "a true democracy presupposed individual personalities, who remain conscious of their political and human freedom".²⁷² Nowhere had this remark more relevancy than in an under-developed polity like Pakistan whose political consciousness was not solely dependent upon overall mass literacy. Hence personalities were an essential feature of Pakistan. The octogenarian legendary, Huq, a smashing lawyer in the pre-partition days, was twice the Premier of Bengal, the President of the M.L. and General Secretary of the Congress simultaneously in the twenties, and the mover of the Lahore Resolution (1940) who had already earned the title of *Sher-e-Bangla* meaning the tiger of Bengal featured signally. In short, he was an All-India figure in those days. Professor Coupland thought Haq to be a 'resourceful' politician. A substantial number of people in Indo-Pakistan subcontinent thought Haq had the tongue of an Edmund Burke, the courage of a Napoleon and the pen of a Macaulay. These ascriptions were not exactly *ipse dixit*.²⁷³ His spirit of parliamentarianism and independence of mind were amply manifest when in 1943, as the Prime Minister of Bengal, he said in reply to the Governor's²⁷⁴ letter that "I owe you no explanation whatever in respect of my conduct" for, "My colleagues and I are responsible to the legislature". He refused to see the Governor "unless sufficient amends are made for the language used" in his "letter under reply".²⁷⁵ Haq himself was a legend – an institution where many a politician had their early lesson. His occasional but fatal emotionalism many a time signaled his eclipse and at times, emergence as a political turncoat as well. But everything boiled down to one thing that his magic name i.e. Haq Shahib was affectionately and reverentially stuck to the lips of Bengali underdogs who were immensely benefited by his social measures.²⁷⁶ The eyes of the middle-aged people would moisture and faces of the underdogs would glow with devotional fervor since he was essentially regarded as the man of the people. A politician of Haq's persuasion could always sway mass politics. Now that Jinnah was dead, the seven years of M.L. rule of drifts, shifts, maladministration and postponement, paved the way for Haq – who had incurred Jinnah's wrath and suffered an 11-year political eclipse – to rise from his old ashes like a *Phoenix*.

Suhrawardy, equally brilliant, dashing, ebullient and enterprising but unlike Haq he was discreet pragmatic, dedicated organizer, and calculating having proverbial

²⁷² Quoted in Richard Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany* (London, 1957), p.139.

²⁷³ Lord Zetland on Haq: "... the youthful vigour of Pitt, the eagle flight of Gladstone, the enthralling magic of Disraeli and the moral grandeur of John Bright." Quoted in A.S.M. Abdul Rab, *A.K. Fazlul Haq*. (Lahore. 1966), p.196.

²⁷⁴ Sir John Herbert.

²⁷⁵ Letter quoted in the Observer Supplement on "Shera Bangla", April 27, 1963.

²⁷⁶ The Bengal Debt-Settlement Board, a Money-lending Act, and a Tenancy Act were cases in point.

courage. Himself a layer of captivating repute like Haq, Suhrawardy had the additional benefit of going to Oxford and Gray's Inn. Suhrawardy's was the approach of channeling popular movement through the path of constitutionalism. He upheld the preeminence of the rule of law and parliamentarianism to the last. His political career was one of gradual adaptation in that he entered politics with urbane sophistication decanted in a *Saville Row* suit, but ended up successfully as a 'people's man' by having merged himself in the landscape of Pakistan multitude. He was one of the vanguards of independence movement. He rose to the position of premiership in undivided Bengal in British India. It was widely believed that Suhrawardy's contribution to the creation of Pakistan was phenomenon. But his onetime championing of the concept of sovereign undivided Bengal plus convenient devotion to Gandhi for purposes of Hindu-Muslim amity after partition offered a welcome pretext to the ruling coterie of Pakistan to treat him as a *persona non grata* to Pakistan. Now that his A.M.L. Party – the only opposition party that was built up in an otherwise oppositionless state – was "perhaps the strongest in the fight against the Muslim league". Suhrawardy, what according to an International Daily Newspaper, was "the most powerful single individual in the United front".²⁷⁷

If Haq and Suhrawardy were to be viewed as the local *Mossaqdeks* of East Pakistan, then Bhasani had also some force of a *Kassani*. Though Bhasani's religious appeals were confined to the barest minimum. His personal sway extended to the rural peasantry because he yapped with the underdogs²⁷⁸ for their good. He was viewed as the *red Dean of Bengal*, but, although a demagogue, *per excellence*, he was not akin to religious fanaticism. His role in the referendum which resulted in the Sylhet district being incorporated into Pakistan was recognized by Pakistanis. But he soon fell out with the M.L. government in East Pakistan, and for that matter with the central government also, on issues like language, foreign policy and economic deprivation of East Pakistanis, etc., etc. He was gaoled by the government for a long time.²⁷⁹ But he was set free in consideration of popular demands and the ensuing elections.

A coalescence of Haq-led K.S.P. and Suhrawardy – Bhasani-led A.M.L. took place on 4th December, 1953 on the basis of minimum programme. But they were willing to "contact all parties opposed to the Muslim League and forge a broader United front ... with all the parties".²⁸⁰ As a result a broad-based U.F. (United Front) was formed consisting of four parties e.g. A.M.L., K.S.P., Nizam-i-Islam and Ganatartri Dal²⁸¹ on the

²⁷⁷ *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 1954.

²⁷⁸ In East Pakistan Bhasani, was also called *Quaid-e-Muzloom*, meaning leader of the underdog.

²⁷⁹ Bhasani was prisoner 17 times during British regime - a total of more than 15 years. See *New York Times*, January 9, 1954.

²⁸⁰ *Dawn*, December 5, 1953.

²⁸¹ Democratic Party.

basis of 21-point programme.²⁸² But the emergence of U.F. had a more complex orientation than appeared on the surface.

The government took note, of the East Pakistan Communist Party's desire of forging a United Democratic Front as manifest in its party programme of June 1951, on the basis of "anti-feudal and anti-imperialist outlook".²⁸³ The C.P. (Communist Party) emboldened by the support of Haq (K.S.P.), Ataur Rahman (A.M.L.) and Abul Hasheem (Khilafate-Rabbani Party) for its anti M.L. stand successfully held a big meeting in Dacca, for the first time, on 30th October, 1953.²⁸⁴ In a conference held at Dacca from November 10 to 12, 1953, the C.P. passed a resolution calling for active participation in the coming election. A manifesto²⁸⁵ (22-point programme) for the campaign was approved, and a committee was appointed to establish a U.F. of all democratic parties.²⁸⁶ This urge for U.F. was immediately echoed in the council meetings of the A.M.L. on 16th November, 1953, and G.D. (Ganatantri Dal) on 28th November, 1953 respectively.²⁸⁷ But as a piece of supreme election strategy the C.P. was officially disaffiliated when the 'Front' came into being. Suhrawardy was always chary about the U.F. candidates and were averse to communists.²⁸⁸ As a matter of fact the rightist elements in the U.F. far outweighed the leftist ones. And, under pressure of Haq and Suhrawardy who were liberals, moderates and parliamentarians to the very marrow of their bones—extreme election planks such as *leaving the Commonwealth, anti-military pacts, confiscation of foreign capitals* were deleted from the official manifesto of the U.F. Though the U.F. dared not associated with the communists openly, in reality, it was they, as had been correctly observed by the Chief Minister of East Pakistan,²⁸⁹ who augmented the organisational work of the campaign which *ipso facto* boosted the U.F. cause. Why did the communists support the parties forming U.F.? The best answer was Lenin's dictum that "The Bolshevik supports other parties, the way 'a rope supports a hanging man.' The semantic i.e. 'United Front' had communist derivation. In the book "organizational Weapon—a story in *Bolshevik* strategy and tactics the term "United Front" is explained as follows:" to assert this so-called interest in other people's problems, the *Bolshevik* frequently resorts to the tactics of the United Front. This offers many opportunities to pursue assorted but interrelated Bolshevik aims, access to sources of power and the opportunity to train agents".²⁹⁰

The ubiquitous nature of the C.P. in the elections arena found expression in the following way. Given that the respectability of a political party depends on its

²⁸² See Appendix III.

²⁸³ Governor's letter, *loc.cit.*, (Top Secret), D.O.No. 127/PS, 26.7.1954. Appendix 2.

²⁸⁴ *New York Times*, October 31, 1953.

²⁸⁵ See Appendix IV.

²⁸⁶ *New China News Agency*, December 14, 1953.

²⁸⁷ See *Dawn*, November 17 and 29, 1953.

²⁸⁸ *New York Times*, January 19, 1954.

²⁸⁹ *Dawn*, March 15, 1954.

²⁹⁰ See Governor's letter, *loc.cit.*, (Top secret, D.O. No. 127/PS 26.7.1954. Appendix 3

participation in the normal politics of the country, the C.P. of Pakistan was in line with the communist strategy as adopted at the 19th Congress held in Russia in October 1952. Accordingly, it took a 'national' position in uniting different parties on the basis of grievances against the ruling party i.e. the M.L. And in the bid for seizure of power, their strategy was like that of other communists to smuggle themselves inside the established organizations with the aim of "taking power 'from within'"²⁹¹

In the agonizing task of building an opposition at an initial period, Suhrawardy and for that matter the A.M.L. was lax in its recruitment process. Some notable communists infiltrated into the rank and file of the A.M.L.²⁹² What was more they found an ally in the person of Bhasani, the President of the East Pakistan A.M.L. who was intrigued by the C.P.'s 'economic front'. What is more, it had backing "from the powerful General Secretary of the Awami Muslim League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and a section of the younger elements with leftist tendencies who were pillars of strength to the party".²⁹³ The G.D., one of the components of the U.F., was, according to the government, 'the Communist Party under a different name'. There was no doubt that many of its members were also members of the C.P. There was a Youth Convention held in January, 1951, which resulted in the creation of the Y.L. (Youth league). And the C.P.'s infiltration in it was complete in that by December, 1953 it occupied the main offices of the Y.L. 'the Second Front' of the C.P. The E.P.S.U. (East Pakistan Students' Union) which had been regularly agitating against Commonwealth ties, military pacts, the Rosenbergs' trial, etc., was under the clutches of the C.P. through the instrumentalities of the G.D. and Y.L. with which the E.P.S.U. rubbed shoulders. In the education institutions, such as the University of Dacca, Colleges and High Schools of the province, there were 'extreme communists'. The subtlety of communist indoctrination found expression in a Girl's High School when an English passage was asked to be rendered into Bengalee, during an examination: "Now comrades, what is the nature of this life of ours? Let us face it: our lives are miserable, laborious and short. We are born, we are given just so much food as will keep the breath in our bodies ... We are slaughtered with hideous cruelty". Similarly, the Trade Union²⁹⁴ Movement was not free from communist influence. Bhasani's soft corner for the working class made him eligible for the Presidency of some labor unions sponsored by the C.P. Bhasani was the president of two important labor organization e.g. the Adamjee Mills Mazdoor Union and the East Pakistan Railways Employees' League. Besides, the Communists hold²⁹⁵ in the rank and file of the Home Transport Workers' Union, Printing Press Workers' Union and Mills Workers' Union was dominant.

²⁹¹ Bernard S. Morris, "Recent Shifts in Communist Strategy", in Kantsky (ed.), *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, p.301.

²⁹² See Ajit Guin, *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 10, 1953.

²⁹³ See, Governor's letter *loc. cit.* Appendix 4 & 8.

²⁹⁴ Noticeably, Huq and Suhrawardy was very much opposed with idea of C.P.S runing the U.F.

²⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, communists penetrated in the labour force long before the creation of the U.F. Mr. Karim who managed mills in Calcutta before partition recognised many communist elements in the labour force and warned the administration. See *Times*, December 29, 1954.

In December, 1953, the C.P. in a document e.g. Election Affairs and Our Immediate Task, devised a plan of forming an All-Parties anti-M.L. Workers' Camp. Accordingly, the communist cells at the district, sub-divisions and Thana levels were asked to work in that direction. Again, a willing Bhasani was tempted by the C.P. to form the so-called *Karmi Sibir* meaning Workers' Camp comprising all parties to fight the M.L. in the elections. This was on 9th January, 1954. The A.P.P. of the West Pakistan joined this 'camp' as workers.²⁹⁶ In short, the workers of the K.S. (*Karmi Sibir*) i.e. vigorous young people, students, journalists, teachers, etc., were in a different way, the *storm troopers* of electioneering who criss-crossed the entire province with the sole purpose of popularizing the U.F. and its programmes. Needless to add, that communists were there, too.²⁹⁷ And the interesting thing was, that through these various 'covers' the communists were able to circumvent the U.F.'s official stand by letting a few *Trojan horses* pass over the hurdle of nomination mechanism of the U.F.²⁹⁸ Furthermore, two cardinal communist purposes were served in that the two component parties of the U.F., e.g. A.M.L. and G.D. had specific planks in their respective party manifestos in favor of a neutral foreign policy and against joining "any military alliance".²⁹⁹ And the theoretical silence of the U.F. vis-à-vis foreign policy degenerated into electioneering eloquence; for, a considerable number of the U.F. candidates minced no words in portraying the aftermath of military pacts, in terms of Japanese Hiroshima to their dazed audience, as the political air became heavier at the inevitability of military aid to Pakistan. Interestingly, Suhrawardy was a bit equivocal on this matter while saying "by and large I am in favor of Pakistan remaining neutral in a World War."³⁰⁰

Under the Separate Electorates system there were 72 reserved seats for the non-Muslims, e.g. Caste Hindus, Scheduled Caste Hindus, Buddhists and Christians in a legislature of 309 seats. The National Congress' attempt to create an agreed minority front was abortive. Instead, among the minorities a U.F. was forged consisting of the Gana Samity (a splinter group of the old Congress), the Socialist Party, Abhoy Ashram and Independents to contest the elections.³⁰¹

However, the communist elements threw themselves as a spanner in the hustings. Surely, they acted as an auxiliary force remaining underground. They were, in no way, a deciding or pivotal factor. The popular Haq was no connoisseur of Communism, nor the astute Suhrawardy receptive to it. Unequivocally, Suhrawardy claimed that the U.F.

²⁹⁶ See *Dawn*, June 3, 1954.

²⁹⁷ Governor's letter, *loc.cit.* The writer's findings based on other sources, are in substantial agreement with the observations. Appendix 5.

²⁹⁸ *The New York Times*, October 25, 1954, Editorial "Crisis in Pakistan".

²⁹⁹ *Dawn*, November 17, 1953; November 29, 1953 and *Christian Science Monitor*, February 3, 1954; *Dawn*, January 10, 1954.

³⁰⁰ See *Dawn*, May 14, 1954.

³⁰¹ *Ibid*, February 2, 1954.

candidates were campaigning against the communists whose proffered support was refused.³⁰²

Unwisely, the Central Government undertook some negative measures in that the polling date was shifted from early February 1954 to March 8, 1954 to the financial disadvantage of the opposition. Arrests of more than 200 people, including a number of alleged communists were made under the Public Safety Ordinance and finally a desperate offer of the Governorship of Bengal to Haq was made in vain.³⁰³ And to crown everything the central government sanctioned \$80,000 for financing the M.L. elections in East Pakistan.³⁰⁴ The Government party was also assisted by all paraphernalia of administration and executive clout as complained by Suhrawardy. That was why he also insisted on having a *caretaker government* "to ensure free and fair election" in the province.³⁰⁵ Then, followed the traversing of the luminaries of the M.L. including Jinnah's sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah³⁰⁶ across the country to bring home to the people the indispensability of the M.L. She joined the tautology—"our hard won independence is at stake".³⁰⁷ Government oriented Newspapers displayed cartoons depleting the opposition leaders, Haq, Suhrawardy and Bhasani as an ill-sorted crew in a rocky boat (Boat happened be the election symbol of the U.F.). Quite a large section of *Ulema* also supported the M.L., for they thought they had still something to milk from the old organization. Unlike its opponents the M.L. had no challenging 'planks' save a ridiculous one, viz. "Vote us out and India will swallow the divided halves of our country."³⁰⁸ The Prime Minister warned the electorate that a vote against the M.L. would be a vote against Pakistan interests.³⁰⁹ This indirect muckraking campaign of the M.L. against the opposition, and precisely the U.F. of whose leaders were not less patriot before the public eyes, did not work anymore than Churchill's warning to the British electorate against the labor party did in 1945.

Suhrawardy was elected the president of the U.F. Virtually, he bore the main brunt of nominating candidates purely on the basis of suitability.³¹⁰ Wearing in *Khadi Pazama* and Punjabi perching on *Khatia*,³¹¹ skipping daily meal, oblivious of routine shaving, he would work day in and day out either in the U.F. office or at large engrossed over head and ears in election hub bub. He would stomp up and down the countryside like a

³⁰² See *New York Times*, January 10, 1954.

³⁰³ See *Dawn*, February 2, and February 25, 1954. Also, *Times*, March 3, 1954 and *New York Times*, February 20, 1954.

³⁰⁴ *New York Times*, January 9, 1954.

³⁰⁵ See *Dawn*, November 22, 1953. Also see *Dawn*, December 22, 1953.

³⁰⁶ She had her title too, namely '*Mother-e-Millat*' meaning the Mother of the nation.

³⁰⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, March 10, 1954.

³⁰⁸ *Sunday Observer*, March 6, 1954.

³⁰⁹ *Dawn*, January 16, 1954.

³¹⁰ See Appendix V. The letters addressed by Suhrawardy would signify how serious he was in the ensuing elections and beyond.

³¹¹ An improvised "Couch".

meteor addressing meetings, campaigning and propagandizing for the U.F. candidates. In all these exercises he was greatly assisted by the formidable Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who according to Suhrawardy was his "star organiser"³¹² Similarly, Sher-e-Bangla and Maulana Bhasani were on their wings touring constituencies wherever needed.

On the 8th of March, 1954, the majority of the country's population residing in the Eastern wing was poised to fulfill democracy's first test of exercising voting rights based on universal adult suffrage, the first of its kind. As many as 23,020 polling booths were catered for the benefit of 1,96,77,013 voters of whom 1,05,71,949 were men to elect their 309 members out of 1,284 contesting candidates.³¹³ More than 50 symbols such as boat, hurricane, camel, bicycle, crescent, hamper, saw, rice, wheat, automobile and flower were pressed on the ballot boxes to help the unsophisticated electorate to identify their choices of candidates with that of the symbols.³¹⁴ The East Pakistan elections were a refreshing contrast to the ones held earlier in the Western wing of Pakistan—an electioneering model for any underdeveloped polity in that it demonstrated how a given people largely unenlightened, technically speaking, could, on the one hand, use the ballot box as an input side of their collective power unsmirched by bloodshed or coercion and get across the election messages among themselves through the vehicle of an ingenuous communication process in a country lacking modern mass media, on the other.

Suhrawardy reminisced how ungrudging help and assistance were given by the voters of each constituency. Youngmen worked and the student community spent money from their own pockets to ensure the success of their candidates.³¹⁵ The student population played a dynamic role in bringing about the defeat of the M.L.³¹⁶ Constituencies were swarming with dedicated workers whose strategy of political communication was designed to make the unfamiliar, the incomprehensible and the unconventional issue appear understandable to the masses. The entertainment function of communication was emphasized, in that political messages were transmitted through both oral and physically demonstrable communications. In the former case they were folk songs, people's dramatic songs, lyrical plays; and the latter, shadow play, one-act play, dance, mock-heroic play and farce. It was a solo performance by the U.F. group. All these media invariably portrayed the earlier rising hopes of the people at the dawn of independence and their gradual disillusionment at the hands of the M.L. governments till men beheld the march of the U.F. on the scene which revived their hopes in the 21-

³¹² "Memoirs", *op.cit.*

³¹³ 986 men contested the 228 (male) seats and 32 Muslim women fought for 9 seats. Scheduled caste candidates (151) contested 36 seats. 3 scheduled caste women contested for one woman seat. 28 caste Hindu seats were contested by 101 candidates, while 12 Buddhists fought for 2 seats. And 2 contested for 1 Christian seat. See *Dawn*, March 11, 1954. The communist party in its individual capacity put up 10 candidates - 7 in Hindu districts and 3 in Muslim areas. See *New York Herald Tribune*, March 8, 1954.

³¹⁴ *Times*, March 9, 1954; *New York Times*, February 7, 1954.

³¹⁵ See *Dawn*, May 14, 1954.

³¹⁶ See *Hindu*, March 20, 1954.

point programme. The rhythm and music of political communication minimized resistance and maximized the cognitive grasp of the voting people, and precisely the stoic citizens, namely boatmen, fishermen, rickshawpuller, taxidriver, labourers, postman, peon and cultivator, who suddenly experienced new ripples of hope in their boggy minds, and sensation of politics. In short, it was more than an election, nay a *movement*.

Reflecting on the inadequate growth of parliamentary institutions and imposing of 'leadership from outside'³¹⁷ in Pakistan Professor Morris-Jones thought the holding of elections might "break the pattern and let in a cleansing breath of real reform."³¹⁸ As a matter of fact, the East Pakistan elections did have 'a cleansing breath' whose effect was invigorating in an otherwise monolithic state of politics. The ballot boxes produced not only a 'landslide but an avalanche', in that the ruling M.L. party, credited for the achievement of Pakistan, was ignobly rejected' – a rare electoral feat in Asia.

The results were the following:

The U.F. and its supporters

A.M.L. (U.F.)	140
K.S.P. (U.F.)	34
M.L.	9
Independents	12
Khilafat-e-Rabbani	1
*Y.L.	15
*G.D. (U.F.)	10
*C.P.	<u>4</u>
	237

* Even the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Nurul Amin was defeated by an 18-year old student by 7,000 votes. 65 percent voters went to the polling booth. This would have been more if women were less shy. See *Times*, March 17, 1954. See also, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (1954) which also maintains that out of 19,677,013 votes 65% turned up to the polling booth. p.13, 514A.

Minority

Scheduled Caste Federations	27
Pakistan National Congress	24
+U.F. (Minority)	10
+G.D. (Minority)	2
+C.P.	5

³¹⁷ Such as Mohammad Ali himself, who was not a member of the Constituent Assembly when he was called upon to assume Premiership. And the membership of the Constituent Assembly (leg.) followed the Premiership not preceded.

³¹⁸ W.H. Morris-Jones, "Experience of Independence - India and Pakistan", *Political Quarterly* (29, 1958), p.237.

+C.P.	5
Buddhist	2
Christian	1
Independent (Caste Hindu)	<u>1</u>
	237 ³¹⁹

+ Though the C.P. won 9 seats officially its unofficial alleged fronts e.g. Y.L., G.D., U.F. (Minority), G.D. (Minority) gained 37 seats. Besides, there were more unmarked C.P. sympathisers in the A.M.L. and in the category of Independents. That meant leftist elements had their numbers in the legislature exceeding 46 in a house of 309 seats.

The electoral results at once acquired an all-Pakistan significance. The influential newspaper *Dawn* (usually known as the official organ of the M.L. government) acclaimed the electoral result with an epithet e.g. *the awful majesty of the people's will*, and warned Mohammad Ali of its consequences on the oligarchic nature of the M.L. of which he was a member. The editorial cautioned the central leadership not to allow "itself to be swayed by the false propaganda that the people who have been returned to power in East Pakistan are less patriotic than those who sit in power in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and elsewhere in the western wing."³²⁰ Evaluating the reactions of the masses of the people in West Pakistan, *Dawn* remarked that the people's elation was 'phenomenal', but also noted that high placed persons (Muslim leaguers) were trying to work up a feeling as though the U.F. victory in East Pakistan was a "threat to West Pakistan".³²¹ Unequivocally, Suhrawardy had declared earlier that the U.F. leaders would fight to the last to maintain the integrity of Pakistan and its independence. He refuted the bootless accusation that if the U.F. won it would strike at the root of Pakistan.³²²

An index of the common people's feeling in West Pakistan was amply demonstrated when Suhrawardy riding on the crest of triumphal wave arrived in Karachi. He was rapturously welcomed by all the various groups opposed to the Muslim league.³²³ People regardless of party hue with waving placards with inscriptions such as "Long live Suhrawardy", "Long live Fazlul Haq", "Long live the U.F.", "Down with dictatorship", "Down with Imperialism" and "Dissolve Constituent Assembly", gave Suhrawardy a hero's welcome, "the biggest ever seen in Karachi".³²⁴ It was not just a courtesy that miles-long crowds owed to a winning leader. It was an effusion of West Pakistan people's aspirations as symbolized in the U.F. victory. In a vein of statesmanship Suhrawardy, the astute organizer of the U.F. campaign declared that he would fight constitutionally and fight for the rescue of the people from fear of

³¹⁹ R.L. Park, "Pakistan's Troubled Province", *Far Eastern Survey* (May 1954), pp. 71-72. According to the *Dawn*, the U.F. won 222 seats: A.M.L., 142; K.S.P. 48; Nizam-e-Islam, 19 and Ganatantri Dal, 13. See *Dawn*, October 19, 1954.

³²⁰ *Dawn*, March 18, 1954, "The awful majesty of the people's will", (Editorial).

³²¹ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1954; Also see *Manchester Guardian*, April 5, 1954.

³²² See *Dawn*, February 8, 1954.

³²³ *Sunday Times*, October 3, 1954.

³²⁴ *Dawn*, March 19, 1954.

demoralisation both in East and West Pakistan.³²⁵ There was a school of thought who opined that U.F. victory was negative in that the people just wanted to get rid of the M.L. government. And, after all, the 'general will' as revealed through the ballot-box was uneducated. While the desirability of an enlightened electorate is always unquestionable, one should bear in mind what Professor Morris-Jones observed in connection with the Indian general elections, the implied overestimation of the "rational character"³²⁶ of an educated electorate. And, as far as the East Pakistan people were concerned, they were not just robots voting mechanically in favor of the magic name called 'Haq'. For, it was the same electorate which had not scrupled to reject his leadership in the elections of 1946. The broad political consciousness of Bengali electorate has always been remarkable.

The people of East Pakistan had received unsullied political education in the school of recently held general election; for, unlike West Pakistan, there were neither the so-called 'vote banks' nor the feudal incubus, worth mentioning at whose beck people voted. It was, on balance, 'a public-spirited vote' cast against what Mill might call "the monster evil, the overruling influence of oligarchy".³²⁷ For, was it not the M.L. government which alienated the people by having repressed the growth of opposition, incarcerated people under so-called Security Acts, mishandled the language issue, stumbled on the constitution making, and sent the price of salt beyond the reach of the common people? It was a movement of the first magnitude in that the electoral mandate emphasized a rethinking of the basic postulates of Pakistan's political ideology and governmental structure (See Appendix: 21-point programme). Explaining the party manifesto in the East Pakistan Awami League council session in July 1953, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the General Secretary of the organisation maintained "If we are to find a permanent solution of the situation in the country then we have to turn especially to the historic Lahore resolution". This was again repeated in November, 1953.³²⁸ The main streams of the movement were three fold namely, socialistic democratic with strong tributaries of Bengali nationalism. The U.F. registered the sapling of a social democratic and autonomy movement in Pakistan. It did not undermine liberalism. On the contrary, it upheld the rule of law and parliamentarianism. As a matter of fact, as many as 14 'planks' out of 21 had all-Pakistan bearings a pointer to the brief but spontaneous repercussions that were evident in West Pakistan. This simultaneous growth of liberalistic socialistic and centrifugal ideas were the portents of politics of moderation in Pakistan which had been, since then, hard pressed in their proper development. Certainly, the U.F. was not an organization of extremism. It was neither "communist nor fellow-travelling".³²⁹ It fought and won the elections on a socialist-democratic and federal platform. Indeed, communist elements were there, but that consideration was

³²⁵ See *Ibid*, Dawn, May 14, 1954.

³²⁶ W.H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India* (London, 1957), p.328.

³²⁷ J.S. Mill, *On Liberty and Considerations of Representative Government*, (Oxford, 1948), p.234.

³²⁸ See *Ibid*, Dawn, July 10, 1953; Dawn, November 22, 1953.

³²⁹ *Sunday Observer*, March 20, 1954. See also: *Journal de Geneve* as quoted in *Dawn*, March 31, 1954.

not a factor for the powerful right wing leader and one of the architects of the U.F., Suhrawardy to say categorically: "I think progressive capitalism is ideal for Pakistan. It is time to prick the communist bubble".³³⁰ Continuing he said that the U.F. had no truck with the reds and they were no part of it. Similarly, *Sher-e-Bangla* insisted that "there are no communists in the province".³³¹ Essentially, the U.F. victory was the victory of a movement which received an electoral sanction of Pakistan's *Cinderella Province*, East Pakistan. It was a "bloodless revolution" as it was grandiloquently called.³³² Alas, the victory was destined to be a pyrrhic one.

There witnessed some delay in the formation and expansion of *Sher-e-Bangla* Cabinet, what according to Suhrawardy a kind of 'Chicanery' on the part of the Governor who was in collusion with the Prime Minister.³³³ As the surface would have us believe it, with the lapse of time the U.F. showed some signs of factionalism and it was alleged that the Awami Muslim League—the biggest and strongest partner of the U.F. was a bit slighted and the influence of Suhrawardy in the Cabinet was rendered nominal.

Haq "coming with irrepressible *Churchillian* high spirits"³³⁴ (he was 83) formed the U.F. government in East Pakistan in April, 1954. The Pakistan National Congress, second biggest party in the legislature pledged its support for the new government in its pursuit of progressive and popular measures. The first gesture of the new government was the immediate release of 210 political prisoners out of 276 imprisoned earlier by the M.L. government.³³⁵ But before the new parliamentary government could get on its work properly, the quicksands of two controversial issues, namely, (a) the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and (b) foreign policy, buried it altogether.

(a) Now that elections had been won the U.F. and its components both collectively and individually, demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, since the people of East Pakistan had no confidence, as had been revealed in the recently held elections, in the members representing, at the moment, East Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly.³³⁶ Fortright, Suhrawardy suggested that "It would be well, therefore, if instead of wasting time in evolving an unacceptable constitution, the members were to set about taking steps to dissolve the present Constituent Assembly and replace it by a directly elected body".³³⁷ In fact he had been hammering this point for long time.³³⁸ This disturbed the central government, for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by any suitable legislation would mean also the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly as

³³⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 1954.

³³¹ *The New York Herald Tribune*, May 31, 1954.

³³² See Ian lang, *Sunday Times*, October 3, 1954.

³³³ *Dawn*, April 23, 1954.

³³⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, July 19, 1954.

³³⁵ *Dawn*, April 5, 1954.

³³⁶ See *Dawn*, April 2, 1954; April 4, 1954, and April 8, 1954.

³³⁷ *Ibid*, March 12, 1954.

³³⁸ See *Dawn*, January 26, 1952, February 3, 16 and 18, 1952, Also December 22, 1953.

the parliament to which the central government owed its existence. The politics of pragmatism confronted the legalistic-moralistic aspects of constitutional laws. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, maintained in the parliament that he knew "no parallel in the constitutional history of any federation to the effect that when the composition of a province or a unit changes the representatives of that province or unit in the Federal Government must also change at the same time."³³⁹ Obviously, the Prime Minister was speaking as though Pakistan had already settled her problems of institution-building and was at comparable to other federally structured parliamentary governments such as Canada or Australia. The Prime Minister might have scored a technical point, but the analogies did not hold much water in the context of Pakistan politics, and precisely, when the position of East Pakistan as a unit vis-à-vis Federal Government was unusual. For there was no federal polity in the community of the commonwealth countries or beyond where a single unit contained a population far exceeding the sum total numbers of other units like that of East Pakistan.³⁴⁰ Again, it was equally unthinkable that a ruling party – to which the central government owed its life having been severely defeated in the country's biggest electoral constituency i.e. East Pakistan would rob the new balance of forces, released in the elections, of their proper significance by its intransigence. Even if it should be granted that the Constituent Assembly was entitled to go ahead with constitution-making as envisaged by the independence Act, further complications would arise when the Constituent Assembly was to sit as the federal legislature, as well. In other words, Pakistan was to be theoretically prepared to adhere to untilted central leadership so long as the constitution-making remained incomplete, even at the expense of the people's will. The logic implied the creation of a veritable oligarchic body in perpetuity.

However, the U.F. demand for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was simultaneously accompanied by demands for provincial autonomy (one of the main 'planks' of the U.F.) as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 (usually termed as Pakistan Resolution, see Appendix X) and recognition of Bengali as one of the State languages. This was a situation that at once called for a spirit of compromise and accommodation. But politics wrenched into negative directions in that there started "a malicious campaign to create the impression that the people whom the East Pakistan electorate have so resoundingly voted into power are anti-Pakistan elements".³⁴¹ The worn-out tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing, i.e. *Bharati* machinations was imputed to the activities of the U.F. Even Suhrawardy, a Bengali with some difference, who hovered between Dhaka and Karachi with his eyes always on the integrity of Pakistan dismissed the whole thing as "lying and mischievous propaganda,

³³⁹ C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. 1, March 20, 1954, p.286. The A.P.P. in the parliament strongly urged for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. One M.L., M.C.A. of East Paksitan, Azizuddin Ahmed, in response to the U.F. demands already resigned saying "We are not true representatives of the people. We were elected by a party which has gone down". See *New York Times*, March 19, 1954.

³⁴⁰ There were 45 members representing East Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly.

³⁴¹ *Dawn*, March 22, 1954 (Editorial), "Sorting out the Situation".

carried on by the M.L. during the election campaign and broadcast through the mouths of West Pakistani leaders that the U.F. was being influenced by the Hindus, that it has received money from *Bharat* that it would unite *Pakistan* with *Bharat*".³⁴²

Most relevantly, a foreign journalist of a reputed English Daily committed his considered opinion to the following manner: "... four months of teaching and travelling in East Pakistan have convinced me that the chance of reviving the political and administrative link between *Dacca and Calcutta* is as remote as that of *Canada* joining the U.S when leaders in West Pakistan talk of secession, of union with India, of "Hindu" money and Calcutta based conspiracies, they are deceiving themselves and angering an already frustrated Eastern wing".³⁴³ Hooked by the popular demand the central government was on the look-out for an appropriate pretext to clamp down the agitation. Incidentally, the demand for the dissolution in East Pakistan was also echoed in the Western wing as well.

(b) As we have shown earlier the communists had their incarnation in various forms in the body politic of Pakistan. They were certainly not an overwhelming force. But they were still a force to be reckoned with. The communist influence had an erratic snowballing effect. It grew in stature when the moderate populist movement foundered on the shoals of political intransigence. Moderates in their frustration found refuge in the communist fold with shoulder-shrugging pessimism. Young people and students in their disillusionment developed a 'tragic hobby' in the cult of communism and scurried along innumerable roads, lanes and by-lanes, disheveled, ill-kempt and greasy. But when the course of politics became less refractory there was a corresponding waning of the communist hold. In sum, communism in Pakistan was not a self-perpetuating creed, *a priori*. Economic reasons apart, its strength was derived from the weakness of the country's moderate and liberal political leadership.

Remorselessly, the Mohammad Ali government pursued the foreign policy of which the people had no inkling whatever. What the Prime Minister ought to have done was either to have the grave issues of foreign policy and its various commitments debated and considered on the floor of the Parliament or left them under a moratorium till such time as might be convenient for the government to convince the people concerning the utility of the pacts and refute the charge that the government was entering pacts clandestinely at the back of the people. This was more appropriate particularly when the M.L.'s democratic credentials were challenged in the East Pakistan elections. Instead, the Mohammad Ali government committed Pakistan in the East-West cold war with such a zeal that "socialist countries", commented *Pakistan Times*, "are viewed with unreasoning hostility".³⁴⁴ Earlier, the Moscow radio had made a broadcast to this effect that the anti-red drive in Pakistan had been ordered by the U.S. as part of the recent

³⁴² *Ibid*, March 18, 1954.

³⁴³ See *Manchester Guardian*, July 19, 1954.

³⁴⁴ *Pakistan Times* quoted in *Hindu*, October 8, 1954.

military aid agreement.³⁴⁵ The 'hush hush' manner of handling foreign policy evoked widespread criticism. The U.S. government granted military aid to Pakistan in February 1954 and in the following month Pakistan entered into a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey an indirect link with N.A.T.O. These were the "significant developments"³⁴⁶ of the year – the Prime Minister told the nation in a broadcast. The communist activities doubled through reinforcements from India; for, East Pakistan, as usual, served as "a bolt hole for communists on the run from West Bengal".³⁴⁷ This was possible because communists in India were outmaneuvered by Nehru's non-aligned foreign policy. In a given situation, Pakistan was ideal place for them. They found in U.F. a ready-made platform and in Bhasani a gullible ally. The hyperboles of communist vocabularies leaked through the lips of Bhasani what could be described as post-election comment: "The bloodless revolution which the people of East Pakistan have brought about by crushing the stronghold of imperialist agents has no parallel in political history of the world".³⁴⁸ This was followed by an observance of Thanksgiving Day', organized by U.F. which in a resolution asked the Mohammad Ali government to quit and reject U.S. military aid.³⁴⁹ Then, the "popular demonstrations"³⁵⁰ continued throughout East Pakistan against U.S. military aid with unabated fury. In the recent East Pakistan election campaigning fury manifested in, among others, anti-imperialist slogans. The A.M.L. election manifesto contained, inter alia, one plank expressing desire for remaining friendly with all countries and no military alliances with any country. This was aimed at the Middle East Defense Organization and the United States.³⁵¹ General Mirza's assessing letter to the Prime Minister contained a line: "American military aid is attacked day in and day out".³⁵² Undoubtedly, turmoil grew in Pakistan soon after the elections in East Pakistan was over. The internal politics of Pakistan become consequential for the rest of the world since Pakistan entered the American bloc. If, by any chance, the incumbent central government was endangered the American policy in the Middle East would be in jeopardy."³⁵³

In his book Professor Morgenthau warned (as Machiavelli did) weak nations against "making alliances with strong ones", since "a great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies".³⁵⁴ Hildreth, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan joined the political fracas, rather indiscreetly by having reflected on the U.F. demands and its *locus standi*. This exacerbated the situation further, in that the U.F. could, as a proof of their arguments, point to the alleged statement of

³⁴⁵ *New York Times*, June 3, 1954.

³⁴⁶ See *Dawn*, May 1, 1954; *Manchester Guardian*, April 5, 1954.

³⁴⁷ *Times*, April 19, 1954.

³⁴⁸ *Dawn*, March 20, 1959.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, March 26, 1954.

³⁵⁰ *New York Times*, May 31, 1954; April 4, 1954.

³⁵¹ See *Christian Science Monitor*, December 10, 1953.

³⁵² Governor's letter, *loc.cit.*, (Top Secret), dated 21st June, 1954. Appendix 6.

³⁵³ See *Manchester Guardian*, Editorial, "Pakistan"?

³⁵⁴ Morgenthau, *op.cit.*, p.185.

the ambassador as a piece of foreign interference.³⁵⁵ A thinly veiled semblance of East West cold war was also introduced when the central government abruptly cancelled, to the dissatisfaction of East Pakistan, a proposed visit of the soviet cultural mission³⁵⁶ to the Eastern part.³⁵⁷ Matters went up to the parliament in the shape of adjournment motions, but to no purpose. Although, the members of the Congress and A.P.P. under appropriate cut motions were able to give vent to their ideas. The burden of their arguments was this, that the British-sponsored "Subsidiary Alliance", once succeeded in converting the subcontinent to slavery, and the present tendency of alignment would, *pari passu*, end up in neo-colonialism. And the protagonists of the alliance were, argumentatively, put at par with the stock traitors of the folklore, such as *Omichand*, *Mirzaffar*, etc., etc."³⁵⁸

As luck would have it, the Mohammad Ali government tended to be so squeamish about U.F. because of its alleged communist undertones, to the point where any matter in which the U.F. was involved was dismissed as though its composing elements were all *personae non grata*. But the crux lay elsewhere in that amid the din and bustle of the U.F.'s anti-pact slogans there was a hidden message to be deciphered i.e. that the U.S. was negotiating pacts with a wrong government.

At a post-elections conference, Suhrawardy reflected on the foreign policy saying that "lots of things have to be considered which people outside the government did not know". And on the issue of military aid he appeared evasive but added "by and large I am in favor of Pakistan remaining neutral in a world war". In November of the same year he told his London audience that Pakistan "could have done better"³⁵⁹ on the aid issue. In the following year he repeated the same burden of his saying: "we will want more aid from America and in a much more liberal way than has been provided in the past". Reflecting on communism his assertive observation was: "I personally do not think communism is of any importance in Pakistan at present".³⁶⁰ Ataur Rahman, one of the prominent leaders of the U.F. (and later to become Chief Minister of East Pakistan) rather bluntly admitted that he was not opposed to military aid but was sore about the fact that the pacts were not signed by the real representatives of the people.³⁶¹ In regard to the so-called *Red Mullah*, the *Times* found "no evidence that Bhasani is a communist".

³⁵⁵ *New York Times*, April 5, 1954.

³⁵⁶ Perhaps the central government found some parallel between the events of 1954 with that of Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951. The Russian ambassador Mr. M. Stentensko had paid an unscheduled visit to Lahore in 1951 just prior to the abortive 'coup'. This was explained to have been in connection with establishing a Soviet cultural college there. This was followed by a Russian economic delegation at the head of M. Nemtchina who stayed at the House of Faiz Ahmed Faiz, one of the main leaders of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. See *Daily Telegraph*, March 18, 1951.

³⁵⁷ *Dawn*, April 4, 1954

³⁵⁸ C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. 1, March 29, 1954, pp.898-905.

³⁵⁹ *Dawn*, March 18, 1954; November 12, 1954.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid*, June 12, 1955.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, October 15, 1954.

In a letter to the editor of the *Times* Bhasani maintained: "Islam enjoins on me to work for the amelioration of the down-trodden and exploited Muslims and, indeed, all other peoples of the world."³⁶² But the fact remained that perhaps due to his long imprisonment during British regime and subsequent frustrations at the hand of his own national government, which, to Bhasani, was growing increasingly pro-Anglo-American, chose to be a dedicated anti-Western. As far as Haq was concerned he delayed the formation of a full Cabinet as his recruits had to be clear of supposed communists elements.³⁶³ Far back in December 1953, while the joint electoral alliance was at formative phase, the *Shere-e-Bangla* had revealed a bit of his mind saying, "I wish to emphasize that the four parties, namely the Awami Muslim League, the Krishak Sramik party, the Nizame Islam Party, and the Khilafat-e-Rabbani party will form the U.F ... this included a loyalty to Islamic ideology, and specially the fact that the constitution of Pakistan should be based on the *Quran* and *Sunnah*".³⁶⁴

Despite the right wing preponderance in the U.F. and its tacit adherence to a new foreign policy the central government fell short of statesmanship, in that its unyielding attitude drove the right-wingers into a position where they could neither eulogize military aid in public nor discourage their motley associates, both official and unofficial, hovering in and around the U.F., from decrying military aid. So, the bandwagon of protests against military aid begun to roll in by default. This appeared to Karachi (like the so-called 'peasants' march of death' of March 1969) as the projection of a red movement in East Pakistan a much more inflated estimate of communists than their actual numbers and strength would have entitled them to. Then came labor troubles which were coeval to the U.F. election victory. A labor force which had been experiencing difficulties in ventilating its grievances collectively, saw in the U.F. a hope. An excessive hope found its expression in an intricate socio-economic plane in violence. For, the labor movement was not well-organized any more than its supposed beneficiaries had control on their emotion. An outbreak of a small fire in the Adamjee Jute Mill resulted in what was called the "worst in the history of Pakistan's labor troubles".³⁶⁵ The interesting thing was that when the riots broke out the new ministers were just sworn-in. Even the preceding labor troubles occurred before the U.F., Ministry came into being. In short, the U.F. Ministry could hardly settle down before it was faced with problems. More than 500 laborers were slain. This was on May 15, 1954, four days before the Mutual Defence Assistance Pact was to be signed formally by the governments of the U.S. and Pakistan.

Now, the central government had an appropriate opportunity to strike back. Already Haq had incurred the wrath of the 'centre' when on May 4 he visited Calcutta—a place with nostalgic memories where he had lived with distinction for more than 50 years—

³⁶² *Times*, December 5, 1954; November 1, 1954.

³⁶³ C.A.D.(Leg.) Vol. 1, March 18, 1954, p.172.

³⁶⁴ *Dawn*, December 22, 1953.

³⁶⁵ *Time*, May 16, 1954.

and fulminated in emotional utterances which according to the central government smacked of disloyalty to the nation.³⁶⁶ Haq rejoined with the taunt 'that the budding politicians do not understand English', as his utterances was misconstrued, after all, "Pakistan is an accomplished fact". The Prime Minister lost no time in holding "communists and other elements inimical to Pakistan"³⁶⁷ responsible for the massacre. The Prime Minister's diagnosis was not altogether fallible. It could have been due in part to anti-labor attitude of the Mill owners. A month before the Adamjee calamity two prominent leaders of trade unions were murdered.³⁶⁸ Or, there might be a degree of jealousy among the Bengali laborers against their West Pakistani and non-Bengali refugee counterparts who outnumbered them in the Mills and factories. The problem of Muhajirs i.e. the non-Bengali immigrants (Biharis) and Bengali was severe. (It was not just an accident of history how Biharis acted as a pandaros in the perpetration of inhuman autocracy of Bengali people in 1971). The chances were that the communists might have poured their puckish minds into it. The most important thing was to bear in mind that Pakistan was trying to telescope economic development which had been achieved only gradually in Western countries. In this process of rapid industrialization there appeared in Pakistan what Lipset would call "sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and industrial situation", that caused the emergence of an "extremist working class"³⁶⁹ All these lava of melted factors were erupted just by kindling a small fire. Hence, there was as much truth in the saying that the mill-riots were entirely due to communist machinations as there was in the hypothesis that the small fire of Adamjee Jute Mill was deliberately made to be the *Reichstag Fire*, to enable the central government to make an end of parliamentary rule in East Pakistan.

Since a popular government with a welfare bias was not a welcome proposition to a business community which thrived well in the unrestrained private sector of the economy, they seized this opportunity and asked the government to take recourse to drastic measures even to the extent in introducing martial law. Drawing 90% of its capital from West Pakistan as it did, the West Pakistan industries were extremely vulnerable to the progressive depression in the share markets and a flight of capital from East and West Pakistan.³⁷⁰ What was more, politics now took to provincial factionalism. The riot—terrible as it was did not last beyond a day nor did it spread elsewhere. Bhasani threatened to fast unto death unless peace was restored. The Peace Committee was formed and everything was under control.³⁷¹ Furthermore, Suhrawardy appealed to the Bengali and non-Bengali people in East Pakistan to "let by gone be by gone".³⁷² As the non-Bengalis were among the riot victims, even fraternal bodies like the

³⁶⁶ *Dawn*, May 5, 1954.

³⁶⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, May 17, 1954.

³⁶⁸ See *Dawn*, March 27, 1954.

³⁶⁹ S.M. Lipset, "Political Man" in H. Exkstein and D.E. Apter (ed.) *Comparative Politics* (New York, 1963), p.206.

³⁷⁰ *Financial Times*, May 21, 1954. Following troubles in East Pakistan industrialists transferred more than \$50,000,000 to Banks in Karachi. See *New York Times*, June 19, 1954.

³⁷¹ *Ibid*, May 21, 1954.

³⁷² *Ibid*, March 18, 1954.

East Pakistan Federation of Labor, Central United Refugee Council, Karachi Bar Association, etc., etc., asked central government to impose martial law in East Pakistan.³⁷³ Even the East Pakistan press (mostly) which was once all praise for the U.F. movement suddenly recanted. At this juncture, Pakistan politics resembled an almost classical example of what Aristotle called *stasis*—unrest which was to eat into the very vitals of constitutional government.

Haq was immediately summoned to Karachi (as was Dubcek to Moscow) with some of his colleagues. Sher-e-Bangla was reported to have assured the central government of cooperation if he was left alone in East Pakistan. In the course of his dialogue with the central government Haq happened to grant an interview to P. Callahan, the *New York Times* correspondent for whose benefit Haq recited a Bengali poem. Translated versions of literature are not always true to their original in matters of form and spirit. It transpired that Callahan saw in this poem a demand for the complete independence to East Pakistan.³⁷⁴ *Sher-e-Bangla* was also quoted to have said, in keeping with the *New York Times*, the following, "... independence will be one of the first things to be taken up by my Ministry. There is a trend for it. Undoubtedly they will try to resist such a move. But when a man wants freedom, he wants it". He was alleged to have also maintained building up a Bengali Navy in connection with provinces' natural defenses. All these was said in the light of U.F. election campaigning.³⁷⁵ He was also said to have told the Prime Minister on another occasion that "we cannot begin to discuss our problems until you cease to impugn our patriotism. How can a majority of a nation be traitors".³⁷⁶ (Historical imperative was once again transparent when, in the political crescendo of late sixties, *Bangabandhu* could utter those phraseologies rather with a flourish and vigour). The gravity of Haq's offence was further compounded when the correspondent told the world in spite of Haq's protests, that East Pakistan was bidding for independence. Haq refused to be the pawn of the central government.³⁷⁷

At this juncture, perhaps, a word of reference to Suhrawardy is warranted. When the political confusion was worst confounded the name of Suhrawardy featured prominently. He seemed to be the only person who could bring the emotional Haq and West Pakistan leadership to compromise their differences. Suhrawardy was thought to be the only personality or catalyst in the existing set up who was not fully committed or hidebound on all matters that now threatened to divide the nation.³⁷⁸

³⁷³ *Ibid*, May 17, 1954.

³⁷⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, July 19, 1954, "East Bengal Looks for Autonomy, not Independence".

³⁷⁵ *New York Times*, May 23, 1954.

³⁷⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, July 19, 1954.

³⁷⁷ "Many years later one of the confidants of Haq, in one of his expansive moods told the writer how the *Sher-e-Bangla* had retorted to Mohammad Ali's sneer at the U.F. with this saying: "I had the privilege of showing my mettle to those who came across the seas, and am not prepared to play second fiddle to those urchins of self-styled politicians who have just crossed the Meghna (a river)".

³⁷⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 1954.

The author had been watching the election situation rather inquisitively. The circumstantial evidence coupled with my intuition would, *prime facie*, hint that Suhrawardy kept low profile having had a disagreeable feeling in the manipulations and consequent formation of ministry where the A.M.L. recruits were not adequate, and thus allowing ageing *Sher-e-Bangla* to burn his finger on tripping rhetorics. Besides, he was not well as the U.F. electioneering had acted upon his health, and soon had to leave for Zurich for treatment. Down with severe illness he promptly disapproved the imposition of 92-A in East Bengal stating". It is a thousand pities that the government has considered it in the fitness of things to impose section 92-A in East Bengal. In view of the spectacular rout of the Muslim League ... a thing like this immediately after the victory of a party is unprecedented ... I would also beg to finish this period of 92-A as soon as possible".³⁷⁹

Immediately after this statement, Suhrawardy left for Zurich with an appeal to countrymen: "If Allah is pleased to restore me to health ... I hope to place myself again at the disposal of the nation and our party ... It is an article of faith to us that the two wings of Pakistan form an integral whole ... differences over economic and political questions, as far as the party is concerned we shall never allow these to impair the ideal of one country and one nation".³⁸⁰

Mohammad Ali, with the obsession of communism uppermost in his mind, perpetrated the worst character assassination by branding Haq as "traitor", and imposed Governor's rule, in place of parliamentary, in East Pakistan, under Section 92A of the India Act, 1935. The governor's rule in East Pakistan was virtually a state of siege. The central government sent 10,000 troops³⁸¹ to East Pakistan only to be further reinforced by more troops, arms and ammunition. More than 100,000 leaflets eulogizing the Prime Minister's decision were dropped in an around the country by Pakistan Air Force planes.³⁸²

The central government's decision came to appear to be the least perceptive one. For it was not an isolated issue of a federal unit being knocked back into its senses. The U.F. was a movement that developed on the national scene. It did not operate in a vacuum but in a living community of men and women. The U.F.'s greatest contribution was its laying the foundation of a parliamentary opposition, electorally chosen, in an otherwise

³⁷⁹ *Dawn*, June 6, 1954.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid*, June 7, 1954.

³⁸¹ History was repeated itself even after 16 years. In 1970, we find the same movement towards autonomy, parliamentary democracy, the same riots with an addition of peasants' participation. But the riots were not as macabre as they were made to appear to be. The same discomfort of the business community matched with a flight of capital. But above all the same loss of the people's freedom. Above board, the people of Bangladesh were rock solid behind the historic and spectacular leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The difference was then in 1954 it was the *Frankenstein-Politicians* who sabotaged the parliamentary democracy, what their monster's did have perpetrated in 1969.

³⁸² *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *Dawn*, dated May 31, 1954.

oppositionless parliamentary system of government. It was a movement par excellence, in that it challenged the *status quo*. A foreign critic remarked: "The United Front represented the second round in the agrarian revolution. It is certainly not the last. Bengali leadership may yet play a major role in carrying the agrarian revolution to the whole of Pakistan".³⁸³ The movement provided Pakistan with a testing ground for a parliamentarianism which was dying of atrophy. The small oligarchic base of the central government did not like to see the waves of Bay of Bengal reach the Arabian Coast of West Pakistan. There was no trace of M.L. in East Pakistan which could in any way boost the morale of the central government. The central government had no political mood for granting autonomy to East Pakistan. There was no chance of getting aid, military or economic, from the U.S. unless the central government could produce some evidence that it was totally committed to the routing of communists from Pakistan. All these factors were dovetailed into one almighty decision, i.e. that the central government could not afford to allow parliamentary government to continue in East Pakistan. And the most immediately motivating impulse for imposing Governor's rule in East Pakistan was the central government's desperate desire to give a drastic demonstration of its new foreign policy at the expense of parliamentarianism. There is a revealing line in a letter written by the newly appointed Governor to the East Pakistan to the Governor General which brought to the fore the main crux of the matter. The containing sentence was: "America is supposed to have compelled us to take action under section 92-A and I am supposed to have established a Military administration".³⁸⁴

However, *Sher-e-Bangla's* jugglery of words or semantics was confusing, no doubt, but, for purposes of the central government, it turned out to be the fittest pretext. As far as East Bengal was concerned it was already a doomed case to the authority. The man who 'epitomised the *Kipling* administration' the redoubtable General in the person of Iskander Mirza who would take charge of the East Bengal administration in no time, had these to say later on the configuration of the U.F. in general and *Sher-e-Bangla* and Suhrawardy in particular in the following manner: "... there is no room for equanimity and that *handing over power to the United Front* whether under Suhrawardy or anybody else would be tantamount to *destroying Pakistan* ... Krishak Sramik Party ... led by A.K. Fazlul Haq ... mainly consisted of Muslim league secessionists while the Awami Muslim League led by H.S. Suhrawardy was composed of energetic young men with leftist tendencies...".³⁸⁵

There was an oracular touch in the warning given by Professor Morris-Jones that unless Pakistan was able to foster leadership from within the framework of parliamentary institutions, reforms might take place "with a vengeance from without".³⁸⁶ This occurred later, but the seeds were sown in 30th May, 1954, in the unusual appointment of

³⁸³ See Stanley Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan", *Pacific Affairs* (June, 1955), p.144.

³⁸⁴ See Governor's letter, *loc.cit.* Appendix 7.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, *loc.cit.* Appendix 8

³⁸⁶ Morris-Jones, *op. cit.*, "Experience of Independence India and Pakistan", p.237.

General Mirza, the Defence Secretary, as the Governor of East Pakistan. It is to be noticed how within a few months after he had written a letter to Nazimuddin, the former Prime Minister, pledging army support to curb religious fanatics, that General Mirza came into the political limelight. No wonder that he was selected as the Governor of East Pakistan for it was he who negotiated arms deals with the U.S. Now, this time he was to curb down the extreme leftists.

We would try to show how the central government caused enormous harm to the growth of federal sentiment, parliamentary politics in its remorseless pursuit of the cause of the 'containment policy'. Indeed if the containment policy was to be a success in Southern and South East Asia, the position of East Pakistan deserved a careful consideration. It was a bridge between the subcontinent and South East Asia—a flank that could be used as land communications for subversive movement. As early as 1948 there was an organizing committee of communists formed in Calcutta to raise insurrections in India, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma. An Indian Communist leader was killed fighting with the communist insurgents and a number of Burmese communists were arrested in East Pakistan. The so-called 'Free Thai' movement spilled over the whole area. The Indian side of Tripura District, north of East Pakistan, and the Hill areas of Assam were supposed to be strong-holds of armed communist bands. Considering the geopolitical potentiality of East Pakistan the panicky statesmen presumably thought that the onrush of the communist movement might convert East Pakistan into one arm of the so-called "pincer movement"—the other arm was the Viet Minh³⁸⁷ in Indo-China—to pinch off Burma, Thailand and the rest of South Asia.³⁸⁸ Relevantly, there were some interesting links between Pakistan's increasing troop concentration along the borders of East Pakistan with that of the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu (May, 1954) which preceded the ousting of the parliamentary government of East Pakistan by only a few days.

But whatever the size of the communist threat, the solution ought to have been sought within the parliamentary framework. General Mirza perceived the situation in simple terms i.e.

"If Pakistan has decided to line up with the anti-communist forces and *this is the only logical corollary to accepting American Military Aid and Turko-Pakistan Pact*, then the only safe course is to ban the communist party ... We cannot tinker with the problem nor play politics with the communist."³⁸⁹

It was a pity that the central government suffered from the ambivalence of communist policy. Although a telegram from the Cabinet Secretariat told General Mirza that the Cabinet regarded communism "as a major political problem" this grasping of the truth

³⁸⁷ See *New York Times*, May 28, 1954.

³⁸⁸ See *Times*, December 29, 1954; *New York Herald Tribune*, August 10, 1954.

³⁸⁹ Governor's letter to Prime Minister, *loc.cit.*, (Top Secret: dated 21st June, 1954). Appendix 9.

was not there. For, politics succumbed to bureaucratic pressures in that General Mirza thought of it "as purely a law and order problem".³⁹⁰ So, politics were administered. Instead of harnessing its own internal leadership just released from the parliamentary elections, to the task of fighting communism on political platforms, the central government subjected the country to an external leadership with which the people had no communicating link. The credibility value of Haq and Suhrawardy in the eyes of the public would have been much greater than the sound and fury of a quasi-military rule dedicated to the fight against communism. Even the central government had in its consideration the revival of M.L. in East Pakistan under the cloak of Governor's rule indeed this was one of the clearest purposes; for in General Mirza's very first letter to the Governor General these lines occurred twice e.g. "You may be able to resuscitate the Muslim League some time in future but not early."³⁹¹ It could have made a different choice. For, after all, General Mirza was not destined to be a sinecurist. This was an act of suicide committed by the central government.

The day was won for the administration of law and order. General Mirza told his press audience: "I hope to inspire confidence in the minds of administrations"³⁹² (not the confidence of the people). The parliament recorded a 14-hour marathon "debate in which the Congress and A.P.P. fought heroically for the restoration of parliamentary government in East Pakistan only to evoke a comment from the Prime Minister: "The present government is determined to crack down on all communists".³⁹³ Then followed an anti-communist drive throughout Pakistan which was so suggestive of the *McCarthy witchhunt*, Pakistan style. A so-called 'screening committee' was established to purge subversive elements from the administration, university, press, trade unions, mills and other organizations. The real red round-up started after the Pentagon had announced on 21st July, 1954, that it was shortly sending to Pakistan an American Military Advisory Group. Under Section 3 of the Pakistan Security Act the communist party was banned in July 1954 all over Pakistan (in East Pakistan a ban came into operation two weeks earlier). An order was passed restricting the members of the Soviet Embassy to a 35-mile radius from the centre of the Federal Capital.³⁹⁴ Among the arrests of suspected communists made all over Pakistan were students, lecturers, professors, journalists, trade-unionists and politicians. All organizations suspect of communist activities were sealed off. A mouth long ban on the assembly of more than five persons was ordered in Karachi. More than 500 red suspects in West Pakistan were sentenced to 1-year

³⁹⁰ Governor's letter to the Governor-General, *loc.cit.*, (To Secret: D.O. No. 111/PS) dated 10th July, 1954. Appendix 10.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Governor's letter to the Governor-General (Top Secret: 14th June, 1954). Appendix 11.

³⁹² *Dawn*, June 9, 1954.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, June 17, 1954; See also New York Times, June 28, 1954.

³⁹⁴ The Moscow-Chinese radio and newspapers joined the East-West cold war drama as enacted in Pakistan. See *Daily Worker*, July 23, 1954; *New China News Agency*, July 27, 1954; *Daily Worker*, May 31, 1954; *Isvestia* quoted in *Dawn*, June 4, 1954.

imprisonment without trial, in addition to the 1293 alleged communists and fellow travellers who had been arrested in East Pakistan.³⁹⁵

In his enthusiasm for tackling the communist problem, General Mirza suggested to the Governor General: "In America there is the F.B.I., in England there is the M.L. (5). We must waste no time in creating an organization ... first class men ... must be sent to America to study methods of anti-communist operation ... *the Americans have promised to place all their knowledge and research at our disposal.*"³⁹⁶ The stop-communism society, the Pakistan-American Cultural Association, government patronized organizations that worked in conjunction with the U.S.I.S. – were set into motion for the anti-communist drive.³⁹⁷ Then, in a mighty plunge, the central government committed Pakistan to anti-communist pacts e.g. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (with the U.S.), S.E.A.T.O. (South East Asia Treaty Organization) and Baghdad Pact (later known as Central Treaty Organization after Iraq's withdrawal) in a 'hush Hush' manner having unwisely discredited the moderate, liberal right wingers and sent communists underground only to reappear later on, on the surface under the tutelage of the rightists; for, after all, the rightists in their resentment against the political cartel – the central government – would always welcome willing partners. In sum, the recession of self-government with its clear predominance of right wing moderate elements to the background in East Pakistan and the foisting of so-called 'good government' in its place indicated one fact, *inter alia*, that foreign policy was going to be a 'variable' in the parliamentary politics of Pakistan. Moreover as far as the eclipse of parliamentary government in East Pakistan was concerned it was not unlikely that the U.S. in its pragmatism supported by a huge investment of men, money and equipment for the promotion of its containment policy would have counseled 'good government' rather than a return to the risks involved in 'self government', Westminster style. To this end, a general comment on such a situation by professor Hugh Tinker appears appropriate. His was the Comment, "Even beneficial contact with East and West always carried with it intensive exposures to the American or the communist way of life. These external pressures probably form a greater threat to the evolution of an indigenous democracy than do the internal tensions."³⁹⁸

Now that the East Pakistani cries for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly had been taken care of, Mohammad Ali switched his attention towards constitution-making. The draft constitution of 1954 (B.P.C Report) was adopted on the 21st September. We

³⁹⁵ General Mirza remarked: "This, to my mind, is not a large number in a population of 42 million." *Source:* Governor's letter to Prime Minister (Top Secret) 21st June 1954. For more details of the communist round-up see: *New York Times*, June 2, 1954; July 24, 1954; *Hindu*, June 13, 1954; *Dawn*, June 2, 1954; July 26, 1954; July 29, 1954, July 25, 1954; and Richard L. Park and Richard S. Wheeler, "East Bengal under Governor's Rule" *Far Eastern Survey* (September, 1954), p. 133.

³⁹⁶ Governor's letter to the Governor General, *loc. cit.*, (Top Secret : D.O.No. 185/PS), 16th September, 1954. Appendix 12.

³⁹⁷ *Dawn*, June 8, 1954.

³⁹⁸ See Hugh Tinker, *Ballot Box and Bayonet* (Oxford: 1966) p. 126.

have already shown how the previous B.P.C reports had come to nothing. But the third draft constitution appeared to have been the product of the government's responsiveness and receptivity to public opinion. On the question of the ideology of the state the draft struck a moderate note, in that it annulled the erstwhile provision of the so-called 'third legislature' i.e. the board of *Ulema*, as was envisaged by Nazimuddin's draft. In its place, the Supreme Court was given the full authority to determine "whether or not a particular law is repugnant to the Holy *Quran* and *Sunnah*".³⁹⁹ With the exception of certain clauses (particularly the mandatory provision) making the Head of the state a Muslim which reaffirmed the aim of ensuring the Islamic character of the State, the 292 draft articles were a code of secular laws 'for the administration of a democratic parliamentary form of government'. They guaranteed the right of all citizens, including the minorities, to apply to the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights.⁴⁰⁰ The Islamic aspects in the draft constitution were superficial, which, by implication, pointed to the inadequacy of the M.L. leadership in its endeavor to translate Islam into what an Islamologist thought, "an effective, realistic, meaningful ideology",⁴⁰¹ capable of fulfilling Pakistan's needs in her situation.

The constitutional entanglement on the language question⁴⁰² was extricated in that the draft constitution stipulated that "The official languages of the Republic should be Urdu and Bengali"⁴⁰³ – the fulfillment of the very first item of the 21-point programme of the U.F. Having regard to the early Punjabi opposition to Nazimuddin's federal schemes, Mohammad Ali devised a constitutional plan nicknamed the 'Mohammad Ali formula'. Five units were hewed out for the federal structure e.g. (1) East Pakistan, (2) Punjab, (3) N.W.F.P, Frontier States and tribal areas, (4) Sindh and the State of Khairpur and (5) Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union, Karachi (Federal Capital) and the State of Bahawalpur. In a bicameral legislature, the House of Units would contain an equal number of seats regardless of size for each of the federating units. The House of the People (lower House) would be composed of members the distribution of whose seats was to be made in terms of the total population of the respective units. Both the Houses were granted equal powers. A joint session of the two Houses was envisaged to iron out their respective differences on any matters, where necessary, but in any case a "matter should not be deemed to have passed unless the majority supporting the motion includes at least 30 percent of the total number of members from each zone."⁴⁰⁴ This was done to allay fears of any unit being dominated by another. Despite an earlier Congress resolution asking for broad provincial autonomy (which was lost to voting), the Constituent Assembly chose to strengthen the Federal government.⁴⁰⁵ Three lists of

³⁹⁹ Report of the Basic Principles Committee Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi: 1954), p. 4 Clause (6).

⁴⁰⁰ *New York Times*, October 16, 1954.

⁴⁰¹ W.E. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: 1959), p. 229.

⁴⁰² Nazimuddin's draft constitution did not mention language at all.

⁴⁰³ Basic Principles Committee, *loc. cit.*, p. 72, Clause (276) (1).

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-19, Clauses 41 (1) and 65.

⁴⁰⁵ *New York Times*, September 15, 1954.

subjects e.g. Federal, Unit and Concurrent, were delineated (they were in fact taken from the India Act of 1935) in which the federal government retained 66 subjects, including defence, foreign affairs and currency, whereas the provinces were left with 48 subjects with a difficult chance of sharing concurrent list (38 subjects) along with the federal government. In addition, the residual powers which were given to the person of the President, as head of the state⁴⁰⁶ thus residual powers were proposed to be transferred from an institution, the federal legislature to an individual person, the President.

But as the Constitution was on the verge of being produced the Punjabi group became stiff-necked. Instead of participating in the constitutional debates in the Constituent Assembly the Punjabi M.C.A. gulped teas in the room of Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, the Punjabi Finance Minister.⁴⁰⁷ Whatever compromises and improvements were made in the Mohammad Ali formula, the Punjabis refused to budge from their dogged opposition to the potential ascendancy of the Bengalis in federal politics. The victory of the U.F. in East Pakistan and its collective stand on provincial autonomy was a threat to the Punjabi supremacy; for, the politically divided units of West Pakistan of which the Punjab was one, would have to confront in national politics an East Pakistan which would be numerically superior and politically unified entity. Added to this was another apprehension. After the discomfiture of the M.L. from East Pakistan the last vestige of its prestige and power resided with the Western part. Now things came to such a pass that the central government, the M.L. parliamentary party and the Constituent Assembly were all made to serve as an entrenched base for the first decaying M.L. And if the Mohammad Ali government backed by the Constituent Assembly with its still clear majority of East Pakistani members, succeeded in drawing up the constitution by the end of 1954, the control of the country would pass on to the hands other than the Punjabis. For, after the passing of the Republican Constitution, the Constituent Assembly would elect the new Head of the State who in turn would appoint a provisional government for the administration of the country till the first general elections could be held. In other words, in the existing parliamentary ascendancy of the Bengali group, the chances were that the next President might be Nazimuddin⁴⁰⁸ a contingency not to the liking of the Punjabis.

It was stated above, that in the dismissal of Nazimuddin's Cabinet, the Governor General⁴⁰⁹ was also motivated by a desire to thwart the constitutional proposals so unpopular to the Punjabis. Since Mohammad Ali owed his premiership to the Governor

⁴⁰⁶ B.P.C. 1952, *loc.cit.*, p.38, Clause 133(1) and B.P.C. Report, 1954, p.39, Clause 147(1). Even the members of the B.P.C. of 1952, The Chief Ministers of the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and East Pakistan dissented from the recommendation as to the residuary power. They were always for residual powers being given to the provinces. See B.P.C. Report of 1952, p.38.

⁴⁰⁷ C.A.D., Vol. 1, September 9, 1954, p.630.

⁴⁰⁸ *Sunday Times*, October 17, 1954.

⁴⁰⁹ Who happens to be a Punjabi.

General's wishes, it was but natural for the latter to expect an eager ear from the former. The Governor General wanted the amalgamation of all Western units into one, so that the partnership of the two zones, e.g. East and West Pakistan, could be based on an equal footing. Chow. Mohammad Ali with his Punjabi colleagues in the central Cabinet urged upon the Prime Minister to have this scheme implemented. Perhaps the Prime Minister in the course of his successful negotiation for American aid and his involvement in country's administration and politics, had developed a degree of personal confidence, and a sense of noblesse oblige. Understandably, the Prime Minister had an entente with the Bengali group led by Nazimuddin and the provincial leaders (except the Punjabis) of West Pakistan who were committed to his constitutional formula. The Punjabi members of the sub-committee on allocation of powers between centre and provinces overstepped the terms of reference of the Committee by raising the possibility of one-unit idea. Noon, the Premier of the Punjab, said in the Committee: "I am one of the supporters of one unit",⁴¹⁰ but Pirzada, the Premier of Sindh, was "dead set" against the one unit move. The Premier of the N.W.F.P. was also opposed to the plan. Spasmodically, talks veered around the one unit plan or alternatively the zonal federation of West Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was committed to his scheme of federation, which was, of course, adopted on the 21st September.

But the real cold war started when on the 15th September, contrary to the decision of the M.L. Parliamentary Party, Noon suddenly dropped a bombshell in the Constituent Assembly by demanding "Zonal Federation"; and on a point of verbal violence he insisted on having it "now and here"⁴¹¹ Nazimuddin characterized it as an attempt to delay the framing of the constitution "at the last minute". The other prominent members of the West Pakistan (except the Punjabis) were also unsympathetic to the idea of Zonal Federation. A showdown was, now, in the offing. On the one side, there was the axis of Bengali-Sindhi-Pathan and on the other was the Punjabi group drawing sustenance from the Governor General—a man of deteriorating health, but still characterized by a resolute mind as prominent as was his sculptural nose. The Governor General summoned all the prominent leaders of West Pakistan and bid them to bring about Zonal Federation⁴¹² failing which they would be rendered politically impotent by the P.R.O.D.A.⁴¹³ Endangered, the anti-zonal federation group hastened a Bill through the Constituent Assembly on 20th September, 1954 for the repeal of the P.R.O.D.A. Act. An epitaph was given by the mover M.H. Gazder⁴¹⁴—to the repealed Act that it had

⁴¹⁰ *Dawn*, August 30, 1954 and July 24, 1954.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, September 16, 1954.

⁴¹² Sayeed, *op.cit.*, p.420.

⁴¹³ This Act was passed in 1949 to bring holders of public offices to book on charges of corruption, Tammanyism, etc., etc. The mover of the Bill, Liaquat said in the Constituent Assembly: "... to purify our public life and to see that Pakistan is founded on sound foundation..." see C.A.D., Vol. IV, January 6, 1949, p.44.

⁴¹⁴ The irony was that five years ago the same person, while welcoming the P.R.O.D.A. had maintained: "The Nazis did not try people. They shot them. I do think, sometimes, in my moments of weakness, that the Government should occasionally shoot a person or two". See C.A.D., Vol. IV. January 6, 1949, p.49.

already outlived its utility.⁴¹⁵ This was not considered enough. For the ghost of Nazimuddin's dismissal was still haunting. It was resolved that the Governor General's wings of power must be clipped. To that end they perpetrated a constitutional *Pearl Harbour* upon the Governor General. Flouting the Rules of Procedure of the Constituent Assembly, they surreptitiously introduced an amending Bill in the Assembly at an unusual hour (9.00 a.m. The usual time had never previously been before 10.00 a.m.) of the 21st September, 1954.⁴¹⁶ A far reaching change was made in the India Act of 1935 in that the office of the Prime Minister was specifically mentioned for the first time. From now onward the constitutional position of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the central government would be analogous to those practicing parliamentary democracies of the Commonwealth countries. It was parliament which would make or unmake the ministry, not the Governor General. This was done by amending Section 10 comprising seven clauses.⁴¹⁷ Thus, with Governor General's powers neutralized, the Prime Minister embarked upon a scheduled journey to the U.S. leaving a message to the nation that the constitution would be ready by December, 1954.

This was an occasion which evoked alloyed feelings. The curtailment of the Governor General's arbitrary powers viewed from the parliamentary angle was, no doubt, a welcome act. For this would in any case be a feature of the new constitution. But the action was taken in dubious circumstances. Had this parliamentary truth suddenly flashed across the minds of members of the Constituent Assembly after being previously hidden from them? Was not Mohammad Ali's premiership born of this controversial power? Was not Mohammad Ali's parliamentary morality contingent? When the largest section of the people of Pakistan had already questioned the representative character of the Constituent Assembly was it democratic to add another cubit to its height? Indeed, the extent of the Governor General's powers needed to be curtailed in a parliamentary polity. But the Prime Minister's action was of the so-called penny-wise pound-foolish nature. While the Prime Minister had brusquely declined the U.F. in the share of power how could he expect the U.F. to back his action, however desirable, when this would mean giving longevity to the Constituent Assembly for whose death the U.F. had been praying. In these circumstances, the U.F. would try to find an ally in the Governor General, as Suhrawardy once remarked that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'.

In quashing the U.F. the Prime Minister downgraded the parliamentary cause, but surely he had the support of the majority of the Constituent Assembly and 'power elites'. In curbing the Governor General's powers which were anachronistic in a Westminster system, he, no doubt potentially upgraded the parliamentary cause, but, ironically, he would fail to enlist the support of the largest section of the people, because of his own myopic approach towards vital issues. And paradoxically, despotic

⁴¹⁵ *Dawn*, September 21, 1954.

⁴¹⁶ G.W. Chowdhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*. (Longmans, 1959), p.43.

⁴¹⁷ *Times*, September 22, 1954.

powers grew in Pakistan within a democratic framework when a party in power in its intransigence compelled the parties outside of power to call upon the Head of the State to act as *Deus ex Machina*.

Suddenly, the Governor General's support for the cause begun to grow. He remembered Suhrawardy's comment on his dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet, and was not taking stock of the widespread demand for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Suhrawardy's observation was the following: "The Governor General is the guardian of public opinion; he gauged it correctly when he dismissed Khaza Nazimuddin; he must gauge it correctly so far as the Constituent Assembly and the provincial legislatures are concerned ... he (Governor General) has handed back power to the same guilty Muslim league, and has placed himself at its mercy".⁴¹⁸ His reflexes were further enlivened by the latest tonic administered from Zurich Hospital, Geneva, where Suhrawardy—who was receiving treatment for his damaged liver—in a statement demanded "the dissolution of the present Constituent Assembly and its replacement by a representative body".⁴¹⁹ Frustrated in its purpose, the Punjabi group now came down on bended knees before the U.F. in order to harness the latter's support to blow up the constitution.⁴²⁰

Now the Governor General was to give an account of his political *Jamesbondship*. He summoned the touring Prime Minister from Washington. Earlier, he had lifted the order against M.A. Khuhro, K. Fazlullah, A.G. Nabi, H. Haq Chowdhury which prohibited them holding public offices.⁴²¹ He also cancelled P.R.O.D.A. proceedings to disqualify Daultana. The whole purpose was "to release into the political arena a group of influential men who may unseat Mohammad Ali and his administration",⁴²² unless the Prime Minister could challenge the legality of the Governor General's ruling. The palpitating Prime Minister, on his way to Pakistan, stopped at London and had an aircraft⁴²³ chartered to accommodate his growing retinue⁴²⁴ and shrink the distance. The next story was well-related by Russel Spurn, correspondent of the *Daily Express* who flew to London to avoid censorship:

Troops poured into Karachi ... Telephone line to politicians' houses were cut. Mohammad Ali flew Home from an American tour on Saturday ... drove off for

⁴¹⁸ See *Hindu*, June 21, 1953.

⁴¹⁹ *Dawn*, October 8, 1954.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid*, October 7, 1954 (Editorial) "The Madding Crowds' Ignoble Strife".

⁴²¹ These people were provincial Ministers and prominent M.C.A.'s. They were already P.R.O.D.A. stricken. When the Constituent Assembly repealed the P.R.O.D.A., it did not give retrospective effect to it.

⁴²² *New York Times*, October 21, 1954.

⁴²³ This cost Pakistan public exchequer £10,000. General Mirza told the writer.

⁴²⁴ The Prime Minister's accompanying personalities - Chow. Mohammad Ali, the C-in-C, General Ayub were already with the Prime Minister in Washington to help him negotiate economic and military aid and General Mirza who was receiving treatment to his injured back in London, joined the caravan along with I.H. Ispahani, the Pakistan High Commissioner in London. However coincidental, these circumstances lent an air of suspicion.

an urgent interview in the Governor General's palace. He emerged four hours later in tears". Iron man "Golum Mohammad and the army generals had threatened him with arrest. He was given until yesterday's morning to meet their demands ... 'reorganize your Cabinet and bring in the army'".⁴²⁵

The Governor General declared a state of emergency throughout Pakistan and performed the *coup de grace* by dissolving the Constituent Assembly which, to him, had "lost the confidence of the people". New elections were to follow. Emerging out of the meeting with Governor General, Bogra Mohammad Ali registered his experience in the following manner "I feel like *Farouk* must have felt when the British put tanks around his palace".⁴²⁶ The Prime Minister, in the tradition of a Quisling, backed the Governor General's action and told the nation unabashed that "constitution making is important. But more important by far is the security and stability of our country".⁴²⁷

The Governor General could find solace in a *Cromwellian* remark that "not a dog barked"⁴²⁸ when he dissolved the long parliament. His sense of timing was astute. The M.L. had long ceased to be an assertive parliamentary body. It was all faction. *Albeit*, the name M.L. was ceremoniously retained, as it was still thought to be capable of commanding veneration and affection from the people. By 1954, the M.L. had degenerated into a condition resembling that of the not-too-distant Egyptian *Wafd* party before its knock-out at the hands of the army. Then, there was the question of the U.F. on whose support the Governor General could confidently count in his bid for *grand slam*.

Thus, the Governor General's Sandstone Palace was inundated by congratulatory notes for his public-spirited action.⁴²⁹ But it was an accident of complex circumstances that the Governor General was (mistakenly) hailed as the custodian of public opinion. His sense of political morality was in no way higher than that of the Prime Minister. For, did he not suspend parliamentary government in East Pakistan and send General Mirza there to revitalize the M.L. – whose *coup de grace* he had just performed – as a part of a great plan? Where was his public spirit when the U.F. demanded dissolution of the C.A.? It was only through a provincial lens that he could visualize greater issues. Prior to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Punjabi leaders, namely Noon, Daultana, Chow. Nazir Ahmed, Sheikh Sadiq Hasan, Malik Shawkat Ali, etc., etc., had been in constant touch with the Governor General. The same lobbying of the Punjabi leaders presaged Nazimuddin's dismissal.⁴³⁰ This was a *distinct line* of his action. And the most

⁴²⁵ *Daily Express*, October 25, 1954.

⁴²⁶ *Observer*, October 31, 1954.

⁴²⁷ *New York Times*, October 25, 1954. See also *Times: Manchester Guardian* and *Daily Herald*, October 25, 1954.

⁴²⁸ Jennings, *op.cit.*, "Cabinet Government", p.510.

⁴²⁹ *Dawn*, October 25, 1954.

⁴³⁰ See *Ibid*, October 17, 1954 and October 25, 1954.

redeeming feature was that the action of the head of the State however tendentious in its origin, did at least score in some respects, some points ancillary to popular demands. This period, 1947-54, was a period of unusual tension and strains which bent many a rule of the federal and Westminster system, but surely did not break it altogether. True, Jinnah as the founder of Pakistan nation had failed to foster liberal forces. What was more, like Bismarck of Germany, Jinnah's credentials as the father of the nation prompted him to indulge in certain activities in no way conducive to the growth of liberalism. Although, certain discretionary powers were taken away from the Governor General, under Section 17 of the adapted Act he had the rule-making power by dint of which he could determine the business of the Central government and allocate portfolios among ministers.⁴³¹ Some temporary powers were further bestowed upon the Governor General. The Governor General in the initial period of Pakistan did not much resemble their prototypes in the Commonwealth countries. Because of certain powers given to the Governor General to facilitate government activities pending the future constitution, the Governor General's office resembled, in some respects, the American Presidency. There was thus a potential conflict between the office of the Governor General and the Cabinet sustained by the Constituent Assembly, in that the former, devoid of dynastic interest, but full of personal ambitions propped up by regional sentiment, could always create a constitutional crisis, when the latter was not prepared to cooperate. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was a case in point. The attempted curtailment of the Governor General's power by the Constituent Assembly could be likened to the U.S. Congress' trying to impeach the President Andrew Jackson in vain. In addition, the office of the Governor General was very conspicuous since the dawn of the British rule when the incumbent was regarded "as *de facto* Emperor of India surrounded with some of the trappings associated with *Moghul* rule".⁴³²

But, equally correctly, it could not be maintained that the post-partition Governors General had their sails untrimmed. In Jinnah's case he had a relatively unified country behind him. Nazimuddin, as the Governor General, had no issue on which he could display his mettle. It was only in Gulam Mohammad's tenure that great issues threatened the country. It was doubtful if he would after all, have dismissed Nazimuddin had there not been such widespread discontent against the Ministry. Was it the powerhouse of the Governor General's office or the U.F. that was responsible for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly? It was always the majority of the people that made the Governor General's Office respond. The only vital snag was that the Governor General's cheque was cashed in imperceptivity along with the people's.

Then, what were the legacies of this period, 1947-54? "Five important issues viz. (i) the objectives resolution; (ii) the Interim Report; (iii) the B.P.C. report; (iv) compromise on the deadlock over the B.P.C. report, "marked the road of Progress",⁴³³ towards making

⁴³¹ Sayeed, *op.cit.*, p.270.

⁴³² K.J. Newmann, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes". *Pacific Affairs*. (March, 1959), p.54.

⁴³³ Grace J. Calder, "Constitution Debates in Pakistan", *The Muslim World*, (January, 1956), p.41.

consensus-based institutions. In the ensuing chapters, it will be seen how the experiences gained throughout this period i.e. 1947-54 would act as launching pad towards a solution of national dissension. In the course of their dialogue in regards to institution-building the politicians understood one vital point: that in the state of Pakistan no particular area or for that matter, any group of people, were going to be dominant at the expense of the rest. Compromise through reasoning and moderation had to be institutionalized. One imperative result that stood out of the labors of the Constituent Assembly was that "there should be parity in representation between East and West Pakistan".⁴³⁴ Similarly, on the ideological front, Pakistan after having travelled a long way was able to intonate Islam moderately.

In sum, the working of the federation and parliamentary government during the period 1947-54, viewed from the legalistic—moralistic point of view was, no doubt, an inadequate and in some cases, disastrous performance. But there was at least a silver line, in that the government of the country and the quest for integrating institutions were made, on balance, within the ambit of parliamentary system. What was more, an image or modicum of viability was attached to the State of Pakistan distinct from the position at the beginning in 1947 when the central government could not offer its administrative officials chairs to sit on, desks to put their papers on, papers to write on or pens and ink to write with.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁴ L.F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan* (London, 1962), P.139.

⁴³⁵ Sir Zafrullah's address at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, on August 18, 1951 (Ferozsons: Karachi, 1951), p.3.

FEDERAL PARTNERS

It has been remarked that "India was moving steadily towards a Federal structure already before independence",⁴³⁶ but the post independence cultivation in the field of federalism had the effect of diminishing returns in Pakistan. In modern times, there has been a general tendency of central governments in federations (such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, Switzerland) to exercise more powers than were contemplated earlier by the federating units. The measuring *scale*, whether federal powers are to be, at all times, kept down to minimum, no matter if circumstances demand that this minimum be high or that it be low, has been a country's given internal and external situation. New needs have brought flexibility to the otherwise airtight structures of a federal polity a trend to what are in the words of Prof. K.C. Wheare, "quasi-federal" systems.

The federation of Pakistan was made up of units which were at once varied and disconcerting in their make ups, resources and potentialities. During the honeymoon period of independence the provinces were, relatively speaking, charitably disposed towards the growth of central leadership, the institution of which had to be created *de novo*.⁴³⁷ The maiden session of the parliament recorded views that were germane to the future federal structure of the country. Apart from the ritualistic charge leveled by the regional leaders against the federal government for encroaching upon provincial subjects three district lines of approaches crystallized. The Premier of East Pakistan Nazimuddin, categorically asserted that "the stability of the centre is a condition precedent to the development of the provinces". Obviously, his mind was not operating in a unitary direction. He invented the image of the Pakistan provinces as 'horses' drawing the 'carriage' of the central government. But his accent was on the balanced nourishing of the provincial horses without the central government's letting anyone turn "lean and thin"⁴³⁸ That was the trigger-release of the whole arguments about federalism. After all, federalism is a sentiment that lives on equality, fair play and justice whose dispensation remains at the hands of the centre.

Representing the federal government's point of view, the Prime Minister, Liaquat, was equally smooth in his utterances when he observed that the central government was "working as agents of the provincial governments of all the provinces that compose the State of Pakistan".⁴³⁹ In the discharge of duties if the central government faltered, he

⁴³⁶ W.H. Morris-Jones, "Stability and Change in Indian Politics" in Seul Rose (ed.) Politics in Southern Asia, (London: 1963.)

⁴³⁷ India obtained Delhi i.e. the whole central structure, intact. Pakistan had to found one. Only three provinces e.g. the Punjab, Sindh and N.W.F.P. found their head quarters, readymade.

⁴³⁸ CAD (Leg.), Vol. I, March 2, 1948. pp. 127-147.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

continued, the parliament could always throw the Ministry overboard. With all these mottoes in front, the process of centralization began. It could not however, be maintained that Pakistan started from a smooth federal base. On the contrary, she had all the elements what according to Prof. K.C. Wheare should be prejudicial to federal cause e.g. "war or power politics, and economic crisis, or depression politics"⁴⁴⁰

Soon after partition the Pakistan Army collided with Indian forces in Kashmir. But the 'march of affliction' witnessed in the cataract of refugees pouring into the country from India was one of the biggest tests that awaited the new government. It was not only the question of rehabilitating them physically. They had to be integrated into the economic and social pattern of the country, since the immigrating refugees mostly differed with the migrating ones in matters of complexions. By 1953, there were as many as 80 lakhs⁴⁴¹ of refugee population of which 33.42 lakh Muslims entered East Pakistan, and the rest, the different provinces of West Pakistan.⁴⁴² In short, the country was faced with overwhelming problems which contributed considerably to the growth of power at the centre.

The political and economic powers of the central government were already outlined in the Act of 1935, during British rule. Yet, the division of responsibilities between the general and unit governments were well delineated in the three lists, e.g. the federal, provincial and concurrent. In the reorientation process the central government of Pakistan felt impelled "to ask for a revision of all these things",⁴⁴³ in its effort to form financial resources. Thus, the central government took the responsibility of collecting the proceeds of the Sales Tax from the provincial governments for a period of two years, (It was renewed again.) The proceeds of estate duties on both agricultural and non-agricultural estates were left to the charge of the central government.⁴⁴⁴ The Provinces were denied, at the outset, the income tax receipts so that central credit might be built up quickly. What was more, the advisability of taking over the tax-accruing areas of provinces such as electricity, irrigation, land revenue, water rate, business tax, all excises, was also emphasized in the very first session of the parliament.⁴⁴⁵ Likewise, the provincial responsibilities in the industrial field were qualified by the passing of the Development of Industries (Federal Control) Bill, in that the subject 'industries', unlike the previous arrangements of the India Act, leapt from the provincial into the concurrent jurisdiction.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁰ K.C Wheare, Federal Government (London 1951), p. 254.

⁴⁴¹ The number of refugees rose, later on, as high as 12 million. The people who left Pakistan were mostly of middle-class persuasion. Those who replenished the gap were mostly artisans and peasants with exceptions to quite a good number of top-class people. See: W. Norman Brown (ed.), *India, Pakistan and Ceylon* (University of Pennsylvania Press: 1960), p. 171.

⁴⁴² "Economic Appraisal Committee", *loc. cit.*, p. 131.

⁴⁴³ CAD. (Leg.), Vol. In, March 2, 1948, p. 146.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, January 3, 1950, p. 271.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, March 1, 1948, p. 57.

⁴⁴⁶ CAD, (Leg.), Vol. 1, March 10, 1949, p. 135.

Another major controlling arm of the central government was the planning organization. In recent discussions of economic development in the emerging countries it has become the trend of the day to entrust the central government the possessor of finance, capital goods and technical resources with bringing about an integrated economic development of the country. In Pakistan, like India, the execution of national economic programmes were left to the care of the provinces as far as practicable, but the main decision-making mechanism lay with the centre. Having evaluated the country's economic position the Economic Appraisal Committee maintained that "planning and regulation of development should be made a central responsibility."⁴⁴⁷

Even in the areas where the provinces were entitled to work on small projects, final approval had to be obtained from the centre. An East Pakistani Chief Minister has committed his bitter experiences to a book:⁴⁴⁸ "It is not far to seek the reason as to why East Pakistan has remained underdeveloped. The secret gets unsecreted as soon as one goes into the files lying in the chest of drawers of the Secretariat. A good many number of plans and decisions have ended in fiasco. Why? Development plans are financed from the central coffer as loans, or grants-in-aid. Schemes have to be sent to various departments for scrutiny ... By the time the final order is released from the cobwebs of central machineries the financial year is at its fag end ... so projects die a premature death."⁴⁴⁹ By and large, the central government, through fiscal policy and taxing powers,⁴⁵⁰ assumed an almighty stature like that of other federal governments say the U.S., Canada and Australia that the provinces were reduced to a position of sunflowers of whose blossoming were conditioned to the sunrays of the central government.⁴⁵¹ But then, there was a good deal of difference between the climate in which the federal *Leviathan* grew in the U.S., Canada and Australia and that of Pakistan's. In the former case, the federal growth occurred in a climate of necessity and spontaneity. The federating units were interested in the growth of the general government. Through time honored experience, usage, convention and mandatory methods they evolve some mechanisms and formulae so that co-operations between the centre and the unit, and precisely, the federal government's presiding over the allocation of (or reallocation) of national wealth were held in the best tradition of federalism.⁴⁵² The constant process of

⁴⁴⁷ "Economic Appraisal Committee", *Loc. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴⁴⁸ Administration of two years". This was a book written in Bengali.

⁴⁴⁹ Ataur Rahman Khan, *Ozaratir Dui Bashar* (Standard Publishers' Ltd.: Dacca), nd. pp. 141-142.

⁴⁵⁰ The main source of central revenues are: customs, central excise duties, income tax and corporation tax, sales tax, salt, capital gains tax, surcharge, etc., etc., import duties on spirit, liquors spices, tea, tobacco, oil, motor spirit, machinery so and so forth. Export duties on raw jute, cotton seeds, skins, hides, jute manufactures, rice, tea, fish, wool, etc., etc.

⁴⁵¹ "Sir I plead guilty to that charge... the centre did ... encroach on the provincial field." The Finance Minister admitted on the floor of the House. See: CAD, (Leg.), Vol. I, March 24, 1951. p. 2.

⁴⁵² K.C. Wheare, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

readjustment kept the balance of interests even—a federal requirement. To this end, the system of judicial review acted as a steadying factor.⁴⁵³

In the Pakistan situation the lurch towards centralization, with inadequate bridle, on the balance, harmed the cause of federal democracy. In the realm of inter-zonal financial relations, the judiciary had no tangible role to its credit. The judiciary, perhaps, was looking forward to an emerging constitution to work upon it. Serving as the provisional constitution, as it did, the Act of 1935 did not have to stand the rigor of a difficult amending process, in that a simple majority of members in the Constituent Assembly was all that was required.

During the British time the centre had a fixed grant earmarked for the provinces on various heads. This position was reversed. The provinces—they were all in deficit save Sindh—were not only deprived of their shares of the income tax proceeds⁴⁵⁴ but also the usual grants whose dispensation depended on the will of the centre. Assuming control over certain items of taxes for instance, Sales Tax or Estate Duty, was, no doubt, productive; for, it helped to bring about a rationalism and uniform tax structure throughout the country. Tax yields were equally encouraging. But the bone of contention was the distributing mechanism of the central government not its accumulative capacity.

There was a convention of holding annual conferences in which Premiers and Finance Ministers of respective units sat with the general government to thrash out the distributive tangle of national wealth. But then, its efficacy was fleeting as the politics of economics got the better of it. Provincial shares in the central tax revenues,⁴⁵⁵ of course had statutory sanction, but the basis of shares was determined by the centre. Although an independent body, namely the National Finance commission, came into being later on to look into the matter, yet its role was purely advisory. Not that the Central government was particularly callous. The services of Sir Jeremy Raisman were employed to determine the provincial share of central revenues. The Raisman award was the basis of allocation—though East Pakistan thought the award was harmful to her economy⁴⁵⁶—but the government despite the opposition's resentment handed the power to the Governor General, instead of the parliament, to decide on the Raisman award.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵³ J.D.B. Miller, *Australian Government and Politics*, (London: 1959). p. 141.

⁴⁵⁴ Although agricultural income tax was under provincial jurisdiction. Regarding personal income tax it was decided in 1947 that the centre would not make any allocation of income tax share to the provinces so long as the defence expenditure remained heavy.

⁴⁵⁵ Some taxes e.g. Corporation Tax, Export Duties, Excise Duties, Personal Income Tax, etc., etc.

⁴⁵⁶ Mahbul ul-Haq, *The Strategy of Economic Planning*, (Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 98.

⁴⁵⁷ *Dawn*, March 19, 1952; March 21, 1952.

Unfettered, the central government handled its economic resource in a way that resulted in making some units beautiful while others ugly. No doubt, some native factors of some units in no small way influenced the indexes of development. But on federal reckoning, the central government failed in that it could not create a climate of confidence among the units. A regional leader remarked that the centre was building "its castle on the carcasses of the provinces"⁴⁵⁸

Besides the Central government was not exempt from the charge of partiality in its dealings with the units. For instance, central loans advanced to provinces since partition till 1952 had no East Pakistan and Sindhi shares.

Description	Date of floatation	Amount outstand Rs.
1. 3½% Punjab loan, 1963	27.11.51.	3,92,16,406
2. 3½% N.W.F.P. loan, 1964	30.8.52.	75,00,000
2. 3½% Punjab loan, 1964	30.8.52.	4,11,94,700 ⁴⁵⁹

When the East Pakistani premier was unhappy at receiving only 30% of the Sales Tax proceeds against a population of 56%, the Sindhi premier thought that the basis of distributing finances should be the 'incidence of taxation' not population. For, he continued, "in Sindh the incidence of taxation per capita is no less than 14, in the Punjab it is 10, and in Bengal⁴⁶⁰ it is hardly one-fourth of that, about 2½ percent."⁴⁶¹ All these contentions were never realistically dealt with by building impartial institutions capable of resolving conflicts.

No doubt, the central government in each fiscal year allotted funds on social development projects such as education, health, housing refugee rehabilitation, but in matters of grants-in-aid—a vital fact to provincial needs—it supposedly played politics. To contain the Pakhtoonistan movement in the N.W.F.P and enhance the credibility of the M.L. Ministry there, the central government, apart from fixed yearly subvention,⁴⁶² poured in huge grants. The central doles were skillfully made to appear as genuine revenue incomes of the province in the budget. The 1953 budget of the province displayed a 70% revenue increase over the revenues of 1947.⁴⁶³ This was designed only to divert people's attention and silence the opposition. Whereas in the same year, both the government and opposition in the Sindh legislature, while debating on a "communication" addressed to the Governor, concluded that Sindh was meted out a

⁴⁵⁸ See Nurul Amin's speech. CAD, (Leg.), Vol. I, March 21, 1951, p. 54.

⁴⁵⁹ "Economic Appraisal Committee", *loc. cit.*, p. 163.

⁴⁶⁰ Under the Permanent Settlement Act land revenue in Bengal was fixed whereas in West Pakistan taxation was flexible.

⁴⁶¹ CAD, (leg.), Vol. 1, March 23, 1951, p. 115; vol. I, March 21, 1951 pp. 54-55.

⁴⁶² "In British time, the N.W.F.P heavily relied on the central grant of subvention as its revenue-yielding capacity was low.

⁴⁶³ *Dawn*, March 12, 1953 (Editorial) "N.W.F.P. Budget" Also, March 18, 1953.

"step motherly treatment" by the centre in money matters.⁴⁶⁴ Even, a centre-oriented provincial governor of Gen. Mirza's persuasion governing in a still centrally administered province under 92A of the Constitution Act was resentful of the central government's wily parsimony and wrote a complaining letter: "I would beg the centre not to give more money than absolutely necessary. This system of doles will make this nation a nation of *Shukrana Khors*⁴⁶⁵ and this must be avoided at all costs."⁴⁶⁶

However, there was another loophole in the centralizing process viz, the absence of a clear definition of functional responsibility for the development of resources between the general and units governments. This irregularity was surely caused by the existence of one party rule throughout the country, which acted as a silencer. Although, a timely warning was given by an expert to this end that "when the day comes on which different parties are in power at the centre and in the provinces, any weakness in the definition of responsibilities will undoubtedly be exploited politically, and development will suffer."⁴⁶⁷

It was not, however, economic control alone that the centre had over the units; political means were also used. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 bestowed powers to the Governor General⁴⁶⁸ under Section 9 "for bringing the provisions of this Act into effective operation."⁴⁶⁹ Jinnah incorporated in the Constitution Act a new version of the early Section 93 of India Act of 1935 which had been sparingly used during the British regime to enable the central government to assume the administration of the provinces in case of emergency. This was the Section 92A – an emergency weapon of the Governor General relying on which he could ask the provincial executive head i.e. the Governor to take charge of the governance of the province by suspending the provincial constitution. The black and white position had it that the provincial governors were to be aided by a Council of Ministers whose appointment and dismissal rested on the gubernatorial pleasures.⁴⁷⁰ And the offices of the Governors, in their turn, appeared as assessing posts of the central government and particularly of the Governor General whose line of communications with the provincial heads had always been alive. Under Section 51(5) of the India Act 1935, as amended by the Pakistan Provisional

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1953.

⁴⁶⁵ Those who live on other's mercy and still remain grateful.

⁴⁶⁶ Governor's letter to the Governor General, DO No. 161/PS, dated 16th August, 1954 (Top Secret/Personal).

Appendix 13.

⁴⁶⁷ R.G.A. Jackson, *Development in Pakistan*, (Government Press, Karachi 1953), p. 6.

⁴⁶⁸ Although the preceding section i.e. 8 stipulated that the Governor General, in his exercise of the power, must consult the Constituent Assembly to which the central government was responsible.

⁴⁶⁹ "Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan", *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴⁷⁰ The position of a constitutional head has an euphemistic bias in all the parliamentary government of the Commonwealth. But on the functional level Ministers hold office so long they enjoy confidence of the legislature. This was the spirit in which Pakistan governments both of the centre and the units were initiated into. Powers that were there in theory were used in Pakistan in practice pending constitution making to uphold both warrantable and un-warrantable causes.

Constitutional Order of 1947, a provincial governor in fulfillment of the Governor General's Order could dismiss any Provincial Ministry. This occurred in the N.W.F.P. in August 1947, Sindh April 1948, the Punjab January, 1949, Sindh December, 1951 and East Pakistan May 1954.⁴⁷¹ It was not, however, the question of imposing 92A in the province which was so imperative from a pragmatic point of view in some cases, but the question of "getting out of it"⁴⁷² as was maintained by Sir Francis Mudie, the Punjab Governor. Because there was always a danger of the centre's forming a habit.

Then, the power of the Governor General regarding issuance of Ordinances was provided in the Section 102 of the India Act of 1935 as adapted. In no small way were the provinces themselves responsible for provoking the Governor General's reserve power. Jinnah was compelled to issue a proclamation (August 27, 1948) of a State of Emergency in Pakistan, since "the mass movement of population from and into Pakistan" had already threatened "the economic life of Pakistan". Now, on the basis of the Proclamation Sindh was to absorb 200,000 refugees; The N.W.F.P 100,000.⁴⁷³

It has been the practice of the British system of government and its emulators that the Ministers suspected of gross misconduct are dealt with through appropriate party machineries. Besides, this process is farther reinforced by public opinion strong enough to make a corrupt politician to seek his oblivion. But the central government of Pakistan in an ingenuous frenzy placed the PRODA on the Statute Book to purge corrupt public office-holders. The ideal which inspired the production of the Act could not long survive the test of Pakistan politics. Soon, the Act was to hang as the sword of Damocles over the necks of the provincial leaders who would turn nonconformists to the central establishment. The Constituent Assembly empowered the Governor General to disqualify a person under the PRODA. The worst part of it was that the public were kept in the dark in regard to the findings of the tribunal⁴⁷⁴ "which are produced at so much expense of taxpayers' money, energy and time".⁴⁷⁵ No doubt, some of the PRODA struck politicians had a legend of notoriety, but the bizarre side of it was that the central government stood on the way of public opinion and parliamentary mechanism on the one hand and the due process of law on the other. Besides, the central government in its process of drowning the provincial leaders also left a few subtle straws to catch at i.e. submission to the central leadership was the price of final rescue.

⁴⁷¹ *New Chronicle*, August 23, 1947; *Manchester Guardian*, April 27, 1948; *Statesman*, January 25, 1949.

⁴⁷² *Ibid*, February 1, 1949.

⁴⁷³ Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, (New York: 1967), p. 267.

⁴⁷⁴ A case having been instituted the Governor General would appoint a tribunal to enquire into the matter. The Governor General's award followed the recommendations of the tribunal. Interestingly enough, when parliamentary government was effaced in 1958, the Martial Law Administrators - the hater of parliamentary government and politicians - followed the footsteps of the very politicians and hatched a measure called EBDO (Elective bodies Disqualification order) to condemn politicians, selectively.

⁴⁷⁵ *Dawn*, October 9, 1951.

Leaders who had all-Pakistan status – though a very few – spoke from the pedestal of the central government. Furthermore, the Prime Minister was also the President of the M.L. The Central Executive Committee of the M.L. had sway over all the provincial organizations. By virtue of the Presidential authority vested in the Prime Minister, he could direct the provincial M.L. to move in a particular direction in matters of policy or choosing parliamentary leaders. There was, however, too much bickering about the centre's making provincial premier high-handedly. When Nazimuddin was commissioned as the Governor General he, as the departing Premier of East Pakistan, used his privilege to suggest his successor, knowing that the Parliamentary Board would approve of it. The case of the Punjab (1953) was somewhat unusual. Martial law was already in force. Noon, the then Governor of East Pakistan, was made the Premier of the Punjab at the central government's direction. Surely, Noon had a better claim to the Premiership so far as the Punjab was concerned. And the Punjab parliamentary body approved of it, later on.⁴⁷⁶ When the N.W.F.P. Chief Minister was to join the central government (1953) he was to nominate his successor.⁴⁷⁷ But in any case, the central government through the party machinery could make its powers felt by the provinces.

Services also accounted for the centralization process, particularly, the cadre, namely central services of Pakistan whose control lay with the Establishment Department of the Central Secretariat. The C.S.P. officials were placed at the key area of provincial administration which resulted in the centre's having more grip on the provincial government. Similarly, the organization of the judiciary starting from the lowest base of courts at subdivision and district level and extending to the zenith i.e. the Federal Court (later named the Supreme Court) had strong centralizing characteristics. The cumulative effect of all these impelled the ship of the Pakistan state into a quasi federal direction, and the federal mottoes with which the leaders had started earlier failed in their proper manifestation.

But was this growth of centripetal forces of pressures that might paradoxically originate from the units themselves? The oddity was that provincial fears of centralization were not consistently expressed, in that they were dissipated as soon as a particular unit or a coalition of units secured a position of dominance over the centre. The provincial leaders while crying for more autonomy, also acted as a pressure group to render central authority amenable to provincial causes. Successes or failures in that direction determined the force of centre-unit relations. What was distinct in the ebb and flow of centre-unit relations was that at no period of time was there a federal government which could claim immunity from all sorts of partiality, any more than the units could show an honest record that they did not sabotage the federal government to feather

⁴⁷⁶ *Dawn*, March 25, 1953.

⁴⁷⁷ *Times*, April 25, 1953.

their own nests. It was an issue of shared follies. We now examine the parliamentary record of the provinces.

East Pakistan

As the prospect for independence along the line of divided India steeped in communalism drew on apace, Suhrawardy, the M.L. Premier of Bengal struck a surprise demand for independent, sovereign, undivided Bengal. He declared that "Bengal is eagerly looking forward to an era of independence." Arguing vigorously for his demand he said that Bengal belonged to Bengalis and Bengal was indivisible. He maintained "Bengalis are one race and have one language and same history and have many points in common and are capable of understanding each other." Appealing to the people he said "I beg of all not to destroy Bengal, not to be blinded by wrath and prejudices, or consumed by their hatred for their fellow Bengalis, but to look ahead ... of making Bengal free and independent, master of its own destiny and its own wealth..." Furthermore, he emphasized that Bengal divided will mean a Bengal prey to the people of other parts of India, waiting to be exploited for their benefits.⁴⁷⁸

Momentarily there witnessed a tempo of *bandwaganism* on the issue, in that a plethora of prominent Hindu personalities – Mr. Kamini Kumar Dutta, leader of the Congress party in the Bengal Council, Mr. Dharendra Nath Dutta, Deputy leader of the Congress party in the Bengal Assembly, Mrs. Nellie sen Gupta, M.L.A, S.M. Sen, Mr. Purne Chandra Das etc. – hailing from East and North Bengal assembled. They called the move for partition of Bengal as "anti-national, absurd, suicidal and inglorious". The interest of Hindus of Bengal, according to them, "should be safeguarded through means other than that of dividing the province".⁴⁷⁹

Mr. Abul Hashem, Secretary, Bengal provincial Muslim League, also reechoed the same feeling stating that the remedy "for present ills lies" not in proposed division but in a united and sovereign Bengal enjoying political power and economic privileges on a fifty-fifty basis as propounded by the late lamented C.R. Das. This was reflected in the famous Bengal pact signed in 1923 to usher in an atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim harmony.⁴⁸⁰

Recently, Mr. Baren Roy, a noted Indian historian citing evidences told at the centre for advancement of Social Sciences, Dhaka University that Abul Hashem had long and productive discussions on the matter with Gandhi and had his consent on the unity of Bengal. What is more, robust talks featured prominently to form a M.L. – Congress coalition government for restoration of Hindu-Muslim amity.⁴⁸¹ Similarly there was another influential bloc, led by Sharat Chandra Bose – brother of illustrious Subhash

⁴⁷⁸ See *Statesman*, May 1, 1947, May 8, April 29, May 18, May 14, April 10, 1947.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.* April 24, 1947.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1947.

⁴⁸¹ See *Statesman*, May 12, 1947.

Bose—along with Kiran Shanker Roy stood for sovereign independent, undivided Bengal.⁴⁸²

But as luck would have it the idea of independent united Bengal fizzled on the shoals of various opposition. The opposition emanated from consuming suspicion, namely Suhrawardy was advocating the cause of independent united Bengal as a staunch, dedicated Muslim Leaguer. The author has an abiding feeling that had Suhrawardy quit the M.L. earlier his credibility would have brightened among the Hindu Community. Campaigning the cause of United Bengal as a diehard Muslim Leaguer could have one meaning to Suhrawardy, according to a section of dissentient Hindus that without substantial areas, in which the Muslims were in a minority, included in Pakistan state, it could not be administratively and economically viable. To the non-conformists, it would appear like a Pakistan without being called so, or a kind of replica of grouping system, as envisaged in the cabinet mission plan. Initially, Suhrawardy was not unequivocal whether there would be joint electorates in force in an undivided Bengal. (Incidentally, the number of Muslims was marginally greater than that of Hindus). Besides, the Hindus of Bengal had developed a 'suspicion complex' as a result of ten years of one-party Muslim minority administration in undivided India.

Similarly, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee a red-hot communal leader of *Hindu Mahashabha* was opposed tooth and nail to the proposal of independent, undivided Bengal. What is more, the Congress High Command, Particularly Sardar Ballav Bhai Patel, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru were not amenable to the idea, which manifested in the Congress's resolution for division of Bengal. Although rumor had it that Suhrawardy had Gandhi's approbation.⁴⁸³

Nevertheless, whether it was a convenient romanticism for greater Bengal or genuine could not be ascertained and be well left to posterity to judge. But the fact remained that Suhrawardy, on the eve of partition of India, put forward the idea of Sovereign United Bengal forcefully and in full cry. But the air was heavy with communalism and the mutual misunderstanding of the two communities Hindus and Muslims—saw the collapse of the movement that was once a galvanizing issue momentarily. Even, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, renowned historian, while commenting on the impending partition maintained that "The Hindus and Muslims of Bengali origin have lived together side by side in peace for centuries in their villages ... now the partition would be more like the legal partition of a landed estate between two brothers for ensuring more efficient and peaceful management."⁴⁸⁴

However, the sequel of the partition of Bengal had its bearings on the formation of the East Pakistan cabinet, in that Nazimuddin became the Chief Minister in place of

⁴⁸² *Ibid*, April, May 18,12, 1947.

⁴⁸³ *Statesman*, April 24, 1947.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid*, July 8, 1947.

Suhrawardy who was defeated by the former in his bid to secure the leadership of the M.L. parliamentary party.⁴⁸⁵ Suhrawardy's commitment Suhrawardy was already the M.L. Premier of undivided Bengal, 1946-47 to "an independent, undivided, sovereign Bengal in divided India",⁴⁸⁶ was used as a hostage by his political adversary i.e. Nazimuddin⁴⁸⁷ who successfully lobbied among the M.L. leaders, including Jinnah against Suhrawardy's anti-M.L. stand vis-à-vis the partition of Bengal.⁴⁸⁸ A dedicated loyalist, Nazimuddin enjoyed the affection of the M.L. High Command with whose help he assured the Premiership of East Pakistan and pitched his camp at Dacca the place of his birth and huge Zamindari.⁴⁸⁹ Nazimuddin's selection as the Chief Minister of East Pakistan appeared to be tendentious and symptomatic to future political trends. On the one hand, it fulfilled the gregarious urge of the ruling coterie—the Prime Minister himself and the Chief Ministers of the Punjab, Sindh were all of feudal stock⁴⁹⁰—and deprived the progressive mass leaders in the share of powers, on the other. For, judging Suhrawardy's later leadership pattern, would not Pakistan political history have been gone into different directions, had he been selected as the Premier of East Pakistan? Nazimuddin was no mass leader. His hold on people was judged when in the 1937 election (under India Act of 1935), he being the Nawab and member of the Governor's Executive Council could not win the elections in his own estate constituency against Fazlul Haq.⁴⁹¹ But, after necessary deductions, what remained was Nazimuddin's fairly long experiences as administrator and parliamentarian on which he could count. The provincial Governor, Sir. A. Frederick Bourne thought himself to be fortunate to have Nazimuddin as the Chief Minister and "was most agreeably surprised to find no little change from what" he "regarded as normal"⁴⁹² in a parliamentary sense. Unlike other Pakistan provinces, East Pakistan had a small but compact group of opposition members⁴⁹³ which numbered 72 in a legislature of 237 seats.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸⁵ *Times*, August 5, 1947.

⁴⁸⁶ *Statesman*, April 27, 1947

⁴⁸⁷ And his lieutenants Messrs. Nurul Amin, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, Fazlur Rahman, Youssouf Ali Chowdhury, etc.

⁴⁸⁸ Begum Ekramullah Sister of Suhrawardy, told the writer that Suhrawardy's demand for an undivided Bengal had Jinnah's blessings. Jinnah dared not support Suhrawardy publicly, and Suhrawardy never chose to discredit his one-time leader by divulgence. Nazimuddin himself maintained that "partition of Bengal is fatal to interests of its people". See: *Statesman*, April 23, 1947.

⁴⁸⁹ Nazimuddin himself hailed from the Nawab family. Gen. Mirza another descendent to the Murshidabad Nawab family told the writer that Nazimuddin made it a point to see that Murshidabad (now in India) did not form part of East Pakistan; for, that would have meant a challenge to his 'Nawabi' by the more famous 'Nawabs of Murshidabad. The writer wonders if Gen. Mirza's personal vendetta had made any contribution towards Nazimuddin's dismissal as the Prime Minister.

⁴⁹⁰ The Premier of the N.W.F.P. was no landlord, but he had no clannish ties with the province either.

⁴⁹¹ "An all-out fight ensues from today between the Zamindar and the peasants. By the grace of God I shall abolish zamindari within the shortest possible time... But god forbid if I am defeated, this defeat will be more glorious than the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. Fazlul Haq's statement. See: A.S.M. Abdur Rab, A.K. *Fazlul Haq: Life and Achievements*, (Lahore: 1966) p. 88.

⁴⁹² Quoted from the letter written to the writer by Sir A. Frederick Bourne, dated 19.2.1969. See Appendix-VI.

⁴⁹³ Mainly the Congress Party supported by a few members of the Christian and Buddhist group.

⁴⁹⁴ *New York Times*, January 18, 1954.

At the start, the opposition in the House or at large was not in a combative mood particularly in a situation when in the wake of the partition of Bengal East-Pakistan inherited a debt of Rs. 14 crores, an inadequate "police force, a few Executive Officers" and an economic life "Paralyzed by the migration of non-Muslim businessmen who held ... the field of trade and commerce in the province".⁴⁹⁵ So well-entrenched was the position of the government and the cohesion of the M.L. party in East Pakistan in the beginning that Jinnah, contrary to his usual practice, allowed the province to steer its own course. The Governor categorically observed that "Mr. Jinnah never interfered so far as I was concerned in provincial affairs. He no doubt kept in touch with our proceedings, but my direct contacts with him were minimal."⁴⁹⁶ But as the early difficulties were reduced to a state of toleration, the government having felt the power of the statecraft in a few years' time of existence grew arrogant only to be matched by ever-increasing opposition.

Nazimuddin before he became the Governor General of Pakistan in 1948 had already set the pattern of intolerance towards the growth of opposition. Suhrawardy was at that time a full-time devotee to the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity between the two Dominions, India and Pakistan. Nazimuddin thought this to be 'mere eyewash' and detained Suhrawardy for a few hours under Section 10 of the East Bengal Public Safety Order 1948,⁴⁹⁷ so that he could no longer hold public meetings in East Pakistan and criticise the government. At the partition of Bengal, West Bengal had 5 million Muslims out of a total of 21 million people. But out of 42 million people East Bengal (East Pakistan) had 12 million Hindus who were psychologically "less reconciled to their lot".⁴⁹⁸ Suhrawardy urged the ruling leaders to take Hindus into the Cabinets⁴⁹⁹ both in the centre and provinces to create confidence among the minorities.⁵⁰⁰ A sore point with the Hindus was that their houses were being requisitioned – the reason they possessed the largest number of houses whereas there was scarcity of accommodation. The East Pakistan government had one crucial choice before them i.e. whether or not they were going to play parliamentary politics with the Hindus. Till 1949 – a period of relative "peace and quiet"⁵⁰¹ the M.L. government had no concrete answer to this.

Then came the communal riots in early 1950. "It was not at all the anger of one community against another" maintained by a Congressite "that found expression ... in

⁴⁹⁵ CAD (Lge.), Vol. II, December 16, 1948, p. 4.

⁴⁹⁶ Governor's letter to the writer, loc.cit. See Appendix VI.

⁴⁹⁷ Statesman, June 3, 1948.

⁴⁹⁸ Times, July 25, 1948.

⁴⁹⁹ From a strict parliamentary point it is the party having a majority in the legislature forms the Cabinet. But the Situation in Pakistan was different. Although the central and the East Pakistan Cabinets each had one scheduled caste Minister but their representative character was questioned by the largest sections of minorities. See: Statesman, May 17, 1948.

⁵⁰⁰ CAD (Leg.) Vol. I, March 6, 1948, p. 262.

⁵⁰¹ Statesman, December 31, 1950.

East Bengal",⁵⁰² but, surely, it was the result of the inadequacy of leadership that was found both in India and Pakistan to suppress the communal extremists. And, as far as the East Pakistan government was concerned, the remark of a Congress member in the parliament that "... minorities ... were held there as hostages for the good conduct of the majority in another state",⁵⁰³ could not be easily dismissed. There was no doubt that in the early flush of independence the ruling party (the M.L.) displayed an element of Islamic jingoism⁵⁰⁴ which through the ensuing years did much to annoy and alarm the minorities. A veteran Congress leader, and one-time finance Minister of East Pakistan, Mr. P.C. Lahiry, compared the dual policy of the M.L. vis-à-vis minority in his book (proscribed in Pakistan) with that of the two sets of teeth of a rogue elephant – "one set was for show of beauty, and the other was for the real purpose of mastication".⁵⁰⁵ So, in circumstances like these the Congress and other minority groups in the legislature could not beguile themselves into thinking that they were truly parliamentary opposition groups. Hence, they looked for a fundamental change in the scheme of things.

Similarly, the M.L. government in East Pakistan became alienated from its own party and the majority community at large because of its dogged following of the central government the symbol of monolithic unifying power. It did not thwart the centre in its determination to impose 'Urdu' on East Pakistanis. It did not arrest the growth of the centralization process⁵⁰⁶ which was contrary to the Lahore resolution, the basis of Pakistan. It failed to secure the benefit of the non-devaluation policy to the jute-growers of East Pakistan, and created an organization i.e. Jute Board to look into the plight of the jute growers which had no East Pakistan member at all.⁵⁰⁷ Having failed to win a bye-election in Tangail the government postponed as many as thirty four bye-elections.⁵⁰⁸ In 1950, the army was used to suppress ruthlessly the so-called 'Tebhaga' movement (claiming a two-thirds share of the crop by the actual tillers of the soil) among the *Sontals* and *Adibasis* of Mymensingh District.⁵⁰⁹ Hunger-strikes were resorted to by the security prisoners as a protest against the government's suppression policy. Nurul Amin, the Chief Minister, replying to an opposition resolution asking for the releases of all political prisoners told the House that there were as many as 300 political detainees.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰² CAD (Leg.) Vol. I, March 16, 1950, p. 63.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ "Pakistan designs to show a beacon light to the world, which has been caught in the vortex of materialism... atheism and agnosticism ..." a part of a speech made in the Constituent Assembly by Moulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmand, known as the Archbishop of Pakistan. See: CAD, Vol. V, March 9, 1949, p. 44.

⁵⁰⁵ Pravash Chandra Lahiry, *India Partitioned and Minorities in Pakistan* (Writers' Forum Private Limited, Calcutta: 1964), p. 11.

⁵⁰⁶ Gobindalal (Congress) accused the government during budget discussion of having "mortgaged" the entire province "somewhere" outside. See: *Statesman*, February 26, 1951.

⁵⁰⁷ *Dawn*, October 25, 1952.

⁵⁰⁸ Keith Callard, "The Political Stability of Pakistan", *Pacific Affairs*, (March 1956), p. 11.

⁵⁰⁹ *Times*, December 29, 1954. (The leader of the movement was found to be a communist - Miss Ila Mitra)

⁵¹⁰ *Dawn*, October 19, 1952.

Prominent leaders, workers of political parties and leading people of social and academic areas came within the purview of the government's public safety Act as they failed to subscribe to the official fiats on issues. A good many parliamentary Secretaries, and members of the Legislative Assembly resigned from the M.L. parliamentary party saying that they could no longer "record a silent vote",⁵¹¹ when issues were being mishandled and civil liberties eroded. Although the Chief Minister had no difficulty in maintaining the confidence of the East Pakistan M.L. Parliamentary Board as was tactfully manipulated on the 9th May, 1953. But the cost was high in that the General Secretary of the East Pakistan M.L. had to be expelled from the party along with other influential members.⁵¹² Similarly newspapers showing independence of outlook could not escape the scourge of the government as was the case of the English Daily, *The Pakistan Observer*, which was banned at one time and on another occasion its editor was arrested for publishing an article which was according to the government, "calculated to offend the religious sentiment of the people".⁵¹³

In the overall pursuit of policy the East Pakistan government was so much identified with the centre, that the later, instead of asking the former to trim its sails, sought the negative posture of extending the life of the East Pakistan legislature which was supposed to be dissolved in 1952 to make room for a newly-elected legislature.⁵¹⁴ Dr. Chowdhury's contention that "political agitation in East Pakistan *was largely due to ... economic discontent* which caused the "defeat of the Muslim league ... in the provincial elections of 1954",⁵¹⁵ did not take into account the still larger areas of gloom i.e. the people had a growing sense of losing its 'identity', and its grip of parliamentary democracy. As a matter of fact, the economic discontent of East against West did not feature in the 21-point programme of the U.F.

To the opposition the economic situation was not particularly fundamental. Interestingly enough, it was the Chief Minister himself and his colleagues who both in the provincial legislature and parliament drummed up the economic misery of East Pakistan and its causes. That did not save him from the electoral wrath. Why? Because, people were more indignant about the centre's obscurantist, unprogressive and regimented policies, whose major interpreter happened to be the government of East Pakistan, the largest province of Pakistan.

True, gloomy aspect of the East Pakistan economy was very, apparent in 1954, as it was in 1958. But the issue was that the articulate group of East Pakistanis were political animals, as well as talking ones. And so long they could exercise their political rights as enjoined in a parliamentary democracy with an iota of pride, even an acute economic

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, November 11, 1951 See also: May 15, and 20, 1953.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, May 16, 1953.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, March 6, 1952

⁵¹⁴ *Dawn*, April 7, 1952 (Editorial), "East Pakistan Assembly".

⁵¹⁵ G.W. Chowdhury, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

grievance against the centre, and for that matter, the West which was to be aired periodically, never took place beyond the parliamentary confines. The people's regional grievances however pronounced were liable to be notoriously forceful, if their basic democratic rights were denied. A number of bye-elections were won by the A.L. government in East Pakistan in the late fifties and people did not cast their votes against the party in power as the province had not recovered from economic ills. So, it was mainly a question of a clog to democratic channels for whose removal opposition stood. Also, the opposition efforts were not negative, namely "to prevent the Muslim league from regaining power",⁵¹⁶ but were proved positive in its victory in the elections which signaled "the first opportunity to show that democracy in Pakistan was strong enough to allow different parties to control central and provincial government without disrupting the state."⁵¹⁷

The important thing about East Pakistan was that its people did not suffer from political apathy due to any intrinsic factor of social structure. East Pakistan had zaminders who were already 'absent on the spot. Among the zaminders were mostly Hindus whose numbers were further thinned out as they went to West Bengal simultaneously with the partitioning of Bengal. The East Pakistan Land Acquisitions Act—a substantial piece of legislation—which entered the Statute Book in February 1950, further enhanced the tenants' rights to the land. The cumulative effect of all these produced an impetus towards a kind of genuine social and progressive changes. As a natural corollary, parties had claims to grassroots support. This was a plane where protracted undemocratic government was not feasible, if elections were to take place. And in fact, the 1954 election was the case in point. Although it was a different but cruel point when the governor of the province under 92A told the centre in a secret dispatch "It is my considered opinion that the United Front leaders are the enemies of Pakistan and cannot be trusted."⁵¹⁸

However, there is one last point to be made about the M.L. Ministry in East Pakistan it did succeed in maintaining parliamentary stability until its departure from the scene⁵¹⁹—a solitary example when compared to other provinces of Pakistan. Also, most of the issues were debated in the legislature, as the congress was not prepared to allow matters to be settled by default.

Punjab

On the 5th August, 1947 the Pakistan sector of the Punjab (Western) elected its parliamentary leader without a contest, as Sir Firoz Khan Noon chivalrously withdrew

⁵¹⁶ Chowdhury, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁵¹⁷ Keith Callard, *op. cit.*, p. 161

⁵¹⁸ Governor's letter, *loc.cit.*, D.O. No. 101/PS 21st June, 1954 (Top Secret: Personal). Appendix 14.

⁵¹⁹ Constitution Commission, *loc.cit.*, p. 66 July 4, 1947.

his candidature in favor of the Khan of Mamdot.⁵²⁰ In the Punjab situation it was all ruse and cabal. The new premier and the Finance Minister, Mr. Mumtaz Daultana hailed from the Eastern sector of the Punjab (now in India), and the holding of their key positions in the Cabinet was a boost to the morale of the refugees.

The Ministry thus formed was from the very start wobbly in that the prominent Ministers particularly the Khan of Mamdot, Mumtaz Daultana, Mian Iftikheruddin, Shawkat Hayat Khan were ranged against each other both on personal and policy grounds. Their predilections could be broadly grouped as rightist, centre-left and leftist. For instance, the Premier evolved a programme of *Islamic Shariat* for enforcement. At an annual recurring loss of Rs. 50,00,000 the government decided to enforce prohibition. The first step was taken in April 1948. But in the following year the High Court held it invalid on technical grounds and readjustments were made with the provincial Excise Act.⁵²¹ This measure was shrewdly employed to rally the conservative elements to his side. Similarly, the 'ambitious Finance Minister leaned towards the left of centre as he proposed to tax agricultural income on a scale rising from 50 percent to 500 percent of the land revenue. This move was "both revolutionary and courageous", but also had the force of liquidating the Finance Minister's adversaries The Noons, Tiwanas and Iftikharuddins".⁵²² Mian Iftikheruddin, on the other hand, since his early Congress association had always been thought to be a crypto-communist. His was the most important portfolio namely, refugee rehabilitation. At a time when millions of refugees were to be socio-economically integrated into the society, Mian Sb. emphasized that agrarian reforms were the *sine qua non* of refugee rehabilitation. He wanted to build up 'People's Pakistan' under 'a People's Government'.

Furthermore, a crisis of ministerial jurisdiction was also in evidence, in that whether allotment of forsaken factories and commercial shops to Muslim refugees from East Punjab was the responsibility of the Minister for Finance and Industries (Daultana) or the Minister for Refugees (Mian Sb.).⁵²³ This was, though temporarily averted by Jinnah.

But ultimately 3 out of 5 Ministers, including Mian Sb. resigned from the office as a protest against the centre's interference in provincial rehabilitation matters.⁵²⁴ Mian Sb. free of Ministerial responsibility and helped by his enormous wealth and two self-owned newspapers (*Pakistan Times* and *Imrose*), and the Presidency of the provincial M.L. just seized, was now in the drive for political recruitment to his leftist camp only to be expelled from the M.L. shortly afterwards.

⁵²⁰ *Statesman*, August 6, 1947. In deference to the wishes of 53 out of the 59 M.L. member of the West Punjab section of the Provincial Assembly. Noon agreed to serve as their parliamentary leader, subject to Jinnah's wishes. Whereas, the Eastern section had 22 M.L. members. Noon obviously showed good sense. See: *Statesman*, July 4, 1947.

⁵²¹ *The Punjab Review*, 1947-1953 (Information Directorate of the Punjab Government, n.d.) p. 79.

⁵²² K.L. Gauba, *Inside Pakistan*, (Delhi: 1948), P. 151.

⁵²³ *Statesmen*, November 2, 1947.

⁵²⁴ *Times*, November 10, 1947.

Now, with the leftist Mian Sb. gone, the new difficulties cropped up in the expansion of the Cabinet. The principal leaders were summoned before Jinnah as the tussle between the rightist Chief Minister (Mamdot) and "progressive"⁵²⁵ Finance Minister (Daultana) became pronounced. Jinnah failed in his mediation. Daultana and Shawkat Hayat resigned. The formation of the Second Ministry could not last long as the centre promulgated 92A on the province in January 1949.

The Cabinet was prone to disunity. The Ministers could not give parliamentary account to the legislature, either collectively or severally. One major reason, however, was the total absence of any opposition in the legislature.⁵²⁶ As a result there developed factional opposition within the ruling party. Added to this, the time-honored rivalries among the so-called noble families such as Tiwanas, Noons, Qizilbashes, Mamdots, Daultanas, Mians, etc., etc., which had always been, as suggested by many critics, the determining factors of the Punjab politics since the British time. It was always the clannish balance of power that ruled the roost of parliamentary politics.

In a situation like this when the Ministry had to follow, for many reasons, "the attitude of the ostrich", the only stable office was the Governor's. Sir Francis Mudie (Governor) was "a keen Pakistani".⁵²⁷

An innovation was added to the 92A rule, in that under the new governor, Sardar Nishtar five advisers were taken from the M.L. party to aid the governor in the discharge of duties.⁵²⁸ A modicum of parliamentary government was created; for, in the absence of legislature and Ministry, the Governor's advisers and M.L. Council became the *de facto* Ministers and legislature respectively. That the Advisers to the Governor were responsible to the M.L. party was evident from the fact that the Chief adviser had to go when adverse votes were recorded against him in the M.L. Council meeting.⁵²⁹ Two things, however, crystallized amid the vicissitudes of the Punjab politics during the period of 92A, namely, the M.L. party was relatively filtered of factional elements,⁵³⁰ and electoral rolls were prepared for the general election to be held in March 10, 1951 based on universal adult suffrage first of its kind anywhere in Pakistan.

So, the election results had more than provincial significance. There were 197 seats in the Assembly, of which 40 were reserved for refugees who fled to Pakistan from India since 1947, 5 were reserved for woman 4 for Christians, 1 for other minority groups, and

⁵²⁵ *Manchester Guardian*. April 27, 1948.

⁵²⁶ Sri Parkash, *Pakistan: Birth and Early days* (Meerat : 1965), p. 29. A couple of Anglo-Indians or scheduled caste members could not be styled as opposition.

⁵²⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, July 10, 1949. (Lack of support for the Governor from the centre was also alleged.)

⁵²⁸ *Statesman*, November 5, 1949.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, July 27, 1950.

⁵³⁰ The groups such as Bari and Mamdot in the league gave way to the larger group, Daultana.

one earmarked for the graduates of the Punjab university.⁵³¹ The electoral rolls had about 9 million voters of which 34,00,000 were women,⁵³² most of whom would be in their Burqas.⁵³³ The M.L. party apart, there were five contesting parties in the field viz. J.A.M.L.,⁵³⁴ A.P.P., Jamate-e-Islami, the Islam league (Allama Mushriqui) and the Communist.

That the M.L. did not look askance to the opposition was indicative of its 'stake-all' directive to the centre and provinces for marshaling their resources for the M.L. victory. The central M.L. parliamentary board sat with the provincial one to decide nominations for the candidates. The M.L. working committee considered its 50,000 word election manifesto which contained, inter alia, the promise of the fulfillment of agrarian reforms—the watered down version of the drastic, agrarian reforms recommended earlier (1949) by the M.L. Agrarian Reforms Committee. But essentially the manifesto suffered from generalities viz. "The Muslim league did not fail in 1945 when it promised Pakistan. It will not fail now in 1951 when it plans to reshape Pakistan. The task of the Muslim league is not yet done."⁵³⁵ Ranged against it were the opposition planks of the J.A.M.L. and particularly of A.P.P. which envisaged, among others, drastic agrarian reforms and severance of commonwealth ties. So the issues on which the campaigns were fought were both local and national. Since the M.L. could not stress local issues beyond a certain point,⁵³⁶ it placed emphasis on the federal issues. The Prime Minister himself undertook a marathon electioneering tour in the province, defending Pakistan's membership of Commonwealth.⁵³⁷ The Prime Minister did not halt there; for he set into motion outside pressures⁵³⁸ to plough a harvest of votes for the M.L., as Chancellor Dr. Adenaur did in the 'Land' elections of West Germany during the time of the Second Bundestag. However, the revelation of the sensational news of the communist inspired abortive coup (discussed earlier) further helped the M.L. and produced an "adverse effect on the electoral chances of the leftists",⁵³⁹ as it distracted attention from the issues which came up in the general elections.

The 10-day electoral exercise was finished with an epitaph from Suhrawardy that the Punjab elections were "fraud and farce". *The Times'* correspondent characterised the elections as "less disorderly, on the whole", but also noted that only "one-third" of the

⁵³¹ *Times*, March 12, 1951.

⁵³² *Hindu*, January 29, 1951.

⁵³³ A sort of veil that surrounds women from being seen.

⁵³⁴ Jinnah Awami Muslim league. The ex-premier, Mamdot coalesced with Suhrawardy's A.M.L. to fight the Punjab elections. The party thus formed was named J.A.M.L. See: *Statesman*, January 25, 1951.

⁵³⁵ Quoted in *Statesman*, March, 1951.

⁵³⁶ That would mean the extinction of the landlords who comprised the M.L.

⁵³⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, March 9, 1951. (The election prospects for the M.L. candidates were further improved as India accepted the value of Pakistan currency.)

⁵³⁸ "Gen. Mirza told the writer that the Prime Minister (Liaquat) in front of him asked the Inspector General of Police - who also happened to be the uncle of Daultana - to see that the elections were won for the M.L.

⁵³⁹ *Hindu*, March 11, 1951 (Editorial), "Pakistan's first election".

voters "exercised their rights".⁵⁴⁰ The final party position resulting from the elections was: M.L. 141, J.A.M.L. 32, Independents 17, Jamat-e-Islam 1, A.P.P. 1, Minorities 5. Among the members elected 30 had been members of the previous legislature dissolved in 1949.⁵⁴¹

An analysis of the election results reveals firstly that a considerable share of the total votes cast went to the opposition side. Secondly, the voting had been extremely close and the opposition group fared better in urban constituencies.⁵⁴² (An interesting similarity with that of the Indian Congress which has been more successful in the rural constituencies.) The people's reactions to adult franchise as manifested in their voting apathy were not encouraging. There was no doubt much truth in the comment in a leading article of the *Statesman* that it was a "not wholly unexpected result of extending novel political rights to the masses".⁵⁴³ But the crux of the question lay elsewhere. The Punjab was a landlord-infested agrarian province.⁵⁴⁴ Land was the measure of power, prestige and a deterrent against insecurity. This 'golden earth' was institutionally monopolised by a string of zaminders. As far as cultivable lands were concerned, about "80% of the owners owned more than one-fifth of the area".⁵⁴⁵ The tenure system harboured the "old ruling oligarchy with its roots in big estates". This had an adverse effect on the political freedom of individuals, as well as the country's political institutions. And the opinion that "political independence without a social revolution is a mere substitution of 'brown capitalism' for white,⁵⁴⁶ had its relevance in West Pakistan. The apathy was largely formed out of the peasants stoicism and fear of feudal wrath. That was why parties could not root deep into the masses as it did in East Pakistan's case. On that point East and West Pakistan told the *tale of two cities*.

However, the most compensating aspect was that a group of about 40 (out of 197 members) obtained the right to dissent and formed the nucleus of a potentially lively opposition in a hitherto oppositionless legislature. No less important was the circulation of new blood in the legislature in that 167, members made their parliamentary debut. The new parliamentary opposition did not let the new M.L. government practice in a way far short of its election-professions, nor the Cabinet at the head of Daultana fell back upon its pledge to bring through agrarian reforms. Faced with an anti-reform group within the M.L. Assembly party, who thought agrarian reforms "unislamic,⁵⁴⁷ uncalled for and ruinous for the ... well-being of the Punjab",⁵⁴⁸ Daultana took umbrage and threatened to dissolve the legislature and face the electorate. A mountain of tedious

⁵⁴⁰ *Times*, March 27, 1951. See Also: *Hindu*. March 1951 (Editorial) "A Plea for Free Elections".

⁵⁴¹ *Statesman*, April 1, 1951.

⁵⁴² *Manchester Guardian*, March 18, 1951.

⁵⁴³ *Statesman* April 3, 1951 (Editorial) "Punjab (P) Election".

⁵⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, the whole of West Pakistan had a feudal structure.

⁵⁴⁵ Report of the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan (Lahore: 1959), p. 13.

⁵⁴⁶ Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Commonwealth in Asia* (Oxford: 1951), p. 53.

⁵⁴⁷ Instant religious decrees (*Fatwa*) against reforms were made available.

⁵⁴⁸ *Dawn*, October 1, 1951.

and fatiguing⁵⁴⁹ discussions on reforms produced a mice of mild programme. The draft bill which had earlier allowed landlords to possess 25 acres of irrigated land and 50 unirrigated, and the share of produce between the tenant and landlord to be divided at the rate of 66% for the former and 34% the latter was revised and instead a much more moderate measure was proposed which to the Premier himself was "not revolutionary".⁵⁵⁰

Suddenly, the puffs of the *Qadiani* movement and the breath of federal politics produced a wind that swept Feroze Khan Noon into the Premier's office in early 1953 marking the end of Daultana's fairly productive parliamentary years. Noon was an *apostle* of feudalism who thought his predecessor's agrarian legislation was based on "precepts from books of progressivism ... with utter disregards of hard facts of our national life,⁵⁵¹ and with the help of bell, book and candle⁵⁵² and extant anti-reform groups rushed to the scrapping of the Daultana reforms. Noon, however, could not make any further headway as the majority members of the M.L. Assembly party served notice of no confidence against Noon, who saved his skin by agreeing to the status quo.⁵⁵³

In sum, the period 1951-54 i.e. after the general election, was a definite improvement upon the previous ones in that some social legislation⁵⁵⁴ was enacted, the opposition played its role in the House, on balance, quite loudly but little more vigorously than its number should have permitted, and regular party intrigues did not follow regular change of government.

Sindh

The Sindh governments were historically notorious for instability. The readymade answer could be traced, like that of the Punjab, in an intriguing publication, namely the *Biographical Encyclopedia of Pakistan* which described the relationships of individuals in a country of *Jagirdars* and *Zamindars*.⁵⁵⁵ The landscape of barony in Sindh was highly pronounced where noble families such as Pirs, Mirs, Talpurs, Khuros, Sayeeds and Kazis were in state of corrosive co-existence. These families owned 87% of the entire cultivable land of Sindh.⁵⁵⁶ Among them there were big jagirdar families "descendants of marauding clans or mercenary soldiers"⁵⁵⁷ who were earlier given the right, by the

⁵⁴⁹ Some members literally fell in a swoon. See: *Dawn*, October 2, 1951.

⁵⁵⁰ *Dawn*, October 6, 1951.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, May 17, 1953.

⁵⁵² He also argued that Islam was on his side in the retention of Zamindari.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, December 1, 1953 (Editorial), "Quo Vadis?".

⁵⁵⁴ Particularly, the Punjab Children Act which held the state responsible for undertaking the responsibilities of those children who had no one to look after them. See: *Dawn*, December 9, 1952.

⁵⁵⁵ See: Donald N. Wilbur, *Pakistan, Yesterday and Today*, (New York: 1964), p. 126.

⁵⁵⁶ Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, op. cit., p. 346.

⁵⁵⁷ Grenfell Rudduck, *Towns and Villages of Pakistan*, (Karachi: 1957), p. 138.

state, of collecting and appropriating a share of the produce of land. Hence, politics in Sindh were dominated by nobility.

At independence the number of members in the legislature was sixty which afterwards dwindled to less than forty, as the Hindu members went to India. A couple or more of Hindu members (Congress and Scheduled caste) who were still Pakistanis pending solution of their properties could not fill in the gap of parliamentary opposition. In other words, all the prominent clans were in control of the M.L. the governing party. The members of the Sindh M.L. parliamentary board considered themselves all *chiefs* not *Indian*. And among the chiefs, there was a sinister figure, namely Ayub Khuhro whose major contribution to Sindh politics in the words of Suhrawardy was *Khuhroism* i.e. "striking terror in the hearts of his political opponents." He was chosen to be the first Premier of Sindh in place of Sir Hidayattullah who was promoted to the Governorship. The formation of Khuhro's Cabinet was significant in one respect, in that G.M. Syeed⁵⁵⁸—himself a landlord of no mean stature but always championed the cause of the peasants and downtrodden Haris⁵⁵⁹—and his following were left out of the government. A Hindu journalist of repute who thought G.M. Syed representing "Sindh's eternal soul ... Sindh without ... Syed is like playing *Hamlet* without the *Prince of Denmark*".⁵⁶⁰ The G.M. Syed groups exclusion from the government meant that in the Cabinet there would be no progressive elements who would challenge the Social status quo. The Cabinet having been formed with like-minded people however reactionary they might appear, created the basis of teamwork. But this did not work out as cabals flourished on the personal ambitions of the Cabinet members and members of the parliamentary body. As a result, M.L. Ministries from August 1947 till December 1951 followed one another with amazing frequency viz. those of Khuhro, Pir Ellahi Bux, Yussouf Haroon, Kazi Fazlullah.⁵⁶¹ The parliamentary majority for each succeeding group could be managed through "a mixture of patronage and coercion".⁵⁶² Then followed a 17-month Governor's rule from December 1951 to early 1953. A new parliamentary phase was initiated after the general elections of 1953.

However, the Cabinet inconstancy was not all the fault of the Sindh politicians; for, the centre had its subtle hands played in it. On two issues the successive Sindh governments turned recalcitrant e.g. Karachi and refugees. Sindh was virtually generous enough to play host to the federal government, which later took away Karachi Sindh's former capital to make its own capital. Sindh was equally fearful of an unrestricted flow of refugees into its territory. The Sindhi sentiments on both these

⁵⁵⁸ G.M. Syed was the President of the Sindh Muslim league 1943-45. But he could not continue in his office further due to his independence of mind and ideas that were not appreciated by the top circle of the M.L.

⁵⁵⁹ People who were sitting on the lowest rung of social arrangements. See G.M. Syed, *Struggle for New Sindh*, (Karachi 1949) where he pleaded for the abolition of jagirdari and zamindari system.

⁵⁶⁰ M.S.M. Sharma, *Peeps into Pakistan*, (Calcutta: 1954), p. 102.

⁵⁶¹ See: *Manchester Guardian*, 27 April, 1948; *Statesman*, February 4, 1949; May 5, 1950; *Hindu*, January 11, 1951, *Statesman*, December 1951.

⁵⁶² Callard, "The Political Stability of Pakistan", *loc. cit.*, p. 10.

issues found expression in G.M. Syeed's speech in the legislature who said amid thunderous applause that "It was Sindh which invited Pakistan government to have sojourn under her roof ... It was again Sindh which opened her doors for the armies of political refugees⁵⁶³ from India".⁵⁶⁴ The federal government, no doubt, felt affronted.⁵⁶⁵ Whenever the Sindh government failed to toe the line of the centre its Chief Minister came within the jurisdiction of that infamous PRODA or election tribunal for gross public conduct. Most of the prominent ministers, one time or another, were PRODA-struck. True, politicians such as Khuhro, Fazlullah, Pir Illahi Bux and Golam Ali Talpur were found unscrupulous, but the vital point was that the centre acting through the Governor chose its own particular time to bring the politicians to book. And the criterion was the extent of the provincial government's subservience to the centre.⁵⁶⁶ The official memory of the central government was so short that it felt no scruple in emancipating those very convicted politicians to assist the federal cause. Khuhro offered an extraordinary example of it when he was ransomed by the Governor General to bolster the cause of the one-unit.

However, the bright spots during the whole of Sindh parliamentary life were the holding of general elections and their resultant benefits. Electoral rolls were prepared based on universal adult franchise. There were 17 lakhs of voters of whom 5 lakhs were females. The women were not only to vote for the first time but were registered by their names abandoning the age-old system of their being registered as 'wives' and 'daughters'⁵⁶⁷ The government made elaborate arrangements for facilitating voting and preventing adoption of unfair means. As many as 1200 polling booths were made and voters were required to place their ballot paper in the boxes bearing colors or symbols⁵⁶⁸ of their respective party candidates. A number of 540 gazetted officers were entrusted with the counting of votes and ballot boxes were required to be sealed and later opened in the presence of the candidates or their agents. Indelible ink lasting for 24 hours was imported from India the sole possessor for the use of voters' thumb impression so that casting of votes could not take place more than once.⁵⁶⁹ The election commissioner recognized, three parties and colors were allotted to them accordingly—M.L. (green color), Sindh Awami Mahaz (white) and Sindh league⁵⁷⁰ (a black background with

⁵⁶³ Writer's italics.

⁵⁶⁴ Quoted in *Dawn*, September 17, 1953.

⁵⁶⁵ The writer heard from a knowledgeable quarter that when Khuhro shilly-shallied about moving his provincial headquarters from Karachi to Hyderabad, Jinnah summoned Khuhro and charged him as a dictator. Khuhro exclaimed, "Quaid-e-Azam, you telling me a dictator." Khuhro was duly dismissed by him, later on, on charges of maladministration, corruption, etc., etc.

⁵⁶⁶ Haroon was made the Premier of Sindh, obviously at the backing of Liaquat. And when Gulam Ali Talpur was elected the leader of the Sindh M.L. Assembly party in 1951, the Governor did not call him to form a Cabinet. See: *Statesman*, December 26, 1951.

⁵⁶⁷ *Dawn*, March 24, 1953.

⁵⁶⁸ 12 symbols were selected: sword, bicycle, scales, elephant, plough, umbrella, tiger, hand, millstone, sun, tree and horse. See *Dawn*, April 12, 1953.

⁵⁶⁹ *Dawn*, April 5, 1953

⁵⁷⁰ The splinter group of the Sindh M.L. led by Khuhro. Usually known as Khuhro league.

white stripes). Since both the Hari Federation and Islam league applied for red color, no color was given to them.⁵⁷¹

In a legislature of 111 seats, there were 101 Muslim seats, for which there were 378 contestants and for the remaining 10 seats (minority) the contestants numbered 46. The M.L. parliamentary party put up 100 candidates, Sindh Awami Mahaz 51,⁵⁷² Khuhro league 55.⁵⁷³ The remaining contestants were the sundry independents and minorities who did not come in an organized way. A model Election Day was observed in each district and Taluks headquarters to educate the voting people and election machinery on the conduct of election.⁵⁷⁴ The elections commenced on May 4, 1953.

Because of Khuhro's leaving the main M.L. body and contesting elections on a bogus M.L. platform after his name, the central M.L. parliamentary board formed a 5-man committee under the supervision of the Prime Minister himself to campaign for the Sindh M.L. Its 16-page election manifesto contained *inter alia*, planks such as the abolition of jagirdari, the enjoyment of civil liberties and protection of the interests of minorities.⁵⁷⁵ Khuhro's 22-point programme was more generous promising to do everything, even maintenance of "harmony between Haris and Zaminders".⁵⁷⁶ The Awami Mahaz stood on 7-point programme of which the first two items, namely (1) total abolition of jagirdari and (2) limitation of zamindari acreage,⁵⁷⁷ were prominent.

The elections were over by 10th May, 1953. According to the Dawn's estimates 52% of the voters cast their votes. Among women voters, about 35% went to the polls⁵⁷⁸—a better record than that of other provinces of West Pakistan. The M.L. party—old and organized—swept the elections. The M.L. won 88 seats, Awami Mahaz 4 (later became 7), Khuhro league 4, and the rest independents.⁵⁷⁹ Obviously, the election results contained a message. Though the M.L. won the elections overwhelmingly, it only obtained 53% of the votes polled in upper Sindh, the stronghold of landlords.⁵⁸⁰ Secondly, the elections proved that only well-organized parties could make any electoral impact. A powerful opponent 'worth his powder and shot' Khuhro was of no avail before an organized party, the M.L. And the most important revelation according to the *Guardian* was "that it was a fair fight—no extraordinary powers were invoked by the administration. Even the disappointed opposition leaders, by some miracle, agree that the elections were completely fair. This was an unheard of verdict in Sindh, where

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, April 14, 1953.

⁵⁷² G.M. Syed's party.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, April 6, 1953.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, April 14, 1953.

⁵⁷⁵ *Hindu*, April 16, 1953.

⁵⁷⁶ *Dawn*, April 12, 1953.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, April 9, 1953.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, April 15, 1953.

⁵⁷⁹ *Hindu*, April 12, 1953.

⁵⁸⁰ *Dawn*, May 17, 1953.

corruption and improper influence had always tended to reduce election ... to a farce. It also shows—and there were many who had begun to doubt this—that democracy really can be a working and workable system in Pakistan.⁵⁸¹

Since May 1953, the Sindh government under the new Premiership of Pirzada Abdus Satter had a definite veneer of stability till early 1955. Only the larger issue of the consolidation of all West Pakistan units into one province produced a ruffle in the course and the legislature had to be dissolved in late 1955. A few pieces of social legislation were enacted.⁵⁸² Although the opposition was impoverished of numbers—only 7 Awami Mahaz and a few independents—nevertheless, it contributed in a 'positive manner' to the business of the House. It was observed by Dr. Muneer that "the standard of debates and general level of proceedings registered an improvement after the election."⁵⁸³

N.W.F.P.

The N.W.F.P. Ministry was the first to have been dismissed on 22nd August 1947 at the behest of the Governor General. Dr. Sayed's observation indeed, a well meaning one that "the precedent of dismissing a Ministry which had a majority.. was bound to lead to political instability in the provinces,"⁵⁸⁴ was steeped more in the moralistic legalistic aspect of parliamentarianism than in the psychology of political surroundings. Back in the mid 1920s the Simon Commission wrote: "The N.W.F. is not only the frontier of India; is an international frontier of first importance from the military point of view for the whole empire."⁵⁸⁵ And the new situation did not alter the geographical and political realities. The Congress Ministry in the N.W.F.P. was formed after the electoral verdict of 1946. But when the referendum was held in July 1947 in the province in pursuance of June 3rd plan of the British government, on the question whether the province should join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Indian Constituent Assembly, the province decided in favor of Pakistan.⁵⁸⁶ The verdict of the referendum was also, by implication, anti-Congress i.e. the Ministry, which had been consistently opposed to the idea of Pakistan and threw hundreds of M.L. leader and workers into prison.⁵⁸⁷ The situation was further complicated when the Frontier Congress in a resolution demanded Pakhtoonistan, a free Pathan State, and after the Congress defeat in the referendum the Congress flag was totally abandoned and its place given the *New Zalme Pakhtoon* red flag with two black crossed swords on it.

⁵⁸¹ *Manchester Guardian*, May 20, 1953. See Also: *Dawn*, May 6, 1953; May 7, 1953.

⁵⁸² For example the Sindh Village Sanitation Act, Children Act, The Sindh Tenancy Act, 1950 etc., etc. In 1954, Jagirdari was abolished but could not be enforced due to legal complications. 5-year plan, *op.cit.*, pp. 314- 15.

⁵⁸³ Muneer Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁵⁸⁴ Khalid-bin-Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

⁵⁸⁵ Quoted in *New Zealand Herald*, January 2, 1948.

⁵⁸⁶ *Statesmen*, July 20, 1947.

⁵⁸⁷ Including Qayum Khan the later M.L. Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. For Congress persecution on the Muslim leaguers see: *Times* April 20, 1947; *Statesmen*, May 25, 1947.

Perhaps the Pakistan government could show its qualities of magnanimity and farsightedness vis-à-vis the Congress Ministry, particularly in a situation when Afghanistan which was occupying the same strategic position in relation to the subcontinent as Armenia did in the days of the *Flavian Emperors*, when *Parathion* imperialism was the major military problem of Rome, showed her interests in the Pathans. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, a venerable leader of the Frontier avowed his loyalty to Pakistan but insisted on having 'Paktoonistan within the polity of Pakistan. The central government elected to its reserve powers and dismissed the Congress government for its sponsoring a scheme considered to be anti-Pakistan.

Khan Abdul Qayum, the M.L. leader became the Chief Minister. Jinnah himself tried to make Gaffar Khan⁵⁸⁸ agree to a political truce and form a coalition government with his Red Shirt (or Khudai Khid matgar⁵⁸⁹) but to no purpose.⁵⁹⁰ The *Ides of March* of 1948 falsified the political soothsaying in that the Frontier budget of the M.L. Ministry was duly passed. In a legislature of 50 members there were 30 Muslims of whom the M.L. had the allegiance of 25 members⁵⁹¹ including 3 members who were elected in the recent by-election. Among the 12 Hindu members 11 left for India leaving one (Lala Koth Ram) who found it more convenient to support the M.L. government.⁵⁹² This depleted Assembly of 39 members continued to function until the general elections of December, 1951 brought forth a new and enlarged legislature.

The Frontier province was also not devoid of landlords. One eighth of the total area in lots of more than 500 acres each was owned by 0.1% of the people.⁵⁹³ But feudal dominance could not get upper hand as the Khan brothers particularly Gaffar Khan⁵⁹⁴ (affectionately called the *Frontier Gandhi*) always kept some sort of egalitarian movement in motion. So, the accents of Frontier politics were mainly on the *Pakhtoonistan* movement struggling to come out on the surface, on the one hand, and the government's autocratic antidotes against the very movement what it considered to be evil, on the other. That the rise of opposition parties was not a welcome proposition to the Premier was made clear by him in the first session of the legislature. Viz. "Our new State ... is at present surrounded by enemies. We should give up our differences for at least five years."⁵⁹⁵ Gaffar Khan became a security prisoner to the central government, and his brother Dr. Khan was put under house arrest. Large number of the followings of *Red Shirt* and Congress fell victim either to the Frontier crime regulation or the

⁵⁸⁸ Gaffar Khan was brother of Dr. Khan Shahib, the dismissed Chief Minister.

⁵⁸⁹ Meaning servants of God. The predecessor of the M.L. government was virtually the coalition of Congress and Red shirt party.

⁵⁹⁰ *Statesman*, June 28, 1947; August 2, 1947.

⁵⁹¹ The writer was told by Qayum Khan himself that 8 Congressmen crossed the floor to join the M.L. bandwagon.

⁵⁹² *Statesman*, April 11, 1948.

⁵⁹³ Land Reforms Commission, *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵⁹⁴ They themselves were landlords too. Qayum Khan himself made flattering references to Khan brothers in his book, 'Butter and guns.'

⁵⁹⁵ Quoted in *Statesman*, March 24, 1948.

Security Act. There was room for personal vendettas; for, in the days of Congress-Red Shirt rule people were fined for just being Muslim leaguers and those fines were refunded from the public exchequer.⁵⁹⁶ Extraneous factors such as certain Indian leaders' occasional outburst of sympathies for the Khan brothers which rather dramatically culminated in the Frontier government's unearthing of the so-called "heinous plot"⁵⁹⁷ which showed that the *Red Shirts* were in collusion with some Indian leaders, influenced governmental policy. Then the Fakir of Ipi, a religious zealot par excellence he had declared a crusade against the British rule in the mid-thirties despite his being forgiven by the government for his earlier role, involved himself in anti-state activities in Waziristan before he made a clean pair of heels to Afghanistan. Toughness, no doubt, was required of the government up to a point, but its excessiveness, perhaps, was the reflection of Qayum's penchant for political masochism.

Qayum's myopia was evidenced by his brandishing the big stick all the time without holding out an olive branch to dissentients, as he would not "let off disloyal persons, come what may", despite the opposition's plea for a general amnesty, for prisoners who declared "unflinching loyalty to Pakistan".⁵⁹⁸ Qayum's was the policy of gradual release. His policy alienated some of the influential Muslim leaguers such as Pir of Manki Sharif, Zakori Sharif, Khan of Lundker, who ultimately came out of the M.L. after the centre had failed to bridge up the schism and started operating under the new party, (Awami Muslim league) A.M.L. The A.M.L. activities were hamstrung as their leaders, by rotation, suffered either expulsion from the province or imprisonment. However, the clouds of repression started lifting a bit as the sunrays of the general elections to be held in November 1951 were breaking in. Compared to other provincial elections, the Frontier electioneering atmosphere tended to be a cramped one. Though campaigning started in April (the legislature was dissolved at the end of March) so far as the M.L. was concerned, the opposition parties, particularly the rising one, A.M.L.—the Red Shirt was banned when its leader Gaffar Khan went to prison—could not function properly as its leaders and workers were allowed to electioneer only shortly before the elections. Even its President, Pir of Manki Sharif, and Convenor, Suhrawardy were not allowed to enter the province until November 15—twelve days before polling. Qayum declared: "After his (Suhrawardy) speech in East Pakistan applauding the Red Shirts, how could we take the risk of allowing him in the province and trying to revive a banned organization".⁵⁹⁹ In spite of the opposition parties⁶⁰⁰ threat that they would boycott elections "till full civil liberties are restored in the Province,"⁶⁰¹ they, at length, chose the positive method of contesting the elections.

⁵⁹⁶ The writer was told by Qayum Khan, the Chief Minister.

⁵⁹⁷ *Hindu*, March 14, 1949.

⁵⁹⁸ *Hindu*, March 12, 1949.

⁵⁹⁹ See: *Dawn*, November 17, 1951.

⁶⁰⁰ M.L.; A.M.L., A.P.P., the Islam league and Jamat-i-Islami.

⁶⁰¹ *Statesman*, November 25, 1951.

The Electoral rolls published on November 6, 1951 showed an electorate of 15,16,347 of which 44,777 were for the two reserved seats for women and 5,618 for the general constituency (Hindu).⁶⁰² The basis of allocation of seats in the legislature was one representative for every 40,000 people. As many as 396 candidates were contesting the elections in a legislature of 85 seats of which 84 were Muslim seats, including 2 women⁶⁰³ and 1 minority. The M.L. Parliamentary Board nominated candidates for all the seats, the A.M.L. 44 (due to insufficient party propaganda), and the remaining contestants hailed from the Independents and other parties.⁶⁰⁴ The common denominator of the opposition plank was the restoration of full civil rights in the province. Whereas all the M.L. promises boiled down to, as usual, one thing i.e. the M.L. "is just like a mother to Pakistan and as a mother it has a special love for its child that no other political party could have"⁶⁰⁵—said the campaigning Chief Minister. The 17-day polling results (November 26—December 12, 1951) brought forth the following party position: M.L. 67; Independent Muslims 13; Non-Muslim 1 and A.M.L. 4.⁶⁰⁶ Apart from the opposition's allegation that the elections were not fair⁶⁰⁷ and its quick refutation by the government that they were, the poll had some positive indices. The Pathan (People of the N.W.F.P.) reactions to adult franchise, first of its kind was quite favourable. The percentage of votes cast was 48:72⁶⁰⁸—9 members returned unopposed. The inculcation of the democratic idea made through the vehicle of general election brought about, evidently, a suspension of fratricidal village feuds and rivalries for which the Pathans had been historically condemned. Instead of rifles in their hands Pathans clasped loudspeakers and trudged around villages of rolling surface to electioneer.⁶⁰⁹

A highly patriarchal society like the N.W.F.P. where women could scarcely have a glimpse of the sun, nor the chance of exercising voting rights in an environment where orthodox Pathans scrupled to eat the humble pie of winning a seat on woman's vote, had to its credit two women elected by the women votes for the first time—a

⁶⁰² Year Book of the North West Frontier Province, 1954. (Information Department: Peshawar : 1954), p. 30.

⁶⁰³ Five women contested for the two seats reserved for women. See: Pakistan News, November 25, 1951.

⁶⁰⁴ Dawn, November 24, 1951.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid, November 26, 1951.

⁶⁰⁶ Statesman, 13, December, 1951.

⁶⁰⁷ The possibility of some irregularities could not be ruled out altogether. But its reality was magnified by the disgruntled Muslim leaguers themselves, let alone the defeated parties. The re-election of the chief Minister as President of the Frontier M.L. was opposed by Khan of Jhagra who led the dissidents supported by Youssouf Khatak, the General Secretary of the all Pakistan M.L. The Jhagra-Khatak group could not defeat Qayum (66:48 votes). As a result, this group was deprived of M.L. nominations in the elections. Though the central parliamentary Board cancelled some of the nominations of the provincial board in favor of the Jhagra Khatak group. But the group was far from satisfied. See: Dawn, October 22, 1951; November 4, 1951; November 5, 1951 and December 14, 1951.

⁶⁰⁸ "Year Book", loc. cit., p. 31. "The polling was heavy, considering the enlarged franchise and inaccessibility of many regions of the Province. *Times*, December 13, 1951.

⁶⁰⁹ *Pakistan News*, December 15, 1951.

phenomenon which "would have been inconceivable in the North-West Frontier Province only a short time ago".⁶¹⁰

The poll was also indicative of the Frontier people's loyalty to the Pakistan government as the M.L. "has buried the myth of Pakhtoonistan".⁶¹¹ If the Pathans were so keen on the creation of Pakhtoonistan, they would have voted the M.L. government out, no matter that the protagonists were interned. And the charge that Pathans were goaded into voting in favor of the M.L. was not convincing to those who knew that Pathans were fiercely independent and their traditional love for freedom was legendary and more than enough to Stave off outside intervention. Surely, the opposition parties could have fared better had they been provided enough political leeway. After all they were new to people's eyes. The abstract stand for 'civil liberties' attracted the attention of the electorate less from the tangible achievements made by the M.L. government in nation-building areas; for, "strong leadership and enterprise are often accepted as adequate excuse for rough and ready methods".⁶¹²

The second phase of parliamentary government registered a change of attitude vis-à-vis opposition, particularly when Qayum joined the central Cabinet in April 1953 and Sardar Abdur Rashid became the Chief Minister. Meanwhile, Pir of Manki Sharif—he did not contest the general elections won a by-election and became the opposition leader of the paltry group of Members. The Chief Minister initiated, to the delight of the opposition, a resolution in the House to the effect that Standing Committees be appointed consisting of members from both sides to advise the government on measures of public interest, law and order, taxation, jails, education, agriculture, etc., etc.⁶¹³ Over and above this, the Chief Minister granted a general political amnesty and released Red Shirt leaders including Gaffar Khan and Dr. Khan.⁶¹⁴ Suhrawardy recorded his comment e.g. "I am extremely happy ... at the news that the N.W.F.P Ministry have released all political prisoners."⁶¹⁵ However, it would appear from the records that the M.L. Ministry, during the period 1947-1954 had the distinction of achieving stability through harsh measures which were however gradually relaxed.

The Princely States and centrally administered areas

The tact and toughness with which Sardar Patel of India brought about the process of democratization in the Princely States and their accession to India could not be followed in Pakistan. One big reason was that the M.L. leaders, prior to independence, always hobnobbed with the Princes to enhance the cause of Pakistan and thwart the Congress, which stood for a united India. The States falling under Pakistan—acceded to Pakistan

⁶¹⁰ *Times*, December 18, 1951 (Editorial), "Pakistan and the Frontier".

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, December 13, 1951.

⁶¹² *Statesman*, December 17, 1951 (Editorial), "N.W.F.P. Politics".

⁶¹³ *Dawn*, November 18, 1953.

⁶¹⁴ *New York Times*, January 5, 1954.

⁶¹⁵ *Hindu*, January 7, 1954.

at the eleventh hour. They were veritable islands of medieval autocracy. The central government found it rather too delicate to steamroller the States—the erstwhile allies of the M.L.—into accepting parity with other provinces having responsible governments. Besides, the central government was intrinsically inhibited i.e. a wholesale reformation in the principalities would ultimately bind the central government *pari passu* to abolish the feudal system in the provinces. In a situation like this, the road to reforms, constitutional or otherwise, was bound to be "dangerously long one."⁶¹⁶

Although, after dawdling initially the biggest state, Bahawalpur, set a remarkable example in that the Ruler transferred the State's administrative powers to the Cabinet responsible to the Majlis (legislature) of 49 members elected on adult franchise.⁶¹⁷ Addressing people he urged them to be worthy of the "new and great opportunities" which provided the "majority rule" and also "an opposition within constitutional limits".⁶¹⁸ 11 The Central Ministry of States and Frontier Regions persuaded four States of Baluchistan (Kalat, Mekhran, Lasbela and Kharan) to merge into one union with a common executive, legislature and judiciary and introduce some reforms towards responsible government.⁶¹⁹ The Frontier States (Chitral, Dir, Swat and Amb) had anthropological difficulties in the way of progress as the tribal habits and customs rendered the people deferential to their respective leaders.

Next to Bahawalpur was the Khairpur State which maintained parliamentary machinery and had its State legislature elected on an adult franchise. It was the only State which enacted a Bill guaranteeing free compulsory education (excluding girls) up to matriculation.⁶²⁰ Baluchistan was the stronghold of feudalism. The 55 tribal chiefs who constituted the Shahi Jirga (Royal Council) influenced the destinies of the nomadic people of Baluchistan. The Indian Central Assembly of the British period urged for its reform. But nothing new was added to the then existing system by which this area was governed viz. the agent to the Governor General, the Chief Commissioner and the Jirga system. One big obstacle, though, was Baluchistan's being a "politically heterogeneous"⁶²¹ area. The only improvement made under the Pakistan government was the forming of 15-man advisory council representative of the Baluchis who would enjoy the same privileges as the members of a legislature to assist the centre in administration. Some association between administration and people was made by

⁶¹⁶ *Dawn*, April 10, 1952 (Editorial) "Reforms in States".

⁶¹⁷ The Ruler was so enlightened that in response to the opposition complaints of racketing in the elections held in April 1952 he ordered re-election in May in which the M.L. won 35 seats in a legislature of 49. The opposition (A.M.L.) won 14 seats - a rare feat compared to other regular provinces. See: *Dawn*, April 27, 1952; May 29, 1952.

⁶¹⁸ *Dawn*, March 10, 1952 (Editorial) "Bahawalpur".

⁶¹⁹ A "Council of Rulers" with "Khan-e-Azam" (sort of Prime Minister) at the head was in charge of the administration. But the greatest drawback of the scheme was that in a legislature of 40 members 30% of the membership belonged to the category of nomination. See: *Dawn*, April 14, 1952 (Editorial) "Baluchistan States Union".

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, March 11, 1952 (Editorial) "Baluchistan States"

⁶²¹ *Statesman*, February 27, 1948.

attaching the council to the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan rather than to the Governor General at Karachi. This constitutional advance was further supplemented by the extension of local self-government to deal with education, health and economic development.⁶²² The N.W.F. agencies were the responsibilities of the central Minister of States and Frontier Regions. And, representative tribal chiefs were associated with the Frontier administration.

The metropolis, Karachi like Baluchistan and the N.W.F. Agencies was within the sphere of the central government, which operated through the Chief Commissioner. Karachi had nearly 40 years of experience in local government to its credit. The refugees who filled in the gap caused by Hindu migration pressed, under the leadership of Hussain Imam, for an elected legislature and responsible ministry to look after Karachi,⁶²³ on the grounds of its increasing population, higher literacy rate, number of newspapers and commercial superiority.

Lobbying to this end was actively carried on by the Karachi Chapter of the M.L. which ostensibly behaved as though it had the *de jure* status of a provincial unit.⁶²⁴ But the centre was apprehensive of the Karachites who had all the symptoms of the proverbial *Roman mob*. Besides, the centre had political grounds for not envisaging a separate status for Karachi. For example, the East Pakistanis might object (as in fact they did) to Karachi's sudden change of status after so much federal money had already been invested therein. However, the Karachi Municipal Corporation which was already in existence with its 82 councilors and a Mayor at the head which were freely elected in 1953 by a 4 lakh voters⁶²⁵ continued to function within the jurisdiction of local subjects.

The relation between the centre and the Princely States and the centrally administered area was not uniform. States were duly represented in the Constituent Assembly. The terms of the Instrument of Assession entitled the States to conduct their respective governments independently of the Pakistan government, provided they had full allegiance to the Pakistan constitution. The main policy of the centre was one of persuasion through which it wanted to bring about a uniform level of democratic development among different States.

The degree of success was not commensurate with its intention. The States, at bottom, were feudal edifices. The noble heads could have been severed from their necks, French style or, left intact, British style, to be assimilated into the society through evolution. The central government chose the path of gradualism and persuasion vis-à-vis the

⁶²² *Ibid.*, February 25, 1949.

⁶²³ Central and provincial governments coexisted in Calcutta till 1911, Simla till 1939. Besides, the Indian example of giving smaller units like Ajmer, Bhopal, Delhi, etc. elected legislatures and responsible ministries gave some impetus to the demand.

⁶²⁴ *Dawn*, May 27, 1952.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, April 24, 1953.

Princely States. And its relation to centrally administered areas was rather direct and temporary,⁶²⁶ as well.

In the foregoing pages we have analyzed the relation between the centre and the units. We have also seen how the parliamentary governments functioned in various units. The quick rise and fall of Cabinets, particularly in Sindh was, no doubt, a disturbing phenomenon. Internal causes apart, some dyarchic arrangements of governmental powers between the centre and units operated to the detriment of the growth of parliamentarianism in the latter. But what was discernible was the continuity of policy, which did not change along with the permutation, and combination of Cabinet personnel in the provinces. That policy, however, was not progressive, particularly when only the fringes of agrarian reforms were touched. But, we emphasize, that there was positive improvement registered by all units from a broad parliamentary standpoint, after each general election held in each unit.

Considering that "the political system ... itself a system of choices" and "voters are the political equivalents of consumers in a free economy",⁶²⁷ the elections held in the provinces and some States⁶²⁸ in Pakistan were a remarkable feature. Mr. Sydney D. Bailey, a Hansard Society man, having enormous interest and knowledge in the affairs of South Asian governments, thought that the very conduct of elections based on adult franchise among a marginally educated populace "is a remarkable achievement".⁶²⁹ Still, one can pause on the fruitfulness of having elections in an illiterate electorate. Perhaps Bryce's dictum i.e. 'the tool will give the workman the skill' has more force in this world of today than the more desirable one held out by J.S. Mill, 'universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement'. The Pakistan Electoral Reforms Commission of 1955 struck a note of cynicism that elections were "a farce, a mockery"⁶³⁰ upon the people. This was so due to the existence of the feudal system and so-called 'pocket constituencies' that resembled the 18th century 'rotten boroughs' of England. But the impediments were bound to be removed, gradually, as the elections would give electorate a sense of participation in government, a degree of political education and new political parties committed to electoral emancipation through reforms.⁶³¹

⁶²⁶ For instance, some portion of the excluded areas of the Frontier region, according to the centre's decision, came under the executive authority of the provincial government of the N.W.F.P. See: *Times* September 27, 1950.

⁶²⁷ D.E. Apter, "Comparative Politics", op. cit., p. 331.

⁶²⁸ During this period 1947-1954, all and sundry local self governing bodies had their elections held, too.

⁶²⁹ Sydney D. Bailey, *Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia*, (London: 1953), p. 59.

⁶³⁰ Quoted in Report of the Franchise Commission. 1963, (Ministry of Law, Pakistan: 1964), p. 44.

⁶³¹ Even under the quasi-dictatorial regime of Ayub born of highly qualified electoral system. the franchise Commission of 1963 in its majority report strongly recommended the universal adult franchise.

STORMS OVER

True, the Governor General fulfilled one of the demands of the U.F. by dissolving the Constituent Assembly which was reduced to the position of an unrepresentative rump, but in doing so he was no less actuated by the desire of creating one unit in West Pakistan. While the U.F. victory in East Pakistan gave a façade of unity to the central government of the M.L., curiously enough the U.F.'s victory also "gave a leg-up to the dissidence in the West",⁶³² i.e. the Punjabi group's dissatisfaction with constitutional proposals of the East Pakistan dominated Constituent Assembly produced a deep rift in the rank and file of the West Pakistan M.L. And it happened that the Punjabi group, of late, came to look forward to the end of the Constituent Assembly like that of the U.F., though obviously for different reasons.

Now the question was one of means as to how best the present unusual political situation could be exploited for the realization of the designs for which the Governor General performed the final *coup de grace* on the M.L. It was possible for the Governor General in his moments of pent-up rage⁶³³ caused by the politician's snatching away his powers by an Act of the Constituent Assembly, to suggest to Gen. Ayub (C.-in-C.) the taking over the government of the country.

For he knew Gen. Ayub was mentally committed to the one-unit project. Whether Ayub was formally approached to assume the reigns of the country or given a casual hint by the Governor General⁶³⁴ there is no definite proof. But on hindsight it can be maintained that it was but natural for the Governor General to have support of the army in the person of Ayub in the reconstructed Cabinet. For, after all, a Cabinet orphaned by the absence of a parliament, responsible only to the Governor General, and committed to undertake country's major issues, to be successful needed the support of those who represented the influential sections or groups of people in Pakistan. And as far as Ayub's alleged magnanimity reflected in his "No"⁶³⁵ to the hypothetical offer of the Governor General was concerned it was, no doubt, dictated more by the native unpreparedness of the *Military Establishment* to seize power than Ayub's deep sense of parliamentary politics. The Army was yet to be adequately fed with the fodder of American Military Aid before it could flex its muscle decisively. The Prime Minister

⁶³² *Hindu*, October 27, 1954 (Editorial) "Crisis in Pakistan".

⁶³³ Begum Taz, wife of the A.D.C. to the Governor General (also daughter of Gen. Mirza) who had the opportunity of seeing the Governor General at a close range, told the writer that during the later part of 1954 the Governor General was almost half mad and running a temperature of 102° or 103° on occasion.

⁶³⁴ Gen. Mirza told the writer that when the Prime Minister's retinue assembled at the London Airport to depart for Pakistan in response to the Governor General's call, Ayub took Mirza aside and told him: "*Kichiko Ma'at Koha Karo, Golam Mohammad Hukumat Ham Logo Ko De Denge*", meaning 'Don't tell anybody the Governor General had told me that he would hand over administration to us'.

⁶³⁵ A devoted lieutenant of Ayub magnified this aspect of Ayub's saying 'no to the offer.

himself regretted the delay of the U.S. military aid before the M.L. central parliamentary party which, according to him "should have been faster".⁶³⁶ However, the situation was tempting for a man of ambitions and Ayub could only 'look into the seeds of time' and await his grains of ambitions to grow into maturity; for, he read things suggestive to his inner ambition, first as Macbeth picked up the message of the *witches* that he had the potentiality of a *king*. The Governor general willed 'let there be a constituted cabinet with the same Mohammed Ali at its head'. And there was one. The retention of Mohammed Ali as Prime Minister – the Governor General's erstwhile tormentor – was perhaps motivated by reasons. Pakistan could not afford to alarm her allies who had just poured into the country \$105 million in aid.⁶³⁷ A non-party Cabinet of 9 members was sworn in on October 25, 1954. It was a broad-based Cabinet in which the services, business interests and the country's politics were represented viz., Gen. Ayub (military); Gen. Mirza⁶³⁸ (political service); Chowdhury Mohammed Ali (Audit and Accounts); the Governor General (Audit and Accounts); Ispahani⁶³⁹ (Business), and the Prime Minister, Dr. Khan, G. Pathan and G.A. Talpur (country's politics).

When the Governor General came to preside over the new Cabinet on October 27, it looked as though the new arrangements were reminiscent of the Viceroy's Council of British India where since the time of Kitchener the C.-in-C. always sat in that Council as a military member.⁶⁴⁰ The Governor General who was not much of a politician hit upon a strategy by which he wanted to shoot the target of his programmes by placing his gun on the shoulders of politicians. That was why he brought politicians into the Cabinet and particularly Dr. Khan, of whose inclusion in the cabinet acted as a salve to the *Redshirt* opposition to the creation of one unit. He sent an *emissary* to Zurich to sound Suhrawardy and 'feelers' to other prominent leaders of political parties to fill in the remaining numbers of Cabinet minister.⁶⁴¹ But side by side, he also institutionalized an implicit threat in the Cabinet in the shape of Ayub, who chose to have his ministerial duties performed from his military headquarters at Rawalpindi⁶⁴² – a step that gave him an air of non-involvement in politics on the one hand, and saved him from being alienated from the army's affection, on the other. Gen. Mirza, who in his recent tide of fortune found a suitable base for climbing the rungs of upper echelon of power continued liaison, as an ex-defense Secretary, between the civilian government and the army. Here the Governor General dug in the canal of the so-called "Cabinet of talents" to bring in the crocodile of military threat of take-over. Although, in matters of Cabinet recruitment the Prime Minister had no other alternative than to play second fiddle to the Governor General; but, supposing the Prime Minister had a free hand in the

⁶³⁶ See M. Ahmed, *My Chief* (Karachi : 1960) 142 *Dawn*, June 1955.

⁶³⁷ *Observer*, October 31, 1954, "Tough Politics in Pakistan" by Philip Deane. "Army needed him (Mohammad Ali) to remain as recipient of much needed American aid." See *Daily Express*, October 25, 1954.

⁶³⁸ Lately Governor of East Pakistan.

⁶³⁹ Lately High Commissioner of Pakistan to U.K.

⁶⁴⁰ *Times*, October 28, 1954.

⁶⁴¹ See *Manchester Guardian*, October 28, 1954; *Statesman*, October 30, 1954; *Dawn*, October 28, 1954.

⁶⁴² *Dawn*, November 1, 1954.

selection of Cabinet members it was doubtful if Mohammad Ali would have dropped Gen. Mirza⁶⁴³ after having written in longhand a testimonial extolling Mirza's "... high sense of patriotism ... our country is safe, so long as we can count on such selfless devotion to duty ... and loyalty to an officer like the Def. Secretary".⁶⁴⁴ True, there could be no two opinions about Gen. Mirza's efficiency as an officer, but commissioning his services for a political job⁶⁴⁵ was equivalent to putting a square peg in a round hole. And, precisely this was the way in which top officials of different cadres by dint of their past services were catapulted to higher political jobs by the unsuspecting politicians – an extra parliamentary recruitment process that was not always infallible.

Among the influentials in the Cabinet three persons, e.g. Ayub, Mirza and Chowdhury Mohammad Ali (Finance Minister) were in the higher brackets. But Chowdhury's frame of mind was more in harmony with his other colleagues representing the country's politics in that he wanted to have things done at least with the varnish of available democratic procedure. While these elements remained quiet and reticent, Gen. Mirza⁶⁴⁶ told the Pakistanis for the first time in his reckless and shattering candor that they were not worthy of enjoying democracy, much less the Westminster system. He opined Pakistan needed "controlled democracy" an irreconcilable contradiction of words – since politicians were "scallywags" – perhaps, except those to whom he owed his new life. He canvassed for one-man rule "to prevent people from destroying themselves" – suggestive of a strong presidential form of government. "None can stop formation of one unit. Have you seen a steamroller being stopped by small pebbles on road"?⁶⁴⁷ – he said in a Press Conference implying the threat of army intervention. In sum, Gen. Mirza, the aggressive member of the council of the Cromwellian Governor General recited before the public with full-throated ease that outrageous rhyme of Alexander Pope e.g. "For forms of Government let fools contest; what is administered is best." And the substance of it was found in the broadcast of the almost captive Prime Minister who promised "a vigorous and stable administration"⁶⁴⁸ to the nation.

The Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation on 22nd November, 1954 was a prelude to what the government was going to undertake. The Prime Minister envisaged two provinces e.g. East and West Pakistan. In other words, the existing provinces and states in West Pakistan whose boundaries seemed "to be completely illogical" must go.⁶⁴⁹ The provincial and state legislatures registered their support in favor of the one unit rather

⁶⁴³ Since the beginning of Pakistan's arms deal with the U.S. Gen. Mirza had become very close to Mohammad Ali.

⁶⁴⁴ See Appendix VII.

⁶⁴⁵ Gen. Mirza, for the benefit of the writer, jocularly defined the role of an Interior Minister in the Pakistan situation as to break heads'. He said in October 1954 "I don't expect trouble ... But if anybody wants it they will have it from me." See: *News Chronicle*, October 29, 1954.

⁶⁴⁶ Gen. Ayub kept a well-studied silence throughout. He found it more profitable to watch the trial balloons launched by Gen. Mirza.

⁶⁴⁷ See *Manchester Guardian*, October 29, 1954; also *Dawn*, February 1955.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ten Years of Pakistan, 1947-1957*, (Government Publications, Karachi, 1957). p. 16.

⁶⁴⁹ *Times*, November 23, 1954.

quickly, not taking any time to look into the pros and cons of the issue. The Governor General relying on the Section 135 of the India Act of 1935 passed an order setting up the establishment of a Council for the administration of West Pakistan to chalk out immediately a detailed scheme for the project.⁶⁵⁰ Thus the government devoid of parliament was veritably pushing through a major issue of such magnitude by decree. And a government by decree presaged the advent of the so-called 'controlled democracy'.

But soon after Suhrawardy's return to Pakistan after a four-month stay in Zurich hospital, the political process took a new turn and precisely for the better. This was evident in the huge reception given to Suhrawardy on his arrival at Karachi—this was the second one after he had been accorded a similar welcome in early 1954 for the U.F. victory in East Pakistan elections. On landing he assured the nation that government would have "to take people into confidence".⁶⁵¹ The octogenarian Haq was summoned in Karachi, too, by the Governor General. So an atmospheres of talking was ushered in.

The Governor General and his council knew it would take them more time to build up a following in the country. If Suhrawardy could be tempted inside the Cabinet, the Governor General's purpose would be served; for, he was the only man who had the instant popular support behind an organized political party and ability to deliver the goods. Suhrawardy was on the other hand placed between the two horns of a dilemma. Relevantly, it could be argued how come a political personality of Suhrawardy's stature having tremendous popular underpinning could scarcely imagine the idea of joining a spurious cabinet of disconcerting anti-political elements, and more so, under a Prime Minister who had been his parliamentary secretary and Finance Minister respectively while he was Minister and Chief Minister in the undivided Bengal in the forties. Could he not launch a movement for democratization of Pakistan polity as he did at the legend of his life during General Ayub's autocratic regime? was not his leadership of all Pakistan level and for that matter popularity all time high? Here lay the inherent inadequacy of a constitutional politician to go for something convulsive or revolutionary in nature. Suhrawardy who had been cradled in British constitutionalism was primarily hamstrung by innate mind-set. Even, his party was not very happy about joining the Cabinet, initially.⁶⁵² While he associated himself with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly he had enough reasons to dissociate himself from the autocratic pattern of the government. His was the concern for drawing up the Constitution and calling elections for a new parliament to which the government ought to hand over power, eventually. It was a crucial moment both for Suhrawardy and for the country i.e. how best and quickly parliamentary politics could be restored. Evidently, Suhrawardy was smarting under an implied threat of a military take-over.

⁶⁵⁰ *Dawn*, December 14, 1954.

⁶⁵¹ *Times*, December 13, 1954.

⁶⁵² "Memoirs" *op.cit.*

The choice before Pakistan was between democratic confusion or 'undemocratic clarity'. A foreign journalist observed that there is a great confidence in the Army, "two of whose leaders, General Ayub Khan, and General Iskander Mirza, now are in the Cabinet."⁶⁵³ The *Manchester Guardian* editorialised saying "It was a cabinet of the civil service backed by the army."⁶⁵⁴ It was a psychological education for Suhrawardy and finally he elected to join the Governor General's Council (20th December, 1954) to fight from within. Hailing Suhrawardy's entry into the present Cabinet as a landmark in the country's current political history", the influential *Dawn* thought this would facilitate the task of "constitutional reconstruction ... notably in the context of return to democracy".⁶⁵⁵ Suhrawardy argued: "... We are making every possible effort to avoid this (martial law) alternative ... that we are appealing to the people to cooperate ... so as to avoid such a dreadful contingency".⁶⁵⁶ He said his sole object in joining the Cabinet was to establish democracy in Pakistan, and held up Gen. Mirza's eerie concept of "controlled democracy" to ridicule in a rejoinder and added that "true democracy controls itself".⁶⁵⁷ His becoming the Law Minister entrusted with the task of framing country's constitution was also a recognition of opposition triumph after years of living in the doldrums. Soon Abu Hassain Sarkar, as the representative of the U.F. of East Pakistan, joined the Cabinet. In short, Suhrawardy's entry gave the Cabinet the semblance of a political body to what otherwise was operating "simply as a committee of administrators".⁶⁵⁸ But the fact remained, the Governor General was still in effective control of the political situation holding all trumps; for, the political leaders got into his council from a weak bargaining base. It was, however, the institutionalized countervailing power i.e. the judiciary which challenged the Governor General's constitutional rashness and insisted on his following the due process of law.

A robust judicial foundation ensures a healthy growth of a political society as the latter is always in a process of being jogged into its conscience by the former. In his analysis of the English institutions, the late Professor Gneist found the judiciary contributing to "the success of the parliamentary system".⁶⁵⁹ In this context, a word of reference to Pakistan judicial tradition appears warranted. When the British came to India they also brought along with them not only guns but also the tradition of Anglo-Saxon law. The British importation of Anglo-Saxon legal paraphernalia and the concept of rule of law into the subcontinent was one of the hallmarks of British rule in India, and exactly on that point Great Britain as a colonial power stood apart from her other European colleagues. A century-old judicial system had established deep roots in Indian society, and there were abundant cases of the judiciary's putting checks on executive excess. In

⁶⁵³ *Christian Science Monitor*, November 29, 1954. Also *Daily Telegram*, November 11, 1954.

⁶⁵⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, Editorial "Political", December 30, 1954.

⁶⁵⁵ See *Dawn*, Editorial, "Mr. Suhrawardy", December 21, 1954.

⁶⁵⁶ See *Dawn*, April 23, 1955.

⁶⁵⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, December 21, 1954.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, December 29, 1954.

⁶⁵⁹ Quoted in A. Lawrence Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, Vol. 1, (Longmans, London: 1896), p. 68.

the resolution of conflicts the judiciary always acted as one of the 'intermediaries' an "institution" which was built up in imperial India and became part of the legacy handed over in 1947⁶⁶⁰ to the succeeding states e.g. India and Pakistan.

If we are to hypothesize that religion does influence human behavior then the predominantly Muslim population of Pakistan whose *Quran* enjoins them. e.g. *Wa-etha hakamtom bayn al nasi ann takhomu bel-ade* (you have to be just between people) are spiritually closer to the essence of Angla-Saxon law. Besides, the spirit of *Montesquian* separation of governmental powers was practiced during the period of Delhi *Sultanate* in India, in that the Abbaside traditions of submitting the affairs of canon law to the care of the *Kajis* (judges) were adhered to. The independence of the *Kajis*⁶⁶¹ restrained much of the autocracy of the Kings.⁶⁶² And a people having a tradition of respect for justice however crude, primitive and inadequate from modern viewpoints were psychologically more receptive to British legal system. Hence, Sir Ivor's remark that "the British tradition for the Rule of law has been firmly established in Pakistan,⁶⁶³ was not an exaggeration. (It is a sad commentary upon the present judiciary of former Pakistan that it fell from the path of rectitude and earlier prestigious tradition as it has been subverted by the distressing frequency of military coups).

The judicial leadership and role as an intermediate institution during the post independence period in Pakistan were a great stabilizing factor in the country's politics. The judiciary held the anchor of the ship of the State from being marooned. For instance, the Federal Court declared the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance of the Governor General *ultra vires* in response to an *habeas corpus* application and ordered the release of the appellant, Sobo Gianchandani. It cautioned the central government that "A legislature cannot delegate its powers of making, modifying or repealing any law to an external authority. If it does so, it would be creating a parallel legislature.⁶⁶⁴ The Sindh High Court defended freedom of political comment in the Press and set aside the sedition charges leveled by the central government against the editor and cartoonists of the *Evening Times* of Karachi. The judgment clearly made a distinction, for the benefit of both government and the press, between politically fair and seditious comment. It envisaged the scope for legitimate criticisms of the government based on a party system and asked the government to amend the laws of sedition in the light of the individual freedom following independence.⁶⁶⁵ The judicial concept of freedom was, however, not that permissive. The High Court denied Allama Mashriqi the freedom of raising a private army for his organization, the *Khakhsar* party, and upheld the government's

⁶⁶⁰ W.H. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India* (Hutchinson University Library, London: 1964), p. 41.

⁶⁶¹ A King of Bengal found guilty by the court remarked "I have in my dominions a judge who acknowledges no authority superior to the law", *op.cit.* Lawrence Lowelly, p. 371.

⁶⁶² See H.N. Sinha, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

⁶⁶³ Sir Ivor Jennings, *Constitutional Problems in Pakistan*, (Cambridge, 1957), p.51.

⁶⁶⁴ Judgment quoted in *Dawn*, March 4, 1952.

⁶⁶⁵ *Times*, May 6, 1953 (Editorial) "Press Liberties in Pakistan".

action in suppressing the militant party.⁶⁶⁶ Even the lower courts were to mediate some times, the internecine disputes of political parties namely, whether a member was rightly expelled from the party, a meeting legally called or a party election for office bearers was held to the letter of the party constitution, etc., etc. If an epitaph was to be written on the demise of the first Constituent Assembly one would have extolled the M.C.A.s for their ensuring full independence to the Supreme Court in the proposed constitution.⁶⁶⁷ What was more, they conferred unfettered powers, pending the framing of the constitution, upon the provincial High Courts to issue *writs*—what to the M.C.A.s were *Magna cartas*—in the nature of *habeas corpus*, *mandamus*, *quo warranto* and *certiorari*. This was done by amending the India Act of 1935 and incorporating a new section, 223A.⁶⁶⁸ What has been said of English constitutional growth, that it "was marked by a close alliance between parliament and the common lawyers",⁶⁶⁹ the developments of which, in the initial period, had their marks on the constitutional plane of Pakistan. Perhaps the alliance was uneven or lopsided, in that a century-long judiciary with all its accessories produced a class of lawyers whose "preponderance ... among top politicians"⁶⁷⁰ was a case of near-notoriety.

But, on balance, they were the standard bearers of the British legal and parliamentary ideals; for, to the lawyers the terms 'parliament' and 'court' were not mutually exclusive. In fact, all the great parliamentarians (or politicians) were at the same time great lawyers. They had the greatest commitments to parliamentary and legal habits, which, at least, contributed to the growth of individual and collective respect for the rule of law among the Pakistanis—one of the fundamental prerequisites of *Westminster* system. And, imbibed with the same habit and with an air of *Hampden*, the President (Speaker) of the Constituent Assembly, himself a lawyer, went to the Sindh High Court in November 1954 to prove that the Constituent Assembly had been wrongfully and illegally dissolved by the Governor General.

The Sindh High Court in its judgment⁶⁷¹ held that the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was unconstitutional. The Federal Court on appeal from the Federal Government ordered the Sindh Court to stay its *writs*. This was a situation that raised a vital question of judicial ethos i.e. whether the judiciary ought to behave mechanically in applying rules upon cases to the utter disregard of genuine demands and needs of a given country. One knows, particularly, how the American Supreme Court which gradually managed to find itself in an important position in the Federal scheme, could declare the so-called *Jim Crow law* (separate but equal rights) legal at one stage only to

⁶⁶⁶ *Dawn*, May 31, 1952.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, April 5, 1954.

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1954.

⁶⁶⁹ Geoffrey Marshall, *Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth* (Oxford: 1957), p. 55.

⁶⁷⁰ Morris-Jones, "Government and Politics of India", *op. cit.*, p. 42. (Though Prof. Morris-Jones reflected on the Indian situation, it had its applicability on Pakistan, as well.)

⁶⁷¹ February 9, 1955.

be declared *ultra vires* of the 14th amendment in 1954, later on. In other words, the judiciary has become susceptible, by and large, to social forces and its alleged cold and reactionary attitude of earlier days is on the wane.

However, the Federal Court from the start was aware of the delicacy of its position vis-à-vis the struggle for supremacy between the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly on the one hand, and the Governor General, supported as he was by the weight of informed public opinion, on the other. No doubt, the court was equally conscious of an implicit threat of military take-over. Following the verdict of the Sindh Court Gen. Mirza remarked that the court's ruling would not affect the one-unit scheme, for "those necessary steps will be taken in any case."⁶⁷² Although the dissolution case was focused on a legal matter, it had non-justifiable aspects, as well. The Court, at first, dropped a hint for a compromise and suggested that an appeal to the constituencies would be more graceful solution of the dispute than the appeal to the court.⁶⁷³ Interestingly enough, Suhrawardy, far back in March 1954, while advocating dissolution of the Constituent Assembly had opined similar things. It did not work and the legal fight ensued. The plaintiff⁶⁷⁴ argued that common law of England did not apply in Pakistan and should not limit the independence of Pakistan. Regarding Section 5 of the Independence Act under which the Governor General was to represent Her Majesty for purposes of the government of the dominion, the Governor General was to be the representative and not the agent of the Crown. If the latter had no powers, the former did not have either. The Governor General, in short, was a symbol of a symbol.⁶⁷⁵

The defendant established that the Indian Independence Act placed Pakistan in a position of a dominion devoid of (theoretically) full independence. The sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly was complete with the Governor General, not without. And the royal prerogatives were in existence in common law which were "vested in the Governor General" enabling him "to legislate without the ... consent of a legislature"⁶⁷⁶ So, the Governor General exercised his emergency powers in dissolving the Constituent Assembly imbued with the spirit of *salus populi suprema lex* i.e. the public safety was the main criterion.

The cautious court avoided saying whether the Constituent Assembly had been dissolved constitutionally or not, but gave its judgment on the 'unassailable ground that the Governor General was a part of the Constituent Assembly and the laws passed by it to be valid required the Governor Generals assent to them. And it just happened that 35 Acts out of 44 passed by the Constituent Assembly did not bear the signature of the

⁶⁷² See *Manchester Guardian*, February 10, 1955.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, March 3, 1955.

⁶⁷⁴ On the government side was Sir K. Diplock, Q.C., and D.N. Pritt, argued for the President of the dissolved Constituent Assembly.

⁶⁷⁵ See Court's Proceedings quoted in *Times*, December 22, 1954.

⁶⁷⁶ Sir Ivor Jennings, "Crown and Commonwealth in Asia", *International Affairs* (April: 1956, p. 142.

Governor General. In other words the country, as it were, had been ruled illegally on many a matter. The Governor General, however, felt encouraged at the judgment and issued an ordinance proposing to validate the illegal acts with retrospective effect and give a constitution to the country. On April 22nd 1955, the court held that the Governor General could neither validate laws nor make constitutional provisions by decree. The Chief Justice warned the advocate general in the court: "If you ride roughshod you will bring disaster to this country. You don't have a validating machinery, nor you intend to create one".⁶⁷⁷ In the determination of whether or not the Constituent Assembly existed in law, Sir K. Diplock's commendable reply that "the constituent convention is a body inside the Constitution Act" to a rather passionate remark of the Chief Justice, namely "The fate of the country depends on the statement that you are going to make on this point",⁶⁷⁸ further strengthened judicial pronouncements. The court then suggested to the central government "If Lord Mountbatten could set up a Constituent Assembly what prevents the Governor General of Pakistan from setting up a body, not necessarily on the same line?" At the same time the court warned the government of packing the convention with sycophants who might be told "here is a constitution and you endorse it".⁶⁷⁹ The positive utterances by the court were further facilitated when the government volunteered itself to have an "advisory Judgment⁶⁸⁰ of the Federal Court" the advice of which showed the path and ended the constitutional crisis.⁶⁸¹

The judgment of the Federal Court was *magnum opus*.⁶⁸² The court prevented the Governor General from short-circuiting democratic processes. While justifying the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly it made its necessity a justiciable issue. But at the same time it paved the way for a new Constituent Assembly with similar scope jurisdiction and powers to its predecessor. A consequential issue like the one-unit was not left to the Governor General to stoke but to the country's ensuing Constituent Assembly to dispose of. The Punjabi group which was being mounted into prominence since the dismissal of the Naizimuddin government read in the judicial decision that unholy alliances were vulnerable. The judgment was also an implied recognition of what the U.F. had been agitating for, since its electoral triumph of 1954. Lastly, in essence, the court hurt neither the plaintiff nor the defendant. The Speaker in his heroic struggle for the restoration of parliamentary sovereignty failed particularly in reviving his constituent Assembly, but his principle triumphed in the revival of another Constituent Assembly far more representative in character. Similarly, the Governor General was allowed a graceful retreat in that his prerogative rights to dissolve the

⁶⁷⁷ *Times*, April 13, 1955. See also K.J. Newman, *Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan*, (Dacca: 1956), p. xlviii.

⁶⁷⁸ *Dawn* April 27, 1955.

⁶⁷⁹ *Hindu*, April 28, 1955.

⁶⁸⁰ See *Times*, April 27, 1955 and *Daily Telegraph*, May 10, 1957.

⁶⁸¹ Alan Gledhill, "The Pakistan Constitution, *Public Law* (Winter: 1956), p. 435.

⁶⁸² For detailed discussion on the judgment, see Sir I. Jennings *Constitutional Problems in Pakistan*, (Cambridge, 1957).

Constituent Assembly was upheld by the court. In sum the Federal Court in its judgment discretely rolled legal and political aspect into one.⁶⁸³

At this point, however, a reference to Suhrawardy is called for. No doubt, the Governor General's sudden deference to the Judicial system was praiseworthy. But this psychological change was initiated by Suhrawardy, the Law minister, whose distinct presence in the Cabinet had the effect of an indoctrination upon the Governor General. When Suhrawardy said that the Governor General would "abide by the decisions of the Federal Court and continue steadfastly to uphold rule of Law"⁶⁸⁴ without any rejoinder from the Governor General or his truculent colleagues. Interestingly, following the Federal Court's judgment even Mirza was very watchful. Accused by a friendly journalist that he was not bold as he had been a couple of months before, Gen. Mirza replied I am not conversant with the contempt laws. You don't know what may happen if you say a thing.⁶⁸⁵ It signaled that the Governor General was well briefed about the efficacy of the rule of law.⁶⁸⁶ It was everybody's knowledge that Suhrawardy was in charge of the drafting of the one-unit scheme and the country's constitution. Suhrawardy was busy consulting British constitutional experts (particularly Sir Ivor Jennings) on how to organize for Pakistan a parliamentary system that would stick.⁶⁸⁷ The Governor General wanted him for the implementation of the one-unit plan. While Suhrawardy served as a restraint to the executive rashness in giving an opportunity to judicial leadership, similarly it was he who was largely and singularly responsible for giving a concrete shape to the judicial decision. It was his titanic endeavor to help people choose between a constitution convention proposed by the Governor General in pursuance of the Court's verdict or a military rule that was all implicit.⁶⁸⁸ Even a good many influential leaders at this critical hour including the octogenarian Haq castigated Suhrawardy for proposing constituent convention while others accused him for holding out threat of martial law in the country.⁶⁸⁹ In reality the fact of the matter was that Suhrawardy was explaining to the people the possible alternatives to the proposed 'constituent convention' for legalizing laws. Those alternatives would, by default, be the following: (a) a revolution (b) civil dictatorship and (c) martial law.⁶⁹⁰

⁶⁸³ Maulana Mandoodi told the writer that the then Chief Justice Munir in his speech to Bar Association in Lahore in 1960 had remarked "*Adalat Hookumat ka Bahar Nehi Rah Sekta*" meaning the court cannot altogether stay outside of politics.

⁶⁸⁴ *Hindu*, April 22, 1955, Also, *Dawn*, April 24, 1955.

⁶⁸⁵ See *Dawn*, February 1955.

⁶⁸⁶ After the demise of Suhrawardy, Mr. A.K. Brohi a legal and an intellectual luminary in Pakistan - commented on Suhrawardy's passion for the rule of law saying that in "mysterious manner Suhrawardy is going to rule the State of Pakistan from his grave so that the coming historian will see the triumph of what he stood for in the act of his passing ever." See *The Dacca Times* "Suhrawardy Supplement, May. 1964, p. xxiv.

⁶⁸⁷ See *News Chronicle*, May 30, 1955.

⁶⁸⁸ *Sunday Times*, April 23, 1955.

⁶⁸⁹ See *Dawn*, May 12, 1955.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid*, April 29, 1955.

At this juncture the irrepressible and formidable A.L. General Secretary Sheikh Mujibur Rahman directed all the Awami League units to observe 21-point programme week. Vouching for regional autonomy he vigorously pointed that "Pakistan was achieved but unfortunately the Muslim League rulers of Pakistan tried to shelve the Lahore Resolution and made all attempts to forge a unitary government without taking into consideration the geographical aspects of Pakistan". Earlier, he had cautioned motivated people saying that "the Awami League could not and has not mortgaged its conscience to anybody", and would pursue its programme.⁶⁹¹

Later, he maintained that "the Awami League viewed with great concern the critical situation in the country ... accepted the Constituent Assembly proposal on the definite understanding ... that in case the members realize that they cannot achieve the regional autonomy and the 21-point programme as far as it concerns the constitution, they must resign from the Constituent Assembly".⁶⁹² Maulana Bhasani also in the long run accepted the proposal of Constituent Assembly and concept of parity. The Awami League working committee finally endorsed it.⁶⁹³ And precisely Suhrawardy was solely instrumental in weaning East Pakistan from an attitude of complete non-cooperation with the central government and inducing the East Pakistan legislature to participate in the elections to the new 80-man Constituent Assembly announced to be held in June 1955. Remarkably, following the commencement of the session of the Constituent Assembly II, mutuality of understanding among the prominent leaders of both the wings of Pakistan reached a new height, in that, on 15 July 1955, an agreement was reached at Murree that the forthcoming constitution would be framed on the basis of five points. They were the followings:

1. West Pakistan to be integrated into one unit.
2. Each wing was to have full regional autonomy.
3. There would be parity between the two wings in all respects and not merely in representation.
4. Election would be through the medium of joint electorate. 5. Bengali and Urdu would be the two state languages.⁶⁹⁴

Now, what emerges from the foregoing discussions? One significant fact crystallized that civil or military dictatorship was not at any time virtually established, *albeit* it could have been. The irrevocable decision to do away with democratic institutions and to achieve the one-unit plan through executive fiats was not taken, though it could have

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid*, May 29, 1955.

⁶⁹² *Ibid*, May 29, 1955.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid*, May 10, 1955.

⁶⁹⁴ See "Memoirs", *op.cit.* p. 17. Also *Dawn*, August 27, 1955.

been. The litigation on constitutional issues could have been stopped and jurisdiction of the courts curtailed. Similarly, the convening of the new Constituent Assembly could have been brushed aside but this was not done. The facts were indicative of that, although the forces of dictatorship did rear their heads occasionally that was also mainly due to politicians becoming party to self-defeating purposes they failed to gain a permanent foothold in Pakistan, so far, as the democratic forces far outweighed the anti-democratic ones. And to the author's findings, Suhrawardy was the *avant courier* of democracy. His was democratic forces incarnate.

POLITICS WAY BACK

The fallout from the explosion of 92A rule in East Pakistan produced a blighting effect on the political health of that part of Pakistan. Suhrawardy till December 1954 had been at the Zurich Hospital. Haq volunteered himself to choose a life of a political recluse to fight shy of the central government's wrath. While Bhasani was away from Pakistan to avoid being 'shot at hand' by Gen. Mirza. And among the prominent leaders of the U.F. who were inside the country only Aaur Rahman was outside of jail⁶⁹⁵ In short, political incommunicability between leaders and rank and file of the U.F. during the 92A administration resulted in the stultification of that cohesive force that was the U.F. at the outset. And as politics were on the way back to Pakistan and the new Constituent Assembly was going to be convened following the judicial decisions the U.F. became again a determining factor in that half of the members of the proposed Constituent Assembly i.e. 40, would have to be elected by the U.F. dominated East Pakistan legislature. But the irony was that the U.F. instead of voicing with one accent its components became more inward-looking and tended to speak for the 21-Point Programme from their respective party bases. The state of disarray was mainly caused by the entrance of personalities in the politics as the two tigers namely, Haq and Suhrawardy could not co-exist in the same platform of the U.F. any more. At length, the A.L. quit the U.F. but not the 21 planks.

Away in Karachi the Prime Minister of the caretaker government was counting his days as the elections to the new Constituent Assembly drew on apace. He needed a membership in the Constituent Assembly to ensure his political future. While the country had been gasping under constitutional crisis the Prime Minister kept mum leaving his law Minister to undertake the onerous "task⁶⁹⁶ of restoring parliamentary rule" once again in Pakistan. Now that storms were over and Suhrawardy was away in London discussing constitutional affairs with Sir Ivor, Mohammad Ali flew in tranquil weather to East Pakistan to pour his puckish mind into a secret alliance with Haq, the "traitor" for whose overthrow he had asked the nation to back him in 1954.⁶⁹⁷ The Prime Minister made a preemptive decision in that he restored parliamentary government in East Pakistan on 3rd June, 1955 entrusting Haq's nominee, Abu Hussain Sarkar (lately a member of the Governor General's Council) with the premiership.

⁶⁹⁵ Gen. Mirza the then Governor of East Pakistan explained Aaur Rahman being outside of jail in the following lines - lines that will also demonstrate the General's approach towards politics and politicians following the independence: "I would have arrested him, but it is necessary to have one man out in the camp of the *enemy* to enable us to know the intentions of the *enemy*. This is an old *trick* of the now defunct political department of the old Government of India. Have worked in the past and so far I have no reason to grumble." Source: Governor's letter to the Governor General, D.O. No. 111/PS, dated the 10th July, 1954 (Top Secret/ Personal).

⁶⁹⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, August 7, 1955

⁶⁹⁷ This was termed "Shameless" by the *Times of Karachi* and "brazenfacedness of the Prime Minister" by the *Morning News* (Dacca). Both are quoted in *Hindu*, June 6, 1955.

This incident had "the elements of a constitutional coup"⁶⁹⁸ for the Prime Minister neither did ask the A.M.L. – by far the majority party in the legislature⁶⁹⁹ – to form the Cabinet, nor did he ask the U.F. to elect its own leader.⁷⁰⁰ Now the U.F.'s taking over the governmental powers minus the A.M.L. gave an advance hint to the nature of the central government that was going to be formed shortly after the elections to the second Constituent assembly.

The existing legislatures of both the wings of Pakistan elected members (21st June, 1955) to the Constituent Assembly II of which the results were the following:

M.L.	25	Minorities	
U.F.*	16	Pakistan National Congress	4
A.M.L.	12	Scheduled Castes Federation	3
Independents	8	United Progressive Party**	2***
Communist	1		
* K.S.P. + Nizam-e-Islam -G.D.			
** Congress dissident group.			
*** The rest of the Members, were elected from the tribal areas and frontier states by the Constituent Assembly II in July 1955.			

Among the 13 existing ministers in the central government only 6 survived the elections. General Ayub did not seek membership in the constituent Assembly II but his peer, General Mirza, contrary to his earlier avowal that "the army wishes to get out of politics" and "I hope you will not find me here (in the Cabinet) in 18 months' time",⁷⁰¹ entered the Constituent Assembly II through the M.L. ticket by rather adroit moves which saw the discomfiture of Noon (and his group), the then Chief Minister of the Punjab from the M.L. For, he had opposed the Punjab M.L. parliamentary party's decision of entrusting the M.L. Central Parliamentary Board with the task of nominating members for the Constituent Assembly elections.⁷⁰² And needless to say, that the hand-picked Muslim leaguers of the Central Parliamentary Board treated the General by nominating him from the Punjab quota.

⁶⁹⁸ See G.W. Chowdhury, "The East Pakistan Political Scene, 1955-1957" *Pacific affairs*, (October 1957), p. 313.

⁶⁹⁹ *Dawn*, June 6, 1955.

⁷⁰⁰ The Governor of East Pakistan resigned as he was not consulted by the Prime Minister in the restoration of parliamentary government. See *Times*, June 6, 1955. The Prime Minister had also disagreements with the then Governor of East Pakistan in April 1954 vis-à-vis 92A rule in East Pakistan. As a result the Governor had to quit giving way to Gen. Mirza. This was dramatically revealed in 1957 when the ex-Governor published his correspondence with the Prime Minister. This was indicative of the presence of parliamentary spirits against non-parliamentary ones. For the published letters see *Dawn*, September 2, 1957.

⁷⁰¹ *Daily Telegraph*, November 11, 1954.

⁷⁰² *Dawn*, June 14, 1955.

As soon as the elections were over, the A.M.L. working committee in a resolution demanded the resignation of the present government in view of the new elections to the Constituent Assembly II. Suhrawardy urged the Prime Minister to resign immediately "to restore people's confidence in democratic values".⁷⁰³ He had already fired his first shot in a statement e.g. "The voting has clearly demonstrated that the only true and reliable party is the Awami league".⁷⁰⁴ Given that there was no majority party in the central legislature the M.L. being the largest single party would have to switch for coalition government. And the question of Suhrawardy's heading the coalition government would not have been an unheard-of instance in parliamentary almanac.⁷⁰⁵ Besides, the M.L. parliamentary party had no leader of all-Pakistan reckoning. Surely, Suhrawardy had marked himself out for a key post in the new constitutional set up; for, he had been a successful political catalyst in changing the stubborn attitudes of political parties for the greater interest of Pakistan. His painstaking persuasion course had borne fruit in that the East Pakistan A.M.L. Working Committee accepted the concept of parity in all matters between the two wings of Pakistan, as Bhasani openly recognized the principle of Parity as a "compromise and gesture of good will",⁷⁰⁶ towards west Pakistan. This was followed by other parties' adhering to it. Suhrawardy's was the main role towards detaching the East Pakistanis from their former stand and stress on their population strength. He was heard in the Constituent Assembly II inculcating to his compatriots that "Democracy does not mean only numbers. In democracy you will have to give and take. Democracy means agreement between the people".⁷⁰⁷ Suhrawardy had in his mind the picture of a national constituency uppermost that was why his natural loyalty to the regional constituency i.e. East Pakistan, did not preclude him from undertaking an unpopular stand—a stand that had secured him a national stature at that point of time. A leader of such a quality who was "thought to be the only member who can pilot a constitution through the Assembly"⁷⁰⁸ was assuredly tipped for the country's next Prime Minister ready to be sworn-in at any moment in early August 1955.⁷⁰⁹

But things were disposed in a different way. Although Mohammad Ali had secured his membership in the Constituent Assembly II through Haq's cooperation, he later failed to obtain the leadership of the M.L. parliamentary party which was bestowed upon Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, the Finance Minister. So the Prime Minister⁷¹⁰ resigned in keeping with the parliamentary convention. Significantly, this took place a day after

⁷⁰³ *Times*, July 6, 1955.

⁷⁰⁴ *New York Times*, June 23, 1955.

⁷⁰⁵ Ramsay Mac Donald led the minority party in the coalition. And in undivided India the Unionists Ministry of Khizir Hyat Khan in the Punjab was a case in point.

⁷⁰⁶ *Dawn*, April 27, 1955.

⁷⁰⁷ *CAD*, Vol. 1, September 12, 1955, p. 680

⁷⁰⁸ *New York Times*, July 10, 1955.

⁷⁰⁹ See *Daily Telegraph*, *Times*, *News Chronicle* and *Dawn* dated 8th August, 1955 "Suhrawardy was assured of Premiership" See John F. Callahan, *New York Times*, August 10, 1955.

⁷¹⁰ Mohammad Ali again went back to the U.S. as the accredited ambassador of Pakistan, following resignation.

General Mirza's elevation to the position of an acting Governor General as Golam Mohammad was ailing. That meant that the loss of Mohammad Ali as the Prime Minister who was popular in the eyes of Americans and a lubricant to the U.S.-Pakistan pacts and aid deals was replenished by General Mirza as the Governor General of Pakistan.⁷¹¹

Despite Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's initial willingness⁷¹² to act under an A.M.L. party-led Cabinet, he was commissioned by the Governor General to form a coalition government which he did with the U.F. eventually (11 August). As to the M.L.'s going back on its word in regard to head a coalition government of M.L.A.M.L.⁷¹³ it can be hypothesized that the M. L. leaders were apprehensive of Suhrawardy's success in the office which might 'seriously weaken' their influence among the people. Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, of late, and for that matter the M.L. parliamentary party might have been uncomfortable at the prospect of being governed by a Prime Minister of a minority party. This ambivalent position of the M.L. was, however, solved when the U.F. – now an uneasy alliance of rightist⁷¹⁴ and leftist⁷¹⁵ elements – acted like the proverbial dog in the manger by agreeing to work under the M.L. party provided Suhrawardy was not made the Prime Minister.⁷¹⁶ But beneath these apparent reasons there was a telepathic communication between the M.L. and the K.S.P. – Nizam-e-Islam dominated U.F. as far as their Islamic predilections were concerned. The octogenarian Haq with one leg in his grave was more inclined to tell his beads and to give an Islamic bias to the ensuing constitution. Besides, it furnished him an opportunity for political restoration having been previously branded as "Traitor" by Bogra Mohammad Ali. Also, it would bring his party into a focus. Although, it had been a familiar guess that the octogenarian Haq would support Suhrawardy at the Centre as was agreed upon at the formation of U.F. in 1954. On the contrary, it transpired as "frailty thy name" was politics. And Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's subsequent activities and his joining with the Nizam-e-Islam party clearly demonstrated his frame of mind. Incidentally, it was Chowdhury Mohammed Ali himself, in the words of Suhrawardy, who had earlier offered him the Prime Ministership, but, later on, yielded to such a coveted post.⁷¹⁷ In other words, the

⁷¹¹ "Western observers hailed Gen. Mirza's appointment. The consensus was that he would continue his... policy of close alliance with the U.S. ..."See *New York Times*, August 5, 1955. In the later part of 1954 Gen. Mirza's son, Humayun married Josephine Hildreth, daughter of the U.S. Ambassador Horace A. Hildreth. See *Manchester Guardian*, August 5, 1955.

⁷¹² Gen. Mirza himself told the author that Chowdhury Mohammad Ali did not mind working under Suhrawardy. But Gen. Mirza told Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, the M.L. parliamentary leader that in case of his failure to form a government he would then ask the minority leader, Suhrawardy to do the same. Gen. Mirza also admitted to the author that as the prospect of Suhrawardy's becoming the Prime Minister was imminent people like Col. Abid Hossain, M. Ali Kizilbash of the Punjab (Prominent landlord-politicians) were constantly whispering to his ears in order to intercept Suhrawardy.

⁷¹³ See *Dawn*. August 12, 1955.

⁷¹⁴ K.S.P. and Nizam-e-Islam.

⁷¹⁵ G.D.

⁷¹⁶ See *Manchester Guardian*, August 9 1955.

⁷¹⁷ *Dawn*, August 13, 1955.

formation of the M.L.-U.F. government was a victory for the modernist–Islamist groups. Suhrawardy's A.M.L. could not intrigue with the M.L. as the former had a secular orientation and made no secret, particularly of upholding the issue of a joint electorate instead of a separate one. That was why a foreign critic remarked that "what the constitution of Pakistan might have been had he (Suhrawardy) steered his own draft through the Assembly must remain one of the engaging ifs of history."⁷¹⁸ It was, however, a pity that Pakistan's first and foremost opposition party i.e. A.M.L. could not find a proper place in the coalition government.

It might appear that Chowdhury's elevation to the premiership just formalized a ruling Punjabi triumvirate—Golam Mohammad, General Mirza⁷¹⁹ and Chowdhury Mohammad Ali— which had dominated the Pakistan government in recent months. But in fairness, it could not be said that the Governor General acted unconstitutionally; for, he asked the M.L. to form a government after he had been told of U.F.'s support to Chowdhury.

However, the induction of Chowdhury Mohammad Ali in the office of the Prime Minister marked a new but positive phase in the parliamentary life of Pakistan. First, the State authority was restored in a Cabinet responsible to the new parliament. The coalition government was at advantage in that its components were also in charge of the governments of both wings of Pakistan i.e. the U.F. was in East Pakistan and M.L. in West Pakistan. Second, the M.L. was bound to share powers with other contenders after having monopolistically ruled the country for eight years. This demonstrated the modicum of mobility and free interplay of social and political forces—the requisites of democracy. There was a time when Masco's "political class" and Michel's "iron law of oligarchy" were feared to have been parading the political plane of Pakistan. And, accordingly clichés such as "ruling coterie" "caucus", "vested interests", "oligarchy", etc., etc. were leveled against to characterize the ruling M.L. party. But the position of the well-entrenched oligarchical base in Pakistan was appreciably challenged by 'democratic, leveling and centrifugal forces', in that a new sense of representativeness and competitiveness entered the body politic of Pakistan. And precisely, the so-called "ruling coterie" was replaced yielding place to new categories of people which in Pareto's phraseology might be described as 'circulation of elites'.

It is said that "the greater the degree of constitutionalism in a society, the less the middle classes function merely as agents of the elite and the greater their personal independence, autonomy and security,"⁷²⁰ and the recent triumph of constitutionalism in

⁷¹⁸ Grace J. Calder. "Constitution Debates in Pakistan". *The Muslim World* (January 1956) P. 265.

⁷¹⁹ Although Gen. Mirza comes from the Murshidabad Nawab family, he had no connection with that part of Bengal except for the huge mango gardens he inherited there. He had all along been associated with the Punjabi group.

⁷²⁰ Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A theory of social stratification*, (McGraw-Hill Book Company. London: 1966) p. 63.

Pakistan gave an impetus to that direction as well. The recruitment process of the cabinet bore testimony to that; for, it was largely middle class-oriented. Prior to Chowdhury Mohammad Ali the Prime Ministership happened to have been the preserve of the noble families.⁷²¹ Chowdhury Mohammad Ali who had been associated with the so-called ruling coterie climbed his way up from a middle-class base.

Third, the coalition Cabinet reflected a composite character in that it admitted minority parties into it—an admission of social realism. Although there was a minority minister⁷²² representing the scheduled caste in the first Cabinet of Liaquat, in reality this was an act of political window-dressing. The inclusion of K.K. Dutta and A.K. Dutta as representatives of the U.P.P. and scheduled caste Federation respectively in Chowdhury's Cabinet was a genuine parliamentary recognition that in a new political cycle even the minorities could lay claim to a share in the distribution of powers—a topsy-turvy of earlier vogue when the Congressites were habitually accused by the ruling Muslim leaguers of disloyalty and Pro-Indianism.⁷²³

Fourth, regional representations in the Cabinet fulfilled federal requirements. During the periods from Liaquat to Mohammad Ali the share of East Pakistanis in the central ministership had always been disproportionate to what they were entitled to. In the II-man Cabinet of Chowdhury Mohammad Ali East Pakistan had 5 against West Pakistan's 6. But in the distribution of 3 Ministers of State East Pakistan claimed 2 giving 1 to her Western partner.⁷²⁴

Fifth, this period marked the institutionalisation of political opposition in that A.M.L. growing as it did from the electoral soil was entrusted with that job. The new found spirit of parliamentary opposition was well reflected in Suhrawardy's speech which came at the backdrop of his being refused to be Prime Minister of Pakistan. Inaugurating the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League Council Suhrawardy declared that his party which had all along been in opposition for the last eight years was "prepared to remain in opposition for eight years longer ... So long as politics is not clear and interest of the country can best be served we shall have no objection in remaining in opposition".⁷²⁵

The A.M.L. was now to the central government and provincial government of East Pakistan what the Congress had been in the days of the first Constituent Assembly. But the only fundamental difference between them was that while the former succeeded in narrowing the gap between the government and opposition to a position of

⁷²¹ Liaquat, Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali hailed from Nawab Families.

⁷²² After J.N. Mandal's defection to India (1950) there was no minority minister in the central government till 1954.

⁷²³ *CAD* vol. 1. March 3, 1949, p. 325.

⁷²⁴ *Dawn*. August 16, 1955.

⁷²⁵ *Dawn*, October 20, 1955.

tweedledum and tweedledee, the latter, despite its meaningful parliamentary services, its opposition was dismissed as the will-o'-the wisp.

Of course, the dynamics behind all these improvements registered during the second phase of parliamentary life was essentially the U.F.⁷²⁶ That was why we noted earlier that the U.F. had the potentiality of a movement. Without the victory of the U.F. in the 1954 general elections in East Pakistan, no tangible transformation of power structure would have taken place. It was quite a revolution initiated by the U.F.

However, amid all these new developments the coalition government mainly addressed itself to the task of framing a constitution which, according to the Prime Minister, was given the "highest priority".⁷²⁷ But constitution-making could not progress unless there was an agreed formula evolved placing both East and West Pakistan "on a footing of equality promoting a feeling of partnership."⁷²⁸ This was thought to be accomplished by reorganizing the federal process not by adopting the unitary form of government which would be impolitic, since the main constituting units of Pakistan e.g. East and West Pakistan, were miles asunder and had intervening foreign territories (India) between them. In the new federalizing process if the units of West Pakistan were aggregated into one, parity on the quantum of representation in the parliament and distribution of powers finally agreed upon on the shoals of these issues all previous constitutional proposals had foundered—the framing of the constitution would be greatly facilitated and there would neither be any ground for East Pakistanis being accused of *Balkanizing* the Western wing nor there ought to be monopolization of any sort in any field by the West Pakistanis, as alleged, once conflicts were resolved into constitutional clauses. Now the Constituent Assembly II was to thrash out the one-unit tangle—an event of great consequence and implications that could be ranked next to the very event of the creation of Pakistan itself.

It has been said that "the Punjabi, the Pathan, the Sindhi and the Bengali has each in his mind's eye an 'emerald isle,⁷²⁹ set in a silver sea, a demi-paradise' ... this ... regional feeling has been a powerful factor in Pakistani public life."⁷³⁰ From the vedic, Mauryiya, Gupta and down to Harsa periods political integration in the Indian subcontinent was very loose. Centralization was far from rooted in the soil. Clannish, tribal, Mandala and

⁷²⁶ We are talking about the spirit and achievements of the U.F. not its constituting parties which were gradually coming apart. The U.F. was not like the alliance (Party) of Malaysia. It was formed for the realization of limited objectives. Its final disintegration was natural in that the constituting parties faced with the new evolving realities of country's politics sought to realize their objectives in the light of new experiences.

⁷²⁷ *Hindu*, September 3, 1955

⁷²⁸ Prime Minister's speech. See *Dawn*, November 23, 1954.

⁷²⁹ "We are all Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis - a nation. But we have bye-nationalities, also". Abul Mansur Ahmed and M.C.A echoed Dr. Spear's remark while opposing one-unit Bill in the Constituent Assembly II. See *Dawn*, September 9, 1955.

⁷³⁰ Percival Spear. "The Political Evolution of Pakistan: A study in Analysis" in Saul Rose (ed.) *Politics in Southern Asia*, *Op. cit.*, p.9.

tributary systems were cases in point. It was only in the Moghul period that centralization of power was effected, and subsequently pushed to its logical extent during the British regime. And as far as the areas of Pakistan are concerned they "remained largely independent for almost 1,500 years, from the death of Asoka in 232 B.C. to the rise of the Delhi Sultanate in the thirteenth century A.D."⁷³¹ Practically the British governed India from a unitary base they did not really demolish the edifice of localism which was, however, shaken not insignificantly as "the rapid development of all means of communications"⁷³² enabled the hitherto insular-minded Indians to have the 'feel' of a greater India. The British vice-regal system of government was superimposed on the already fragmented society of India. Hence, historically speaking, the accusation that Britain put Indians to thrall by taking recourse to *Divide et impera* policy was to be understood on a proper perspective.⁷³³

Now at this juncture of Pakistan political chronology the most hidebound pro-one-unit politician, Mr. Daultana, expounded a theory in the Constituent Assembly II that the region of West Pakistan was culturally, economically, geographically and historically an "integrated whole" and the unification of West Pakistan was a logical corollary of Pakistan ideology and culmination of irreversible acts of destiny.⁷³⁴ The statement was, however, positive but the irony had it that Daultana, and for that matter the pro-one-unit group of politicians realized the truth that there was such a thing as underlying unity amid diversity in West Pakistan which had not occurred to their cognitive map before August 1947, that not only West Pakistan but the whole subcontinent had the element of an underlying unity-in-plurality admitted by historians and politicians-cum-statesmen alike.⁷³⁵ That transcending feeling of underlying unity of the then India had been sacrificed at the altar of 'fear of Hindu domination', and the current sense of underlying unity in West Pakistan was born of both necessity and complacency now that Pakistan was a reality. In the quest for common identity among the various people of West Pakistan another protagonist of one-unit, Nawab Gurmani, claimed for them to have held, in keeping with Renan's dictum, "Many things in oblivion".⁷³⁶ When the Prime Minister in his first official pronouncement in regard to the unification of West Pakistan had already laid the metaphysical foundation of underlying unity of Pakistan by reminding the nation "of one God, one prophet, one Quran".⁷³⁷ There is an illuminating reminder given by Professor K.W. Deutsch that the 'art of nation-building' also depends on the 'art of nation-limiting'; for, the nations should be limited "to a size manageable for ... integrative and decision-making capabilities".⁷³⁸ A state of non-

⁷³¹ See A. Tayyeb, *Pakistan, A Political Geography* (Oxford University Press, London: 1966), P. 47.

⁷³² Morris-Jones, "Parliament in India", *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷³³ Maulana Mohammed Ali once said addressing the Englishman that "There is a division of labor. We divide and you rule".

⁷³⁴ See *Dawn*, August 30, 1955; also *CAD* Vol. 1, August 31, 1955, PP. 354-382.

⁷³⁵ See V.A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*. (London: 1958) P. X.

⁷³⁶ *Dawn* September 16, 1955.

⁷³⁷ *The Unification of West Pakistan: Authoritative Statements* (Ferozsons: Karachi), n.d..p.2.

⁷³⁸ "National- Building" *op.cit.*, p.x.

manageability features in the integrative process when linguistic, racial, cultural, geographic and economic factors predominate. One knows how integrating process fizzled out in the West Indies Federation, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Mali Federation and the Malaysian Federation.⁷³⁹ What was more the very birth of Pakistan was a burning instance in that the leadership of the subcontinent failed to mend the federalizing process in the light of new experiences obtaining at that particular point of time. Even the Lahore Resolution which claimed to have been the basis of Pakistan envisaged an autonomous federal polity. Even the break-up of former Pakistan itself was a case of failure of federation. The amalgamation of all western units into one would amount to jettisoning the very scheme of Pakistan and incorporating a unitary structure in an already elaborate federal system based, evidently, on century-old cultural, linguistic and racial considerations.

However, the question was before the Pakistan statesmen whether political institutions were a means towards an end or an end-in-themselves-whether they should let institutions serve the society or worship them as sacrosanct for all time to come without enriching them with new awareness or experience. Nawab Gurmani while speaking on the one-unit Bill in the Constituent Assembly II struck a note of progressive politics: "Those who advocate ... retention of political boundaries on the basis of race or language do not seem to appreciate that making politics depend upon ethnographical or philological analysis is allowing it to be borne upon a chimera. Racial differences do not divide human beings in the sense of rodents and filines. Human history is essentially different from zoology."⁷⁴⁰

Reflecting on the Australian Federation J.D.B. Miller observed that "If the separate State governments were to disappear, it is difficult to see how any sense of separate community could survive among the people living within the present state boundaries."⁷⁴¹ The political leaders was to analyze if the same situation obtained in West Pakistan i.e. whether or not political divisions were on sound foundations.

The provinces of the Punjab and N.W.F. were constituted into one province following the British conquest of the Punjab in 1849, but were separated by Lord Curzon in 1901 despite the protests lodged with the Secretary of State for India by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Mackworth Young, on grounds of economy and administration. Decades later Sir Abdul Qayyum told the then Indian Legislative Assembly of the adverse effects on the N.W.F. following the separation of the provinces.⁷⁴² Sindh was annexed by the British in 1843 and was adjoined to the Province of Bombay. It was maintained that had the conquest of Sindh followed and not

⁷³⁹ Singapore came out of the Federation.

⁷⁴⁰ *C.A.D.*, Vol. 1. September 15, 1955, p. 791.

⁷⁴¹ J. D. B. Miller *Op.cit.*, p. 139.

⁷⁴² "Ever since the separation, the Punjabis have been passing from class to class ... while we are still in the infant class. Is it going to be forever?" Quoted in *C.A.D.* Vol. 1. September 15, 1955. p.790.

preceded the conquest of the Punjab, Sindh would have been incorporated into the Punjab, for the two are not only contiguous but are connected with a single river which is the most natural tie between them.⁷⁴³ Since the time of Lord Dalhousie—he was the first to initiate the proposal of incorporating Sindh into the Punjab Province—down to the viceroyalty of Lord Lands-downe (1888-94) the idea of including Sindh within the Punjab was vainly pursued.⁷⁴⁴ It would indicate that the idea of hammering the western units into one administrative whole had been in the air for quite a long time before the birth of Pakistan awaiting fulfillment.⁷⁴⁵

Similarly, the people comprising each unit were not homogeneous in character. For instance, the Punjab had large numbers of Pathans and Baluchis. The N.W.F.P. did not have all the Pathan populace except in the tribal areas. Baluchistan contained more Punjabis and Sindhis than Baluchis. In other words, people of the same origin instead of confining themselves in one geographic area allowed themselves to be dispersed in all regions of West Pakistan. Besides, the new demographic penetration i.e. refugees, demolished whatever homogeneity was left in certain areas, particularly Sindh. Likewise, no single unit could communicate with the aid of one language. Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, Brohi and Baluchi were the languages used in varying degrees. Also, beneath the apparent semantic differences there were elements of mutual intelligibility and similarity as far as those languages were concerned. However, it is not suggested that political divisions did not have any support on account of separate community or sociocultural distinctiveness which, indeed, had developed into micro-nationalities through ages of living apart. It is to emphasize that the political divisions producing hyphenated Pakistanis i.e. Punjabi-Pakistani, Sindhi-Pakistani, Baluchi-Pakistani and Pathan-Pakistani had also, substantially speaking, a common frame of reference. The people of various units developed unconsciously a sense of togetherness having lived through centuries in a geographically compact area unindented by any natural barriers and protected by the rocks of the Himalyas and waters of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. That was why Sir. R.E.M. Wheeler portrayed the entire West Pakistan as a geographic and cultural unit⁷⁴⁶ deserving a nomenclatural consideration.

Economically speaking, the whole parts of West Pakistan were interlinked. And the question was in an age of 'rising expectations' to what extent existing federal arrangements were going to meet present requirements. Professor Laski pointed out the inadequacy of federal governments in matters of planning economic development and precisely, of bringing about a welfare state. Sir Ivor voiced the same feelings that federal

⁷⁴³ See Dr. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*. (Bombay, Thacker & Co. Ltd. 3rd edit., 1946.) p. 209.

⁷⁴⁴ See "Authentic Statements", *loc. cit.*, p. 29.

⁷⁴⁵ "... had the British not conquered Baluchistan and had Lord Curzon not thought of carrying out the North-West Frontier Province out of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit." Dr. Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁷⁴⁶ Sir R.E.M. Wheeler. *Five thousand years of Pakistan*, (London: Cassell & Company: 1956), p. 15.

system was both "extravagant and inefficient".⁷⁴⁷ This was anticipated by Dicey even in the 19th century that "A federation ... will always be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states of equal resources."⁷⁴⁸ Operating under a federal system as it did, West Pakistan in spite of its being governed by same economic forces could neither develop evenly nor cultivate its potentiality adequately. Natural resources were in a state of diffusion. Water resources happened to be confined in the north east area. Mineral wealth was located in the mountainous areas. Inter-provincial rivalries hindered the growth of say an hydro-electric project whose generation could have been used in an ample measure benefiting the less lucky areas. What was more provincial wisdom justified the hoarding of food or other commodities while famine stalked in neighboring states. And it was a routine affair for money to be doled out yearly from the central coffer to the backward areas of West Pakistan for which richer provinces had to be taxed. The irrational part of it that despite the presence of both identical and complementary elements in the West Pakistan economy the existing political divisions suffered from an uneven level of economic development. For instance, in a basically agricultural economy the percentage of cultivation in different units was in varying proportions viz. the Punjab 81%, Sindh 44% N.W.F.P. 52%, while Baluchistan's share was negligible. Similarly, the per capita financial contribution of the respective units in the maintenance of their provincial establishment was equally dissimilar.⁷⁴⁹ Once units were amalgamated into one, their resources pooled together, and economies planned on an overall basis there would be free flow of trade, commerce, capital, labor and entrepreneurial talents resulting in a speedy and balanced development. This economic mobilization in its turn would usher in social mobilization as was rightly maintained by Rupert Emerson that "Economic planning can be employed as a deliberate means of achieving a social mobilization which will draw people into the national community."⁷⁵⁰ And, as the growing economy would be co-extensive with developmental strides in the region of communications the hitherto marooned people of the backward ranges would have an opportunity of coming out of their narrow world. This economic cum social mobilization process would go a long way in the growth of urbanization, literacy, media consumption, voting habits and, above all, qualitative manpower.

Administratively speaking, it was both a case of efficiency and frugality. In the founding of the West Indies Federation, Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, economy and efficiency of administration were stressed.⁷⁵¹ This was equally

⁷⁴⁷ Sir Ivor Jennings and C.M. Young, *Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth*, (Oxford: 1952), p. 343.

⁷⁴⁸ A.V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, 10th edition. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.: London: 1959), p. 172.

⁷⁴⁹ The Punjab Rs.-/4/-; N.W.F.P. Rs.-/12/-; and Sindh Rs. 1 (whereas East Pakistan's per capita share was only Rs. -/2/- due to its living under one administrative system. See: "Authentic Statements", *Loc.cit.*, p. 12. Also *Dawn*, September 16, 1955.

⁷⁵⁰ Rupert Emerson "National-Building in Africa" in K.W. Deutsch (ed.) *National Building. op.cit.*, p. 116. See also, K.W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", *American Political Science Review* (1961). pp. 493-514.

⁷⁵¹ See R.L. Watts, *New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth* (Oxford: 1966). p. 52.

applicable to West Pakistan; for Pakistan, at partition, was an heir apparent of an infinitesimal number of administrators nevertheless the provinces were bearing the astronomical costs of maintaining separate Secretariats, Ministries, Governors, Courts of law and services to make an appearance. It was estimated that a financial advantage of the one unit plan would be savings of \$60,000,000 a year through elimination of administrative operating costs.⁷⁵² Despite the fact that those units had a good deal of common political and administrative institutions developed from the time of the British rule, precise standardization of system could not be achieved due to both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. This was more obvious in the dispensation of justice. For instance, in the N.W.F.P. the highest judicial authority was the Judicial Commissioner's Court, whereas in the Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan there existed a High Court, the Chief Justice's Court and a Revenue and Judicial Commissioner respectively.⁷⁵³ In short, there were different levels of administration and dispensation of justice prevailing in West Pakistan. Once services were streamlined and standardized it was the neglected areas which would most benefit from it. And most of the senior administrators themselves thought that too much of "stress on federalism will encourage fissiparous tendencies in Pakistan."⁷⁵⁴

Lastly, the concept of one-unit had the force of both idealism and realism. We have from the very beginning mentioned the efficacy of institution-building as a sure means for Pakistan's achieving political development. It has been also maintained that the nation state position was nebulous at the creation of Pakistan; for, "by the accepted criterion of nationhood ... there was in fact no such thing as a Pakistani nation."⁷⁵⁵ Now that Pakistan came into being its survival lay in the political development which in the words of Lasswell would mean propounding of "explicit doctrines and formulas."⁷⁵⁶ The micro-nationalism or regional chauvinism must yield to 'constructive nationalism'. Robert E. Scot has pointed out that in the Latin American countries "unresolved social-cultural and psychological questions continue to slowdown nation-building."⁷⁵⁷ This was true of Pakistan; for, she needs integrative institutions to instill the notion of a national identity i.e. Pakistan. The project of one-unit was a step towards fulfilling a condition of nation-building, which W. Myron would term as value-integration.⁷⁵⁸ That meant the particularistic values of the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis would dissolve into that universalistic value called Pakistani. If the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan's creation was the result of the demand of the then Indian Mussalmans on the basis of their being a nation then the predominantly Muslim population of West Pakistan ought to be the instrument of Pakistanization not a hindrance. In other words, the one-unit

⁷⁵² See *New York Times*, November 20, 1954.

⁷⁵³ *Dawn*, January 11, 1955.

⁷⁵⁴ Khalid Bin Sayeed "Federalism and Pakistan", *Far Eastern Survey* (September, 1954), p. 142.

⁷⁵⁵ Rupert Emerson, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

⁷⁵⁶ "H.D. Lasswell. "The Policy Sciences of Development", *World Politics* (XVII, 1965), p. 301.

⁷⁵⁷ R.E. Scott, "Nation-Building in Latin America". in *Nation-Building. op.cit.*, p.77.

⁷⁵⁸ See W. Myron, "Political Integration and Political Development" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 358, March 1965.

project was also a test of Pakistan as a nation. That was why an M.C.A. maintained in the Constituent Assembly II that there was such a thing as Pakistan nationalism distinct from sub-nationalism the revival of which depended on the building of proper institutions. Continuing he said that "the integration of West Pakistan is the establishment of precisely such an institution."⁷⁵⁹ Surely, the one-unit concept was a choice between larger and petty loyalties.

Realistically, apart from the geographic, economic and administrative considerations which we have mentioned above, the one-unit Bill was destined to be enacted if the country was to have a constitution at all. Unequivocally, it was stated in the Constituent Assembly that "the establishment of one unit, amongst other things, was a deliberate attempt to meet the national demand of Bengal for provincial autonomy the most happy consummation of all will be that it will provide a solution ... to frame a constitution."⁷⁶⁰ We have already analyzed earlier the constitutional angularities between East and West Pakistan. The Punjab-dominated West Pakistan would not let East Pakistan have provincial autonomy which it was not mentally prepared to give to the other units of West Pakistan, because that would have ensured Bengali supremacy. Since the governmental system in Pakistan was perforce to be federal in the long run due to bizarre geographic halves of Pakistan, the proposed one-unit Bill before the Constituent Assembly II envisaged a unitary structure of administration in the Western wing only to bring about a redesigned federal polity of two wings e.g. West and East Pakistan and also to institutionalize equilateral politics between them.

However, in the foregoing pages some argument have been trotted out to establish a case for the integration of West Pakistan. Although political boundaries were irrational, nevertheless a mere lifting of the boundaries would not have been the end of 'separateness' born of historic forces. The edifice of supra-nationalism could not be created on the mausoleum of localism, really. Perhaps this was behaviouristic anathema. As a matter of fact, one M.C.A. rang truth in the Constituent Assembly II saying that "as charity begins at home similarly your patriotism must begin at home."⁷⁶¹ That meant local culture, habits, traditions, etc., etc., ought to be accommodated respectfully before stamina for larger loyalties could be fostered. Neither the cantons of Swiss lost their individual flavor nor the Welsh and Scottish people theirs in the formation of Great Britain. In fact, the Council for administration of West Pakistan set up by the Governor General during the transitional period when the first constituent Assembly was dissolved, for reorganizing the administrative set-up in the ensuing one-unit had this consideration of retaining cultures of the sub-societies in front of it; for, the Chairman of the Council, M.A. Gurmani, himself maintained that "the regional languages and cultures will not only be protected but their further development will be

⁷⁵⁹ CAD Vol. 1, August 26, 1955, p. 343.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, August 31, 1955, p. 361.

⁷⁶¹ CAD, Vol. 1, August 31, 1955. p. 377.

encouraged. We want to develop West Pakistan as a garden where variety of flowers and trees and plants blend in harmony and enhance its beauty and grace."⁷⁶²

The recommendations of the Council formed the basis of the one-unit Bill which envisaged 50 districts to be grouped into 10 divisions. The Commissioners would be the pivots of the administration; when districts would form basic unit of administration under Deputy Commissioner. The States of Dir, Swat and Chitral and the tribal areas attached to the districts of Peshawar, Mardan and Hazara and the agencies of Malakand, Mohammad and Khyber were included in the Peshawar division. The tribal areas attached to the district of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Kohat and the agencies of Khurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan were included in the Dera Ismail Khan division.⁷⁶³ There would be one Ministry, one Secretariat, one Revenue Board, one Legislature, one Public Service Commission and a single High Court of Judicature for the whole Province. But in all these new schemes of things the key point was the association of the people 'in an increasing measure with the administration at all level', and maximum delegation of powers to the regions. Stressing the point the Prime Minister further added that "when I talk of decentralization of authority, I do not mean merely decentralization of bureaucratic authority. I, for one, would like to see a great extension of local self-government."⁷⁶⁴ The number of officers and other staff in the provincial quota of the one-unit secretariat as well as the procedure for new recruitment had been decided upon in the following manner. Decisions on this issue were, however, weighted in favor of the small units and backward areas. As far as representation in the legislature was concerned the Punjab volunteered itself to accept a representation of 40% for a period of 10 years although it constituted 56% of the entire population of West Pakistan.⁷⁶⁵ This act of generosity was shown to purge the minds of the non-Punjabi populace of West Pakistan of terror of that pejorative and xenophobic term e.g. Punjabi.⁷⁶⁶

Now we must consider whether the various people of various units accepted the project. or, had a proper climate of opinion been created before the Constituent Assembly II could raise its hand of benediction in the enactment of a bill thought "revolutionary" and "far-reaching in significance."⁷⁶⁷

The straw of one-unit had been in the wind of Pakistan since 1948. Jinnah was quoted by Sardar Bahadur Khan⁷⁶⁸ to have wanted to implement one-unit in 1948 when some

⁷⁶² See *Dawn* September, 16 1955.

⁷⁶³ Times, October 14, 1955.

⁷⁶⁴ CAD, Vol. 1, September 15, 1955, p. 818.

⁷⁶⁵ See Prime Minister's broadcast quoted in *Dawn*, December 2, 1954.

⁷⁶⁶ "... In Bengal anybody who is a stranger and a person they do not like ... they call him a Punjabi. If a Pathan comes to Larkana, he is a Punjabi. If a man of Sukkur goes to Hazara, he is a Punjabi ... when we do not like a person, we say he is a Punjabi ... "See CAD, Vol. 1, August 31, 1955, p. 356.

⁷⁶⁷ Prime Minister's broadcast, quoted in *Dawn*, April 2, 1955.

⁷⁶⁸ Gen. Ayub's brother.

such programme had been placed before him by the latter.⁷⁶⁹ Members of the Constituent Assembly I had on many an occasion referred to it to contain provincialism. In 1949, Professor A.K. Sen had in a formal memorandum to the B.P.C. suggested integration of West Pakistan.⁷⁷⁰ In 1950, there was a national convention of all parties except the M.L. held at Dhaka which in a resolution demanded East Pakistan as one region leaving the matter to the people of West Pakistan to decide upon what pattern of government they were in favor of.⁷⁷¹ The issue did really surface palpably after the demise of the Nazimuddin government as a recipe for constitution-making. And it was the Punjabi leadership which was distinctly but notoriously associated with the issue, and which helped to create a public readiness for its general acceptance. But in fairness, except for the four provincial *Musketeers* such as Abdul Gaffar Khan (N.W.F.P.), G.M. Syed (Sindh), Abdul Majid Sindhi (Sindh) and Abdur Samad Achakzai (Baluchistan), the integrative plan in principle had been acclaimed by all parties and relevant sections of the people till the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly II.

The N.W.F.P. Legislative Assembly was the first to come out with a resolution supporting one-unit on 25th November, 1954.⁷⁷² The Punjab Assembly did the same on 30th November, 1954.⁷⁷³ The Sindh Legislature followed suit on 11th December, 1954.⁷⁷⁴ Fifty five members out of sixty of the Shahi Jirga of Baluchistan and Chitral's Advisory Council welcomed one-unit.⁷⁷⁵ Similarly, resolutions were adopted in the Legislative Council of Khairpur State, the Municipal Committee of Quetta, the Municipal Corporation of Karachi, the Council of Rulers of Baluchistan States, Union and Bahawalpur Legislative Assembly recommending the integration of West Pakistan.⁷⁷⁶ But despite the general unanimity as revealed through these resolutions when the one-unit Bill came up for discussion before the Constituent Assembly II it was accorded the bitterest reception by the opposition, the A.M.L. A secret document came to light which opened the Pandora's box again. Sardar Abdur Rashid who as a Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. had earlier moved a resolution backing one-unit discovered that the one-unit plan had been guided by a sinister "thesis".⁷⁷⁷ This document was given to him in the month of November, 1954 by the Prime Minister⁷⁷⁸ to help Sardar (Sb.) grasp the meaning of one-unit. Words like "clear the decks", "why uncork Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who has been safely closed in the bottle?"⁷⁷⁹ occurred in the document, which was both scandalous and *Machiavellian*. But the most damaging and crucial part

⁷⁶⁹ See *Dawn*, July 27, 1955.

⁷⁷⁰ See Azit Kumar Sen, *The Islamic State and Other Political Essays*, (Calcutta: 1950).

⁷⁷¹ See *Dawn*, November 23, 1954.

⁷⁷² See *Dawn*, November 26, 1954.

⁷⁷³ See "Authoritative Statements, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

⁷⁷⁴ See *Dawn*, December 12, 1954.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid*, November 29 and December 6, 1954.

⁷⁷⁶ See *CAD*, Vol. I, September 15, p. 796.

⁷⁷⁷ Quoted in *Dawn*, September 9, 1955.

⁷⁷⁸ Needless to say the Prime Minister denied the allegation.

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid*.

unfolded like this: "A final word about the role of the Punjab. At present we do not require too much noise in the Punjab ... Punjab must be kept quiet. The folly of our friends must be checked ... at a later stage Punjab will have to take the lead. At that time I hope an effective Punjab leadership will have been put in place at the centre and at Lahore."⁷⁸⁰

The disclosure of the document gave the opposition a lever against the unification of one-unit; for, it was made to appear as though the constitutional arrangements were designed to provide a secure niche for the Punjabi leadership. Again, contrary to the council's recommendation the capital of the new one-unit province was earmarked for Lahore (capital of the Punjab) instead of somewhere near Peshawar (capital of the N.W.F.P.). And the A.M.L.'s attack on the Bill was the product of its growing apprehension under the circumstance lest the government should have vitiated the five fundamentals e.g. (1) full regional autonomy; (2) Parity in all respects; (3) one-unit in the West with full regional autonomy with the approval of the people thereof; (4) Bengali and Urdu should be the two state languages; and (5) joint electorate agreed as the basis of future constitution in Murree prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly II.⁷⁸¹ The A.M.L. was already obsessed by the flouting of the convention (the spirit of parity) that the Governor General and Prime Minister should not represent the same wing.⁷⁸² Suspicious, Suhrawardy demanded that a clause for provincial autonomy to East Pakistan be included along with the one-unit Bill which was an agreed term.⁷⁸³

At this juncture, a situation of overriding nature deserves a positive reference. Unquestionably, the period starting with 1955 and onward reinforced commitment to parliamentarianism. Elements of correct parliamentary behavior started forming. But equally emphatically, the tide of Bengali nationalism reached its high water mark in the parliament. The early Congress opposition (1947-54) was lame duck, more symbolic than actuality. The Bengali M.L. parliamentarians were virtually second-fiddlers to the ruling party. With the advent of second parliament in 1955, there witnessed a solid, passionate, and compact group of Bengali parliamentarians belonging to the A.L., who, with a comparative youthful vigor, could successfully open the floodgate of accumulated grievances to flow on the floor of the house, as the constitution-making was at the anvil. The real state of efflorescence was now ensued in the parliament with full fidelity. The Bengali M.N.A.s, specially the Awami Leaguers became the mouthpiece of Bengali nationalism incarnate, now that the parliamentarians unlike the Congressites, belonging to parties having popular underpinning, could flex their muscles effectively. The twelve redoubtable Awami Leaguers made a clean breast of the tale of woes, deprivation and exploitations suffered by the East Wingers since independence.

⁷⁸⁰ 'CAD, Vol. 1. September 6, 1955, pp. 508-509. See Sardar Sb.'s Speech.

⁷⁸¹ See *Dawn*, August 11, 1955; also Ataur Rahman, *op. cit.*, 95.

⁷⁸² East Pakistan was not ready to accept Gen. Mirza as East Pakistani.

⁷⁸³ See *Dawn*, September 22, 1955.

Clear as day, the *Prometheus* was unbound in the person of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the potential *Bangabandhu* of the coming days of Bangladesh destiny and apostle of Bengali nationalism of the sixties and early seventies. While spitting fire on the one-unit bill, the romantic Sheikh, minced no words in opposing the new nomenclature of East Bengal i.e. East Pakistan. He roared in the parliament pointing: "we have demanded so many times that you should make it Bengal. The word Bengal has a history, ... a tradition of its own. You can change it only after the people have been consulted ... So far as the changing of the name is concerned, we would like to be called ourselves as Bengali. What is there in it". Continuing, he held out that, "we had given 21-point programme to the people of East Bengal, in which we had categorically mentioned that only Defense, Foreign affairs, and currency should remain with the central government and the rest should be transferred to the provinces".⁷⁸⁴

Furthermore, addressing the treasury bench in a vein of verbal violence he administered a prophetic warning saying: "I appeal to my friends. *Zulm maat karo*. If you will force it upon us then we have to adopt *unconstitutional means* ... that is what happened all over the world."⁷⁸⁵

Participating in the same constitution-making debates he also held out an assurance that the opposition would be happy to pass the Constitution Bill "within seven days, even three days" provided provincial autonomy as demanded was stipulated in the constitutional clauses. The victory of the UF over M.L. at the general election in 1954 ushered in an era of re-awakening of linguistic nationalism. The Bengali MNAs were very conscious about the glory of Bengali language. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, bathed in Bengali nationalism, made a point of issuing order of the day in Bengali, thanked the speaker for having allowed him to speak in Bengali in the parliament. Passionately, the Sheikh revealed in the parliament that out of the total budget money of Rs. 915 crores in the 1947-58 period an amount of Rs. 530 crores was spent for the expansion of the metropolis, Karachi. The East-West conflict in Pakistan was like that of the longstanding conflict between the Northern Flaming and Southern Waloons of Belgium. As Brussel, though a bilingual capital tended to be French, so Karachi inspite of its being the capital of the whole of Pakistan, tended to be more West Pakistan. East Pakistan did not yield any economic benefit from this huge expenditure, since the buzzer grotesque, geographic halves prevented the 'multiplier effect' to operate between the two wings in terms of mobility of labor, capital, technical staffs and entrepreneurial class.⁷⁸⁶ Likewise, another veteran Awami League Parliamentarian, in a fit of burning effusions on the imperativeness of removal of disparity between wings cautioned the House saying that,

⁷⁸⁴ See CAD II, Vol. 1, 21 September 1955, p. 1007.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁶ See Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's speech in the House, CAD II, Vol. 1, September 21, 1955, p. 1072.

"The Ocean that divided England and America could not be dried up and so geography played its part and created history when politicians failed."⁷⁸⁷

In a marathon rhetoric, Abul Mansur, what in the words of Suhrawardy "has placed facts and figures before the House which have never been ventilated here before."⁷⁸⁸

Correspondingly, Aaur Rahman and Maulana Abdul Rashid Tarkabagish delineated the political malaise of East Pakistan in full throated ease. Championing the Bengali cause, the leader of the opposition, H.S. Suhrawardy, known to be reticent, self-possessed, and pragmatic came out into the open emphasizing the unassailable reality that, "East Bengal is greatly perturbed. More than that, there is a storm brewing there ... for four and half crores of population are living between wind and water ... obviously, west, as a nation, as a group, was pitched against the East as a nation or as a group. I am using the word "nation" in the loose sense they (East Bengal) must have regional autonomy"⁷⁸⁹ Suhrawardy, unlike the M.L. did not consider religion as the basis, on which "the two wings can live together."⁷⁹⁰

On a most sensitive question of Bengalis being a non-martial race and their representation in the Army, even the First Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had earlier dismissed the matter in an airy manner, when he told the house that "for the sake of numbers I shall not allow the efficiency of the Army to be undermined."⁷⁹¹ One can fathom the depth of ingrained prejudice, in that seventeen years afterwards the spokesman of the central government said the same thing in the floor of the Ayub's spurious parliament, rather insolently, that he was not prepared to "experiment with inferior human material."⁷⁹²

It smacked of a kind of new-fangled *apartheid* policy. It hurt the ego and self-respect of the Bengalis, as they were substantially refrained from the honor of defending the country. Professedly the Bengalis were relegated to the position of *Zimmies* (or plebeian) who were required to pay defense taxes for the security they received from the state. Evidently, the East Pakistan was rendered as the 'sickman' of Pakistan both economically and militarily, if not the "world of William Hunter" on another count. Even the tough customer—General Iskander Mirza,—no lover of Bengalis, while governing East Bengal in a state of sieze had to say this in a secret letter" ... if I have to shoot, ... if Pakistan integrity is endangered, I will shoot and shoot till the last round. But believe me Excellency, Pakistan's integrity can only be maintained for all times to come, if we are able to solve the economic and human difficulties of these simple and

⁷⁸⁷ See Mr. Abul Mansur's speech. *NAD*, Vol. 1, March 19, 1956, p. 213.

⁷⁸⁸ *CAD*, Vol. 1, January 13, 1956, p. 2238.

⁷⁸⁹ *CAD* vol. 1, 13 January, 1956, p. 2238.

⁷⁹⁰ *Dawn*, 1 February, 1956.

⁷⁹¹ See *CAD* (leg.) vol. 1, March 2, 1948, p. 138.

⁷⁹² See the *Hindu*, July 22, 1965.

sentimental people here.⁷⁹³ Suhrawardy refuted that unfounded charge maintaining that Bengalis were historically resentful of British colonial rule of which tale had been written in letters of gold. Even the first shot was fired at Barrakpore (Bengal) as the Sepoy Mutiny broke out. Neither the Bengalis were eager to join the British army, nor were they trusted by the later. On the contrary it was a pat story that most of the people from the 'saltish belt' – west Pakistan – made the bulk of the British Indian Army. That was the handy story of their being the martial race as portrayed by the Britishers conveniently. Concluding, Suhrawardy added that "... this much I am certain that every patriotic citizen desires that he should be associated with the defense of his country."⁷⁹⁴ However, having inserted a new dimension of political assertiveness of East Pakistani legislators on the input side of political development of Pakistan we now revert back to one-unit issue.

As far as the opposition's arguments vis-à-vis the one-unit Bill was concerned they were more related to the aspects of tendentious methodology, gross omission than principle. Suhrawardy challenged the Prime Minister to face an investigation of his allegations before the Chief Justice of Pakistan that the members sent by the different legislatures of west Pakistan to the Constituent Assembly II to support the one-unit Bill were irregularly elected. For an instance, he chose Sindh. Armed with evidence obtained from court records he cited dates, hours, names and places – "his assembly colleagues and the packed public gallery listened for two hours in pin-drop silence"⁷⁹⁵ – to expose Khuhro, the Chief Minister that he had tampered with the Constituent Assembly II elections. Suhrawardy named Sindhi politics after Khuhro, saying: "Khuhroism is a new political philosophy. Khuhroism is striking terror into the hearts of members of the Sindh legislature and causing them to return certain members to this house whose duty it is to support the one-unit plan."⁷⁹⁶ True, Khuhro was congenitally capable of pursuing a policy of coercive politics. And an element of coercion would be a possibility so long the whole of west Pakistan remained feudal in structure, let alone Sindh. But when Suhrawardy himself was "prepared to accept the proposition that the elections⁷⁹⁷ in Sindh were generally fair"⁷⁹⁸ how could he explain that a freely elected legislature of 102 members⁷⁹⁹ would be simply coerced into underwriting power to Khuhro at the expense of their own Sindhi interest unless they had predilections for the political integration. Even the worst victim of Khuhroism, Mir Gulam Ali Talpur (ex Central Minister and lately the Speaker of Sindh legislature) who characterised Khuhro's regime with the "reign of Halaku and Chengiz Khan"⁸⁰⁰ admitted that there was general consensus regarding one-unit among the 102 members of Sindh legislature, and his

⁷⁹³ See Governor's secret letter *loc, cit*, Appendix 15.

⁷⁹⁴ *NAD*, Vol. January 31, 1956, p.2238.

⁷⁹⁵ See *New York Times*, September 11, 1955.

⁷⁹⁶ See *CAD*, Vol. 1 September 10, 1955, p. 647.

⁷⁹⁷ The last general elections which produced a new legislature in Sindh.

⁷⁹⁸ *CAD*, vol. 1, September 10, 1955, p. 646.

⁷⁹⁹ Out of 102 members only 4 voted against the one-unit resolution in Sindh legislature.

⁸⁰⁰ *CAD*, vol. 1, September 16, 1955, p. 840.

group of 52 members despite "vicious propaganda" and "lot of misunderstanding" supported "integration of the provinces into one province."⁸⁰¹ The truth, however, was that the various assemblies "had met and voted their approval with only the faintest flicker of overt opposition."⁸⁰² Hence, it could not be maintained really that the climate of general integrative spirit prevailing in the country was purely engendered by engineering and coercion.

Although, in the process of institution-building legalistic morals were bruised. Indeed, the dismissals of the N.W.F.P. Ministry and Sindh Ministry on grounds of maladministration by the central government when they smelt anti-one-unit were cases in point. But then how one would pronounce political value judgments. Had not the same ministries earlier supported the Bill and then again conveniently gone back to their pledges to stay in power by tending regionalism?⁸⁰³ Reflecting on the federal experiments in the Commonwealth Professor R.L. Watts observed that when leadership "has lacked vigor ... the process of constitution-making has proved more protracted and controversial."⁸⁰⁴ And the piloting of the one-unit Bill was precisely that sort of vigorous leadership towards constitution making. The state of mental ambivalence or shilly-shallying on the part of some leaders was but natural as they could not blue-print the future life under one-unit. Even the opposition leader himself (Suhrawardy) – reiterated that "I ... do adhere to the principles of the Bill and considered and do consider that the unification of West Pakistan as a measure of integration was most desirable", but he insisted on the circulation of the Bill for eliciting public opinion as "the circumstances have changed".⁸⁰⁵

But then, for a period of nine months i.e. since the announcement of the one-unit plan, there had been enough ventilation of informed opinion on this subject. Nawab Gurmani reeled off statistics that as many as 500 statements by prominent public figures were printed by the newspapers. Public bodies numbering 200 including political, cultural, commercial organizations, Bar associations and local self-government institutions passed resolutions on it. More than 370 editorials, 700 articles and letters were printed into the news-papers of Pakistan. More than 280 amendments to the Bill were received by the Constituent Assembly II secretariat.⁸⁰⁶ Besides, more than 21 days were devoted to the general discussion of the Bill, claimed the Prime Minister.⁸⁰⁷ It could be maintained that no measure of public policy had received so much public attention in Pakistan.⁸⁰⁸ And the balance of public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of the integrative plan. The Bill was virtually opposed on principle by three M.C.A.s in the

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 842.

⁸⁰² Callard, *op.cit.*, p. 167.

⁸⁰³ See K.J. Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes", *Pacific Affairs*, (March: 1959), p. 81.

⁸⁰⁴ R.L. Watts, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

⁸⁰⁵ *CAD*, Vol. 1, September 10, 1955.

⁸⁰⁶ "Authoritative Statements", *loc.cit.*, p. 32.

⁸⁰⁷ *CAD*, Vol. 1, September 15, 1955, p. 813.

⁸⁰⁸ See Talukder Maniruzzaman, *The Politics of Development-a case of Pakistan 1947-1958*, Dacca, 1970.

Constituent Assembly II. Fazlur Rahman, a former rightist Muslim Leaguer and lately a political recluse thought that the one-unit project was an ill-omened phenomenon. Mian sb. of the A.P.P. and Mahmood Ali of the G.D. voiced leftist sentiments in that they subscribed the view that the "multi-national states" as was Pakistan would always gather "strength and cohesion"⁸⁰⁹ in the existing system. But quantitatively speaking it was the 55% of the entire population of Pakistan i.e. East Pakistan and the 56% of the entire population of West Pakistan i.e. the Punjab who were attuned to the integrative plan. That was why it was maintained that the Punjab favoring a unified West Pakistan and East Pakistan yearning provincial autonomy, "that produced the new 1956 constitution".⁸¹⁰ And qualitatively speaking, the one-unit plan resulted in the major achievement of what was called the Bengali-Punjabi *entente* the absence of which had hitherto been a stumbling block to constitution-making.

Concerning the charge that Lahore was chosen as the capital of the new province, it was but a temporary arrangement due to the non-availability of a more suitable place. But the Chief Ministership of the new province was awarded unanimously to Dr. Khan even before the legal birth of the new province. Then the question relating to the controversial document that detonated. Granted that it was true, was it to bind the Punjabi posterity eternally? A conspiratorial legacy, if any, handed down by a decadent society of feudalism to the subsequent generations had the chance of being discarded, as the people of new society would grow in a progressive milieu by being already born into a larger community i.e. West Pakistan. Behind all the great achievements of mankind there lay ideas. The one-unit plan was such an idea born of social, political, economic and international⁸¹¹ forces.

It was a very difficult but challenging task. It was the people in general and leaders in particular on whose abilities depended the survival of the institution i.e. one-unit. And as far as the A.M.L.'s opposition to the one-unit Bill was concerned it did the parliamentary duty of breaking the huge china vase of commissions and commissions of the one-unit Bill in the market place which held out a corrective warning to the would-be operators of the one-unit machinery. Thus after a marathon debate the one-unit Bill was passed on 30th September, 1955⁸¹² "ending ravages of provincialism",⁸¹³

⁸⁰⁹ See *Dawn*, July 19, 1955. Cf. The earlier leftist support of multilingualism (in language movement in East Pakistan) and the present support for multi-national states. It is to be recalled that the Muslim as a nation in the subcontinent was recognized by the Indian Communist Party, before the subcontinent was halved.

⁸¹⁰ See R.L. Watts, *op.cit.*, p. 122.

⁸¹¹ The demand for Pakhtoonistan in the N.W.F.P. was fuelled by Afghanistan. The integrative plan was also designed to contain separatist tendency of the Pakhtoons, led by Gaffar Khan. The announcement of the one-unit plan had its repercussions across international borders. The Pakistan flag was hauled down from Pakistan Embassy building in Kabul by Afghans as a protest against the one-unit plan. See Prime Minister's speech, *CAD*, Vol. 1, September 15, 1955, p. 818.

⁸¹² The province of West Pakistan came officially into existence on 14th October, 1955 and the two wings of Pakistan were officially designated as West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively.

⁸¹³ See *Times* October 15, 1955.

merging 310,000 square miles and integrating the 36,000,000 people of West Pakistan into a single province.⁸¹⁴

With the enactment of the one-unit Bill the last wrinkle on the Constitution Bill was ironed out, as far as the regional conflicts were concerned. Now it was the doctrinal part of the constitution awaiting resolution. We have commented earlier that the unconventional exit of the Nazimuddin government was the beginning of the entrance of the modernist-Islamist group. The consolidation of this group was finally consummated in the present coalition, the M.L.-U.F. The coalition government decided to attach some Islamic accretions to the constitution. But the opposition, A.M.L, was secular oriented. These secular forces were released in the general elections of East Pakistan in 1954.⁸¹⁵ The Constitution Bill submitted by the Prime Minister was pretentious, in that it envisaged Pakistan as an Islamic state a "venture.. to.. fulfill the high purpose for which Pakistan was established."⁸¹⁶

The pragmatist opposition leader, Suhrawardy, with clear vision, and cool logic argued back that there had never been such a thing as an Islamic state (a utopia yet to be achieved) but there were all Muslim states: "I say that you are deluding the people here by calling this an Islamic State. Never has there been such a precedent before. There have been other Muslim countries. Did we have a *Daulat-i-Islamia Abbasia*? Have you ever heard of *Daulat-i-Islamia Muawia*? Did we ever have *Daulat-i-Islamia Mughalia*? Have we had in recent time *Daulat-i-Islamia-Saudi Arabia*?" Arguing on the efficacy of Islam in cementing the bonds of two wings of Pakistan he observed that this "is a very tenuous bond indeed"; for, after all, there were Muslim countries in the world and "to what extent are we part and parcel of the same states?"—he asked. He urged the coalition government to be oblivious of the so-called "compendious method of saying that we want a country in which the Muslims will predominate"; for, with the same logic the Hindus, Parsis, Christians and Buddhists would have pressed for their own nationalistic goals. Aware of the presence of great numbers of minorities in Pakistan he contended that "all of us residing within Pakistan ... are one nation. irrespective of the provinces.. of the origin ... race ... tribe ... religion, caste or creed", and Islam could not be an acceptable bond between peoples living in Pakistan since its sociology was not conducive for it. The cementing bond of Pakistan nationhood, according to him, was "the realization that neither part of Pakistan can live without the other ... there is the military reason; ... the economic reason; there is the fact that we have to live together: we realize that there cannot be any getting out of it".⁸¹⁷ He welcomed, though, the broad principals and spirit of Islam with all its social, economic and political implications to

⁸¹⁴ See *New York Times*, September 31, 1955.

⁸¹⁵ The preamble of the 21-point programme talked about the 'fundamental' principles of Islam, though. But there was nothing particular about Islamic provisions in the preamble. (See Appendix).

⁸¹⁶ Prime Minister's speech on the Constitution Bill, "Documents and Speeches, *loc. cit.*, p. 311.

⁸¹⁷ See Suhrawardy's speech on the Constitution Bill published in *The Dacca Times* (Suhrawardy Supplement), May, 1964, pp. XVIII-XXXI.

be the guiding factor of the Pakistan polity, but was averse to the tendency of pinning down things unrealizable. But this unalloyed secularistic philosophy was not like throwing pearls before the swine, in that Pakistan Constitution remained substantially secular, though an Islamic facade had to be erected for giving continuity to a necessary myth that the concept of Pakistan had an ideological affectation.

But why did the framers have to graft an Islamic form on the Westminster system at all? It has been maintained, and rightly so, that "even eclecticism can be valid if it comes out of experience, felt needs and social realities".⁸¹⁸ The framers of the constitution could not deny the existence of the force that was Islam in Pakistan society. They could not brush aside the Islamic slogan that was so effectively used during the Pakistan movement. It had to be kept as a token of 'national identity'. But while dyeing the constitution they took care of avoiding fast Islamic colors. For, after all, "every constitution must be a product of its environment."⁸¹⁹ However, about the general Islamic provisions there were two stipulations in the constitution (Articles 197 and 198). It was envisaged in the constitution that there should be an 'organization for Islamic research' to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim Society on Islamic lines. Furthermore, it was laid down that "no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam". And these provisions would not affect the personal laws of non-Muslims and Muslim sects other than the Sunnis. But in all these matters it was clearly stipulated that it was the Pakistan National Assembly which would pronounce the last verdict on them i.e. which was Islamic or which was not.⁸²⁰ This was far from the futile ecclesiastical arrangements made in the shape of the *Mullah Board* during Nazimuddin's period. This was also the admission of the continuity of *Iztihad* (reason) and institutionalization of *Ijma* (consensus) in the legislature. Now it was the Pakistan National Assembly "representing the people which will, by deliberation and discussion, decide how to apply the principles of Islam to the needs of the community in varying circumstances".⁸²¹ In other words, Pakistanis had "denied to the clergy and given to the people the right to interpret Islam."⁸²²

About the non-secular stipulation that Head of the State must be a Muslim [Article 32(2)] there was severe opposition.⁸²³ The opposition was, however, successful in compelling the government to delete the provision of a vice president.⁸²⁴ In doing so, they made room for the Speaker of the N.A. (National Assembly)—who was not required to be a Muslim—to officiate as acting president in case of the latter's sickness or death [Article 36(1)]. The retention of the provision that the president ought to be a

⁸¹⁸ Francis Carnell, "Politics in Southern Asia" op. cit. P. 302 Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Approach to Self-Government* (Cambridge University Press: 1956), p.7.

⁸¹⁹ "Constitution", loc. cit. p. 143.

⁸²⁰ "Constitution", loc. cit. p. 144.

⁸²¹ Dr. I.H. Qureshi, *Pakistan, An Islamic Democracy* (Institute of Islamic Culture: Lahore) n.d. p.26.

⁸²² W.C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

⁸²³ See Suhrawardy's speech in the Constituent Assembly II quoted in *Dawn*, February 1, 1956.

⁸²⁴ See *Dawn* February 21, 1956.

Muslim [Article 32(2)] could be rationalized as a symbolic provision,⁸²⁵ though. And as far as the incorporation of religious values in the constitution was concerned Pakistan was not outside of the traditions of the modern constitutional governments.⁸²⁶ For, "there is hardly any human action that does not originate in some very general idea men have conceived of the Deity, of his relation to mankind ... and of their duties to their fellow creatures."⁸²⁷ But apart from the apparent religious undertones⁸²⁸ the 'legal character' of the State of Pakistan was, no doubt, a 'Federal Republic' and it is only its name that was Islamic Republic of Pakistan⁸²⁹ claimed a famous Pakistan jurist, Mr. A.K. Brohi.

As to the granting of legal imprimature to provincial autonomy it was remarked that the Pakistan constitution of 1956 "*Ostensibly* assigned greater powers to the provincial governments".⁸³⁰ It was ostensible in the sense that the overall central control had been retained despite the presence of elaborate lists of distributive powers e.g. Federal, Concurrent and Provincial. For, the powers of the Federal list would take precedence over those on the concurrent list, and the powers on the concurrent list over those on the provincial list.⁸³¹ The opposition i.e. the A.L. M.N.A. accused the coalition government of such a climb down on the issue of autonomy. But in reality the coalition government reflected a greater sense of urgency and inclination towards maintaining a strong centre. Apart from the awareness of the inexorable tendency of the general government growing powers in a federal polity owing to social and economic factors the coalition government scrupled to reduce the central government to a position of an ineffectual institution on grounds of present-day international politics; for, how could a nation with a weak centre negotiate deals with other nation-state, let alone command respect.

One of the chief architects of the U.F. and the 21-point programme, Haq perhaps came to grasp the truth that he had to secure for East Pakistan a more watered down version of provincial autonomy than he had been demanding. But there was another strong view that Haq relinquished his earlier active agitation for autonomy and became one

⁸²⁵ The Danish King must belong to Evangelical-Lutheran Church (Art. 11:5); so must the Norwegian King (Art. 13-4); the Swedish King must adhere to Evangelical faith (Art. 2); the Spanish Regent or King must belong to Catholic Church (Art. 9); the king of Greece must belong to Eastern Orthodox Church (Art. 1); the English King or Queen must belong to the Church of England (3 Act of Settlement).

⁸²⁶ South Africa; West Germany; Ireland; Argentina; Columbia; Costa Rica; Portugal; Thailand; Iraq; Jordan, etc., are examples.

⁸²⁷ Do Tocqueville. "Democracy in America" Vol. II, pp. 20-21 quoted in A.K. Brohi, *Fundamental Law of Pakistan* (Karachi: Din Mohammad Press, 1958), p. 737.

⁸²⁸ *The New York Times*, dated 9th January 1956 in a leader remarked on the Islamic provisions of Pakistan constitution: "It will be readily agreed that the broad basis of Islamic ethics could properly become the foundation for a healthy legal state, just as the broad basis of Judio-Christian ethics has been the substructure of several Western legal buildings."

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 740.

⁸³⁰ R.L. Watts, *op.cit.*, p. 189.

⁸³¹ See Allen Gledhill, "Public Law" *op. cit.* p. 356.

among the turn-coats having entered the parlor of Ministry. He might have nourished a view that, had East Pakistan been granted full autonomy except the three subjects e.g. Foreign Affairs, Currency and Defence, the gravitational pull of the eastern province with its distinctive language, culture and outlook would have been overwhelming compared to the heterogeneous West Pakistan just merged into a devised homogeneous polity i.e. one-unit. It was in the rolling of time that inter-wing climate of confidence would have been grown and further devolution of powers achieved. That was why Haq told the Constituent Assembly II that the "Draft constitution presented before the House is the result of our honest and sincere efforts"⁸³² and on the implementation of full regional autonomy laid down in the 21-point programme he aspired to fulfill it in auspicious future. But the author has strong hunch that beneath the obvious reason of strengthening the centre there lay a lurking confidence in the minds of the U.F. leaders of the coalition government that given that parliamentary democracy in Pakistan was a going concern the relatively politically conscious region of Pakistan i.e. East Pakistan might have the prospect of dominating the centre in future.

But, in any case, the provincial powers envisaged in the Constitution were not all hoax. The draft Constitution recorded the progressive shrinking of federal and concurrent lists in favor of the provincial one. The following are the changes:

	Subjects:		
	Federal	Concurrent	Provincial
B.P.C.R. of 1952:	73	39	42*
B.P.C.R of 1954:	66	38	48**
Constitution of 1956	30	23	94***
* Basic Principles Committee Report (Karachi: 1952), pp. 69-75			
** Basic Principles Committee Report (Government of Pakistan Press: 1954), pp. 73-79.			
*** The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Dept. of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1956) pp. 206-221.			

Besides, the draft Constitution bestowed residual powers on the provinces (Article 109). Again, the very first item of the 21-point programme was fulfilled in that article 214(1) stipulated that 'the state languages of Pakistan shall be Urdu and Bengali'. It has been held that "the Constitution will flourish in so far as it reflects social and political development."⁸³³ Not long after the creation of Pakistan a state of mutual resentment between East and West Pakistan developed into a gnome in social discussion in that West Pakistani's presence in East Pakistan was viewed as the conquest of the barbarians by the civilized westwingers, whereas East Pakistanis holding any positions in the West

⁸³² Haq's speech quoted in *Dawn*, January 24, 1956.

⁸³³ Allan Gledhill, *The Republic of India* (London: Stevens & Sons: 1951), p. 13.

was equated to *Attila's* conquest of Rome. This sentiment did really grow out of the absence of equal participation in national activities. The Directive Principles of state policy incorporated into the Constitution Bill laid down that "People from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the Defence Services of the country and steps shall be taken to achieve parity in the representation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan in all other spheres of federal administration".⁸³⁴ Over and above, Article 118(1) envisaged the constitution of a National Finance Commission consisting of the Federal Finance Minister, and Provincial Finance Ministers to ensure that the Federal grants-in-aid and net proceeds of the taxes were rationally distributed between the provinces. In addition, there was the provision for the establishment of a National Economic Council (Article 199(1)) consisting of four Federal Ministers and three Ministers of each provincial government with the Prime Minister as the *ex officio* chairman of the Council which would be in charge of advising the Federal and Provincial government in matters of 'financial, commercial and economic policies' and ensuring that uniform standards were maintained in the economic development of all parts of the country. In all these arrangements the politicians adhered to the view that "All government, indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act—is founded on compromise and barter",⁸³⁵ on the one hand, and created appropriate institutions to take care of doctrinal and regional conflicts, on the other. They evolved machineries to put an end to the existence of so-called permanent winners and losers among Pakistanis. Did not the East Pakistanis show magnanimity in accepting parity in coming to terms with their western partners? Did not the Punjabis make a commendable concession to their neighbors in accepting 40% representation in the legislature?

Similarly, in the definition of parliamentary structure the framers of the constitution took a leaf from the book of their past disagreeable experiences in that "the supremacy of parliament had been established and the role of the executive scrupulously defined".⁸³⁶ The president would appoint a Prime Minister from among the members of the National Assembly commanding the confidence of the majority of the members (Art. 37:3). All Ministers were required to be members of the N.A. (Art. 37:4). The Cabinets as a whole would be collectively responsible to the N.A. and the President was required to be satisfied before dismissing the Prime Minister that the latter had no command of confidence in the N.A. (Art. 37:6). And the President would be bound to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet (Art. 37:7). Regarding the promulgation of Ordinances by the President when the N.A. was not in session they were made to be laid down before the N.A. and would cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks (Art. 69:2). Regarding the proclamation of assumption of power by the Federal government in case of failure of the constitutional machinery in any province the president was bound to lay the proclamation order before the N.A. The proclamation

⁸³⁴ "Constitution", *loc. cit.* p. 20.

⁸³⁵ Edmund Burke, *Speech on the Conciliation of America*, Vol. II, p. 169.

⁸³⁶ H. Tinker, "*India and Pakistan*", *op. cit.*, p. 80.

would be inane at the expiration of two months, but the N.A. might extend the Federal rule on the provinces and that, too, was limited upto six months (Art. 193:2).

Although the Constituent Assembly II after a three-hour debate had to make provision for preventive detention but it was made clear that no person should be detained exceeding three months unless an appropriate advisory board reported before the end of this period that there was sufficient cause for such detention. The Constitution Bill ensured an independent judiciary, Election Commission, the justiciability of fundamental rights and finally the adoption of the British Cabinet system in both Federal and provincial governments.⁸³⁷ And the Bill was finally adopted on the 29th February, 1956.⁸³⁸ It would, however, appear that the framers of the Constitution in many an affair gave habits and conventions—the ornaments of British parliamentary system-juristic force instead of letting them grow spontaneously. But frailty that was the nature of the Pakistan politicians in the pre-1954 periods became the positive guidelines to the politicians of the post-1954 era. And it was the same past with a background of the longest deliberations on the institution-building that made it easier to drawing up a Constitution in the post-1954 era in the shortest possible time.⁸³⁹ However, in writing a postscript on constitution making there should be a mention of the role of the opposition mainly led by Suhrawardy. They had the credit of moving 670 amendments in the 245-clause Constitution Bill⁸⁴⁰ and forcing a dozen divisions in the Constituent Assembly II, particularly the last two divisions on the 21st February, 1956 (47:22; 43:20) relating to the nomenclature of the Constitution and the question of the President being Muslim in which the minorities,⁸⁴¹ G.D.,⁸⁴² and Mian Sb.⁸⁴³ supported the A.M.L. in the division.⁸⁴⁴ But the opposition had never been obstructive, in essence. It had been working on a schedule based on an understanding that was given to the Prime Minister by Suhrawardy that all the readings of the Bill were to be finished by the end of February, 1956.⁸⁴⁵ If it had chosen dilatory tactics the passage of the Constitution would have been much more delayed. On this the *Dawn* had an editorial saying that "The cooperation of the leader of the opposition, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy and his team alert and

⁸³⁷ See Times, January 9, 1956; *Daily Telegraph*, January 9, 1956.

⁸³⁸ It was announced on the 23rd March, 1956 to coincide with the date of the Lahore Resolution moved by Haq on 23rd March, 1940.

⁸³⁹ The coalition government appointed a 16-man sub-committee to deal with the controversial matters vis-à-vis constitution. The Constitution Bill was announced on the 8th January, 1956, submitted to the Constituent Assembly II on the 16th January, 1956 for discussion and finally adopted on the 29th February, 1956.

⁸⁴⁰ *Dawn* February 2, 1956.

⁸⁴¹ The Congress, U.P.P. and S.C.F. (Schedule Caste Federation) were supporters of the coalition government.

⁸⁴² The G.D. still a part of the U.F. and supporter of the coalition government supported the A.M.L. on all secular issues.

⁸⁴³ Mian Sb. the leader of the then A.P.P. group of the Constituent Assembly I also supported the A.M.L. on all secular issues.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, February 22, 1956.

⁸⁴⁵ See Suhrawardy's Statement, *Ibid.*, March 1, 1956.

vocal front benchers should ... be acknowledged."⁸⁴⁶ Indeed, the Prime Minister himself praised the opposition and its leader.⁸⁴⁷

If that was so, how could one account for the A.M.L.'s walking out of the Constituent Assembly II—the minorities, G.D. and Mian Sb. did the same when the Constitution Bill was about to be adopted, in protest against the Islamic provisions and failure to accord sufficient provincial autonomy to East Pakistan. In the first place a 100% consensus was an impossibility, particularly in a country like Pakistan where language, religion and remoteness had good deal of influence on politics. And the parliamentary system of party politics was superimposed on those existing cleavages. The A.M.L. though a rising national opposition party, had still to be nourished from its original base, East Pakistan. It gave the A.M.L. enough grist for its mill of opposition to have registered a protest against the Constitution, thus proving that the Awami leaguers were more sympathetic to the cause of East Pakistanis and minorities, as well. Similarly, the minorities could not be expected to be glib about a constitution that reduced them to a position of an implied plebeian class. But the opposition had a genuine cause for grumbling in that the coalition government contrary to the Murree Agreement of June, 1955 left the principle of the electorate and some other issues (mentioned earlier) undefined in the Constitution. That was why Suhrawardy had suggested to the Prime Minister for convening a round table conference of all parties for thrashing out difference and to have a more acceptable constitution to all and sundry. But the coalition government's failure to have shared the credit of constitution making with others gave the opposition the pretext of dissociation from the constitution.

But the tenor of opposition to the Constitution was best illustrated in Suhrawardy's views on the ensuing Republic Day Celebrations: " ... our opposition to it will now take the form of constitutional attempts to amend it (Constitution) in such a manner that both the wings of Pakistan may feel satisfied ... As regards the emergence of Pakistan as a Republic *there can be no two opinions that it is a red letter day* in the history of our country ... The ... Awami League ... has decided not to participate in any ... festive celebrations organized by Government parties ... (but) ... Ready to participate in functions organized on a state level".⁸⁴⁸ The latter events would prove that Suhrawardy did live up to its pronouncements and defend the constitution to the letter. Similarly, in our findings the minorities appeared less pungent in their attack vis-à-vis Islamic provisions than they were in the pre-1954 era. With all the ultimatums served on the coalition government by the Congress, U.P.P. and S.C.F. that they would withdraw support from the coalition Government in case of Islamic provisions being incorporated in the Constitution, no minister had ever resigned from the Ministries prior to the

⁸⁴⁶ *Dawn*, March 1, 1956, Editorial "Great day".

⁸⁴⁷ See *Ibid.*, also see *Ibid.*, September 9, 1956, Editorial, "Fifth Crisis". One knows how differences of languages have been a factor in the politics of say Belgium, Czechoslovakis, Finland, etc. and religions in the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Germany (W), etc., etc.

⁸⁴⁸ See *Dawn*, March 21, 1956

passing of the Constitution or immediately thereafter. They appeared to have been more (psychologically) adjusted to the *fait accompli*,⁸⁴⁹ Islamic Republic of Pakistan.⁸⁵⁰ While the Constitution Bill was at the anvil K.K. Dutta, the Central Minister, extolled that it "will make a welfare state"⁸⁵¹ though he remained silent on the Islamic provisions. Later on, he made an honest confession in the first session of the N.A. that "the problem of minorities is the most complex problem in a democratic state" and urged them to be "genuine Pakistanis".⁸⁵²

Again, a new realization was in evidence as far as the extreme rightists such as the Islamic fundamentalist and orthodox groups were concerned, in that they held out their grudging approval for the Constitution. Surprisingly, 26 *Ulema* including the influential Moulana Ehteshamul Haq thought the Draft Bill was on the whole "commendable"⁸⁵³ as soon as it was announced. Mufti Mohammad Shafi, President of the Jamat-i-Islam voiced his support, too.⁸⁵⁴ And the holiest among the holier *Ulema*, Maulana Maudoodi, the President of the Jamat-i-Islam party reacted in the same way but also epitomised the genuine collective feelings of the rightist *Ulema* by having said that the Draft Bill contained many an unislamic provision and if left "unamended it would be unislamic."⁸⁵⁵ In other words, the erstwhile aggressive *Ulema* were subdued by social and political forces and contented themselves with whatever Islamic provisions were promised in the Constitution of 1956. In sum, the constitution adopted on the 29th February, 1956 was based on the consensus of the overwhelming majority of the entire populace of Pakistan touching all shades of lives. It was an *annus mirabilis* for the coalition government and the country, as well. But having elected General Mirza as the first President of the Pakistan Republic in March, 1956,⁸⁵⁶ the coalition government displayed its poor political foresight. However, innocuous the titular office had been rendered in the Constitution General Mirza's—whose bizarre democratic concept had gained so much notoriety lately, both at home and abroad—elevation to the Presidential Office was an ill-omen incarnate. He had already been the country's *Regent* during the successive crises in the Governor General's health only to be elected country's first President, later on. This was an installation of a time-bomb. However, the President allowed himself to be mellow, in the beginning, on the workability of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.

⁸⁴⁹ See K.K. Dutta's speech in *Dawn*, March 12, 1956.

⁸⁵⁰ The West Pakistani minority M.C.A.s, namely C.E. Gibbon (Christian) and Sirumal Kirpadas (Hindu) abstained themselves regularly from voting against Islamic provision in all divisions forced by the opposition and minorities of East Pakistan.

⁸⁵¹ See Speech of K.K. Dutta in the Constituent Assembly II quoted in *Dawn*, 27 January, 1956. Also see March 25, 1956.

⁸⁵² See Speech of K.K. Dutta in the N.A. Quoted in *Ibid.*, April 1, 1956.

⁸⁵³ See *Dawn*, January 10, 1956.

⁸⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, January 15, 1956.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, January 31, 1956; also see *Ibid.*, January 12, 1956.

⁸⁵⁶ The opposition did not vote in the election as a protest against the infringement of the convention that both the Prime Minister and President should not come from the same wing.

Meanwhile, the coalition government was running short of its political plums in that its components e.g. the U.F. and M.L. had ceased to be a force in their respective provinces. This was bound to be as the central parliament to which the centre owed its existence was indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures not directly by an independent electorate. It is to be recalled that how abruptly the U.F. Ministry was restored in East Pakistan by Mohammad Ali without asking it to elect its parliamentary leader and over the head of the A.M.L., the largest single majority party in the legislature. Since the formation of the U.F. government with the coalescence of the minorities at the head of Abu Hossain Sarkar it had been eking out a fugitive existence. It resorted to all kinds of shifts and avoided a straight vote of confidence in the legislature pending frantic attempts to get the centre to save the ministry from the fall. The Prime Minister was obliging to the U.F. lest his coalition Cabinet and still more, the constitution-making should come to naught. Now that the Constitution was ready and meant to be the starting point for general elections based on a final political structure the East Pakistan legislature was required to pronounce its view on the electorate principle as its counterpart in West Pakistan had already done in favor of the separate electorate. Mr. Sarkar was in a dilemma i.e. being sandwiched between two opposite views of his coalition partners, namely the M.L. and N-I-P pressing for the separate electorate on the one hand, and the G.D., Congress, U.P.P. and S.C.F. for the joint electorate, on the other.⁸⁵⁷ While the legislature remained unsummoned to clear the electorate issue, let alone the confidence issue, the A.M.L. steadily increased its popularity "not only in public but also among members of the Provincial Assembly".⁸⁵⁸ Admirably, the Prime Minister rose to the parliamentary occasion and in response to the opposition demand and to the detriment of his own coalition partner⁸⁵⁹ counseled Sarkar to face the legislature by 31st August, 1956, (the date on which the budget period would end) or else an alternate government would be formed.⁸⁶⁰ Needless to add, the Sarkar Ministry gave way to the A.M.L in the first week of September, 1956.

The West Pakistan situation hit the coalition at the centre rather directly. On the appointment of Dr. Khan as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan Dr. Chowdhury held the view that "Iskander Mirza and Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, for some vested interests ... required the services of Dr. Khan Sahib at that moment, but to the Muslim League ... the Khan brothers were still not acceptable."⁸⁶¹ Obviously, General Mirza had a utilitarian affection for Dr. Khan dating back to his early life when he was the political agent to the then British India at the N.W.F.P. and might have backed Dr. Khan's appointment, but there was nothing on record to prove that the M.L. leaders had, at any time, let it be known that Dr. Khan was unacceptable to them. On the contrary they vied

⁸⁵⁷ See *Times*, February 19, 1956.

⁸⁵⁸ *Times*, August 16, 1956.

⁸⁵⁹ All East and West Pakistan newspapers and informed opinion hailed it. See *Dawn*, 25 August, 1956.

⁸⁶⁰ *New York Times*, August 23, 1956.

⁸⁶¹ See G.W. Chowdhury, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

with each other in paying tributes and pledging support to Dr. Khan. The zeal for the solidarity of the one-unit project witnessed the elections to the West Pakistan legislature on a non-party basis. And the M.L. veterans like Daultana, Sardar Bahadur Khan and Khuhro were working as Ministers in Dr. Khan's Cabinet from October 14, 1956 to April 1, 1956 without any protest. What was more the top leaguers (particularly Daultana) had the Prime Minister made a statement (on March 29) in favor of Dr. Khan's retaining as the Chief Minister for greater interest.⁸⁶² But within a weeks' time, wrote Dr. Sayeed, after the issuance of the statement the M.L. asked Dr. Khan and his ministers to be catalogued as Muslim leaguers or quit the office.⁸⁶³ Dr. Khan immediately returned the tit for tat by having created a new party called Republican which signaled for a regular stampede in the M.L. ranks with large scale defections in favor of the new party or ministerial bandwagon. This provincial development had corresponding reflections at the national level, in that a similar R.P. (Republican Party) was formed in the N.A. with the dissident Muslim leaguers thus reducing the actual number of the former M.L. to 10 only.

It was rather an over simplified opinion to hold that Pakistan inner politics had been overlaid by maneuverings by the aspirants to power. We wish Dr. Sayeed had mentioned that there were certain principles at work beneath the apparent contradictions in the politicians' behavior. The first Cabinet of Dr. Khan was a non-party, caretaker government formed at a time when the exigencies of the situation demanded a national rather than a partisan approach. With the framing of the Constitution and coming into being of the provincial legislature, the political perspective was substantially changed. A shift of emphasis to parties, political programmes and aspirations was natural. This was in keeping with parliamentary politics. On principle, the position of the M.L. was unassailable. Here was a political party concerned with its revitalization and preparation for the general elections. It could not but form a parliamentary party in the province. East Pakistan was almost denuded of Muslim leaguers. At the centre there was a coalition government. It was only in West Pakistan that there existed an oasis for the M.L. Would it then make over charge to a non-leaguer for the care of that oasis?

The whole controversy was born of two equally demanding situations. The parliamentary needs i.e. the desire to form a M.L. legislature party at the head of a leaguer, were pitted against the equally important but non-parliamentary ones i.e. the retention of an hitherto apolitical Dr. Khan as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan in fulfillment of earlier unofficial commitments of the Muslim leaguers and placatory gestures to the frontier people. In the quest for a solution the M.L. broke but remained unbended. But it had a salutary effect in that it produced an opposition in the West Pakistan legislature and helped the winnowing process in politics. Bagehot maintained

⁸⁶² See Prime Minister's Statement, *Dawn*, September 9, 1956.

⁸⁶³ K.B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

long ago that "parliamentary government is, in its essence, a sectarian government, and is possible only when sects are cohesive."⁸⁶⁴ The act of differentiation occurred in the M.L. organization which had gathered so much of non-cohesive elements in its fold. True, both the M.L. and R.P. were designed with the same fabric of feudalism, nevertheless both of them managed to remain apart till the end of parliamentary life in Pakistan even on matters of issues. It will be seen later on that had not this sect of people distilled themselves out from the parent M.L. party and formed R.P. the electorate issue would have been bogged down and the tomb of dead constitutional issues disinterred again.

Now that the number of M.L. members in the N.A. had dwindled to merely ten, the President of the M.L. party, Sardar Nishtar counseled the Prime Minister to resign from the coalition government and lead the M.L. opposition in the N.A.⁸⁶⁵ For, the M.L. thought that by sitting in the opposition it could create a new image, particularly in the context of the coming general elections. But the newly formed R.P. pledged its support to the Prime Minister and the coalition government. Now the Prime Minister was placed in a position of riding two horses going in different directions. For the coalition government was legally composed of the M.L.-U.F not R.P.-U.F. In following the counsel of the M.L. on whose back he had climbed to power the Prime Minister could switch over to the role of the opposition leader, alternatively, he could stay as Prime Minister by relying on the R.P. The Prime Minister received a vote of confidence (August 26) from the coalition parties, though the M.L. members did not attend the meeting as a protest against the presence of the R.P. members who to them were not a part of the coalition government and above all seceders. The M.L. members of the coalition such as Chundrigar, Pir Ali Mohammad Rashid, Amir Azam and Kayani resigned as they failed to persuade the Prime Minister to attend the M.L. parliamentary party meeting.⁸⁶⁶ The Prime Minister was still smarting under an injury caused by the M.L. leader's rescinding from their early promise of support to Dr. Khan. The Prime Minister was a first class administrator by background and knack but lacked the flexibility of mind essential to politician. He held – indeed correctly that "the leadership of the country must be vested in parliament" and not be subjected to the caprice of "elements external to it."⁸⁶⁷

But these 'external elements' were meant to be the M.L. organization whose Prime Minister he was. It did not occur to the Prime Minister that in the Westminster system parliamentary leadership was understood in terms of party politics. He could not govern Pakistan in 1956 in the face of his party's disapproval as he had wanted to act "as I think best in the national interest",⁸⁶⁸ any more than Harold Wilson could have

⁸⁶⁴ Bagehot, *op.cit.*, p. 231.

⁸⁶⁵ See *Manchester Guardian*, September 9, 1956.

⁸⁶⁶ See *Times*, August 27, 1956; *Dawn* August 29 and September 6, 1956.

⁸⁶⁷ *Dawn*, September 8, 1956.

⁸⁶⁸ *Sunday Times*, July 28, 1956.

governed Britain in 1965 as he had wished to by incurring T.U.C.'s wrath. The truth was that both the Prime Minister and M.L. failed to strike a working arrangement as far as the relationship between the parliamentary party and organizational leadership was concerned. What started as a mild difference of opinion in 1947 ended in the dissociation of the M.L. from the governing of Pakistan in 1956. On many occasions during the past eight years compromises had been made to stop the widening gulf between the M.L. and its parliamentary party. The latter's supremacy was always ensured, though.

Aware of the painful memory of the past when in the dismissal and appointment of ministries⁸⁶⁹ the M.L. had been used as a passive ratifying body. The M.L. was determined to reassert its position now and avoid recurrence of extra-parliamentary influences on it. In the present situation, the Prime Minister could not even make a case that his government was on the brink of serving two masters, namely the M.L. and N.A.; for, even the M.L. parliamentary party went in favor of the M.L. organization leaving him to plough his lonely furrow. In the circumstances, the Prime Minister acted honourably, if not correctly. He resigned his Premiership on 8th September, 1956⁸⁷⁰ despite his holding the confidence of the majority, with R.P.'s support in the N.A. The President was evidently upset⁸⁷¹ seeing the last vestige of bureaucracy leaving the Cabinet platform and refused to accept his resignation as he thought the Prime Minister still commanded the confidence of a majority of the N.A.⁸⁷² But Chowdhury Mohammad Ali having happened to derive some political education during the years chose to spurn the offer and hand down a much-needed tradition to Pakistan posterity, that the office of Prime Minister was prestigious and crucial in the parliamentary scheme of government, not to be held by any trick. The very refusal augured an healthy precedent for the first time at the centre, in that the President called upon the opposition leader, Suhrawardy, to form the Cabinet. And the *Times* (London) summed up the whole development in a French phraseology *Reculer pour mieux saunter*⁸⁷³ indicating that it was a step back in order to have a better jump in the future. The continuing process of minority parties' forming governments had an ultimate healthy future; for, this was the inevitable result of parties' passing through the stage of regeneration and differentiation. The *Mecca* of Parliamentary system, Great Britain had the same experiences during the period 1845-1852 when there was the transition from Whigs and Tories to Laborals and Conservatives and 1910-1931 when Labor displaced the Liberals

⁸⁶⁹ For instance Nazimuddin's dismissal and Mohammad Ali's appointment.

⁸⁷⁰ Simultaneously, he did resign from the M.L. organization.

⁸⁷¹ When trouble started brewing the President himself being a constitutional head visited Prime Minister's house on August 27, 1956 at 3.30 p.m. (See *Dawn*, August 28, 1956), and a day before Prime Minister's resignation talks were still going on at the initiative of the President to make the coalition parties agree to recognize Chowdhury Mohammad Ali as an independent leader and thus form the Cabinet in that capacity. Source: *Dawn*, September 8, 1956 and *Pakistan Observer*, quoted in *Dawn*.

⁸⁷² See *Times*, September 10, 1956.

⁸⁷³ *Times*, September 9, 1956.

as the second major party.⁸⁷⁴ Did not both the A.M.L. and R.P. come out of the original M.L.? Did not the R.P. replace the M.L. as the largest single party? Did not the A.M.L. now occupy the largest second position in the N.A.? What apparently appeared to be sheer factionalism was also a process towards final cohesion.

⁸⁷⁴ See D.A. Rustow, *The Politics of Compromise. A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden* (Princeton: 1955), p. 208.

THE MAKING OF THE PRIME MINISTER – H.S. SUHRAWARDY

A coalition of the A.M.L. R.P.⁸⁷⁵ (including minorities) Ministry was sworn-in on the 12th September, 1956 at the head of Suhrawardy, who was rather on call for it since early 1955. Mr. Tamizuddin Khan (the ex-President of the Constituent Assembly I), now the President of the East Pakistan M.L., epitomized the country's general feelings vis-à-vis Suhrawardy's rise to Premiership in his comment that in Suhrawardy "the county has got a Prime Minister who has a political past and an undeniable political stature."⁸⁷⁶ He is a *front door entrant* to the portals of his high office, is not propped up puppet and has had to fight every inch of his long and arduous way to power.⁸⁷⁷ In the process of fighting democracy's battle the Suhrawardy Cabinet scored a substantial victory at the operational level of the parliamentary system of government. Suhrawardy with his resplendent record of political struggles, courage and resilience was raised to power through the "sheer force of democratic pressure"⁸⁷⁸ not by the dark hand of patronage. What an extraordinary come-back! He was in the political wilderness. He had been eking out a life of a political refugee. He could not even visit his own native Bengal where he was detained and duly served a notice prohibiting his movements. Since then his story had been one of a *day-in-day-out* struggle to establish himself as a leader of Pakistan. He built up an effective and viable opposition political party by village to village tours of the country with the dogged perseverance of, in the words of Suhrawardy, his *star organizer* – *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*. In short, he rose for a start from the plane of jerry-built to substantial form of opposition which ultimately and democratically cast him as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Remarkably, for the first time the opposition party almost simultaneously came to power both in East Pakistan and at the centre. Suhrawardy's coming to power was the driving of the last nail into the coffin of the M.L. Now the erstwhile opposition was to don the government's attire and the M.L. the opposition's.

The coalition Cabinet had one limiting qualification in that its main component, R.P. born of political exigency lacked the basis of broad electoral support. The Republicans were entirely drawn from the class of big landlords and had a generally conservative outlook. They were not supposed to support any drastic changes in agrarian reforms. They were mainly social *Darwinians* with leanings towards free enterprise on economic front. Whereas, the A.M.L. was committed to the abolition of Zamindari and the nationalization of key industries. At best the coalition was conservative, at worst it

⁸⁷⁵ The existing party position of the coalition Ministry was the following: R.P. 30; A.M.L.: 13 and minorities (Congress: 4; S.C.F. :3) 7, in the N.A. of 80.

⁸⁷⁶ "Suhrawardy Best of the lot". See Sir Percival Griffiths, "Pakistan Today", *International Affairs*, (July: 1959), p. 317.

⁸⁷⁷ Quoted in *Dawn*, September 13, 1956.

⁸⁷⁸ *Dawn* September 13, 1956 (Editorial).

could be potentially hazardous. The working definition of the present government should be that it was the coalition of centre-left (A.M.L.) and centre-right (R.P.) relying on mutual accommodation to stay in power. The Cabinet⁸⁷⁹ had one distinction—also the first of its kind—in that it was not peopled by any metamorphosed officials and came under the rubric of the *Times* (London) as "politicians are on the ascendancy"⁸⁸⁰ in Pakistan.

Suhrawardy took off from an invigorating atmosphere saying: "I have not diverted from the path which I set out for giving democracy a chance to function in Pakistan."⁸⁸¹ Scarcely had he been sworn into the office than he said—*unlike his predecessors* one of the important tasks of his government would be to *reestablish confidence between the government and administration, on the one hand, and the people on the other.*⁸⁸² With all these mottoes in front Suhrawardy ushered in an era of a new psychological climate both inside the country and outside. He flew to East Pakistan—unlike his predecessors—when his Cabinet was only 12 hours old to help dispel the mood of isolation and dejection that had been hovering around the mind of East Pakistanis since independence that they were scarcely visited by the Prime Minister or Ministers. Equally unusually, in reflecting on the Kashmir problem he wondered: "what a wonderful thing it would be if both India and ourselves could in friendly cooperation march with each other"⁸⁸³—a sort of sound comment, however, diplomatic, which was rarely heard from the earlier politicians. What was more, he asked the Indian government for a food loan to alleviate the acute shortage in East Pakistan—an attitude of mind which would have been invariably discarded by his predecessors on grounds of false vanity of whose response was surprisingly followed within 24 hours by Nehru's sending 2,000 tons of cereals with a promise of a further supply.⁸⁸⁴ These, however, were the initial gestures of moderation in the course of his settling down in the office. But his leadership, sense of earthiness, drive and dynamism came in the limelight as soon as he grappled with the country's issues.

In order to expedite the process of general elections, Suhrawardy picked up the unresolved electorate issue left by his predecessors. The former M.L.-U.F. ministry had enlisted support of the minority parties on a distinct understanding that along with other deals, namely parity, support for the one-unit, etc., the principle of joint electorate had to be incorporated into the Constitution.⁸⁸⁵ The M.L. being a communal party had slurred over the issue thinking that at an opportune moment it would be able to have the separate electorate passed by the N.A. as it was still the largest single party in the

⁸⁷⁹ The Convention of parity in regards to the numbers of Ministers in the Cabinet was observed, viz. East Pakistan 5 (Cabinet Minister); West Pakistan 5 (Cabinet Minister) plus two Ministers of State each from one wing.

⁸⁸⁰ *Times*, September 11, 1956.

⁸⁸¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, September 11, 1956.

⁸⁸² *Hindu*, September 13, 1956.

⁸⁸³ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 2, 1956.

⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁵ See *Dawn*, October 11, 1956. (General Mirza told the writer that he was also aware of this fact).

House. The U.F., on the contrary, had contented itself with the status quo; for, it had not the courage to go in either direction of the electorate issue for fear of being hurt by the front lash of one of its components, N.I.P. and backlash of the minority parties. Now that the M.L. was reduced to a non-malignant position in the N.A. and the A.M.L.-R.P. Ministry formed the secular forces were, perforce, to hold sway. It has been pointed out that "a good electoral system is not by itself a sufficient condition for the insurance of genuine representative government, it is nonetheless a necessary condition. We may not get what we need with even a good electoral system: we shall certainly not get it with a bad one."⁸⁸⁶ As far as Pakistan was concerned the very existing principle of electorate i.e. separate electorate appeared crude and insensitive to democratic forces. This was an unfortunate but unavoidable legacy of the past.

In the history of the constitutional development of the subcontinent the demand for separate electorates had been a device required by a minority to seek the protection of its rights and interests against the majority. Speaking on the electorates question at the first Round Table conference held in London in 1931, the present U.F. leader, Haq, had said: ... "Responsible government for India means that our Hindu friends will have 17 shillings in the pound "... all we want is that in the three shillings that remain, we and the other communities will be allowed to have our proper share."⁸⁸⁷ And in the course of securing that share the whole electoral system had degenerated into what we tend to characterize as a polymorphic franchise systems, in that not only were the Hindus and Muslims represented in the various legislatures of the then undivided India through separate electoral devise but also various business communities, landlords, educationists, etc., etc., as well.

Now that Pakistan came into being and a democratic constitution was drawn up how could the communal system of separate electorate be compatible with secular expectations and conducive to the growth of Pakistan nationhood? If joint electorate were to be rejected and Hindus, Christians, Parsis and Buddhists were made to be elected to the legislatures on a fragmented electoral plane would not Pakistan show greater kinship to the South African policy of racial segregation as electoral *apartheid* would prevent both the Hindus and Muslims from entering same polling booth? what was more, history did not repeat itself as far as the electorate issue was concerned, since, contrary to the earlier precedent of undivided India, it was the minority who yearned for the joint electorates in Pakistan. Now Pakistan was to resolve upon how she was going to build her electoral institution the most decisive one in nation-building.

On August 4, 1956 the West Pakistan Assembly had voted (122:10) on a resolution recommending to the N.A. the principle of separate electorates for the coming general

⁸⁸⁶ J.F.S. Ross, *Elections and Electors* (London: 1955), p. 47.

⁸⁸⁷ Speech quoted in *The Pakistan Observer*, April 27, 1962 "Sher-e-Bangla Supplement", p. v.

elections. Only the Awami Mahaz Party⁸⁸⁸ (A.M.P.) and the Hindu members⁸⁸⁹ were against the resolution. The Republican Chief Minister, Dr. Khan had acquiesced to it on sufferance; for, he was yet to wrench the members of the breakaway Muslim leaguers who had just formed R.P. into non-communal direction. That was why he did not say a word about the merit of the separate electorates while speaking on the motion which was subsequently termed as "interestingly enough"⁸⁹⁰ by the influential Dawn. It would appear that the passing of the resolution was treated by Dr. Khan as an ad hoc measure in a given situation pending a final verdict. For, as a former Congressman he had been a lifelong supporter of the joint electorates. Besides, he was aware that the R.P. had the potentiality of being developed into a non-communal organization. It was a question of time. As soon as the liberal forces symbolizing in the A.M.L.'s forming coalition government with the R.P. at the centre were on the rise Dr. Khan was emboldened and issued a statement in favor of the joint electorates when the Suhrawardy Cabinet was just two days old.⁸⁹¹ And finally in a Republican party moot held on 28th September, 1956 Dr. Khan, the Chief of the R.P., succeeded in declaring his party to be a non-communal organization open to all communities for membership regardless of caste or creed."⁸⁹²

As far as East Pakistan was concerned the A.L. coalition government had no difficulty in passing (October 1, 1956) by 159 votes to 1 the resolution recommending to the N.A. the joint electorates system. During the division 84 opposition members remained in the House which meant they were not essentially opposed to the resolution. The House then resounded with the voice of *Jukta Nirbachan Zindabad* long live (joint electorates), Hindu-Muslim Ek ho (Hindu-Muslim unity).⁸⁹³

Now that provincial verdicts were available Suhrawardy made a thrust on the electoral issue by introducing an electorate Bill in the Daa session of the N.A. held in October, 1956. The electorate issue opened the Pandora's box of ideological controversies once again. The M.L. and the N-I-P regarded the system of separate electorates as an article of faith and thought it was inseparable with the concept of Pakistan. The arguments that were trotted out both for and against the respective electoral system, namely joint and separate electorates unconsciously formed an illuminating literature for the inquiring students of politics. The respective contenders were in the quest of rational logic to give Pakistan a moral personality in order to sustain national boundaries. The

⁸⁸⁸ This party of G.M. Syed - he was mentioned earlier in connection with the Sindh politics - was progressive minded.

⁸⁸⁹ The Christian members were in favor of the separate electorates. And their spokesman, C.E. Gibon fought tooth and nail in the N.A. against the introduction of the joint electorates. See his speech, *N.A.D.* Vol. II, April 22, 1957, pp. 847-911.

⁸⁹⁰ *Dawn*, August 5, 1956.

⁸⁹¹ *Hindu*, October 17, 1956.

⁸⁹² *Dawn*. September 29, 1956.

⁸⁹³ Large number of persons from the visitors' galleries booed the opposition and threw paper balls on them,. See *Dawn*, October 2, 1956.

votaries of separate electorates did not think that Pakistan was "the wages of a particular folly of a particular generation of a particular community; that ... had a particular portion of the people (Hindus) of India shown generosity ... then the ... Mussalmans would have (not) demanded a separate homeland for themselves."⁸⁹⁴ That the Muslim nationhood was already there lying dormant in the subcontinent and the coming into being of Pakistan amounted to what in Miltonic diction would mean: "a puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep" (*Areopagitica*). The two-nation theory i.e. that the Hindus and Muslims were separate nations, basing on which India was divided was linked up with the system of separate electorates. The fact that the Muslims had to be represented separately in the legislatures of British India through separate electorates was also a recognition that Muslims were a separate nation. So, "Pakistan and separate electorate are two fruits of the tree that is the separate nationhood of Islam".⁸⁹⁵ The institution, separate electorates, had fostered the growth of 'the community of feelings amongst the Muslims of India of whose utility was still thought to be indispensable no matter Pakistan had been an accomplished fact now. "Consider the two parts of Pakistan, one here, the other a thousand miles away, and with so much territory ... hostile, in between. And yet our hearts beat as one, for a common spirit gives them cohesion. Take away that spirit, that community of emotion, feeling and faith, and we must fall apart."⁸⁹⁶ So, to them politically the existence of Pakistan hinged on the acceptance of separate electorates.

However, these self-indulgent fountain of arguments eventually rolled down into the ocean of transcendental values—notorious tendency showed by the Muslim leaguers whenever they were called upon to define Pakistan. For example, it was held that "the method of representation is not a transient interest. It is the question of continuing or discontinuing a collective ego ... the Muslim nation has an enduring connotation. Leaving aside eschatological issue, there is no ideal below the blue sky which can be placed higher than the survival of the Muslim nation. This ideal is an end in itself. The state can be sacrificed for this end. *Even curtailment of the homeland can be tolerated ... to save the person of the nation.*"⁸⁹⁷ It would appear from the above arguments that there lay a messianic character in the nationhood of Pakistan, in that the concept of Muslim Millat tend to be universalistic unconfined within the Pakistan territory. The Mullahs (religious group) echoed the same feelings that Islam would be in jeopardy if separate electorates were not retained.⁸⁹⁸ Thirty five leaders of different political and religious parties⁸⁹⁹ met at Sardar Nishtar's residence in Karachi and formed a 7-man Emergency Committee to fight for the cause of separate electorates. The members of the Committee

⁸⁹⁴ N.A.D., Vol. II, April 23, 1956, p. 947.

⁸⁹⁵ N.A.D., Vol. II, October 11, 1956, p. 293.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, October 10, 1956, p. 186.

⁸⁹⁷ N.A.D., Vol. II, October 11, 1956, p. 301.

⁸⁹⁸ See Maudoodi's speech, *Dawn*, September 15, 1956; also Pir of Sarsina's Speech, *Dawn* September 28, 1956.

⁸⁹⁹ M.L., Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamit-i-Ulem-i-Islam, Jamiat-i-Islami, Islam league, National Reconstruction Movement, etc., etc.

flew to Dacca (capital of East Pakistan) by the P.I.A. special flight,⁹⁰⁰ to campaign for the electorate issue.⁹⁰¹ It was a virulent agitation against the Prime Minister's stand on the joint electorates. The campaign included street corner meetings, addressing *Jumma* congregation (Friday prayer in the mosque), strikes, selling and distributing of books on separate electorates, collecting signatures on scrolls, public meetings and procession with placards and slogans demanding separate electorates.⁹⁰² It was the last spasm of obscurantism and religious fanaticism suffered by the body-politic of Pakistan. That the principle of joint electorates would be tantamount to the negation of all values that were understood by the terms Pakistan and Islam.⁹⁰³ And the Hindus and other minorities who could not be integrated into Muslim fraternity ought to be prevented from joining the main stream of politics through the device of separate electorates.

However, in the course of our research we felt jolted by a touch of an historic irony as far as Hindu-Muslim confluence or apartness were concerned. Around the year 1679, the then Mughal Emperor Aurenzeeb in his zeal for Islamization reimposed *Jizya*⁹⁰⁴ tax on the Hindus, contrary to the policy of his great grandfather, Emperor Akber. Appalled by the discriminatory measure, the then Maharastrian nationalist, *Shivaji* wrote to draw the emperor's attention to the following lines: "Your Majesty" if you believe in the true Heavenly book and word of God (i.e. the Quran) you will find there *Rabb-ul-alamin* (God of all men), and not *Rab-ul-Musalman* (God of Muslims only).⁹⁰⁵ And the irony had it, the same sentiment of fear was expressed when the leader of the opposition S.C. Chittapadhyaya cautioned the M.L. government on the floor of the parliament in the following lines: "Give up your two-nation theory. According to the *Quran* there cannot be two nations. There is in the *Quran* this beautiful term, *Rabb-ul-Alamin* i.e. lord of the worlds."⁹⁰⁶ Then, would it mean that there had been no durable change in the dichotomy of Hindu-Muslim thinking during this gap of 272 years? Indeed, as far as Pakistan was concerned the thawing process of the Hindu-Muslim relationship had started with the U.F. movement of early 1954, and the present stand of the Prime Minister on electoral issue—an inevitable result of the U.F. victory of 1954 was an illustration.

What was more, the President of the East Pakistan A.L. Bhasani, himself a *Maulana* (religious scholar) of great repute now addressed himself to his fellow Muslims of

⁹⁰⁰ See *Dawn* September 30, 1956 and October 4, 1956.

⁹⁰¹ Interestingly enough, it was the solo performance of the West Pakistan leaders. East Pakistan leaders and for that matter the people responded to this fanatic movement very negligibly.

⁹⁰² See *Manchester Guardian*, October 8, 1956; *Times*, October 8, 1956; *Dawn*, September 29, 1956; October 5, 1956 and October 7, 1956.

⁹⁰³ See Farid Ahmed's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, October 11, 1956, p. 273.

⁹⁰⁴ The Hindus were charged with this tax- not Muslims - as they were protected by the army of Islam in the Mughal India under Aurenzeeb.

⁹⁰⁵ 146 Letter quoted in Jadunath Sarkar, "Shivaji's letters: From the Persian", (Calcutta: 1905), pp. 21-22. *op.cit.*, Hafeez Malik, p. 295.

⁹⁰⁶ See Chattapadhyaya's speech, *C.A.D.*, Vol. 1, March 24 1951, p. 255.

Pakistan saying: "Do we really believe that Allah is *Rabb-ul-alamin* and not *Rabb-ul-Muslemin* and our great prophet is *Rahmatul-lil-Alamin*⁹⁰⁷ not *Rahmatul-lil-Muslemin*?⁹⁰⁸ ... Are we going to have a caste system and base our great religion Islam on hatred ...?"⁹⁰⁹ The mill of human history of understanding and education grind slowly.

However, coming back to the electoral issue we find that the protagonists of the separate electorates were also influenced by other considerations, real or imaginary. They held that if joint electorates were put into motion in general elections Hindus would gain control over the political life of East Pakistan and through it become a decisive factor in the N.A. and national politics of Pakistan. The position of Hindus in different constituencies analyzed in relation to the number of members in the East Pakistan legislature.⁹¹⁰ It was submitted that the non-Muslims had more than 50 percent votes in 14 constituencies, between 36.3 percent to 49.19 percent in 35 constituencies and 20 percent to 35.45 percent votes in 89 constituencies. And in four women constituencies non-Muslim votes ranged from 34 percent to 39.7 percent.⁹¹¹ Having reeled off the statistics they claimed that the Hindus under the joint electorates would capture as many as 142 seats whereas under the separate electorates they would be entitled to only 70 seats. This hypothesis was based apparently on the following beliefs: (a) that the '*pardah* system' would stand in the way of Muslim women's voting in the elections in great numbers; (b) that the Muslims were politically apathetic; (c) that the Muslims were prone to division during elections.

It seems to us that the argument advanced by the advocates of separate electorates had more relevancy to the condition of pre-partition India than post. According to the census report of 1941 the population of Muslims and non-Muslims comprising the areas which had been solely demanded for their inclusion in Pakistan was the following: Muslims 55.23 percent and non-Muslims 44.77 percent.⁹¹² This ratio of population was considerably changed in the Pakistan that came into existence and was further altered due to riots, and large scale migration. By 1949, 40,000,000 Muslims remained in India, forming about 11 percent of her population and 13,000,000 non-Muslims had remained in Pakistan, forming about 17 percent of her population.⁹¹³ Hence, the so-called percentages of Hindu voters in 142 constituencies quoted by the pro-separate electorates group were far from the actual ratio of Hindu populace. And as far as the probability of the Hindus securing more seats under joint electorates was concerned the existing facts would not support it. For instance, in a referendum held under joint electorates in 1947 to decide whether or not Sylhet district would form part of Pakistan

⁹⁰⁷ Merciful of all mankind.

⁹⁰⁸ Merciful of all Muslims.

⁹⁰⁹ See Bhasani's speech on electorate issue quoted in Dawn, September 29, 1956.

⁹¹⁰ 310 (300 general and 10 women).

⁹¹¹ See Dawn, February 7, 8, 10 and 11, 1958 "The Electorate issue" - I, II, III and IV.

⁹¹² Source: Dawn, April 4, 1956.

⁹¹³ K. Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, (Princeton university Press: 1951), p. 198.

or not Muslims voted solidly in favor of Pakistan despite the fact that the Hindus were placed at the higher echelon of the society.

The Prime Minister shattered his opponents' arguments by pointing the actual working of joint electorates and their current results at the local self-government level. In a district like Khulna where Muslims and Hindus were almost evenly distributed, the former had 8 seats in the East Pakistan legislature and the latter 7 under separate electoral arrangements. But the same district offered a different picture under joint electorates in that 28 Muslims and 2 Hindus were returned to form the District Boards of 30 members. In the same fashion, 32 Muslims and 4 Hindus were elected to the Faridpur District Board, and 21 Muslims and Hindus nil to the Dinajpur District Board.⁹¹⁴ This proved that Muslim voting behaviour in joint electorates was different to what had been apprehended by the advocates of separate electorates. It showed that Muslim voters did not act as passive agents to the "Hindu will" under joint electorates. However, part of his arguments were based on the belief that the Hindus, with seats of their own, might become too pivotal in a divided parliament. Undoubtedly, a good part of his arguments was based on the perennial convention that Pakistan's Hindus must be recognized as first-class citizens. Demonstratively, the A.L. had already secularized its motto by dropping the word "Muslim" from its nomenclature in order to be agreeable to the minority communities at large.

There was another dimension of this electoral issue, in that the individuality of the two wings of Pakistan came into sharp contrast. The main bulk of opposition to the joint electorates system originated from West Pakistan and precisely from the Punjab. It was observed by Tayazinkin that "the real threat to stability in Pakistan is more difficult of solution. It is Punjabi arrogance."⁹¹⁵ We like to add another word to it i.e. *fanaticism*. Instead of appreciating the progressive, secular and democratic forces manifested in the desire of East Pakistanis living together as Pakistani nationals by obliterating the age-old distinction of Hindu-Muslim at the ballot box, the Punjabi-oriented West Pakistan leadership dubbed the electoral issue as "Bengali nationalism."⁹¹⁶ And the *Moulanas*, particularly Maulana Maudoodi viewed joint electorates as a slide to Islamic perdition and *Hinduism*.⁹¹⁷

This was flashed in the pan by Suhrawardy by asserting that "joint electorate is not a negation of Islamic trends of thought or a negation of a state based on the principles of Islam, which are resilient enough to adapt to themselves to the modern world".⁹¹⁸ This difference of approach of the two wings towards substantive issues of the state was

⁹¹⁴ See Prime Minister's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, October 10, 1956, p. 171.

⁹¹⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, January 9, 1955 (Article) Tayazinkin, "Pakistan Politics".

⁹¹⁶ See *Dawn*, June 2, 1956.

⁹¹⁷ For details see *Dawn*, October 24, 1956.

⁹¹⁸ *Dawn*, December 31, 1955.

always there in varying degree as the eastern part tended to be ahead of its western one in progressive thinking.

Historically speaking, the communalization of the electorate system eventuated in the accentuation of differences and growth of an unhealthy political life. The Ceylonese had joint electorates since 1931 based on the Donoughmore Committee's findings. The Hilton Young commission recommended the same common roll for the integration of Indians, South Africans and Europeans in Kenya. Even the Parliamentary Select Committee dealing with the constitutional reforms of 1935 vis-à-vis India regretted that they could not provide for the joint electorates in the scheme due to minority insistence. The separate electorates could not be blotted out in British India was due to the failures of the leaders to devise a viable arrangement to safeguard minority rights. But the fact remained that all the top minority leaders in British India had, in essence, believed in the system of joint electorates. For example, Jinnah on March 20, 1927 was willing to accept joint electorates, provided his four conditions namely (i) Sindh should be made a separate province; (ii) the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan should be modelled on other provinces; (iii) the Punjab and Bengal should be represented in their respective assemblies on the basis of population and (iv) the Muslim representation should be 33 percent in the Central Assembly, were fulfilled. Even Moulana Mohammad Ali was willing to trust "the justice of joint territorial electorates."⁹¹⁹ What was more Jinnah, while addressing the Constituent Assembly I on August 11, 1947, sufficiently reflected his liberal mind when he observed "If you will work in cooperation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, ... in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs ... is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights ... and obligations ..."⁹²⁰ Hence, the impregnability of the principle of separate electorates vis-à-vis Muslim nationhood could not be proved historically. Tennyson once composed a definition of a conservative: "he is the best conservative, who lops the moldered branch away". The issue of separate electorates represented the 'moldered branch' in Pakistan politics and the worst conservatives e.g. M.L., N-I-P, and *Ulema* objected to its lopping away.

Looking from another angle the electoral issue was linked up with the provisions of the constitution recently drawn up. It is to be recalled that East Pakistan had acceded to the principle of parity by sacrificing the advantage of population strength. If the separate electorates were to be continued the Muslim representatives of East Pakistan in the N.A would be pitted against the Hindus coming from that part of the world, for, the Hindus would have a sizeable fixed quota under the separate electoral arrangement. The parity concept was expressly related to the two wings of Pakistan, not between Hindus and Muslims. Now, under the separate electorates East Pakistan would appear bi-polarized i.e. Hindus and Muslims in every sphere of life, let alone politics. Though minorities did

⁹¹⁹ *Ibid*, Dawn January 12, 1956 (Article), Ghazanfar Ali Khan, "Joint Electorates and the Quaid-i-Azam".

⁹²⁰ "Speeches and documents", *loc.cit.*, p. 21.

not constitute more than 10 percent of the entire population of Pakistan at that point of time, their geographical distribution between wings had political implication, in that West Pakistan had minorities bordering around 2 percent of its populace whereas in East Pakistan the quantum of minorities would be in the vicinity of 18 percent. Beneath the apparent cry of support for the separate electorates on grounds of a two-nation theory the East Pakistanis could suspect that there lay a Punjabi trap to *Balkanize* East Pakistan on the psychological plane as they had been alleged to have tried to *Balkanize* West Pakistan regionally in the early fifties.

Implications apart, on forensic count the East Pakistanis could hold that parity could be logical only when the system of joint electorates was adopted, else they would go for parity representation between the Muslims of West Pakistan and of East Pakistan, on the basis of the two-nation theory or alternatively, representation on the population basis on general democratic principles.⁹²¹ In other words, parity, one-unit and joint electorates were the inseparable issues and pillars on which the edifice of the constitution stood.

On the eve of the N.A. session at Dacca, the campaign of pressure was mounted against the passing of the joint electoral system to such an extent that the Republicans were evidently alarmed by the possible repercussions that it might have on their party in west Pakistan in future if they were to back Suhrawardy's stand fully, The President, General Mirza who had perennial contempt for fanaticism showed his best judgment and insight in regard to the electoral issue. The President dashed to Dacca and struck a compromise formula on the electoral issue—joint electorate for East Pakistan and separate electorates for West Pakistan after having had three hours' conference with the Republicans on whom he was widely rumored to have great influence. This part of Presidential contribution was described by the Dawn in the following way: "... higher intervention has now saved the nation for the time being".⁹²² We think that this incident was the first example in Pakistan political history that a Head of the State tried to help out a Prime Minister who was a popular politician.

In pursuance of the compromise formula Suhrawardy had the Electoral Bill passed by 48:19 votes in the N.A. on October 10, 1956.⁹²³ The passing of the Electoral Bill was not much of an eventful achievement because of the dual electoral methods which were prescribed for the two wings of Pakistan represented duality of their attitudes—much as was the Prime Minister's speech on the Bill itself. No Prime Minister before Suhrawardy had ever ventured to taunt the legend of the two-nation theory in Pakistan. The myth existed in the country by default. With cold blooded logic Suhrawardy asked the two-nation theorists to come down to earth from the ethereal plane. His was the submission for precise territorial nationalism. He told the House that "the two-nation

⁹²¹ See Suhrawardy's Press Conference published in *Dawn*, January 4, 1956.

⁹²² *Dawn*, October 10, 1956.

⁹²³ *Ibid.*, October 11, 1956.

theory lost its force even for the Muslims" the moment the state was created. He continued that "the two-nation theory carried to its logical conclusion would have connoted total exchange of population, the creation of a completely Hindu nation in India and the creation of a completely Muslim nation in Pakistan". This could not have been done any more than all the Jews of the world could have done so by immigrating to the State of Israel. The separate electorates had never been meant to be a device to safeguard the interests of a majority populace. If the theory of two-nation, Suhrawardy maintained, "is still persisted in, it will logically lead to a partition of Pakistan and the creation of a state made up of contiguous areas where non-Muslims are in majority."⁹²⁴ As a matter of fact the Congress leader Mr. B.K. Das voiced the same feeling: "If you want to keep up two-nation theory give us a separate home".⁹²⁵ To Suhrawardy Muslims had been a nationality in undivided India and were now citizens in Pakistan in which every citizen was a member of the Pakistani nation regardless of religious differences. He found nothing unislamic in the joint electorates and held out a stern warning to the Ulema class that "the final word as to what is Islamic or not rests with the National Assembly ... no one can take away from it that right."

The most daring portion of the speech was his bold soul-searching confession that "the Muslim demand for separate electorates is based on deep ... distrust and even hatred of the non-Muslim element". He asked his co-religionists "what have you done for them to get their loyalty? Are you not keeping them in separate compartments insisting that Hindus must continue to be Hindus in the political and religious sense?" While realizing the Hindu-Muslim scars caused by the partition of India which had yet to be healed he insisted that "the process of healing must begin now."⁹²⁶ He argued saying "let the question of electorate be discussed politically and in the context of the welfare of the country, but not in the context of religion."⁹²⁷ Discarding the frigid two-nation theory he also pointed out that in all Islamic countries of the world elections were held under joint electorates—Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco and Tunisia. Even, the president of Pakistan was earlier elected by the members of the parliament belonging to Muslim, Hindu and Christian Communities, respectively. This was, we consider, an audacious testimony of the first magnitude in that it held up Muslim self-delusion to pragmatic scrutiny at a time when religious favor could have been whipped up against his leadership to put an end to his political career.

Courage yielded him good dividends.⁹²⁸ His work was not over with the delivery of the speech. He accepted the challenge of a member of Parliament to fight the issue in the

⁹²⁴ See *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, October 10, 1956, p. 204.

⁹²⁵ See *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, October 10, 1956.

⁹²⁶ For details see Suhrawardy's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, October 10, 1956, pp. 162-172 and *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, October 11, 1956, pp. 322-331.

⁹²⁷ *Dawn*, October 5, 1956.

⁹²⁸ After the speech Suhrawardy received 2000 congratulatory telegrams from various cross sections of the people. What was more, some mild religious organizations such as Majlis-i-Tahafuz-i-Islam, Anjuman Muhibban-i-Islam,

seven by-elections that were pending in East Pakistan.⁹²⁹ This offered an opportunity 1.163 for the trial of strength among all political parties of Pakistan vis-à-vis issues. Suhrawardy made a whirlwind tour of the country campaigning for his party's policies.⁹³⁰ The by-elections were over by mid-December 1956 and the A.L. swept the polls capturing 5 out of 6 Muslim seats⁹³¹ conceding one to N-I-P in Bhola North. The election victory was a vindication of the A.L. policies.

As far as West Pakistan was concerned Suhrawardy did the same thing in explaining his policies to the people. Dr. Khan joined Suhrawardy in the same venture and in the Republican Workers Conference he held the brief for launching a joint electorate campaign as his party had already incorporated the one-nation theory in its Constitution.⁹³² This eventuated in the R.P.'s capturing all 5 seats to the West Pakistan legislature in the by-elections held in the Jhang District in January 1957.⁹³³ As a sequel to the by-election results the R.P. in the N.A. unanimously decided along with its coalition partner, A.L. to bring in a substitution to Section 3 of the Electorate act, 1956 providing elections to the N.A. and provincial Assemblies on the basis of joint electorates. This was also a tense moment what according to the *Times*: "steel-helmeted police guarded barbed-wire barricades outside the National Assembly in Karachi today as the Bill to do away with the separate electorate system in the province of West Pakistan was debated. Outside were gathered more than 1000 demonstrators."⁹³⁴

The Prime Minister struck the opposition dumb by suggesting what impact the two-nation theory would have on the *Qadianis* if separate electorates were retained in West Pakistan. He also attacked the opposition on their own ground by saying that if they were so glib about early general elections why did they remain so adamant on the separate electorates issue as it offered more complexities in the delimitation of constituencies.⁹³⁵ The opposition attack was blunted considerably, in that it registered its protest vote in a lost division (14:36) only once during the three readings of the Bill.⁹³⁶ The historic Bill was enacted on April 24, 1957 culminating in the rejection of the time-worn separate electorates and ushering in an era of secular and democratic trends.

Now, Suhrawardy was to give another crucial test of his leadership on foreign policy. Though foreign policy did not formally feature in the U.F.s 21-point programme, nevertheless in the election campaigns pro-western foreign policy was denounced.

Majlis-i-Islamia and anjuman Muhibban-i-Pakistan also praised the Prime Minister. See *Dawn*, October 12, 1956 and October 20, 1956.

⁹²⁹ See *N.A.D.* Vol. II, October 11, 1956, p. 279.

⁹³⁰ See *Dawn*, October 31; November 26; December 3; December 4 and December 7, 1956.

⁹³¹ *Ibid*, *Dawn*, 16 December 1956 (The 7th seat was concerned with the minority).

⁹³² See *Dawn*, October 30, 1959.

⁹³³ *Ibid.*, January 23, 1957.

⁹³⁴ *Times* April 23, 1957.

⁹³⁵ *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 22, 1957, p. 847.

⁹³⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, April 25, 1957.

What was more, in the opinion of some foreign newspapers one of the causes of the M.L.'s failure in the elections was foreign policy.⁹³⁷ The crescendo of criticism against foreign policy was always on the increase, because the people had no inkling of the government's foreign policy in the shape of pacts nor had the latter had ever told the people about the exact nature of its alliances. It was public ignorance allowed by the successive governments which made fears a mountain of a molehill vis-à-vis military pacts. Apart from Pakistan's signing the mutual defence Assistance Agreement with the U.S. and joining the S.E.A.T.O. in 1954, she also became a member of the *Baghdad* pact⁹³⁸ in 1955. All this was done behind the people's back. The politically vigilant people of Pakistan namely, the East Pakistanis grew more restive about the conduct of foreign policy in a world whose politics were on the throes of great changes in approach in the mid 1955.

This was the so-called 'Geneva Spirit' – the denouement of the Geneva Conference of the big powers held in July 1955. The Dullesian containment strategy and Stalin's stonewalling tactics yielded place to "a welcome relaxation of tension in international affairs."⁹³⁹

Russian withdrawal from Austria, the invitation of Dr. Adenauer to Moscow, leniency to Turkey and the Krushchev – Bulganin tour of the U.K. preceded by *desalinization* speeches anticipated an age of detente. Krushchev wanted to live in peaceful coexistence and redefined Marxism-Leninism saying that socialism could be established all over the world without war, though admitting at the same time that the "economic basis for war will continue as long as capitalism exists, war is no longer inevitable."⁹⁴⁰ But Krushchev viewed peaceful coexistence as an appropriate weapon to fight "against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations."⁹⁴¹ In other words, this was a new Soviet anti-western offensive in the non-aligned world of Afro-Asia in the garb of peaceful coexistence. Soviet Russia doled out economic and military aid unconditionally to the emerging countries and put her weight and prestige behind them whose political movements were in the realm of anti-colonialism. The Krushchev-Bulganin tour of the non-aligned world in late 1955 was demonstrative of Russian policy. Along with these new trends in international politics was the technological revolution which witnessed production of more lethal nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and long-range air power, missiles, rockets, etc., etc. This new situation challenged the existing importance of local bases in the case of a nuclear flare-up.

⁹³⁷ See Journal de Geneve & Le Monde quoted in *Dawn*, March 31, 1954.

⁹³⁸ Consisting of U.K., Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The U.S. was not member but closely associated with it.

⁹³⁹ J.M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press: London: 1963), p. 112.

⁹⁴⁰ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Frederick A. Praeger: New York: 1962), p. 98.

⁹⁴¹ Richard V. Allen, "Peace or Peaceful Coexistence?", in E.L. Dulles & Robert D. Crane (ed.), *Detente, Cold War Strategies in Transition* (Frederick A. Praeger: New York: 1965), p. 44.

How then did all these new phenomena of world politics affect Pakistanis? Firstly, they saw that aid could be had without entering into pacts—non-aligned countries were the examples. Secondly, any sort of possible foreign bases in Pakistan under the pact system would be vulnerable to rocket attacks. The third consideration was rather of overriding importance, in that Pakistan still could not have the Kashmir problem solved in her favor, one of the cardinal reasons for which she had entered into western alliances. People found government facing difficulties in holding bilateral talks with India vis-à-vis Kashmir since Pandit Nehru saw a qualitative change in the *status quo* of the Kashmir problem as soon as Pakistan became a party to military alliances sponsored by the U.S. The Kashmir issue could not be solved peacefully—held Nehru as Pakistan military alliances brought about a "climate of War"⁹⁴² in the subcontinent. So to the critics, Pakistan's association with the western world was apparently a hindrance rather than a help to the Kashmir cause.

Now we are to examine American position—Pakistan's chief ally. George F. Kennan, one of the architects of American post-war foreign policy had always doubts in regard to the adequacy of military association and particularly on the ground "whether the participation of smaller states can really add very much to the ability of the great powers to assure stability of international life."⁹⁴³ For the U.S., the late 1950s marked the beginning of a realization of a doubt pertaining to the sheer adequacy of military alliances; for, "world affairs had ... largely left the quasi-military phase behind".⁹⁴⁴

The germs of an American foreign policy shift were already there when Suhrawardy came to power in Pakistan. The same Eisenhower regime which was responsible for initiating all kinds of military pacts earlier in 1954 became more mellowed in its attitude toward the non-aligned world at the very end of its tenure. Neutralism which was dismissed by Dulles once as "immoral" now attained a modicum of respectability. This new American definition of neutralism was best illustrated by a study prepared for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959: "Neutrality in Asia is closely related to nationalism ... United States policy must recognize that most Asian States do not consider the struggle between the Soviets and the West nearly as important as their national problems of consolidating a stable government and achieving economic progress and social change."⁹⁴⁵ Based on this new realization, the U.S. vied with the U.S.S.R. in giving generous aid to the neutrals—a wooing process. But with this new sense of urgency in giving economic aid to the developing countries so as to deter the spread of communism, the U.S. did not explain the compatibility of pursuing a contradictory dual policy. On the one hand, she was associated with the non-aligned world in terms of unconditional aid-giving—a symbol of detente—on the other, simultaneously she was equally associated with her militarily aligned colleague-nations

⁹⁴² Quoted in Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1955), p. 302.

⁹⁴³ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (University of Chicago Press: 1951), p. 86.

⁹⁴⁴ Charles O. Lerche Jr., *Foreign Policy of the American People* (Prentice Hall Inc.: 1964), p. 313.

⁹⁴⁵ Coulon Association Ltd., U.S. Foreign Policy Asia (U.S. Government Printing Office: November 1959), p. 15.

in terms of conditional aid-giving—a symbol of belligerency. This was both anomalous and dangerous for a pact-signing country like Pakistan which was neighbor of two giant communist countries e.g. Russia and Red China and also between two neutrals, India and Afghanistan. In brevity, this was the trend of international politics obtaining at that point of time in the light of which Pakistan foreign policy had to be dealt with by Suhrawardy.

Suhrawardy began by saying that Pakistan foreign policy meant 'friendship towards all and malice towards none'. He assured the country that "the government is fully alive to the changing international kaleidoscope and will do everything in its power to preserve the interests of Pakistan."⁹⁴⁶ That he would have to take his leftist elements in the party into account in public statements. They would certainly expect Suhrawardy to demonstrate some palpable gestures in the direction of the "no" enemies policy. In fulfillment of new foreign policy compulsion he boldly embarked upon a State visit to Red China on October 16 1956. Prior to this, the name Red China was a taboo in official pronouncement in Pakistan. The Chinese sojourn of the Prime Minister augured a refreshing change. Elucidating his foreign policy in China he clearly indicated that Pakistan would not be "apronstring" of any power.⁹⁴⁷ The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En Lai came to visit Pakistan in December, 1956 as a *quid pro quo*. While India's air had been ringing with the chantings of "*Hindi*" *Russo bhai bhai*" (Hindustan and Russia are brothers) "*Hindi*" *China bhai bhai*" (Hindustan and China are brothers) following the earlier visits of Krushchev, Bulganin and Chou En Lai in that country, the Pakistanis felt an acute sense of remoteness from the socialist world and jealous about India's new relationship with both socialist and non-socialist countries. This time the Pakistanis made up the deficiency by rending the sky even more vociferously with the cries of *Pakistan Chini bhai bhai* (Pakistan and China are brothers). All the big cities of Pakistan wore a festive look to accord reception to Chou En Lai. Even the fanatical people of the tribal areas of West Pakistan did not hesitate to treat the Red leader with their traditional gifts of lambs. Obviously, East Pakistan was more enthusiastic as Bhasani was the President of the East Pakistan A.L. — the party in power of that province. More than 100,000 people congregated to listen to Chou in a meeting held at Paltan Maidan.⁹⁴⁸ Suhrawardy allowed people to participate in this new situation which had bearings on foreign relations in order to acclimatize the people to the new trends of Pakistan foreign policy in the perspective of changing world. Chou's visit was followed by his sending a Chinese Trade Delegation to Pakistan to pave the way for commercial transactions between the two countries. Regarding the U.S.S.R. Suhrawardy sent a Pakistan Parliamentary delegation there and ultimately a trade agreement was signed between the two countries, the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan. As far as the Eastern Democracies were concerned the Pakistan Ambassadors in Moscow and Switzerland were accredited as Ministers to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Poland. Burma was visited by

⁹⁴⁶ N.A.D., Vol. I, February 22, 1957, p. 912.

⁹⁴⁷ *Dawn*, October 27, 1956.

⁹⁴⁸ *New York Times*, December 30, 1956.

the Prime Minister himself. Similar arrangements were made in regard to Indonesia, Ceylon and Afghanistan. In establishing various relations, cultural and commercial, with the neutral and communist countries the Prime Minister gave a new orientation to the country's foreign policy, in that it reflected the realism of international politics vis-à-vis Pakistan's.

Candidly, the Prime Minister interpreted the new approach of Pakistan foreign policy in the following speech: "It is true that in the adjustment of our way of life, we have more in common with those countries that are known as free democracies and which believe that it is possible for the nations of the world to live in accordance with their own lives ... that all of us are actuated by the motive of advancing the welfare ... of our peoples, and yet with all this diversity, we should be able to live side by side in peace and harmony and cooperate with each other in the interest of our peoples and for the welfare of the world."⁹⁴⁹ Evidently, this new line or style of foreign policy short of Pakistan's coming out of the military pacts completely was not liked by the leftist elements of the country, least of all by the left wing elements of the A.L. It is to be mentioned here that in the formative phase of the A.L. many an 'unmarked' element managed to smuggle into the party. Bhasani, the East Pakistan head of the A.L. was always a willing accomplice to this leftist group. Now that their party was in power both at the centre and East Pakistan they wanted Suhrawardy to declare an independent neutral foreign policy unattached to any bloc, east or west, whatever.

Evidently, the official stand of the A.L. had all along been a resolute opposition to all regional pacts of the military characters and a demand for a new independent and neutral foreign policy.⁹⁵⁰

The inner pressure that had been brought to bear upon the Prime Minister by the A.L. left-wingers to change the foreign policy suddenly surfaced with all its fury as soon as Britain (a member of the Baghdad pact), France and Israel attacked Egypt on account of nationalization of Suez Canal in October 1956. It gave an impetus to the agitation as the victim of the Anglo-France attack was a Muslim and, at once, a neutral country. A new dimension was added to the already overwrought atmosphere of anti-imperialism i.e. religious fervor. The whole populace of Pakistan, as it were, came out into the open streets and performed all rituals meticulously which were associated with any kind of hostile demonstration. Bhasani let loose his tongue-batteries in lashing out the "barbarous" and "treacherous" acts of aggression on the peace-loving Egyptian peoples by the imperialists.⁹⁵¹

The Pakistan government was embarrassed at Britain's involvement in the Suez adventure in that she had expected the British government to send an advance note to

⁹⁴⁹ *Dawn*, February 23, 1957.

⁹⁵⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 3, 1956; *Dawn*, December 2, 1956.

⁹⁵¹ *Dawn*, November 7, 1956.

her indicating the British position. According to the President Mirza this came telegraphically at the eleventh hour facing the Pakistan government with a *fait accompli*. Having asked the Shah of Iran to arrange a meeting of the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact at Teheran—the Prime Minister was away in China—President Mirza himself boarded his Viscount aircraft en route to Teheran.⁹⁵²

Returning home amid an anti-western climate the Prime Minister felt the country's pulse and condemned the Anglo-France action with cautious words but chose only Israel to be branded as an aggressor. (Since the days of the electoral controversy this was the second time that the President could see eye to eye with his Prime Minister on these two issues due to strange coincidences.) Immediately, the Prime Minister flew into Teheran to confer with his Muslim colleagues of the Baghdad pact which resulted in the issuance of a unanimous statement on November 8, 1956 condemning Israel as aggressor and asking Britain and France "to end hostilities immediately, to withdraw their forces from Egypt."⁹⁵³ Pakistan's role in the two London conferences on the Suez Canal crisis was notable, in that she helped to obtain recognition of Egypt's sovereign rights to nationalize the canal but at the same time she insisted on the freedom of navigation in Canal in keeping with the 1888 Convention which Egypt had to admit herself. Suhrawardy claimed on behalf of the Muslim Baghdad powers to have been a party to the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Egyptian territory and Anglo-French willingness to submit the issue to the U.N.⁹⁵⁴ It was both a very delicate and difficult situation for a Premier of a Muslim country to avoid being emotionally involved and to see things in proper perspective. But Suhrawardy's pragmatism stood him in good stead.⁹⁵⁵ As soon as Suhrawardy was saddled with the premiership of Pakistan there was a tide of popular sentiment in favor of Egypt. It was so pronounced that it might have precipitated termination of all west sponsored ties manifesting in military pacts, even commonwealth. Steeped in non-aligned philosophy, Col. Nasser of Egypt unleashed some snubs at Pakistan sympathizers. Since then, under Suhrawardy's adroit leadership popular feeling earlier roused for Egypt were, in an ample measure, found new expression in a desire for solidarity with other more friendly Muslim countries belonging to the Baghdad pact. However, Pakistan's recognition of Nasser's nationalization of Suez canal was modified by insistence on the necessity of free navigation. Suhrawardy opposed with unequivocal terms the demand for British expulsion from the Baghdad pact. Even if the calamity was dissipated, deep popular "distress" persisted that made Suhrawardy's position a difficult one, as the ML. Opposition strode ahead preaching a "pan-Islamic Alliance."⁹⁵⁶

⁹⁵² This information is based on an interview with the ex-President General Mirza by the writer. Also see Appendix VIII for Mirza's version.

⁹⁵³ M.A. Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Regional Pacts*, (East Publications: Karachi 1958), p. 106.

⁹⁵⁴ See Prime Minister's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. 1, February 22, 1957, p. 916.

⁹⁵⁵ In the Conservative Party Conference at Brighton, Suhrawardy's statesmanship was quoted in the foreign policy debates. *Dawn's* correspondent in London, Nasim Ahmed, reported. See *Dawn*. October 12, 1957.

⁹⁵⁶ See the *Times*, December, 17, 1956 also *Scotsman*, September 10, 1956.

With the Anglo-French troops withdrawn from Egypt and a Pakistan offer of troops to be stationed at the Middle East under the U.N. supervision indignantly rejected by Col. Nasser, the earlier opposition to the foreign policy begun to peter out. Suhrawardy who had all along been, rather tendentiously, advocating a strong decision making U.N. saw in the recent emergence of the U.N.E.F. (United Nations Emergency Force) in connection with the Middle East crisis, a ray of hope for the solution of the Kashmir problem. As soon as the Indian government proposed to annex the disputed Kashmir valley into Indian territory, Suhrawardy immediately availed himself of the opportunity of pressing the matter into the Security Council of the U.N., so that some such U.N.E.F. should be sent to Kashmir pending the final plebiscite therein. A Resolution to that effect was voted upon on the 24th January, 1957 in the Security Council. Needless to say, the Resolution foundered on the rock of a Soviet veto. The Second Resolution made the best of a bad bargain in maintaining the *status quo* (voting highlights 10-0. The U.S.S.R. abstained.) in Kashmir.⁹⁵⁷

It was, however, the voting of the member-nations in the Security Council which mattered, for the time being, much more for Pakistan foreign policy than the actual results. In justification of his foreign policy Suhrawardy could now say that all the member-nations in the Security Council but Russia voted for Pakistan. It was just due to the generous use of the Russian veto which understandably went in favors of India. But it could be well maintained that it was due to Suhrawardy's able handling of the foreign policy⁹⁵⁸ that the Kashmir issue was revived under the torch of world opinion which had been fossilized in the U.N. for a long time. The Pakistan reactions were best illustrated in the testimony given by an influential opposition M.P. in his speech in the N.A. which ran in the following way. "In India they have burnt your⁹⁵⁹ effigy but remember that the day they were burning your effigy, the nation was deciding to raise your statue in every street of every town of Pakistan ... you have succeeded in arousing world conscience (behind Kashmir) to an extent never before achieved."⁹⁶⁰

In this connection we want to add a footnote to an opinion shared by many that Suhrawardy relied more on the *western powers*, vastly the U.S. in solving Kashmir issue and less on the good neighborly relations to solve the same. The reason was obvious, for; Pakistan had already "jumped wholeheartedly into the idea of military containment of the communist heartland—at times, it appeared even more wholeheartedly than the western inventor of the idea."⁹⁶¹

⁹⁵⁷ For details, see *NAD* Vol. I, February 23, 1957, p. 967.

⁹⁵⁸ "Suhrawardy had displayed qualities of decision in Suez and Kashmir issue." See *Times*. May 12, 1957.

⁹⁵⁹ Suhrawardy.

⁹⁶⁰ *NAD*, Vol. 1, February 23, 1957, p. 1017.

⁹⁶¹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 10, 1957.

Suhrawardy inherited this setting from the past. Nevertheless, we would argue that he, in his 17-day state visit to America moved among the people as much as possible making great headway. *The New York Times*, hailed him as a welcome friend and a firm ally. Newspapers in Washington, San Francisco, Detroit and other cities echoed the same view. Suhrawardy himself, while speaking before the congress told that "peace is safe" in American hands which was equally matched by the U.S. Vice-President, Richard Nixon when he reciprocated by saying that "the United States has no closer friend or ally than the country represented by our visitor today."⁹⁶²

However, on the second count that the Prime Minister ought to have gone straight from the Security Council to the General Assembly to force a decision on India.⁹⁶³ Since 1947 Suhrawardy, at the risk of his life, had worked for the closer relations of the two countries, India and Pakistan. He lost his Indian platform after the demise of Gandhi. Then, he lost his membership in the Constituent Assembly I on the ground that he was too much of an Indian working jealously to give effect to a document called the Charter of Minority Rights concerning both India and Pakistan. He believed fervently that the success of Indo-Pakistan relations would be the basis for the solution of mutual problems which in turn depended upon the attitudes both the countries would be willing to show to their respective minorities. To this direction, Suhrawardy's record was, no doubt, glorious. What was more, when the Kashmir issue was being hotly debated in the Security Council Suhrawardy sent a delegation to India consisting of his closest followers—Messrs Abul Mansur Ahmed, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman etc. This delegation and its gift of a big jar of pure honey to Nehru came under scathing criticism in the N.A. which resulted in the Indian's chanting *Pakistan-Bharat bhai bhai* (Pakistan and India are brothers). The Prime Minister defended it by saying that "this should be our attitude ... we are not at war with the Indian people. I do not want to create enmity ... between people and people, because we are contesting the Kashmir case in an international forum."⁹⁶⁴

To this end, a foreign journalist, Sharokh Sabavala, reflected broad Indian mood. "... it is to the Bengali in Mr. Suhrawardy—he was born and brought up in Calcutta, Capital of Bengal—that India looks hopefully for a possible solution of a problem of mounting perplexity".⁹⁶⁵

As to the question of the Prime Minister's not going to the General Assembly Suhrawardy had this to say: "We must prepare the ground before we do so."⁹⁶⁶ He thought and perhaps correctly so, that despite the fact that Pakistan was

⁹⁶² *The New York Times*, July 12, 1957; *The Japan Times*, August 2, 1957; *Dawn*, July 19, 1957; This was a pointer to Suhrawardy's native constitution.

⁹⁶³ Suleri, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁹⁶⁴ *NAD*, Vol. I, February 25, 1957, p. 1093.

⁹⁶⁵ *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 3, 1956.

⁹⁶⁶ *NAD*, Vol. I, February 25, 1957, p. 1094.

overwhelmingly supported in the Security Council and outside as well. Pakistan could not take the risk of going into the General assembly; for, the requisite number of votes might not have been there to back a resolution—a job which was to be done in the course of time and through intense lobbying.

However, Suhrawardy's handling of the Suez and Kashmir issues gave a booster to Pakistan's pro-western foreign policy and with that prestige behind the Prime Minister faced the East Pakistanis the most critical people of his foreign policy. In a series of public and privately organized meetings in different parts of East Pakistan Suhrawardy vigorously defended his foreign policy and surprisingly rallied the largest sectors of public opinion behind his policy including those of the informed opinions, namely intelligentsia, students, teachers, lawyers, etc. The most memorable was his 95-minute extempore speech delivered in a student meeting held in the S.M. Hall⁹⁶⁷—a graduate student residential Hall proverbially credited with the glory of producing pupils who become, later on, leaders of science, economics, politics, administration and the academic world in the country. He told his audience that nations comprising of human beings were involved. Hence neutrality was at best a misnomer at worst 'a species of blackmail'. Neutrality did not save many a country in the 2nd world war. He wondered "... as to why there are certain nations that oppose military alliances. If we say anything in favor of America or the United Kingdom we are called 'stooges of imperialism, and if we say anything in favor of Russia we are called independent." Reflecting on the configuration of Muslim countries of the Middle East he regretted their chronic dissensions preventing them to sit together". Answering the question as to "why we do not get together rather than tied to a big power ... my answer is that zero plus zero plus zero is, after all, equal to zero".⁹⁶⁸

On the legalistic count, Suhrawardy maintained that the pacts Pakistan entered into were defensive in nature and in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Art. 51), and Bandung Conference in which 29 Afro-Asian countries participated. He continued that Pakistan was weak both economically and militarily and could neither stay in isolation nor flourish without aid. He warned students not to be always gullible about clichés like western imperialism. The Russian hegemony over the so-called satellite countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, East Germany and Poland, was a species of neo-imperialism. He refreshed his young audience's memories by citing the recent tragedy of Hungary by cautioning with this words, "beware of the fate of Hungary". He also pointed out that a "march of communism" had been going on in the

⁹⁶⁷ The writer remembers having sat down in the meeting with his student colleagues in order to heckle the Prime Minister with questions on the foreign policy. The meeting ended in giving a hearty applause to the Prime Minister.

⁹⁶⁸ *Manchester Guardian*, December 11, 1956.

Middle East. In a world where a 'balance of terror'⁹⁶⁹ between two great rival powers i.e. the U.S.S.R. and U.S. prevailed the Prime Minister maintained – there was no possibility of Pakistan's being involved in a nuclear war as in the flare-up "there will be no victor, there will be no vanquished ... both will lie in the dust".⁹⁷⁰ He convinced his audiences that the current foreign policy of Pakistan was positive and met the terrestrial considerations.

This was an extraordinary feat in that the Prime Minister won the support of the student community and a large part of the previously hostile press a critical section which all his predecessors had been at pains to avoid—at a time when the whole country was demanding severance of its ties with the Commonwealth, the Baghdad and S.E.A.T.O. Pacts fuelled by a tide of popular sentiment in favours of Egypt. Even so, he succeeded in carrying for his party a series of 'hotly contested' bye-elections in East Pakistan by virtue of sheer democratic combativeness and energy "which have confounded his opponents and astonished his warmest admirers".⁹⁷¹ His lightning electioneering campaigns covering all the constituencies were in keeping with the spirit of 21-point programme which, among others, stipulated that any political party losing three successive by-elections would amount to a loss of confidence in the party.⁹⁷²

All governments have an inner urge for keeping their respective foreign policies above party politics since they are regarded as instruments of national interest. Difference in matters of emphasis within the framework of substantial agreement are tolerated among the party-oriented democratic governments, but the presence of fundamental discord as to what constitutes national interests vis-à-vis foreign policy among parties or among the composing members of a given party is a pregnant situation from which foreign policy cannot be separated from the country's internal politics. This was exactly the situation which Pakistan had reached.

The A.L. like the Labor Party of Britain, came to power after having remained in opposition for long years. While in opposition both these two parties found fault with the then existing governments and promised the *millennium* to the people if returned to power. When they did come to power and faced the reality of government the heritage of a host of irresponsible utterances or commitments made during the days of the opposition became somewhat embarrassing to them. So far as the A.L. was concerned almost all its members, except Suhrawardy and a small handful of them had condemned the Pakistan pro-western foreign policy and military alliances while in opposition. Its party manifesto envisaged an independent foreign policy divorced from

⁹⁶⁹ "A potential aggressor is 'balanced' at each level of violence if his objectives can be denied him at that level, if his costs of fighting at that level would be higher than his expectation of gain." Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense toward a theory of national security*, (Princeton University Press: 1963), p. 48.

⁹⁷⁰ "Suhrawardy Supplement", *op. cit.*, p. v.

⁹⁷¹ *Times*, December 16, 1956.

⁹⁷² *Dawn*, November 4, 1956; December 4, 7, 8 and 9, 1956.

military alliances. The party was chary about military pacts lest they should encroach upon Pakistan's sovereignty. This was due to the fact that the party and for that matter the public in general had no inkling whatever in the nature of agreement Pakistan had entered into the Pacts. It was a case of 'ignorance thy name is fear'. Maulana Bhasani, the President of the East Pakistan Awami League, was also on record saying that "the country has all along been demanding for placing all foreign pacts before parliament for discussion and ratification".⁹⁷³ An amendment was incorporated into the existing party resolution in October, 1955 in the following terms that all the copies of the pacts and agreements should be placed before the parliament for the scrutiny of the representatives of the people. If the pacts were found to be prejudicial to Pakistan sovereignty they would be repudiated.⁹⁷⁴ This amendment took place after the Constituent Assembly II came into being.

On seeing the Prime Minister's growing success in the defence of his foreign policy Bhasani and his leftist lieutenants summoned an A.L. council meeting at *Kagmari*—Bhasani's home village. It was meant to be both an A.L. council meeting and a cultural conference. The *Kagmari* Conference was given such a wide publicity as though it was going to be a jamboree of all progressive elements the first of its kind in Pakistan. The word *Kagmari* was on everybody's lips in Pakistan in February, 1957. New unmetalled roads were built up connecting all parts of East Pakistan to *Kagmari*. Soon, an expression like 'all roads lead to *Kagmari*' came into vogue a leftist propaganda achievement. Beneath the apparent cover of a down-to-earth party meeting *Kagmari* was virtually converted into the headquarters of a new movement through immaculate and elaborate arrangements made by the dedicated leftists attached to the A.L. Huge gates paying homage to Marx, Lenin, Gorky, Bernard Shaw, *Gandhi*, *Subhas Bose*⁹⁷⁵ in the midst of decorative flags and buntings, were erected. Literary personages with leftist leanings from India were invited.⁹⁷⁶ Thousands of pigeons were caught to be let loose at the start of the meeting as a symbol of peace.⁹⁷⁷

What was the political message hidden in all this decorative ballyhoo? The gates supposedly representing the most eminent people of the world, in fact, represented the socialist cum communist world as the number of gates, their sizes and art of placing would give a decisive proof to that end. Western statesmen were completely left out Jinnah's gate had to be there, though ill-placed.⁹⁷⁸ This was the second phase of the leftist movement that had once veered around the U.F. in 1954.⁹⁷⁹ Apart from the

⁹⁷³ *Dawn*, October 27, 1956.

⁹⁷⁴ See Zahiruddin's speech, *NAD*, Vol. I, February 25, 1957, p. 1066. Also Aatur Rahman, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁹⁷⁵ They are all Indian political and literary figures.

⁹⁷⁶ For instance, Monoz Bose, Tarasankar Bandhapadhy, Sukanta Roy, Provod Sanyal.

⁹⁷⁷ See *Dawn*, February 8, 9, 13, 1957.

⁹⁷⁸ The writer vividly remembers all these as he was at *Kagmari* along with his other inquisitive friends.

⁹⁷⁹ Again, Pakistan was featured in the psychological warfare of international politics. Both the Moscow and Peking radios gave an exclusive coverage of the *Kagmari* Conference the way they did in 1954 when the U.F. swept the general elections of East Pakistan. See H.H. Chowdhury's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 23, 1957. p. 999.

intrinsic merit of having subscribed to an independent, non-aligned foreign policy the left-wingers in the A.L. fold, were per force, also anti imperialist and were prone to view western sponsored pacts with jaundiced eyes. Imbibed with Marxist philosophy they looked upon Russia as the natural ally to the third world countries as she was divorced of imperialistic legacy. So, the left-wingers turned themselves as foreign-Moscowvites.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria offered Pakistan aid, ties and trade if Karachi would sever western bonds.⁹⁸⁰ For, the immediate goal of Russian South Asian policy was to neutralize Pakistan by emasculating S.E.A.T.O. and the Baghdad Pact. To the Western eye any change in the strategical managements would profusely undermine western credibility in the whole wide area between the Mediterranean and South China seas. Similarly, Indian sub-continent would be vulnerable while Soviet 'thrust' through the Middle of Asia was already extended into Afghanistan. Russian policy was to have Pakistan agreed to any kind of definition as was available, in the parlance of neutrality—such as Nehru's "areas of peace", Tito's "active co-existence", Indonesia's "active neutralist" or that of Paris *Le Monde*, "Virile neutrality".⁹⁸¹

In the event Pakistan swallowed the bait Russia might revise its policy on Indian and Afghan claims in Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan. Pertinently, among the supporters of the pro-western foreign policy there was an air of skepticism about the efficacy of Pakistan association with the bellicose Pacts, since dogged adherence to western policy did not enlist positive support of the U.S. and U.K. in her dispute with India. Similarly, there was a general feeling that the U.S. Military aid was not commensurate with Pakistan's increased commitments under the Manila and Baghdad Pacts, leaving Pakistan more exposed than before. Whereas, Russia sided with India in their disputes with Pakistan.⁹⁸² Even Suhrawardy's state visit to the U.S. did not bring any increased economic and military aid.⁹⁸³

However, Suhrawardy came to confront his party at *Kagmari* against this general scenario. Debates on the foreign policy continued for the whole night of 8th February, 1957. The split between the right and left wing of the party on foreign policy touched off another controversy, in that both the rival groups claimed endorsement for their respective stands by the Council. Mujibur Rahman (General Secretary, East Pakistan A.L.), Aatur Rahman (A.L. Chief Minister of East Pakistan) and Suhrawardy denied Bhasani's version and insisted that 98 percent present in the Council meeting endorsed

⁹⁸⁰ *New York Times*, February 7, 1956.

⁹⁸¹ See *The New York Times*, Editorial "Foreign Affairs", February 11.1956.

⁹⁸² *Christian Science Monitor*, September 11, 1956.

⁹⁸³ See the *Hindu*, July 13, 1957.

the government's foreign policy.⁹⁸⁴ Whereas, the all Pakistan Awami League working committee had already approved the foreign policy earlier.⁹⁸⁵

Meanwhile the repercussions of the Kagmari Conference produced another boon for Suhrawardy. To the rightist parties like the M.L., N.I.P., K.S.P., etc. the *Kagmari* episode was an overdose of Communist and progressive ingredients difficult to digest. To them, the recent movements, overt or covert, manifested in the *Kagmari* Conference were signs of homage to, both Communism and *Bharat* (India) – the worst enemies of Pakistan.⁹⁸⁶ The M.L. working committee, the council of N-I-P and K.S.P. in their respective party resolution reinforced their support to the Prime Minister on foreign policy.⁹⁸⁷

Suhrawardy then brought the matter before the N.A. This was the first time in the history of Pakistan politics that a Prime Minister moved a motion in the House in regard to the approval of his foreign policy by having submitted the white paper on aid, copies of the pacts and documents of the U.S. Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement to the N.A. It was, however, not the case that the Prime Minister was committed to a dogged perseverance in the retention of the present policy for all time to come nor was he unresponsive towards the current leftist criticism against the foreign policy. It was a question of a fundamental nature i.e. under the Westminster system to what extent the party in power would be justified in rejecting foreign commitments given by the outgoing party. If the parties were to come to power in order to cancel each other's deeds frequently the country was bound to go down in international evaluation, let alone instability at home. It is customary, civil, modern and democratic to abide by contractuality, commitment and obligation. It is indeed in keeping with international rule of law. That was why the Prime Minister reminded the House that "a continuity is maintained in foreign policy matters and transitions are gradual".⁹⁸⁸ Speaking in a rhetorical vein on foreign policy he had, on an earlier occasion, maintained: "I will never sell Pakistan of any price. If ever situation arises I will tell you to go without shelter, eat less food, go without clothes, but do not become slaves".⁹⁸⁹ He did not rule out the possibility of a change in foreign policy when "expediency may cause us to trim our sails",⁹⁹⁰ but the criterion of that change would be national interest as understood on the context of world politics. Having reflected a new mood and approach in the application of foreign policy Suhrawardy had already demonstrated that Pakistan was capable of having terms for political, economic and strategic reasons, with all countries outside of free democracies without jeopardizing her formal relation with the west, particularly the U.S. What came out in bold relief was the unmistakable fact that Suhrawardy was by

⁹⁸⁴ *Hindu*, February 12, 1957.

⁹⁸⁵ *Dawn*, December 2, 1956.

⁹⁸⁶ See *Ibid.*, February 17, 1957 (Editorial) "Kagmari"

⁹⁸⁷ See *Ibid.*, February 14, 27, 1957.

⁹⁸⁸ *NAD.*, Vol. I, February 22, 1957, p. 912.

⁹⁸⁹ *Dawn*, October 5, 1956.

⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, P. 928.

training and propensity an *Anglophile*. He minced no words confessing that "everybody has a bias. Ours, from conviction and background, is toward the free democracies".⁹⁹¹ Evidently, he did not adhere to the opinion that Pakistan's commitments had made her any country's satellite. Judged from that angle Suhrawardy was as responsive to the genuine anxieties of the leftist critics as he was to the global politics.

However, defending the fruitfulness of joining the Pacts as he ably did, the Prime Minister's leadership seemed inadequate in one important area, in that he could not stem the tide of imbalance in the government priorities pertaining to the allocations of aid received through the pursuit of particular line of foreign policy. Was Pakistan not sacrificing the quality of its national life to the demands of a military establishment? Could he not help Pakistanis the way he did in many an affair prick the bubble of the fear of Indian aggression on Pakistan and siphon funds off from military expenditure into nation-building activities? Would it not prevent national values from being grotesquely distorted and add moral grandeur to Pakistan foreign policy? Who were the beneficiaries of the foreign policy in the final analysis, really? was the expenditure on defence aid to Pakistan achieving anything like value for money?⁹⁹² Would it not have been better to make Pakistan economically viable and let her spend money on armament according to her own real capability? A British M.P., John Dugdale, sighed that "Even if half the sum spent on defence aid in the last five years had been devoted to helping her develop her basic industries, it would have been a far better insurance against communism."⁹⁹³ Did he not comport himself a bit like an *Anglo-Saxon* rather than an Oriental premier? Did he not fish British chestnuts from out of the fire', serving as a main agent for creating division in the Middle East. Did he not by implication, hint that British aggression in Egypt was an effort for the maintenance of international stability? How could he justify Britain's membership in the *Baghdad* pact by saying that the British intervention in Egypt was a "past history" and should be considered on the count that she had supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations?⁹⁹⁴ Could he not build up Pakistan's unblemished prestige in the international arena and reorient her foreign policy in the light of her natural genius and propensities? Could he not have made Pakistan the architect of Muslim unity and evolved a kind of progressive leadership vis-à-vis the third world counties providing 'check to colonialism'? Would not have the people of Pakistan consolidated themselves behind him had he chosen to lead them? Manifestly, a sizeable segments of people across the two wings of Pakistan had some share with Mian Daulatana's animadversion of Suhrawardy's handling of foreign policy. He said "... the fall of Suhrawardy is greater than himself. He bids fare to take the whole of Awami League with him. A party which struggled so and proclaimed

⁹⁹¹ *The New York Times*, September 11, 1956.

⁹⁹² See U.S. Government Printing Office, hearings before the sub-committee for review of the Mutual Security Program of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, p. 33.

⁹⁹³ See *Manchester Guardian*, March 11, 1958.

⁹⁹⁴ *The Hindu*, February 26, 1957.

so well, shall fawn at the first morsel of the scented bait, is the tragedy not of a person alone but for the whole nation".⁹⁹⁵

However, it was a great challenge bristling with odds. Suhrawardy himself once exclaimed before the seemingly, hostile student audience with his characteristic flourish: "I wish I could do it".⁹⁹⁶ But the Prime Minister could be set right on the ground of Pakistan psychology obtaining at the time; for, had he tried to curtail military expenditure it would have amounted to stoning at the hornet's nest. The night of October 1954 was still fresh in public memory "when, with a general to the right of him and a general to the left of him, a half-mad Governor-General imposed upon a captured Prime Minister the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly."⁹⁹⁷ So, on that point he chose to remain on the tactical political level in not rationing the fodder of the sacred cow, the Army, when the general mood of the country mainly the west Pakistan was not in favor. Over and above, most rightist-oriented political parties and their adherents appeared lukewarm to the concept of 'non-alignment' and joined issue with it. To them, it was a game that could be played with some dividends by a big country like India which could venture for trade, not aid; loans not grants. In Pakistan situation, alliance with the west, in the typical words of the Governor General-Major General Iskander Mirza—which had been ventilated earlier was "the only alternative to becoming progressively a satellite of Russia or India. It was in this spirit that Pakistan grasped this opportunity offered by the S.E.A.T.O. and Baghdad pacts".⁹⁹⁸ Suhrawardy's was the biding of time before acting which in turn depended on the holding of early general elections. It will appear from our subsequent pages that the more the Prime Minister pressed for General elections, the greater was his experience of resistance, both visible and invisible.

However, the Prime Minister's leadership in foreign policy was not dogmatic; for, he laid down all his cards on the table of the N.A. for the scrutiny of the people's representatives. The N.A. overwhelmingly sanctioned the country's foreign policy⁹⁹⁹ (40:2) – only Mian Bari (Independent) and Mian Iftikheruddin (A.P.P.) voted against.¹⁰⁰⁰

But the Prime Minister was still not out of the wood. Bhasani could not accept the parliamentary approval of the foreign policy with good grace. Nothing could please the A.L. left-wingers short of rejecting the pro-western foreign policy and walking out of the military alliances. The A.L. now lurched very close to open split. Bhasani threw down the gauntlet by resigning from the presidency of the All Pakistan A.L. on March

⁹⁹⁵ See *Dawn*, December 14, 1956.

⁹⁹⁶ "Suhrawardy supplement", *op. cit.*, p. vi.

⁹⁹⁷ *Dawn* August 11, 1957 (Editorial) "Revolution".

⁹⁹⁸ *The Times*, February 28, 1956.

⁹⁹⁹ The M.L. and K.S.P. abstained for party reasons. They did so not because they disagreed with the Foreign Policy but because of its mode of handling.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 25, 1957, p. 1102.

1957.¹⁰⁰¹ Now the Bhasani-Suhrawardy showdown within the party became inevitable. The Council Meeting of the A.L. was called in mid-June, 1957 to settle the foreign policy issue decisively and discuss Bhasani's resignation. Prior to the meeting Bhasani began a self-purifying fast Gandhian in style in sympathy for the common people who were facing rising prices. But tactically speaking, his choice of occasion could not be dissociated from the simultaneous holding of the council of the Baghdad pact in Karachi.¹⁰⁰²

However, the trial of strength went decisively in favor of the Prime Minister in that the Council approved the foreign policy by 800 to 25 votes.¹⁰⁰³ The right-wingers were distressed even at their victory that the two leaders, Bhasani and Suhrawardy should have clashed so openly.¹⁰⁰⁴ Obviously, there was no one to replace Suhrawardy at the national parliamentary level. Similarly, Bhasani's irreplaceability in terms of his organizing ability and mass contact was unthinkable to the party. It was a great political tragedy for the party certainly, no less for the entire country as the subsequent events would testify that both Bhasani and Suhrawardy became so antithetic to each other on matters of foreign policy. What was once said of Adenaur (C.D.U) and Dr. Schmacher (S.P.P.) in regard to their respective stands on foreign policy that "seldom has a country suffered such heavy political consequences from the antipathy between two men"¹⁰⁰⁵ could equally be said of Suhrawardy and Bhasani who chose to find foreign policy as their main ground of mutual disagreement. It was in the realm of foreign policy that a rapprochement between the two wings of the A.L. was warranted for the sake of national interest and ensuing general elections. But it could not work out as their respective attitudes were antagonistic to each other, stock, lock and barrel. This cleavage in the A.L., however, had one redeeming feature in that it punched the A.L. into a vigorous process of winnowing which had been rather overdue. The party would be now composed of members with like minded people of both the wings of Pakistan which in turn would give more cohesion to the organization.

In this connection we want to establish the most important point we have raised earlier regarding centre's clamping down 92A rule in East Pakistan in 1954 without giving a chance to the rightist elements to fight the leftists on political platform,. If the fear of Communist takeover of East Pakistan was one of the reasons—indeed it was that led the centre to freeze parliamentary machineries in East Pakistan, at the expense of the rightists, the events of late 1956 and early 1957 proved without the slightest shadow of doubt that how wrongly the central government of 1954 had overestimated the leftist elements and underestimated the moderate rightist ones. Did not Suhrawardy fight with all the armoury of parliamentary democracy, defeat the leftists on political

¹⁰⁰¹ See *Times*, March 22, 1957; also *Daily Telegraph*.

¹⁰⁰² *Times*, June 14, 1957.

¹⁰⁰³ See *Dawn*, June 14, 1957; also *Manchester Guardian*, June 14, 1957.

¹⁰⁰⁴ See *Times*, June 17, 1957.

¹⁰⁰⁵ R. Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany* (Oxford University Press: London: 1957), p. 116.

platform and rally the nation overwhelmingly behind his foreign policy? It demolished the myth of 1954 that leftist-oriented politics deserved to be tackled *administratively only*, not *politically*. Apart from Suhrawardy's establishing the parliamentary strength to resolve conflicts in favors of moderation, he restored the right to the N.A. to question the country's foreign policy for the first time, and give the people a sense of participation¹⁰⁰⁶ in the stimulating public debates on foreign policy which were going on country-wide.

Now, we are to examine if the Suhrawardy Cabinet did make any headway towards putting into motion machinery for the holding of the country's first general elections on which depended the full implementation of the 1956 Constitution. Suhrawardy having overcome the considerable obstacles that were strewn on his way achieved the nation's highest Parliamentary post. He strove to stabilize Pakistan's unsteady economic and political situation to the point "where national elections can be held".¹⁰⁰⁷ In fact, the post- 1956 period should be viewed as a transitional period pending the general elections. We do not know on what basis Dr. Chowdhurya Pakistan political Scientist—made an observation that "... no progress was made by the Suhrawardy Cabinet towards general elections."¹⁰⁰⁸ In our findings it was rather the opposite. There was once some talk of the A.L. 'making an issue' out of it and going out of office, if they could not keep their promise of holding the general elections earlier.¹⁰⁰⁹

Contributing an article to the *Dawn* the Prime Minister reflected that "... estrangement between the governing and the governed, *anxiety on the part of those in authority over their warrant and their tenure*; sterility of Government resulting from a lack of confidence among those in authority as to their *ability to tap the creative forces of public trust*,"¹⁰¹⁰ were the factors of instability in Pakistan the cleansing of which depended, among others, greatly on the having of periodical elections. Since his assumption of the Prime Minister's office he laid great stress on that point and told people at home and abroad that the general elections were going to be held in February/March 1958.¹⁰¹¹

It is to be recalled how a dual principle of electorate was enacted in the Dacca Session of October, 1956. It could be leveled against the government as to why did they not push up other necessary legislation relating to the machinery of elections immediately after the passing of the Electoral Bill. The Prime Minister's preoccupation with foreign policy which first took him to China, then to Teheran, again to Baghdad and Ankara was

¹⁰⁰⁶ The writer distinctly remembers that in one of the Prime Minister's public meetings at Dacca in early 1957 an ordinary member of the audience stopped the Prime Minister in the midst of his speech saying politely with his hands folded if the Prime Minister would care to repeat some of the facts on Kashmir he had unfortunately missed due to his arriving late in the meeting. Moved, the Prime Minister smilingly repeated things he had covered earlier.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 10, 1957.

¹⁰⁰⁸ G.W. Chowdhury, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

¹⁰⁰⁹ See *Dawn*, October 1, 1957 (Editorial) "General Elections".

¹⁰¹⁰ S.H. Suhrawardy, "Political Stability", in *Dawn*, June 10, 1957.

¹⁰¹¹ *Dawn*, December 18, 1956 (Editorial) "Prime Minister's Press Conference".

pressing enough for continuing to keep the N.A. in recess. But the Prime Minister had also been creating the ground, at the same time, for having a uniform electoral principle in both parts of Pakistan. Evidently, the Prime Minister availed himself of the first opportunity of introducing the Electoral Rolls Bill¹⁰¹² and the Representation of the people's Bill in the N.A.¹⁰¹³ the moment he was sanguine of giving the nation a secular electorate system having the force of uniform applicability all over Pakistan. For instance, the Electorate Act of 1956 was amended on the 22nd April, 1957 to be followed by the passing of the Electoral Rolls Bill on 24th April, 1957.¹⁰¹⁴ The Representation of the People's Bill was referred to the Select Committee on 20th April and finally passed on August 26th, 1957.¹⁰¹⁵ These measures provided the Election Commission with a complete framework to work upon so that electoral preparations were completed in time and elections held at the target time. The franchise issue had already been solved in favor of the universal adult franchise requiring the male voters to possess an identity card with photograph, based on the Electoral Reforms Report.¹⁰¹⁶ Meanwhile, the Delimitation Commission (Art. 142) which had already started demarcating the 155 constituencies in the N.A.¹⁰¹⁷ and the same in the Provincial Assembly from East Pakistan in November, 1956¹⁰¹⁸ virtually finished accomplishing the task by the 15th June, 1957.¹⁰¹⁹ Suhrawardy asked the Governor of West Pakistan to be in top gear to set up things for general elections.¹⁰²⁰

An influential English Daily – The *Dawn* – echoed the general view of the people that "Mr. Suhrawardy and his valiant colleagues of the Awami League were responsible for creating the optimism among the people that they were going to have access to the ballot box early next year. The Prime Minister himself made statement after statement, inside and outside Pakistan, repeatedly.¹⁰²¹

A prestigious foreign newspaper – The *Times* maintained that the coalition government at the head of Suhrawardy had displayed qualities of decision and stability and

¹⁰¹² April 9, 1957.

¹⁰¹³ April 15, 1957.

¹⁰¹⁴ *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 24, 1957, p. 1078.

¹⁰¹⁵ *N.A.D.*, Vol. III, August 26, 1957. p. 277.

¹⁰¹⁶ 100,000 of steel ballot boxes were already available in East Pakistan. Besides, the government placed an order for importing 3000 tons of steel of a particular specification to make an approximate number of 6 lakh ballot boxes. See *Dawn* April 9, 1957.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Dawn*, April 25, 1956.

¹⁰¹⁸ The N.A. would have 300 members - 155 each from the two wings - for 76 million people which would give an M.P. to represent every quarter million people. The Indian Lower House consisting of 500 members, the Upper House 250- total 750 - Britain with 50 million people had an elected House of Commons of 630 members - that gave 13 seats per million people. If Pakistan took all the representatives of the Assemblies - national and provincial - the total number would be 900 seats for 76 million people that gave 12 seats per million people. See *Dawn*, March 24, 1956 "Republic Day Supplement".

¹⁰¹⁹ *Ibid.*, June 16, 1956.

¹⁰²⁰ *Ibid.*, May 1956.

¹⁰²¹ *Dawn*, October 2, 1957.

appeared "determined to keep its promise of general elections in spring 1958 and to give the country a tolerable caretaker government meanwhile".¹⁰²²

When the country was scheduled to have elections in the spring of 1958 the Supreme Court wanted to be sure of it by sounding the Elections Commission. To the chagrin of the Elections Commission the Supreme Court managed to have a programme of elections from them on July 25th 1957 which was different from that of the government.¹⁰²³

Having handed in the election programme to the Supreme Court the commission thought it wise to reveal to the country that general elections were not possible in the spring of 1958¹⁰²⁴ while the Prime Minister was in London emphasizing his commitment to the holding of elections as announced earlier. The Electoral Rolls Bill was passed in April 1957 and the necessary Rules were notified on the 25th May, 1957, but, in spite of it the Election Commission could not find it convenient to start with the preparation of the Electoral Rolls before August 1st, 1957. What had really transpired between these intervening months that the Elections Commission could neither start working before August 1st nor find it appropriate to notify the government of its difficulties, if any? It was only due to the insistence of the Supreme Court that the people came to know that the Commission had been working on a schedule vastly different from that of the government.¹⁰²⁵ This untimely controversy arose between the government and the election commission was a veritable index of "a more deep-rooted malaise".¹⁰²⁶ The Election Commission was a statutory body with autonomous powers but the major policy decision rested with the government and that decision was to have elections in the spring of 1958 on which direction the Commission was supposed to proceed. Could not the Commission await the Prime Minister's arrival from London before announcing its decision?

The *Dawn* in a leader observed that "Somewhere there are still forces working to defraud people's right of access to the ballot box".¹⁰²⁷ Indeed it was true, otherwise how could one account for the Commission's inaction following the passage of the relevant laws from the N.A. Was it any Executive Authority at the centre or in the province

¹⁰²² *The Times*, May 13, 1957.

¹⁰²³ For details see *ibid.*, July 26, 1957.

¹⁰²⁴ *Dawn*, August 1, 1957; also *New York Times*, August 1, 1957.

¹⁰²⁵ A. Khaleque, an A.L. Central Minister who was so obsessed with the holding of early elections, gave his government's time table in the following way:

- (1) 6 weeks for preparation of voters' lists;
- (2) 2 months for preparation of voters' lists;
- (3) 1 months for receiving and hearing objections;
- (4) 2 weeks for printing of additions and alterations after hearing objections. That meant all necessary works could have been done by December, 1957, See *Dawn*, August 2, 1957.

¹⁰²⁶ *ibid.*, August 3, 1957.

¹⁰²⁷ See *Dawn*, August 3, 1957 (Editorial) "Anti-election forces"; also *Dawn*, July 27, 1957 (Editorial) "March 1958".

acting as an incubus on the prospect of elections? Or was it the Election Commission itself which was to be brought to book? Evidently, the Prime Minister who was really emphatic about holding early elections got into a situation where his commitments were in jeopardy. Driven to despair, the *Dawn* editorialized appealing to the President and also Prime Minister to "make an immediate declaration that the country's first general elections shall be held on the basis of the present constitution and shall not be delayed by the west Pakistan's action (to be discussed in the coming pages).¹⁰²⁸ Obviously, the anti-election forces were those which could be identified in the words of Suhrawardy in the persons who had 'no warrant to rule but power to rule'. Their activities were too clandestine to be detected openly. They harbored in their minds fear of losing their jobs, status and influence before the ballot box symbolizing the *vox populi*. Elections to them by all intents and purposes meant *Hara Kiri*. No doubt, the incubus of uncertainty was hovering around them. Perhaps, fear and apprehension gripped them further when the formidable Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, *the-world-be architect of Independent Bangladesh*, in a feat of prophetic cast of mind roared in the parliament: "Exploiters have no political life *Inshallah*, if God grants, say in June 1958, we will have our general election and the opposition benches will be wiped. Their money will be forfeited at the elections. Let them see, I declare here in this House."¹⁰²⁹

Away in the year 1954 General Mirza poured out his mind in a letter addressed to the then Governor General, Golam Mohammad saying that "*the introduction of adult franchise was the biggest crime against the integrity of Pakistan*".¹⁰³⁰ Now he was the President of Pakistan. Should we suppose that General Mirza had already adjusted his early bizarre views to the democratic needs of the country during these periods? Indeed, he did talk about the efficacy of having a general election immediately after his escalation to the office of the Presidency. But that passed away as platitude. The zeal and enthusiasm he had shown in backing the Prime Minister in matters of foreign policy was conspicuous by its absence in matters of elections. He appointed Mr. F.M. Khan¹⁰³¹ as the Chief Election Commissioner who eventually became a member of his first Council of Ministers after he had promulgated martial law in Pakistan in October, 1958. This, no doubt, bespoke their mental frame of mind and surreptitious relationship. Nawab Gurmani, the Governor of West Pakistan who was lately showing signs of loyalty to the parliamentary system, was suddenly replaced by Mr. Akhtar Hossain, Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, as the Governor in what was termed by the *Times* as "surprise."¹⁰³²

Feudalistic in structure as was the West Pakistan society the election prospects as such were not particularly inspiring to those who would lose more through it than gain. No

¹⁰²⁸ The *Dawn*, Editorial, "Elections in danger", September 19, 1957.

¹⁰²⁹ Strikingly, the prophecy came true in the general election of 1970. *NAD*, Vol. I, February 24, 1957, p. 389.

¹⁰³⁰ Governor's letter to the Governor General, *loc. cit.*, Do No. 101/PS (Top Secret) dated 21st June, 1954. p. 6.

Appendix 16.

¹⁰³¹ A civil servant.

¹⁰³² See *Times* August 28, 1957.

less a person than the Chief Justice Munir, who was also the Chairman of the Delimitation Commission, himself opined that the appropriate authorities in West Pakistan were reluctant to give him information relating to the delineation of constituencies when he was on the verge of completing the same in East Pakistan.¹⁰³³ This was followed by a resolution passed in a meeting of the past and present Parliaments' Association, held at Karachi pointing out the "deliberate" attempts that were being made by some governmental quarters in West Pakistan to delay general elections in Pakistan.¹⁰³⁴ The appointment of the Defence Secretary, the post which the president himself had ornamented previously, as the new Governor was meaningful in that the President would be able to get his ideas carried out by Akhtar Hossain.¹⁰³⁵ The way personnel were selected for the strategic jobs and the way those personages were rewarded subsequently, make us wonder whether the President was above being identified with the 'anti-election forces'.

Arriving back from London the Prime Minister immediately summoned the Chief Election Commissioner¹⁰³⁶ who told him that until sufficient progress had been made in the preparation of electoral rolls the exact date of the election could not be given. The Prime Minister called a Round Table conference on polls inviting all the political parties including the Chief Commissioner himself.¹⁰³⁷ The talks progressed rather haltingly as the politicians were not averse to the idea of having elections in the hot or rainy weather of July, 1958, while the Commission would not "countenance the idea".¹⁰³⁸ Although the Commission had a point there, for the torrid heat of West Pakistan and the heavy rains of East Pakistan would have caused considerable inconvenience to the voters. Finally, the talks bore fruit in that all political leaders including the Chief Commissioner agreed to have elections in November, 1958.¹⁰³⁹ A consideration of further grant of Rs. 1.5 crores was given by the Cabinet.¹⁰⁴⁰ On top of it A. Khaleque—a central Minister of Labor—promised 10,000 workers from each wing of the country to help complete the works of the Commission.¹⁰⁴¹ Hence, it is more appropriate to maintain like that of the *Times* that "he (Suhrawardy) has set in motion machinery for the general elections,¹⁰⁴² than to say that he did not. What is more, scarcely had he¹⁰⁴³ assumed the position of

¹⁰³³ See *Dawn* May 9, 1957.

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid.*, May 18, 1957.

¹⁰³⁵ A civil servant.

¹⁰³⁶ *Dawn*, August 8, 1957.

¹⁰³⁷ See *Dawn*, August 28 and September 4, 1957.

¹⁰³⁸ *Ibid.*, October 1, 1957.

¹⁰³⁹ *Ibid.*, September 30, 1957.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, August 13, 1957.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*, August 4, 1957.

¹⁰⁴² *Times*, October 13, 1957.

¹⁰⁴³ "We do realize that the present government is anxious to hold general elections at an early date." - This was the remark of Mr. Y. Harun, the Secretary and the Chief Whip of the opposition party, the M.L. See *N.A.D.* Vol. III, August 22, 1957, p. 105.

Pakistan premiership than he dropped a definite hint to the various political parties to begin 'political education' of the masses in preparation for general elections.¹⁰⁴⁴

The parliamentary system of government in Pakistan was a ship, as it were, launched in a sea of ruffled society. In order to make the ship float there needed constant corking in the holes, as one successful corking was followed by the uncorking of a couple. This is true of all developing countries; thus a Hansard Society report states that as the developing "pace quickens, success imposes increasingly onerous burdens"¹⁰⁴⁵ Such was the case with the Suhrawardy cabinet. The more Suhrawardy cleared his way through, the greater were the obstacles strewn in the way. This time he was confronted with the biggest crisis, and his nemesis, as well.

It has been mentioned earlier that four local leaders namely, G.M. Syed (Sindh), Abdul Gaffar Khan (N.W.F.P.), Abdul Majid Sindhi (Sindh), and Abdus Samad Achakzai were on principle opposed to the one-unit plan. None of them had been able to secure a seat in the Constituent Assembly II, but some of them and others belonging to the category of anti-one-unit group were able to secure seats in the West Pakistan legislature—though their numbers were negligible. After the formation of one-unit, an anti one-unit front comprising of like minded local parties was formed. Its activities were concerned with the propagation of anti-one-unit ideas. Its leaders such as Gaffar Khan and A.S. Achakzai were intermittently in the process of being arrested and released subsequently on ground of anti-State activities. Some local newspapers e.g. *Pashtu*, *Paigam-i-jadid*, *Nawa-i-watan* and *Al Wahid* were banned on the charge of being extremely parochial only to be revived again under judicial orders.¹⁰⁴⁶ The cumulative effects of this group's activities resulted in the merging of six political parties¹⁰⁴⁷ of West Pakistan into one called P.N.P. (Pakistan National Party). A two-day convention 17 and 18 November, 1956¹⁰⁴⁸ of the P.N.P. chalked out 6 principles of which 3¹⁰⁴⁹ were the pronounced ones on which basis the party was to work.¹⁰⁵⁰ We recall having already introduced Mian Iftikharuddin (Punjab), G.M. Syed (Sindh) and A. Gaffar Khan (N.W.F.P.) as people of progressive and socialistic ideas. The former two politicians were always kept outside of power—though Mian Sb. was in the Punjab Cabinet in 1947 for a very brief period. The latter politician had always been a *persona non grata* to the Pakistan government due to his demand for *Pakhtoonistan*. They were all feudal lords in varying degrees, and to

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, September 11, 1956.

¹⁰⁴⁵ "Hansard Society", *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴⁶ For details see *Dawn*, January 24; February 1, 4, 9; June 15; July 23, 1956; *Hindu*, September 7, 1956; and *Times*, July 7, 1956.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ajud Pakistan Party, Wrore Pashtoon, Khudai Khidmatgars, Ostaman Gul. Sindh Awami Mahaz and Sindh Hari Committee.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Dawn*, November 19, 1956.

¹⁰⁴⁹ The elimination of feudalism and pursuit of independent foreign policy; (2) Economic, commercial and cultural relations with all countries on equal basis; (3) To strive for unity amongst the anti- imperialist nations especially Afro-Asian countries and their solidarity.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Dawn* November 19, 1956.

what extent they were genuinely interested in the cause of agrarian reform cannot be definitely ascertained. But the fact remains that this was for the first time that all the leftist groups in West Pakistan not necessarily communists – were aggregated into one bloc, P.N.P. This was very significant in the context of West Pakistan politics where organized challenge to the *status quo*, social or economic, had never crystallized before. We like to call it the emergence of a budding movement on the Pakistan western horizon subject to florescence. The P.N.P. strategy was predicated upon the assumption that once the one-unit was dismantled in favor of the original political division, they would be able to work for social and economic reforms from their respective local bases simultaneously. For, to the P.N.P. one-unit meant a union of reactionary elements against whose fortress of solidarity they were no match. In demanding the regrouping of one-unit linguistically the P.N.P. strategy had communistic undertones in that they were heading for what Professor Emerson would call a 'multilingual state' of Pakistan and the creation of an "autonomous base of national languages",¹⁰⁵¹ namely Sindhi, Pushtoo, Punjabi and Baluchi.¹⁰⁵² In this process, the P.N.P. had the instant advantage of playing upon what anthropologists would call people's dormant regional sentiments. However, the formation of the P.N.P. was followed by a P.N.P. parliamentary group in West Pakistan legislature consisting of 10 member.

Circumstantially speaking, the P.N.P. group was placed in a situation from where it could feather its own nest at the expense of the two major parties in the legislature, the M.L. and R.P. It has been shown earlier how the R.P. came into being and the Chowdhury Mohammad Ali Cabinet fell. The parties—the R.P. and the M.L. were so divided that it was the marginal votes of the unattached groups or wavering members on which depended the fate of the R.P. government in West Pakistan. With the formation of the P.N.P. the lobbying for the disintegration of one-unit became intense inside the west Pakistan Legislature. Soon, some politicians who had flourished in the local assemblies found themselves ineffectual in the larger arena of integrated legislature of West Pakistan. The anti-one-unit campaign gained further encouragement due to some irrational political steps taken by the M.L., the opposition party.

As luck would have it, the M.L., which was the chief architect of the one-unit scheme, found itself out of power in West Pakistan. It was already denigrated in East Pakistan. So, the M.L. was determined to cultivate its fullest possible potentialities in the soil of West Pakistan. Out of desperation, the M.L. entered into an ugly alliance with the P.N.P. to the end that if the former was supported in its bid to oust the R.P. government the new M.L. government would break up the one-unit province as a *quid pro quo*. As a

¹⁰⁵¹ Rupert Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

¹⁰⁵² Having quoted Stalin, Prof. Emerson argued that national languages were not a 'class matter' and served both 'bourgeoisie and proletariat' alike. Since language was one of the bases of self-determination the communists stood by it. Although, to the communists, it was a different matter when the formation of a one world language would follow mechanically with the emergence of communist society all over the 'globe'. (See R. Emerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-137.)

result 4 resolutions for the purpose of breaking up one unit were moved by the opposition on 3rd March, 1957 but were talked out,¹⁰⁵³ as Dr. Khan was still enjoying the support of 164 members in a legislature of 305.¹⁰⁵⁴ But the moment 30 Republicans defected to the M.L. it was inevitable that the 17-month-old R.P. Ministry was bound to fall. Suddenly, the Governor prorogued the Assembly and central rule (Art. 193) was imposed in West Pakistan. The M.L. was not asked to form a new government for the underlying fear "over the opposition's demand that West Pakistan be restored to its original status".¹⁰⁵⁵

That was the overriding reason that Suhrawardy denounced them for betraying the constitution and the people for political expediency; for, this would necessitate constitutional amendments, damage integrative prospects and certainly delay further, what in the words of the *New York Times* "the ten-year-old nation's first general elections."¹⁰⁵⁶

What we wish to emphasize here is that the newly-formed P.N.P. in West Pakistan having a programme of drastic agrarian reform, an independent foreign policy and anti-imperialism combined with pro-Afro-Asianism, had to rely for its existence on the sub-nationalistic sentiments. Holding the balance of power, accidentally in the west Pakistan parliamentary government as it did, the P.N.P. was as much responsible in dangling a bait of provincial pill before the M.L. as was the M.L. in swallowing it. And this was not an isolated fact in that the same trend of movement was noticeable in East Pakistan where provincial slogans were pressed into service for various reasons and tactical purposes. Around the time the P.N.P. was making its mark on West Pakistan politics the leftist elements of the A.L. were warming up to the same position in East Pakistan.

When the A.L. council was being held at Dacca to decide foreign policy and discuss Bhasani's resignation, at about the same time Bhasani telegraphed to M. Huq Usmani-ex-General Secretary, All Pakistan¹⁰⁵⁷ A.L. in West Pakistan to come to Dacca¹⁰⁵⁸ along with Mian Sb., G.M. Syed and Mian Bari.¹⁰⁵⁹ Thus, the holding of the A.L. session went parallel with this move of Bhasani. As a result Bhasani called an all-Pakistan democratic Workers' convention at Dacca on the 25th and 26th July, 1957.¹⁰⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the pro-Bhasanissites were expelled from the A.L. Working Committee including the

¹⁰⁵³ *Observer Foreign News Service*, March 22, 1957.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Dawn*, March 21, 1957.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Times*, March 22, 1957.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *The New York Times*, October 12, 1957.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Mr. Usmani was expelled by the A.L. Working Committee for a period of 5 years from A.L. membership for having criticized Suhrawardy's handling of foreign policy publicly. See *Dawn*, January 8, 1957.

¹⁰⁵⁸ They did come to Dacca on the 16th June, 1957.

¹⁰⁵⁹ *Dawn*, June 14, 1957.

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Ibid* June 16, 1957.

organizing secretary of the A.L., Oli Ahad.¹⁰⁶¹ As many as 200 primary members resigned from the A.L. following Bhasani's exit.¹⁰⁶² The all-Pakistan Democratic Workers' Convention began with 1000 delegates from all over East Pakistan and 100 from West Pakistan, 20 East Pakistan M.L.A.s (Members Legislative Assembly) and two M.P.s under the Presidentship of Bhasani. All the P.N.P. prominent leaders were present. The outcome was the bringing into existence of a new political party, the N.A.P (National Awami Party). The P.N.P. and G.D. of East Pakistan were merged into the N.A.P. The N.A.P stood for, *inter alia*, an independent foreign policy, the abolition of zamindari, a welfare federal state and provincial autonomy.¹⁰⁶³ The proximate effect of the formation of N.A.P. in terms of parliamentary strength was that nearly 35 M.L.A.s of East Pakistan, 21 of West Pakistan and 4 M.P.s¹⁰⁶⁴ in the N.A. were able to form their respective N.A.P. parliamentary groups in both the provincial and the national legislatures. In national politics the emergence of the N.A.P. had greater import in that for the first time after the banning of the communist party in 1954 all the leftist elements with varying degrees of moderate and extreme socialistic leanings found a legitimate nationwide platform on which to operate. Evidently it created a bridge between the two wings of Pakistan in having brought into being an alliance of interest against a background of certain programmes by overcoming the geographical hurdle.

There was a time when the waves of the U.F. movement could not reach the Arabian coast of West Pakistan. Now in 1957, things came to such a pass that a portion of the people of both parts of Pakistan would be able to speak with same intonation, through the instrumentality of N.A.P. This was more relevant to the issue of agrarian reforms in West Pakistan. It was not, however, the question of the number of supporters the N.A.P. could count on either in legislatures or outside at that point of time, but it was the question of N.A.P.'s having an immense future as long as Pakistan society and for that matter other political parties remained unadjusted to the demands of social reforms. It was stronger than its actual numbers suggested since it offered a unified front when other major parties appeared less coherent in their approaches. While the N.A.P. received the attention of the critics as a political party which was responsible for the bringing about a topsy-turvy in Cabinet formation at the end of 1958 *it was never emphasized that the N.A.P. was also a major emerging force in Pakistan politics*. Indeed, the N.A.P. was a distinct political force in Pakistan in this period and later.

Reinforced, the N.A.P. now went on in full swing to dismantle one-unit. Meanwhile, the R.P. Ministry was restored in West Pakistan at the head of Sardar Rashid – Dr. Khan

¹⁰⁶¹ *Times*, June 10, 1957; also *Dawn* June 3, 1957.

¹⁰⁶² *Ibid*, July 15, 1957.

¹⁰⁶³ For details see *Dawn*, July 26, 27,28, 1957.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Two A.L. M.P.s, namely Mr. Akhand and F. Karim joined the N.A.P. parliamentary party in the N.A. reducing the A.L. strength from 13 to 11. Similarly, the N.A.P. parliamentary party in East Pakistan legislature was formed out of the former A.L. M.L.A.S. This was how the foreign policy issue exacted toll on the A.L.

was dropped but was still the head of the R.P.¹⁰⁶⁵ Because of the almost even parliamentary strength of both the government and opposition—the R.P. and M.L.—the N.A.P. support was vital to the retention of power. The R.P. government took a leaf from the book of M.L. and signed an agreement with N.A.P. after a four hour discussion to this effect that the N.A.P. would support the Republicans in all matters involving confidence in the Ministry provided the Republicans would support a resolution in the West Pakistan legislature and in the N.A. for the replacement of one-unit in West Pakistan by a zonal Federation of West Pakistan composed of autonomous provinces on a linguistic and cultural basis.¹⁰⁶⁶ As a corollary to this, on 17th September, 1957, 170 members voted for such a resolution in a House of 305, subject to the final verdict of the N.A.¹⁰⁶⁷ It was less than two years since the integrated province came into being. Was a two-year period enough to pronounce a judgment on a larger political experiment that was the one-unit? Could the people shake off localism born of centuries within the compass of two years? It was once said by Italy's Risorgimento after the national unification had been accomplished: "*Fatta I 'Italia, bisogna fare gli Italiani*—having made Italy, we must now make Italians."¹⁰⁶⁸ Although the dialects of Saxons and Franks were mutually intelligible to a great extent, it still took more than a century's effort for a Saxon Prince to become Henry I in *Frankist* attire "to symbolize the active integration of his people into the common State".¹⁰⁶⁹ The one-unit was not too unique an issue to be judged beyond the context of historic experiences that had been gained elsewhere.¹⁰⁷⁰

It was rather a question of time. True, there were some initial frustrations. This was a question of acclimatization to a new situation. The 305-strong M.L.A.s flocking from all over West Pakistan into Lahore to attend the legislative session could not find a readymade official residence to live in. They along with thousands of secretariat staffs who came to work in the new unified Secretariat at Lahore, experienced, to their dismay, housing and gastronomical difficulties.¹⁰⁷¹ Added to it were the genuine obstacles faced by the people living far away from the capital. In the pre one-unit period many a local office or court of justice could cater to the social and economic needs of the people, since they were within commuting distance. Now they were obliged to go, for certain matters, to a distant capital and for a frontier man to reach Karachi took about 36 hours. A journey from Baluchistan to Lahore was more tortuous as communications difficulties were more acute. Considering that there was such a thing as 'creature comfort', the initial disagreeable feeling towards one-unit was understandable. What was the really vexing problem said Sir Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of the N.W.F.P.,

¹⁰⁶⁵ *New York Times*, July 16, 1957.

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Times*, September 15, 1957.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1957.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Quoted in J. La Palombara & M. Weiner (ed.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton University Press: 1966), p. 414.

¹⁰⁶⁹ K.W. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷⁰ "These were the approximate time spans for the linguistic assimilation of the Langobards in Italy (568-c. 1050), and later of the French-speaking Normans in England (1066-c.1400). K.W. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁷¹ *Times*, June 11, 1956; *Hindus*, October 1, 1956.

1946-47 – was that "with the accretions of representative government, the new province became top-heavy".¹⁰⁷² Schemes were said to have been planned and executed by officialdom and the 11 divisional commissioners came to be regarded as powerful *satraps* who were given more powers on the pretext that problems would be solved locally. Similarly, departmental secretaries were given extensive powers – complained an M.L.A. in the legislature speaking on a cut motion on general administration.¹⁰⁷³

One big reason for the administration becoming top heavy was that the country was now governed from one central point. All the administrative machinery and for that matter political activity were concentrated at the top to the impoverishment of the local bases. Particularly, the former minority provinces had a sense of remoteness from the centre, Lahore, no matter however efficient, the local administrators were in remedying people's grievances. Local officials were not trained to become substitute politicians with an easy communion with the local people. In other words, there ought to have been more radiation of power from the centre down to the bases, more participation of the people in the governmental schemes of things and a drive towards pulling up the hitherto neglected people. As many as 24 Ministers were appointed and they were given handsome traveling allowances¹⁰⁷⁴ for keeping in touch with the people throughout the country to evaluate their experiences in the new situation.

In order to foster the growth of a mercantile community among the tribal people business licenses and permits were generously given.¹⁰⁷⁵ The politicians – Pirzada Abdus Sattar, Sardar Abdur Rashid who had clumsily opposed the one-unit scheme earlier joined the West Pakistan Cabinet from the very start and were given the important portfolios of Finance, Industries and Law. What was more, the post of the Chief Ministership had been consistently retained by politicians coming from the minority areas. Besides, the politicians were willing enough to add to or subtract from the one-unit project in the light of new experiences that might accumulate. Virtually, a resolution proposing to set up a parliamentary committee to enquire into the economic, financial and administrative position of West Pakistan as influenced by the recent unification came up on the 18th February, 1957 before the N.A. for consideration.¹⁰⁷⁶ In short, no palpable evidence could be cited in this period to suggest that the one-unit project was conducted to the gross violation of its basic commitments. On the contrary, the bond of unification was further strengthened. The N.A.P. desire reflected in the recent resolution to dismantle one-unit as though the experiment had failed sounded to an M.P. like saying "that even the experiment of partition of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was a bad experiment which has failed".¹⁰⁷⁷

¹⁰⁷² *Ibid*, June 19, 1956 (Article) Sir Olaf Caroe "The N.W.F.P.: Revisited".

¹⁰⁷³ *Dawn*, May 30, 1956.

¹⁰⁷⁴ See Syed Abid Hossain Shah's speech, *NAD*, Vol. II, April 12, 1957, p. 239.

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, February 16, 1957, p. 513.

¹⁰⁷⁶ See *Ibid.*, Vol. I, February 18, 1957.

¹⁰⁷⁷ *NAD*, Vol. II, April 11, 1957, p. 191.

It may, however, be asked why there was such violent agitation in Pakistan in the late 1960s in regard to the dismemberment of one-unit, when it was such a good project. The three chief architects of the one-unit in letters to the writer offered the following causes. The ex-President of Pakistan, General Mirza said that "the Punjabis have run the one-unit in such a selfish manner that there is great hatred of them in Sindh, Frontier and Baluchistan."¹⁰⁷⁸ The ex-Prime Minister, Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, maintains that it was the cardinal point of the one-unit scheme that the administration should be decentralized to an extent "so that 99 percent problems would be settled on the spot. This was not only not done; on the contrary, such decentralization and devolution of powers as there was before was reversed."¹⁰⁷⁹ The ex-Governor of West Pakistan, Nawab Gurmani, held the same view: "It is unfortunate that certain vested interests did not permit the full implementation of the various important parts of the scheme, such as the decentralization of the administration, association of people's representatives with the administration at various levels, unification of laws, etc., etc. These factors caused resentment ... in certain parts of the Province."¹⁰⁸⁰

All these developments took place under the quasi-dictatorial regime of General Ayub a decade of accumulated political frustrations which made the one-unit extremely unpopular. Had the one-unit been run, throughout, within the framework of parliamentary democracy there would have been no scope for its being totally unpopular, simply because the government linked as it would be to all democratic channels would not need to rely on insurgency to get clues to public grievances to mend its ways. In the past the one-unit scheme on the count of economic dimension "makes the developing world green with envy"¹⁰⁸¹ but on the count of the non-economic dimension it did not arouse envy. However, in the preceding paragraphs we have tried to show that there was no positive evidence available to suggest that the one-unit scheme had failed. And the present N.A.P. resolution was based on different consideration.

Now the resolution itself was a potential quagmire for the Prime Minister as well as the country. The one-unit was one of the key pillars of the constitutional edifice. The Prime Minister had taken an oath to defend the Constitution.¹⁰⁸² After more than seven years of birth-pangs the Constitution was finally delivered. Would not the Constitution be on the melting pot? Would not the East-West controversy surface again with unabated fury as the East Pakistanis might demand replacement of the parity formula in favor of a one-man-one-vote system in case the one-unit was disintegrated? Supposing a bill to that effect picked up the required two-thirds majority in the N.A. what would be the

¹⁰⁷⁸ See General Mirza's letter to the writer, dated 8.3.69. (Teheran) Appendix IX.

¹⁰⁷⁹ See Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's letter, dated 2.6.69 (Lahore) Appendix X.

¹⁰⁸⁰ See, Nawab Gurmani's letter dated 30.3.69 (Muzaffargarh) Appendix XI.

¹⁰⁸¹ *Economist*, April 5-11, 1969, p. 63.

¹⁰⁸² See Prime Minister's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 13, 1957, p. 332.

immediate effect on the electoral structure of the country, particularly in West Pakistan? Would not the Election Commission have to *start de novo*? On what basis were the redemarcated provinces of West Pakistan to be represented in the N.A., leaving aside the question of the delimitation of constituencies on a new basis? In other words, the country would be plunged into an abysmal depth of political crisis once again i.e. what had been gained through years of perseverance would be lost by an act of de-merger and the country would be preyed upon by anti-democratic forces in the absence of general elections.

It is appropriate to mention here that the soup of provincialism was violently stirred in both the wings of Pakistan in the same period and within a short interval of time. In April, 1957, while the A.L. government was on the saddle in East Pakistan a non-official resolution was passed in the legislature asking the central government to transfer to the province all powers except those relating to Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency by incorporating needful amendments to the Constitution.¹⁰⁸³ This incident was usually quoted by critics to show how different had been Suhrawardy's views of things from that of his own party, A.L. But having studied the time sequence of the events that had taken place before the passing of the resolution we deeply feel that it was the potential members of the yet-to-be-born N.A.P. who were ostensibly enthusiastic about it. As soon as the *Kagmari* episode boomeranged and public brows were furrowed at it, the leftist elements of the A.L. toned down their opposition to foreign policy. In lieu of foreign policy they devoted themselves to Bhasani's *Salam-O-Alaikum*¹⁰⁸⁴ theory of which semantic implication was full regional autonomy.

These leftist politicians took the challenge to the provincial legislature in order to expose the sober elements of the party on the sub-national question. It was not very easy for the provincial government to say 'no' when the people at large had strong feelings on the question of autonomy. So, the East Pakistan A.L. Working Committee 'in good earnest' passed a resolution on 2nd March, 1957 asking its members in the legislature to support a *non-official* resolution in the forthcoming budget session recommending full autonomy.¹⁰⁸⁵ Needless to say, *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman* played the role of a precursor. The M.L.A. Mr. Mohiuddin Ahmed of Barisal—who moved the resolution became subsequently one of the veteran leaders of the N.A.P. And the group which sounded hyperbolic in the matter left the A.L. *en bloc* in three months' time and formed what was now the N.A.P. This resolution which was thought 'to be effected only after months' came up dramatically and was forcefully supported by *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman* with full-throated ease. Quoting prominent pro-Bhasani M.P.A.s the influential *Dawn* observed that *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman* "had stolen the *leftist Awami Leaguer's* thunder". For, according to them, the discontent lay in their not being able to

¹⁰⁸³ *Manchester Guardian*, April 4, 1957.

¹⁰⁸⁴ The etymological meaning is: 'Peace be on you'. People say this to their friends while meeting or departing from them.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, March 3, 1957.

demonstrate publicly that the Centrist Awami Leaguers "preferred power and position to East Pakistan's interest".¹⁰⁸⁶

Evidently, the leftist Awami Leaguers counted upon the motion—which they looked for to be opposed by the Awami Leaguers in office" to expose the anti-Bhasani group", and turnish the image of the government in the public eye. Since the strategy did not work they, the surrounding facts would indicate, were all out for ousting the centrist Awami Leaguers by chaperoning all these leftist and disgruntled groups, mainly the Ganatantric Dal and Congress etc.

However, one of the reasons that, accelerated the process of the quoted resolution, perhaps, was the unbecoming view of the titular head of the state on a loaded issue of provincial autonomy which was given "an emphatic rebuff by the East Pakistanis" by moving the autonomy motion. Besides, the President, being the custodian of the Constitution as per the oath recanted by saying that "the removal of this malaise requires serious consideration. I commend to your consideration a careful study of American system of administration with necessary modification to suit our own conditions."¹⁰⁸⁷ Interestingly enough resolutions with varying accents of regionalism were moved in the legislatures of both the provinces of Pakistan by the members of leftist persuasion who used regionalism like a shield to protect their other provocative programmes. In saying this, however, that the leftist elements of both parts of Pakistan were mainly responsible for initiating resolutions in their respective legislatures, we do not maintain that those 'moves' were just 'stunts' and did not reflect social desire. Of course, on the question of autonomy the East Pakistanis had some viable points to make, perhaps more than could have been leveled against the one-unit Establishment in operation at that period of time by the West Pakistanis. Thus, things came to such a pass that the country was pushed into bewildering abruptness where doubt and uncertainty crept up. The West Pakistan government was now without a constitutional government. The central government was like a cat on hot bricks. Suhrawardy's own leadership within the party seemingly challenged; and a constitution, barely a year old was brunted from all sides.

But, no matter how was the autonomy motion interpreted by the leaders of the western wing the hackneyed allegations were wide of the mark. The autonomy move did in no way have "betrayed any leanings towards full independences, let alone reunion with India."¹⁰⁸⁸ But, certainly the move did point out one cardinal fact that unified rule was an impossibility on the count of distance between the two wings. Hence, the largest practicable measure of autonomy was the only panacea. Since both issues were vital to Pakistan politics we shall briefly deal with the causes prompting the demand for autonomy in East Pakistan as we have done in the case of the one-unit in West Pakistan.

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Dawn*, April 5, 1957.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *The Times*, May 13, 1957.

¹⁰⁸⁸ *Times*, May 13, 1957.

It was said that the East Pakistani "grievance of being the victim of discrimination is as much psychological as material, and is essentially a negative, defensive emotion".¹⁰⁸⁹ Does this remark ring truth? At partition and until 1949-50 the share of manufacturing industries was the same in East and West Pakistan.¹⁰⁹⁰ Since then the growth rate in every sphere of economic development was progressively higher in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. As a result, regional disparities between East and West Pakistan widened in terms of per capita income, per capita consumption and availability of commodities, per capita electricity generating capacity, transport and road development, number of educational institutions and health and medical services.¹⁰⁹¹ There is no positive evidence to suggest that the economic structure of both the wings of Pakistan was fundamentally different so that, on intrinsic ground, disparity could be regarded as inevitable. True, there was a modicum of economic infrastructure existing in West Pakistan at independence. West Pakistan had an international seaport and airport at Karachi and a fairly developed railway system already in operation. But East Pakistan had the same potentiality, even though it had been a hinterland to Calcutta in the pre-partition days.

Then who was to be blamed for this disparity? Clearly, disparity "had largely been due to the past policies of the central government".¹⁰⁹² Government policies relating to investment, credit facilities, licensing, aid and loan allocation had always favored economic growth in West Pakistan. We have already mentioned in the earlier pages how some economic powers were taken away by the centre from the provinces at the initial stages. This greatly affected the economy of East Pakistan.¹⁰⁹³ Karachi being the metropolis all the headquarters of banks and economic institutions were situated there. The mercantile or industrial community grew around the fertile ground of these decision-making economic institutions. The instruments of economic development like P.I.D.C., P.I.C.C. and I.D.B. helped to develop industries mainly in West Pakistan.¹⁰⁹⁴ Dr. Sayeed wrote in his book that East Pakistan's "total revenue was less than one-third of the total provincial revenue of Pakistan".¹⁰⁹⁵ Continuing he maintained that East Pakistan had to depend on the centre for her economic development and the centre in its turn obliged her by giving shares of various taxes and duties and various other loans and grants to East Pakistan. And he ended his chapter quoting the central government's

¹⁰⁸⁹ Keith B. Callard, *Political forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959* (Institute of Pacific Relations: New York: 1959), p. 10.

¹⁰⁹⁰ See *Economic Disparities between East and West Pakistan* (Government of East Pakistan: Planning Department: East Pakistan Government Press: 1963), p. 15.

¹⁰⁹¹ Tables showing discrepancies on these subjects are given see *Ibid.*, pp. 10-14.

¹⁰⁹² "Planning Department", *loc.cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁹³ "... they (central government) took away the power over industries and commerce by a special Act of the central legislature... This they (centre) did in 1949 to prevent me from giving effect to a number of industrial schemes drawn up by me as Minister of Finance of East Bengal". See H.H. Chowdhury's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 13, 1957, p. 309.

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Planning Department", *loc.cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Sayeed, K.B. *op.cit.*, p. 372.

arguments not his vis-à-vis East Pakistani grievances that "the Federal bread could not be distributed on the basis of population alone and that the Bengalis had contributed much less than their brethren in West Pakistan towards the making of this bread."¹⁰⁹⁶

True, East Pakistan's contribution to the Federal exchequer was less compared to West Pakistan, but that argument was valid so far as land revenue was concerned since land revenue could not have been raised due to permanent settlement in East Pakistan. But one cannot slur over the fact of East Pakistan's huge earnings of foreign exchange through exports of raw materials, particularly of jute. On the East-West financial controversy, there had been the polemics of statistics and growth tables with the familiar economic conundrums to justify each other's stand. But as far as the Suhrawardy Cabinet was concerned, the Finance Minister in answering a question whether East Pakistan earned more foreign exchange compared to West Pakistan and got less foreign exchange compared to West Pakistan he candidly said "yes"¹⁰⁹⁷ Foreign trade was a central government monopoly. It was calculated by a Pakistan scholar that the East Pakistan balance of trade position in comparison with western part covering the periods from 1947 to 1961 was favorable to the extent of Rs. 473.7 crores.¹⁰⁹⁸ And since West Pakistan was importing more than her exports¹⁰⁹⁹ covered the surpluses of East Pakistan were used to cover up her deficits. Besides, a large portion of East Pakistan foreign exchange was spent in buying capital goods and services from abroad for West Pakistan industries.¹¹⁰⁰ Hence, there had been no opportunity for East Pakistan to develop capital formation, though she should have. During the time of the non-devaluation of Pakistan's currency, she sold raw materials at the highest price abroad and bought capital goods for West Pakistan at a low price. When manufactured goods of West Pakistan industries were ready for export the currency was devalued to suit the new situation. So, East Pakistan missed the first chance of creating a pedestal for industrial edifice.

Perhaps, the most colossal deprivation from which East Pakistan suffered was her inability to derive benefits from central government expenditure. Of the total central government expenditure from 1947 to 1961 East Pakistan claimed only 29 percent.¹¹⁰¹ "Government expenditure, taken by itself," says Samuelson, "... has a multiplier effect upon income just like that of a private investment. The reason is ... that a chain of responding is set into motion."¹¹⁰² Until 1957, the central government spent slightly over

¹⁰⁹⁶ Sayeed, K.B. *op.cit.*, p. 381.

¹⁰⁹⁷ See *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 12, 1957, p. 123; also "The Credit Enquiry Commission Report of 1957", "Report of the Panel of Economists", and the "Second Five Year Plan-1960-65".

¹⁰⁹⁸ Dr. Aleem Al-Razee, *Process of Economic Disparity* (Ferdoush Publications: Dacca: n.d.), p. 23.

¹⁰⁹⁹ See Tables showing East-West pattern of exports and imports year-wise in the Appendix XII. See also *C.A.D.*, Vol. I, March 25, 1951, p. 312.

¹¹⁰⁰ "Planning Division", *loc.cit.*, p. 21.

¹¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹¹⁰² Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics: An Introductory Analysis* (McGraw- Hill Book Company, New York, 6th ed. 1964), p. 244.

Rs. 18 crores in East Pakistan on account of defence expenditure. In comparison, more than Rs. 400 crores were defrayed in West Pakistan.¹¹⁰³ In the defence perimeter of Pakistan, the western part appeared to have featured prominently as all the headquarters of Army, Navy and Air Force and industries of military complex were situated there. Whereas the *raison d'etre* which had dictated a military buildup i.e. to deter Indian aggression and communist infiltration had its minimal application in the area, East Pakistan, which according to official belief was more vulnerable to Indian and communist pressure and so ought to have received the maximum military attention. As a result of huge expenditure in West Pakistan on account of defence the multiplier impact boosted the pace of development there by providing more roads, industries and jobs.¹¹⁰⁴ What would have been the effect on the left-wingers of the A.L. in East Pakistan relating to their attitude to foreign policy and coming out of the A.L. dramatically, had Suhrawardy succeeded in securing for East Pakistan the due share in what came as military aid from the U.S. and other matters peripheral to defence Establishment, was food for thought. In any case, there was never such a 'test' on that score.

Suhrawardy, while he was the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, as well, of the country, tried in vain to persuade the C-in-C. General Ayub Khan to raise some battalions in East Pakistan or to militarise the Ansars. So, unassailable, impregnable and unresponsive was the Defence Establishment. In the words of Suhrawardy some "steps were shown to show that something was being done, but there was always a lag, an excuse and an ultimate retreat".¹¹⁰⁵ Out of the total budget money of Rs. 915 crores in the 1947-58 period an amount of Rs. 530 crores was spent for the expansion of the metropolis, Karachi.¹¹⁰⁶

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appealing fervently to the West Pakistan brothers, students, intelligentsia and especially the press to understand the enormity of exploitation, deprivation and utter neglect suffered by the East Pakistanis with unabated trends since 1947. He reeled off statistics stating that vast amount of East Pakistan revenue found its way to the central exchequer during the last eight years. East Pakistan contributed to the central exchequer to the extent of Rs. 171.99 crores but the central government spent in its turn only Rs. 46.49 crores in East Pakistan, the balance went to the development of West Pakistan. The central government defrayed Rs. 283.6 crores on capital investment, but in East Pakistan it spent only Rs. 32.1 crores. Similarly, the relative capacity of foreign exchange earning was in favor of East Pakistan. For example, East Pakistan earned exchange by export of Rs. 421.21 crores with a favorable balance of Rs. 254.04 crores in 1948-52 while West Pakistan earned Rs. 342.95 crores against her import of Rs. 411.88 crores i.e. sustaining an adverse balance of Rs. 69.88 crores. Likewise, the Sheikh pointed out, that with foreign aids the central government showed lopsidedness in that

¹¹⁰³ Aatur Rahman, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

¹¹⁰⁴ See Appendix" for other discrepancies.

¹¹⁰⁵ See "Memoirs" *op.cit.* p. 157.

¹¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

it built up cement factory at Mianwali, a tubewell factory in that area with Canadian aid, with New Zealand and a cement factory in Hyderabad, a fertilizer factory at Dandkhal and with a FAO aid a DDT plant at Nowshera. East Pakistan was sidetracked.¹¹⁰⁷

All this huge investment of money in West Pakistan on account of different heads only helped build up social overhead capital for the westerners. East Pakistan did not obtain any economic benefit from it, since the bizarre geographic halves stood on the way of mobility in respect of labour, capital, technical staffs, entrepreneurial class between the two wings. It is said that "all development circles are vicious, some are more vicious than others".¹¹⁰⁸ Perhaps Pakistan happened to be one of those vicious ones.

It was not, however, the question of economics alone, in the case of central services and army, the same story was repeated.¹¹⁰⁹

In regard to the civil services, the central government maintained that at partition there was a scarcity of experienced civil servants among Bengal Muslims, and the non-Bengalis replenished the shortage. Regarding defence services Bengalis were told that they were not a martial race. True, there were not enough experienced civil servants among the Bengali Muslims at the outset, but people from the provincial services could have been promoted to fill in the central jobs. The Bengali officers belonging to the erstwhile central superior services gave a good account of themselves in the subsequent periods, even by having topped the list of successful candidates in the hard-slogging competitive examination. In time, Bengali soldiering was tested and proved valiant. They were not "chocolate-cream-soldiers", *Shavian* style. Instead, those who came from West Pakistan to serve in East Pakistan developed an attitude which "was one at its best a sort of patronizing ... and at its worst one of contempt".¹¹¹⁰ As a result, the conflict of interest between West and East Pakistan turned out to be what Stanley Maron has characterized as "the conflict of interests between the elite and the masses".¹¹¹¹ Similarly, admitting that West Pakistan had some such preliminary defence structure at independence, but that should not have amounted to carrying coal to Newcastle on the ground that East Pakistanis were a non-martial race, a thesis which could be proved neither historically nor genealogically. Did it not wound the ego and self-respect of the East Pakistanis as they were substantially dissociated from the honor of defending the country? Taking everything together, East Pakistan was, no doubt, the most neglected, emasculated, exploited and thus an unequal federal partner.

¹¹⁰⁷ See for details, *Dawn*, April 10, 1957.

¹¹⁰⁸ A.O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1958), p. 11.

¹¹⁰⁹ See Appendix XIII.

¹¹¹⁰ See Dr. Mahmood Hussain's speech, *C.A.D.*, Vol. I, July 17, 1954, p. 1476; see also "Tidal Wave of Bengal anger not yet spent" Neville Maxwell, *Times*, March 26, 1970.

¹¹¹¹ Stanley Maron (ed.), *Pakistan: Society and Culture* (Human Relations Area Files: New Haven, 1957), p. 6.

East Pakistanis, however, were no less responsible for their own poverty which was rather self-perpetuating. There is a non-economic dimension to economic growth. Growth implies "far-reaching social changes. 'Social' in this context means all aspects of the relations of human beings to each other political economic ... patterns of family life, education, and the ideals or values that determine what people strive for."¹¹¹² In other words, social factors act as powerful incentives for the growth of an economy. Historically, Bengalees as race produced a galaxy of notables in most branches of human life other than commerce or business. In the scheme of things, values relating to commerce, trade and finance were traditionally rated low. Famous Bengalees like Tagore, Dr. P.C. Ghose, Bhudeb Mukhapadhyia cried hoarse to draw Bengalees' attention to the realm of business. As a result, comparatively speaking, the Hindus were able to throw some commercial groups of people in the society. But the Muslim Bengalees did not show any tangible signs in this direction.

At partition, East Pakistan was denuded of whatever commercial class there had been as the Hindus who were the main bulk of it made a clean pair of heels to West Bengal, India. East Pakistanis did not make a virtue of their weaknesses. They did not show a sense of purposefulness in this direction as the Japanese did after World War II, the Irish in the 18th century, and as the Chinese and Israelis are doing now. Instead, the loquacious East Pakistanis took the negative attitude of telling the world of their being wronged¹¹¹³ by the West Pakistanis without taking positive steps to right their own position by trying to evolve an entrepreneurial class or business-oriented community. It is interesting to note that the business community among the Muslims that had grown in undivided India was not Bengali by race. When they migrated to Pakistan their capital and large business connections stood them in good stead. But the only snag was this that they chose to pitch their main tents in West Pakistan as the zone was culturally more close to them. The central government showed more interest in the old business community that came to Pakistan than it did in the creation of a new one. Tendentially, the central government carried coals to Newcastle. It did not provide any invigorating or productive incentive to the growth of entrepreneurial class. So, the potentiality died of atrophy. Perhaps this was one of the contributing factors of economic disparity between East and West Pakistan.

Hence, the resolution asking for full autonomy for East Pakistan is to be judged on this background. The East-West conflict in Pakistan was like that of the long standing conflict between the Northern Flemings and Southern Walloons of Belgium.¹¹¹⁴ As Brussels, though a bilingual capital tended to be French, so Karachi in spite of its being the capital of the whole of Pakistan tended to be more West Pakistani. The most critical

¹¹¹² Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 13.

¹¹¹³ In the pre-partition Bengal both Hindus and Muslims used to blame the Marwari class for its economic domination over them. After partition, East Pakistanis blamed the Iranis, Isphahanis and Memons just for the same.

¹¹¹⁴ It may be equally compared to the Sudanese position as far as the northern and southern parts are concerned.

problem was that the East and West Pakistan were as far apart as Spain and Finland with people as different. Suhrawardy's coalition government had to be tested against this drastic resolution.

As a palliative to the commotion created by the resolution Suhrawardy dismissed the issue saying that it was "a stunt to show individualism",¹¹¹⁵ and next told in the A.L. Council in the presence of Bhasani that 98 percent autonomy had been granted to the provinces of Pakistan and cautioned Bhasani about his *Salam-O-Aliakum* theory.¹¹¹⁶ Suhrawardy did not confine his arguments within the compass of party meetings alone, he faced public meetings at large on the topic and argued: "What is the significance of the cry for provincial autonomy? ... if autonomy means groundwork for something else, I will not have it ... if it cuts at the roots of Pakistan I am not for it ... We are Pakistanis first and Pakistanis last."¹¹¹⁷ Far back in 1958 while inaugurating the E.P.A.L.P. Council Suhrawardy poured down his mind in the following sentences: "we are pledged to full regional autonomy consistent with the stability and integrity of Pakistan and an honorable place before the Comity of nations ... It is we the people of Bengal, who have fought most for the achievement of Pakistan and it is our heritage..."¹¹¹⁸ Even immediately after the passing of the resolution Suhrawardy avowed that he was prepared to give all powers to the provinces that did not interfere with the stability and integrity of Pakistan.¹¹¹⁹ Now, it is highly pertinent to decode the semantics and smoothen the angularities centering round the terminology i.e. provincial autonomy. How did the rank and file of the Awami League visualize it? How do we delve deep into Suhrawardy's *psyche* in respect of provincial autonomy? Was there any ambiguity in his utterances? Most importantly, how do we evaluate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's performances as the true and principal exponent of provincial autonomy? Presumably, our analysis revolves round the period 1947-58 earmarked with a certain scope for anticipation. With a sense of academic detachment and to my empirical findings I regard Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who championed the cause of autonomy with unmitigated terms behaved very soundly, consistently and with dogged firmness. We attempt to analyze his *raison de'tre* for provincial autonomy.

Summing up the debate on the resolution, the commerce and Industries Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, held that the demand for regional autonomy was a question of *life* and *death* for the 42 million people of East Pakistan and was not intended to undermine the solidarity of the state. On the contrary, he argued, the regional autonomy would further strengthen the foundation of Pakistan and the demand, if conceded to, the central government would not be weakened. He said that the central government would still remain effectively powerful even it granted all powers, except

¹¹¹⁵ *Observer*, April 6, 1957.

¹¹¹⁶ *Times*, June 17, 1957.

¹¹¹⁷ See *Dawn*, March 24, 1957.

¹¹¹⁸ *Dawn*, October 20, 1955.

¹¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, April 5, 1957.

currency, foreign affairs, and defence. Clarifying further he maintained that the demand for regional autonomy was not a *political* one. It aimed at the economic self-sufficiency of the province and for the solidarity of the country. Besides, he emphasized that regional autonomy was incorporated in the twenty-one-point-programme of the United front.¹¹²⁰

Elucidating further on the theme of zonal autonomy, the Sheikh, while at Karachi, administered a mild but, pointed riposte to his leader, Suhrawardy that it was not mere "*political or election stunt*" but a matter which dealt with imperative economic function with an urge to live based on decentralized, political, administrative functionaries and redistribution of central funds between the two zones". Refuting the charges of secession made in the West Pakistan, the Sheikh, suspected a "colossal ignorance" that prevailed in the minds of the some of the Pakistan rulers regarding the problems of East Pakistan and as such they had no conception of provincial autonomy. Hardly had he spared his own political mentor, Suhrawardy when he regretted the opinion made by the Prime Minister that the people never bothered for it but were concerned with "good government." In a quick repartee, the Sheikh, opined." It is a good proposition, no doubt, but as a price of allegiance to a good government a citizen might demand from it security from want of food, clothing, medical relieves, unemployment and illiteracy which are the primary needs of a citizen; for, the civilized existence of a nation and those material conditions presuppose the existence of a balanced national economy".

Detailing further the concept of Zonal autonomy he maintained that it was inextricably linked up with a good government" especially in a country like Pakistan which was a bi-zonal state." A government could be a good government if it could create and sustain condition by redistribution and readjustment of its political, administrative and economic paraphernalia between its component zones without jeopardizing the integrity of the state—he argued. Passionately, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressed himself to the leaders of West Pakistan by pointing out that the people of "East Pakistan is groaning under abject poverty with proverbial subhuman standard of living, ill-fed, ill-clad, deceased, illiterate over population and high birth rates and death rates, less than minimum per capita food supply, unemployment, and with only 22 million acres of land for 45 million population in East Pakistan", The crux of his arguments became more pungent when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman paid his political master back in his own coin. Having reminded the Prime Minister the fact that conception of provincial autonomy was not a new thing to him; for, when he had been the Finance Minister of undivided Bengal in 1941, he did protest against the central government exploitation, encroachment and stood for fiscal autonomy. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, quoted his budget speech which Suhrawardy had delivered in the House in the following manner." The greater part of the money raised within the boundaries of this province finds its

¹¹²⁰ Dawn, April 4, Pakistan Observer, April 4, Sangbad, April 4 1947 Also, EPLA proceedings Vol. VIII p. 360, April 3, 1957.

way in the central exchequer and what is left is hopelessly inadequate for the needs of the government."¹¹²¹

All we want to emphasize that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's commitment to provincial autonomy at that point of time was passionate, value-impregnated, unflinching and lock, stock and barrel. Unhesitatingly, he declared before a 'cheering crowd' that if necessary they would quit ministry but would not allow East Pakistan to be exploited, anymore.¹¹²² In toto, the Sheikh's loyalty to federal Pakistan had, at no point of time, been at the expense of his *golden Bengal*. East-Bengal's interest was the *Seni qua non* which governed his federal sentiment. He was a pragmatic, ruthless Federalist believing in 'union' rather than 'unity'. His was the stand for the retention of 'local independence' in all but essentially common matters to be left for the central government. Certainly, this is a prerequisite to Federal polity. Far back in 1954, the governor of East Bengal—Major General Iskander Mirza—in his secret fortnightly letter addressed to the Prime Minister assessed the traits of character and portrayed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in a nutshell". Has been in prison several times. Is a remarkably good organizer. *Has guts. Holds extreme views in politics. Is an experienced agitator. May be described as the stormy petrel of the Awami League. A dangerous gentleman. Who is best in jail*".¹¹²³

However, having delineated the approach of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman towards autonomy issue, we now turn to the ticklish and baffling question of Suhrawardy's true color to the concept of autonomy, and his relationship with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in respect of the said burning issue. As I have scratched the head, it can be testified that Suhrawardy had never been at variance with Bengali interest or cause. An erudite, and, at once, a touch politician Suhrawardy had sophistication, delicate nuances of expressions and statesmanlike orientation, who would never opt for derogatory spheres other than laudatory. Never would he hesitate to call spade a spade with clarity whenever an occasion arose. A sea of Bengali people would not have thronged in Dhaka to pay homage to the departed soul—Suhrawardy had he not endeared himself to the Bengalis as a faithful and trusted friend.

Eulogizing the Bengali character, he once wrote to say the following, "I am thoroughly familiar with the political consciousness of the people of East Pakistan. I should be the last to deny their aptitude for seasoning the meat of politics with the spice of enthusiasm. Yet, I have seen them many times gather by tens of thousands to give rapt attention to a realistic discussion of policy".¹¹²⁴ As I attempt to grapple with the Suhrawardy issue the overriding question that emerges is that Suhrawardy exhibited a promethean urge towards building up an all pervasive *federal sentiment*. His was the accent on greater national loyalty rather than regional loyalty, if feasible. He

¹¹²¹ See *Dawn*, April 10, 1957.

¹¹²² *Ibid*, October 26, 1957.

¹¹²³ *loc. cit.* "Governor's letter." Top secret, Do. No. 101/ps. 21st June 1954. See Appendix 17.

¹¹²⁴ See *Dawn*, June 10, 1957.

emphasized that "we are one, our prestige is founded on this sense of unity. My one success has been that I have removed mutual hatred from Pakistan".¹¹²⁵ In the same breath, he declared in another occasion that "I believe in provincial autonomy myself, but then let us guard against carrying this autonomy to the point of absurdity".¹¹²⁶ Perhaps, a strong federal government was a *priori* concept to Suhrawardy. Undoubtedly, that was the trend (and still is) all over the world. The ever increasing power of the federal government grew in a contiguous polity spontaneously, necessarily and in a spirit of cooperative evolution. It was never a case of dictation, imposition and compulsion.

Having reached the stature of a national leader, Suhrawardy was steeped in the spirit of national constituency; for, he had eclipsed all political opponents in West Pakistan. There was evidence, that Moulana Bhasani who was earlier swaying Bengali audiences with appeals to the heart, now gave in to Suhrawardy's "superior political acumen".¹¹²⁷

On this vantage point, Suhrawardy could afford to pronounce remarks that could seemingly breed a sense of misunderstanding among the Bengalis. But my abiding impression is this that beneath the apparent irreconcilable contradictory utterances made by Suhrawardy and the A.L. rank and file there was an agreement on the fundamentals. There was an element of histrionic finesse in their demeanor. I think it was all tactical and strategic. A vigorous pressure pertaining to provincial autonomy was brought to bear upon the Pakistan polity for purposes of further deconcentration of power. I think the *reticence* of Suhrawardy occasionally become *manifest* in the utterances of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This point would be further illustrated if we would read Abul Mansur Ahmed's fascinating, book, where he meticulously pointed out the scenario of cabinet meeting, showing how he was rescued eventually by Suhrawardy. Although, the Prime Minister had started in a vein of mock heroic verbal fight, ostensibly harassed his close colleague, putting puzzling questions on the submitted proposal in relation to autonomy only to be rewarded, with approval, later on.¹¹²⁸

In sum, there was no fundamental difference between Suhrawardy and his lieutenants and the rank and file of the A.L. *in the periods under examination, touching the provincial autonomy*. They were not antipodes to each other. Whatever, differences that peeped through the period was in terms of emphasis, methodology, approach, timing and vision. A difference of opinion in matters of foreign policy witnessed an outright expulsion of the General Secretary of the A.L. Mr. Mahmudul Huq Osmani. But there was no application of this measure in East Pakistan situation. On the contrary, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, returning from Karachi to Dhaka, after having attended the N.A.

¹¹²⁵ Speech at Paltan Maiden, *Dawn*, February 26, 1957.

¹¹²⁶ *Dawn*, February 20, 1957.

¹¹²⁷ See *Times*, June 11, 1957.

¹¹²⁸ See Abul Mansur Ahmed, *Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Boshar* (Naorze Kitabisthan, 1975) pp. 412-418.

urged in defence of Suhrawardy, the "interested parties not to make false propaganda against the Prime Minister". He asked people to go through the statement of Suhrawardy made in the parliament where he gave full support in favor of autonomy in the provinces. The Sheikh emphatically maintained that "it would be possible for the A.L. to achieve its objectives only when there would be an Awami League government at the centre. At present the A.L. is in the coalition with another party ... so everything is not possible in the present context..."¹¹²⁹ What is more, when Suhrawardy was controversially ousted from the office, the Sheikh observed *Hartal* throughout East Pakistan and made a scathing comment that it was because East Pakistan had been getting her just dues under Suhrawardy that he had been removed.¹¹³⁰

S.H. Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had all along been bracketed in *Guru-Chella* situation even, since the days of forties. The Sheikh who regarded Suhrawardy as his "leader" and a "superman" as well, had also been closely associated with Suhrawardy in his last minute drive for independent, sovereign and undivided Bengal.¹¹³¹ Similarly, Suhrawardy had also deep affection for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who would call him boastfully as "my star organizer". Undoubtedly, they had been, politically speaking, confidant and, above all, *amicus curiae*, to each other, till the last.

However, reverting back to the question of interpretation of autonomy resolution in its prevailing setting we find that, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the G.S. (General Secretary) of the East Pakistan A.L. and a provincial Minister, viewed the resolution as an embodiment of *financial autonomy* for East Pakistan not *political autonomy*.¹¹³² Later on, he further elucidated the point that the East Pakistan legitimate financial claims could be met through the medium of the *National Economic Council* and the *National Finance Commission*.¹¹³³ He had earlier admitted before the N.A. that the central government, for the first time, was showing interest in East Pakistan industries.¹¹³⁴ Similarly, Aaur Rahman, the A.L. Chief Minister stated that the central government would set up a committee to study how far autonomy could be granted "without disturbing the integrity of Pakistan."¹¹³⁵ Abul Mansur Ahmed, another stalwart Awami Leaguer expressed similar feelings.¹¹³⁶ In other words, the moderates at the head of Suhrawardy who far outweighed the extremists did not do anything that would have amounted to as an attack to the Constitution. We have already mentioned what had really occasioned the moving of the resolution. No sooner had the resolution been adopted than the saner leaders publicly reasserted their belief in the machineries envisaged in the Constitution to resolve conflicts—an act of strengthening constitutionalism and the institutions

¹¹²⁹ See *Dawn*, April 28, 1957.

¹¹³⁰ See *Ibid*, October 26, 1957.

¹¹³¹ See Harun-or-Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*, (Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka), 1987, p. 323.

¹¹³² *Dawn*, April 5, 1957.

¹¹³³ *Ibid.*, April 9, 1957.

¹¹³⁴ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 16, 1957, p. 553.

¹¹³⁵ Quoted in *Times*, May 12, 1957. See *Dawn*, July 8, 1957.

¹¹³⁶ See *Dawn*, October 20, 1957.

which were created earlier. They did not precipitate the issue at flashpoint, on the contrary, they were agreeable to a constitutional remedy for their economic grievances. Again, a question may be posed to explain the forceful demand for provincial autonomy in the late 1960s based on six point in East Pakistan bordering on secession,¹¹³⁷ when, according to our submission politicians of moderate persuasion were so well-meaning in the late 1950s.

The answer is the same as has been suggested in connection with the one-unit problem. In both cases the problem was one of decentralization of culture and economy and the task for solving the problem had been entrusted to a regime which was inherently incapable of doing so. Too much of authoritarianism and too little of politics which had been going on since October, 1958 was the proximate cause for the demand of full provincial autonomy grounded on six-point in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of the one-unit in West Pakistan. In the absence of political freedom, the East-West bridge which was in the process of being durably built in the parliamentary era, was then coming apart. Denuded of democracy, negative political *snowballing* effect descended on the Pakistan polity. And the irony had it, that East Pakistanis came to regard, and rightly so, the then political system as an instrument of West Pakistan domination over the east. Had democracy prevailed, East Pakistan would have much control over her political, economic and cultural affairs and thus reflected larger accommodation and loyalty. Things came to such a pass that East Pakistan held the view that she had been economically fleeced by the Western: Pakistan,¹¹³⁸ while the latter cried wolf of secession in the jungle of East Pakistan.¹¹³⁹ Conveniently, they did find one wolf of secession—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—in the shape of the famous *Agartala conspiracy* in 1968 only to be set free in January, 1969 on account of democratic pressures culminating in the epoch making popular crescendo for emancipation under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.¹¹⁴⁰

However, the reason we have dealt at some length with the issues of provincial autonomy and dismemberment of the one-unit scheme is to show the varying general motivating forces of those demands in juxtaposition with the particular motives of the leftists vis-à-vis the rightists. We have so far postponed dealing with the situation arising out of the dismemberment resolution in West Pakistan legislature only to show how the shoals of regionalism had also threatened to rock Suhrawardy's boat in the eastern part earlier and the prominent leaders thereof survived the test of the autonomy

¹¹³⁷ *Times*, February 25, 1969.

¹¹³⁸ Disparity between the per capita incomes of the two provinces increased from £5.0-0 in 1959 to about £8-6-0 in 1967. See *Times*, June 25, 1968. "Pakistan's overall economy has grown by 5 percent a year for the past five years. Yet East Pakistan's situation has probably declined during those years". Nicholas Tomalin, "Portrait of a dying land", *Sunday Times*, March 16, 1969.

¹¹³⁹ See Cyril Dunn, "Why Pakistan must hold that Bengal tiger", *Observer*, March 9, 1969.

¹¹⁴⁰ The struggle of Bangabandhu for existence for a repressed humanity and a liberation war leading to independence of Bangladesh will be critically narrated in my forthcoming book - *The Saga of Bangabandhu: The birth of an independent Bangladesh 1958-1971*.

question without jeopardizing the constitutional structure of the country. Now we go back to Suhrawardy's grappling with the another burning issue, the anti-one-unit resolution.

Of leadership Professor Laski wrote that "its ability to use the issue for the purpose of making known its central philosophy is the real test of its quality, the proof of its power to take the offensive in party warfare."¹¹⁴¹ In Pakistan, Suhrawardy was an example.

He knew that his coalition government depended on the support of the Republicans, the party, which had just entered into a sinister alliance with the N.A.P. to delete a vital piece of the constitution. Uninhibited by personal aspirations or considerations he immediately took the issue to the public bar. He stumped up and down in every part of West Pakistan explaining to the people the philosophy underlying the one-unit and urging them to rise above the level of their sub-societies in favor of a supra-society, the one-unit.¹¹⁴² He told the West Pakistanis: "I am not prepared for any measures which may delay the general elections ... We can have stability only if we have general elections. General elections must be held under the present constitution."¹¹⁴³ The Prime Minister rose to the height of true leadership unconcerned that the plank of Republican support could be withdrawn from under his feet. He could easily beguile his time as the Prime Minister and as an East Pakistani he could have indulged in an euphoria wishing a plague on the house of West Pakistan. He did not do that as he looked at Pakistan as one national constituency. He was both listened to and secured a response from the East Pakistan M.L. and the N-I-P which supported the Prime Minister.¹¹⁴⁴ West Pakistan, M.L., Jamaat-e-Islam did, the same¹¹⁴⁵ and Daultana urged the ensuing M.L. Council meeting at Dacca "to take a categorical and clear decision to support one-unit."¹¹⁴⁶ Also, the Press rallied round the Prime Minister's leadership.¹¹⁴⁷

It was alleged that Suhrawardy with an eye on the coming general election found in the issue an opportunity for building up his party in West Pakistan by making it a rallying point for the parties opposing the break up.¹¹⁴⁸ Chances were he might have visions of a sweeping victory for the A.L. in the general elections under his leadership and letting himself emerge as a national leader for all Pakistan. Political ambitions *per se* are not evil, rather a virtue so long as they are compatible to the good of the country. Here the Prime Minister's alleged ambition was rather contributory than derogatory to national interest.

¹¹⁴¹ Laski, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

¹¹⁴² For this massive campaigning see *Dawn*, September 25, October 4, 6, 7,9. 1957.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, September 24, 1957.

¹¹⁴⁴ *Dawn*, September 23 and 26, 1957.

¹¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, September 28, 1957.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, October 9, 1957.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, September 25, 1957.

¹¹⁴⁸ *New York Times*, October 10, 1957.

However, the net result of Suhrawardy's counter offensive to the R.P.- N.A.P. move for calling a special N.A. session to undo one-unit¹¹⁴⁹ bore fruit in that Dr. Khan declined to press for drastic amendments in the constitution before the general elections and pledged for the consolidation of the one-unit.¹¹⁵⁰ But in doing so he avenged Suhrawardy's washing of Republicans dirty linen before the public by withdrawing R.P. support from the coalition. As a matter of fact that the coalition cabinet that was installed earlier consisted of essentially, two diverse political forces not only belonging to different geographical regions of Pakistan, but also exhibiting different tendencies. Accommodation could not outlive mundane consideration.¹¹⁵¹

But a profile in political courage was registered in the esoteric history of Pakistan. Historically speaking, there was a touch of tragic irony of epic proportion, after the fashion of a Greek fallen hero in his character. He, as it were, made a tryst with a predestined fate which transpired as tragic, pathetic and agonizing. He always got himself involved in unpopular political issues. With undaunted spirit and courage Suhrawardy braved through the ordeals sometimes remaining alone in the breeze. He had one distinction i.e. courage which easily distinguished himself from the rest of the contemporary politicians. At partition, he chose to remain in Calcutta-India – to render succor to the ill-fated minority community. Again, he had to return to Pakistan and started *de novo*. He institutionalized opposition with painstaking efforts in a parliamentary system in otherwise an opposition less country. When he made the Bengalis agreeable to the difficult and unpopular idea of *parity* between the two wings, he had the *courage of his conviction*. When Pakistan was at crossroads during the Governor Generalship of Golan Mohammed he had the courage of his conviction to sell the idea of constitution convention to salvage the country. He again displayed his real pro-western grit in the conduction of foreign policy and also in defence of pro-British plan at the height of Suez crisis. We do not say that Suhrawardy was always infallible in his show of courage. All we say that as a political leader the never oscillated in *the to-be-or not-to-be* situation but would clinch the issue going to *the offensive level of his leadership*, come what may. He would either ascend or descend by his conviction, courage and commitments.

However, as a sequel to R.P. withdrawal of support, the Prime minister asked President Mirza to call a N.A. session on October 24, 1957 to test if he had still the confidence of the House.¹¹⁵² The President turned a deaf ear to this plea and the Prime Minister resigned in deference to the wishes of the former.¹¹⁵³ Spontaneous protest rallies in both wings of Pakistan – including one complete *Hartal* (strike) in Dacca were held criticizing the manner of Suhrawardy's removal, demanding his recall and urging the convening

¹¹⁴⁹ *Dawn*, September 25, 1957.

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, October 8, 1957; also *Hindu*, October 12, 1957.

¹¹⁵¹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 11, 1956; *Hindu*, October 13, 1957.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid.*, October 11, 1957.

¹¹⁵³ *Manchester Guardian*, October 12, 1957.

of the N.A. Never had there been such protest rallies held in both parts of Pakistan in sympathy for an outgoing Prime Minister during the entire parliamentary history of Pakistan.¹¹⁵⁴

Why did not the President launch a salvage operation for the Prime Minister who had so gallantly fought the battle of foreign policy and one-unit issues in which General Mirza had the deepest commitments? There was a time when General Mirza on many an occasion maintained: "The Prime Minister and I will stick together. I regard him as the ablest man in Pakistan today."¹¹⁵⁵ But they could not stick together. In politics, "where personality enters, capriciousness begins",¹¹⁵⁶ so was the case with Suhrawardy and General Mirza in Pakistan. They were poles asunder in their respective attitudes towards the art of governance. General Mirza would be willing to let Suhrawardy grow big but not big enough to eclipse him. Besides, "the President did not want a precedent under which the Assembly determined whether a Prime Minister enjoyed its confidence, to be established."¹¹⁵⁷ On strict constitutional ground (Art. 37:3) the President was unassailable in that it was he who was competent to judge if the Prime Minister had a majority in the N.A. Evidently, the Prime Minister had no majority in the House the moment Republican support was removed.¹¹⁵⁸ The President's sense of arithmetic and legality was infallible but his sense of parliamentary ethics fell short of popular expectation as manifested in his spurning the request of the Prime Minister. Besides, he could have cried halt to all these developments in the first place, by having dissuaded the R.P. on which he was believed to have ample holds¹¹⁵⁹ from deserting the coalition government. Instead, he "sent out of office the only available man with aptitude as a politician and giving reasonable promise of national leadership".¹¹⁶⁰

Suhrawardy reinforced the pattern of parliamentary politics that had taken a healthy turn since the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly II, and set the ball rolling for further regularization and strengthening of the existing institutions. His regime witnessed the release of political prisoners and freedom of speech, press and political parties to operate. No less important on social, economic and political grounds was the question of the rehabilitation of refugees. Suhrawardy retained the refugee portfolio himself. As a result the pace of rehabilitation was quickened in his period – from 1947 to February 1957 6.8 million refugees were rehabilitated¹¹⁶¹ out of 8.48 million.¹¹⁶²

¹¹⁵⁴ For details see *New York Times*, 12 October, 1957; *Times*, October 14, 1957; *Dawn*, October 14, 15, 16, 1957.

¹¹⁵⁵ *New York Times*, January 13, 1957.

¹¹⁵⁶ Bagehot, *op.cit.*, p. 242.

¹¹⁵⁷ K.B. Syed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan", *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 13, 1959), p. 398.

¹¹⁵⁸ C.B. Marshall, "Reflections on a revolution in Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 37 (January, 1959). p. 252.

¹¹⁵⁹ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 19, 1957, p. 736.

¹¹⁶⁰ See *Dawn's Leader*, September 25, 1957.

¹¹⁶¹ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 19, 1957, p.736.

¹¹⁶² *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 12, 1957, p.213.

On the realm of economy the performance was not happy. The State Banks review of the year 1956-57 spoke of "serious strains" on the economy, a shortage of consumer goods, new materials and spare parts. The stoppage of the Suez Canal was partly responsible for this. But excessive expenditure on government's account, the import of 500,000 tons of wheat for West Pakistan and 800,000 tons of rice for the East, while defence ate up half the revenue were also some causes of economic difficulties. Though industrial growth was encouraging. In the past year industrial output was 35 percent more than in 1955. Production of jute rose from 188,000 to 1,300,000 tons; sugar from 95,000 to 125,000 tons; cotton textiles from 453 million to 502 million yards. Output of cement and paper rose substantially. The P.I.D.C. claimed to have saved 60 million worth of foreign exchange. Karachi's new shipyards now could build and repair ships of 7,000 tons. Similar development was taking place at Chittagong, East Pakistan. It now had both cotton and jute mills. Suhrawardy devoted himself to the task of erasing disparity between the wings. Having done away with the Chief Controllers office in Karachi he created three independent office of Controller of Exports and imports one each at Chittagong for eastern zone, Lahore for the West Pakistan and Karachi for the federal zone. Equally boldly, he made arrangements for equal division of earned foreign exchange between the wings and federal region. He also put into motion a new financial year beginning July each year enabling East Pakistan executives sufficient time to complete developmental works before the monsoon. There were other pioneering works saw the light of day under the tutelage of Suhrawardy.¹¹⁶³ However, the most serious blemish in the national wealth was agricultural production which was 3½ percent in 1956 below that of 1955.¹¹⁶⁴

Pakistan's first 5-year plan was launched almost simultaneously with the inauguration of Pakistan as a Republic under the new Constitution a common starting point served to inspire promise of a new and better future for the nation. Pakistan's National Economic Council (Art. 199) the supreme economic body in the country held its first meeting under the Chairmanship of Suhrawardy¹¹⁶⁵ on February 19, 1957, who emphasized uniform economic development in all parts of the country.¹¹⁶⁶ Besides, the N.E.C. officially approved the draft 5-year plan together with its overall size at the revised figure of £771.4 million as against £828.5 million in the first draft. The most important aspect of Suhrawardy's economic leadership was his giving a strong bias to agriculture in what was called the "reorientation policy."¹¹⁶⁷ On the basis of this new emphasis the government spent \$24 million on a "grow more food campaign to include new irrigation and cleaning old canals of salinity."¹¹⁶⁸ The interest Suhrawardy¹¹⁶⁹ showed towards

¹¹⁶³ For further details see "Memoirs", *op cit.* pp. 43-44. 360

¹¹⁶⁴ See *Observer Foreign News Service*, October 11, 1957.

¹¹⁶⁵ This was also an act of consolidation of the institution.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Times*, February 20, 1957.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Financial Times*, February 20, 1957.

¹¹⁶⁸ See *Observer*, October 11, 1957.

¹¹⁶⁹ Dr. Papanek - a Harvard teacher and economic adviser to Pakistan government - told the writer in 1966 at a gathering of international students, Harvard that Suhrawardy was very keen on economic development. He used

economic development was indicative of his having called the N.E.C. to session several times, viz. January 29, February 19, April 10, July 27 and August 29, 1957.¹¹⁷⁰ Actually, before Suhrawardy could break a new ground in the emphasis of economic planning and have a strong grip on the country's economy he had to go, no matter prudence dictated no change of horse in the midstream.

to come to N.E.C. meeting well-studied and well-informed and was eager to discover the rationale of economic planning vis-à-vis Pakistan.

¹¹⁷⁰ *Dawn*, December 30, 1957.

BREAK OF CONTINUITY

With the halo of martyrdom Suhrawardy now went back to the N.A. as the leader of the opposition, and I.I. Chundrigar (M.L.) the then opposition leader was commissioned by the President to form a new Cabinet which he did with the alliance¹¹⁷¹ of the M.L., N-I-P, R.P. and K.S.P.¹¹⁷² It was, no doubt, in accordance with parliamentary convention to ask the opposition leader to form the Ministry. The R.P. was insistent on getting the Prime Ministership,¹¹⁷³ but the M.L. fastened a condition to this effect that the Republicans who were just 'deserters' from the M.L. must return to the parent body, the compliance of which would have spelt suicide for the R.P.¹¹⁷⁴ Having just sent out of office a liberal government the R.P. was now rather a fish out of water. The M.L.- R.P. coalition presented an interesting situation in that both parties might well have hoped to absorb each other ultimately. It was rather more in line with the M.L. mood of bringing back renegades into its fold once again as reflected in its recently held council meeting at Dacca. Evidently, there was one redeeming feature of the new coalition in that it held out the prospect of a solution of the long stalemate between the Republicans and M.L. in the West Pakistan legislature and the restoration of political normalcy in the province. Also, it would not be vulnerable to N.A.P.'s pressure for disintegrating the one-unit against which Suhrawardy had fought so successfully a while ago and lost his office as a premium. Advantages apart, the Chundrigar government on the whole, had a touch of Gresham's law of economy in the political sense. It sought for the substitution for the joint electorates by separate ones an attempt to unsettle the settled matter.

Now that they staged a remarkable come-back to power they forged ahead with the task of undoing the joint electorate. And the 53-day old Chundrigar Cabinet was singularly identified with the introduction of fresh complications, electorate issue. Draft legislation to provide for separate electorates as the basis of the general elections were finalized and were ready to be placed before the Cabinet and moved in the N.A.¹¹⁷⁵ The R.P. came back to itself and set up a fact-finding committee to assess public opinion vis-à-vis the electorate issue and cautioned the Chundrigar government 'to go slow'.¹¹⁷⁶ On the eve of the departure of the Fact-finding Committee to East Pakistan, the Karachi M.L., as an ancillary to its cause, managed a rowdy demonstration in front of the N.A.

¹¹⁷¹ The party position at this stage in the N.A. is the following: R.P. 26; M.L. 13; A.L. 13; N.A.P. 4; N-I-P. 3; Congress 4; Sc. C. 2; U.P.P. 1; K.S.P. 7 and independents 5 - two vacancies. The U.F. disintegrated the moment N-I-P left it. *Hindu*, October 12, 1957.

¹¹⁷² Sarkar group of the K.S.P. not Hamidul Huq's. Also see *Dawn*, October 18, 1957.

¹¹⁷³ *Times*, October 14, 1957.

¹¹⁷⁴ *Hindu*, October 14, 1957.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Dawn*, October 28, 1957.

¹¹⁷⁶ This was the decision of the central organizing committee of the R.P. It also requested the coalition government not to do anything which would result in the postponement of the general elections. See *Hsinhua News Agency*, November 22, 1957.

at session and smashed Suhrawardy's car. Chundrigar himself addressed the crowd from the N.A. balcony.¹¹⁷⁷ After a fact-finding orbit of the country the Committee came back to Karachi convinced that the people were in favor of the joint electorates.¹¹⁷⁸

The R. P. from the very beginning had been uncomfortable being with the M. L. in the coalition lest it should lose its own identity and finally the elections: The electorate issue knocked it into senses that it had some common grounds with the A.L. than with the M.L. It took the Republicans 53 days to realize that no love had been really lost between them and the Awami Leaguers following Suhrawardy's ouster. Perhaps Suhrawardy himself, on the whole, did not mind being out of the Office prior to the elections as he might have thought it more tactical fighting elections from outside of office.¹¹⁷⁹ So there occurred a rapprochement between these two parties in what was described as "a dramatic physical display of a new party grouping in one of the committee rooms of the National Assembly".¹¹⁸⁰ They—the A.L. and Republicans—along with the Congress, U.P.P., Sc. C., N.A.P. and K.S.P.¹¹⁸¹ offered to form a new government and pledged to hold elections by next November with a common voters list. Chundrigar resigned on the 11th December, 1957 after having met a post-midnight—3 a.m.—Cabinet meeting but was recommissioned by the President¹¹⁸² to form a new Cabinet if he could find like-minded people in favor of the separate electorates.¹¹⁸³ Chundrigar returned the Commission to the President on the 13th December as he failed to get support of the majority of members of the N.A. on the basis of the system of separate electorates, but, at the same time, he advised the President to call upon, from amongst the members of the N.A., another person who was most likely to command the confidence of the majority of members.¹¹⁸⁴

The ruling coalition was now formed by Firoz Khan Noon (Republican) with the support of the A.L., Congress, N.A.P. and K.S.P. (Hamidul Huq group) whose total strength turned out to be a little over 50 in the N.A. The parties supporting Noon were chary of joining the Cabinet immediately,¹¹⁸⁵ which prompted a comment from the opposition leader, Chundrigar to this effect that "effective powers would not thus reside in the Cabinet, but in a group of members who ... have refrained from participation in

¹¹⁷⁷ *Scotsman*, November 30, 1957; also *Dawn*, November 30, 1957.

¹¹⁷⁸ *Dawn*, December 9, 1957. The Committee visited 8 districts of East Pakistan, received 60 deputations, 2,700 telegrams, 500 postcards, 32 memoranda containing 300 pages and attended 16 public meetings.

¹¹⁷⁹ "New alliances in the making?" by the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, February 25, 1958.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Observer Foreign News Services*, December 12, 1957.

¹¹⁸¹ Hamidul Haq Group.

¹¹⁸² The contrast of the Presidential behavior is illuminating. He had earlier received the resignation of Suhrawardy and refused to call the N. A. session, but in Chundrigar's case he rather recommissioned him, though obviously he had no majority support.

¹¹⁸³ *Times*, December 12, 1957; also *Dawn*, December 12, 1957.

¹¹⁸⁴ *Dawn*, December 14, 1957.

¹¹⁸⁵ *Times*, December 17, 1957.

the government.¹¹⁸⁶ This innuendo was meant for the Awami league. In reality, Noon was neither a puppet nor subservient to the coalescing parties; for, he displayed, fairly remarkably, his independence and sense of constitutionality. He refused to grant Rs. 11,00,00,000 to the A.L. government of East Pakistan to tide over food and epidemic.¹¹⁸⁷ Unscared by the fact that his government rested on the support of the A.L. Similarly, he refused to be dictated to by the K.S.P. in regard to the distribution of portfolios among its members.¹¹⁸⁸ Also, he did not drop Messrs. K.K. Dutta and B.K. Das (Congress) from his Cabinet in favor of the Congress members of the A.L. government in East Pakistan as was demanded by the A.L.¹¹⁸⁹ In short, he made his mark as the Republican Prime Minister of a coalition government.

About the question as to why the coalescing parties did not join the Cabinet straight away the answer, perhaps, could be found in their ambivalent positions i.e. whether, in the face of coming general elections, would they be better off by being inside the government or outside the government. Finally, the initial reluctance of the parties to join the Cabinet developed, later on, into a willingness to do so. As a result, the strength of the Pakistan Federal government rose to 26 by October 2, 1958, out of a N.A. of 80 members. In other words, one M.P. in three was a Minister. Parity was maintained in that the coalition government consisted of 8 Cabinet Ministers and 4 Ministers of State from West Pakistan, and 9 Cabinet Ministers and 4 Ministers of State from East Pakistan.¹¹⁹⁰ A significant change did take place—though for a brief period as, for the first time since the creation of Pakistan, an East Pakistani was entrusted with the portfolio of finance.¹¹⁹¹

To all intents and purposes, the Noon government was born of the desire of the coalescing parties to hold the elections under the common voters list in no time. The Prime Minister himself reiterated that fact and told the nation that his Cabinet was going to stay until polls were held.¹¹⁹² A programme for general polls rehearsals was chalked out by the Election Commission by early January, 1958.¹¹⁹³ The Pakistan Delimitation Commission completed its task of delimitation of constituencies in West Pakistan on 9th April, 1958¹¹⁹⁴—the same job was completed in East Pakistan on June 15, 1957. The Electoral Rolls for East Pakistan were published on May 11, 1958 to educate the voters—"the first concrete step towards holding elections".¹¹⁹⁵ The election

¹¹⁸⁶ *Dawn*, December 19, 1957.

¹¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, June 10, 1958.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Manchester Guardian*, June 10, 1958.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Dawn*, September 16, 1958.

¹¹⁹⁰ *Manchester Guardian*, October 3, 1958.

¹¹⁹¹ *Times*, September 18, 1958.

¹¹⁹² *Dawn*, March 9, 1958.

¹¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, January 11, 1958.

¹¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, April 10, 1958.

¹¹⁹⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, May 12, 1958.

rules were published by Gazette extraordinary on June 17, 1958.¹¹⁹⁶ The Prime Minister's belief in holding elections in November, 1958 was further reinforced by the Chief Election Commissioner's declaration on the 26th February, 1958 that the elections would be held as scheduled.¹¹⁹⁷ Meanwhile, 15 Deputy commissioners from East Pakistan made a representation to the Prime Minister to the effect that the holding of the general elections in November, 1958 would be unsuitable because the time clashed with the harvesting period in East Pakistan. Consequently, the Prime Minister called a National Election Conference on July 18, 1958.¹¹⁹⁸ The Conference was attended by 41 leaders of various parties and it was unanimously decided that the elections would be held on the 15th February, 1959.¹¹⁹⁹ Accordingly, the Election Commission published the final electoral rolls including West Pakistan on 22nd September, 1958. Thirty-eight million voters were listed for the general elections. The total number of voters registered in East Pakistan was 2,19,51,086, of these the male was 1,17,53,386, the rest female. The voters in West Pakistan numbered 1,60,37,536, of these the male was 11,19,797 and the female 59,17,739.¹²⁰⁰ Hence, the country after 11 years of patient waiting was now well poised for the holding of the general elections.

¹¹⁹⁶ *Dawn*, June 18, 1958.

¹¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, February 27, 1958.

¹¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, July 19, 1958.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*. July 29, 1958.

¹²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, September 23, 1958.

A BOLT FROM THE BLUE

Suddenly, there was a bolt from the blue. Within a fortnights time after the publication of the final voting lists, the President on October 7, 1958 promulgated martial law in the country and abrogated the constitution, dissolved the N.A. and provincial Assemblies, abolished political parties and dismissed the central and provincial governments. He reasoned that "The mentality of the political parties had sunk so low that I am unable to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today."¹²⁰¹

We shall now examine the precipitating and underlying causes which led to such a drastic measure.

As the year 1958 wore on Pakistan became economically beleaguered. She suffered an adverse balance of payments deficit. Foreign exchange earnings the life-blood of economic development of any underdeveloped country – during the second half of the trade year, 1958 were nearly 200 million rupees less than those of the corresponding period in the previous year, i.e. Rs. 850,000,000.¹²⁰² Yet, in 1957 Pakistan's export earnings were running below the level of expectation so much so that the trade year (July 1956 June 1957) of 1957 ended with a balance of payments deficit to the tune of Rs. 26.66 crores – the largest since 1952-53 and was in marked contrast with the 1955-56 surplus of Rs. 34.99 crores. The momentum of the 1955 devaluation was lost. The total foreign exchange earnings, which amounted to Rs. 208.97 crores in 1955-56, were Rs. 190.8 crores in 1956-57.¹²⁰³ And except for jute manufactures, every item of export showed reduced earnings which resulted in an adverse balance of trade, for the first five months of 1958, estimated to be about 11 crores of rupees.¹²⁰⁴

Compared with the low export earnings there was progressive rise in the spiral of the government's import bill – viz. 1954, Rs. 145 crores; 1958, Rs. 143 crores; 1956, Rs. 204 crores; 1957, Rs. 228 crores; 1958, Rs. 95 crores (first half-year).¹²⁰⁵ Since the adverse balance of payments for the year ended in June 30, 1958, was 20 percent higher than in the previous year, the cumulative effects were that the gold, dollar and sterling reserves slumped to historic low e.g. £66 million, compared with £104 million three years earlier.¹²⁰⁶ On the home front, the situation was not encouraging either. The internal

¹²⁰¹ *Daily Telegraph*, October 8, 1958.

¹²⁰² *Manchester Guardian*, April 24, 1958.

¹²⁰³ *Times*, November 18, 1957.

¹²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, October 27, 1958.

¹²⁰⁵ *N.A.D.*, III, September 9, 1958, p. 665.

¹²⁰⁶ See Sir Percival Griffiths's article in *Financial Times*, November 27, 1958.

revenue receipts dwindled to Rs. 99 crores in 1957-58, while the expenditure on collection charges rose from Rs. 2.50 crores to Rs. 3.18 crores in the same year. When a situation like this warranted draconian measures the country virtually slipped into prodigality. Expenditure on general administration rose from Rs. 8 crores to Rs. 17 crores. To crown everything, the country now had the largest ever number of provincial and central Ministers and a glut of Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to be maintained by the States already hard-pressed purse.¹²⁰⁷ Consequently, money had to be created, to meet various expenditure, by an overdose of currency circulation. As a result, the money supply in the country soared from Rs. 390.64 crores in 1955 to a quantum exceeding Rs. 501.53 crores by the end of the year 1956.¹²⁰⁸ Since then, this trend was always on the increase. That meant the internal and external value of Pakistan "Rupee" touched a low point. And this sort of deficit financing surcharged the economy with inflation resulting in the increase of commodity prices, particularly of foodstuffs whose index of price registered 11 points higher in 1958 compared with the last year.¹²⁰⁹

How did Pakistan economy come to such a pass? From the year 1956 down to the first half of 1958 Pakistan spent from her own foreign exchange resources 53.2 crores on account of food imports alone.¹²¹⁰ This huge amount could have been added to the foreign exchange reserve to back up the currency and survive the vicissitudes of foreign trade, but for food imports.¹²¹¹ At the same time Pakistan could not sell her export materials at favorable terms. Raw jute prices fell during the first quarter of 1958 by 5 to 10 dollars a ton. Raw cotton prices fell more. Wool prices slumped by two to three dollars during the same period.¹²¹² So, Pakistan fell victim to the world depression in the commodity market. Besides, the government had ended the licensing of raw jute export to the non-American account area far back in February, 1956.¹²¹³ When the various pacts were laid down before the N.A. it was known that Pakistan, according to pact contracts, would not be entitled to sell her commodities "to the enemies of peace"¹²¹⁴ i.e. the communist countries. In other words, Pakistan had no larger choice in the world commodity market to this end of getting a favorable price for her export materials. Despite American military aid the Pakistan government expenditure on defence averaged Rs. 77 crores 1947-58. When the Finance Minister wanted to slash high figures

¹²⁰⁷ See *Dawn*, May 18, 1958 (Editorial) "While the sun shines - 1".

¹²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, January 8, 1958 (Editorial) "Our Currency". See also the statement of the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, *Dawn*, July 3, 1957.

¹²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, September 10, 1958.

¹²¹⁰ *N.A.D.* Vol. III, September 9, 1958, p. 666.

¹²¹¹ To a query, the then Finance Minister, Syed Amjad Ali, told the writer that he did not borrow money to buy food because of the after-effect of deferred payment.

¹²¹² *Manchester Guardian*, April 24, 1958: see also *Times*, 10 September, 1958.

¹²¹³ See *Financial Times* February 11, 1956.

¹²¹⁴ See debates. *N.A.D.* Vol. I, February 25, 1957, p. 1064.

on defence expenditure from the budget, he was told by the defence experts that no reduction would be possible.¹²¹⁵

Of all the foreign aids received i.e. \$839 million, only \$186 million was used, constructively speaking, in the purchase of capital equipment and machinery and the rest was spent to keep the industries going¹²¹⁶ and import food. The debt-servicing charge for the loans, grants, etc., etc., cost Pakistan 8 percent of her foreign exchange earnings. And the food subsidy.¹²¹⁷ Pakistan had to pay America from 1956 to 1958 was Rs. 33 crores.¹²¹⁸ Since Pakistan had weaker bargaining power she had to pay in subsidy perhaps no less than the sums received in aid. As one critic pointed out that "Rich societies do not generally lend or give money unless they can profit by doing so."¹²¹⁹ These are the imponderables of economic aid to be faced by any developing countries, let alone Pakistan. They may suffer in not receiving aid, in as much as by receiving the same. As far as Pakistan was concerned she had certain intrinsic economic difficulties in that she had neither control on the natural calamities on which caprice depended largely the volume of export materials nor on the terms and conditions on economic aid flowing into the country.

The first Five Year Plan (1955-1960) was prepared in late 1955. Its first draft was published in 1956, and received official approval by the N.E.C. in April 1957.¹²²⁰ Usually, the central government was accused of belated production of the 5-year plan. Perhaps, the delay was uneconomic but, surely not undemocratic. Economic development "required the mobilization of the entire people" both physically and emotionally,¹²²¹ so that they develop a sense of national goals and a 'will to develop'. The participation of the people in Pakistan's economic activities was as legitimate as in political activities. The Planning Commission reflected the desire for popular participation so that the people could feel that "the plan embodies their hopes and aspirations."¹²²² Accordingly, institutions such as Chambers of Commerce and industries, universities, trade unions, local self-governing bodies, cooperative societies and the press were sounded and their suggestions were carefully weighed before the plan was finally compiled.¹²²³ It is interesting to note that two major events, namely the creation of a political framework and the preparation of an economic framework for Pakistan took place in a climate of popular participation. The plan being the first of its kind in Pakistan reflected a passionate desire to have socio-economic development for

¹²¹⁵ *N.A.D.* Vol. III, September 9, 1958, p. 669.

¹²¹⁶ These included payments for technical assistance, engineering services. industrial raw materials, spare parts and oil.

¹²¹⁷ The American price of rice and wheat was much higher than the international price.

¹²¹⁸ See Finance Minister's speech on economic 'Resolutions'. *N.A.D.*, Vol. III, September 9, 1958 pp. 667-667.

¹²¹⁹ Ral Segal, *The Crisis of India* (A Penguin Special: 1965), p. 185.

¹²²⁰ The final version of the plan was released publicly in May, 1958.

¹²²¹ Organskis P. Katherine and A.F.K., *Population and world power/* New York; 1961), p. 96.

¹²²² *The First Five Year Plan 1955-60*, Vol. I. (Draft) (Planning Board: Government of Pakistan: May, 1956), p. IV.

¹²²³ See *Dawn*, November 4, 1956.

Pakistanis on a just level. Apart from the moralistic tone "reflecting the philosophy of the Planning Board's first Chairman".¹²²⁴ The 652-page long plan was a major treatise on Pakistan social, economic, administrative and educational requirements. It had been a guide to subsequent planning.

The Plan envisaged an increase of 15 percent in national income, in the face of a 1.4 percent population growth, and a per capita income of 7 percent. The private sector of the economy was recommended a share of 30 percent of the funds, and the public sector 70 percent.¹²²⁵ On matters of emphasis the Planning Board said: "Our immediate purpose in the Plan period is to accelerate the process of agricultural development."¹²²⁶ But at the same time it directed that "A balance must be maintained between industry and agriculture by stimulating agricultural progress rather than by curtailing industrial progress."¹²²⁷ But in the implementation of the plan Pakistan committed the usual *faux pas* in neglecting agriculture, as it happened in many other underdeveloped countries which viewed at the giant industrial edifices as a symbol of status in the comity of nations. As a result, "Industries have been the pet child of the central government ever since Pakistan was created."¹²²⁸ Industry had been pushed ahead faster than the resources of the country allowed, while less was done to counteract the annual loss of cultivable lands as a result of water-logging and to use thousands of acres of cultivable land that had been lying untilled for years.¹²²⁹ This was virtually a case of planning trap. It was a pious hope that savings of foreign exchange on manufactures out of industrialization would cancel out the increased need of import for commodities. But in reality, the growth of industrial production stimulated the demand for imported commodities, namely raw materials for the new industries and food products needed to make up the decline in agricultural production. With outlays on capital goods running at a high level, the rate of spending abroad rose still higher. And the shortage of money compelled the government to take recourse to deficit financing without which developmental projects would have come to a standstill.

This lopsidedness of industrial growth to the detriment of agriculture – 'the *Cinderella* of economic development' – was the main cause of economic malaise. This was understood by the Suhrawardy government and, accordingly gave an agricultural bias to development. But the result could not be spectacular as the growth in the agricultural sector was also related to the man-land ratio and the agrarian systems the reform of which the 5-year Plans strongly advocated. This could not be effected as the Republicans happened to be big landlords. It was rather a matter of time. Suffice it to

¹²²⁴ Claire Wilcox, "Pakistan", *Planning Economic Development*, ed. Everett E. Hagan (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1963), p. 63.

¹²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹²²⁶ *The First Five Year Plan, 1955-60* (Planning Board: Government of Pakistan: 1958), p. 213

¹²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹²²⁸ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 12, 1957, p. 171.

¹²²⁹ *Dawn*, May 9, 1958 (Editorial) "While the Sun Shines- II."

say that the government through experience now realized and admitted that "the first phase of industrialization is over; we have neglected agriculture in the past and our emphasis should be entirely now on agriculture".¹²³⁰ This reorientation policy of development was also admitted by the *Financial Times*: "Thus, Pakistan tended to curb industrialization and emphasized on agriculture".¹²³¹

In retrospect, it can be now said that the works e.g. the Ganges-Kabadek Irrigation Project, Teesta Project, the Fertilizer Factory at Fenchuganj, the Guddu Barrage, the Taunsa Barrage, the Jhal Development project, etc., etc., which produced increased agricultural yield in the autocratic and dictatorial period of 1960s, were started in the parliamentary period of 1950s.¹²³² And, as far as the 5-year plan was concerned, despite the political strains, bureaucratic and partisan intervention, a slower inflow of economic aid than anticipated and some bungles in financial management, it established a system of partially completed *social overheads*. Industrial production, which was accelerating between 1950 and 1954, doubled again by 1960. Power capacity tripled, roads were built, university enrollment rose from 3900 to 7400, and the number of graduating engineers increased from 274 to 400 and agricultural graduates totaled 180. And more than 2 million acres were brought under cultivation through irrigation.¹²³³ In short, the plan provided an infrastructure for further development.

However, in examining the government's handling of non-development expenditure and expenditure on general administration we find the government immediately adopted a stringent policy on imports of non-essential goods which were "cut to the bone".¹²³⁴ An Economy Committee consisting of M.P.s was formed far back in early 1957¹²³⁵ to look into the matter of colossal expenditure on the administration and some of its recommendations were heeded by the government. For instance, the Finance Minister told the House that "there was a reduction in some of the services" according to the Economy Committee's proposals, but at the same time he also told the truth that "vested interests once created cannot be easily eliminated".¹²³⁶ One knows that germs of economic malaise have the survival-value of a jellyfish and are no respecter of advanced or backward countries but bring down all to varying levels of crisis. The best thing a civilized nation can do is to face the challenge boldly and imaginatively.

The economic situation in Pakistan was, no doubt, going downhill, but the government did not panic nor succumb to the crisis. It took all the precautionary measures permissible under a parliamentary system of democracy to arrest the trend of economic

¹²³⁰ See Finance Minister's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. III, September 9, 1958, p. 667.

¹²³¹ *Financial Times* September 23, 1958.

¹²³² Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, *An Appraisal of Pakistan's Economic Development*, (Nawa-i-Waqt Printers, Ltd., Karachi, 1967), p. 14.

¹²³³ For details see "Pakistan", *The Economist*, December 2, 1961, pp. 923-940.

¹²³⁴ See *Financial Times*, September 23, 1958.

¹²³⁵ *Dawn*, February 16, 1957.

¹²³⁶ *NAD*, Vol. III, September 9, 1958, p. 669.

deterioration the reserves of gold and foreign exchange amounted to Rs. 88.4 crores i.e. Pakistan by 1958, did still meet the statutory requirement of a backing of 30 percent in gold and foreign exchange for the note issue.¹²³⁷ Hence, the promulgation of martial law and the extermination of parliamentary government on grounds of the politicians' muddling with economy was more a pretext than a real cause.

On the political front, developments were described by Dr. Sayeed in the following terms: "... during the last five years Pakistan has been very much like Hobbes' State of nature where there has been a war of every man against every man. The present martial law administration is the *Leviathan*..."¹²³⁸ Then, what was there precisely in the latest political developments in Pakistan to inspire the arrival of the *Leviathan*? Had there, in fact, a grave emergency existed? There was the allegation of instability of governments both at the centre and in the provinces. The latest example was the national government' undergoing frequent reshuffles, with the A.L. first entering the Cabinet and then quitting the same four days later i.e. on the day of martial law.¹²³⁹ Equally true, was the M.L.'s launching of an aggressive electioneering campaign. Its bloodcurdling threat of crossing the cease fire line of Kashmir to liberate Kashmiris from the yoke of India, the desire of employing volunteer armies (P.N.G.¹²⁴⁰) in elections purposes and finally its constant threat of 'bloody revolution' "if Polls are put off"¹²⁴¹ were cases in point. Similarly, the unfortunate incident that took place on the floor of the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly (September 25) where in a mellee the Deputy Speaker received a blow from a stray missile and finally died in the hospital,¹²⁴² presented a tense-creating situation in politics. On October 3, 1958 the ex-ruler of Kalat State proclaimed his intention to declare himself once again the ruler of the Kalat State, which had legally acceded to Pakistan long ago.¹²⁴³ Added to it were the N.A.P.'s ever increasing activities to mobilize mass support for the disintegration of the one-unit, the pursuit of a neutral foreign policy devoid of military alliances and agrarian reform. To crown all, it had been alleged that Pakistan political life was replete with corruptions and lack of principles and the fight over office, power and perquisites was endemic. Evidently, the facts mentioned above were all true. A *prima facie* view of these facts will indicate that the situation was dangerous needing a preventive measure, unless we weigh carefully the premises of our reasoning. A closer look at the situation should reveal that the heavens were not really falling upon Pakistan as they perhaps appeared to be.

¹²³⁷ Under the dictatorial rule, the reserves of gold and foreign exchange came down to Rs. 79 crores in June 1967 and the statutory provision had to be amended. Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan for 1966- 67, quoted in Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, *op.cit.*, p.44.

¹²³⁸ K.B. Syeed, "Formative Phase", *op.cit.*, p. 437.

¹²³⁹ *New York Times*, October 8, 1958.

¹²⁴⁰ Pakistan National Guards.

¹²⁴¹ See Qayyum's speech (M.L. President), *Dawn*, July 4 and 15, 1958 and October 5, 1958.

¹²⁴² *Dawn*, September 26, 1958.

¹²⁴³ *Ibid.*, October 4, 1958.

To begin with, we think the remark that Pakistan during the last five years of parliamentary life was in a *Hobbesian state of nature* i.e. nasty, brutish and short, is, perhaps a bit inexact. We, on the contrary, hold that the very last five years of Pakistan parliamentary life were rather creative, meaningfully productive and resilient. One has to take into account that amid the swirling dusts of chaos the cosmos of Pakistani political, economic and national consensus was also on the process of being formed. Was it not during these periods that all consensus-bound institutions were created? A broad-based consensus in matters of lingua franca, one-unit, the electorate issue, parity and conflict-resolving machinery relating to ideology of the state and federal economy was achieved and duly embodied in the country's supreme institution, namely the constitution. All these developments were augmenters to the nation-state position of Pakistan. Their fruits could not be expected so easily in a span of 5 or 10 years of a national life, any more than corruptions in public life could be taken as moribund within the same period. About the so-called 'corruptions' Herbert Feldman had this to say: "Much has been said about malpractices in Pakistan's public life, but although evils of this kind exist, they are not peculiar to Pakistan. It is to say the least, extremely doubtful whether the state of affairs in this regard, in Pakistan today, approaches the scope of evils of a similar kind that existed in the United Kingdom prior to the first Reform Bill.¹²⁴⁴ A dynamic view of the situation will reveal that despite the sad incidents of somersaults and brazen-facedness on the part of the several politicians, in reality, nothing succeeded in deleting a comma or semicolon from the Constitution that had been framed through years of toil, political sufferings and patience. In fact, the institutions were further consolidated in the course of their weathering political storms. Influential leaders at the national level, who, of course, were not many, but mattered very much in terms of national politics, were not willing to bring about drastic changes in the Constitution before the general elections.

Under the leadership of Suhrawardy election planks in support of the one-unit and the joint electorate were retained by the A.L., the most powerful party in Pakistan. Similarly, the M.L. campaigned—so did other right wing parties—for the retention of the one-unit in accordance with the election manifesto as was adopted in its council meeting at Dacca far back in October 12, 1957.¹²⁴⁵ What was most revealing was that these two major political parties in Pakistan during early 1958 and more so in the later part of the same year reflected their general consensus on the basic issues of the state. Of course, the electorate issue was an apple of discord between them. But having examined the chronological developments of the M.L. election strategy, we get a clear impression that the M.L. leaders were soft-peddling on the electoral issue,¹²⁴⁶ particularly after the exit of Chundrigar from the central government. The speeches of

¹²⁴⁴ Herbert Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan* (Oxford University Press: London: 1955), pp. 99-100.

¹²⁴⁵ See *Times*, October 13, 1957 and *Dawn*, October 13 and 14, 1957.

¹²⁴⁶ In an interview with Daulatana the writer was told that the M.L. eventually slurred over the issue of electorate in order to brighten the M.L. election prospects, particularly in East Pakistan.

the M.L. President, Qayyum Khan in mid 1958 at Dacca also bore testimony to that.¹²⁴⁷ In other words, the major parties did not stand poles asunder on issues at the face of approaching elections which should undermine basic consensus as embodied in the constitution and anticipate a chaotic future for the country.

Elucidating the question of the instability of the central government, it can be said, in the first place that its roots were traceable in the composition of the N.A. In view of the fact that there was no party holding a clear majority in the House, the governments since 1955 had to be formed as either minority or coalition. In fact, the successive governments had all been coalition ones. Coalition or minority governments have had to be formed even in Great Britain,¹²⁴⁸ the cradle of the parliamentary system of government and elsewhere. In modern times, coalition governments are formed, as a rule in West Germany, Italy and some of the Scandinavian countries. Coalition governments usually said to be notoriously weak and hence they are given to instability. But they have their virtues as well, particularly when judged against the background of a pluralistic society having accents on religion, language and diverse cultures.

As far as Pakistan was concerned the cause of the rapid formation and break-up of Ministries could be traced in the massive political competitions that were taking place prior to martial law among the various political parties. To borrow a metaphor from Professor Morris-Jones this situation can be aptly described as 'market polity'. In a piercing article on the Indian post-election of 1967 Professor Morris-Jones used this metaphor in order to bring home to the squeamish critics the fact that the Indian democracy was not on the verge of collapse; for, "the truth is more complex". A "market polity" was visualized as "a system in which large number of decisions are taken by a substantial number of participants who stand in positions of both dependence on and conflict with each other. The decisions are reached by a process of bargaining; no one is strong enough to impose his simple will. Although the terms of trading fluctuate continuously, every outcome is some kind of compromise where what is hoped for gives way to what is practicable."¹²⁴⁹ This description conveniently fits the situation that obtained in Pakistan in the late 1950s. Though Pakistan did not have a general election like India in the country, nonetheless, after the general elections of East Pakistan (1954) she did experience a tangible change in the political structure the like of which occurred, rather progressively in India. While the Congress was still a powerful force in India, the M.L. in Pakistan had ceased to be so since 1954 onwards. The M.L.

¹²⁴⁷ See *Dawn*. June 7, 1958.

¹²⁴⁸ There were minority governments from 1839 to 1841, from 1846 to 1852, in 1852, from 1858 to 1859, from 1866 to 1868, from 1885 to 1886, in 1886, from 1886 to 1892, from 1910 to 1915, in 1924 and from 1929 to 1931. There were coalition governments from 1852 to 1855, from 1895 to 1905, from 1915 to 1922, and from 1931 to 1945. Jennings "Cabinet Government", *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

¹²⁴⁹ W.H. Morris-Jones, "From Monopoly to Competition in India's Politics", *Asian Review*, Vol. I, (November, 1968), p. 2.

omnipresence, monopoly of power and narrow oligarchic base gave way to free political market open to all political entrepreneurs. As a natural corollary, political parties of various persuasions stepped into the market polity for shopping as well as for founding a base for future operations. Viewed from this angle the stigma of governmental instability should tend to be mitigated.

Competitive political culture is the spice of democracy. The interactions of faith and doubt, assent or dissent on the part of the political parties, groups and various public or private bodies create the real dynamics of progress. It is only by doing so the underdeveloped polities can further polish their political institutions, and the language of negotiation and compromise. In this process the key word is mutual tolerance among parties. But once a party starts taking recourse to unfair means to grab power its rivals will follow suit; for, "it is not much use their being clean fighters if their rivals are dirty."¹²⁵⁰ This will have a multiplier effect on the sinister side. Risks there are many but there are challenges as well. It is only through experience and by going through the mill the peoples of the underdeveloped polities can learn the art of governing and being governed. There is no historic evidence that democracy was followed by first having fulfilled all its requirements. Instead, democracy and its sustaining requirements have grown organically that is the western experience.

However, picking up the thread of Pakistan governmental instability¹²⁵¹ we find that technically, there were 5 Prime Ministers in the last 5 years of parliamentary life. In substance, there were two Cabinet governments, namely Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's and Suhrawardy's.¹²⁵² The 53 day old Cabinet of Chundrigar technically broke the continuity of Suhrawardy administration, else the Noon Cabinet was as good as Suhrawardy's since both the governments were basically the outcome of the R.P.-A.L. coalitions. The only visible change was the swapping of Prime ministership. The allegation that the Awami Leaguers got out of the Noon Cabinet after having accepted the job four days previously was a tissue of wicked publicity. They volunteered to go out of the Cabinet in the apprehension that the existing tussle over the allocation of portfolios that was going on might thwart the election schedule. But they continued their support for the Noon government all the same.¹²⁵³

Most critics of Pakistan parliamentary politics 1947-1958 only showed the debit side of the picture not the credit one. Upon a closer examination of the ways in which the transition of power was effected during the last five years it will be seen that this period had some marked distinctions over the preceding years. Chowdhury Mohammad Ali was called upon to form a coalition government as a leader of the majority party, and

¹²⁵⁰ John Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government*, (Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London: 1960, p. 52.

¹²⁵¹ See Appendix For Party Configuration.

¹²⁵² Virtually, Bogra Mohammad Ali Cabinet was a stop-gap arrangement.

¹²⁵³ This was further clarified by the statements of both Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman *Daily Telegraph*, October 8, 1958.

relinquished the Primeministership voluntarily the moment he felt he no longer enjoyed the confidence of his own party – although he had the Presidential consent to continue in office. Conventionally, Suhrawardy as the opposition leader was asked to form the government. Ostensibly, he lost office as he had no majority support in the N.A. Again, the opposition leader, Chundrigar came to power, who having failed to acquire enough support for his government resigned, though he could have stuck to power with the Presidential backing. Finally, Noon became the Prime Minister as the parliamentary leader of the largest single majority party in the N.A., R.P. Habit formation in the right direction is considered as one of the guarantees of the Westminster system. Compared to the earlier period (1947-54) the latter one (1955-58) stood out in bold relief, in that the politicians neither stuck to power to the detriment of parliamentary canons, nor did they, on balance, offer themselves as guinea pigs for the experiments of the head of the state's designs. Despite the existence of a multiplicity of parties in the N.A. there had been no instance of stalemate in the Cabinet formation.¹²⁵⁴ The East Pakistanis had their proper share in the Cabinet as the minorities had theirs.¹²⁵⁵

Then, what about other derogatory things that were taking place prior to martial law? With the run-up to the general elections imminent the "market polity" situation in Pakistan became more accentuated. The people were going to have general elections for the first time. Political bargaining became more acute in East Pakistan as some political parties who had no real 'grass root' support in the country and were afraid of being wiped out in the elections, desperately sought to have a share in power prior to elections. Talks of compromises and of forming all-party governments at the centre and provinces were there subject to fruition. Meanwhile, as luck would have it, the East Pakistan legislature witnessed the disgraceful act of rowdyism. The Speaker was not bludgeoned to death in cold blood. This was an obnoxious accident. Undignified things did or do take place on the floor of the legislatures of many a country. They are always deprecated. Bengal, among others, had always been, to use Professor Morris-Jones' word, a "difficult" province in the subcontinent. With the partition of Bengal, East Pakistan had her share of difficulties. Perhaps the incident that took place in the legislature had as much a social as a political expression. And if this incident was received by the politicians as 'shock treatment' "Deputy Speaker Shahid Ali will not have died in Vain."¹²⁵⁶ Similarly, the aggressive election campaign launched by the M.L. screaming for war with India and promising the moon to the people if returned to power is to be judged in the light of the election fever that gripped the whole nation. The M.L. hatred for India was historic. Making anti-India, and liberation of Kashmir the focal points of campaigning tactics, the M.L. tried to attract popular attention to it by playing upon mass emotion. The M.L. was concerned with the functional value of the slogan. If they were serious about war with India to solve Kashmir issue they would

¹²⁵⁴ For eleven years (1922-1933) neither the left nor right wing parties of Sweden could overcome their differences to the point of forming a coalition. See D.A. Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹²⁵⁵ The Noon Cabinet had two Congress members.

¹²⁵⁶ *Manchester Guardian*, September 26, 1958.

have done it in the heyday of the M.L. rule.¹²⁵⁷ Again, a good deal was made out of the M.L. desire to use the N.G. in election purposes. In the first place the volunteers—60,000 thousands in number¹²⁵⁸—army was not created off-hand. They were there already. What was more, the M.L.N.G. was used as an auxiliary to Pakistan movement itself. Many illustrious persons ladies included—were associated with it.¹²⁵⁹ As an heir-apparent to this organization, the M.L. wanted to employ its services for canvassing purposes. But the whole thing was finished when the Noon government totally banned this organization making its operation a non-bailable offence with 2-year jail sentence.¹²⁶⁰ As a sequel to the ban when there was a big demonstration in Karachi, the M.L. President asked the people "to go home quietly."¹²⁶¹

The rebellion of the Khan of Kalat was absolutely outside the periphery of politics. What did it matter really if a former ruler of a tiny princely state who was living on a privy purse sanctioned by the Pakistan government chose to be independent again? It was a quixotic feat. The people of this area namely Khaaranis, Bhugist, Marris and Mekhranis had nothing to do with the ruler's intention.¹²⁶² There was no iota of backing from the people. The Noon government just took action against the Khan who was duly stripped of his powers and vestiges. The ageing Khan was perhaps happy to be retired; for his son Daud Jan Khan (18) was appointed as his successor by the Pakistan government. So the situation was absolutely under control.¹²⁶³ What did really contribute to a great extent to the coming of martial law was the emergence of N.A.P. on the Pakistan political spectrum. General Mirza knew how the leftist elements had worked so vigorously for the U.F. in the 1954 elections in East Pakistan. Members of the banned communist party and other leftist oriented groups would now obviously marshal their forces behind the N.A.P. vis-à-vis the general elections. The government were aware of it. A report identifying communists in the fold of N.A.P. was compiled,¹²⁶⁴ and the N.A.P. leaders' activities particularly in West Pakistan were closely watched.¹²⁶⁵

A tough election fight was anticipated in West Pakistan. *Zamindari* in East Pakistan had already been abolished, but it was still very much alive in West Pakistan. Whatever reforms that had taken place gave rather more impetus towards "tensions between the

¹²⁵⁷ Is it not paradoxical that General Ayub who emerged in October 1958 to restore sanity to nation, himself went to war with India in 1965?

¹²⁵⁸ *New York Times*, September 24, 1958. According to the Dawn the number of the N.G. was 100,000, *Dawn*, November 14, 1956.

¹²⁵⁹ For details see *Dawn*, September 23, 1958.

¹²⁶⁰ *Times*, September 21, 1958.

¹²⁶¹ *Manchester Guardian*, September 24, 1958.

¹²⁶² See *Dawn*, October 4, 1958.

¹²⁶³ For details see *Daily telegraph*, October 7, 1958; *Dawn*, October 7, 1958.

¹²⁶⁴ *Dawn*, March 20, 1958.

¹²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, November 14, 1957.

landlord and the tenant¹²⁶⁶ each thinking that he was being dispossessed. The one-unit was born of one of the desires to bring about a uniform standard throughout West Pakistan, and this was true of uniform land reforms in the country the absence of which was causing "serious tensions".¹²⁶⁷ Bhasani was spitting fire. Now that he had a political platform in both parts of Pakistan he indulged himself in incessant election campaigning asking peoples to rise against social tyranny which had the smell of "class war."¹²⁶⁸ He, along with other N.A.P. leaders, toured the whole of West Pakistan threatening the landlords and capitalists with dire consequences as he did recently in early 1969.¹²⁶⁹ The second threatening issue was the N.A.P.'s anti-unit drive. Khan A Gaffar Khan threatened, to launch a civil disobedience movement and boycott even the general elections unless the one-unit was restored to its original shape.¹²⁷⁰ While in West Pakistan the N.A.P. was more concerned with radical land reform and disintegration issues, the eastern N.A.P. having had no such immediate problems laid stress on the question of a neutral, independent foreign policy. It is to be recalled how Muslim fervor was aroused in Pakistan at the beginning of Suez crisis in 1956, and paled down later on. Now in July 1958 a sudden blow was dealt upon the Baghdad pact, as one of its partners, Iraq became a Republic having killed the royal family through a military coup. Bhasani ended up his European and Middle eastern tour including one prolonged meeting with Colonel Nasser.¹²⁷¹ Upon reaching Karachi he warned the government that the fate of the Pakistan leaders would be the same as those of Iraq unless they quit the Baghdad Pact.¹²⁷² So, the N.A.P. found a new ground for pointing out the vulnerability of military pacts.

On all these issues the N.A.P. could talk freely and confidently because it had a balancing position in the legislatures of both East and West Pakistan. A parliamentary board consisting of 9 members was entrusted with the task of guiding and controlling the parliamentary parties in the central as well as the two provincial assemblies to keep in view, besides the other party objectives, 5 principles viz.: (1) joint electorate, (2) undoing one-unit, (3) independent foreign policy minus military pacts, (4) full regional autonomy and (5) fulfillment of 21-point programme.¹²⁷³

¹²⁶⁶ "Five-year Plan", *loc.cit.*, p. 317.

¹²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶⁸ *Dawn*, September 29, 1958.

¹²⁶⁹ There is an illuminating contrast between the event of 1958 and 1969. In 1958, when the country was about to establish people's rule through general elections martial law was imposed. Similarly, in 1969 when the parliamentary democracy was within the reach of the people martial law was again clamped down. Apparently, in both cases, the imposition of martial law was preceded by the preaching's of socialistic hyperboles on the part of the N.A.P.

¹²⁷⁰ See *Dawn*, September 6, 1958; April 20, 1958 and *Manchester Guardian*, February 16, 1958.

¹²⁷¹ General Mirza told the *New York Times* correspondent, Elie Abel that Bhasani's making a direct contact with Nasser was tantamount to "high treason". See *New York Times*, October 9, 1958.

¹²⁷² See *New York Times*, October 12, 1958; Also *Daily Worker*, October 21, 1958.

¹²⁷³ *Manchester Guardian*, June 2, 1958.

Then, how did the N.A.P. programmes expedite the arrival of martial law? In the first place General Mirza and those who were in collusion with him did not believe in anything the N.A.P. stood for. General Mirza with his characteristic bluntness had told the Lahore Rotarians back in March that "those who wanted to undo one-unit were exactly those who wanted to wreck the country's foreign policy."¹²⁷⁴ He developed doubts in the capacities of the R.P. and M.L. to hold one-unit together in the face of N.A.P.'s trickery. The eventual N.A.P. support for the A.L. Coalition government in East Pakistan did not seem to have appeared well-meaning to the President. He could not afford to gamble on these two vital issues. The irony of foreign policy was this that due to massive American military aid to Pakistan it became a vested interest with the army. To animadvert the foreign policy was amounted to bringing the army into hatred.¹²⁷⁵ That was why countries like South Korea, Formosa, Thailand, etc., permitted neither alternative governments nor growth of critical opinion in the legislatures; for, "Military today is, by and large, a powerful class in modern society."¹²⁷⁶ But, in spite of military predominance in the western society (Russia, too) they are finally subject to civil authority. In essence, this was not true of the Pakistan situation. Besides, the agrarian character of Pakistan also placed the military in peculiar position. Professor Lenski found that the military in agrarian societies was a powerful and dominant force.¹²⁷⁷ In the higher echelon of military cadre of Pakistan there were personnel who had a vested interest in agrarian matters. As the *Economist* pointed out that "Many of these officers come from landlord families, while those of humbler birth have acquired a landlord veneer. They may be expected to offer strong support to a regime of efficiency and enlightened despotism."¹²⁷⁸ The army in Pakistan was basically a conservative institution and had a vested interest in the retention of the *status quo*. Similarly, the army had a deep commitment to the maintenance of the one-unit.

It will now appear that the Army and its Supreme Commander in Chief – the President himself – had some anxieties over some of their favourite subjects for whose drastic changes the N.A.P. stood. Having toured Pakistan in early March, 1958 a British M.P. – John Dugdale committed his impressions to an article saying that "There is, it is true, a distinct possibility that the National Awami Party, which some say is pro-Communist and others simply neutralist, may gain a large number of seats in the forthcoming general elections."¹²⁷⁹ And the editorial view of the *Hindu* that it was against this

¹²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, March 16, 1958; also *Observer Foreign News Service*, March 21, 1957.

¹²⁷⁵ An ordinance prescribing punishment for public statements likely or intended to criticize the armed forces was promulgated by General Mirza on June 9, 1958. The offence was cognizable and non-bailable. See *Dawn*, June 10, 1958.

¹²⁷⁶ C.W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (New Jersey: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 147.

¹²⁷⁷ See Gerhard E. Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y. 1966), p. 362.

¹²⁷⁸ *The Economist*, October 18, 1958.

¹²⁷⁹ See his article, published in *Manchester Guardian*, March 11, 1958.

movement towards drastic land reform and neutral foreign policy¹²⁸⁰ that the "revolution appears to have been primarily directed, rather than against the old gang of politicians¹²⁸¹ seems to us to have some validity.¹²⁸²

The values of pro-western foreign policy in which the saner leaders of Pakistan believed in did consist of something more than combating communists was too acute to permit other western values to flourish in the emerging countries. It has been shown in the first part how East Pakistan was viewed from the anti-Communist strategic angle vis-à-vis South East Asia. We have also shown the possible impact of foreign policy on the doing away of the parliamentary government in East Pakistan in 1954. The Iraqi revolution which was thought to be Russian-backed alerted General Mirza and his associates to think of the position of Pakistan (West Pakistan was regarded as a link to the middle east) in the face of general elections. That the events in Iraq were not lightly taken could be seen from the American decision to send troops to both Jordan and Lebanon. Both America and Pakistan knew of the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' which crept up in 1951. There is no evidence to prove that America was behind the 1958 revolution, nor was there any to show that being an influential ally to Pakistan she had tried to prevent this calamitous step. The post-revolution comment of the *New York Times* was this : "Mirza is a firm ally of the West, looks down on his co-religionists, the Arabs, and holds Nasser in contempt."¹²⁸³ And the former American ambassador to Pakistan (1953-56) Mr. Hildreth away in the States felt relieved that "two ablest men in Pakistan is in control of situation".¹²⁸⁴ The official attitude of the U.S. Government could be seen in its stepping up more military and economic aid since martial law to such an extent that Pakistan financial calendar was changed to coincide with that of the Americans.¹²⁸⁵ In March 1959 Pakistan signed another bilateral agreement of cooperation with the U.S.¹²⁸⁶ The Climax was reached in May 1960 when Pakistan incurred the ire of Krushchev for letting Gary Powers (U-2 crisis) take-off from the Peshawar base for a reconnaissance flight over Russia. However, it was only Great Britain's Canada'a Prime Minister too.¹²⁸⁷ Prime Minister, Mr. H. Macmillan who through the British ambassador, Mr. Alexander Squire, in Pakistan showed his concern for the scrapping of the parliamentary institutions to General Mirza. "I note that the continuance of martial law will be for the

¹²⁸⁰ That the N.A.P. was an emerging force was even recognized by Gen. Ayub, in that by having pursued a neutral line of foreign policy he neutralized the N.A.P. opposition to his despotic regime and thus thwarted the movement towards parliamentary government for a long time.

¹²⁸¹ See *Hindu*, November 6, 1958 (Editorial) "Pakistan Revolution."

¹²⁸² Immediately after the martial law all the prominent N.A.P leaders and workers were arrested. See *Manchester Guardian*, October 13, 1958; *Daily Telegraph*, October 13, 1958. The Martial Law court sentenced them all. See *Dawn*. December 15, 1958.

¹²⁸³ See *New York Times*, October 11, 1958.

¹²⁸⁴ *Dawn*. October 10, 1958

¹²⁸⁵ "Chowdhury Mohammad Ali", *op. cit.*, p.53.

¹²⁸⁶ Aslam Siddiqs, *Pakistan Seek Security* (Longmans, Gree & co., 1960), p. 192.

¹²⁸⁷ Mr. Diefenbaker said, "The middle class in Pakistan may be too strong for a permanent abrogation of democracy." Quoted in *Hindu*, November 21, 1958.

shortest period possible...¹²⁸⁸ was the assurance the British Prime Minister received through secret correspondence.

However, in maintaining that the N.A.P. was one of the factors in the abrogation of parliamentary institutions in Pakistan, we again reemphasize the point that General Mirza committed the greatest blunder like that of the Central government of 1954 vis-a-vis the imposition of 92-A in East Pakistan in not allowing the right wingers to fight the leftist elements politically.

However, the N.A.P.'s prospect of making any headway in politics also depended upon the extent to which other parties were responding social grievances. Two major parties e.g. the M.L. and A.L. were genuinely committed to agrarian reforms. Their approach to this end had to be both gradual and moderate on constitutional and party considerations. The peasants were aggrieved, no doubt, but they were not Mao's peasants given to a revolutionary urge. When Bhasani who had trudged over the jungles of East Pakistan for ages could not raise and organize peasants' movement the question of West Pakistan did not arise at all. The peasants in Pakistan were basically conservative. They would, we believe, have leaned towards moderation. In other words, there would have been no spectacular election results in favor of the N.A.P. Interestingly enough, the N.A.P. itself towards the end was showing some moderation in that its high command refused to allow Gaffar A. Khan to launch a civil disobedience movement on the issue of one-unit.¹²⁸⁹ The way both the M.L. and A.L. were drawing huge crowds to their election meetings in both parts of Pakistan compared to the N.A.P. indicated which way the political wind was blowing. The right and moderate wing leader, Suhrawardy, had accepted the challenge of the N.A.P. far back in 1957.¹²⁹⁰

If bye-elections are a guide to the trends of public opinion vis-à-vis political parties, it can be said the A.L. was supreme in East Pakistan. From 1954 till December 1957 it won 12 bye-elections out of 13. In the latest by-elections held in Sirajgonj, Madaripur, and Rangpur on December 3 and 22 respectively the A.L. defeated all its rivals including the N.A.P. which even forfeited its election deposit at the Rangpur constituency.¹²⁹¹ Similarly, in West Pakistan bye-elections were won either by the M.L. or R.P.¹²⁹² Allowances for 'swings' in the election results considered, it could not be expected

¹²⁸⁸ *The letter of the British ambassador to the President of Pakistan conveying personal message of H. Mcmillan, (U.K. High Commission Karachi: Top Secret) October 9, 1958. See Appendix XIV.*

¹²⁸⁹ *Dawn*, September 10, 1958.

¹²⁹⁰ See Suhrawardy's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 13, 1957, p. 331.

¹²⁹¹ *Dawn* December 4 and 23, 1957. See the voting analysis at the Rangpur bye-election:

A.L.	-	10,342 Electorates	69,513
M.L.	-	9,502 Votes cast	24,751
K.S.P.	-	2,206 one vote found invalid.	
N.A.P.	-	2,126	
Ind.	-	575	<i>Dawn</i> , December 23, 1957.

¹²⁹² See *Dawn*, August 16, 1957, November 20, 1957 and August 31, 1958.

under any stretch of imagination that the N.A.P. would have come out from the general elections with whip in hand. The assumption that the N.A.P. was a potential force in terms of political influence had been made keeping in view of Pakistan society where there was no average Pakistani but "extremes of wealth and poverty, of desert and jungle, educated and illiterate."¹²⁹³ Its apparent egalitarian approach had an appeal so much so that other political parties had to adjust themselves to the social, economic and political requirements of the country. The N.A.P.'s strength was 'relative' in that if the other major parties like the A.L. and M.L. could have come out with positive social ameliorative programmes the extremism of the N.A.P. would be of no avail. Its emergence was positive in the sense that it was offering a sort of socialist opposition to the country a cheek against lopsidedness. The doings and intentions of the N.A.P. were either over estimated or intended to be overstressed by General Mirza and his co-plotters to add another point to their justification for the abrogation of parliamentary democracy.

However, in the foregoing pages we have dealt at some length with the economic and political situation showing the extent to which they could be taken as contributory to the abrogation of parliamentary democracy. Now, an examination of the presidential demeanor will throw some more light on the so-called October revolution. General Mirza's meteoric rise on Pakistan political horizon had always been an ill-omened phenomenon. Here was a man egotistic on outlook, though not without some traits of sociability, intellectually unobtrusive but instinctively superb, unappreciative of music and the finer shades of life but deeply interested in sports, *Narcissistic* about his ideas but ready to listen to everybody only to make his views more intransigent, expert on Bridge as he was of gastronomy, ruse and certainly intrigue, as well. General Mirza, a Sandhurst graduate, whose long services in the political department of the late government of India groomed him to view a political situation as something to be managed. Born with the bluest of blood of the Nawab family of Murshidabad he acquired an appreciation of a *Mogul* quality which was described by Philip Woodruff as "the tactical use of power."¹²⁹⁴ And from the *Officers Mess* in Poona perhaps he learnt the "soldiers' traditional contempt for politicians".¹²⁹⁵

President Mirza had not concealed his disapproval of the 1956 Constitution ever since its launching. Sir Ivor was said to have been asked "to draft a Constitution in which the American idea of an executive irremovable for four years was grafted on to a British system of representation".¹²⁹⁶ This was rejected by the Constituent Assembly II on grounds of "suspicion".¹²⁹⁷ As a result, the President and the Cabinet were removable

¹²⁹³ Richard V. Weekes: *Pakistan, Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation*, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964), p. 8.

¹²⁹⁴ Quoted in *Observer*, October 11, 1958.

¹²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁶ Sir Ivor Jennings, "The Approach to Self-Government", *op.cit.* p.18.

¹²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19

under the existing system. The President did not have much overriding power. He could rule by Ordinance but only for 6 weeks, after which period the N.A. was to approve his acts. Furthermore, in a subsequent 53 page unanimous judgment of the Pakistan Supreme Court on a reference case of the President whether or not he could dissolve any legislatures in Pakistan, it was maintained that the Article 234 (2) of the Constitution did not provide the President with the power to dissolve¹²⁹⁸ any legislatures, national or provincial.¹²⁹⁹ That meant General Mirza who had an authoritarian disposition, could neither have the 'feel' of power nor reconcile himself to the position of a titular head as envisaged by the Constitution. Above all, he did not like the principle of decentralization that was being adhered to in the central-units relationship. "This is where the Moguls let off. The Moguls were defeated because *they gave too much authority to local Princes*. Now we are starting at that point."¹³⁰⁰—General Mirza told C.L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times* correspondent.

Before the ink of the Constitution could dry, the President on the eve of the Republic Day of March, 1957 described the British system of government in Pakistan as "malaise", Indeed his sincerity of belief in the American system of government could not be doubted.¹³⁰¹ But nevertheless he was abusing and subverting the Presidency for a purpose for which he had not sworn into the office. He could either gracefully submit to the will of the people or come out of the office to lead a movement for the Presidential system of government which perhaps appealed to him more as a powerful executive than any other considerations. No honorable course was followed. Instead, he emerged himself in the best tradition of Cardinal Richelieu in that General Mirza took recourse to all sorts of sly ruses to dethrone parliamentary politics and enthrone his brand of governance.

Since 1954 there was a sort of public discourse going on between General Mirza and Suhrawardy in regard to the propriety of democracy in Pakistan. General Mirza's concept of 'controlled democracy' was publicly ridiculed by Suhrawardy. Whenever any political difficulty arose the President would say: "I am told by experts on democracy that these change in government are ordinary processes inherent in the interplay of democratic forces ... I must take the liberty of disagreeing with them."¹³⁰² This was again repeated in early 1958.¹³⁰³ He could venture to say all these and remain unscathed; for, in the presence of multiple parties in the parliament he could influence the formation of

¹²⁹⁸ Perhaps this was one of the reasons that the drastic action had to be taken by General Mirza e.g. the abrogation of the constitution.

¹²⁹⁹ See *Times*, August 5, 1957 and *Dawn*, July 23, 1957.

¹³⁰⁰ *New York Times*, October 10, 1958.

¹³⁰¹ Writing a letter to the author from Iran in early 1969 General Mirza had this to say: "I for one do not believe that Westminster system of democracy will ever succeed in Pakistan. The 1956 Constitution nearly created a jungle. The American system with amendments required for conditions in Pakistan will be much more suitable", See Appendix XI.

¹³⁰² *Dawn*, December 28, 1957.

¹³⁰³ "I am told democracy controls itself, but I have yet to see it controlling itself here." See *Dawn*, March 16, 1958.

the coalition government by playing off one party against the others and at the same time making him more indispensable to them. Obviously, a part of the cause of governmental instability emanated from the Presidential cupidity.

In this game there were some politicians—General Mirza claimed to have a number of friends and supporters in the N.A. who did things as they were told by him "regardless of Party"¹³⁰⁴—who acted as accomplices to the President. In Pakistan political loyalties were divided between those who thought it unwise to tinker with a constitution once it had been established and those who cared less for the Constitution but supported President Mirza on a personal basis in order to promote their own interests. The number of this latter group of politicians was insignificant, but their very presence was significant. The climate of West Pakistan politics bore resemblance to the 18th century politics of England where the influential landlord aristocrats used to pay lip service to the parliament. Similarly, some of the Republicans who were very big landowners (as well as big industrialists) who did not feel enthusiastic about empowering the parliament were "warm toward Mirza."¹³⁰⁵ Probably, the following politicians were confidants to the President: Col. Abid Hossain, Syed Amjad Ali,¹³⁰⁶ Mian Zaffar Shah, Gul Aurangzeb,¹³⁰⁷ Malik Jahangir Khan, Khan Jalaluddin,¹³⁰⁸ G.A. Talpur, etc. The central Finance Minister would always say in the N.A prior to any announcement that he had "talks with the President" when Suhrawardy would correct him by saying that "such and such" was due to the results of the Cabinet decision.

In East Pakistan there were no big landlords but party jealousies abounded. General Mirza kept contact with Huq's K.S.P. and used it as a lever against the rising power of Suhrawardy's A.L.¹³⁰⁹ It was strongly alleged by the ex-Chief Minister of East Pakistan that an 'influential' person was employed by the President to persuade Bhasani to leave Suhrawardy and as a reward the 'person' was given a partnership in a business farm of his friend. He also documented evidence that the Speaker of the East Pakistan Legislature whose intransigence finally resulted in rowdyism in the House had an understanding with the President to the effect that the A.L. government must be harassed to the benefit of the K.S.P. What was more, to create dissension in the party, the President, on several occasions, allured the Chief Minister with the Primeministership of Pakistan, the way M. Qizilbash was offered the same when Noon was away in London.¹³¹⁰

¹³⁰⁴ See *New York Time*, October 11, 1958.

¹³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, April 9, 1958.

¹³⁰⁶ See *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 13, 1957, p. 295.

¹³⁰⁷ Prince of the Swat State and son-in-law of General Ayub.

¹³⁰⁸ Chairman of the so-called "National Congress for Presidential Cabinet", organized to amend the Constitution in the light of President Mirza's advice, See *Dawn*, April 7, 1957.

¹³⁰⁹ K.B. Syeed, "Formative phase", *op. cit.*, p. 434.

¹³¹⁰ For details see Ataur Rahman, *op.cit.* p. 159.

However, General Mirza's greatest advantage was the bringing of the R.P. the largest single party in the N.A. under the sphere of his influence. This was done through Dr. Khan who was "like a father to him"¹³¹¹—Iskander Mirza. As a R.P. leader he was the vital cog on which General Mirza sought to turn the support of the R.P. M.P.s towards him. He succeeded greatly in this venture, but up to a point. When Dr. Khan ceased to be the Chief Minister of West Pakistan he did not cease to be the right hand man of the President as the head of the R.P. Hardly a political trip in the country was made by the Head of the State without being accompanied by the silver-haired, venerable looking Khan.¹³¹² When Dr. Khan talked about the setting of a "revolutionary council" to govern the country partyless which was followed by a massive wave of protests sweeping the whole country,¹³¹³ the people took it as a trial balloon and projection of the ideas of the President. But suddenly the "Young Turks" of the R.P. "rallied for what is considered ... to be a revolt against their acknowledged political mentor, who is Mirza".¹³¹⁴ This culminated in the R.P.'s withdrawing support from the Chundrigar Cabinet and forming their own with the support of the A.L. Dr. Khan, too, ceased to dance to the tune of the President.¹³¹⁵ General Mirza always kept his powder dry. If he had commissioned Suhrawardy to form the government he did not forget to retain Chundrigar, the opposition leader, as partner of his Bridge.¹³¹⁶ His channel of communication was ubiquitous. However, having failed to reinstate Chundrigar,¹³¹⁷ General Mirza with the help of an influential M.L. leader, Daultana—a personal friend of his and a few other Republic elements who were leaning towards the M.L., tried to merge the R.P. into the M.L.¹³¹⁸

The idea of a merger in the face of the coming general elections obviously intrigued some of the Muslim leaguers and some such drafts to this end were tentatively drawn up in the presence of the President. Daultana placing his loyalty to the President urged him to contact Chundrigar with this saying that "till everything is agreed, I would request that it may not be mentioned to others who saw and approved of the drafts."¹³¹⁹ This did not work out for many other reasons. To name only two, firstly, after the death of Nishtar—the M.L. President—and the election of Qayyum Khan as the new President

¹³¹¹ Firoz Khan Noon, *From Memory* (Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore: 1969), p. 294.

¹³¹² *Dawn*, February 22, 1957.

¹³¹³ *Ibid.*, August 10, 1957 (Editorial) "Revolution".

¹³¹⁴ *Observer Foreign News Service*, December 12, 1958.

¹³¹⁵ *Dawn*, December 28, 1957.

¹³¹⁶ See Sir Feroz Khan Noon, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

¹³¹⁷ Mr. Yussour Haroon, The chief Whip of the M.L. parliamentary party in the N.A. told the writer that the night when Chundrigar returned his Commission back to the President, the idea of setting "a revolutionary council" in Pakistan for 10 years without parties was suggested by General Mirza. Both Chundrigar and Daultana who were present there vehemently opposed the idea. However, interestingly enough, a week before this incident large sized posters proclaiming that a 'Revolutionary Council' was in harmony with the dictates of Islam appeared in parts of Karachi. See *Dawn*, December 7, 1957.

¹³¹⁸ See *Manchester Guardian*, May 13, 1958.

¹³¹⁹ General Mirza's verbatim version to the author.

on 30th March, 1958,¹³²⁰ the M.L. got a new lease of life and was confident of the elections. Its President massively campaigned against the involvement of the Head of the State in politics.¹³²¹ Secondly, Dr. Khan would not buy the idea of breaking the R.P., come what may.¹³²² However, on May 9, 1958 Dr. Khan was knifed to death.¹³²³ The explanation of his assassination was inadequate like that of Liaquat's. The immediate effect of Dr. Khan's death was the R.P.'s being further alienated from General Mirza. Noon (Prime Minister) himself became the Party head and Arbab Noor Mohammad Khan replaced Colonel Abid Hossain (Pro-President) as the General Secretary.¹³²⁴ Nawab Qizilbash, the Chief Minister of West Pakistan was already a strong Republican friend to Noon. That meant the consolidation of the politician's position and the A.L. R.P. axis featured prominently on the eve of the elections. That the Prime Minister Noon could act independently of General Mirza was amply demonstrated in his ousting the Governor of East Pakistan, the octogenarian Haq—General Mirza's political hope in East Pakistan who had resorted a hasty decision in dismissing the A.L. government.

Now, where did General Mirza stand during the closing period of 1958? To quote the *New York Times*: "Mirza's tenure threatened ... politicians of most of the parties are making it clear that they think Mirza has shown too strong a taste for jumping into the political free-for-all instead of standing on the side-lines ... All this means that after November the road back to the Presidential palace will be rougher."¹³²⁵ The President played all the cards he had under his sleeves. His finesse worked up to a point. The politicians sinned along with him, but were not ready to commit the blackest ones beyond redemption; namely banishing democracy from the country. The politics and politicians of the 1954-58 period were a good deal distilled and winnowed compared to the preceding periods. The days of Golam Mohammad were stale in 1958. Despite "the rows", says the last Prime Minister, "and apparent instability, the country and our people were more alive and conscious than ever before".¹³²⁶ Nothing could stop that trend save drastic measures.

General Mirza turned lukewarm towards holding the general elections since Noon was installed as the Prime Minister. He said to the Bar Association in December, 1957 that he was not "in a position to say if the election deadline can be maintained".¹³²⁷ By March, 1958 he became clearer commenting that "elections by themselves were not the remedy".¹³²⁸ The last Prime Minister records in his memoirs:

¹³²⁰ *Manchester Guardian*, March 31, 1958.

¹³²¹ See *Dawn*, May 12, June 25, 26, August 13, 1958.

¹³²² Sir Noon, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

¹³²³ *Manchester Guardian*, May 10, 1958.

¹³²⁴ *Times*, May 30, 1958.

¹³²⁵ *New York Times*, April 9, 1958.

¹³²⁶ Sir Noon, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

¹³²⁷ *Dawn*, December 23, 1957.

¹³²⁸ *Ibid*, December 23, 1957.

"I had known from the day I took on Prime Ministership that Iskander Mirza wanted to bring in 'controlled democracy'. He had suggested it to me on one or two occasions and asked if I would not say that a democratic form of government was not suited for our country and that I, therefore, would resign and hand over government to the President. When he realized that I was bent on carrying on to see the elections through, abrogation of the Constitution was the only way to dislodge me".¹³²⁹

However, in the task of banishing democracy the President now had to rely on the army. The army Chief, General Ayub, had always been imperceptibly in touch with the country's politics, and perceptibly with the President as his supreme Commander in Chief.¹³³⁰ General Ayub's loyalty to the President at this time was unflinching. Here is an extract from a letter written by general Ayub to the President six months prior to the imposition of the martial law which will show how loyal the former was to the latter: "Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up on the Defence Forces ... you ... have done the Defence Forces and the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud of you. I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. *Let us hope that I shall come to your expectations.* I can promise you my very best effort."¹³³¹ (Author's italics). However, in any case the President had the loyalty of the Commander in Chief of the army prior to the imposition of martial law.

Of the view that the "U.S. aid programs aimed at the development of the military can sometimes be politically destructive",¹³³² Pakistan was a classic example. The American military assistance to Pakistan was classified but its valuation in terms of money was guessed to the tune of \$500 to \$600 million dollars,¹³³³ The military in Pakistan could now flex its muscle. A carefully planned maneuver according to Noon's guess had taken place months earlier before the fatal night of October 7.¹³³⁴ The Prime Minister suspiciously complied with the Presidential request to send the heads of West Pakistan Intelligence and Police Departments to Teheran to help them organize their police. The West Pakistan Border Police was replaced by army personnel at General Mirza's

¹³²⁹ Sir Noon, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

¹³³⁰ General Mirza: "We have known each other for ages. He (Gen. Ayub) was the only person I talked to." See *Daily Mirror*, October 9, 1958, "Revolution" by Patrick Sergeant.

¹³³¹ General Ayub's letter to General Mirza dated 2nd April, 1958. See Appendix XV.

¹³³² La Palambara and Weiner", *op. cit.*, p. 434.

¹³³³ Amos A. Jordan, Jr. *Foreign Aid and the Defense of South East Asia*, (Frederick A. Praeger, N.Y., 1962), p. 209.

¹³³⁴ According to General Mirza's version to Elie Abel, *New York Times* correspondent, the actual planning started about 3 weeks earlier. Secret orders had gone out to redeploy army units for controlling possible civil disorder by courier. The capital was given a complete military reconnaissance a week before the martial law on the pretext that there might be political demonstration against the government decision banning M.L. N.G. See *New York Times*, October 9, 1958. This means that if planning had started so early the untoward events of September in the East Pakistan Legislature could not be the reason for martial law. Curiously enough, Gen. Ayub in his autobiography indirectly implied that Gen. Mirza was responsible for cooking up the revolt of the Kalat States' ruler to justify his action of martial law. See F.M. Ayub, *op. cit.*, P. 51.

insistence.¹³³⁵ The East Pakistan border was already closed by the army in the name of 'Operation Closed Door'. Hence, martial law came as a complete fulfillment of a pre-ordained plan methodically executed, and a surprise to the country.

The event was trumpeted as the 'October Revolution' which came like *Deus ex Machina* to save the country. And the regime that was born of that revolution had to be under the clutches of "one of the biggest and most bogus public relations operations the modern world has known".¹³³⁶ The net result of this event accounted for the loss of national consensus which was largely achieved during the parliamentary period.

Hence the so-called revolution of October 1958 was merely an anti-populist *coup d'état* devoid of any popular support. It was perpetrated by a small group of people who were situated on a vantage ground of authority and had no sense of involvement or commitment to democracy. Neither General Mirza nor General Ayub could be compared with these personages and their mode of arrival on the political scene viz. General De Gaulle, Colonel Nasser, Brigadier Kashem or even Kemal Ataturk. Even the Burmese position where the Prime Minister Unu had to call the army Commander in Chief to save the country from disintegration could not be cited in the Pakistan situation. General Mirza and his associates had either wrongly read the political realities of Pakistan or overreacted in their anxieties. The chances were that those with vested interests who included some people who happened to ride the hobby-horse of politics without ever facing the electorate, certain big industrialists who were afraid of socialistic restraints on their economic activities¹³³⁷ and some senior bureaucrats civil and military¹³³⁸ – who thought of outlawing politics for the good of the country were determined to seize power before the politicians could at last get mass backing and parliament become powerful and responsible through the general elections.

The administration of the country functioned much better than in most Afro-Asian countries. The press¹³³⁹ was vocal and free and the courts as usual were impeccable in issuing *writs* to set things on the right tracks. The consensus-bound institutions were built and more national consensus would have reflected in the parliament had there been an election. Leaders who were counted in terms of national politics displayed moderation and realism. Lord Birdwood's commentary that Pakistan failed to produce a workable "political machine and the men to work it"¹³⁴⁰ was perhaps made without

¹³³⁵ Sir Noon, *op.cit.*, p. 299.

¹³³⁶ "The short, sad history of Pakistan", Cyril Dunn, *Observer*, March 30, 1969.

¹³³⁷ See Finance Minister's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. III, September 9, 1958, p. 673.

¹³³⁸ See *Hindu*, Editorials dated October 17 and November 6, 1958.

¹³³⁹ Pakistan journalistic publications totaled 1106 in 1958. The breakdown is the following: 103 dailies, 21 bi-weeklies, 396 weeklies, 88 fortnightlies, 434 monthlies, 40 quarterlies and 24 other publications. Among publications 685 were in Urdu, 165 in English, 130 in Bengali and 126 in other regional languages as well as foreign languages. For details see *Dawn*, May 21, 1958; also General list of Newspapers and Periodicals published in Pakistan: References Series No. 1, (Ministry of Information: Government of Pakistan, 1958), pp. 1-41.

¹³⁴⁰ See *Daily Telegraph*, October 16, 1958 for Lord Birdwood's article.

evaluating the whole crystallization process of Pakistan politics. Merely extraordinary people do not live anywhere. There are only great challenges that are sometimes may be faced by small men. There was no evidence to suggest that Pakistan could not have thrown appropriate leadership, given time and opportunity. A decade after the October coup the *Economist* had this to maintain: "Pakistan's first ten years of parliamentarism were not as merely chaotic as they have been made out in retrospect."¹³⁴¹ The fact that the people of 1958 had affection for, understanding in and commitments to the Westminster system could not be denied under any pretext. General Ayub's 10-years old straight-jacketed regime could not even make people get used to what they were getting. The events of late 1968 and early 1969 bore eloquent testimony to people's urge for federal parliamentary democracy and provincial autonomy anchored on 6-point. And the movement of 1969 under the phenomenal leadership of Bangabandhu "cannot be written off", said a journalist while making an on-the-spot survey in Pakistan, "merely as the work of a few hotheaded mal-contented or power-seekers. The student offspring of the establishment are involved up to their young necks. So are lawyers, writers, doctors, journalists, religious leaders, some industrial workers".¹³⁴² Hence, the parliamentary system in Pakistan did not fail in 1958, it was, on the contrary, sabotaged by a 'power elite' whose vested interests were endangered in the flowering of democracy.

¹³⁴¹ *The Economist*, March 1, 1969, p. 17.

¹³⁴² "Behind the tension in Pakistan", Harold Sieve, *Daily Telegraph*, January 22, 1969.

NEW FEDERAL CONFIGURATION

A caretaker Cabinet of 7 men at the head of Dr. Khan was sworn in October 14, 1955—the day when all the former Provinces and states officially merged themselves into a single administrative unit e.g. West Pakistan.¹³⁴³ By virtue of the establishment of the west Pakistan Act, 1955 the Governor General ordered the holding of elections for an interim legislature of the new Province.¹³⁴⁴ The members to be elected were 310 in number.¹³⁴⁵ The members of the old legislative Assemblies of the Punjab, Sindh, N.W.F.P. and Bahawalpur would form electoral colleges on a district basis to send representatives to the interim legislature. The old Khairpur Legislative Assembly would elect 4 members. In the N.W.F.P. tribal areas and states, Baluchistan and the Baluchistan States Union, the Jirgas (the Council of Elders) would elect the members. The non-official members of the Municipal committee and Cantonment Board of Quetta would elect one member for Baluchistan. From Karachi, 13 members would be elected by the elected members of the Karachi Municipal Corporation and 1 by the Containment Boards of Karachi, Drigh Road, Malir and Manora.¹³⁴⁶ The method of single transferable votes would be the basis of the elections. Accordingly, the elections took place on the 19th January, 1956.

Apparently, the elections were held in an atmosphere of competition there were 700 contestants in the field.¹³⁴⁷ But in essence, the circumscribed nature of the electorate and the vogue of indirect election took away much of the winds out of the sail of the one unit's maiden voyage in the waters of parliamentarianism. The limiting causes mainly emanated from the decision to make a stop-gap arrangement for a legislature pending general elections. The elections were fought on a tribe and cast basis rather than on rival socio-economic programmes. The elections assumed the character of factions, warfare as the landlords who happened to be the dominant class, themselves were tribe or caste-oriented.

For instance, in the Northern districts of the former Punjab Province the tussle was between Arains and Jats, in the Multan division it was between Gardezis and Gilanis, the former being in the Daultana group and the latter on the Gurmani side. In Dera Ghazi Khan district, the Mazaris fought the Legharis. In former Bahawalpur, Hasan Mahmood group had rough brush with the Nizammudin's. In Sialkot, the Ghuman and

¹³⁴³ *New York Times*, October 15, 1955.

¹³⁴⁴ The Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, Sub-section (3) and (4) of Section II.

¹³⁴⁵ The former Provinces and States were allotted seats in the legislature in the following way: The Punjab - 124; Sindh-75; the N.W.F.P.-41; Tribal areas 22; Karachi-14; Bahawalpur 23; The N.W.F. States - 10; Baluchistan - 8; B.S.U. - 7; Khairpur - 4; Women-10; Non-Muslims - 10. see *Dawn*. August 9, 1955.

¹³⁴⁶ Governor General's Order quoted in *Dawn*, December 20, 1955.

¹³⁴⁷ *Dawn*, January 14, 1956.

Malli group were united to fight the rest. In Sargodha, the Tiwanas and Qureshis were at daggers drawn, while in Attack the Maliks were opposed to each other. The former Sindh province witnessed a bitter fight between the two main group, namely Talpur and Khuhro, the former being aided by Syeds, Kazis and Pagara group to the disadvantage of the latter. The former N.W.F.P.¹³⁴⁸ did not have much of a feudalistic fight.¹³⁴⁹ And due to the narrow base of electorate most of the members of the former legislative Assemblies swarmed into the interim legislature of West Pakistan to the loss of new blood. As a result neither did the complexion of the House alter nor did the politics of the Province undergo any positive change of direction. It was, however, too early to expect a real breakthrough in politics in the presence of marked social inequality in terms of honour, privilege and power which were associated with the agrarian economics of West Pakistan, namely landlords. Professor Lenski having made an extensive survey of the Agrarian Societies held that "landownership was valued chiefly as a means to obtain prestige and economic security, while public office was used primarily for political and economic advancement."¹³⁵⁰ So the landlords of West Pakistan became *ex officio* members of a political elite and power holders of the body politic. The conclusion of Lasswell's comparative study on elites that "the power holders include the leadership and social formations from which leaders typically come",¹³⁵¹ was applicable to the situation in West Pakistan. For the power elite happened to be the 'top power class' namely the landlords who were disorged from the existing social configuration. So politics was the preserve of the few and devoid of large scale mass participation.

But the interesting thing was that the landlords themselves were not united. In the course of their mutual quarrels or fights for supremacy, the landlords themselves had to enlist the support of the people at large, and paradoxically stand for social and economic programmes which strictly speaking were opposed to their own interests. In addition, some landlords were influenced in their political attitudes by the education they had received. The effects of the internecine conflicts among elites compelled the masses, otherwise uninterested, to participate in it and side with the warring elites according to their own propensities. Human nature is such that even the reactionary landlords had to create an 'audience' to justify their leadership. As a matter of fact, whatever agrarian reforms were achieved in West Pakistan were precisely the result of the interactions of the rival landlords on the one hand, and mass involvement manifested in their support for a particular group of elite who stood for social amelioration, on the other. Thus the masses had some scope for political participation and the implications were, that this tendency would have increased considering the fact that there emerged some parties which desired to be mass-based.

¹³⁴⁸ The Lundhkar and Khattak groups were prominent, but they could not do well in the elections.

¹³⁴⁹ See *Dawn* January 8, 12, 14 and 17, 1956.

¹³⁵⁰ Lenski, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

¹³⁵¹ Lasswell, et. al., *The Comparative Study of Elites*, (Stanford University Press: 1952), p. 13.

However, going back to the groupings of elites in the interim legislature of West Pakistan we find that the Daultana group captured 90 seats out of 124 allocated to the former Province of Punjab. The Gurmani¹³⁵² group occupied 31 seats. The remaining 3 went to the minority members. In the former Province of Sindh Mir G.A. Talpur triumphed over the Khuhro group. Also, three former Chief Ministers of Sindh e.g. Kazi Fazrullah, Pirzada Satter and Pir Illahi Bakhsh were elected.¹³⁵³ From the former N.W.F.P. Dr. Khan, Sardar Bahadur, Sardar A. Rashid emerged. However, as soon as the M.L. High Command desired to form a M.L. Assembly Party in the legislature to give a partisan character to the government new complications arose.

Indeed, this was an orthodox approach towards the parliamentary system. But the Chief Minister turned anachronistic saying "I am above parties"¹³⁵⁴ and "my life is dedicated to the service of Pakistan."¹³⁵⁵ The statement was saintly but dangerously impracticable. There were two schools of thought, one believing that the "ablest leaders" should exercise powers of the government regardless of popular support, while the other maintained that the Chief Minister should be supported as widely as possible by the dominant party or parties. In any case, partyless government could have been suicidal in an already authoritarian society of West Pakistan. If more than half of Pakistan territory was to be governed without parties then there was no rationale to maintain all the trappings of the Westminster system. The Chief Minister, however, realized the truth with the formation of a M.L. Assembly Party¹³⁵⁶ with Sardar Bahadur Khan as its leader who asked the Governor to commission him as the new Chief Minister.¹³⁵⁷ The shock tactics of the M.L. were answered by Dr. Khan with equal vigor in that a new political party was christened as the R.P. (Republican Party) Dr. Khan now admitted that the "formation of a political party at this stage is an absolute necessity to be able to serve the people".¹³⁵⁸ Much was said against the dubious origin of the R.P. that it was born inside the Assembly having no grass root support. Evidently, it was true. The legitimacy of the R.P. was its birth in response to a pressing challenge in what was described by the Times as "the beginning of two-party system ... with real swings of political life".¹³⁵⁹ This was obviously a healthy sign in the right direction. Actually, the potentiality for the formation of some such political grouping had been apparent since August 1955 and the coming of the R.P. was the fulfillment of this potential. Dr. Khan only occasioned its birth.

Far back in August 4, 1955, Sir Noon the then Chief Minister of the former Province of Punjab along with 30 M.L.A. s quit the M.L. as a protest against the Central

¹³⁵² The Governor of the Province.

¹³⁵³ *Times*, January 20, 1956.

¹³⁵⁴ *Dawn*, March 13, 1956.

¹³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, April 8, 1956.

¹³⁵⁶ This was done on the 2nd April, 1956.

¹³⁵⁷ *Dawn*, April 7, 1956.

¹³⁵⁸ *Times*, April 24, 1956.

¹³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, June 12, 1956.

Parliamentary Board's decision to select Punjab M.C.A.s at the expense of the Punjab Provincial Parliamentary Board.¹³⁶⁰ Sir Noon did not participate in the election of the interim legislature as a protest against the use of a narrow electoral college. The Mamdot group was eliminated in the interim legislature. Both the Mamdot and the Noon group which thought to have been wronged by the Muslim leaguers were waiting for a political platform to operate from outside, so they joined the R.P. with alacrity.¹³⁶¹ From inside the legislature the Gurmani group of the former Punjab and a number of M.L.A.S from the former minority provinces formed the nucleus of the Republican Parliamentary Party.

However, the M.L. was quick to point out that the Governor had acted unconstitutionally in not asking its Parliamentary leader who claimed to have majority in the House to form the government. Apparently, it was true. But according to the Constitution (Art. 71(3))¹³⁶² the 'discretion' lay with the Governor in matters of appointing a Chief Minister who was most 'Likely' to command the confidence of the majority of the legislature. The Governor had the power to invite the M.L. to form a government, and there was no doubt that they would have succeeded in doing so; for, the members who were not previously elected to the legislature on a party basis would have the psychological tendency to join the bandwagon of a party which had the first opportunity to form a government. This was a great factor particularly in a society where politicians did not show much reluctance to succumb to the lure of office. It was a question of choice on the part of the Governor. He could either give the incumbent Chief Minister, who had just formed a new party the chance of showing his majority backing in the legislature, or ask the M.L. which came into being in the legislature on second thought to form the Ministry, repudiating the incumbent government. In allowing the incumbent Chief Minister to carry on the government till the legislature was summoned to judge his position, the Governor seemed not to have committed any flagrant violation of the Constitution. There was, however, no doubt that the Governor had sympathy for the Dr. Khan Ministry. When the legislature met on the 19th May, 1956 it appeared that the marginal vote of the smaller groups might dictate the fortunes of the two big protagonists in the struggle e.g. the M.L. and R.P. What a large 'margin' there was could be seen from the claims made by the M.L. and R.P. on the eve of the session. The R.P. leaders produced the signatures of 160 supporters, while the M.L. maintained that it had a solid 183 votes in its pocket. This meant that a few waverers were notoriously prudent enough to sign with both hands had promised support to both sides pending some tangible signs as to which side would win in the end.¹³⁶³ As a result the first round of the fight on the floor of the House between the M.L. and R.P. in regards to the election of the Speaker the M.L. nominated G.A. Talpur and R.P. M.A.

¹³⁶⁰ *Times*, August 5, 1956; also see *Dawn*, 15,22, 30 June and August 1, 4 and 5, 1955.

¹³⁶¹ *Johannesburg Star*, April 25, 1956.

¹³⁶² "Pakistan Constitution", *loc. cit.*, p. 48.

¹³⁶³ *Hindu*, May 22, 1956.

Quzilbash¹³⁶⁴ was the closest one, namely each side scored 148 votes and the tie was resolved in favor of the government by the conventional casting vote of the Presiding Officer.¹³⁶⁵ After this testing event, the stampede in party alignments followed in favor of the R.P. and the M.L., to their chagrin, found themselves in the opposition thus signaling the final dissociation of the M.L. from the governmental power all over Pakistan.

However, the second round of the parliamentary conflict erupted in early 1957 when the 17-month-old R.P. Ministry went out of office on March 21, giving place to central rule (Art. 193). This new situation was resulted from the process of realignments of political parties. The Awami Mahaz group of G.M. Syed and the A.P.P. were from the very beginning supporting Dr. Khan on the ground of his being secular minded and his past political record. As soon as these groups merged themselves into a new party called N.P. they switched their support over to the M.L. who were acquiescent to the N.P.'s genuine demand for the re-demarcation of the one-unit on its former lines. Soon after the Assembly session began on March 21, the newly-won M.L. supporters took their seats on the opposition benches 30 more Republicans who crossed the floor did the same.¹³⁶⁶ When the House was discussing a cut motion on the government demand for grant for land revenue, the leader of the opposition rose to say that the government party had no majority and so had no right to continue discussions on the budget. He also moved that the censure motion against the government of which notice had been given be put to vote. But Dr. Khan instead of facing the confidence vote immediately advised the Governor to impose Section 193 of the Constitution on the Province.¹³⁶⁷

Evidently, this was a clear case of violation of an important parliamentary convention, since an opportunity for the formation of an alternate government was denied by the application of Section 193. Again, one has to delve deep into the propriety of following a Parliamentary Convention in a given situation. If the Parliamentary Convention on that point was adhered to in the face of the professed motives of the opposition and in complete isolation of the substantive issues involved therein, there would have been the end of the Constitution. After all, the conventions were not an end in themselves. What was the position? Here was an interim legislature peopled by the members of the former Provincial Assemblies, which was not truly representative. At no time was there a clear and coherent opposition majority. And the precarious alliance between the M.L. and N.P., which rendered the Republicans temporarily in the minority, had been secured through a pledge by the 'Leaguers' to dismantle the one unit system. Far back in January 28 the 15-month old Khan Ministry did survive a vote of no-confidence tabled by an Independent member – the voting result was 162-2¹³⁶⁸ On march 8, it again

¹³⁶⁴ *Dawn*, May 20, 1956.

¹³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, May 21, 1956.

¹³⁶⁶ *Dawn*, March 22, 1957.

¹³⁶⁷ *Hindu*, March 22, 1957.

¹³⁶⁸ *Dawn*, January 29, 1957.

survived a division on an amendment to the Development Fund Cess Bill.¹³⁶⁹ Just 3 days before the Governor's rule i.e. on March 18, the government obtained 164-0 votes in a division on one of the budget demands clear majority in a House of 304.¹³⁷⁰ So, it would appear that the late unholy alliance of the M.L.-R.P. and crossing of the floor on the part of few M.L.A.s disturbed the overall majority confidence hitherto enjoyed by the R.P. Ministry.

Presumably the Prime Minister got an understanding from the M.L. leaders to the effect that they would not sabotage the Constitution should they form the Ministry. Governor Gurmani was aware of it and lately showing signs of Constitutional restraint, in that he did not restore the R.P. Government on July 2 and told Dr. Khan that his present number of supporters – 146 – was short of required number for a majority.¹³⁷¹ Daultana appealed to the central government to give the M.L. an opportunity for showing their relevant parliamentary strength.¹³⁷² The Prime Minister Suhrawardy who was at London and had a long distance telephone conversation with Daultana wrote to the Governor to postpone the restoration of parliamentary government in West Pakistan till his arrival.¹³⁷³ If the M.L. could have shown its parliamentary strength convincingly and promised to slur over the issue of the disintegration of one-unit, Suhrawardy would have gone for the formation of the alternative government. This would have taken edge off of some of the distasteful squabbles that were the political vogue of the day. But this line of action could not be pursued as the senior partners of the coalition government at the centre, namely the R.P. which had a strong feeling that the Prime Minister might prevent their return to power in West Pakistan restored the Republican administration on July 15 while Suhrawardy was out of the country.¹³⁷⁴ Subsequently, Governor Gurmani had to quit, making room for Akhter Hossain.

However, when the R.P. administration was restored under the leadership of Sardar Abdur Rashid, who replaced Dr. Khan, there was a repetition of the earlier situation as far as the unhealthy alliances were concerned. The R.P. government which was able to display majority support in the legislature which met on September 14 had in its turn to follow the footsteps of the M.L. The N.A.P. which was holding the balance between the two parties in the Assembly had to be wooed and an *entente* of R.P.- N.A.P. came into being exactly on the following lines as that of the erstwhile M.L.-N.P. one. The ramifications of the R.P.-N.A.P. alliance had been explained earlier. Suffice it to say that the main purpose of the alliance from the N.A.P.'s point of view did not fructify. Whereas, the Republican purpose was served; for, it ensured a parliamentary majority. However, from July 15, 1957 till October 7, 1958 there had been no tangible cases of

¹³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, March 9, 1957.

¹³⁷⁰ See Syed Abid Hossain speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 11, 1957, p. 190.

¹³⁷¹ *Times*, July 3, 1957.

¹³⁷² *Dawn*, July 3, 1957.

¹³⁷³ *Ibid.*, July 11, 1957.

¹³⁷⁴ See *Scotsman*, August 8, 1957.

trouble in the formation of any Ministry. Though there was a change of Chief Minister, in that Sardar Abdur Rashid joined the centre making room for M.A. Qizilbash whose Ministry duly survived a confidence vote on March 20, 1958 when it was only tow-days old.¹³⁷⁵ The reasons for this temporary lull in an otherwise politically embroiled Province were apparently the following. The general elections were almost due. The M.L. having been frustrated in its bid to capture power chose to invest its energies in the consolidation of its electoral position. The same was true of the N.A.P. which, having flirted with both the parties e.g. the M.L. and R.P. to press their services to the cause of anti one-unit found them utterly insincere. With the trust shaken in the unholy alliances the N.A.P. also cast its eyes upon the impending elections.

It is, however, worth bearing in mind that not only were the parliamentary institutions on trial but the new province itself was subjected to an ordeal. The politics of West Pakistan was now the politics of all the former provinces and states put together. Shortcomings were obvious, virtues hoped for. Initially, parliamentary politics of West Pakistan was bound to be complex, suspicious and strenuous. The proximate cause, however, which really bedeviled West Pakistan politics was not personal self-seeking alone but the unwillingness of the M.L. to reconcile itself to its position as an opposition party. Surely it was silly, unimaginative and undignified on the part of an old political party like the M.L. to have entered into a deal with the N.P. to undo a project of which it was the main architect. In retrospect, it can be said that the leaguers did not mean to undo the one-unit. But the fact remained that it was an unprincipled manoeuvre to capture power. Of course, they woke up when they found Republicans having the same arrangement with the N.A.P. As the leader of the M.L. Assembly Party was heard saying "All this is a dirty business and I must be the first to be condemned for it".¹³⁷⁶

As a matter of fact the one-unit issue had been genuinely a settled fact with both the major parties—the M.L. and R.P.—and was used only to enlist support of the N.P./N.A.P to retain or capture power. And because of the R.P.'s having a small edge over the M.L. in terms of parliamentary strength the latter had the underlying urge of tilting the balance in its favor. One, however, could have some sympathy for the M.L. as an old party having a history and a good deal of mass contact when contrasted with other parties which had recently mushroomed. Apart from its deal with the N.P., the M.L. in the course of fighting for its cause indirectly contributed to the country's democratic good. It fought on the party platform in the N.A. for the revocation of the governor's rule from West Pakistan. Its great contribution was the legal fight it put up in the Supreme Court against the President's application seeking advice if the Provincial Governor was empowered to dissolve the Provincial Assembly.¹³⁷⁷ The President's reference case had the significance of great constitutional import. The President's

¹³⁷⁵ *Dawn*, March 21, 1958.

¹³⁷⁶ *Hindu*, September 19, 1957.

¹³⁷⁷ *Times*, July 17, 1957.

application was successfully controverted by Nishtar¹³⁷⁸ and Nazir Ahmed, counsels for the leaders of opposition in the National Assembly and West Pakistan Assembly, so much so that the court pronounced its judgment that the Assemblies could not be dissolved before the general elections and directed the central government to pay Rs. 5,000 to the leaders of the opposition in the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies as compensation.¹³⁷⁹ These were the few laudable examples set by the M.L. which, though marginal in themselves, had a cumulative effect in changing attitudes and institution.

However, the first thing which strikes one when comparing the period of 1947-1954 with the 1955-1958, is the fact that the politics of the latter period was conducted in an atmosphere of comparative freedom and competitiveness. There had been no gross example of political victimization. The first thing the West Pakistan government did was the granting of amnesty to all political detainees.¹³⁸⁰ Secondly the parliamentary government in West Pakistan was disturbed by slightly over 3 months of Governor's rule during the entire period of 2 years, 19 months and 21 days of parliamentary life. Whereas in the days of the first Constituent Assembly Governor's rule was imposed on many an occasion on the former Provinces of West Pakistan and East Pakistan as well. For example, the Parliamentary government of the former Punjab Province was suspended for 2 years and two months, Sindh for 1 year and 3 months and East Pakistan for 1 year and 8 days.¹³⁸¹ Thirdly, in earlier periods Governor's rule was invariably imposed on the sole initiative of the central government under many a pretext in order mainly to make the provinces toe the line of the centre. Whereas for the first time in Pakistan Governor's rule was imposed on the advice of the Chief Minister which had an air of parliamentary convention. The section. 193 was a contingency provision retained in the Constitution to take care of a political situation when a province could no longer be governed through normal parliamentary procedure. Even the Indian President under the same provision had assumed the administration of PEPSU in March 1953, Andhra in November, 1954 and Kerala on March 23, 1956. The power of this constitutional provision had, however, been abused in the past. But the present situation had some distinct features in that the central government within a month's time submitted the Presidential proclamation to the N.A. for its approval¹³⁸² which the House endorsed after having debated the issue for a few days. What was more, the three months budget which had to be certified by the Governor on account of the Promulgation of 193 in the midst of the budget session was duly scrutinized, debated and passed by the N.A.¹³⁸³ In other words, the constitutional mechanism was utilized (sub-section (d) of Section 193 of the Constitution) so that M.P.A.s particularly

¹³⁷⁸ The President of the M.L.

¹³⁷⁹ See *Ibid.*, August 6, 1957; Dawn, July 25, 1957.

¹³⁸⁰ See B.K. Dutta's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, March 22, 1956, p. 334.

¹³⁸¹ See Prime Minister's Speech, *Ibid.*, II, April 13, 1957, p. 327.

¹³⁸² See *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 11, p. 1756.

¹³⁸³ See *N.A.D.*, April 18 and 20, 1957, pp. 636-668 and 806-828 respectively.

those representing West Pakistan¹³⁸⁴ had the opportunity of seeing expenditure of public money duly authorized by the people's representatives which had not occurred in earlier periods.

Fourthly, in the days of the first Constituent Assembly the formation of the Ministry and appointment of the Provincial Chief Minister the central government which was indistinguishable from the M.L. had a deliberate role to play. Whereas, in the present context it was the provincial parliamentary party itself who always did the selecting of its leaders, Dr. Khan was replaced by Sardar Rashid who in his turn by Sir Qizilbash all these changes took place without the direct intervention of the centre.¹³⁸⁵ That meant the centre compared to earlier days tended to be less involved in provincial politics. On the contrary provinces themselves showed tendency to enlist support of the national government to their respective causes. In sum, the provinces in the latter periods had some freedom of action.

The Legislature

The remarkable thing about the West Pakistan legislature was its containing a powerful and sizeable opposition—first of its kind. But in reality the legislature could be likened to a new 'power plant' which, though had huge potentiality was not exploited to its fullest capacity. For a great deal of valuable time was wasted in the wrangles of party politics. In addition, there was some intrinsic difficulties the legislature had yet to survive. The West Pakistan legislature resembled the session of the United Nation General Assembly in miniature. The *Dawn* reported its impression of the first session of the legislature: "The house wore a strange appearance since it was the first occasion that members from all regions of West Pakistan were seen sitting together ... they could be recognized easily as they were sitting in groups, many of them in their typical dresses."¹³⁸⁶ Doubts, hesitancy, shyness, curiosity, the presence of unfamiliar faces, all these factors psychologically inhibited the M.L.A.s from shaking off the effect of the new environment and acting in collective unison within the House, based on programmes to the exclusion of particularistic approach. The M.L.A.s, as it were, were having a new orientation course in the West Pakistan legislature.

However, some impressions of the make-up of the legislature may be had by looking at the following figures which indicate a partial picture of the membership pattern of a large number of M.L.A.S:

¹³⁸⁴ One redeeming feature of double membership.

¹³⁸⁵ See *Dawn*, July 8, 1957; January 13, March 17, 1958; also *Manchester Guardian*, January 30, 1958.

¹³⁸⁶ *Dawn*, May 20, 1956.

Lawyers	41	University Graduates	66*
Zamindars	76	Businessmen	43
Former Ministers	19	Former Chief Ministers	11
		Former Speakers and Deputy	
Former Governors	2	Speakers	6
		Total:	264**

* They may be equally found among the categories of Ministers, Governors, University graduates, etc.

** Muneer Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

The rest of the members of whose whereabouts were not available seemed to have come from the former states, Baluchistan and tribal areas.

The chances were that those members were not enlightened from a parliamentary point of view. The Assembly met in 1956 twice for 23 days, in 1957 thrice for 30 days and in 1958 twice for 25 days. During these periods e.g. 78 working days, it passed three budgets. Flood, the Governor's rule and the need to enable some of the M.L.A.s who were also M.P.s to attend the N.A Session were some of the reasons that led to the curtailing of legislative sittings. Nonetheless, the legislative sittings were inadequate. Generally 6 days were given for the general discussion of the budget and 8 days for the voting of grants.¹³⁸⁷ Having examined the parliamentary reports it seems to us that the opposition – the M.L. strength in the House was never below the mark of 100 – put up a tough parliamentary vigilance.

Usually during the budget sessions they directed their attacks against the government policies relating to taxation, general administration, food, refugee rehabilitation and lastly the one-unit. On the demand for a grant for general administration Syed Amir Hossain Shah pointed out the precarious position of the Ministers and people's representatives under the framework of the new administration. For, in the new situation the people's representatives became less visible. It was more so as the politicians were torn by internal strife making bureaucracy the "ultimate arbiter of people's destinies".¹³⁸⁸ This was a well-timed warning so that the government could stem the tide of bureaucratization by decentralizing and giving more power to local government units and at the same time making people's representatives more visible. The government at least responded to the suggestion by allowing members free first class railway tickets to visit any part of the Province to see the conditions of the people themselves.¹³⁸⁹ The opposition within the range of these 78 days reminded themselves and the government the following: that there should be unity amongst themselves to work out this new experiment of the one-unit; that there should be more governmental

¹³⁸⁷ See Daultana's speech on West Pakistan budget, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 18, 1957. p. 649.

¹³⁸⁸ *Dawn*, May 30, 1956.

¹³⁸⁹ See Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi's speech on West Pakistan budget. *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 18, p. 666.

activities suitable for bringing about psychological integration among the people; that the promises given to the smaller units ought to be fulfilled; lastly that there must be agrarian reform, economy in the expenditure a member vehemently objected to Governor's spending Rs. 45,000 per months when a poor man's per capita income was 5 annas only –and relief to taxpayers.¹³⁹⁰ Generally, the budget sessions looked serious and somber, but sometimes the raising of frivolous points marred that atmosphere. For example, the statement that "It is tragic when men create difficulties in such circumstances to pursue their own ends in utter disregard of the national interests" in a 1,000 word budget speech of the Finance Minister witnessed an opposition walk-out; for they thought it applied to them.¹³⁹¹

On the legislative side, the House enacted 79 Bills of which 4 were referred to the Select Committees. Most of the Bills passed were non-controversial in the sense that they were former provincial laws which had to be adjusted to the new situation. The opposition sought to prevent the government from hustling through Bills. A battle of wits between the R.P. and M.L. lasting for three and half hours in the Autumn session of 1958 blocked the government bid to rush through Bills.¹³⁹² Of the Bills passed 5 appeared to be quite important e.g. the West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Bill –this was of historic importance in that it took the notorious Bengal Regulations of 1818 off the Statute Book the Development Fund Cess Bill, Members' Allowance Bill, Ministers' Salaries, Allowances and Privileges Bill and members' Privileges Bill. The Members' Allowance Bill took a six and half hours marathon session to pass. The Ministers' Salaries etc. Bill consumed 14 hours spread over 3 days including 1 division (130-75) to be enacted. The Development Cess Bill was debated for 3 days. The last 4-day session of 1958 – August 25 – August 28 spent 33 hours exclusively to dispose of 11 Bills of which the passage of the Members' Privilege Bill was one.¹³⁹³

In regards to ventilation of grievances and putting a check upon the government through parliamentary machinery, the use of question hour apart, there were as many as 108¹³⁹⁴ adjournment motions on subjects like food, refugees, Algerian Muslims, the Pakhtoonistan flag on Afghan Consulate, Nehru's claim on Chitral, the ejection of tenants by landlords, seditious act of Red shirt, police coercion, etc., were proposed to be moved of which only 4 were debated. As usual the rest could not stand the rigors of rules. However, the Assembly rule (Number 12) permitted a half hour discussion on important issues at the end of each sitting, except when the House was discussing the budget.¹³⁹⁵ This was a good practice, indeed. The interesting thing was that the West Pakistan legislature showed its keenness to discuss things pertaining to India and

¹³⁹⁰ *Dawn*, May 27, 1956; March 8, 1957; September 16, 1958.

¹³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, March 10, 1957.

¹³⁹² *Dawn*, August 27, 1958.

¹³⁹³ See *Dawn*, February 4, 5, 6, March 9, 1957 and August 29, 1958.

¹³⁹⁴ Calculated by the writer by going through the reporting of each Assembly sitting.

¹³⁹⁵ Rules quoted in *Dawn*, May 4, 1956.

International Muslim affairs an area of central government's concern. The House obviously failed to discuss the pressing problems of ejections of tenants by the landlords, though it could find time to make a strawman of Nehru's claim on Chitral and punch it for 3 hours in a special sitting.¹³⁹⁶

The most unfortunate thing was the bad relationship between the Speaker and the opposition which impeded a good deal of parliamentary progress. It was obvious that the newcomers were not conversant with the parliamentary niceties as to how, where and when to raise a point. This was the Speaker's opportunity, and should have been his duty to assist the beginners with patience, respect and tact. Instead, he appeared to be gruff and arrogant to the opposition member. As many as 33 adjournment motions were ruled out by the Speaker on the ground that it was a budget session, which actually was not true.¹³⁹⁷ He would occasionally crack at a member "sit down", instead of saying "Please, sit down". Members were bodily removed from the House by the Sergeant-at-arms at the behest of the Speaker,¹³⁹⁸ though he could have been lenient. Similarly, some fanatical members would show disrespect to the Speaker on the ground of his shaking hands with the women M.L.A.s while taking the membership oath and allowing them to sit in the House with their faces unveiled, which appeared to be unislamic to them.¹³⁹⁹ On balance, the Speaker appeared to be patronizing and unsympathetic to the opposition. Eventually, the Speaker wrote to the leader of the opposition assuring improved behavior. On that ground the opposition also forgave him in not pressing a division on a no-confidence motion against the Speaker which was debated for three consecutive days.¹⁴⁰⁰

However, the House had some moments of truth when it showed its capability of debating on some of the issues of the country with decorum and dignity. The debates on a resolution on the electorate continued for four days followed by 2 divisions, on refugee rehabilitation 5 hours followed by 1 division. Similarly, on the motion on parliamentary privilege, and resolution asking for a probe into assets of the people who had become suddenly rich after partition the debates of the House appeared serious. Messrs. S.M. Bennet and F. Tomney, British M.P.s who watched the proceedings of the budget session of 1957 appreciated the high level of debate.¹⁴⁰¹ Members were capable of raising finer parliamentary points. For instance, Mr. Allana (M.L.) told the House, which was called into session after its prorogation in the midst of the budget session, by refuting the arguments of the Advocate General, who came to the House to define the legal position of the budget, that the budget consideration be taken *de novo*. He explained that three eventualities were contemplated in the presentation of the budget

¹³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, May 29, 1956.

¹³⁹⁷ *Dawn*. January 31, 1957.

¹³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1956; January 29, 1957; February 1, 1957.

¹³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, May 21, 1956.

¹⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid* March 2, 3 and 4, 1957.

¹⁴⁰¹ *Dawn* March 7, 1957.

e.g. either the budget was to be rejected or accepted with amendments or passed as it was.¹⁴⁰² This raising of point of order enabled the House to discuss the budget once again in a new situation.

On the count of what Professor Laski called 'the selective function of the House' the West Pakistan legislature produced quite a number of good parliamentarians e.g. Daultana, Bahadur Khan, Qayum Khan, Pirzada, Sardar Rashid, Allana, Rana G.M. Noon, Mian Md. Shafi etc. Of the women members Begum Zari Sarfraz of Mardan, Begum Zari, Tahira Agha of Hyderabad, Begum Fida Hossain¹⁴⁰³ of the former Punjab proved their mettle.¹⁴⁰⁴ Despite the existence of highly inflammable relationship between the government and opposition, there were instances when both the parties accommodated each other. In as many as 5 Bills the opposition cooperated with the government in passing them and the suggestions made thereto were appreciated by the government. Similarly, the Chief Minister himself on behalf of the government persuaded the opposition from the lobbies back to the House who had earlier walked out as a protest against the guillotining of the legislation, on a promise that the Assembly sittings of the Spring session of 1958 would be extended to 21 days with arrangements for midnight sitting.¹⁴⁰⁵

Members were concerned about the misdemeanor on the part of their colleagues so far as the habit of floor-crossing was concerned. Quoting the example of the House of Commons which passed a resolution in 1695 forbidding any sort of misdemeanor on the part of the members, Mr. Allana impressed upon the House to emulate that example. What was more, an independent party within the Assembly was formed with a nucleus of 8 members led by Mir Balakh Sher Mazari pledging themselves to act as "corrective influence" in the working of the parliamentary life of the country by steering clear of unhealthy party wrangles.¹⁴⁰⁶ By quoting this we do not point out their actual achievements but to say that the members were aware of their limitations which was a meaningful sign.

However, taking everything together it can be said that the West Pakistan legislature was fortunate to have a strong opposition which had the potentiality of forming an alternative government. One's impression is that had there been general elections there would have been no prospect for poly-partisan politics i.e. there would not have emerged a situation of competition among nearly equal parties. This assumption is made by making due allowances for the religious parties—at this point there was no religious party in the Assembly which might enter the new legislature after the elections. This is precisely because the parties stood at the point in the political

¹⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, September 16, 1957.

¹⁴⁰³ They were made parliamentary Secretary and Deputy Minister respectively.

¹⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, March 26, 1957.

¹⁴⁰⁵ *Dawn*, February 7, 1957; April 3, 4, 1958.

¹⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, March 26, 1957.

spectrum where their respective attitudes to issues overlapped, despite their distinctiveness. For instance, the R.P. resembled the N.A.P. on the broad issue of non-communalism, but stood apart on the agrarian point. Whereas, the M.L., though communal had more in common with the N.A.P. as far as the agrarian issues were concerned. This was a mitigating aspect of existing party cleavages. By all indications, the General elections would not have given an overwhelming majority either to M.L.¹⁴⁰⁷ or R.P. in the legislature. A coalition government was inevitable. Considering the fact that there was no minority problem in West Pakistan, the N.A.P., whose number would have expectedly increased in the new legislature, might have chosen to join or back up a M.L.-led coalition government in West Pakistan¹⁴⁰⁸ after the elections. This was more probable on socio-economic consideration, already a trend towards that direction was visible 7 months prior to the martial law. Disillusioned in their attempt to undo the one unit through secret deals with both the M.L. and R. P., the N. A. P. entered into a pact with the M. L. based on a 16 point programme inside the legislature. They skipped over the ideological issues and concentrated on socio-economic issues. Nineteen M.P.s in a statement expressed surprise at it. This new line was clearly reflected in the West Pakistan legislature.¹⁴⁰⁹

And, as far as the essentially important aspect of West Pakistan politics was concerned i.e. to make the politics mass-based, accessible and humane, social revolution was the panacea. On that score we can only commit a foreign observer's opinion to paper "Feudalism will go (by legislation or revolution) and a rural middle class with a stake in stability will be created. Already in that desert owner-peasants are being settled on reclaimed land, and in the towns there is a steady creation of an urban middle-class. The services ... contribute to the formation of a middle- class; every sergeant major's son ... and there are many small landlord's son who becomes a lawyer or a veterinary surgeon is a pawn in the right direction. Even middle class girls are slowly becoming doctors and teachers ... The creation of a genuine middle class is therefore only a matter of time".¹⁴¹⁰

East Pakistan

The Socio-political ecology of East Pakistan was in marked contrast with that of the western half. According to Lasswell politics is the study of "who gets what, when and how" and it was in the analysis of the social stratification "Which answers 'who gets what, when and how.'"¹⁴¹¹

¹⁴⁰⁷ No doubt, the M.L. would have a clear edge over the R.P. and for that matter any party in the elections in West Pakistan.

¹⁴⁰⁸ It is equally possible that the N.A.P. might have chosen to remain in the legislature as a socialist opposition - in the event the M.L. succeeded in developing a working relationship with the A.L. in West Pakistan.

¹⁴⁰⁹ See *Dawn*, March 18, 19 and 25, 1958.

¹⁴¹⁰ See Taya Zinkin's article, *Manchester Guardian*, January 10, 1955.

¹⁴¹¹ H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society : Framework for Political Enquiry* (Yale University Press: 1950), p. 67.

The people of East Pakistan dragged themselves out from the slough of feudalistic order as soon as the feudal (also money lending) class, the Hindus dashed to West Bengal (India) following the creation of Pakistan. This was rather an automatic social emancipation. Eventually, the government by a legislative act clinched the issue by abolishing landlordism. Dr. Nazmul Karim, a social scientist, University of Dacca who having done a survey of East Pakistan district-wise opined that quite a large number of districts were already for a long time middle class oriented, and the class consciousness based on nobility of birth or land was fast fading out. He continued that "the establishment of Pakistan meant the creation of a significant middle class among the Muslims of East Pakistan who have adopted the middle class way of living. As most of them have come from the masses of the people, they retain their connections with the latter who have also been trying to copy the aspirations and the standards of living of the middle class."¹⁴¹² This middle class was drawn from all classes. A merchant class recruited from all strata of society also came into being. As a result "The middle class and the merchant class are the two classes which are the most powerful ... of all classes in East Pakistan society. The pretensions of 'nobility'... classes have little or no value to these new classes who have risen to power and position not because of birth, but because of their merit and enterprise."¹⁴¹³

So the very nature of the social configuration of East Pakistan compared to the Western half made politics broad based, accessible and involved. Besides, among the provinces East Pakistan with 21.1 percent had the best literacy figures—the average in West Pakistan was about 16 percent.¹⁴¹⁴ The middle class of East Pakistan was not urban in attitude as 95.6 percent of the population lived in the rural area leaving only 4.4 percent in urban areas. Firstly, the villages were the basic units of East Pakistan society. They survived the ravages of centuries. Secondly, the industrialization process was not as rapid as it was in West Pakistan the rate of urbanization, says the 1961 census, in West Pakistan was 22.5 percent compared to East's 5.2¹⁴¹⁵ percent. Thirdly, the industrial policy of the East Pakistan government was not precisely urban-oriented. That meant the values of village institutions which were not appreciably disturbed were bound to reflect in the legislature. More than 80 percent of the people's representatives hailed from the rural surroundings which also had loyalties to local indigenous institutions. The dynamics of provincial politics were also connected with the dynamics of rural society. Apart from the positive aspects of local institutions there were village factions. In many a developing society the term 'village factions' refer to "groups or sections of a society in relations of opposition to one another, interested in promoting their own objects rather than those of the society as a whole and often turbulent in their

¹⁴¹² John E. Owen (edit.) *Sociology in East Pakistan* (Asiatic Society of Pakistan: 1962), A. L. Nazrul Karim "The Aim of Development".

¹⁴¹³ *Ibid*, "Social Stratification Patterns among Muslims", p. 149. See also A. K. Nazrul Karim, *Changing Society in India and Pakistan* (Oxford University Press, Dacca: 1956).

¹⁴¹⁴ Census of Pakistan, 1951, *loc. cit.*, p. 78.

¹⁴¹⁵ 1961 Census of Pakistan 1961, *loc. cit.*

operations".¹⁴¹⁶ The tradition of 'village factions' from which most of the M. L. A.s of East Pakistan came was an added complication to the country's politics. Factionalism, caste recognitions, village and kinship loyalties were all beginning to diminish but were still exerting what Karl Von Vorys called "pressures of anomie".¹⁴¹⁷

There was, however, a demographic significance of politics in that the population distribution of East Pakistan was pyramidal. More than 51 percent of Muslims, and Hindus were in the age-group of 10-39. Around 16 percent of Muslims and Hindus were in the age structure of 40-59.¹⁴¹⁸ This meant that the preponderance of young and middle aged population in East Pakistan society was contributory towards surcharging political institutions with radical thoughts. It also meant that politicians themselves would have the psychological urge for higher expectations.

On the question of religion which was a great factor in the politics of Pakistan as a whole, East Pakistan, on balance, appeared more moderate. Hers was the Islamic faith just as an expression of simple piety, compared to the West Pakistan attitude to Islam which could, by democratic standards, appear as a reactionary political force. In other words, East Pakistan politics had secular contents. On linguistic, cultural and social considerations East Pakistan was distinctly a homogeneous national unit-save for some 385,000 hill tribes people in the Chittagong hill tracts.

Theoretically and in comparison with West Pakistan-East Pakistan had democratic viability. It had a pervasive middle class, homogeneity, literacy,¹⁴¹⁹ secularity, political consciousness and a good deal of populist movements.

East Pakistanis till the advent of Pakistan did not relish "any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in run ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghals, Pathans or the British ... As such they have all the inhibitions of downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible psychologically to adjust to the requirements of their new born freedom."¹⁴²⁰ Despite the sameness of race and culture East Pakistan society remained functionally fragmented for generations as the people had never been mobilized for a sustained unified action for a collective goal, except for the people's upsurge under the sustained leadership of *Bangabandhu* that led to the liberation war and finally Bangladesh independence. Dr. Sen once gave an anthropological suggestion towards Bengalis' forming a common and collective outlook. He said rice was the staple food for Bengalis and in the process of cooking all together, one had to only press a few grains to

¹⁴¹⁶ Firth, R., 'Factions in India and overseas societies', *British Journal of Sociology* (8, No. 4, 1957), pp. 191-295, quoted in "Sociology in East Pakistan", *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁴¹⁷ Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, London: London: 1965), p. 35.

¹⁴¹⁸ Census Report of 1951, *loc. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁴¹⁹ The Number of Literates, Says the Census report of 1961, in East Pakistan was 17.6 percent compared to West Pakistan's 13.6 percent. Quoted in Report of the Commission on National Education (Government of Pakistan Press: 1963), p. 183.

¹⁴²⁰ Karl von Vorys, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

determine if the rest were boiled properly an example of unity. Whereas, the West Pakistanis, whose staple food was Roti¹⁴²¹ had to make every one separately—an example of individualism.¹⁴²² It was no doubt an interesting suggestion, but the fact remains that the grains of rice stay always distinct and separate from each other, no matter how they are cooked together. That was why critics of Bengali behaviorism in the past rightly warned that the middle class of Bengal would destroy themselves mutually without outside help.

The people of densely populated East Pakistan—the population density varied from a high of almost 2,000 persons per square mile in several sub-divisions of East Pakistan to a low of one per square mile in Dalbandin Tehsil of Baluchistan in West Pakistan¹⁴²³—with their eyes open, tongue let loose, and intellect emancipated came out into the open to push up their respective interests, grievances, ideas and beliefs. Groups and parties were formed along those lines. A unified political line of action, however, advisable, could not be pursued in the beginning because of existing pluralistic trends. Hence, East Pakistan assumed the form of a veritable 'market polity'.

It has been mentioned earlier how and in what way the then Prime Minister Mohammad Ali restored the U.F. Government in East Pakistan headed by Sarker in June, 1955. Personal considerations apart, the Prime Minister's entrusting the task of governance with the particular group of people had also the force of an underlying policy logic that was consistently followed by the central government. Consumed with anxieties for possible communist subversion in East Pakistan which might act upon country's foreign policy the Prime Minister took a cautious line. The centre till then had nothing but suspicion and hatred for the U.F. General Mirza who had earlier given his "considered opinion that the United Front leaders are the enemies of Pakistan and cannot be trusted",¹⁴²⁴ was now at the centre as the Minister for Interior. His advice to the Prime Minister could not be negligible.

Now that the restoration of parliamentary government was inevitable in East Pakistan a choice had to be made of the 'lesser evils' from amongst the U.F. men to run the government. The strength of the parties forming the U.F. was given on April 1, 1954 as A.L. 142, K.S.P. 48, N.I.P. 19, and Ganatantri Dal 13.¹⁴²⁵ By mid-October, 1954 the party strength in the legislature was stated by T. Hossain (K.S.P.) to be the following: A.L. 98,¹⁴²⁶ K.S.P. 86,¹⁴²⁷ N.I.P. 24, G.D. 13 and independent 1.¹⁴²⁸ There was always some discrepancy in the numbers as each party had a tendency of claiming more than its

¹⁴²¹ A sort of flat round bread made of flour.

¹⁴²² Ajit Kumar Sen, *The Islamic State and other Political Essays* (Calcutta: 1950), p. 98.

¹⁴²³ Stanley Maron, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁴²⁴ Governor's letter to the Governor General, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴²⁵ *Dawn*, April 2, 1954.

¹⁴²⁶ To the writer's knowledge the A. L. number should be 107.

¹⁴²⁷ It seems the A. L. dissident group was added to the K. S. P. number.

¹⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, October 20, 1954.

actual number. But the fact remained that A.L. had been always the largest single majority party in the legislature.

Which party could be entrusted with the provincial administration from centre's angle? Ordinarily, it ought to have been the A. L. to form the coalition government. But this was a forbidding proposition for the centre to take the A. L. into confidence, whose prominent leaders like Bhasani and Aaur Rahman attended peace meeting in Europe and Peking which appeared to be 'communist-inspired in the centre's eyes. Did not A. Rahman call a memorial for Stalin in Dacca?¹⁴²⁹ So, the Prime Minister preferred the conservative K.S.P. to the progressive A.L. A few leaders of the K.S.P had past associations with the congress, Swarajist Party and Forward Bloc of Subhas Bose—a fact which was not particularly to the centre's liking. But their past histories were rationalized, so long they were found avowedly anti-communist. Whereas, an A.L. coalition government would let the communists crow over the head of the government. Another factor which seemed to have prompted the Prime Minister to hand over administration to the U.F. was the consideration that given Haq's immense prestige and popularity among the masses of the people the Prime Minister would be able to, with Haq's backing in the Constituent Assembly II, go down to history by giving to the country a Constitution. Besides, Haq's recruitment to the central government—Sarkar was nominated by Haq to form the U.F. coalition government in East Pakistan with the Congress, U.P.P. and scheduled caste federation etc. would assuage Hindu apprehension vis-à-vis Constitution-making. For, Haq claimed to have "enjoyed the confidence of Hindu Leaders for more than half a century".¹⁴³⁰ These are some of the motivating factors that led the Prime Minister to restore the Haq-oriented U.F. coalition government—it was indeed the Prime Minister's solo performance without the knowledge of the central cabinet, which was, on balance, anti-A.L.

The U.F. Government was composed of people who had long political records to their credit. Most of them relatively elderly and incapable of giving a dynamic leadership. None had the *Charisma* and élan of their leader, Haq, who was now placed at the centre. So the government had an intrinsic difficulty when contrasted with the opposition whose members were vigorous, enthusiastic and young. Initially, the U.F. government had an invigorating start. For the first time 3 minority members were taken as Ministers. Mr. B.K. Das, Leader of the congress party, was entrusted with the portfolio of finance—a meaningful gesture that was even hailed by Indian newspapers.¹⁴³¹ As many as 500 political prisoners were released—there were no less than 1600 people who were in jail during the 92-A regime—and a general amnesty was granted to those so-called political offenders against whom legal or police proceeding were pending.¹⁴³²

¹⁴²⁹ Governor's letter D.O. No. 111/PS, July 10, 1954, Appendix, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴³⁰ Haq's speech in the Constituent Assembly II quoted in *Dawn*, January 24, 1956.

¹⁴³¹ *Times* September 8, 1955.

¹⁴³² *Daily Worker*, October 6, 1955 and *Dawn*, July 27, 1955.

But soon the government was engulfed with wrecking problems which in attempting to solve it showed more nervousness than steadiness of purpose. At the same time it was not inclined to relinquish office. When the food crisis loomed large, huge quantities of rice were released from the government stores and permits were given to the party supporters to buy rice which was sold, to the detriment of common people, at a higher price in the market. This decision was taken by the government in the teeth of opposition by high officials who had years of experience in the fields. Industrial, educational and house building programmes were hampered. In the cultural field the Arts Council which had done so much in opening up a new vista for the youth was in a state of decadence. The province's 40,000 policemen who had vainly hoped that the U.F. government would increase their salaries—their monthly salaries were very poor so much so that they were driven to take bribery as a rule suddenly struck. The government in desperation arrested prominent M.L.A.s including 2 M.P.s on charges of collusion with the strikers and sent 600 policemen for trial.¹⁴³³ Similarly, 1200 class IV employees in all departments of the provincial secretariat struck.¹⁴³⁴ All these incidents made the people in general and youth in particular experience 'a sense of frustration'.¹⁴³⁵

On parliamentary count, the legislature was not summoned—since it was elected the legislature had not the occasion to meet properly except for a day to elect its Speaker and Deputy Speaker and administer the oath to members—ever since the Sarkar Ministry was inducted into office. There were some excuses, no doubt, since, the Finance Minister including other M.L.A.s had to participate in the constitution making i.e. to attend the session of the constituent Assembly II. But this excuse could not be tenable when the Governor General made a two month extension¹⁴³⁶ in the deadline for the presentation of the provincial budget.¹⁴³⁷ He—General Mirza—did it precisely to save the U.F. Ministry from the ordeal of facing the legislature and to enlist the U.F. support for his election as the first president of the Republic of Pakistan. Even the octogenarian Haq was sent to East Pakistan in March, 1956 as Governor¹⁴³⁸ as soon as the constitution Bill was passed, to bolster up the U.F. government. Not only was the legislature not summoned but several bye-elections were not declared.

However, when the legislature at long last met on 22nd May, 1956 the Speaker after 7 hours of debate on points of order raised by the opposition about the illegality of presenting the budget, barred the government from moving the budget. In his ruling the speaker took the government to task for allowing only 5 days for general discussions on the budget and for voting on the demands for grants. Considering that

¹⁴³³ See *Dawn*, November 26 & 30, 1955 and *Times*, December 23, 1955.

¹⁴³⁴ See *Ibid*, April 26 & 28, 1956 and *Hindu*, April 28, 1956.

¹⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, January 3, 1956.

¹⁴³⁶ April, 1956 - May, 1956.

¹⁴³⁷ *Dawn.*, February 24, 1956.

¹⁴³⁸ *Times*, March 10, 1956.

the budget had to be passed by May 31, and that some holidays would intervene, the Speaker refused to go down in history by applying the guillotine, only after 3 or 4 days of budget discussion, which would have meant that the legislature was not taken into consideration vis-à-vis country's financial proposals.¹⁴³⁹ Indeed, the Speaker's ruling was an important milestone in asserting parliamentary conventions. As a result of the deadlock the Presidential rule was clamped in the province. The Presidential Proclamation was revoked within a week's time but the same Sarkar Ministry was restored. And when the Assembly was scheduled to meet in August the Governor suddenly prorogued the Assembly just a few hours before the budget meeting was due. The opposition member in a rump session adopted a resolution charging Governor's action aimed to help his provincial Ministry, which no longer commanded a majority.¹⁴⁴⁰

Given the fact that East Pakistan was predominantly middle class even though it was weak by western standard—parliamentary politics could not be dictated upon by a ruling party capriciously for long. For, countervailing forces were operative. The Sarkar Ministry was a coalition born of a desire of following a minimum programme mutually acceptable. When the lowest common denominator was forgotten, the rationale of coalition government could no longer be sustained. Sarkar being the leader of the coalition government could neither soothe the NIP in pushing through a resolution in the legislature recommending separate electorates, nor could he convince the congress of doing the same in the opposite direction, namely joint electorate. Similarly, he appeared circumlocutory to the G.D.'S 5-point demand of which unconditional release of all political prisoners, holding of bye-elections and summoning of the legislature, etc. were prominent. In short, he was incapable of undertaking things in which he himself believed. As a result, the G.D. quit the U.F. on 3rd January, 1956. The U.P.P. withdrew from the meeting of the U.F. parliamentary party on 9th of January, 1956 and the Congress on the same date served an ultimatum on the government. What was more, 2 Ministers belonging to the right wing component of the U.F. resigned as a protest to Governor's sudden prorogation of the Assembly. That the dissident A.M.L. was not happy with the U.F. could be understood in their leader's—Abdus Salam Khan and Hashimuddin—leaving the Ministry in July, 1956.¹⁴⁴¹ It was almost sure that had there been a proper legislative session Sarkar would have met his *Waterloo*. And the interesting thing was this that some of the supporters of the U.F. government on many an occasion tried to bring pressure on Sarkar to call legislative session. They could not be very aggressive lest they should lose membership of the Legislature; for, Sarkar once threatened dissolution of the Assembly. The feeling that there was something undemocratic about the running of the U.F. government was there within the coalescing parties and splinter groups appeared accordingly. This was indicative in the sense that

¹⁴³⁹ See *Times*, May 23, 1956 and *Dawn*, May 23, 1956.

¹⁴⁴⁰ *New York Times*, August 14, 1956.

¹⁴⁴¹ See *Dawn*, January 4, 9, August 24 and July 14, 1956 respectively.

the U.F. itself, finally in a meeting on August 29, 1956, took the decision of asking its own leader to tender resignation.¹⁴⁴²

So far as outside pressure was concerned, the A.L. opposition being deprived of fighting the Sarkar government from inside the legislature took the matter to the people and successfully mobilized public opinion against the government. Food scarcity which was virtually out of the frying pan into the fire helped the A.L. enlist people's wrath against the administration. Students and hungry crowds stormed the residence of the Chief Minister. Even a K.S.P. called public meeting was abandoned when 'screaming women rushed to the dais' accusing government mismanagement of the present food situation.¹⁴⁴³ The A.L. later insisted that the government should declare the province a famine area, when Bhasani went on a spectacular fast to hurt the government more on the food front.¹⁴⁴⁴ What was more, the A.L. observed general strike and protest meetings in both parts of Pakistan on August 27, 1956 against the Governor's prorogation of the Assembly.¹⁴⁴⁵ The situation became more charged in East Pakistan when police opened fire on a 'hunger march' in Dacca killing 4 people.¹⁴⁴⁶ The incident lent itself to the claim that the people were given bullets instead of food. It will appear that mounting pressures of various kinds and from various quarters were brought to bear upon the government to mend its ways. Even the centre—General Mirza, now the President, was chary about doing something unconstitutional at the very start of the Republic—turned its back to the Sarkar Ministry and advised constitutionalism.

Enough was enough, and the Sarkar Ministry relinquished office on August 30, 1956 thus culminating what was called "an inglorious regime".¹⁴⁴⁷ But, while departing Sarkar cultivated, to the embarrassment of the next government, the art of the political impresario. For, he announced a proposal to nationalize the jute industry, decisions to abolish the jute license fee recoverable from jute cultivators and write off Rs. 1,75,00,000 on agricultural rent, which was outstanding against cultivators of acquired estates.¹⁴⁴⁸ However, having exhausted his bag of tricks to keep the discredited U.F. Ministry in office, the Governor was now compelled by the forces of democracy to call the opposition parties to form an alternative government. Aaur Rahman (A.L.) on the 6th September, 1956 constructed a broad-based coalition with all the parties¹⁴⁴⁹ except the U.F. and M.L.—the name of U.F. which now consisted of only the K.S.P. and N.I.P.¹⁴⁵⁰ was retained as a political stunt, and the M.L. was voiceless in the House. This time two Caste Hindus were taken, of whom one M. Dhar was allotted the portfolio of Finance.

¹⁴⁴² See *Times*, *New York Times* and *Dawn*, August 30, 1956.

¹⁴⁴³ See *New York Times*, November 20, 1955 and *Hindu*, November 19, 1955.

¹⁴⁴⁴ See *Hindu*, May 25 and *Times*, May 26, 1956.

¹⁴⁴⁵ See *Dawn*, August 28, 1956.

¹⁴⁴⁶ See *New York Times*, September 7, 1956.

¹⁴⁴⁷ W. Chowdhury, *op.cit.*, p.117.

¹⁴⁴⁸ *Dawn*, August 29, 1956.

¹⁴⁴⁹ The A.L., Congress, part of U.P.P., Schedule Caste Federation (S.C.F.) and the G.D.

¹⁴⁵⁰ It finally severed ties with the U.F. on September 17, 1956. See *Dawn*, September 18, 1956.

The Cabinet was young compared to its predecessor. It had an intense urge for doing something positive for the country.

How passionate was Rahman's vision of his country can be gauged from these following lines he wrote subsequently in his book:

"I was inspired. How often have I been conjuring up the golden land of Bengal in my reverie for the last twenty-five years of my life-sketching its grandeur on the canvas of my mind and building many a Taj Mahal in imagination. Much had I read about the legend of golden Bengal in epic, literature and rhapsody, heard the earth was so kind that she used to laugh with a harvest of gold whenever tickled with a hoe. Clusters of gold used to hang round those magic tress—and there the wind blew dusts of gold. The land of golden people—they exhaled pearls in their laughter, rubies in their tears."¹⁴⁵¹

With this zeal of bringing back the glory of the country, Rahman was said to have assumed the Chief Ministership. Unprecedented, the Chief Minister and his colleagues with bouquets of flowers went to the zail gate to receive political prisoners¹⁴⁵²—some of them were languishing in the prison for more than 7/8 years without trial whom they had just released unconditionally. Having been swept into office under the most forbidding situation when the land was in the grip of famine, the A.L. led coalition government ordered a general mobilization of the entire government machinery for handling the food crisis. An urgent Food Conference was called in which the Prime Minister himself came all the way from Karachi. The party (A.L.) itself was not complacent now that it had captured power. For Bhasani warned his own government that unless at least 17 lakh maunds of rice was sent out to feed East Pakistan's 6,000 villages within a fortnight the government would not last more than 6 months.¹⁴⁵³ And it was to the credit of the government that it succeeded considerably in tackling the Food problem and saving people from starvation.¹⁴⁵⁴

Less than fortnight after its assumption of office the government called a regular session of the legislature¹⁴⁵⁵ and had the budget and the resolution recommending the joint electorates passed. Similarly, all the bye-elections were declared as promised in the 21-point programme. This told of the faith the government had in parliamentarianism. During its two-year stay in power the government had these achievements to its credit. The most ill-omened Public Safety Act which was virtually abused to silence political criticism and ensure rather the safety of the people who were already in power, was repealed. The age-long popular demand for the separation of the judiciary from the

¹⁴⁵¹ Translated into English from Bengali by the writer, Aatur Rahman, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

¹⁴⁵² The U.F. government did not release all.

¹⁴⁵³ *Hindu*, September 8, 1956.

¹⁴⁵⁴ See for details the speech of the Central Food Minister, *N.A.D.*, Vol. 1, February 14, 1957, pp. 389-394.

¹⁴⁵⁵ First of its kind after the victory of the U.F. in the elections of 1954.

executive—the directive principles of the Constitution recognized such separation—was partly fulfilled. The executive magistrates would now deal with the preventive sections of Criminal Procedure Code; and the judicial magistrates would try all criminal cases, being directly responsible to sessions judges. Regarding land tenure, Zamindari had already been abolished. But it could not be done without compensation as the Constitution forbade it. Moreover, the infamous procedure of recovering arrears from the cultivators through the *Certificate* system was abolished. With regard to jute it could not be nationalized for fear of repercussions in the international trade and domestic economy, but a Jute Marketing Corporation was established to ensure a fair price to the jute growers and stabilize the mercurial jute prices. To improve the irrigation system with which country's agriculture was linked a good many planned projects were set into motion. The services of Mr. Julius Croog and his troupe of specialists of the U.N. were enlisted to help prevent the yearly devastating floods that rendered millions homeless, killed cattle and destroyed crops. Croog's report was substantial and comprehensive.¹⁴⁵⁶

A new Ministerial department of Salt was set up to make the memories of Salt famine a thing of the past. The framers of the 21-point programme laid much stress on education, particularly primary education. The pay scale of the primary teachers was notoriously poor. It was raised, and primary schools were made the direct responsibility of the government. Strides of progress were made in other areas of education. A 200-year old religio-cultural institution e.g. Madrassa-e-Alia was given a new orientation. What was referred to as 'Black laws' relating to Dacca and Rajshahi universities in the 21-point programme were deleted. To eradicate corruption in all its facets an anti-corruption department—independent of the police department—was set up under a Minister and an appropriate law was passed to this effect. Shahid Minar¹⁴⁵⁷ was erected. February 21st was declared a public holiday.¹⁴⁵⁸ Burdwan House was declared the seat of the Bangla Academy.

On the labor front a revolutionary Bill, called the Minimum Wages Bill was passed the first of its kind in the province—fixing minimum wages for the laborers. To this end a Minimum Wages Board was founded. Salaries of policemen, nurses, clerks, IV class workers in the offices were increased. The rate of court fees was lowered for the benefit of the poor masses. The Ministers themselves volunteered to accept a monthly salary not exceeding Rs. 1,000. To make local bodies more democratic and broad based relevant acts were amended so that the main executive of the local self-government there were 2000 Union Boards, 20 Municipalities and 3 District Boards—could be elected through a ballot system based on adult franchise for the first time in the political history of East Pakistan. Hundreds of canals were dug as an adjunct to agricultural progress. A gigantic road building programme was launched. On the cultural side, to

¹⁴⁵⁶ It is a sad commentary that the full report of Croog has not been fulfilled up to now due to various reasons.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Memorial for those who lost their lives in the language movement.

¹⁴⁵⁸ The day when police opened fire on the students during language movement.

mention only one, the creation of the picturesque Botanical Garden, called 'Ramna Green' was admirable. Capital expenditure on development was always on the increase—for instance the capital expenditure on the year 1957-58 was shown as Rs. 34,55,00,000 as against Rs. 21,65,00,000 in the budget for 1956-57 and to ensure an overall development of the country a Planning Board for East Pakistan, for the first time, was set up.¹⁴⁵⁹

The reason a few examples of government performance are cited above is to show that the government was progressive and programme-oriented. And the 21-point programme on whose basis they won the 1954 elections which was thought in many a circle to be negative and a stunt, was mostly fulfilled. Some were completely implemented, some partially and others in a modified way. That is why we have said earlier that the 1954 elections were in essence a movement. What was remarkable of this period was the unimpeded flowing of socio-cultural and political stream. Still remarkable was the minorities' being incorporated into the main stream of politics. The widespread belief in India that Hindus in Pakistan received the treatment that Hitler gave to Jews could no longer be substantiated. The minority and Finance Minister, Dhar claimed before a foreign journalist that the Hindus, after the passing of the joint electorates, were now 'first class citizens' of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.¹⁴⁶⁰ The ex-Finance Minister of Sarkar Ministry wrote in his book the book is proscribed in Pakistan—that "with the proclamation of the martial law, the short-lived halcyon days for the minorities also disappeared".¹⁴⁶¹

The comment of the Constitution Commission (1961) that the early M.L. Ministry was less "unsatisfactory" compared to the Ministries coming afterwards¹⁴⁶² and Dr. Chowdhury's—an honorary adviser to the Commission nostalgia for the good old days of Muslim "unity and solidarity" under the leadership of Jinnah manifesting in the achievement of Pakistan, which apparently threatened to fade out under the strain of partisan politics,¹⁴⁶³ were perhaps the result of their lopsided and static ways of looking at things. The early period witnessed monolithic politics, the latter one became polymorphic which degenerated into what was termed a 'market polity' from which there could not be, initially, any getting away till the dusts of factional politics settled themselves. The quantum of failure of the politicians of the latter period towards refining politics was, no doubt, great, but the cost of their not having tried, at all, towards that vein would have been still greater. Hence, we shall now delineate the 'market polity' situation which baffled the smooth progress the government was endeavoring to register.

¹⁴⁵⁹ See *Dawn*, March 15, April 3, September 6, September 29, June 30, 1957. Also see Aatur Rahman, *op.cit.*, pp. 125-135.

¹⁴⁶⁰ *Observer Foreign News Service*, October 21, 1957.

¹⁴⁶¹ P.C. Lahiry, *India Partitioned and Minorities in Pakistan* (Writers' Forum Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1964, p. 35.

¹⁴⁶² Constitution Commission, *loc.cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁴⁶³ Chowdhury, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

Politics showed signs of baffling complexity and strains around March 1958. The formation of the N.A.P. (discussed earlier) hit the A.L. strength in the Assembly. The new party lost representation in the government and occupied their seats in the House separately on three front rows facing the Speaker. Still, the N.A.P.'s desire to support the A.L. government in what according to Haji Danesh, the party's Assembly leader would amount to the choice of lesser evil,¹⁴⁶⁴ seemed genuine throughout the period. But the initial dithering attitude of the A.L., quite understandable from the party's angle, to pay the price of the N.A.P.'s support i.e. the fulfillment of 5-point demand,¹⁴⁶⁵ caused the latter to assume an attitude of neutrality in the legislature which was bound to affect the government position in an atmosphere of shifting alliances of parties.

The K.S.P. — its number in the legislature dwindled to about 58, particularly after the defection of the Kafiluddin Chowdhury's group to the A.L.¹⁴⁶⁶ — which was still the second biggest Muslim party in the Assembly consisted of two internal blocs. The Sarkar group was resentful of the A.L. but the Youssouf Ali and Azizul Haq¹⁴⁶⁷ group wanted to cooperate with the government in order to strengthen it against the alleged subversive forces. Talks continued along that line with Suhrawardy himself. The octogenarian Haq gave blessing to it. Even Azizul Haq replaced Sarkar as the opposition leader a gesture to the A.L. This was a great opportunity for ensuring government stability and would have made up the possible loss of the N.A.P. support. The K.S.P.-A.L. coalition decision was scheduled to be announced on April 21, 1957, but 'due to unknown hitch' this did not materialise.¹⁴⁶⁸ This 'hitch' could be interpreted on many a count; but the main impediment was the opposition of the majority of the party's rank and file to K.S.P.'s inclusion in the government unless they formally joined the A.L. For the flourishing A.L. was confident of winning the general elections without the aid of the K.S.P. Having eaten the humble pie the K.S.P. patched up their internal rivalry, made Sarkar again the parliamentary leader¹⁴⁶⁹ and went all out for the ousting of the A.L. government by hook or by crook.

The Congress was a part of the government. By early 1958 about 10 dissident Congressmen joined the opposition, thus reducing to some extent the government legislative strength. This episode needs a brief analysis to gauge minority politics. Dr. Chowdhury viewed the Hindu Congress as holding the balancing power and their ascendancy in the A.L. Ministry was a "disquieting development" in "provincial politics".¹⁴⁷⁰ Similarly, the Constitution Commission (1961) held that the Chief Minister

¹⁴⁶⁴ *Dawn*, March 27, 1958.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Discussed earlier.

¹⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, October 14, 1956.

¹⁴⁶⁷ A nephew to the octogenarian Haq, the Governor.

¹⁴⁶⁸ *Dawn*, April 23, 1957.

¹⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, March 20, 1958.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Chowdhury, *op.cit.*, p. 119.

in response to the pressure of the Hindu minority withdrew a number of criminal cases against some Hindu persons alleged to have passed information to India about East Pakistan "army maneuvers". Also, the 'operation close door' which was stopping huge smuggling of goods, money and gold across the border had to be abandoned to soothe the minorities.¹⁴⁷¹ Again, we consider these statements devoid of whole truth. This is a question whether facts should support beliefs or vice versa.

At the outset, the very inclusion of the minorities was rather a 'disquieting factor' in many a quarter. The communal minded opposition members in the very first session decried the Hindu inclusion in the Cabinet.¹⁴⁷² A fanatical religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islam went round the country saying that Pakistan integrity was going to be jeopardized by the Congress.¹⁴⁷³ The M.L. and N.I.P. distrust for the Hindus was proverbial. In the face of this reactionary propaganda, the A.L.'s allowing the minorities to have their say in the government was bold and realistic. A minority forming 22 percent¹⁴⁷⁴ of the provincial population could not be ignored. Did not some of the central European countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland have to pay the price for their inability to integrate minorities which had been rather 'national outposts'? So the lesson for Pakistan should have been to follow a positive minority policy which "would make it unnecessary ... of any of Pakistan's minorities too look clandestinely beyond the frontiers of the state".¹⁴⁷⁵ And this was precisely that positive policy the A. L. government was pursuing. It is ridiculous to think that a couple of Hindu ministers could hold sway in a country of overwhelming Muslim population. The Hindu inclusion in the Cabinet did not point to a "disquieting" situation. On the contrary, the general political atmosphere was 'disquieting'. Again, it was not the congress alone which was holding the balance of strength in the legislature. In essence, it was the N.A.P., which was predominantly Muslim. In short, it was the peculiar political situation that determined which party on what occasion was going to hold the crucial balance.

In regard the allegation that some criminal cases against the Hindus were withdrawn, suffice it to say that these cases were both silly and bogus trumped up by the D.I.B.¹⁴⁷⁶ (Department of Intelligence Branch). The abandonment of the scheme, the operation close door, which was being conducted by the army to stop smuggling at the border needs a little elaboration. This is linked with the partition of Bengal. Reflecting on the partition of Bengal Sir J.N. Sarkar, a famous historian, commented that:

¹⁴⁷¹ Constitution Commission, *loc.cit.*, p.11.

¹⁴⁷² *Dawn*, September 19, 1956.

¹⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, April 7, 1958.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Census of 1951, *loc. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Prof. K. J. Newman, "Minorities and the Democratic State", *Dawn*, October 26, 1952.

¹⁴⁷⁶ For details see Ataur Rahman, *op.cit.*, p. 127.

"the frontier question between the Indian union and Pakistan, as far as Bengal is concerned, is in no respect akin to the international frontier problem, like that between Poland and Russia, or between Greece and Albania. In Bengal, it is more like the legal partition of a landed estate between two brothers ... the population is absolutely one race, language and manner of life, they differ only in religion."¹⁴⁷⁷

In pre-partition days the upper and middle class Hindus of East Bengal were mostly concentrated in Calcutta, which being the capital city provided various opportunities. At partition almost every middle class family was bifurcated. Most of the families were joint ones with their family headquarters in East Bengal. As a result some become of necessity, Indian nationals, while those who used to look after joint properties had to be Pakistan nationals. With partition, the family links and property links with West Bengal could not be sundered immediately. So some Hindu families clandestinely passed goods, money and gold over to the Indian border to their co-sharers of the joint properties. Firstly, this could have been stopped by inter dominion arrangements relating to the bifurcated Hindu joint estate. Secondly, the increasing sense of belongingness to East Pakistan on the part of the Hindus would have, in time, prevented them from smuggling things to West Bengal.

But then the border smuggling was not confined in East Pakistan alone. It was equally widespread along the border of West Pakistan where there was no such scheme like the operation close door.¹⁴⁷⁸ Moreover, it was not the Hindus of East Pakistan alone who were involved in smuggling, in that the overwhelming majority of Muslim families residing the border areas took recourse to smuggling as a 'profession'. In some ways the border peoples were constrained to do this. The cultivators could not find 'Harnia' cattle for their requirements which were available across the border. Nor could the government cater to that need. The cultivators found it lucrative to sell their products say, betel nut, jute, etc., across the border when some such opportunities were not here in East Pakistan. The operation close door did some good work¹⁴⁷⁹ up to a point. But eventually the army let loose a reign of terror in the border areas. The cases of army, oppression, rape, flogging were cited in the adjournment motion on the operation close door. Massive military raids creating havoc were launched which resulted in many a case in the discovery of goods whose value was worthless.¹⁴⁸⁰ So the army operation on the border was replaced by other suitable arrangements. This was not solely the result of Hindu pressure. There was pressure inside the A.L. itself, for, after all, the A.L. could not afford to lose the votes of the border people in the coming elections. Besides, the Government realized that the scheme of the operation close door was nothing but a useful temporary arrangement, the permanent solution lay in the creation of market

¹⁴⁷⁷ Quoted in *Statesmen*, July 7, 1947.

¹⁴⁷⁸ *Hindu*, April 16, 1958.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Smuggled goods valued at about Rs. 1.7 million were recovered. See *Dawn*, September 15, 1958.

¹⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

places with communication facilities, so that the border people could sell their products profitably.¹⁴⁸¹

However, when the foregoing factors are taken into consideration it will be clear that neither were the Hindus particularly involved in border smuggling nor were they truly responsible for making the government abandon the scheme of the operation close door. It was also true that the Congress as a whole did not take advantage of its holding the balancing power in the legislature. The majority of the congress e.g. the Dhar group stayed with the government, while the dissident congress (10) belonging to B.K. Das group joined the opposition not only for the cause of 'army operation' at the border alone, but also for their not having good relations with their own comrades inside the party. That the majority of the congress members were loyal to the government was manifest in its taking disciplinary action against the dissidents who did not vote with the government.¹⁴⁸² However, in the course of showing the diminishing strength of the coalition government we have purposely digressed to lift the fog of some misunderstandings that were hovering around the Hindu minority. There might be some incorrigible among Hindus, but it would be unfair to ascribe motives to them as a whole. There was nothing particular about Hindu ascendancy in the government, any more than there was anything especially Hinduistic in the joining of the 10 congressmen in the opposition—an incident which was quite representative of East Pakistan politics at that time. Now to return to the original theme, the position was that the government was also losing part of the Congress support.

There was tension within the A.L. party itself. It was strongly alleged that Ministry was ignoring the party to which it owed its existence. Mr Ataur Rahman having become the Chief Minister developed a non-partisan attitude towards administration. As a result, there appeared some schism in the government-party relationship. A few sensitive A.L. M.L.A.s left the party and for fear of not belonging to any group, they joined the opposition. The main cold war was going on between the Chief Minister and the A.L. Secretary, Mujibur Rahman. The latter suggested reconstruction of the Cabinet by dropping 3 Ministers who had failed to give a good account of themselves and the inclusion of certain scheduled caste members in the Cabinet to strengthen the A.L. parliamentary party.¹⁴⁸³ Remarkably, Mujibur Rahman to augment organizational activities resigned the secretaryship but had to withdraw the same as the party and workers wanted him very much.¹⁴⁸⁴ However, the internal hitch was subtle and did not assume an ugly form. But no doubt, the government suffered a bit due to Rahman-Mujib clash.

¹⁴⁸¹ See Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's speech, *N.A.D.* Vol. II, March 2, 1958, p. 535.

¹⁴⁸² *Dawn*, June 16, 1958 and September 30, 1958.

¹⁴⁸³ See *Dawn* February 24, 1958 and April 5, 1958.

¹⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, April 6 and 7, 1958.

However, in this overall situation when the budget was presented in March, 1958 the government parliamentary strength was not overwhelming in the House. In view of the fact that the budget had to be passed within 31st March and members could not find much time to discuss the budget, the government decided to have an 'on account' budget authorizing advance expenditure for three months ending June 30 passed by the House so that more members could participate in the budget discussion. Going fast on the road on democracy the government accepted the Assembly's proposal for the circulation of the Finance Bill to elicit public opinion—a most unusual procedure and against all precedents. During the session, however, the Ministry was showing diminishing majorities in division pressed by the opposition which was due mainly to N.A.P.'s ambivalence.¹⁴⁸⁵ This was the fatiguing month of Ramdan—the month of Muslim fasting—and the members by nature tended to be hotheaded and coldfeeted. The cases of cholera and smallpox in the capital were reported so the Chief Minister asked the Governor to prorogue the session of the Assembly on the 31st March. The Governor, Haq, refused to do that. Instead he dismissed the Rahman Ministry and hurriedly swore Sarker in as the new Chief Minister and immediately prorogued the House which he had refused in case of Rahman. Within few hours, the centre dismissed Haq and reinstated the former government on April 1st.¹⁴⁸⁶ Sarker was made an *April fool*, as it were. The Assembly session was immediately called which passed confidence motion in Rahman by 157-0¹⁴⁸⁷ in a House of 309 members, as the opposition walked out¹⁴⁸⁸ Dr. Chowdhury remarked that "The whole episode was an instance of interference by the central government in provincial politics."¹⁴⁸⁹ We beg to differ on the ground that the central government had a supervisory role, which, indeed, was well performed. Haq, who had remarkable record of public services and whose name was still pronounced with the utmost reverence and affection by the masses of the people, was now virtually victim to his age. His mental and physical faculties were at nadir. By virtue of his historic stature he could have a sobering influence in political turmoil. Instead, his acute concern for the rehabilitation of himself reflecting in the K.S.P. became almost a pathological urge. That the Governor determined to oust Rahman was known to the Prime Minister three days before the actual happening.¹⁴⁹⁰ How could the centre ignore the fact of a ministry going out of office which was not defeated in the legislature? Even the writ petition of Sarkar was dismissed by the High Court.¹⁴⁹¹ The Speaker himself told the House that it "can make and unmake any Ministry. The Governor is the registering authority of the verdict of the House."¹⁴⁹²

¹⁴⁸⁵ *Times*, April 2, 1958.

¹⁴⁸⁶ See *Times*, April 2, 1958.

¹⁴⁸⁷ The N.A.P. voted with the government.

¹⁴⁸⁸ *Dawn*, April 4, 1958.

¹⁴⁸⁹ G.W. Chowdhury, *op.oit.*, p. 119.

¹⁴⁹⁰ *Manchester Guardian*, April 2, 1958.

¹⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, June 10, 1958.

¹⁴⁹² *Dawn* April 2, 1958.

However, when the legislature again met in June to pass the remaining budget, the Rahman Ministry was defeated in a division (126-138). This was precipitated by the N.A.P.'s remaining neutral. Rahman resigned in line with parliamentary convention.¹⁴⁹³ Now, Sarker was again sworn in as the new Chief Minister. Within four days he was defeated in the House on a no-confidence motion (156-142)¹⁴⁹⁴ which was debated for 4 hours. The highlight of the debate was the speech of Sarkar—considered to be one of the best heard on the floor of the House¹⁴⁹⁵—who remorsefully sobbed that politicians were enmeshed in conflicts while the country was going to the dogs. However, the centre clamped presidential rule (193) in East Pakistan.

How did all these happen? Both the A.L. and N.A.P, had for some time been wriggling in regard to the finding of a viable basis for their working parliamentary relationship. Prior to the meeting to the Assembly the N.A.P. Central parliamentary Board met to discuss about supporting the Rahman Ministry. The N.A.P. provincial Assembly party decided by 16 votes to 6 to continue support for the government. But the central Board under the pressure of the West Pakistan leaders decided to discontinue support unless the 5-point was accepted by the A.L. Even Haji Danesh's appeal to the Board for reconsideration was spurned.¹⁴⁹⁶ This was an irony that the stability of the government had to be disturbed, because the East Pakistan branch of the N.A.P. to soothe its counterpart in the West, which failed to make any headway in West Pakistan in terms of the 5-point and turned its vendetta on the A.L. government in the East, had to be agreeable to the Board's decision.

This, however, served as trauma to the parties, e.g. the A.L. and N.A.P. For the N.A.P. was not psychologically inclined to coalesce with the opposition, nor could the A.L. now dismiss the indispensability of the N.A.P. So an understanding between the two party secretaries e.g. the A.L. and N.A.P. was reached with the blessing of Bhasani along the lines of the so-called 5-point.¹⁴⁹⁷ It was a distasteful necessity; for, the A.L. being a centre party had to keep its flanks covered against the extreme ones. By all signs, this was basically a working arrangement between the two parties pending general elections. That the East Pakistan A.L. was not essentially committed to the immediate change of foreign policy was amply illustrated when it passed a resolution condemning the execution order of Mr. Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian Prime Minister.¹⁴⁹⁸

This explains how the A.L. government was defeated and the subsequent passing of a no-confidence motion against Sarker. It was not the intrinsic strength of the opposition that caused the dissolution and formation of Ministries in quick succession. The eager

¹⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, June 19, 1958.

¹⁴⁹⁴ This time the N.A.P. voted with the opposition.

¹⁴⁹⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, June 24, 1958.

¹⁴⁹⁶ See *Manchester Guardian*, June 15, 1958; also *Dawn*, June 14, 15 and 16, 1958.

¹⁴⁹⁷ *Dawn*, June 21, July 6, August 27, 1958.

¹⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, July 5, 1958. (The N.A.P. did not condemn Nagy's execution).

opposition, in fact, took advantage of the ruling government's temporary readjustment difficulties vis-à-vis the N.A.P. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why many a thinker on the Westminster system are today reluctant to judge seriously the confidence issue of a Ministry by a sheer snap vote or division.

However, the A.L. fought again forcefully on the public platform for the restoration of parliamentary government. The governor sent a report to the centre saying that the A. L. had a majority in the legislature.¹⁴⁹⁹ So at the expiry of 193-rule the Rahman ministry was again reinstalled on August 24, 1958.¹⁵⁰⁰ The first thing the Ministry did was the repeal of the preventive Detention Ordinance, promulgated by the Governor on July 25 in order to ensure a free political atmosphere.¹⁵⁰¹ The ruling Government was further strengthened by the inclusion of Lutfur Rahman, a prominent K. S. P. leader who joined the A.L.¹⁵⁰²

The K.S.P. now was like a panther heavily bruised and affronted. Each frustration brought in its wake a reinforced sense of vendetta for the A. L. Its sole purpose was now dedicated to the dishing out of the A. L. Government. General Mirza whose grip on the central government and major political parties was fast loosening provided the necessary morale for the K.S.P. After the dismissal of Haq from the gubernatorial post in April, General Mirza came on a week's tour in East Pakistan, ostensibly to see the fallen Haq, who told him that he would enter politics again.¹⁵⁰³ And on May 14 he addressed public meeting in Dacca giving a hint of his entrance in politics.¹⁵⁰⁴ Haq was the last straw the drowning General Mirza could catch at, and the incessant audience of the K.S.P. leaders with the President could not be just explained away as social visits. The presence of the charismatic Haq inside the party and a 'wink' from the President gave a new impetus to the K.S.P.'s fighting the final bout with the A.L. Ministry.

This time the fighting issue would revolve round the Speaker. Prior to the meeting of the legislature on September 20 an Ordinance was made public making some new qualifications to the Speaker's existing powers, viz. in matters of no confidence motions against the Speaker or Deputy Speaker they would have no option since the Secretary of the Assembly was authorized to enter the notice of the resolution in the list of the business. Also, the Speaker would not adjourn the House "unless the leader of the House agrees to such adjournment".¹⁵⁰⁵

¹⁴⁹⁹ *Dawn* August 23,1958.

¹⁵⁰⁰ *Times*, August 25, 1958.

¹⁵⁰¹ *Dawn* August 27,1958.

¹⁵⁰² *Ibid*, September 19,1958. (This happened 40 hours before the Assembly was due to meet.)

¹⁵⁰³ See *Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, August 28,1958

¹⁵⁰⁴ *Dawn*, May 15, 1958.

¹⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1958.

When the House met the coalition government tabled a no-confidence motion against the speaker, which the latter turned down. The opposition sided with the speaker. Rowdyism took place displaying all sorts of cultural philistinism. The Speaker showed a clean pair of heels from the rostrum. After the first phase of the affray was over, a relative calm prevailed. The last phase witnessed the Deputy Speaker's declaring that the no-confidence motion¹⁵⁰⁶ against the Speaker had been passed (170-0).¹⁵⁰⁷ A 'moratorium' to rowdyism was agreed upon on the following day. In the absence of both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, Azizul Haq (K.S.P.) whose name appeared first in the Panel of Chairman, presided and adjourned the House after the submission of the budget.¹⁵⁰⁸ But as luck would have it, on the 23rd September when the Deputy Speaker came to preside over the sitting a cacophony of angry shouts and yells from the opposition greeted him. He could hardly proceed when a missile hit his nose. He was rushed to the hospital to die a couple of days later. Presently, the Sergeant-at-arms and police burst inside the House to quell the rioting members. Twelve opposition members including prominent leaders of the K.S.P. were arrested¹⁵⁰⁹ on charges of rioting.¹⁵¹⁰ And the budget demand was passed on the following day as the opposition boycotted the session.¹⁵¹¹

The proximate cause of the violence was the Speaker's declaring 6 government partymen disqualified as M.L.A.'s on the ground that they were holding offices of profit as government pleaders or prosecutors. His ruling was inadvertent in the sense that the central government on September 19, 1958 had already promulgated an Ordinance giving retrospective effect to the Bill passed by the N.A. during its autumn session. The Ordinance rectified an oversight of the N.A. which failed to give retrospective effect.¹⁵¹² By virtue of this Ordinance the 6 M.L.A.'s were no longer disqualified. The government pleaded with the speaker that there were precedents in undivided India of such legislation as had been passed by the N.A. in respect of the disqualification of members and a law could be passed with retrospective effect.¹⁵¹³ But the Speaker remained adamant. Then the government pressed for the no-confidence motion.

The importance of keeping the position of the Speaker clear of party strife is the *sine qua non* of the Westminster system. In East Pakistan the Speaker was brought to book for acting in defiance of the interests of the ruling coalition. The opposition attacked the Deputy Speaker whom they apparently regarded as a traitor¹⁵¹⁴ to their side. Yet it was

¹⁵⁰⁶ Dewan Mahboob (N.A.P.) moved the no-confidence motion.

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, September 21, 1958; also *Dawn*, September 22, 1958.

¹⁵⁰⁸ *Dawn*, September 22, 1958.

¹⁵⁰⁹ They were released on bail on September 29. *Dawn*, September 30, 1958.

¹⁵¹⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, *Dawn*, September 24, 1958.

¹⁵¹¹ *Dawn*, September 25, 1958.

¹⁵¹² *Ibid.*, September 20, 1958.

¹⁵¹³ *Times*, September 21, 1958.

¹⁵¹⁴ Mr. Shahid Ali was a former K.S.P., but having been elected as the Deputy Speaker he shunned from party politics.

indispensable to the orderly conduct of the House that the rulings of the Speaker ought to have been implicitly accepted so long no malafides could be imputed to his decisions. The Speaker, Mr. A Hakim Khan was a gifted person, and probably could be ranked best among the Speakers, national and provincial, on many a count. He had the poise and personality that aroused confidence in the House. He had a few excellent procedural rulings to his credit. But his greatest fault probably, was his being a megalomaniac. The government thought him to be unsound in mind. The *Dawn* in an editorial termed him as "erratic but not mad".¹⁵¹⁵ He collided with the government as the latter could not afford to provide fund for his burgeoning Assembly Secretariat. Through overstuffing and quick promotions the inflated budget of the Assembly threatened the Finance Ministry. Besides, he approached the government and members individually for passing some such Bill that would make him an absolute Emperor of the Kingdom of the Assembly. The government would not go to that extent. So the Speaker was looking for an appropriate moment to hurt the government. Besides, the government feared that lately there had formed an axis between the Speaker and the President. The opposition had no particular liking for the Speaker, but it served their purpose to fence around the Speaker, so long this aided the anti-government cause.¹⁵¹⁶ The Deputy Speaker was really a victim to his innocence.

However, beneath this apparent reason of violence lay the sinister design e.g. "President Mirza's deliberate divisive tactics designed to dislodge the Awami League Ministry and install another under the K.S.P."¹⁵¹⁷ A cartoonist depicted the disgraceful incident of the legislature in a newspaper as a puppet show with the President pulling the strings.¹⁵¹⁸ In the event the K.S.P. failed to capture power, the mere creation of chaos would have served the purpose of the President. The former Finance Minister of East Pakistan says in his book (proscribed in Pakistan):

"I know it for certain that the reason of disturbance in the East Pakistan Assembly as given out by the authorities is only a cover to hide the truth behind the move of proclamation of the martial law. Even before the Assembly sat for its last session when the disturbance took place, the military generals had visited the central jail of East Pakistan only to ascertain the extent of accommodation there."¹⁵¹⁹

The tragedy is that the opposition was unimaginative and myopic, who failed to see the shadow of nemesis and inadvertently allowed itself as fuel to the fireplace of the President to give him warmth.

¹⁵¹⁵ *Dawn*, September 25, 1958.

¹⁵¹⁶ For details see Ataur Rahman, *op.cit.*, pp. 294-297.

¹⁵¹⁷ K.B. Syeed's "Political System of Pakistan", *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

¹⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.91.

¹⁵¹⁹ P.C. Lahiry, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

The Legislature

Dr. Rashiduzzaman holds that "The East Pakistan Assembly presented on the whole a better picture" despite some "unfortunate incidents".¹⁵²⁰ There was a sense of commitment on the part of the members to the legislature, which could be discerned even in their deviations. The elections of 1954 transfused a complete new blood in the legislature. Unlike the West Pakistan counterpart it was solely composed of professional middle class people who were mostly in their thirties, though some were even below that level. The M.L.A.s consisted of trade unionists, professors, teachers, journalists, student leaders, petty landlords and a few Maulanas. But the main bulk belonged to the lawyers class.¹⁵²¹ The number of veteran parliamentarians in the House was far outweighed by the newly-christened parliamentarians who entered the Assembly with an inadequate background of administrative experience. But they were quite eager, aggressive and fairly literate.

The second legislature in its life met for only 79 days.¹⁵²² Actually, it was with the coming of the A.L. to power in August, 1956 that the legislature was called. The government called the House into session 6 times, namely once in 1956, twice in 1957 and thrice in 1958. Till March, 1958 the House worked productively and uninterruptedly. To enable the members to grasp the budget in its full implication and in recognition of the cultural pride of the East Pakistanis the chief Minister in the very first session of the Assembly delivered his budget speech in Bengali—first of its kind which "created a sensation".¹⁵²³ This gave the members a sense of identity and an incentive to speak on the budget in their own mother tongue instead of English. That the members were serious was evident in the 22-day budget session of March, 1957. more than 80 members took part in the general discussion of the budget, more than 300 cut motions were moved and as many as 13 divisions were forced.¹⁵²⁴ What was more, that all budget demands were passed without guillotine¹⁵²⁵—first of its kind in whole of Pakistan, and a rare event in parliamentary history. The choice subjects of cut motions were usually excise duty, development, jail administration, police, administration of justice, education, etc. the last item provoked about 90 cut motions on March 24, 1957.¹⁵²⁶ Participation was further encouraged when the Speaker ruled that government party member were also entitled to move cut motions.¹⁵²⁷

The number of adjournment motions pressed for discussion were many; but, as usual, the Speaker found almost all of them technically inadmissible. Only 4 appeared to have

¹⁵²⁰ Dr. M. Rashiduzzaman, "Our Legislatures", *Observer Sunday Magazine*, Jun 23, 1968, p. 111 (Dacca).

¹⁵²¹ The members list was published in *Dawn*, March 17, 1954. The Times commented that half of the members were under 30 years old. See *Times*. April 2, 1954.

¹⁵²² Muneer Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

¹⁵²³ *Financial Times*, September 18, 1956.

¹⁵²⁴ Muneer Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

¹⁵²⁵ *Dawn*, March 31, 1957.

¹⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, March 25, 1957.

¹⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, March 20, 1957.

been discussed, of which two dealt with food and the economy, one with a police Lathi (big sticks) charge in a public meeting and the other with religious affairs.¹⁵²⁸ The highlight of the adjournment motions discussed was the opposition's forcing a division on the economic crisis (133-116) and demanding of closure motion on the food situation.¹⁵²⁹ The number of questions put and answered was not many, though the use of supplementary questions in the House was pronounced. A host of resolutions mostly non-official – were tabled for discussion. As many as 40 were tabled for the September session only.¹⁵³⁰ A few resolutions were of important nature such as resolutions on the electorate system, removal of the central and provincial government 60 days before the general elections, collecting of the personal assets of the M.L.A.s, provincial autonomy, adoption of the Bengali as the medium of education in every educational institution, foreign policy, etc., etc. However, not all the resolutions tabled could be discussed or adopted.

What have been cited earlier as achievements of the government were mostly done through legislative acts. The opposition extended its cooperation with the government in matters of legislation, though it also fought bitterly any legislation which was thought to be going too far ahead of the popular mood. For instance, a heated debate ensued during the time of the first reading of a meaningful Bill relating to restrictions on the slaughter of cattle and meat control. For the opposition, mostly N.I.P. and M.L., described the Bill as "dangerous" and against the tenets of Islam.¹⁵³¹ However, in passing a few acts, which would have gone a long way towards consolidating the parliamentary institutions in the country, the East Pakistan legislature compared most favorable to that of its counterpart in West Pakistan. The passing of the East Pakistan Assembly Secretariat Bill was a substantial achievement for the legislators.¹⁵³² Similarly, the House in the Autumn session of 1957 sent the Assembly Members' Privileges Bill to a Select Committee of 17 members.¹⁵³³ This was duly passed in April, 1958 by the House and received the President's assent in August, 1958.¹⁵³⁴ Likewise, a Bill was passed to raise the M.L.A.'s salaries in September, 1957, to enable them to work with less economic worries.¹⁵³⁵

How did the government and opposition comport themselves in the House? The *Dawn* said of the first session of the Assembly that there was a "stubborn parliamentary opposition" ranged against "the Awami league government, who ... emerged triumphant in every trial",¹⁵³⁶ eventually. On the whole, this assessment remained valid

¹⁵²⁸ Attack on holy Prophet of Islam in an Indian publication, etc.

¹⁵²⁹ *Dawn*, September 24, 1957 and March 13, 1957.

¹⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1958.

¹⁵³¹ *Dawn*, March 14, 1957.

¹⁵³² *Ibid.*, October 4, 1956.

¹⁵³³ *Ibid.*, September 22, 1957.

¹⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1958.

¹⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1958.

¹⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, October 3, 1956.

throughout the period. Both the government and opposition showed on many an occasion due parliamentary decorum, and their leaders felicitated each other. At the same time there were occasions when they were found wanting in observing what was considered to be *de rigueur* to the system. Debates could be punctuated by uproars, or marked by walks out. Sometimes parliamentary time was wasted on silly matters—a 90-minute debate filled the House on March 28, 1958 to determine if the N.A.P. had lost the right of criticizing the government on the ground of its being a government supporter.¹⁵³⁷ But on the whole, nothing could be cited save that accidental but unfortunate incident of September, 1958 during the entire period of the Assembly as ineradicable vice. They the government and the opposition only talked themselves out loudly. The Legislature brushed up quite a number of talented parliamentarians, such as, to name a few, P.C. Lahiry, Mujibur Rahman, Salam Khan, Hashimuddin, Mrs. Nelie Sen Gupta, B.K. Das, M. Dhar, D.N. Dutta, Latif Biswas, Farid Ahmed. K.F. Chowdhury, A. Mansur, etc. Even the women members came up fairly well in parliamentary standard.¹⁵³⁸ Some of them Begum Anwara Khatun, Mrs. Daulatunness, Mrs. Badrun Nessa, Mrs. Razia Khatun, Mrs. Noorjahan—were quite dashing, sharp-tongued, eloquent and did not miss participating either in the question hour¹⁵³⁹ or general debates.

However, taking everything together, what was more distinct about East Pakistan was its experiencing a sense of realism in politics. Politics was vibrant. The combined opposition, whose number was never below the level of 100, provided an effective check upon the government. It was the only province which witnessed an alternative government through parliamentary means. The government was programme-oriented. There was not any gross instance to suggest that the centre except General Mirza—dictated provincial politics. The Section 193 was imposed only as a stop-gap and to certify budget without which administration could not have been run. The Governor's rule was never prolonged beyond 2 months maximum. Perhaps everything would have been all right had there been no obstacles in the A.L.- K.S.P. deal. It was mainly due to the problem of political rehabilitation of the K.S.P.¹⁵⁴⁰ that precipitated the situation. No less was the covert maneuvering of some of the communists—after the banning of the Communist Party, they managed to reincarnate themselves in other parties, particularly the N.A.P.—contributory to the general political strain. On prognostication it can be said that a more viable multi-party system would have emerged from the general elections. Splinter groups and small parties would have been wiped out in the elections. All signs were indicative that the A.L. would have crystallized as the dominant party, if not the absolute majority party in the legislature. Under the joint electorate system, the existing plethora of minority parties would have no other alternative than to aggregate

¹⁵³⁷ *Dawn*, March 27, 1958.

¹⁵³⁸ Some were very active in party politics and held the post of parliamentary secretaries.

¹⁵³⁹ On this count the West Pakistan women members generally appeared shy.

¹⁵⁴⁰ The K.S.P.'s main electoral hope was the charismatic Haq. Haq's dwindling health would not have survived the rigors of a rustic electioneering campaign.

themselves with larger parties on the basis of socio-economic programme. Already, the Congress addressed itself to the task of reorganization of the party in the face of changed situation i.e. joint electorate and general elections.¹⁵⁴¹ So, the chances were that the A.L. would have formed a grand coalition with the moderate rightists leaving the N.A.P. to provide socialist opposition.

¹⁵⁴¹ *Dawn*, April 8, 1957

POLITICAL PARTIES

The growth of stable and mass parties is the *sine qua non* of the Westminster system of government. Parties contribute to the emergence of an effective participating political community in a given country. The importance of political parties is still greater, for those countries which come under the rubric of 'developing societies'. A Princeton University publication, "Political parties and Political development", has dwelt at some length on the efficacy of political parties with an emphasis on the help they give to developing societies to achieve national integration, political participation, legitimacy and the management of conflict.¹⁵⁴² The functions of the political parties are not, however, confined to those mentioned above alone. The political parties are the articulate political agents of a society acting as what Lord Bryce termed as 'brokers' of state-policies, and, as such, they are the great intermediaries which link "social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relate them to political action".¹⁵⁴³ They provide a 'simulacrum' of national identifications as the "aristocrats, intellectuals, white collar employees, and workmen can find in certain parties an ... all-embracing institution through which the common good can be sought".¹⁵⁴⁴

Parties act as a check against people's alienation from the government and vice versa; for, they maintain a two-step flow of communications by disseminating governmental policies to the people, on the one hand, and bring people's ideas, wishes and aspirations to the notice of the government, on the other. Mass organizations provide for tapping of new leadership in the country, and for that matter, the recruitment of new public leaders. And, particularly under the British system of polity, they offer "an excellent preliminary training for parliamentary candidature and eventual entry into Parliament".¹⁵⁴⁵ What, however, appears to be more important in the context of developing societies is the role that the mass parties can play by spreading to the farthest reaches of society through elaborate network of party functionaries designed to mobilize, integrate and agglutinate shifting social forces, interests and cleavages into one consensus-bound and cohesive party.¹⁵⁴⁶ And, Pakistan being one of the developing polities, required nothing less than the emergence of mass-based, programme-oriented stable parties.

¹⁵⁴² M. Weiner & La Palombara, "The impact of Parties on Political development in J. La Palombara & M. Weiner (edit.) *Political parties and Political Development* (Princeton University Press: 1966), p. 399.

¹⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties". p. 352.

¹⁵⁴⁴ K.H. Silvert, "Parties and the Masses" *The Annals* (March 1965) P. 104.

¹⁵⁴⁵ R.T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, 2nd edit., (Heinemann, London: 1963), p. 647.

¹⁵⁴⁶ See G.A. Almend, "Political systems and political change" *American Behavioral Scientist* Vol. 5 (June, 1963), pp. 3-10.

The Muslim League (M.L.)

The coming into being of Pakistan was coeval with the institutionalization of one party rule, that of the M.L. This was the consequence of the triumph of the ideology of the winning group, the M.L. which claimed to have avenged the downfall of the Muslim empire in the Indian sub-continent by achieving Pakistan in 1947.¹⁵⁴⁷ Instances abound that at independence emergent

countries' governments were automatically handled by the parties of erstwhile national Independence movements the Congress of India, the C.P.P. of Ghana, the KANO of Kenya, the TANU of Tanganyika (now Tanzania). This has been a perplexing situation on the part of the single party states in the developing areas in matters of responding to "participatory demands long before they have had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalize party government".¹⁵⁴⁸ Governance under a single party system at the initial period is thought in some quarters to be conducive of particularly on account of rapid economic development. This, fundamentally, depends upon the innate strength of the party concerned, still more on the general acquiescence of the masses of the people of a given country. What was the status of the M.L.? The M.L. was a movement *par excellence*. The Muslims of the then India with diverse persuasions suspended their mutual differences in a truce and entered into a *marriage de covenance* under the banner of the M.L. to achieve Pakistan. The galvanizing force that the M.L. once was in unifying the Muslims of undivided India and brought to a successful conclusion its struggle for Pakistan, was no longer true after partition of India had taken place. Why?

The Mussalmans of undivided India became politically conscious only in direct response to Congress activities. The Congress with its gigantic party apparatus tended to be all-pervasive in the then India. It grew roots even in the remotest villages laying the foundation of democracy by contact. The full zest for Pakistan movement under the leadership of the M.L. started from 1939, and the M.L. was obtrusive in those areas of British India where Congress was dominant and "it existed by reaction".¹⁵⁴⁹ The Congress was less powerful in those areas which now formed Pakistan. And the Muslims of what then constituted Pakistan voted for the M.L. only at the eleventh hour. This was one of the reasons that when Pakistan was born, viable local M.L. leadership could not be found. Furthermore, the main strongholds of M.L. were in the urban areas,¹⁵⁵⁰ whereas the basic unit of Pakistan sociology was village.

After the conference of the All India M.L. held in Karachi in December, 1947, the Pakistan M.L. parted with its parent body—a logical consequence. It was alleged that there were "old guards" of the M.L. who maintained that the M.L. died a natural death

¹⁵⁴⁷ See Sir Nazimuddin's speech, *Dawn*, October 13, 1952.

¹⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, "Land Palambara & Weiner", p. 402.

¹⁵⁴⁹ See Taya Zinkin's article, "Pakistan" in *Manchester Guardian*, January 6, 1955.

¹⁵⁵⁰ K.B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Houghton: Boston: 1967), p. 212.

after the creation of Pakistan and were horrified at the idea of the M.L. being a 'Government Party'.¹⁵⁵¹ Jinnah was thought to be lukewarm to the idea¹⁵⁵² and, later on, he himself relinquished the office of the M.L. Presidentship. Though he himself told once the Dacca gatherings that the M.L. was the 'guardian angel' of the community and warned them by implication, as though, the opposition were fifth columnist and saboteurs.¹⁵⁵³

However, a new constitution was drawn up by the Pakistan League Council on February 26, 1948 and Chowdhury Khaliqzaman was elected organizer of Pakistan M.L., who in turn dissolved all provincial M.L. organizations in order to reorganize them afresh. In doing so, he made the error of appointing provincial presidents and secretaries who had ceased to hold office in the League, as provincial organizers—an example of the retention of old people to the exclusion of the new ones. In April, 1949 he was elected the first President of the reorganized All Pakistan M.L. He was weak, unappealing and lackluster; and could not survive the screaming demonstrations of the Mahajirs. He resigned saying that he did not like to be the "cause of any breach of peace or loss of life in the capital city."¹⁵⁵⁴ The M.L. now fell on evil days. The *party-charisma* was fast dwindling after the demise of Jinnah. Among the leaguers Liaquat (Prime Minister) was the only person who had the dynamism and prestige of long association with the father of the nation, Jinnah, and the old organization, thought to be the healing balm for the M.L. The M.L. now was wrenched into a momentous decision. It made Liaquat its President having amended the party constitution¹⁵⁵⁵ previously public office holders were debarred from becoming office-bearers of the League. However, the Prime Minister's holding the League Presidentship was vehemently opposed by a prominent M.L. leader of the Punjab on the ground that it would mean 'the end of democracy in Pakistan', but he was weight-lifted outside the meeting by the M.L. by the national guards. Liaquat identified the M.L.¹⁵⁵⁶ with the state and held that "If the Muslim League is not made strong and powerful and the mushroom growth of parties is not checked immediately, Pakistan will not survive."¹⁵⁵⁷ This was characterized as "an unfortunate doctrine",¹⁵⁵⁸ and Pakistan, in the words of Suhrawardy, was heading for a "police state".¹⁵⁵⁹ Increasingly, the M.L. governments, central and provincial, turned highly intolerant of opposition parties, and their leaders and workers were thrown into prison under one pretext or another.

¹⁵⁵¹ Nazimuddin's speech at the M.L. Council meeting, *Dawn*, October 13, 1952.

¹⁵⁵² Mr. Ispahani, Raja of Mahmodabad and Y. Haroon revealed this to the writer.

¹⁵⁵³ *Statesman*, March 22, 1948.

¹⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, August 14, 1950.

¹⁵⁵⁵ *Statesman*, October 9, 1950.

¹⁵⁵⁶ "I never regarded myself as the Prime Minister chosen by the members of the Constituent Assembly" - See *Dawn*, 9, 1950.

¹⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, October 28, 1950.

¹⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, October 10, 1950.

¹⁵⁵⁹ *Hindu*, July 16, 1951.

After the assassination of Liaquat the M.L. assumed a sort of Messianic character under the Presidentship of Nazimuddin who,—"he is known to be sustained by a deep religious faith and spiritual strength"¹⁵⁶⁰ viewed the M.L. as a "continuous movement" aimed at fulfilling a "mission", e.g. "to demonstrate to the world the Islamic way of living".¹⁵⁶¹ In his initial enthusiasm he did, indeed, show some evidence of purpose. In response to the peculiar federal situation of Pakistan state Nazimuddin brought in parity of representation between East and West Pakistan in Central League Council, increased the number of East Pakistan's quota to 5 in the Central Parliamentary Board, held the M.L. Council session for the first time in Dacca to give a sense of belongingness to that Province, gave provincial status to the Karachi M.L. and appointed *ad hoc* committees under Giasuddin Pathan to reorganize leagues in Bahawalpur, Baluchistan and Karachi.¹⁵⁶² But in October, 1952, the M.L. for the second time changed the party constitution again, to make room for the triennial election of office-bearers of the party, banishing the system of annual election.¹⁵⁶³ This did away the earlier healthy system of yearly election which involved the whole process of membership enrolment, elections to the primary leagues, district, tehsil leagues and finally the all-Pakistan League Council a check against the formation of 'coteries'. The manifest destiny of the M.L. as envisaged by Nazimuddin could not work out due to his sudden ouster from the Premiership by the Governor General. The M.L. now entered into its most inglorious period under the next President, Mohammad Ali, for, "the circumstances were unusual in that the locus of political power had changed from the political leaders of the Muslim League to the 'official group' dominated by the Governor General."¹⁵⁶⁴

At this juncture i.e. by the end of 1954, the M.L.'s position was at its lowest ebb both in terms of party organization and overall influence over the country. Why?

At the outset, the M.L. was quite strong and popular in East Pakistan. But the publication of the interim report and the B.P.C. report under Liaquat and Nazimuddin respectively, the economic malady of the province, the shooting upon the unarmed students of Dacca on account of language and exodus from the League followed by resignations and expulsions virtually shattered the image of the party in power.¹⁵⁶⁵ In the Punjab, the league sway over the people was still solid as the landlords were the party bosses. But the province became the cockpit of intrigues, maneuvers and mutual wrangling among the leaders which immobilized the party. In pre-partition days, a number of Muslim organizations such as Ahrars, Unionists, Khaksars, Momins, Blue shirts, etc., were antagonistic to the M.L.¹⁵⁶⁶ At independence, they made their chief

¹⁵⁶⁰ *Dawn*, November 20, 1951 (Editorial) "New League President".

¹⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*, March 10, 1952 (Editorial) "A new deal for the League".

¹⁵⁶² *Dawn*, October 13, 1952; October 15, 1952.

¹⁵⁶³ *Hindu*, October 14, 1952; *Statesman*, October 13, 1952.

¹⁵⁶⁴ *Pakistan: Government and Politics* (Monograph: HRAF, Inc., New Haven, Box 2054), p. 124.

¹⁵⁶⁵ See *Statesman*, January 20, 21; November 8, 9, 1951; *Dawn*, December 25, 1952, etc.

¹⁵⁶⁶ See A.B. Rajput, *Muslim League, Yesterday and Today*, (Md. Ashraf: Lahore: 1958), p. 49.

abode in Lahore and were operating clandestinely to hurt the M.L., as some did not choose to surface while the others were banned by court orders. The central government also participated to promote its clientship in the organizational disputes. All these harmed the cause of the party and drove some of the leaders away from it.¹⁵⁶⁷ In Sindh, the pattern was same as that of the Punjab – rivalries among Messrs. Khuhro, Mir G.A. Talpur, Kazi Fazlullah, Pirzada Satter, Y. Haroon, etc. The extreme case was the formation of 'Khuhro League', named after Khuhro, which fought against the M.L. in Sindh election. But the Sindhi disaffection with the league was different from the Punjab in one respect, in that Sindh thought itself to have been let down by the central government, particularly the loss of Karachi without adequate compensation.¹⁵⁶⁸ The N.W.F.P. League was weakened by the departure of prominent leaders like Pir of Manki Sharif, Pir of Zakari Sharif, Khan of Lundkhar, etc., from, it, due to the high-handedness of the government in matters of civil liberties. Still then, the Frontier league was tom by the rival groups of Qaiyyum and Khan of Jhagra.¹⁵⁶⁹ The conditions of the M.L. in Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Karachi and Baluchistan did not present a happier picture either.¹⁵⁷⁰

The most serious malady arose out of organizational decay. At independence, the best people become ministers and diplomats representing Pakistan abroad. Some left the organization on principle, while a few others could not overcome disappointments following the distribution of what might be called "loaves and fishes". Those who were in charge of the high offices became engrossed in the affairs of day to day administration. Most of them were primarily concerned in maintaining "the monopoly of an individual or a group of persons".¹⁵⁷¹ The primary leagues were the fountain heads of all goodies and baddies of the entire organization; for, had they been strong and uncorrupt they would bring about better organization in the higher branches. Instead, the primary leagues were influenced by the "monopolistic urge". The M.L. turned callous to annual enrolment, annual elections in wards, villages, cities, districts and provinces. Annual conferences were held by fits and starts.¹⁵⁷² The two "crowns", namely the premiership of the state and Presidentship of the M.L. were combined with an apparent good intention of maintaining a liaison between the government and the party. Soon this example was followed by the lower echelons of the league command, in that the provincial Chief Ministers also became the league presidents of the provincial M.L.s. Since the effective power rested with the governments they had no difficulty in nominating or electing, as the case might be, their henchmen in the 'trunk, branches, leaves and tendrils' of the M.L.

¹⁵⁶⁷ See *Statesman*, March 17, 1949; July 25, August 18, September 11, 1950; *Hindu*, November 5, 1953, etc.

¹⁵⁶⁸ See *Statesman*, August 28, 1949; *Dawn*, February 22, 1952 (Editorial) "Incomplete Purge"; May 23, 1952 (Editorial) "Sindh Politics": March 23, 24, 1953; etc.

¹⁵⁶⁹ See *Times*, April 30, 1951; *Statesman*, July 14, 1951; *Dawn*, February 12, 1953; etc.

¹⁵⁷⁰ See *Dawn*, November 25, 28, 1951; March 4, 1952; etc.

¹⁵⁷¹ See *Ibid*, March 11, 1952 (Editorial) "A new deal for the League" I.

¹⁵⁷² See Chundrigar's speech, *Ibid*, September 27, 1956.

Till the time of Liaquat, policies and programmes of the government were placed before the M.L. Council for approval.

The vogue died of atrophy, as the Council itself became packed-up with the 'yesmen' of the 'official majority' and subservient to the government the best example was the Council's electing Mohammad Ali, a government manufactured leaguer as the President of the League after the dismissal of Nazimuddin. The trends were fatal to the party, and the once national organization was reduced to a position of a mere tool in the hands of, to borrow Duverger's term, a "caucus" i.e. the long entrenched system of political bosses who ruled the roost and deprived the M.L. of mass contacts,¹⁵⁷³ And the M.L. had been running the country exclusively for 7 years 1947-1954 by cashing its past reputation, like the one proverbial Ford car which ran for some time without an engine fueled by previous prestige—commented the *Dawn* with sarcasm.¹⁵⁷⁴

However, the M.L. tended to be aroused into new consciousness at the end of 1953, and more so after its defeat in the East Pakistan general election and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I, the last two incidents acted as shock therapy. Qazi Mohammad Isa on principle did not let Mohammad Ali go uncontested in the election of the league presidency. In his defeat—voting 258.36—he asked the Councillors, "Is there none among the 7 crores of Muslims of Pakistan who can be found to shoulder the responsibilities of this office other than the Prime Minister?"¹⁵⁷⁵ Again, when Mohammad Ali with his incomplete working committee dissolved the provincial leagues of the Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan and allowed the Provincial Chief Ministers a free hand in reorganizing them the non-ministerial groups of those provinces challenged the Prime Minister of his unconstitutional act. This was solely to retain central government favorites who lost the confidence of the local leagues, in provincial governments. The East Pakistan Councillors joined their brethren of West Pakistan in procuring 100 signatures for requisitioning a M.L. council meeting, the highest forum. This was the first time since 1936 that a council meeting was requisitioned to decide an issue. The Prime Minister Mohammad Ali rescinded his decision, later on.¹⁵⁷⁶ The Leagues throughout the country called for revitalization of the organization, and suggestions were dropped to this effect of making Miss Jinnah—Mother-e-Millat¹⁵⁷⁷—the President of the M.L. and Nawab of Bhupal the General Secretary.¹⁵⁷⁸ The East Pakistan M.L. President Moulana Akram Khan openly asked Mohammad Ali to resign the Presidentship. The demand for calling league convention

¹⁵⁷³ For details see *Dawn*, October 22, 1953 (Editorial) "Lights and Shadows"; December 24 (Editorial) "The League's Government or the Government's League" *New York Times*. December 26, 1953; *Dawn*, October 27, 1954, (Editorial) "After the fourth night of crisis"; etc.

¹⁵⁷⁴ *Dawn*, January 30, 1956 (Editorial) "The Muslim League".

¹⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, October 19, 1953.

¹⁵⁷⁶ See *Ibid.*, 22, 23, 24, 31 December, 1953; *Hindu*, 29 December; *Dawn*, January 1, 5, 1954.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Mother of the nation (Mr. Jinnah's sister).

¹⁵⁷⁸ *Dawn*, September 23: October 19, 1954; also *Times*, October 4, 1955.

and council meeting had been persistent since the beginning of 1954, but the prime Minister took to dilly-dallying and shilly-shallying tactics. At long last, Mohammad Ali resigned in September, 1955.¹⁵⁷⁹

The Council of the Pakistan M.L. met in January, 1956, elected unanimously Sardar Nishtar, a veteran leaguer, its President, passed two important resolutions and brought about consequential amendments in the Constitution. The tasks for organizing a new provincial M.L. for the newly created province of West Pakistan, drawing up a clear cut manifesto and a programme of mass contact, fresh enrolment of members, fresh elections and the re-establishment of new branches of the organization were undertaken. Among the changes incorporated in the Constitution, the significant one was the banning of the holding of M.L. offices by Ministers and Deputy Ministers and persons who had not been members of the M.L. for at least one year. The new President immediately appointed his working committee to proceed with.¹⁵⁸⁰ No sooner had Nishtar become the President than he ordered the formation of a pure M.L. parliamentary party in West Pakistan, the consequence of which was the formation of the R.P. The M.L. in this new psychological climate chose to sit in the opposition benches and purged itself of disloyal members by expulsion, rather than compromised with principles. The prominent M.L. members of the central Cabinet resigned after the formation of R.P. rather than sticking to power,¹⁵⁸¹ the like of which was ever shown by any leaguer before, whatsoever. Karachi being the stronghold of the M.L., the President appointed a 90-man organizing committee and a 15-member sub-committee of women to organize the M.L. in the capital city.¹⁵⁸² Bureaus of grievances were set up at different headquarters of the league.¹⁵⁸³ By September, 1956 the basic principles of the M.L. manifesto were made public.¹⁵⁸⁴ The strength of the M.L. national guards, the party militia rose to 100,000 by November, 1956.¹⁵⁸⁵ A successful M.L. Workers' Conference with four thousand delegates in West Pakistan culminating in a record breaking procession with the President bespoke of the league regenerations. In that Conference an inquiry committee was set up to "prepare a comprehensive report on the causes of the downfall of the M.L.",¹⁵⁸⁶ which was later submitted by Manzare-Alam. A vigorous enrolment campaign was launched in early December, 1956 with an intention to finish primary league elections by March 31, city and district league elections by April 10, provincial leagues by May 10, and the Pakistan M.L. elections by May 31, 1957.¹⁵⁸⁷ The veteran old leaguers like Quyyum Khan, Fazlur Rahman and Abul Hashim who had earlier left the league flabbergasted rejoined again.

¹⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid*, September 30, 1955.

¹⁵⁸⁰ For details see *Times*, January 29, 1956: *Dawn*, January 30, 31, 1956.

¹⁵⁸¹ *Dawn*, August 31, 1956.

¹⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, July 4, 1956.

¹⁵⁸³ *Ibid*, September 22, 1956.

¹⁵⁸⁴ See *Ibid.*, September 26, 1956.

¹⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, November 14, 1956.

¹⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid*, November 29, 1956.

¹⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, December 8, 1956.

After the demise of Nishtar, Qayyum Khan became the next President on 30th March, 1958. Compared to his predecessor, he was more dynamic—a former L.S.E. student—aggressive and ruthless. Upon becoming the President the first thing he uttered was "revolution, if evolution fails".¹⁵⁸⁸ The M.L. gained strength further under Qayyum's leadership. At this time, the M.L. was so pronounced on matters of party ideology and discipline that it did not hesitate to expel Khuhro of Sindh, the most powerful person on grounds of his being a political turncoat.¹⁵⁸⁹

The M.L. now offered to be constituted of only the purest of its adherents. There is no denying the fact that the period from 1954 to 1958 and precisely from the time of Nishtar onward, was a period of remarkable recovery and consolidation. Party meetings and league councils were regularly held in this period. The large number of crowds the league President Qayyum was attracting in his meetings in both parts of Pakistan, which led the East Pakistan M.L. to decide to give a 32-mile long welcoming procession to Qayyum,¹⁵⁹⁰ was an index of the existence of the party. The M.L. regained its traditional support from the capital city, in that it won 60% of the seats of the Karachi Municipal Corporation in the elections held in April, 1958. In the Dacca, Chittagong—the main cities of East Pakistan Municipal elections the M.L. also received the lion's share of seats.¹⁵⁹¹ It only failed to win seats in the bye-elections of East Pakistan legislature, though it was successful in West Pakistan. And this was understandable, as the main base of the M.L. was in West Pakistan trying to extend its influence once again in the Eastern part.

Organisational Structure

By nature the organization of the M.L. was restrictive in that its membership was not open to all communities. Hence, it bore some resemblance to the 'cadre' type of party. Only the Muslims who cared to abide by the M.L. ideology, pay a subscription of two annas and completed 18 years of age were eligible for membership.¹⁵⁹² The exclusive character of the M.L. was the negation of the concept of equality of citizenship and political rights. Similarly, by this very policy of restriction it deprived itself of the support of the vast multitude of people professing different religions.

However, the constituents of the All Pakistan M.L. were unions, Thana/Tehsil, sub-divisions, districts, cities and provinces. They collectively elected the Council of the M.L. the highest forum. The strength of the Council was 654 in 1952, equally divided between the two wings.¹⁵⁹³ The number was reduced to 360-180 members each from

¹⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, April 1, 1958.

¹⁵⁸⁹ *Manchester Guardian*, May 6, 1958.

¹⁵⁹⁰ *Why Muslim League?* (M.L. pamphlet in Bengali) n.d., p. 12.

¹⁵⁹¹ See *Dawn*, May 1, August 30, 1958.

¹⁵⁹² For the sample of the M.L. membership card, see Appendix. XVI.

¹⁵⁹³ *Dawn*, October 13, 1952.

both wings in January, 1956.¹⁵⁹⁴ The Presidents and Secretaries of the provincial leagues were ex-officio member of the Council. The President of the national league had authority to nominate some members to provide representation to special interests like laborers, women, youth, etc. The Council was originally required to meet once a year, but in 1956 it was changed to twice a year. A petition consisting of 75-member could requisition a meeting within a month's time. Its power consisted mainly in formulating the aims and objects of the M.L., framing rules, ratifying decisions, etc., etc.¹⁵⁹⁵

The executive power of the party rested with the central working committee, which consisted of the national president and 22 members¹⁵⁹⁶ who would be appointed by the party chief himself. Usually, prominent party leaders were chosen.¹⁵⁹⁷ The President had the power of hiring and firing the members of the working committee.¹⁵⁹⁸ Being the chief executive of the organ, the working committee was virtually responsible for running the main show of the organization and doing things empowered by the Council. Any violations of rules by the working committee particularly by the President, could always be referred to the Council for remedy. The M.L. had also a Central Parliamentary Board consisting of 13 members—6 members each for both wings—of whose ex-officio chairman was the President himself. Its main job was to select candidates for election to the legislatures and 'coordinate the activities' of the other provincial parliamentary parties. Then there was the Central Finance Committee which took care of the party's annual budget accounts, sanctioned all payments, and in short, was the control of financial matters.¹⁵⁹⁹

In sum, the M.L. was anxious to show that its party apparatus was democratic. Indeed, it was so apparently. It had the basis of a written Constitution stipulating elections for all party office-bearers and providing checks and balances to discourage concentration of power. But what Duverger thought of party-pattern usually that "authoritarian and oligarchic methods generally develop without constitutional warrant",¹⁶⁰⁰ was true of the league. Though the M.L. had a democratic Constitution with the power derived from the base through the league primaries in order of union, Thana, sub-division, district, city and province, there had been "in practice a great, although varying, degree of central control at the top".¹⁶⁰¹ So, the M.L. was a highly centralized party having vertical links with the base.

¹⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, January 31, 1956.

¹⁵⁹⁵ For details see, *Constitution of the Muslim League* (Art Press: Dacca-1) n.d., pp. 22-23.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Formerly it was 15.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Namely, vice-President, General Secretary, Joint Secretary, Treasurer, etc., of the M.L.

¹⁵⁹⁸ *Dawn*, January 31, 1956.

¹⁵⁹⁹ For details see Muslim League Constitution, *loc.cit.*

¹⁶⁰⁰ M. Duverger, *Political Parties*, 2nd edit. (translation: Methuen & Co., London: 1964), p. 134.

¹⁶⁰¹ "Government and Politics of Pakistan" (A HRAF Monograph), *op.cit.*, p. 125.

Programmes

The M.L. stand was an ideological one—modernist Islamic. Its aim was "to build Pakistan into an Islamic welfare state" and "to ensure that the Muslims of Pakistan are enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the *Holy Quran* and the *Sunnah*."¹⁶⁰² It relied on the dynamic interpretation of Islam and stressed on the *raison d'être* of the creation of Pakistan. The basic principles of the party manifesto adopted in the Council session in October, 1957 were the following: restoration of the separate electorate, retention of the one-unit, far-reaching agrarian reforms by abolishing feudalism and jagirdari in West Pakistan, and the gradual nationalization of key industries and public utility services. The manifesto was equally generous on repressive laws, Kashmir, the refugee problem, food, labor, etc., etc.¹⁶⁰³ The M.L. leadership had always been emphatic on the electorate and one-unit issues. On the question of agrarian reforms its leadership was less spectacular. The recommendations of the M.L. Agrarian Reforms Committee of 1949 were fairly progressive, but they could not be implemented due to the resistance of the powerful landlords of West Pakistan which comprised the nucleus of the M.L. leadership. When Z.H. Lari in the last Council session of the M.L. at Dacca in August, 1958 brought an amendment to the broad principle of land reforms by suggesting that ceilings of 450 acres for the landlords and 75 acres for cultivators be made, the amendment was lost by 57:42 votes.¹⁶⁰⁴ However, the abolition of the Zamindari system in East Pakistan and some minor land reforms in West Pakistan were credited to the M.L. leadership.

Swept out of power the M.L. lately talked about an 'independent foreign policy', which euphemism, in essence, meant less dependence on the western countries in favor of seeking more cooperation from the Muslim states in solving the Kashmir problem—the cornerstone of the M.L. foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the M.L., during the year 1958, created a significant stir on the question of ideology and Kashmir in the country, particularly in West Pakistan.

Supporters, Activists and Financial Resources

The main bulk of the M.L. adherents was located in the Western region of Pakistan. The refugee-infested Federal Capital was the city of the M.L. In Karachi in 1953, there were 130,000 two-anna members of K.M.L.¹⁶⁰⁵ In 1952, the league President claimed over 60 lakhs of membership for the All Pakistan M.L.¹⁶⁰⁶ The league paper also boasted of having "a paid membership of several millions."¹⁶⁰⁷ A women's section in the league

¹⁶⁰² See "Constitution of the Muslim League", *loc.cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁶⁰³ See *Dawn*, October 15, 16, 1957.

¹⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, August 12, 1958.

¹⁶⁰⁵ See *Dawn*, September 2, 1953.

¹⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, October 14, 1952 (Editorial) "The League President's Call".

¹⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1952 (Editorial) "The Muslim League".

organization was formed at the insistence of Begum Shahnawaz and Begum Tassaduq Hossain of the Punjab—both were social welfare workers and political personalities who helped 34,00,000 Muslim women enrol themselves as voters for the Punjab Assembly elections of 1950.¹⁶⁰⁸ The President of the All Pakistan Women's Association was Begum Liaquat Ali herself. Understandably, the M.L. had a large share of women supporters in West Pakistan. Besides, the M.L. had ideological auxiliaries in the country, in the form of associations like Khilafat-e-Rashida, Hiz-bullah of Sarsina, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam, Islam League, etc., which supported the cause of the M.L. Again, the army of voluntary corps e.g. M.L.N.G. could be counted as activist among the M.L. workers. The M.L. was mainly peopled by the middle, upper-middle and aristocratic classes.

Among the parties in Pakistan the M.L. was the most solvent one. At his death, Jinnah left Rs. 8,400,000 (\$646,000) of public funds of which the largest share went to the M.L.¹⁶⁰⁹ Finally, the then Pakistan M.L. took over the money set aside for the Indian Union M.L. and created a trust fund plan to utilize the money for the education of deserving refugee students in Pakistan.¹⁶¹⁰ Officially speaking, the main sources of organizational income were the subscriptions of membership and the interest accruing from the capital invested by the M.L. The party incomes and expenditure were hardly made public in Pakistan. It was once brought out in public that the income of the M.L. for the year 1951-52 was only Rs. 46,000 whereas the expenditure was Rs. 143,000,¹⁶¹¹ Deficits were obviously off-set by other means. The chances were the business community like Adamjees, Ispahanis, Khojas, etc., who immigrated to Pakistan and were given succor in many a way by the M.L. government initially, used to foot M.L.'s bill considerably also the landlords else cut price subscription of 4 annas could not account for huge expenditure.

Image-building exercise

The party propaganda or party-public relationship was performed in several ways. In a league party meeting an elaborate programme used to be drawn up e.g. physical display, Razakar Rally, mock battle, Moshaira¹⁶¹² of poet, etc. Usually, annual conferences or M.L. Council sessions became the main instrument of mass-contact and publicity. National and international issues were discussed at such meetings, and the delegates of both wings of Pakistan came in first hand contact with each other reinforcing the national identity. Conferences were cast in a giant setting. For instance, the Punjab M.L. Conference of 1952 lasted for 3 days in which attendance in the conference pandal averaged at 2 lakhs per session and the press booked nearly 100,000

¹⁶⁰⁸ *Statesman*, July 25, 1950.

¹⁶⁰⁹ *Times*, September 25, 1948; also *Dawn*, October 30, 1952.

¹⁶¹⁰ *Dawn*, August 30, 1957.

¹⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, May 20, 1952.

¹⁶¹² Poetry reading

words by telegram and telephone.¹⁶¹³ By observing 'workers' fortnight', celebrating the birthday anniversary of the founder of the nation, holding organization's Golden Jubilee Convention and staging impressive march pasts of the M.L.N.G.,¹⁶¹⁴ the commodities of the M.L. were pushed up in the Pakistan political market. Technically, the M.L. could boast of effective communications of its programme and activities, in that two big English newspapers namely, *The Dawn* and *The Morning News* with the largest interwiring circulations, supported the M.L. And the historical Bengali vernacular daily e.g. *The Azad* was the M.L. mouthpiece in East Pakistan exclusively. And these papers received Rs. 10 lacs in 1952 on account of fostering "cultural unity through newspapers and publishing houses" in¹⁶¹⁵ Pakistan. Whereas, *The Pakistan Standard* was officially owned by the M.L.

The Awami League¹⁶¹⁶ (A.L.)

People who could not be evangelized to the M.L. dogma, politicians who could not be accommodated to the M.L. organization and a considerable portion of refugees¹⁶¹⁷ who felt let down and exploited by the M.L. leaders formed the initial constituents of the potential opposition. Pir of Manki Sharif, Ghulam Md. Lundkhor of the N.W.F.F. – the former was an influential religious figure who contributed immensely to the M.L. cause in the frontier referendum of 1947 – clashed head-on with the Frontier Premier in regard to his enrollment and the reorganization method of the M.L.¹⁶¹⁸ The Pir's following was harassed by the Premier due to the alleged discriminating procedure of M.L. enrollment. The League differences could not be ironed out even through the good offices of Sardar Nishtar. Meanwhile, 6 M.L.A.S including the Pir of Zakori, the Nawab of Tonk and the Sultan of Boi, were expelled from league membership on the issue of agrarian reforms.¹⁶¹⁹ The Pir took advantage of the defections and founded the Awami Muslim League (A.M.L.) Party in May, 1949, with himself as the President.

Away in East Pakistan stringent methods were applied by the provincial league Chief, Moulana Akram Khan in enlisting members. Particularly, the eager generation of younger men who had fiercely canvassed for the M.L. cause earlier and now wanted to get into the organization to work from within the proposed reorganized party felt disappointed. Moulana Akram Khan opined that for the purity of the organization all and sundry people would not be welcomed. A delegation went to Karachi to persuade the Chief Organizer, Khaliquzzaman to relax the league admission rules, but to no purpose.¹⁶²⁰ Meanwhile, Moulana Bhasani, the influential old leaguer who had earlier galvanized Muslim support in favor of Pakistan in the Sylhet referendum came from

¹⁶¹³ See *Dawn*, November 9, 1952.

¹⁶¹⁴ See *Ibid.*, August 15, 27, 1957 and September 28, December 27, 1958.

¹⁶¹⁵ *Dawn*, December 11, 1952.

¹⁶¹⁶ The People's League.

¹⁶¹⁷ See Gaffar Khan's statement in the Court quoted in *Dawn*, April 9, 1952.

¹⁶¹⁸ *Hindu*, April 6, 1949.

¹⁶¹⁹ *Statement*, April 28, 1949.

¹⁶²⁰ For details see Ataur Rahman, *op.cit.*, pp. 25-33.

Assam to East Pakistan and joined the anti-league forces. In a convention of a portion of the M.L. workers coming from various parts of the country held at Golap Bag, Dacca on the 23rd and 24th June, 1949 there was formed a new political party called the Awami Muslim League.¹⁶²¹ Suhrawardy, a dynamic and resourceful politician but a political maverick at this time was touring India and Pakistan back and forth with a peace mission for the ensurance of safe living for the minorities of both countries. There was a move in the A.M.L. circles of the N.W.F.P. to extend its activities to the whole of Pakistan i.e. the establishment of branches in the West Punjab, Baluchistan and Sindh, as the A.M.L. was already functioning in the N.W.F.P and East Pakistan.¹⁶²² Consequently, the All Pakistan M.L. workers' convention at Lahore which was attended by 1,500 delegates from all parts of Pakistan, decided to form the All Pakistan A.M.L. Suhrawardy's services were commissioned, in that he was made the convenor of the newly proposed party. Suhrawardy was empowered to appoint an organizing committee and a committee to draft the party's manifesto and constitution. This move was telegraphically congratulated by many prominent leaders of both wings.¹⁶²³ From now onward, Suhrawardy showed a Promethean urge towards building a viable All Pakistan opposition party.

The Nawab of Mamdot, the first Chief Minister of the West Punjab left the league and formed the Jinnah Muslim League at the end of 1950. This party coalesced with the A.M.L. to fight the Punjab election of 1951, which ultimately led to the amalgamation of these two parties with a new name, e.g. Jinnah Awami League (J.A.L.)¹⁶²⁴ The next big incident was the East Pakistan A.L.'s being affiliated with the J.A.L. in a 3-day convention held at Lahore in December, 1952,¹⁶²⁵ through the instrumentality of Suhrawardy. In West Pakistan the J.A.L. was now operating in the N.W.F.P., Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Karachi and even in Azad Kashmir in varying degrees of success. In April, 1953, Suhrawardy appointed a central working committee consisting of members from both wings¹⁶²⁶ to facilitate party unification. The Nawab of Mamdot did not particularly like the East Pakistan unit's affiliation with the J.A.L. because of its radical views on land reforms.¹⁶²⁷ and was expelled by the J.A.L. working committee. The Mamdot-ouster was a temporary upset and the Punjab branch of the J.A.L. was duly reorganized by a 3-man organizing committee headed by Nawabzada Nasrullah.¹⁶²⁸ The J.A.L. braved its way through the heaviest odds to build an opposition party from the bottom up. At regular intervals its party leaders and workers—save Suhrawardy, though restrictions on his movements were imposed on several occasions—were gaoled, offices sealed and searched, meetings prohibited and

¹⁶²¹ See *Dawn*, June 24,25, 1949.

¹⁶²² *Statesman*, January 6, 1950.

¹⁶²³ See *Ibid.*, March 20,21,1950.

¹⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, January 25,1951.

¹⁶²⁵ See *Hindu*, December 28, 1952; *Dawn*, December 29,1952.

¹⁶²⁶ *Dawn*, April 6, 1953.

¹⁶²⁷ *Hindu*, April 12, 1953; also *Dawn*, July 22, 1953.

¹⁶²⁸ *Hindu*, July 27, 1953.

party papers banned by the M.L. governments.¹⁶²⁹ Apart from its struggle for growth through processes permissible under democratic framework, the J.A.L. like the early conservative party of British politics profited in the splits of its opponents and absorbed disgruntled politicians in its fold. Suhrawardy compelled gestures from prominent people like Nawab of Mamdot, Pir Ellahi Bux, Major General Akbar Khan, Lundkhar, Pir of Manki Sharif, etc., for, as an illustrious Barrister he fought in the law courts and had them released from the charges of the M.L. government. He did this in countless cases a unique way of political recruitment. Those politicians who had suffered long terms of imprisonment and become "prison graduates" joined the J.A.L. at their release. By evaluating the J.A.L. activities "throughout the provinces" in late 1953, the *New York Times* saw "the first semblance of an organized opposition to the Pakistan Muslim League."¹⁶³⁰

Firstly, the J.A.L. had the distinction of being born outside of legislative arena i.e. in the country at large. Secondly, it reflected its electoral strength in the legislatures by fighting the elections. In the Punjab elections of March, 1951, the J.A.L. won 31 seats in the legislature and won 18.3 percent of popular votes.¹⁶³¹ In the N.W.F.P. elections in the same year it captured 4 seats, and later on the Pir of Manki Sharif, the party President won a bye-election with an overwhelming majority.¹⁶³² In the Sindh election of 1953, it fought through an electoral alliance called the 'Awami Mahaz Front' which won 7 seats in the legislature. In the general elections of East Pakistan in 1954, it emerged as the largest single party in the legislature.¹⁶³³ In the elections of the Constituent Assembly II in 1955 it captured 13 seats and remained a dominant, well-knit parliamentary party therein. It became the first official opposition in the central parliament and East Pakistan legislature, and eventually was able to form coalition governments on both counts. The J.A.L. record spoke for itself.

"Every Party," said Professor Laski," is, to some degree a federation of interests to which, as best it can, it will seek to accommodate its policy."¹⁶³⁴ This was particularly true of the Pakistan situation. Like the Australian party structure¹⁶³⁵—also, to some extent like the parties of the Swiss Cantons—the J.A.L. was primarily organized at the provincial level, and only secondarily in the N.A. This was, no doubt, in keeping with the federal pattern of Pakistan polity. Geography, cultural variety and regional peculiarities of problems gave some individuality to parties of different areas. This was more true of the J.A.L. of West Pakistan and its sister party in the Eastern wing. Bhasani

¹⁶²⁹ See *Statesman*, December 24, 29, 1951; *Dawn*, May 17, 1953

¹⁶³⁰ *New York Times*, October 20, 1953.

¹⁶³¹ See Report on the General Elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1950-1951 (Government Printing Lahore, 1952), Appendix XI-XII.

¹⁶³² *Dawn*. August 31, 1953.

¹⁶³³ Due to election peculiarity, it had only 3 members in the Provincial Assembly of newly created West Pakistan. Also see *Ibid*. May 19, 1953 and April 1, 1954.

¹⁶³⁴ H.J. Laski, *op.cit.*, p.81.

¹⁶³⁵ See J.D.B. Miller, *op.cit.*, pp. 64-92.

told the East Pakistan Party's Council session that "if anybody wants to interfere with our programme, then we shall be compelled to reconsider the question of our affiliation with the central body."¹⁶³⁶ Similarly, the Western J.A.L. in the beginning was not enthusiastic about its Eastern partner's programmes of making Bengali one of the state languages, sweeping land reforms, more autonomy, etc.¹⁶³⁷ But eventually, these differences were allowed to prevail only in terms of emphasis on the broad lines of party policies agreed upon. Suhrawardy was a great catalyst, composer of differences and a cementer of party hands. Gradually, his leadership of moderation became well established in the party, as the extremists were winnowed out of the party. The exodus of the leftist elements of both the wings of the party on foreign policy was, no doubt, a quantitative loss, but also was an ultimate qualitative gain, as the party became moderate and its mutual differences were reduced to a minimum. On the issue of one-unit the party finally was unanimous, as the Pir of Manki Sharif recanted his early opposition to the one-unit issue.¹⁶³⁸ It can be categorically maintained that by the year 1958, the party had become more notable for its unity than its differences.

However, in the course of the party's evolution the most shining example of maturity, realism, adaptability and innovation was displayed by its decision to open roll to all communities regardless of faith, hue and color. This was to "pave the way", wrote the *New York Times* correspondent, "for 10,000,000 Hindus to associate themselves politically for the first time with a popular political organization".¹⁶³⁹ This was a piece of bold leadership. But its political pragmatism stood it in good stead. The decision was East Pakistan's which was accepted by the Central Working Committee. Henceforth, the party dropped the words, "Jinnah" and "Muslim", and gave itself a non-communal nomenclature e.g. Awami League.

As far as the A.L.'s organizational strength in West Pakistan was concerned it was not as powerful and pervasive as was in the case of its sister party in East Pakistan. In 1954 Suhrawardy had been in Zurich Hospital for treatment for a long time. The Acting Convenor, the Pir of Manki Sharif could not make up Suhrawardy's absence, although an enrollment campaign was carried on in all parts of the country.¹⁶⁴⁰ The organizational work did not receive undivided attention even after Suhrawardy's return due to the serious constitutional crisis. Serious party work began after the establishment of the Republic and amalgamation of West Pakistan. The reorganization committee formed a 6-man sub-committee to draft a party Constitution and manifesto.¹⁶⁴¹ The long awaited A.L. convention was postponed, explained Suhrawardy, only to make it more

¹⁶³⁶ See *Dawn*, July 11, 1953.

¹⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, April 14, 1953.

¹⁶³⁸ See *Ibid.*, July 2, 1956.

¹⁶³⁹ See *New York Times*, October 22, 1955; also *Dawn, Hindu*, dated October 22, 1955.

¹⁶⁴⁰ See *Dawn*, January 17, March 4 & 27, June 2, September 1 and November 7, 1955.

¹⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, January 10, 1957.

representative "in later stage."¹⁶⁴² The General Secretary, Inayatullah Hassan dissolved all A.L. units in West Pakistan "with a view to reorganizing the Party in West Pakistan in the context of one-unit."¹⁶⁴³ At long last, the reorganization job was completed in April, 1958, and in the May Convention of 1958 a unified A.L. for West Pakistan with a party manifesto and Constitution was born for the first time.¹⁶⁴⁴

Mr. Ahmed maintained that A.L. membership in West Pakistan would be a little over 100,000.¹⁶⁴⁵ The circumstantial evidence suggests a greater number. A foreign critic, Collin Jackson, believed that Suhrawardy cultivated tremendous mass response for his party in West Pakistan.¹⁶⁴⁶ The A.L. in the N.W.F.P. had a solid following. In Karachi the A.L. ward leagues were coming up. The A.L. stand on the one-unit issue would have compelled some favourable responses from the Punjab. The Bahawalpur A.L. was "comparatively strong".¹⁶⁴⁷ Besides, influential personalities and landlords counted very much in West Pakistan politics. The A.L. had some share of these. The Pir of Manki Sharif, Zakori Sharif—they had solid Murids¹⁶⁴⁸—and Khan of Lundkhar of the N.W.F.P., Pir Ilahi Bakhs—a former Sindh Premier—Waliyat Ali Khan—son of Liaquat, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan—Chowdhury Abdus Salam, M.P., of Bahawalpur, Nawab Zada Nasrullah, Raja Hassan Akhtar, Khwaja Abdur Rahim, Sahib Zadi Mahmouda (woman), Mir Abid Hossain, Malik Ghulam Nabi of the Punjab and Major General Akbar Khan, etc., were all names to be reckoned with. But the fact remains, the A.L. in West Pakistan was not as deep rooted as was the M.L.

So far as the East Pakistan A.L. was concerned, it marched from strength to strength from its birth. During the period 1957-58, it won all the bye-elections but one for the legislative seats. Its membership roll mounted to a sizeable figure,¹⁶⁴⁹ 1.8 million.¹⁶⁵⁰ A prominent opposition leader, Mian Iftikharuddin confessed in the N.A. in the following words: "The Awami League to my mind in East Pakistan is the only organized party of the country; indeed it is the only best organized party in the whole country."¹⁶⁵¹ The M.L. Parliamentary leader Chundrigarh told the House in the same vein in the following year.¹⁶⁵² Hence, we maintain that by 1958 the A.L. was a viable party with its main root anchored in East Pakistan and unfolding its branches the opposite of the

¹⁶⁴² *Times*, January 18, 1957.

¹⁶⁴³ *Dawn*, February 12, 1957.

¹⁶⁴⁴ See *Ibid.*, May 25, 1958.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Mustaq Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁶⁴⁶ See Colin Jackson, "Pakistan - Ten years after: Political Instability", *The New Commonwealth*, XXXV (1957), P. 227.

¹⁶⁴⁷ *Dawn*, April 10, 1958.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Religious disciples.

¹⁶⁴⁹ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Party Secretary, claimed still more during his interview with the writer in 1969.

¹⁶⁵⁰ M. Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁶⁵¹ See *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 13, 1957, p. 318.

¹⁶⁵² See *Ibid.*, Vol. II, March 1, 1958, p. 465.

M.L.—in the western part. And the judgment of M. Ahmed that the A.L. was the "All-Pakistan party which never came into existence",¹⁶⁵³ was not factually true.

Organizational Structure

The A.L. organization did not possess the highest national forum, a Central Council¹⁶⁵⁴ like that of the M.L. At the national level was the central executive committee alone which, being appointed by the Convenor, Suhrawardy, functioned as a coordinating machine and took decisions on national issues. The 34-member central executive committee consisted of the prominent A.L. leaders of both the wings. This body frequently met, usually at Karachi. Apparently the organizational solar system of the A.L. revolved round the Sun of Suhrawardy's personality.¹⁶⁵⁵ One could suspect the existence of "bossism", American style in the party. But in essence, there was a good deal of "inner democracy" within the organization. By virtue of being the party's national convenor Suhrawardy enjoyed plenary power in some party matters. But nothing in our findings provides grounds for accusing Suhrawardy of committing the party to an action concerning which he was not sure of carrying the organization with him. That was his leadership. If he had preached "parity formula" or "pro-western foreign policy" the party voted its endorsement later. It cannot be said that the party ratified its leader's actions thinking them to be a *fait accomplis*; for, after all the largest branch of the A.L., i.e. the E.P.A.L., remained always under popular control as understood in party sense. The dissentient on foreign policy of both parts of Pakistan were expelled by the appropriate bodies, e.g. the central Working Committee and the East Pakistan Working Committee, respectively.¹⁶⁵⁶ Bhasani left the party on his own accord.

The Central Working Committee authorised Suhrawardy in August, 1955 to take whatever steps he considered necessary in the interest of Pakistan in regard to the one-unit Bill.¹⁶⁵⁷ In December of the following year the central committee in a 3-day meeting had no scruple in expressing "full confidence" in its leader.¹⁶⁵⁸ Similarly, the working committee after 10 hours' heated discussion prevailed upon its leader to withdraw his earlier order disaffiliating the N.W.F.P.'s League headed by the Pir of Manki Sharif.¹⁶⁵⁹ In spite of its being wholly appointed by Suhrawardy the Central Working Committee functioned in a democratic spirit where dissent was tolerated; for, Suhrawardy being the chief aggregator of party interests of both the wings showed discretion in his conduct. In passing resolutions on major issues the committee, in the absence of a

¹⁶⁵³ M. Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁶⁵⁴ The provision for a national council was envisaged in the Constitution when President Ayub revived party politics in 1964. See *Constitution of All Pakistan Awami League* (published by Mr. Shafiul Alam, 15 Purana Paltan, Dacca) n.d.

¹⁶⁵⁵ Observation made in the all-Pakistan perspective.

¹⁶⁵⁶ See *Times*, June 10, 1957; *Dawn*, January 8, 1957.

¹⁶⁵⁷ *Dawn*, August 13, 1955.

¹⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, December 2, 1956; see also *Times*, December 14, 1954.

¹⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, July 3, 1956.

central council subjected them to ratification by a convention of East Pakistan-West Pakistan Awami Leaguers. For instance, it was done on the electorate issue.¹⁶⁶⁰ Situated at the apex the committee also did the valuable job of resolving from time to time internal party conflicts in different regions. The bringing about of rapprochement between the two rival Awami Leaguers – the Pir of Manki Sharif and Khan of Lundkhar in the N.W.F.P., the A.L. stronghold in West Pakistan was done through the central committee's good offices.¹⁶⁶¹ Besides the Central Working Committee there was a Central Parliamentary Board consisting of some A.L.M.P.s, party leaders and the convenor as its ex-officio chairman which functioned in a fashion similar to that of the M.L.

It was, however, the edifice of the East Pakistan A.L. which was erected upon a complete and sound organizational base.

The components of the East Pakistan A.L. were the following: the Council, the Working Committee, the Parliamentary Party, the Parliamentary Board and the district, sub-divisional, city, ward, thana, municipality. union or Panchayat leagues as recognized by the East Pakistan A.L. The Party officers were the President, 3 Vice-Presidents, the general secretary, 6 departmental secretaries, and a treasurer. At the top was the Council the strength of which membership was 876.¹⁶⁶² A prescribed number of elected Councillors from all the district and city leagues constituted the Council, which in turn elected the office-bearers. In marked contrast to the provincial council of the M.L. which admitted the Presidents and general secretaries of district and city leagues as automatic members of the Council,¹⁶⁶³ the character of the A.L. council was essentially elective. It was only in the case of a district or city league's failure to send up elected councillors in time, that the Working Committee through co-option or nomination could fill in the gap temporarily.¹⁶⁶⁴ The Council being the highest forum having an appellate jurisdiction sat in judgment twice a year regularly over the entire activities of the organization and gave policy directives. The residual power was vested in the council. What really distinguished the A.L. Council from that of the M.L.'s was that the former was more animated, assertive and democratic.

The functions of the Working Committee were similar to that of the M.L.'s. But the A.L. Committee was so constituted that unlike the M.L. custom the President of the A.L. could appoint only 25 members in his discretion in a committee of 37 members;¹⁶⁶⁵ for, as many as 12 party office-bearers would become the compulsory members – a check

¹⁶⁶⁰ *Hindu*, December 2, 1955.

¹⁶⁶¹ *Dawn*, March 24, 1956.

¹⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, October 22, 1955.

¹⁶⁶³ *Dawn*, October 25, 1952.

¹⁶⁶⁴ See *The Constitution of East Pakistan Awami League*, (Published by Habiboor Rahman, Publicity Secretary, Shulekha Press, Dacca-I), n.d., pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁶⁵ *Times*, June 10, 1957.

against the President's filling the Committee with yes-man. The II-man Parliamentary Board while being entrusted with the job of selecting parliamentary candidates was required to weigh the opinions of the respective constituency parties from where the candidates were to be chosen. And as far as the Provincial Parliamentary Party was concerned it was made responsible to the Working Committee so that 'party faith' was not violated¹⁶⁶⁶ – a potential area of party conflicts. The Constitution forbade members to hold party offices and public offices at the same time – a directive which was not violated.¹⁶⁶⁷

The organizational superiority of the A.L. over others, however, lay in its creation of a sound and viable *base* i.e. the local party organizations. On paper most of the parties were keen to show that all the districts, subdivisions, cities, unions, etc., were dotted with their party branches. But in reality they were not what they were made out to be. The *Dawn* being a M.L. paper had to admit that extensive membership drive of the A.L. reached "the innermost parts of the province". The organizers of the union leagues – the smallest unit of the A.L. hierarchy – worked with the objective of enrolling at least half of the electorate or one-eighth of the total population of their unions. And no union league was recognized by the A.L. executives until it had enrolled at least 500 members. Ladies' committees were formed in every union to catalogue women membership.¹⁶⁶⁸ These primary units formed the pyramidal base of the organization which met in an hierarchical order at the apex. In this hierarchical ladder each higher rung was constituted by the ingredients of its immediate lower ones. So the top echelons relied on their subordinates for support as the latter looked for incentives and patronage from the higher levels. The link between the two poles e.g. the top and the bottom was officially maintained by the District Leagues. In the Afro-Asian situation it has been found that parties well-established in power reached a phase in which "the basic cells begin to atrophy",¹⁶⁶⁹ through alienation. As the A.L. was not well-established in power it did not develop such complacency to indulge in neglect for the primary units. The District Leagues as an intermediary organ between the base and the top coordinated the activities of the branches which fell within their jurisdiction. Besides the lines of communication at all levels of the party were kept alive in that through dissemination of information the Chief Party Organ always kept its sub-ordinates posted up-to-date. Hardly a single A.L. meeting on an important issue held in the capital city went without its reverberations being heard in the shape of similar A.L. meetings across the country.

Besides, vigorous party leaders like Suhrawardy, Bhasani and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had great passion for public communication, and it can be said without fear of contradiction

¹⁶⁶⁶ Awami League Constitution, *loc.cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁶⁶⁷ Some of the office bearers who joined the coalition government in 1956 did so with the permission of the Working Committee. Later on, they resigned party offices.

¹⁶⁶⁸ See *Dawn*, May 10, 1954.

¹⁶⁶⁹ Thomas Hodgkin, *African Political Parties* (Penguin Books Ltd.. 1961), p. 86.

that the caravan of A.L. stalwarts did cover all the tiny sectors of the organization through their periodic visiting and speaking engagements. Visits by the lesser leaders to the primary leagues had always been constant. Again, big party conferences and particularly council meetings were generally held in the rural areas of different parts of the country. The panorama of debates, resolutions, elections, ovations, slogans, songs, etc., gave an aura of pride where the humblest Awami Leaguer could feel enthusiastic, having been a part of the whole creative movement. If Suhrawardy instilled *reason* and Bhasani *emotion* to the party, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the General Secretary, put *steel* in the organization. Here was a man who almost dedicated his whole life to the building of a mass party and had the distinction of resigning from a ministerial job for the interest of party work.¹⁶⁷⁰ These were some of the factors that might have prompted Mr. Ahmed to say that the A.L. "attained a high degree of organization and cohesion and intimate touch with the people and intelligentsia."¹⁶⁷¹

As to the locus of power, it seemingly manifested itself, in both personal and collective leadership. Major decisions were invariably taken collectively in the highest forum, the Council. For instance, on the question of opening the doors of the A.L. to non-Muslims the Subjects Committee in the Council having failed to arrive at a decision empowered Bhasani to have the final word on it.¹⁶⁷² He, nevertheless, decided the matter in favor of the non-communalization of the party with the help of a joint meeting of the Working Committee and the Presidents and Secretaries of district and sub-divisional Awami Leagues;¹⁶⁷³ but the decision was again submitted for ratification to the Council meeting the following year. Almost the same procedure was followed on the electorate issue. After the exit of Bhasani, the personal leadership of Suhrawardy at the provincial and national level had the acquiescence of the party. The incidence of participation in the collective decision-making by the leaguers was fairly encouraging as the number of attendants of the Council sessions of these four years will indicate – 1953, 721; 1955, 675; 1965, 650 and in 1957, 846.¹⁶⁷⁴

On the crucial question of relationship between the party and its parliamentary representatives a veteran British parliamentarian maintained that "The Government must keep the principles of the party in mind ... and party must understand the difficulties of Government."¹⁶⁷⁵ Since the A.L. savored the taste of governmental power for the first time in 1956 there arose some heartburning between the A.L. Assemblymen and the Party. The causes were more psychological and party-promotional in nature than ideological. The political position of the salaried Assemblymen occasioned some

¹⁶⁷⁰ *Dawn*, August 8, 1957.

¹⁶⁷¹ M. Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁶⁷² *Dawn*, July 5, 1952.

¹⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, April 21, 1954.

¹⁶⁷⁴ See *Ibid.*, 17 November, 1953; October 22, 1955, May 29, 1956 and *Times*, June 14, 1957.

¹⁶⁷⁵ Herbert Morrison, *The Peaceful Revolution* (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London,), p. 60.

jealousies among the outside leaguers. The party workers and supporters needed some government patronage to keep up their party morale now that they had a government of their own.¹⁶⁷⁶ The temporary resignation of the party Secretary was interpreted to be the cause of the existing tension between the organization and the government.¹⁶⁷⁷ But the fact remains that the leaders concerned never slanged themselves in public and swallowed their differences in silence. And the basic relationship between the government and the party always remained sound.

The degree of organizational maturity achieved by the East Pakistan A.L. cannot, however, be claimed for the Western bloc. In fact, a unified West Pakistan A.L. with a full-fledged constitution and party manifesto came into being in May, 1958 where the A.L. Convention elected Nawabzada Nasrullah the President of West Pakistan A.L. and Khan of Lundhor the General Secretary, including 6 vice-presidents, 6 joint secretaries, 2 organizing and publicity secretaries, 1 treasurer, 1 II-man parliamentary Board and a 3-man election tribunal.¹⁶⁷⁸ Finally, it is also to be mentioned here that the A.L. was a non-restrictive and direct organization where any one of 18-years old could become a member after paying a token one anna.

Programmes

Compared to the M.L. the A.L. was, at bottom, a secular organization. It was a centrist party with a left of the centre thrust. To provoke attractability it had some idealistic programmes, but in practice the A.L. remained pragmatic with deep sense of constitutionality. It stood for progressive democratic leadership. From the very beginning it fought for the restoration of civil liberties and allowance of free play to democratic processes. "Mine is going to be a constitutional path" a word of significance which was constantly repeated by Suhrawardy.¹⁶⁷⁹ Upon becoming the Prime Minister his was the emphasis on the "ensurance of the rule of law".¹⁶⁸⁰ A sense of legalism and constitutionality was thus a part of the A.L. tradition.

Its secularism manifested itself in the first item of the election manifesto published before the general elections of East Pakistan which clearly opposed making Pakistan an Islamic state.¹⁶⁸¹ Suhrawardy unlike the M.L. did not consider 'religion' as the basis on which "The two wings can live together".¹⁶⁸² Shattering the myth of religion the Deputy leader of the A.L. parliamentary party¹⁶⁸³ told the Constituent Assembly II that "we are going to frame one state out of two countries; one nation out of two people",¹⁶⁸⁴ and the

¹⁶⁷⁶ For fuller account see, Aatur Rahman, *op.cit.*, pp. 199-110.

¹⁶⁷⁷ *Dawn*, April 5, 1958.

¹⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, May 25, 1958.

¹⁶⁷⁹ See *Dawn*, October 3, 1956.

¹⁶⁸⁰ *Times*, January 8, 1956.

¹⁶⁸¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, February 3, 1954.

¹⁶⁸² See Suhrawardy's speech in the Constituent Assembly II, *Dawn*, February 1, 1956.

¹⁶⁸³ Abul Mansur Ahmed.

¹⁶⁸⁴ *Dawn*, January 17, 1956.

basis of harmony between the two wings depended on political and economic understanding. So regional autonomy and parity between the two halves of Pakistan in every sphere were the two main pillars of the A.L. programmes and recipe for Pakistan problems. And the establishment of the system of joint electorate was another example of the party's secular leadership.

The years preceding the party's sharing governmental power saw the development of the A.L.'s foreign policy. In the initial periods the A.L. was officially averse to the idea of Pakistan's entering into pacts with the western countries. In the Council session of 1955 it resolved that all pacts must be placed before the N.A. for endorsement.¹⁶⁸⁵ While in opposition it urged the ruling parties in vain to place the international pacts and alliances for ratification.¹⁶⁸⁶ The early "theoretical" approach of the A.L. towards foreign policy was, however, revised when it returned to power and became "emphatically" identified with a pro-western foreign policy. The foreign policy differences of emphasis between the M.L. and the A.L. were that the former was more mindful of the Muslim world in the scheme of things, while the latter, though not unmindful of them, found the pan-Islamism as "strings of zeroes".¹⁶⁸⁷ And the A.L. had the unquestionable distinction of bringing 'democratic control' over the country's foreign policy.

On social policy the party appeared more emphatic but not radical. It stood for abolition of feudalism without compensation. But the A.L. government in East Pakistan could not withhold compensation due to constitutional difficulties. But it did touch on others peripheral to the land system. At the centre it was inhibited by its reactionary coalition partner from bringing about agrarian reforms in West Pakistan. But the A.L. made bold to incorporate a land reform formula for West Pakistan in its election. manifesto duly approved by the West Pakistan A.L. convention. Unlike the M.L., it fixed a definite ceiling on land holding – 23,000 units¹⁶⁸⁸ as a maximum and 25 acres as the minimum – risking the support of the party's landlord-group.¹⁶⁸⁹ The rise of population in geometrical progression in Pakistan was, no doubt, a social problem, the Suhrawardy government for the first time ventured to introduce measures for family planning in a conservative society like Pakistan supported by a budget allotment.¹⁶⁹⁰

On the economic side both the M.L. and A.L. believed in a mixed economy. The A.L. also envisaged the nationalization of key industries.¹⁶⁹¹ By and large the A.L. seemed to

¹⁶⁸⁵ *Dawn*, October 23, 1955.

¹⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, December 31, 1956.

¹⁶⁸⁷ H. Tinker, *op.cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁶⁸⁸ The unit is a scale fixed on the basis of the produce index. 23,000 units, in terms of measurement of land would vary from region to region. In the former Punjab it would come to about 300 acres and in the former N.W.F.P. to about 175 acres.

¹⁶⁸⁹ *Dawn*, May 26, 1958.

¹⁶⁹⁰ See *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 9, 1957, p. 13.

¹⁶⁹¹ *The Programmes of the East Pakistan Awami League* (Published by N.I. Chowdhury in Bengali and printed by Consulate Press, Dacca), n.d.

have been in favor of government intervention in the economic sector when the public interest warranted it. For the benefit of the common consumers the A.L. stood for the stabilization of prices through the introduction of price-support schemes by the government.¹⁶⁹² After assumption of office it enacted a bill providing for price control and regulation of trade and commerce between the provinces only to ensure benefits of the consumers.¹⁶⁹³ The A.L. Commerce and Industries Minister wanted to contain the vested interests of the business community in one area of vital importance namely, the coastal trade between East and West Pakistan. He proposed to establish a public shipping corporation as private monopoly and selling of shipping space in the black-market vitiated the situation. One can easily understand the hold the business magnates had on the politicians since the start of Pakistan as in 1949 the Prime Minister refused to have Public Shipping Corporation, on Indian lines, and at the same time would not give reasons to his "questioner" in the Parliament for its non-feasibility.¹⁶⁹⁴ A famine of oil and salt gripped East Pakistan, where as West Pakistan abounded in them. The shipping magnates flourished over human miseries.¹⁶⁹⁵ Before the A.L. could demolish this vicious monopoly of the business community Suhrawardy had to quit the office and the plan for a public corporation was shelved for good.¹⁶⁹⁶ However in East Pakistan the A.L. government established a Jute Marketing Corporation instead of nationalizing the jute industry. Agriculture, cottage industries, village aid development received more attention in Suhrawardy's time than before.¹⁶⁹⁷

The labour movement in Pakistan, which Weatherford saw as "an expression of the age-old dependent status of the workers of the subcontinent",¹⁶⁹⁸ featured prominently in the A.L. programmes. It stood for the growth of genuine and healthy trade unionism. The Employees' Provident Fund Act, and the Workmen's Compensation Act were passed during the Suhrawardy administration.¹⁶⁹⁹ Despite the Pakistan government's acceptance of the ILO conventions trade unions were not recognized automatically. The A.L. Labor Minister publicly announced that he was preparing a Bill for the compulsory recognition of trade unions.¹⁷⁰⁰ But the party fell from power before it could implement its plan. But it set up a labor Wages Board to advise on wages to labor.¹⁷⁰¹ And a Private Bill, The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act passed by the N.A. was A.L. sponsored. While in power at the centre, it allocated Rs. 1,00,00,000 to mine owners to be advanced

¹⁶⁹² See Suhrawardy's Press Conference outlining A.L. economic policies, *Dawn*, February 28, 1953.

¹⁶⁹³ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 25, 1957, p. 1164.

¹⁶⁹⁴ See *C.A.D. (Leg.)*, Vol. I, February 21, 1949, p. 69.

¹⁶⁹⁵ See *Dawn*, November 3, 1951 (Editorial) "Salt, Oil and Shipping".

¹⁶⁹⁶ For details see Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Group-interests in Pakistan Politics, 1947-58", *The Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXIX, Nos. 1 & 2 (Spring-/Summer), 1966.

¹⁶⁹⁷ See the budget for 1957-58, *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 9, 1957, pp. 1-26.

¹⁶⁹⁸ W.D. Weatherford in W. Galenson, (ed.) *Labour in Developing Economics* (University of California Press, 1962), p. 47.

¹⁶⁹⁹ *N.A.D.*, Vol. I, February 27, 1957, p. 1314.

¹⁷⁰⁰ *Dawn*, December 16, 1956.

¹⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, May 27, 1957.

as loans on convenient terms for providing free housing accommodation to the mining force.¹⁷⁰² It was, however, the A.L. government in East Pakistan which promulgated the Trade Unions (Recognition) Ordinance, 1958 for compulsory recognition by the employers of representative trade unions.¹⁷⁰³ The author of the Minimum Wage Act was also the A.L. government of East Pakistan. It was, however, the A.L. government of East Pakistan which could implement some of its programmes touching on various fields.¹⁷⁰⁴

Supporters, Activists and Financial Resources

Because of its non-communistic, secular and middle-of-the-road stand, the A.L. drew its supporters, though in different proportion, from all sections of society and people of all age-groups. No doubt, the party attracted the attention of the younger generation more prominently. As many as 150 accredited representatives of trade unions, controlling over 60,000 organized industrial workers in the Federal Capital area joined the A.L. formally, led by Mr. J.H. Shiraji, a member of the executive committee of the Pakistan Confederation of Labor, the only recognized labor organization.¹⁷⁰⁵ It appeared that the A.L. "would assume the role of a labour Party",¹⁷⁰⁶ British style. In East Pakistan the Party also enjoyed support of some of the trade unions. Abdus Samad, a prominent Trade Unionist was the Secretary of the A.L.'s labour department. Moulana Tarkabagish— an M.P. and later became the President of the E.P.A.L.—was the President of the East Pakistan Association of IV Class Government Employees. Similarly, A. Khaleque and Qamaruddin—prominent Awami Leaguers—were associated with other unions. Among the millions of refugees who fled to Pakistan the A.L. could hope to muster some support, as well. In fact, Suhrawardy himself was a refugee in the technical sense. Mr. Zahiruddin, an immigrant, was a Central Minister during Suhrawardy's time. Mr. Walyat Ali Khan, the son of the first Prime Minister became a prominent Awami Leaguer in West Pakistan. Suhrawardy himself had the portfolio of refugee and rehabilitation. There was a refugee functionary in the A.L. organization solely entrusted with the refugee problems.¹⁷⁰⁷ Suhrawardy's long services to the cause of minorities had an invariable begetting side. The student community's support to the A.L. was channeled through the East Pakistan Student's League¹⁷⁰⁸ the most powerful student organ. Its counterpart in West Pakistan did the same. As many as 30 university professors, and teachers were thought to have been. actively associated with the party.¹⁷⁰⁹ Similarly, leading women Awami Leaguers like Mrs. Sulaiman Akhtar, Begum Anwara Khatoon, Mrs. Sarwar Murshed, etc., were also conspicuous in

¹⁷⁰² *Dawn*, December 27, 1956.

¹⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*, January 30, 1958.

¹⁷⁰⁴ For detailed A.L. programmes see the 41-point manifesto adopted in the 1953 Council session at Mymensingh published in *Dawn*, November 19, 1953. Also for revised one see *East Pakistan A.L. Manifesto* (Vernacular), published by T. Ahmed (Glory Printers, Dacca, 1969).

¹⁷⁰⁵ *Dawn*, January 6, 1956.

¹⁷⁰⁶ K. Mahmud, *Trade Unionism in Pakistan* (The Punjab University Press: 1958), p. 98.

¹⁷⁰⁷ *Dawn*, April 4, 1955.

¹⁷⁰⁸ *Report of the Commission' Problems and Welfare* (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education), 1966, p. 9.

¹⁷⁰⁹ M. Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

social service activities and women's organizations—a fact that had the subtlety of recruiting more women adherents to the organization.

Above all, there was an army of more than 500¹⁷¹⁰ full time, dedicated and fighting workers ready to be mobilized for party work by a snap of the fingers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,¹⁷¹¹ who was so dearly enthroned in the hearts of the workers. Most of them were quite educated and young. They had a will to work for the party. For example, when the A.L. took over the administration of East Pakistan in 1956 in an utter famine condition, the workers helped the government procure and distribute food in the remotest part of the country. In some areas they provided for 'gruel Kitchen' to feed the hungry. In the so-called operation closed door period in East Pakistan border, these workers volunteered to work as border officers to stop smuggling across the border.¹⁷¹² Such was the zeal of the workers for raising the image of the party. Among the activists were the A.L. Mujahed Bahini¹⁷¹³ maintained by the party of which job was to render social services.¹⁷¹⁴

The financial position of the party was weaker than the M.L. Officially, it lived on the varied scale of subscriptions realized, monthly or yearly, from different categories of party members, plus the earnings from the sales of party publications. There was a provision in the Constitution which says of "at a time donation",¹⁷¹⁵ but by whom was not explained. No doubt, the top leaders who were mostly middle class lawyers made frequent donations out of their hard-won money. But as the business community was eager to establish links with any party having potentiality for capturing power, the A.L. also had its share of donations from the former class. Particularly, Sadri Ispahani who maintained his business headquarters in East Pakistan maintained regular financial contributions to the A.L.¹⁷¹⁶

Image building exercise

On this count the A.L. was in the same tradition as that of the M.L. The only difference was that the party being newer the oars-manship of its boat of mass campaigning remained always active. Having remained in the opposition for a long time it had constantly to observe strikes, protest meetings, processions, fastings, prisoners' day wearing black badges, etc. Through all these instrumentalities the party projected its image before the public as the party of sufferers for the popular cause. Unlike the M.L. Conference which smacked of martial grandeur, the A.L. ones seemed more political in matters of internal proceedings and outside displays. The Bengali Dailies, e.g.

¹⁷¹⁰ The writer was told by the Party's General Secretary.

¹⁷¹¹ Affectionately called by people as "Mujib-bhai", meaning 'brother Mujib'.

¹⁷¹² See Zahiruddin's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, March 3, 1958, p. 709.

¹⁷¹³ Volunteers' Corps.

¹⁷¹⁴ *Dawn*, May 11, 1954.

¹⁷¹⁵ Awami League Constitution, *loc.cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁷¹⁶ This is writer's personal knowledge.

"*Ittfaq*"¹⁷¹⁷ and "*Millat*",¹⁷¹⁸ and the weekly "*Morning Star*" in West Pakistan were the party's main communicating organs.

The Republican Party (R.P.)

The R.P. was born in April, 1956 first within the precincts of West Pakistan legislature, and then it sought to extend its activities to the country. In the words of the party's General Secretary, the Republicans were "the renegades of the Muslim League and are proud of the fact".¹⁷¹⁹ The R.P. was drawn 'almost entirely' from the class of big landlords and big industrialists.¹⁷²⁰ Looking at the political lineage of the top R.P. leaders—save Dr. Khan—it can be surely maintained that the party arose from the ashes of the old Unionist Party which governed the Punjab for a long time on a non-communal basis in the pre-partition days of India. The political significance of the party lay in its giving a transient support for secular leadership which culminated in the country's having a joint electorate system. The intrinsic value of the emergence of the R.P. was that it stressed the non-communal aspect of Pakistan politics, when the powerful, conservative M.L. in West Pakistan was going in the opposite direction. Judged on that point the R.P. was liberal. But as a mass-party the R.P. had the slightest chance of success in either wing.

In the September Convention of 1956 the R.P. opened its doors to all people, regardless of religious faith, who were at least 18 years old. The Constitution provided a national convention comprising members of the provincial conventions and of the Parliamentary Party in the N.A. including candidates set up by the party for elections in the constituency concerned provided they were members of a primary or ward R.P. The Executive Committee consisted of 21 members, all elected by the convention except the leader to the party in the N.A. who was an ex-officio member.¹⁷²¹ A central organising committee was formed to constitute the R.P. at the following levels: provincial, district, constituency, city, primary, etc. The enrollment campaign continued from 15th January, 1957 to March 15, 1957. On March 2, 1957 a press release from Republican House claimed that R.P. membership had risen to 1 million and a further 200,000 membership forms were dispatched to different party Headquarters.¹⁷²² No one could verify the authenticity of the claim. but the fact remains that the R.P.'s existence remained essentially on paper.

The election manifesto adopted in the September Convention of 1958 sought for united nationhood, a realistic independent foreign policy, civil liberties, self determination in Kashmir, maximum production under the free enterprise system and exploitation of

¹⁷¹⁷ In the fifties it had the largest circulation in the province.

¹⁷¹⁸ Originally a M.L. paper but transferred its support to the A.L.

¹⁷¹⁹ *Dawn*, September 30, 1956.

¹⁷²⁰ See *Times*, September 19, 1956.

¹⁷²¹ For details see *Dawn*, September 28, 29, 30, 1956.

¹⁷²² *Ibid.*, March 3, 1957.

natural resources, etc., etc. On agrarian reforms it did not fix any ceilings on maximum holdings. On the contrary, promises for the consolidation of minimum holdings and conversion of uneconomic units into economic holdings by further allocation of land were held out. On the one-unit issue, the manifesto stayed non-committal giving freedom to its members to contest the first general elections on either a pro or anti one-unit slogan¹⁷²³—an opportunistic device. Except on these two issues, the R.P. had more similarity with the A.L. than any other parties. But as the R.P., was evasive on many issues it had no future in the election. It had no roots whatsoever in East Pakistan, save Abdul Alim, M.P., who was elected previously on the U.F. ticket and a political non-entity therein. Perhaps, the R.P. should be considered a camouflaged interest group of landlords and industrialists rather than a party in political sense. For its survival, a plan of merger with the A.L. was being considered a few days before the martial law.¹⁷²⁴

The Krisak Sramik Party¹⁷²⁵ (K.S.P.)

In the pre-partition days of Bengal the Krisak Proja Party¹⁷²⁶ was a dominant political organization.¹⁷²⁷ In terms of age the K.S.P. in Pakistan was junior only to M.L. Around the year 1915 it started as the peasant movement under the leadership of the octogenarian Haq. In the historic Proja Conference of Dacca in 1924 it emerged as a political party. Mr. Haq struck a note of bold romanticism in his Presidential speech: "Providence has placed in our hands the noblest of ploughs. We will drive the blade deeper in the confident hope that on the furrows we may raise, the sands of time will germinate the seeds of national regeneration".¹⁷²⁸ The party worked for the abolition of zamindari and amelioration of the peasants. The Bengal Tenancy Amending Act of 1928 was greatly credited to its endeavour. The party was non-communal having both Hindu and Muslim leaders prominent in it. It had an effective newspaper, the *Nawabozuk*¹⁷²⁹ edited by the famous and rebel poet Kazi Nazrul Islam. Under the India Act of 1935, the party formed a coalition government in Bengal in 1937 with Mr. Haq as the Prime Minister and was in power till 1943. During this period The Debt Settlement Board, the Money Lenders' Act and the Bengal Tenancy Act were amended to give succor to the teeming peasantry of Bengal under the initiative of Mr. Haq—a record of achievements which "will be enshrined in our memory, in the memory of our children and children's children, till eternity."¹⁷³⁰

But the vagaries of politics and the new balance of political forces which emerged from the partition of India at independence witnessed an eclipse of the old party. After the birth of Pakistan Mr. Haq was chafing his hands at enforced political idleness. And it

¹⁷²³ See *Dawn*, September 27, 28 and 29, 1958.

¹⁷²⁴ *Dawn*, September 30, 1958.

¹⁷²⁵ The Peasants and Laborers Party.

¹⁷²⁶ Peasant Tenants' Party.

¹⁷²⁷ See Myron Weiner, *The Party Building in a New Nation* (The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 324.

¹⁷²⁸ Abdur Rab, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁷²⁹ The new era.

¹⁷³⁰ *The Holiday*, "Sher-e-Bangla Supplement", April 28, 1968, p. III.

was not until July 30, 1953¹⁷³¹ when clamor against the M.L. government had become ubiquitous that Mr. Haq revived his party again. This time the party underwent a slight nomenclatural change in that the term "Proja" was deleted in favor of "Sramik" to capture the interest of the laborers of Pakistan's growing industries. The K.S.P. was a part of the U.F. and was the second largest parliamentary group in East Pakistan Legislative Assembly and fourth in the N.A., but had no members in the West Pakistan legislature. Nevertheless, its future was hardly encouraging, for several reasons.

Firstly, the K.S.P. was notoriously callous to organizational¹⁷³² work, and had a thin footing in East Pakistan—and none at all in West Pakistan. Mr. Haq's endeavor to merge his party with that of the West Pakistan minor party, the Kishan Masdoor Party¹⁷³³ proved a flop.¹⁷³⁴ Secondly, the organization was denuded of invigorating leadership. Traditionally, it basked under the sunshine of Haq's immense popularity, the party's patriarch. Being dismissed from office (the Governorship) he called the K.S.P. Council meeting, was elected as its President and volunteered himself to campaign in the coming election.¹⁷³⁵ The chances were that he would neither have survived the strain of an election campaign in his late eighties nor mesmerized the voters by his 'charmed' name.

Besides, the party was divided into two camps e.g. Azizul Haq¹⁷³⁶ and Sarkar,¹⁷³⁷ while the ablest Hamidul Haq Chowdhury was left to plough his lonely furrow. Thirdly, the party was more conservative than its name implied. The causes and interests of the peasants and labourers with which the K.S.P. was literally identified were in practice taken up by the A.L. more efficiently. and still more aggressively by the N.A.P., whose leader Bhasani, in the words of the *Times*, "snatched mass popularity two years ago from Fazlul Haq" so far as the "poverty-stricken peasantry" was concerned.¹⁷³⁸ Fourthly, it did not enjoy support from the influential student community, nor to a significant extent from labour. There was nothing like party paper,¹⁷³⁹ tangible financial resources, workers worth naming and distinguishing programmes save the composite 21-point programme.

¹⁷³¹ *Hindu*, July 31, 1953.

¹⁷³² The organizational structure of the party on paper was almost similar to that of the foregoing ones mentioned already. It had a 200-member Council and 37-man working committee (*Dawn*, November 3, 1955), but the elections of the office bearers were mostly irregular and undemocratic.

¹⁷³³ Peasants' and Laborers' Party.

¹⁷³⁴ *Dawn*, November 14, 1955.

¹⁷³⁵ *Dawn*, August 25, 1958.

¹⁷³⁶ The nephew of the octogenarian Haq.

¹⁷³⁷ See *Dawn*, February 23, 1958.

¹⁷³⁸ *Times*, June 11, 1957.

¹⁷³⁹ "*The Pakistan Observer*" an English daily - though, owned by the K.S.P. leader, H.H. Chowdhury, who personally enjoyed some fringe benefits from owning a paper, remained above being identified with the K.S.P.

These were the basic reasons which would have acted adversely against the K.S.P.'s future. Perhaps the general election would have ensured a hand-to-mouth existence of the party, had it been held. That was why an attempt was made by some K.S.P. leaders in early 1958, in vain, to come to terms with the A.L. with which they had some common grounds.¹⁷⁴⁰

The National Awami Party (N.A.P.)

Actually, the formation of the first opposition party in Pakistan was leftist inspired. And, in the emergence of the N.A.P. witnessed a high water-mark of leftist consolidation. At Karachi, on the 9th May, 1948 the All-Pakistan People's Party was formed under the Presidentship of Khan A. Gaffar Khan, known as the 'Frontier Gandhi'. Its Convenor was G.M. Syed. Mr. Khan was a veteran Congressman and Mr. Syed¹⁷⁴¹ a nationalist Muslim. One of the main aims of the party was to secure for various cultural and linguistic units in Pakistan full and unimpaired autonomy.¹⁷⁴² The provincial undertone apart, the party repudiated two doctrines, the one-party state and the communal character of the political party. The party, however, could not get off the ground.

Having been expelled from the M.L. in April, 1950 Mian Iftikharuddin in a convention held at Lahore in November, 1950 announced the formation of a political party named Azad Pakistan Party (A.P.P.)¹⁷⁴³ Mian Sb. did not spend much of his political life in the M.L.¹⁷⁴⁴ but in the radical section of the Congress, where he was at times denounced as a 'crypto-communist'.¹⁷⁴⁵ Himself a big landlord, Mian Sb. was endowed with a bourgeois knack of combining pleasure with business in his 'interminable trips' to communist countries of East Europe and China. Unlike the foregoing one, the A.P.P. was more aggressive, and loud in its aims and activities. It stood for the abolition of zamindari, civil liberties, confiscation of foreign capital, a planned economy and the renunciation of pro-western foreign policy including leaving the Commonwealth.¹⁷⁴⁶

The pre-partition field cadre of the communist Kisan workers from the districts of Lahore, Gujranwala, Shikharpur and Mianwali of the Punjab province flocked to the fold of the A.P.P. which by December, 1952 attracted people's attention for its approach to the politico-economic question.¹⁷⁴⁷ The prophet of this movement was a poet, Faiz Ahmed Fais, who was a colonel in the Army during the 2nd World War. On

¹⁷⁴⁰ See Aaur Rahman, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

¹⁷⁴¹ He joined the M.L. at the last moment of the struggle for Pakistan movement.

¹⁷⁴² See *Statesman*, May 10, 1958 and *Hindu*, May 11, 1948.

¹⁷⁴³ *Ibid*, November 11, 1950.

¹⁷⁴⁴ He joined the M.L. only in 1945.

¹⁷⁴⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, December 23, 1947.

¹⁷⁴⁶ For details see *Statesman*, November 11, 1950 and *Dawn*, November 20, 1952.

¹⁷⁴⁷ *Dawn*, September 16, 1952.

constitutional matters it had a definite secular programme¹⁷⁴⁸ in propagating which Mian Sb. was quite an effective speaker in the Constituent Assembly I. The sprightly English daily *The Pakistan Times* projected the image and activities of the party before the country. It fought the Punjab legislative elections singly, won I seat and obtained only 2 percent of the popular votes,¹⁷⁴⁹ while in the Sindh and Frontier elections the A.P.P. was a flop.

The A.P.P. had no platform in East Pakistan. Main Sb. Perhaps thought of affiliating his party with Suhrawardy's as the former toured East Pakistan many a time with the latter and attended the A.L. Council sessions. (At length, Mian sb.'s political telepathy produced some response in East Pakistan in that a 3-day convention of peasants and trade union workers formed a new leftist party, the Ganatantri Dal (G.D.).¹⁷⁵⁰ The convention also empowered the working committee of the G.D. to negotiate for the setting up of a joint party machinery with the A.P.P. for formulating policies on matters which were of all-Pakistan interest. The economic, national and international policies of the G.D. were similar to those of the A.P.P. except that the former stressed the issue of autonomy, based on the Lahore resolution of 1940.¹⁷⁵¹ So an East-West leftist communicating link was established through these parties, the A.P.P. and G.D. The G.D. according to government intelligence "is the Communist Party under a different name", so was its ally, the Youth League, "the recruiting base and the 2nd front"¹⁷⁵² of the Communist Party (C.P.). The G.D. was a part of the U.F. and in the general elections of East Pakistan where the workers of the A.P.P. also participated, it won a few seats in the legislature and I in the N.A. later on.

When the one-unit scheme was effected the 6 political parties, vis. A.P.P., Wrore Pashtoon, Khudai Khidmatgars, Ostaman Gal, Sindh Awami Mahaz and Sindh Hari Committee which had been operating in the regions of the Punjab, Baluchistan, the N.W.F.P., tribal areas and Sindh for a long time for ensuring justice to the underdogs and more autonomy for the respective regions, finally made a giant stride in amalgamating themselves into one party, called the Pakistan National Party (P.N.P.), on the basis of six programmes of which disintegration of the one-unit, elimination of feudalism, independent foreign policy and maintenance of unity amongst the anti-imperialist nations were the most prominent.¹⁷⁵³ This was an overt demonstration of leftist concord in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan leftist elements like Wali Ahad, Ali Aksad, F. Karim, Abdur Samad, K. Illius, etc., were masquerading as Awami Leaguers under Bhasani's protection. When the A.L. Council endorsed overwhelmingly

¹⁷⁴⁸ See *The New Constitutional Formula* - "An Azad Pakistan Party Publication" (Published by Umar Farooque, Supreme Printers, Lahore, 1953).

¹⁷⁴⁹ Election Report, Appendix X-XII, *loc.cit.*

¹⁷⁵⁰ Democratic Party.

¹⁷⁵¹ *Hindu*, January 21, 1953; also *Dawn*, January 21, 1953.

¹⁷⁵² Governor's Confidential Letter, *loc.cit.* See Appendix.

¹⁷⁵³ See *Hindu* and *Dawn*, November 18 and 19, 1956.

Suhrawardy's pro-western foreign policy, Bhasani came out from the A.L. with his army of left-wingers. What was left now was the final agglutination of the East-West leftists. The G.D. was already there. So at Bhasani's initiative a convention was called at Dacca with the P.N.P. leaders that saw the emergence of the N.A.P.¹⁷⁵⁴ Broadly speaking, the N.A.P. embodied the confluence of the leftist elements of Pakistan. But there was also some heterogeneity of the composing members of the party in that they did not have a shared background and political antecedents. The only binding element was the common programme.

The N.A.P. had great potentiality in an inegalitarian society like Pakistan where there was enough scope for radical agitation. *The Manchester Guardian* commented that "The N.A.P. is proving the cleverest of all"¹⁷⁵⁵—a trait that was shown by the party's having held an accidental balance of power in all the legislatures of Pakistan. But the significance of the rise of the N.A.P. as such was appreciated without any illusion by Qayyum

Khan (President of the M.L.) who commented: "The left is united and they have formed a party with a *definite programme*."¹⁷⁵⁶ Those who believe in the present foreign policy are at loggerheads on minor issues and unless they decide to get together and sink their differences, it will be difficult to withstand the onslaught of the N.A.P.¹⁷⁵⁷ Similarly, the N.A.P.'s appeal to the peasants and laborers was fascinating. That is way we have maintained earlier that the N.A.P. was one of the contributing factors towards bringing in a martial law regime. And the authorities in their anxiety over-reacted to the situation. What was the position of the N.A.P.? There was no revolutionary tradition among the Muslim peasants of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The old dialectical fiction of the Chinese Communists pertaining to peasant leadership did not apply in Pakistan. And apparently Professor Saul Rose was right pointing "the inability of a socialist party to flourish in a Muslim environment".¹⁷⁵⁸ But one should be cautious about a pithy saying; for, Confucianism in China, Roman Catholicism in Italy and Hinduism in India—all conservative faiths failed to contain leftist movements in their respective countries. So here the N.A.P. had a long range hope, but not an immediate one.

Although trade unionism in Pakistan "compares favorably with that in other Asian countries",¹⁷⁵⁹ the N.A.P. could not claim to be the laborers' sole mentor; for, in general trade unionism in Pakistan was apolitical—almost like AFL/CIO of America—and,

¹⁷⁵⁴ *Dawn*, June 27, 1957.

¹⁷⁵⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, June 2, 1958.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Writer's italics.

¹⁷⁵⁷ *Dawn*, July 30, 1957.

¹⁷⁵⁸ Quoted in H. Tinker, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁷⁵⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*, November 17, 1956.

above all, the laborers and workers formed a very small' part of the electorate".¹⁷⁶⁰ This was the position of the peasants and laborers the main constituencies of the N.A.P. Besides, the N.A.P. was not all cohesive and unified internally as its outward projection appeared to be. The West Pakistan N.A.P. was more preoccupied with the disintegration of the one-unit when its counterpart in the East emphasized more the party's other national and international policies. Even the Punjab branch of the N.A.P. in West Pakistan appeared less enthusiastic towards the anti-one-unit plan.¹⁷⁶¹ At one stage Gaffar Khan threatened to come out of the party but for Bhasani,¹⁷⁶² and on another G.M. Syed thought of separating the West Pakistan N.A.P. from the East.¹⁷⁶³ So, a palpable electoral success of the N.A.P. was likely to be impaired by various intrinsic factors. Above all, its political future was contingent upon one main factor i.e. the extent of which the rest of the parties were responding to the country's socio-economic needs. And the A.L. as one of the major political parties was able, to a considerable extent, to undercut the attraction of the N.A.P.

Organizational structure

Organizationally, the N.A.P. was secular and any citizen of Pakistan of the age of 16 or above a device to attract young people, not followed by other parties – who would sign the party pledge and pay an annual subscription of four annas became eligible for membership of the primary unit of the party. Until October, 1958, the N.A.P. did not have any central council like the M.L. At the apex was the 40-man central organizing committee (C.O.C.) consisting of equal numbers from both wings with Bhasani as Chairman and M.H. Usmani of West Pakistan as General Secretary.¹⁷⁶⁴ This committee functioned as a central executive committee like that of the M.L. and A.L. and coordinated and supervised activities of the provincial organizing committees which were also set up to consolidate the party throughout Pakistan.¹⁷⁶⁵ Decisions over issues of national importance reached by any regional N.A.P. were taken up by this high-command for ratification.¹⁷⁶⁶ The C.O.C. appointed a 9-man central Parliamentary Board (C.P.B.) whose main job was to guide and control the N.A.P. Parliamentary parties in the central as well as the two provincial Assemblies under the immediate direction of the C.O.C.¹⁷⁶⁷ From July 26, 1957 until October 7, 1958 these two organs of the N.A.P. exercised more powers than any of their counterparts in other parties. For, the C.O.C. was composed of the purist elements of the party who were also (mostly) simultaneously the rank and file of their respective regional parties; and, since some overlapping of membership occurred at the central and provincial levels of the party structure the C.O.C.'s dictation entailed deference reasonably well from below.

¹⁷⁶⁰ Khalid Mahmud, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

¹⁷⁶¹ *Dawn*, December 9, 1957.

¹⁷⁶² *Ibid.*, September 20, 1958.

¹⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*, August 28, 1958.

¹⁷⁶⁴ See *Dawn*, July 27, October 27, 28, 1957.

¹⁷⁶⁵ *Dawn*, July 30, 1957 and November 12, 1957.

¹⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, September 13, 1958.

¹⁷⁶⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, June 2, 1958.

The organizational arrangements at the provincial level were similar to those of the other parties mentioned above. However, in one respect the provincial executive committee appeared more elective in that, compared to the M.L. and A.L., almost all the members were elected by the Provincial Council,¹⁷⁶⁸ the highest forum. In West Pakistan the spirit of disintegration of the one-unit scheme dictated the whole pattern of party structure therein vis. each region of the pre-one-unit period had had its separate party machinery independent of each other in contrast to the East Pakistan N.A.P. which functioned as a unified bloc. Though there was provision for a regional council for the whole of West Pakistan to be formed with the prescribed number of representatives of various linguistic zones in order to deliberate issues of common interest,¹⁷⁶⁹ there is no evidence if that forum ever came into being.

In short, the N.A.P., national or provincial, in a 13-month period was more preoccupied with day-to-day politics than real organisational work. It was still at an organising stage when the martial law was declared. In East Pakistan the party was organized only in few districts and cities e.g. Dinajpur, Sylhet, Barisal, Dacca and Chittagong, etc.¹⁷⁷⁰ While in West Pakistan the personal influences of Gaffar Khan, G.M. Syed, A.S. Achakzai and Master A. Karim made it possible to organize the party in some parts of the N.W.F.P. Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, Khairpur, etc.¹⁷⁷¹ The N.A.P. was yet to establish at the grass-root level and implement an organizational structure that really worked from the base upward.

Programmes

The N.A.P. convention of July, 1957 maintained that it aimed at developing Pakistan into a fully independent sovereign and welfare federal state on the basis of two autonomous units of East and West Pakistan. While the N.A.P.'s ultimate aim was to bring about a "socialistic state for Pakistan"¹⁷⁷² it never did raise the bogey of class-war in Pakistan. On three points the N.A.P. stood poles asunder from the rest of the parties in Pakistan e.g. (1) an independent foreign policy which euphemism meant total severance from the western alliances and closer relation with the socialistic and so-called anti-imperialistic bloc, (2) the confiscation of zamindari without compensation and redistribution of lands among the landless and (3) restoration of West Pakistan into its pre-one-unit state with full regional autonomy for both wings of Pakistan leaving defense, foreign affairs and currency to the centre's care.¹⁷⁷³ The first and the last item received the greatest attention of the party. Its other programmes on civil rights, refugee

¹⁷⁶⁸ *The Constitution of East Pakistan National Awami League* (Bengali Publication) published by Pir Habibur Rahman 45/3 Ramkrishna Road, Dacca, 1968, P. 8.

¹⁷⁶⁹ *Dawn*, June 24, 1958.

¹⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, August 16, 31 and September 16, 1957.

¹⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*, August 11, November 6, 1957.

¹⁷⁷² For details see *The ideals, aims and objectives of the Pakistan National Awami Party* (Bengali Publication) published by Dewan Mahboob, Sheba Printing Press, Dacca, 1968, pp. 1-12.

¹⁷⁷³ See *The Round Table*, XLVII (1956-1957), pp. 396-397.

rehabilitation, education, housing, etc., were not spectacularly radical or different from other political parties. The N.A.P. of course, favored more state intervention in economic activities, but it did not rule out the scope on private enterprise. Its innate xenophobia discouraged investment of foreign capital to the advantage of the local capital.¹⁷⁷⁴ Its labor policy was emphatic, on the implementation of I.L.O. convention.¹⁷⁷⁵ On contrast, the non-communal policies of the N.A.P. were as good as the A.L.'s; and, it was only on socio-economic and foreign policies that the latter differed with the former in terms of methodology and also, in some cases, on principle.

Supporters, activists and financial resources

With a leftist orientation the N.A.P. tended to be secretive and did not announce its membership strength. Apparently, the N.A.P. seemed to be reluctant to embark on rapid recruitment for fear of being sabotaged from within. For example, when a section of the K.S.P. and Congress wanted to join the N.A.P. the East Pakistan organizing committee having deliberated the matter for 5 hours experienced ideological difficulties in accepting them.¹⁷⁷⁶ However, the N.A.P. adherents were chiefly drawn from the working, peasant, labour and low middle class. In the N.W.F.P. the membership was estimated to be 41 lakhs.¹⁷⁷⁷ There were as many as 20,00,000 Haris¹⁷⁷⁸ in Sindh whose sole party, the Hari Committee was one of the components of the N.A.P. The locally based Awami Jamhoo party of the former Punjab and Bahawalpur formed to fight landlordism¹⁷⁷⁹ therein was a natural ally to the N.A.P. In East Pakistan Bhasani was the President of the East Pakistan Peasants' Association, and Peasants' Conferences were held under his leadership at Bogra, Sylhet and Dacca.¹⁷⁸⁰ Despite the comfortable position of the East Pakistan peasants compared to their opposite numbers in West Pakistan in regard to land system, and the A.L.'s identification with their causes,¹⁷⁸¹ Bhasani held sway over the peasants of the North Bengal areas. On the labour front, Bhasani was already the President of the two powerful trade unions, the East Pakistan Railway Employees' League and the Adamjee Jute Mills Mazdoor¹⁷⁸² Union. In the year 1958, the N.A.P. was one of the main contenders for supremacy in the labour field. And in complete departure from the past traditions of the political parties, the N.A.P. organized its labor front in the shape of the East Pakistan Mazdoor Federation in March 1958 and entrusted its prominent leaders with the task of organizing labour movement.¹⁷⁸³ The former G.D. leaders were already enmeshed with trade union

¹⁷⁷⁴ See "The ideals, aims and objectives of the N.A.P.", *loc.cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁷⁷⁵ See the N.A.P. High Command's resolution on labor, *Dawn*, June 3, 1958.

¹⁷⁷⁶ See *Dawn*, March 14, 1958.

¹⁷⁷⁷ M. Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

¹⁷⁷⁸ A Sindhi word means landless peasant.

¹⁷⁷⁹ *Dawn*, July 12, 1957.

¹⁷⁸⁰ See *Ibid.*, March 1958 and October 2, 1958.

¹⁷⁸¹ The intermediary rights of land were acquired legally by the A.L. government in January, 1957 - a further relief to the peasants.

¹⁷⁸² Laborers.

¹⁷⁸³ Khalid Mahmud, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

activities. In West Pakistan the N.A.P. sympathizer, Faiz Ahmed Faiz was the vice-president of the most militant trade union organization e.g. the Pakistan Trade Union Federation. And as far as the support of the student community was concerned it was channeled through the E.P.S.U.¹⁷⁸⁴ the counterpart of the N.A.P.¹⁷⁸⁵ – and E.P.S.S.¹⁷⁸⁶ Leftist intellectualism had its own elegance and the N.A.P. drew some support from the universities and colleges, too, as the names of Professor Muzaffar Ahmed and Professor Ashanuddin confirmed.¹⁷⁸⁷ Besides, the N.A.P. was the only party which had a number of promising parliamentarians as its members. Concerning party activists it can be safely said that those who had formed the "workers' camp" under the Presidentship of Bhasani during the time of the East Pakistan general elections would mostly become the N.A.P. activists in East Pakistan.

The financial resources of the party were, no doubt, weak. Its methods of raising money were similar to those of other parties mentioned above. Because of the N.A.P.'s avowed association with the trade union activities it was likely that the industrialists might have also obliged the party monetarily. The N.A.P. also, in a novel way, raised money openly from sympathizers in public meetings sponsored by it.¹⁷⁸⁸

Image-building activities

In this matter, the N.A.P. fell in line with the activities of other parties quoted above. But being a late comer in the political field the projection of the party image throughout the country left much to be desired. The N.A.P., however, was blessed with some effective communication facilities to project its views before the public. The Bengali vernacular daily, the '*Sangbad*'¹⁷⁸⁹ under the editorship of Zahur Hossain Chowdhury acted as the mouthpiece of the party. In addition, the well-known, *Times of Pakistan*,¹⁷⁹⁰ the Urdu daily *Imroze* and weekly illustrated magazine, *Lail-o-Nahar* of West Pakistan emphasized leftist policies unhesitatingly¹⁷⁹¹ – a boon to the N.A.P. cause.

The Communist Party (C.P.)

The Communist movement in Pakistan was clandestine, fragmentary and at a preparatory stage. The peasantry was steeped in orthodoxy – a bulwark against a possible growth of communist ideology. The communists' fermentation of troubles, in the early period, among scheduled castes in Khulna district, among Nankar tenants in a part of Sylhet and among Hajangs in the tribal area of Mymensingh all in East Pakistan border areas proved ineffective.¹⁷⁹² They had only a small but growing industrial

¹⁷⁸⁴ East Pakistan Students' Union.

¹⁷⁸⁵ Commission of Student Problems, etc., *loc.cit.*, P. 9.

¹⁷⁸⁶ East Pakistan Satri (Women Students) Sangha (Organization).

¹⁷⁸⁷ See *Dawn*, August 27, 1957.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Rs. 10,000 were raised in Karachi meeting of the N.A.P., see *Dawn*, November 12, 1957.

¹⁷⁸⁹ News.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Its founder was Mian Iftikharuddin himself, the N.A.P. leader.

¹⁷⁹¹ See Majib Nizami, *The Press in Pakistan* (University of the Punjab, Lahore: 1958), pp. 2,3,8,26.

¹⁷⁹² *Statesman*, December 31, 1950.

population to work on. In West Pakistan the abortive 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' further blunted the edge of communist activities there, as suspected communists in the newspapers, trade unions, Kishan party and Hari Committee were arrested, including the Chief of the Pakistan C.P., Syed Sajjad Zaheer.¹⁷⁹³ Essentially, the C.P. was an urban party which drew its strength from petty bourgeois, and proletarian elements, together with a small number of quasi-intellectuals, students and some white-collar employees.

The C.P. in Pakistan operated under different organizational layers. On the surface it had an official party organization which was hardly distinguishable from the structure of other democratic parties. This external layer stood for all democratic causes, and feigned acquiescence to parliamentary procedure. Meanwhile the second stratum was entrusted with the building up of crypto-organizations, infiltrations into existing political parties and institutions, and the creation of a phony conflict between those parties and structures that sought for democracy. The third layer was in charge of selecting and training the leaders and workers, and fourth stratum provided the guidance and supervision of the authoritarian leadership.¹⁷⁹⁴ Until the middle of 1953 the C.P. was a moribund organization politically. Its main attention was focused on the capture of Workers' Trade Unions. Most of the office-bearers of the following trade unions, The Adamjee Jute Mills Mazdoor Union, L.N.C.¹⁷⁹⁵ Mills Workers' Union, Home Transport Workers' Union, Printing Press Workers' Union, the East Pakistan Railway Employees' League, etc., were prominent C.P. members.¹⁷⁹⁶ The East Pakistan Federation of Labor claiming the support of 100 trade unions with a membership of 1,86,258 workers did not completely shift its position to the right even after the hard-bound communist leaders had left it officially in 1948.¹⁷⁹⁷

The general elections of East Pakistan offered the C.P. a golden opportunity of achieving mass contact. It successfully infiltrated the following political organizations, The Karmi Sibirs,¹⁷⁹⁸ A.M.L., G.D. and the Y.L. (Youth League) the components of the U.F. The C.P. fought the elections individually and won a few seats having contested a number of selected constituencies.¹⁷⁹⁹ But when the central government outlawed the C.P., the red movement was again pushed into the invisible arena of under-ground activities. The hard core of the communist elements in both parts. of Pakistan was imprisoned. But this was not the end of the matter. About the East Pakistan communists imprisoned the Governor, Major General Mirza wrote "The communist prisoners detained in the various jails have drawn up a code of conduct for themselves and are

¹⁷⁹³ See *New York Times*, April 29, 1951; *Daily Telegraph, Scotsman* and *Pakistan News*, May 12, 1951.

¹⁷⁹⁴ See the provocative article of the then Head of the Department of political science, University of Dacca, *Dawn*, March 11, 1953, "Observations of leftist or totalitarian tendencies", by Dr. K.G. Newman.

¹⁷⁹⁵ Laxmi Narayan Cotton.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Governor's Letter, *loc.cit.* Appendix 18.

¹⁷⁹⁷ K. Mahmud, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹⁷⁹⁸ The Workers' Camp.

¹⁷⁹⁹ In the Punjab elections of 1951 the C.P. got only 1 percentage of popular votes, see "The Punjab election report", *loc. cit.*

following it systematically. Study classes, cultural classes and discussions are held where Marx-Lenin-Stalinist philosophy is discussed. Physical exercise has not been overlooked. Attempts to establish link between security prisoners in jail and comrades outside continue".¹⁸⁰⁰ Most of these prisoners were released when the A.L. came to power. In West Pakistan, despite the banning of the C.P. underground work continued. Reporting in December, 1955 the Dawn described Lahore as the main centre of the communist activities which were visible in every district headquarters, smaller towns and Tehsils. The number of active and confirmed communists on the C.I.D.¹⁸⁰¹ list was estimated to be five hundred.¹⁸⁰² If the communist strategy of working in an established organization is true, there can hardly be any doubt that they were heart and soul with the N.A.P., the fellow-travellers of the communists. In sum, the communist movement in Pakistan was a flop and episodic.

The Socialist Party (S.P.)

The All-Pakistan S.P. was a lame-duck organization which had hobbled into a standstill by 1957. The S.P. was affiliated with the Asian Socialist Conference and attended its second general session held in November, 1956 at Bombay under the Chairmanship of O.U. Ba Swe, the Burmese Prime Minister. The party's activities were mostly confined to the cities of Karachi, Lahore and Dacca. Only four times did the socialists held their annual conference, the last being in February, 1957.¹⁸⁰³ In the early period it showed some activities. For example, in the first party convention (3-day) held in February, 1948, a socialist constitution for Pakistan was envisaged and recommended to the Constituent Assembly I.¹⁸⁰⁴ On foreign policy, the S.P. stood for severance from commonwealth and the establishment of an independent third bloc in collaboration with Asian and African countries.¹⁸⁰⁵ It was the first party in Pakistan which asked for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on ground of its unrepresentative character.¹⁸⁰⁶ The S.P. had a strong base in the Pakistan Mazdoor Federation (P.M.F.), the second largest labor organization;¹⁸⁰⁷ for Mubarik Saghir, the S.P. Chief became the President of the P.M.F. in 1951.¹⁸⁰⁸ However, the S.P. could never project itself into the political limelight. It had no members in the legislatures, national or provincial except Professor Pulin Dey of the East Pakistan legislature, who finally joined the N.A.P. Youssouf Khan fled to India and became the guest of Mr. B.S. Mahader Singh, the Indian Proza Socialist leader.¹⁸⁰⁹ And the other prominent socialist leaders like Mubarik Saghir, Munshi Ahmed Din, Moulana Shamsuddin, Abdullah Khan, etc. were gradually

¹⁸⁰⁰ Governor's Confidential Letter, *loc.cit.* Appendix 19.

¹⁸⁰¹ Civil Intelligence Department.

¹⁸⁰² *Dawn*, December 24, 1955.

¹⁸⁰³ See *Ibid.*, February 6 and 19, 1957.

¹⁸⁰⁴ *Statesman*, February 3, 1948.

¹⁸⁰⁵ See the General Secretary, Youssouf Khan's Press Conference at Hyderabad (India), *Hindu*, February 21, 1953.

¹⁸⁰⁶ *Statesman*, March 14, 1949.

¹⁸⁰⁷ The leftist All Pakistan Confederation of Labor (APCOL) was the largest.

¹⁸⁰⁸ K. Mohmud, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

¹⁸⁰⁹ *Hindu*, February 21, 1953.

pushed into the doldrums. And the so-called Revolutionary Socialist Party which was only East Pakistan-based died in 1950 when its office in Narayangong¹⁸¹⁰ was ransacked and leader Nepal Saha arrested by the police.

The Nizam-i-Islam Party¹⁸¹¹ (N.I.P.)

The N.I.P. was a politico-religious party which stood in between the modernist-Islamic M.L. and the extreme fundamentalist-Islamic, Jamat-i-Islami. Like the M.L. it aimed at establishing a progressive, democratic, welfare state for Pakistan' based on Islam 'as enunciated in the *Holy Quran* and *Sunnah*'.¹⁸¹² But while the N.I.P. appeared to be more emotive and enthusiastic on the Islamic front the M.L. remained rational and pragmatic. This party was formed in East Pakistan by Moulana Athar Ali, fought the general elections therein in 1954 being a component part of the U.F. and won a few seats in the legislature and, later on, in the N.A. The N.I.P. was fortunate to have an able parliamentarian in the person of Farid Ahmed who never neglected a single parliamentary opportunity in the N.A. to expose Islamic deviation in Pakistan. Sometimes this endeavor bordered on the ridiculous. For, the N.I.P. M.P. in his zeal for Islam urged upon the government to replace the words "Red" and "Cross" of the Pakistan Red Cross Society with the words "Green" and "Crescent",¹⁸¹³ as neither the word "Red" nor "Cross" was soothing to Islamic ears. The N.I.P. however, had no counterpart in West Pakistan till 1957.

Chowdhury Mohammad Ali having resigned the Premiership of Pakistan and M.L. membership formed a 5-member parliamentary group with the independents in the N.A. in November, 1957 and in the same month created a political party, named Tahrik-i-Istehkam-i-Pakistan (T.I.P.)¹⁸¹⁴ Mr. Chowdhury opined that "secularization is disintegration ... the only relation that binds the people of the two wings is religion". He appeared suspicious of 'disloyal Hindus' and 'Pro-Bharat forces' operating in the country, and expressed a view that if his party could recruit 10,000 selfless honest people to work with Pakistan political calamity could be avoided.¹⁸¹⁵ In May, 1958 this party merged with the N.I.P. and formed the All Pakistan N.I.P. with Mr. Chowdhury as its Chief.¹⁸¹⁶ In Mr. Chowdhury the N.I.P., no doubt, found a widely respected person and an economist with shining administrative qualities. But his leadership quality was as lacking as was the party's hold in either parts of Pakistan. In East Pakistan where it had a longer spell of activities it could not form any viable organizational base and as such there was no evidence to suggest that it could have gained more than a few seats in the general elections, had it been held. That was why

¹⁸¹⁰ *Statesman*, December 28, 1950.

¹⁸¹¹ The Organization of Islam.

¹⁸¹² See *Aims and Objects: The Pakistan Nizam-i-Islam Party* (The N.I.P. publication: printed at the Chatan Press, Lahore) n.d., p. 1.

¹⁸¹³ *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, April 8, 1957, P. 37.

¹⁸¹⁴ The movement for the stability of Pakistan.

¹⁸¹⁵ See *Dawn*, November 25, 1957; January 24, 30 and February 4, 1958.

¹⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, May 3, 1958.

the N.I.P. entered into an electoral alliance with the Jamat-i-Islami Party in August 1958,¹⁸¹⁷ which had as much electoral prospect in West Pakistan as its ally had in East Pakistan. Nevertheless, the alliance was a step towards consolidating party interests of both parts of Pakistan.

Structurally, the N.I.P. was fashioned on the pattern of the M.L.¹⁸¹⁸ Membership was restricted to the Muslim community alone. An 18-year old Muslim was qualified for membership, provided he took the oath of membership which was different from the M.L. in that the N.I.P. enjoined upon the members to conform to Islamic way of life.¹⁸¹⁹ However, whatever organizational structure was detailed in the party constitution remained mostly as book work, as the All Pakistan N.I.P. was at budding stage. It was only in East Pakistan that a modicum of party structure was evident.

In regard to programmes, the N.I.P. had a good deal in common with the M.L. The party outlined its aims and objectives in a 40-point election manifesto published in May, 1958. It advocated collective, or alternatively cooperative farming for solving agrarian problems and boosting food production. In keeping with the Islamic law of inheritance it recommended the distribution of the produce of the land among the inheritors rather than of the land itself. Agrarian reforms,¹⁸²⁰ distribution of land to landless peasants, limiting holdings and progressive taxation on larger holdings were stressed. The N.I.P. did not find any "conflict between science and Islam, of the kind that developed in the West".¹⁸²¹ So services of modern technology for production purposes were found Islamic. The private enterprise system was clearly preferred to government intervention, in economic activities. To eliminate monopoly and bring about economic democracy the N.I.P. found the structure and functions of joint stock companies, where ownership was divorced from management, both appropriate and Islamic.¹⁸²²

The education policy of the party envisaged improvement of Madrassah education, compulsory teaching of the *Holy Quran* including learning of Arabic and adoption of the core of Islamic studies at the higher level so that scholars would be able to guide Pakistan's social, economic and political order in the light of Islam. The N.I.P. policy on foreign affairs and electorate issues was as good as the M.L.'s. On the one-unit issue the party appeared more emphatic: "The one-unit was a rock. Whosoever will make an attempt to raze it will be inviting death on him".¹⁸²³

¹⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1958.

¹⁸¹⁸ For details see, *The Constitution of Pakistan Nizam-i-Islam Party*, 2nd edition (Bengali Publication, Printed at Shahin Press, Dacca, 1957).

¹⁸¹⁹ See the N.I.P. membership card. Appendix XVII.

¹⁸²⁰ The total abolition of Zamindari system was not suggested in the manifesto.

¹⁸²¹ Chandhri Muhammad Ali, *Programme for Pakistan*, (Inter Services Press Ltd., Karachi, 1963), p. 14.

¹⁸²² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁸²³ See the detailed programme in *Dawn*, May 3, 1958.

The Jamat-i-Islami Party¹⁸²⁴ (J.I.P.)

Compared to the N.I.P. the J.I.P. was the most militant, dedicated, rightist politico-religious party and had no basic similarity with the modernist-Islamic concepts represented in the M.L. This organization was founded in the pre-partition days of 1941 and was vehemently opposed to the concept of Pakistan on the ground that Islam did not believe in territorial nationalism. At independence it recanted its earlier views and saw in the creation of Pakistan a potential Dar-UI-Islam.¹⁸²⁵ With the passing of the Objectives Resolution in March, 1949, the J.I.P. Chief Moulana Maudoodi got a new impetus. In a convention held at Karachi in 1951 he wanted to usher in an era of complete "renaissance of Islam". He declared: "We want that Islam should be established *do novo* as the system of government which should dominate thoughts and ideologies, education, politics and economy. The impact of western civilization divided the Muslims ... we want to raise a counter storm of Islam to oppose it. For this purpose I am organizing a party of *carefully selected individuals*."¹⁸²⁶ Accordingly, a new constitution¹⁸²⁷ was framed for the J.I.P. in August 26, 1952.¹⁸²⁸ Basically, the J.I.P. acted as the propeller of the Islamic revivalist movement.

Its ultimate aim was to establish Islamic polity i.e. "Kingdom of God" in Pakistan. It would be "a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the Suzerainty of God".¹⁸²⁹ Moulana Maudoodi, a distinguished Islamic scholar, a powerful pen wrote politically books, essays, pamphlets, treatises to give a learned exposition of *Shari'ah*¹⁸³⁰ and to prove that the concept of statehood was imminent in the *Quran and Sunnah*¹⁸³¹ which could be fitted into the modern context through enlightened elaboration. Moulana Sb. would not call the Islamic polity a theocratic government; for, "the Islamic State ... is not ruled by a particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file".¹⁸³² At a time when the other *Ulema* groups while emphasizing the supremacy of *Shari'ah* were also insistent upon their being recognized institutionally the coincidence of "ideal and self-interest"¹⁸³³ – the J.I.P. was the only religious party which laid the greatest emphasis upon the supremacy of *Shari'ah* consistently. Obscurantism apart, the J.I.P. compelled admiration from many a quarter for its showing a dogged,

¹⁸²⁴ The congregation of Islam.

¹⁸²⁵ The home of Islam.

¹⁸²⁶ *Dawn*, November 12, 1951.

¹⁸²⁷ In India, it remained with a new name, Jamat-i-Islami Hind.

¹⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*, August 27, 1952.

¹⁸²⁹ A. Maudoodi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (2nd edit.), Translated and edited by K. Ahmed (Islamia publications Ltd., Lahore, 1960). p.148.

¹⁸³⁰ Islamic law.

¹⁸³¹ The traditions of the Prophet Mohammad.

¹⁸³² K.B. Syed, "Notes and Comments: The Jamat-i-Islami movement in Pakistan", *Pacific Affairs*, XXX (March, 1957), p. 67.

¹⁸³³ L. Binder, "Problems of Islamic Political thought in the light of recent development in Pakistan", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 20 (1958), p. 667.

single-minded and ruthless sense of purpose, when the N.I.P. and other minor religious parties appeared less aggressive and organized on Islamic issues.

However, the most forbidding aspect of the J.I.P. was its readiness to achieve the "ideal it believes not only in propaganda but in the acquisition of political control by constitutional means and where feasible by force".¹⁸³⁴ In its attempt to get into the legislatures the J.I.P. fought all the provincial elections of West Pakistan, and succeeded only in capturing 1 seat in the Punjab legislature having obtained 4.4 percent of the popular vote.¹⁸³⁵ Till the dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet all the energies of the J.I.P. were set into motion to bring pressure upon the Constituent Assembly I to draw up a full-fledged Islamic Constitution. The fanatic belligerency of the J.I.P. was amply demonstrated in its being enmeshed in the *anti-Qudiani* riots of 1953.¹⁸³⁶ which it euphemistically characterized as "people's demands."¹⁸³⁷ (Its Chief was awarded a death sentence by the Martial Law Court only to be shown mercy later on. The party itself was banned by the Ayub regime in 1964 only to be revived again by court order.) However, since the ouster of the Nazimuddin government the J.I.P. militancy was on the wane. Even the government was said to have sent a circular forbidding civil and defense employee to study J.I.P. literature and attend their meetings.¹⁸³⁸ It had no viable base anywhere in Pakistan except among some sections of people in the Punjab, Bahawalpur and Karachi. The party's social services stood it in good stead in that in the Karachi Municipal election of 1958 it won a few seats on the Council.¹⁸³⁹ But the fact remains, the J.I.P. had not much political significance as it had little support from the populace.¹⁸⁴⁰ What was more, it was incapable of undercutting people's attraction to the modernist-Islamic M.L. and secular A.L. — the two major parties of Pakistan.

The organizational structure of the party was taut, to the point of totalitarian fascist or communist parties. For the sake of ideological purity the J.I.P. did not aspire to be a mass party. The party consisted of tried members who might be called 'picked of the picked'. Unlike the N.I.P., the membership requirements¹⁸⁴¹ of the J.I.P. were more demanding and rigorous, in that full-fledged membership was granted after "a long probationary period" and when the prospective members had been duly "observed at study group meetings, in social welfare projects and at prayer."¹⁸⁴² In a way, the J.I.P. members had no liberty to lead any life independent of the party. The party was reduced to a chaste monastic environment without undermining the ecstasy of the

¹⁸³⁴ The Munir Report, *loc.cit.*, p. 243.

¹⁸³⁵ Election Report, *loc.cit.*, Appendix-XII.

¹⁸³⁶ Munir Report, *loc.cit.*, pp. 243-250.

¹⁸³⁷ See *An analysis of the Munir Report* (J.I.P. Publications, Karachi, 1956), p. 234.

¹⁸³⁸ See Maudoodi's complaint against the government, *Dawn*, May 15, 1958.

¹⁸³⁹ Moulana Maudoodi told the writer that the J.I.P. entry into the corporation was an added cause towards expediting Martial Law, as General Mirza was as much against the leftist rise as the rightist.

¹⁸⁴⁰ See K.K. Aziz, "*Political parties in Pakistan*" (A typescript, Institute of Commonwealth Studies) n.d.

¹⁸⁴¹ See the J.I.P. membership form Appendix XVIII.

¹⁸⁴² Binder, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

members. In 1951 the membership strength was 661 with about another 1,000 labeled as sympathizers.¹⁸⁴³ In early 1954 it rose to 999¹⁸⁴⁴ and in 1957, 1,271.¹⁸⁴⁵

As far as the party offices were concerned they appeared "well organized and their accounts well-kept".¹⁸⁴⁶ Apparently, the structures of the J.I.P. and their functions were no different from those of other parties, save that they were given Arabic names and were stipulated in great detail. The distinguishing mark, however, was the people who would work out the organizational machineries. And, in the case of J.I.P. only people possessing the qualities of the highest order could pilot the organization. The highest forum was the 50-man Muzlish-e-Shura¹⁸⁴⁷ to be elected from different party units. The Amir¹⁸⁴⁸ was to form a 12-man *Amir-e-Jamat*¹⁸⁴⁹ from the above body to assist him in party work. The Amir could appoint a *Naeb-e-Jamaat*.¹⁸⁵⁰ There was another functionary called *Qayum-o-Jamat*,¹⁸⁵¹ who along with the Amir was to be elected by the *Muzlish-e-Shura*. Besides these, mention of other functionaries and departments was made in the Constitution. The party claimed to be "consultative" in nature, but it appears that the locus of power rested with the *Amir* who was given wide discretionary power. *The Muzlish-e-Shura* was the chief policy-making and directive institution and could depose the Amir by 2/3 votes, but the Amir could always impose himself on the organization through selecting the influential members from the *Muzlish-e-Shura* to form the *Amir-e-Jamaat*, the chief executive organ.¹⁸⁵² After all, a party which was so dogmatically oriented could not have 'inner democracy' whatever structural facades were retained. Its structure could only facilitate assent not dissension.

Monetarily, the J.I.P. appeared quite well-off. The budget of the party for 1956-57 was to the tune of Rs. 2,000,000 of which half the amount was earmarked for social services in the fashion of free medical service, financial succor to students, refugees, etc.¹⁸⁵³ This act of philanthropy was particularly productive to win support from the workers and lower middle class people. Interestingly, the year 1958 was the J.I.P. as one of the contenders for labor support. It did not believe in class conflict or trade union movement as such, but by forming labor welfare committees at Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Hyderabad, etc., the J.I.P. identified with the welfare of the workers

¹⁸⁴³ *Dawn*, November 13, 1951.

¹⁸⁴⁴ Munir Report, *loc.cit.*, p. 243.

¹⁸⁴⁵ M. Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁸⁴⁶ Binder, *op.cit.*, p. 79.

¹⁸⁴⁷ The Central Council.

¹⁸⁴⁸ The Party Chief.

¹⁸⁴⁹ The Working Committee.

¹⁸⁵⁰ The Deputy Chief.

¹⁸⁵¹ General Secretary.

¹⁸⁵² For fuller details see the 92-page: *Constitution: The Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan*, 4th edit., (Published by M.A. Rahim, Forward Printing Works, Dacca, 1966).

¹⁸⁵³ *Dawn*, April 18, 1956.

and became active particularly in the Karachi Industrial area.¹⁸⁵⁴ The party activities were duly propagandized in the Daily Urdu, *Tasnim*—the semi-official organ of the J.I.P.¹⁸⁵⁵ The sources of party income were varied. The members contributed half of their incomes to the party fund,¹⁸⁵⁶ as a rule. This was the only party which earned a substantial amount of money through Islamic publications. Contributions from the so-called God-fearing Muslim businessmen came as a *Zakat*.¹⁸⁵⁷ The hides and skins of the animals sacrificed at the Muslim festival of Eid-Wl-Azha were collected and sold by the party—another source of income.¹⁸⁵⁸

Spotlighting on the 24-page party manifesto on which basis the J.I.P. wanted to contest the never-held general election of 1959, it can be said that the real message of the programmes was 'to establish the sway of Islamic ideology over the entire scheme of human life'. The monetary policy consisted in the gradual elimination of interest in all its forms and abolition of all those sources of revenues which were forbidden in Islam. Reformulation of taxation policy, proper organization of *Zakat*, *Sadaqat*¹⁸⁵⁹ and *Awkf*¹⁸⁶⁰ and utilization of funds in line with the *Shari'ah* so collected, were emphasized. Private enterprise in industrialization was envisaged. On education the manifesto stood for inculcation of the Islamic spirit, the abolition of coeducation, making of Arabic a compulsory language, the moral and religious training of government staff, the inculcation of the spirit of *Jihadfi-sabillah*.¹⁸⁶¹ On the question of agrarian reforms the J.I.P. policy was remarkably reactionary. It would only abolish those land holdings without compensation which were not rightful ownership in the eyes of *Shari'ah* and which were more than 200 acres of irrigated and 400 acres of unirrigated land. But it remained conveniently uncommitted in regard to which of the vast landed properties of the zamindars of West Pakistan were confiscable according to *Shari'ah*.¹⁸⁶² Here lay one of the big contradictions of the 'Jamat Policy'. It failed to reconcile the creed of private ownership it believed in with social justice. While it blew cold air from one nostril so far as state intervention in economic activities were concerned, but on the other it breathed hot in that the J.I.P. would harness 'all the resources of the State' to *Islamise* "our national life."¹⁸⁶³

¹⁸⁵⁴ K. Mahmud, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁸⁵⁵ M. Nizami. *op.cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁸⁵⁶ Binder, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

¹⁸⁵⁷ An Islamic tax on wealth.

¹⁸⁵⁸ From an influential quarter the writer heard that by far the largest source of income of the J.I.P. was the king of Saud-e-Arabia's donations.

¹⁸⁵⁹ Voluntary contribution.

¹⁸⁶⁰ Muslim trusts.

¹⁸⁶¹ Crusade Islamic style.

¹⁸⁶² For details see J.I.P. manifesto, *Dawn*, June 27 and 28, 1958.

¹⁸⁶³ M. Maudoodi, *op.cit.*, p. 109.

Minority Parties

Constituting 14.1 percent of the entire population of the country and 23.2 percent in East Pakistan¹⁸⁶⁴ alone, the minorities in Pakistan had to organize themselves into parties which essentially behaved as "interest groups". The Hindus – they were divided into Caste Hindus and Scheduled Caste Hindus – formed the largest minority followed by the Christians, Buddhists and Parsis. Among the minority parties the most vocal and organized was the Pakistan National Congress (P.N.C.) the remnant of old Congress of undivided India which, grounded in East Pakistan solely, represented not only Hindus but also other minorities. Its constitution aimed at the realization of peace, property rights and freedom of individuals in the sovereign state of Pakistan by keeping firm in the path of truth and non-violence and by methods of service, education and persuasion and securing for all citizens irrespective of cast, creed and sex, justice and rights – social, economic and political.¹⁸⁶⁵ The P.N.C. was composed of (a) primary members, (b) village, union, ward, town, Thana, subdivision and district Congress Committees, (c) provincial Congress Committees, (d) the Executive Council of the P.N.C. and (e) any other committee and the annual session organized by the P.N.C.¹⁸⁶⁶ In theory, it was a non-communal organization. In West Pakistan the Hindus had no organized political parties. The Congress had its splinter groups in that K.K. Datta walked out of the Congress party and formed a new party, the Gana Samity¹⁸⁶⁷ which in alliance with the Socialist Party (a portion) and Abhayasram fought the general election of East Pakistan and later on merged themselves into a new party, United Progressive Party (U.P.P.). The next big minority organization was the East Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation – the descendent of an old federation first formed by Dr. Ambedkar in 1935. Like the Hindus, the depressed classes of West Pakistan had no such political organization. The Christians had many organizations, but the All Pakistan Christian League claimed to be the most representative. Its political significance was nil due to rivalry among Protestants and Catholic sections. The Buddhists also had many organizations the important one being the Buddhist Kristi (Culture) Pracher Sangha (Publicity Organization).

Minorities had their proper representatives in all the legislatures, national and provincial and wielded, after 1954, more political influence than their numbers would have justified. And as far as their parties were concerned they were all united on one objective which in the words of D.N. Datta, a minority leader, was this: "We want our political ... social and economic safeguards".¹⁸⁶⁸ On the positive side of politics, it can be said that the minority parties fought for the secularization of Pakistan. In this respect,

¹⁸⁶⁴ Minorities in West Pakistan was only 2.8 percent of the population. See 1961 Census Report, Bulletin no. 2, p. 19.

¹⁸⁶⁵ A Behroze, *Minorities in Pakistan* (Thesis), University of the Punjab, N.d., p. 44.

¹⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶⁷ The People's Organization.

¹⁸⁶⁸ Quoted in G.W. Chowdhury, "Religious minorities in Pakistan", *The Muslim World*, (October, 1956). p. 321.

the role of the P.N.C. was emphatic, particularly during the initial periods. However, the existing minority parties had transient value and they were bound to wither gradually; for, in the context of a common electoral roll they had to reorient their narrow, communal basis of party politics and identify themselves with parties having a broad, national outlook. As a matter of fact, the P.N.C. felt the need "to reorganize the Congress with the changed situation i.e. joint electorate".¹⁸⁶⁹

Finally, what really emerges from our foregoing discussions on political parties in Pakistan? Apparently, a lot can be said about the parties' being immature, weak and inadequate. One critic even borrowed Duverger's words to place Pakistan in the 'prehistoric era' of politics.¹⁸⁷⁰ To our findings the parties appeared to have suffered no more than the 'teething troubles' attendant to their initial growth period. Professor Weiner is right to maintain that "there is in fact inherent leadership instability in all political organizations in a society where modern political organizations are relatively new."¹⁸⁷¹ The emergence of a plethora of political parties would not appear capricious once Pakistan sociology was taken into account. Sigmund Neumann in his *Modern Political Parties* accounted for the *raison d'être* of a multi-party system which according to him would develop in a country "whenever ... cleavages in social structure ... exist because of differences in nationalities, regions, religion or class..."¹⁸⁷² And, initially Pakistan had the diverse forces in her womb to give birth to a multi-party system. Thus Pakistan projected herself into a competitive pluralistic party atmosphere which was inherently creative in that a scope for free interplay of party thoughts and ideas existed. Enamored of the successes of certain one-party states in Afro-Asian and Latin American countries R. Niebuhr recommended "one-party democracies, who do not suppress parliamentary and civil liberties"¹⁸⁷³ for developing countries. But the single unifying party which could accommodate conflicting demands of religious, ethnic, urban rural, traditional and modernizing groups of people did not emerge. The M.L. of Pakistan could not be put into the same category. Then, what was the pattern of party position really emerging that could be taken as an index towards political development?

The strength of a given government is derived "from the support," says Professor V.O. Key, Jr., "active or passive, of a coalition of elements of society. That support may be rooted in interest, consent, fear, tradition or a combination of these and other factors in proportions that vary from society to society."¹⁸⁷⁴ While the party system becomes the instrument "for the organization of support in societies",¹⁸⁷⁵ also, in the eyes of Professor G.A. Almond "aggregates interests and transforms them into a relatively small number

¹⁸⁶⁹ *Dawn*, April 8, 1957.

¹⁸⁷⁰ See K.K. Aziz, *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁷¹ M. Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

¹⁸⁷² Quoted in *Comparative Politics, op. cit.*, p. 355.

¹⁸⁷³ Reinhold Niebuhr, "Well-Tempered Evangelism". *The New Republic* (June, 1961), P.11.

¹⁸⁷⁴ V.O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, (4th edit.) (T.Y.C. Company, New York, 1962), P. 218.

¹⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, P. 219.

of alternative general policies".¹⁸⁷⁶ The trends towards 'organization of support' or 'aggregation of interest' were noticeable in Pakistan society. We have seen earlier how the A.L. was first locally formed and then snowballed into a major organization having enlarged its aggregate capacities nationwide. The N.A.P. also was formed as a result of the aggregation of the interests of several parties. The merger of the N.I.P. with the J.I.P. was symptomatic of the same movement, On the one hand, the merger process shrank the number of political organizations and accomplished varying degrees of success in the organization of 'interests', on the other. It established an inter-wing bridge for political communication a contributory factor in national integration. However, in order to label Pakistan political parties and to comprehend their respective future placed in the total political structure we want to evaluate them in the light of three different categories of parties mentioned by Professor Almond. They are (1) secular, pragmatic parties, (2) ideological parties and (3) particularistic or traditional parties.¹⁸⁷⁷

In the first category of parties, which are 'multivalued oriented' having high aggregative potential', falls the A.L., N.A.P., R.P. and K.S.P. Among these parties, the A.L. undoubtedly proved itself as the major party and succeeded in drawing the maximum popular support. The N.A.P. was new in the field. But being one of the chief contenders of popular support on the basis of secular and leftist programmes it was yet to overtake the A.L. on any direction. The R.P. and K.S.P. had no future¹⁸⁷⁸ and they were likely to be absorbed by the A.L. The M.L., N.I.P. and J.I.P. could be classified in the second type. Despite their being classified together there ought to be some qualifiers to indicate their individual approaches to scheme of things. The M.L.'s emphasis on ideology was great, in the case of N.I.P. it was greater but the J.I.P.'s emphasis on ideology was the greatest. What distinguishes the M.L. from the rest of the ideological parties was its willingness to give dynamic and modern orientation to Islam vis-à-vis statecraft. The M.L. being the oldest and modernist-Islamic party having an existing party structure throughout the country was already a major party and the J.I.P. with an absolute 'value-orientation' like Nazism and Fascism had no chance of launching a successful Islamic movement in the face of the M.L. And the N.I.P. whose socio-economic programmes were mostly similar to that of the M.L. could not hope, under any political conjuring, to outbid the latter. While the minority organizations we have mentioned earlier fit into the third pattern of particularistic parties which have "limited aggregative potential" and functionally they behave like "the interest groups".¹⁸⁷⁹ So did the minority parties of Pakistan, initially, but lately they were in the throes of psychological change as the era of the common electoral roll was rung in.

¹⁸⁷⁶ G.A. Almond and T.S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960), P. 37.

¹⁸⁷⁷ Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁸⁷⁸ As a matter of fact, they ceased to exist after 1958.

¹⁸⁷⁹ Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, P. 44.

From the above discussion it will appear that despite the presence of a multiplicity of parties, practically there emerged two major parties e.g. the M.L. and A.L. Actually, the position was that the secular A.L. with its strong foundation in East Pakistan was spilling over into the western wing, whereas the ideological M.L. with its main station in West Pakistan was extending its influence in the eastern part.¹⁸⁸⁰ A trend towards the development of two major political parties with distinct policy orientations was clearly visible and could be taken as an index towards political development. In reading the clues of political developments prior to martial law it could be reasonably predicted that the M.L. and A.L. would have emerged as the two major parties from the general election had it been held. But the nub of the issue is that any sort of coalition governments formed whether at the centre or provinces, either of these two major parties would have become the decisive and basic political partner in the formation of a Cabinet, like, for instance, the Mapai party of Israel, the Social Democrat of Sweden (26 years since 1932), the Christian Democrats of West Germany (till 1969) and the M.R.P. of the French Fourth Republic.¹⁸⁸¹ The facade of communalism, the two-nation theory, and Islamism were retained by the M.L. perhaps to emphasize its unique individuality. In the course of time, the M.L. might tone down its ideological content just as, in the words of Professor Mackenzie, the British Labor party did. What Sir Ivor thought of British Labour and Conservative parties as having "fundamentally" the same policies where their "differences are emphasized and even exaggerated"¹⁸⁸² to facilitate competition for power could have been well applied to the M.L.-A.L. position in the course of time, had the political process continued without interruption.

¹⁸⁸⁰ See also Talukder Maniruzzaman *op.cit.*

¹⁸⁸¹ See Amitai Etzioni, "Alternative ways to Democracy: The example of Israel" in Messrs. Apter & Eckstein (edit.) *Comparative Politics op.cit.*, pp. 712-720.

¹⁸⁸² Sir Ivor Jennings, *Party Politics*. Vol. III (Cambridge: 1962). P. 13.

ADMINISTRATION

In eulogium of some of the public servants of Pakistan in connection with the 1953 Ahmadya riots the Munir report observed: "strong administrative service is God's own boon to people—a boon unto government also, if the government is that of the people.¹⁸⁸³ This strong administrative service was the facsimile of the British administrative system of the pre-independence India usually known as the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.). The competence of the I.C.S. was a by-word which did develop into a cult of fetishism. Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy of India (1884-1888) held that "There is no service like it in the world. For ingenuity, courage, right judgment, disinterested devotion to duty, endurance ... loyalty to one another and their chiefs, they are, to my knowledge, superior to any other class of Englishmen."¹⁸⁸⁴ But on one vital point the pre-independence bureaucracy of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was not in chime with the spirit of the British Public Service as envisaged under the Westminster system. For the I.C.S. did not act merely as an executive agency under the direction of a 'Parliamentary Chief, but some members of it also were Governors of Provinces, members of Executive Councils and of Legislative Councils.¹⁸⁸⁵ Thus the orthodox line of demarcation between policy formulation and policy execution was ignored.

On the context of modern government's burgeoning activities "the separation of policy formation from policy execution in any hard and fast way is probably as untenable as the old politics-administration dichotomy itself".¹⁸⁸⁶ Even in today's Britain, apart from policy implementation the civil servants "are unavoidably involved in the formulation of policy at all levels of nearly every government project".¹⁸⁸⁷ This is, however, a question of degree, propriety and efficacy. But the bureaucratic vogue of the then British India was sui generis in that the I.C.S. obtrusively combined in itself both the agencies e.g. the executive and policy making. However, in the last four decades of British rule, there occurred a general democratization of the administration, and the authority of the I.C.S. was "progressively whittled away; but, nevertheless, it retained its premier position when power came to be transferred to Indian hands in 1947.¹⁸⁸⁸

However, making allowances for the inadequacies of Colonial bureaucracy of which Pakistan was an heir apparent, there can be no doubt about the integrity, efficiency and serviceability of the old I.C.S. cadre. And Professor H. Tinker was apt in his remark that

¹⁸⁸³ Munir Report, *loc.cit.*, P. 287.

¹⁸⁸⁴ Quoted in L.S.S. O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service: 1601-1930* (Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1965), P. 173.

¹⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

¹⁸⁸⁶ Norton E. Long, "The administrative organization as a political system" in S. Mailick and Edward H. Van Ness (edit.). *Concept and Issues in Administrative Behavior*, (prentice Hall, 1962), p. 118.

¹⁸⁸⁷ G.A. Campbell, *The Civil Service in Britain*, 2nd edition, (Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1965), p. 9.

¹⁸⁸⁸ Ashok Chanda, *Indian Administration*, (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958), p. 95.

the administrative machinery inherited by Pakistan (also India) "does provide mechanism to execute the public will, such as many other countries envy and desire to emulate".¹⁸⁸⁹ This, however, is tenable only up to a point; for, the heritage of Colonial bureaucracy was denuded of the component of popular consent. For centuries prior to independence in 1947 the mode of governance was imposed upon the people of the subcontinent by right of conquest. And the British regime was only a final phase of a long record of this character. The weakness inherent in the Colonial administration was the alienation between administration and popular aspiration. Administration devoid of a sense of accountability to popular aspiration is unimaginative: 'at best it tends to be sterile at worst it becomes coercive'. The essence of good government is the continuance of "dialogue between actuality and aspiration, between administrative authority and political leadership—a dialogue that can take place only when each side understands the other and feels kinship rather than distrust"—maintained Suhrawardy in one of his provocative articles. Addressing himself to politicians and administrators alike he continued: "new habits of mind have to be substituted for old. Administration must unlearn its scorn of politics. Politics must overcome its hostility to administration. Only in this way can a government and the people governed communicate confidence to each other and learn that they can count on each other."¹⁸⁹⁰ So, a new shift from the old values associated with Colonial rule was required of the services—also politicians—with the coming of independence. It was now a question of the extent to which the services were able or willing to display a reorientation in outlook, dynamism, adaptability and administrative leadership required of a modern independent country.

The classical features of bureaucracy such as (1) specialized, differentiated administrative roles, (2) recruitment based on achievement rather than ascription, (3) placement, transfer, and promotion based on universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, (4) tendency on the part of public servants towards professionalism and careerism and (5) administrative decision making within a framework of rationality, hierarchy, responsibility and discipline¹⁸⁹¹ were evidently retained in the Pakistan administrative services. The Civil Service in Pakistan was not a unified establishment in that various services were operative under independent arrangements. Broadly, there were four categories of services e.g. (a) The All Pakistan services, (b) The Central Services, (c) The Provincial Services and (d) The Specialist Services. "The All Pakistan Services" meant the services common to the Federation and provinces.¹⁸⁹² There were 10 types of services such as the Civil Service of Pakistan (C.S.P.), the Police Service of Pakistan (P.S.P.), etc., which belonged to this category. Whereas the Central Services of Pakistan¹⁸⁹³ such as the Pakistan Foreign Service, the Pakistan Military Accounts

¹⁸⁸⁹ H.H.Tinker, *op.cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁸⁹⁰ S.H. Suhrawardy, "Political Stability", *Dawn*, June 11, 1957.

¹⁸⁹¹ J. La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development" in J. La Palombara (edit.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, (Princeton University Press: 1963), p. 49.

¹⁸⁹² Constitution of Pakistan, *loc. cit.*, p. 123.

¹⁸⁹³ The Central Service of Pakistan was again divided into Class I, II, III and IV services.

Service, and the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service,¹⁸⁹⁴ were absolutely reserved for federal purposes. The Provincial Services included those services such as the Civil Service, the Police Service, the Health and Medical Service, etc. which were in care of those subjects granted to the provinces under the Constitution. The specialist services included those services which were entrusted with the technical jobs, say in the Meteorological, engineering, agricultural research and economics departments.

In terms of power, position and responsibility the C.S.P. was in the limelight followed by the foreign and police services. By all practical purposes, the C.S.P. was the prototype of the early I.C.S. people who were the eyes and ears of British Indian government, the symbols of "authority-bounty" or "authority-privation" and the *Ma-bap*¹⁸⁹⁵ syndrome,¹⁸⁹⁶ to the teeming millions and were practically responsible for carrying out the whole gamut of the government. This C.S.P. cadre formed the *Corps d'elite* of the Pakistan administrative services which, subject to ministerial and parliamentary direction, were responsible for the execution of public policies and governance of the country. The C.S.P.s were not only the executives and departmental heads, but also acted in an advisory capacity to the central and provincial governments in matters of policy formation. The Foreign Service of Pakistan (P.F.S.) catered to the need of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in respect of providing officers, diplomats and staff. The P.F.S. remained mostly urbane and aristocratic in outlook which had some resemblance to the early political service of British rule. The Police Service of Pakistan (P.S.P.) belonging to the All Pakistan service served both the centre and provinces. But unlike the C.S.P. the P.S.P. did not hold many posts at the centre, but at the district levels in the provinces.¹⁸⁹⁷

The main nerve centre of the administrative system of Pakistan was the Secretariat, the abode of the C.S.P. people who helped the government in policy formation and thereafter its implementation through the operative departments. The Central Secretariat housed as many as 18 Ministries which were again subdivided into a number of 'departments'. At the summit of each Ministry and its attached departments stood the political chief, the Minister and immediately below him stood the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, the head of the pyramid of public servants. (The Provincial Secretariats were mostly fashioned after the central one. The top officials of the Secretariat navigated the direction of the Secretarial business, helped to draft new legislation, circulars and budgets, rendered councils to Ministers and briefed them with information in the conduct of their affairs in the parliament hustings. Since various Ministries and their departments in the Secretariat functioned independently the divergent range of governmental activities required coordinating machinery to reconcile them into a unified government policy. So, the heterogeneity of government

¹⁸⁹⁴ There were 14 types of services classified as Class I services under it.

¹⁸⁹⁵ Father-Mother.

¹⁸⁹⁶ W. Wilcox, "Politicians, Bureaucrats and Development in India" in *The Annals* (March, 1965), p. 121.

¹⁸⁹⁷ The Head of the Cabinet Secretariat was the Secretary General of Pakistan himself.

functions was brought into homogeneity through the coordinating instrumentality of the Cabinet Secretariat, which also performed other routine duties appertaining to the Cabinet Secretariat, as well. The Establishment Division¹⁸⁹⁸ of the Cabinet Secretariat was entrusted with the task of recruitment of officers to the Central Services, the formulation of recruitment policy itself, training the C.S.P. cadre, together with their transfer and promotion and deciding disciplinary matters in respect of central services.

Appointments to posts of the various services were made by the Federal or Provincial Public Service Commission's autonomous bodies—as the case might be. The usual method of entry into service was by open competition which comprised written examination and *viva voce*. The officers of the Superior Services were recruited through competitive examinations of persons between 21 to 24 years of age. The recruitment to the Central Services was made on the basis of equal quotas¹⁸⁹⁹ between the two provinces of Pakistan, with a reservation of 20 percent posts to be filled in on the basis of merit. Usually, qualified public servants were required to undergo two phases of training, the first being the apprenticeship training during the probationary period and the second in-service training. The C.S.P. being the Premier Service there was an elaborate arrangement for the training of its members who compulsorily were made to undergo a 9-month course in the Pakistan Civil Service Academy¹⁹⁰⁰—the manufacturing institution of "generalizing minds" or "intelligent amateurs". Similarly, the P.F.S. people were sent at government expense abroad to study at approved universities of the U.S., U.K. and Paris for 18 months. And as far as the P.S.P.s were concerned they were to undergo a tough course of training at the Police Training College at Sardah, East Pakistan.

In regards to administrative purposes the provinces were divided into divisions, and divisions into districts. Below the districts in East Pakistan were sub-divisions, which were under the sub-divisional officers. In West Pakistan districts were divided into Tehsils under the Tehsildars of which the nearest counterparts in East Pakistan were 'circles' under the circle officers. These Tehsils and Circles were again sub-divided into units variously called. At the head of the division was the Commissioner who, in the maintenance of civil administration and law and order of his region had the assistance of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (D.I.G.P.) responsible for the police administration of the Division. The Commissioner's job consisted in supervising and coordinating the entire administrative activities of the districts which comprised a division. While the district under the Deputy Commissioner (D.C.) formed the basic geographic unit of Pakistan administrative system. The D.C., in essence, projected the government on to the field and transmitted back to the authority the reactions of the people to government policies. In the maintenance of law and order he was to be

¹⁸⁹⁸ Similarly, the Establishment Department was headed by high ranking C.S.P. officer.

¹⁸⁹⁹ This did not mean the end of the competitive method. The 40 percent intake of civil servants for each province was still based on merit applying to that area.

¹⁹⁰⁰ The Colombo Plan Scheme also enabled the Pakistan C.S.P.s to receive training from England as well.

assisted by the Superintendent of Police (S.P.), responsible for the police administration in the district. Briefly, these are the salient features of the Pakistan services and their organizational set up.¹⁹⁰¹ And to use Dr. Syeed's metaphor "The government of Pakistan may be described as a pyramid carved out of a single rock ... the Civil Servants have captured the apex of the pyramid. Below the apex are several layers of authority descending downwards from the Secretariat level to the base of the pyramid, the district administrators."¹⁹⁰²

Elaborating on the question of bureaucratic rigidity Lipset cautioned that "the problem becomes crucial ... when a new political movement takes office and proposes to enact reforms that go beyond the traditional frame of reference of previous governmental activity or which upset the existing set of relations within the bureaucracy".¹⁹⁰³ This was true of the Pakistan situation. Upon independence the shift of emphasis from regulating the life of the community to positive action for promoting its welfare was clear. The existing public administration as admirably suited to the task of collection of revenue, the administration of justice and maintenance of law and order. But it was inadequate to the purposes of implementing a planned programme of economic development, the symbol of 'rising expectations' of the new state. What was more its "unavowed attitude ... regards development work as being of secondary importance".¹⁹⁰⁴ Also, in regard to organizational structure of the services some anomalies or defects were pointed out for reform.

In the scheme of Pakistan administrative system the Secretariats which operated in both central and provincial Ministries with attached functional or technical departments played the pivotal role and gravitated all powers within their folds. This Secretariat system which separated policy-making from policy implementation was criticized by Professor Egger and Mr. Gladieux on the ground that the specialists who were in charge of the implementation of projects had no say in policy matters, as they were administratively under the generalist C.S.P.s directing policies at the top of the Secretariats. Particularly, in terms of economic or technological development the substitution of the informed opinion of specialists for "superficial knowledge" of the generalists having "breadth without depth in terms of experience in development subjects"¹⁹⁰⁵ was thought to be counter-productive. This ruined the inherent link of mutuality between policy formation and execution. Also, there followed the

¹⁹⁰¹ Most of the information of the foregoing pages is based on M.S. Haq, *Public Administration in Pakistan* (Sharada Press: Barisal, 1957); Sir E. Franklin, *Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services* (Karachi: 1954) and *Ten Years of Pakistan* (Pakistan Publications, Karachi, 1957).

¹⁹⁰² K.B. Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Services", *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI (1958), p. 137.

¹⁹⁰³ Seymour M. Lipset, "The rigidity of a neutral bureaucracy" in D.C. Rowat (edit.), *Basic Issues in Public Administration* (The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 442.

¹⁹⁰⁴ The First Five Year Plan (1955-1960) p. 93.

¹⁹⁰⁵ See Messrs. Egger and Gladieux reports quoted in G.S. Birkhead, *Administrative Problems in Pakistan* (Syracuse University Press: 1966). p. 188.

discomfiture of talented technicians who could never cherish the idea of becoming Secretaries – the sole preserves of the C.S.P.S.

The main argument in favor of giving the Civil Servants overriding powers over the technicians was based on the consideration that the C.S.P.s. with a vast reservoir of practical field experience in the districts and departments could bring to the task of policy making in the Secretariat. But in practice these C.S.P. officers could not claim to pile up enough experience from the districts, provinces and departments. The practice of the then British India was that the I.C.S. officers were assigned to various provinces, and they were brought to the centre in accordance with the requirements of the central government. Some efficient officers were selected from all the provinces of India who used to go to the centre and work right from Deputy Secretaries upwards. But in the course of the last 10 years 1947-58 the C.S.P. officers hardly stayed long enough in the field to cultivate depth of experience. Frequent transfers, promotions, multiplication of senior appointments were the practice of the day. The goal of every C.S.P. officer was to short-circuit their way up to the Central Secretariat within a minimal period of time, and never to go back to the field.¹⁹⁰⁶ So the experience of the C.S.P. officers was too far behind their predecessors to justify their monopoly of administrative talent.

Besides this, the gradation and classification of services that prevailed in the propitiating days which in the words of Professor Tinker was the embodiment of "Hindu Caste system and British class system"¹⁹⁰⁷ became also the burden of criticism, since, at partition, there was no change in the *status quo*. The distinction between the C.S.P. officers and P.C.S.¹⁹⁰⁸ officers was one of patricians and plebeians, as it were. The offices of the D.C.s were manned mostly by the C.S.P.s and the P.C.S. officers could climb the higher ladder only by ageing. The Civil Servants of IV Class category were recruited on the principles on which, commented the Pakistan Pay Commission (1949) "beasts of burden" could be hired. Artificial distinctions in the service position of the Central Superior Services abounded. Reforms could not be easy as the Public Service Commissions, both federal and provincial performed only advisory functions but not the function of Public Service management.

Then there were the questions of red-tapism, arrogance, corruption and inefficiency in the administration. Bureaucracy and red-tapism do resemble the correlativity of fish and chips. In Pakistan this was a deep-rooted administrative rut. Projects could not be implemented, cases could not be disposed of quickly because of red-tapism. There was too much of "noting" on files, and it began right at the bottom when the "dealing clerk" or some such functionary put down his views on a profound scheme. Then the file progressed upwards at snail's pace-on the desks of the Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary and Secretary. By this time the file became a

¹⁹⁰⁶ See Mr. Khuhro's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, March 4, 1958, p. 782.

¹⁹⁰⁷ H. Tinker, *op.cit.*, p. 158.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Provincial Civil Service.

bulkier one with stereotyped notings like "as proposed" or "so and so may see". The file might have to go to another Ministry on an interdepartmental jaunt, to be further noted upon by another hierarchy. When it entered the dreaded precincts of the Finance Ministry for financial sanction a new kind of super punditry began. It could be the end of the project or its mutilation.¹⁹⁰⁹

The fact is that the time between the initiation of a project and a decision on it was so tortuously long that the author of the project tended to be oblivious of it. It was a case of *Gresham's law*—the creative work was sacrificed at the altar of routine. The 50-page report on the working of the Punjab administration opens with these sentences: "The state of affairs in various districts is simply disgraceful. Speedy disposal is a story of ages gone by not known to the present government servants. Bribery is rampant in every department. Nepotism, favoritism, carelessness and inefficiency are order of the day."¹⁹¹⁰ The revenue records built up during the past century an administrative treasure left by the British—were rendered to a shapeless mess. The Report referred to "perpetual high handedness and bossing by the police and the consequent demoralization among the magistracy of the province".¹⁹¹¹ Writing the fortnightly letter in 1954 from East Pakistan to the Governor General, the Governor, General Mirza, recorded that the D.C.s did not worry about touring, "never did court work, criminal or revenue. How they got to know their districts is an enigma to me. The caliber of the officers too is extremely low. In British days the majority would not have risen beyond a Deputy Magistrate."¹⁹¹² In regard to police administration he commented in another letter, "It will take time to get the Police Force of 40,000 men to a reasonable state of efficiency ... Habits of high Police Officers are bad. They expect lavish entertainment from their subordinates when on tour. Naturally the subordinates expect entertainment from villagers and in the end the hard pressed peasant pays."¹⁹¹³

Arrogance or an overbearing manner on the part of the civil servants in the newly independent countries make people look upon them as "neo-colonialists"¹⁹¹⁴ black or brown as the case may be. This is, no doubt, the result of the elitist backgrounds inherited by the Civil Servants from the Colonial urban setting. Alienation between the public servants and the people in Pakistan also took place as the former tended to be paternalistic as they believed that "the seat of authority imparts to its occupant superhuman wisdom".¹⁹¹⁵ In regard to administrative corruption the screening of a large number of officials at the advent of martial law in 1958 speaks for itself the second martial law of 1969 rounded up 1,700 officials for corrupt charges and finally 303 high-

¹⁹⁰⁹ See *Dawn*, December 15, 1958 (Editorial) "Administrative Reforms".

¹⁹¹⁰ Report Quoted in *Dawn*, November 4, 1951.

¹⁹¹¹ *Ibid.*, November 7, 1951 (Editorial) "Punjab Administration".

¹⁹¹² Governor's letter, *loc.cit.*, (D.O. No. 101/PS 21" June, 1954), p. 4. Appendix 20.

¹⁹¹³ *Ibid.*, (D.O. No. 127/PS, 26th July, 1954), p. 13. Appendix 21.

¹⁹¹⁴ S. Richardson, "Decolonization and the District Officer" (A Private Paper: Comparative Administration Group Seminar, Boston University, 1963), p. 5.

¹⁹¹⁵ Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 37. See also *Dawn*, November 4, 1951.

ranking officials were dismissed.¹⁹¹⁶ Even the contagion of communalism among the administrators was seriously alleged.¹⁹¹⁷

The pre-independence administrative institutions of which Pakistan was an inheritor might be non-egalitarian and non-conducive to the prevailing context of Pakistan, but those who had peopled the institutions in the old days were never accused of inefficiency, corruption, partiality, nepotism and communalism. Degeneracy could not ooze inside what Lloyd George called the "steel frame" of bureaucracy. At partition the qualities of the administrators degenerated and on this count the system was bamboo-framed. That there was something wrong in the system the various reports like the Pay Commission of 1949 and 1950, the Administrative Enquiry Committee of 1950, 1951 and 1953, the Rolland Eggar Report of 1953 and the Bernard Gladieux Report of 1955 would amply bear testimony. The last two reports were withheld even from public view like the pay Commission Report under the Ayub regime. Despite the reports the administration did not respond favorably to reform requirements, as the inertia and complacency of the Establishments generated enough power to resist change. The foregoing pages, however, have accounted for the debit side of the administration: to point out the major weaknesses of the system vis-à-vis new requirements.¹⁹¹⁸ This is not to suggest that the administrative institutions were beyond the pale of redemption or that the administrators were incorrigible. As a matter of fact the input side of the administrative leadership particularly in the initial period was remarkable. Perhaps, the Planning Commission's judgment on it was discreet, when it observed: "While conscious of the deterioration that has taken place since independence we are of the opinion that the Public Services of Pakistan have their share of the attributes of a true Public Service ... But, when all is said and done, these virtues are of passive character, representing the *absolute minimum*."¹⁹¹⁹

We now address ourselves to the questions of the relationship between the bureaucracy, politicians and parliament. Was Public Service amenable to political control? Were political neutrality and anonymity on the part of the public servants maintained? Did partnership between the public servants and politicians develop into a success? Under the Westminster type of government what Professor Laski called 'a system of integrated powers',¹⁹²⁰ the nexus between the executive and legislature is a cardinal fact. The British model demands that the executive arm e.g. the public servants must be amenable to their political bosses, the Ministers who, in turn, will be responsible to the parliament. Upon independence the survival value of the country was given first preference over these fine points of Westminster system. The politicians very many of them were novices in the art of governance were not equal to the problems engulfing

¹⁹¹⁶ See *Daily Telegraph*, March 1, 1970: "Vast Fortunes amassed by corrupt officials": M. Beg.

¹⁹¹⁷ See D. Ahmed's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. 1, March 22, 1956, P. 336.

¹⁹¹⁸ See The Public Service Commission report of 1951, published in *Dawn*, November 14, 1951.

¹⁹¹⁹ Planning Commission, *loc. cit.*, p. 121.

¹⁹²⁰ H.J. Laski, "The Parliamentary and Presidential Systems", *Public Administrative Review*. IV (1944) p. 359.

the country. The post-natal care of the newly-born nation was largely performed by a group of less than 100 I.C.S.-I.P.S.¹⁹²¹ people—the total strength of the C.S.P. the prototype of former I.C.S. was still a small number in 1955 i.e. 270 only¹⁹²² — who opted for Pakistan in 1947. This group of people mostly U.P.¹⁹²³ and Punjab men together with 5 or 6 officers of the Audit and Accounts Service of former India, the elite corps of finance administration helped enormously in the construction of the new nation and reorganization of administrative set up which was upset at partition.¹⁹²⁴ Conscious of this the Finance Minister (Audit and Accounts) told in the Constituent Assembly I (Leg.) "with the ablest Ministers and with the still abler members of this Assembly unable to keep the fabric of administration intact for the last three years, but for the very loyal and devoted services of the members of these services" (Applause),¹⁹²⁵ When the politicians were groping in search for national consensus, when the country was in a welter of 'atomistic groupings', ideological and regional cleavages the services acted as a 'vital cement' to the maintenance of national entity. Apart from the earlier contributions of the services towards placing the country on a viable footing economically and administratively, the administrative support for the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit, which to our mind was a risky but a major step toward integrating Pakistan into a modern nation-state, was equally invigorating. As many as 8 Secretariats had to be integrated. Various provincial services with varying standards, terms and conditions were to be consolidated, the tasks of which fell upon the Services.¹⁹²⁶

At the start, the reliance of the politicians on the services was great. The first Finance Minister who was so credited for building the Pakistan finance was a civil servant. So was the next Finance Minister. Jinnah appointed 3 British I.C.S. officers as Governors of 3 provinces. The provincial governments were controlled by the centre through the instrumentality of top civil servants posted therein.¹⁹²⁷ At the centre, the Secretary General himself was the Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. Currency gained ground that the Services were on the upper hand, and the opposition contended in the parliament that "Our Cabinet must be one of the most official-ridden Cabinets of the world."¹⁹²⁸ However, it can be said that till the assassination of Liaquat Ali, the politicians had clear edge over the civil servants in terms of balance of power. This situation was reversed at the entrance of Nazimuddin Cabinet.

¹⁹²¹ Indian Political Service.

¹⁹²² M.A. Chowdhury, *The Civil Service in Pakistan* (N.I.P.A., Dacca, 1963), p. 381.

¹⁹²³ United Provinces, now in India.

¹⁹²⁴ See R. Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in J.La Palombara (edit.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 380.

¹⁹²⁵ C.A.D. (Leg.), Vol. I, March 22, 1950, p. 292.

¹⁹²⁶ G.S. Birkhead, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁹²⁷ See for details, K.B. Syed, "Formative Phase", *op. cit.*, p. 384; also C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. 1, November 9, 1955, pp. 2777-78.

¹⁹²⁸ C.A.D. (Leg.), Vol. I, March 22, 1950, p. 286.

"It has to be the Minister," says H. Morrison, "for it is he, and neither parliament nor the public, who has official control over his civil servants."¹⁹²⁹ We have earlier portrayed the fragile leadership of Nazimuddin and particularly his hesitating approach towards handling the Qadiani issue which threatened to tear the country apart on religious fanaticism. The nervous Nazimuddin was greatly initiated to take action in the anti-Qadiani riots by the top civil servants, particularly the then defense secretary, General Mirza. Earlier, it was Nazimuddin who had taken Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, the Secretary General of the Services inside his Cabinet as Finance Minister to replace Golam Mohammed who was catapulted to the position of the Governor General. From the end of 1951 and till the Constitution of the Second Constituent Assembly in 1955 there occurred unusual events like the dismissal of Ministries, both central and provincial, the formation of an official-dominated central Cabinet and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I. Evidently, all these acts were interpreted as the machinations of the top civil servants who worked through the Governor General. By this time, some leading figures of different services like Golam Mohammad (A. & A.), Chowdhury Mohammad Ali (A. & A.),¹⁹³⁰ General Mirza (former I.P.S.),¹⁹³¹ General Ayub (Army C-in-C), Abdur Rashid (P.S.P.), Qarban Ali (P.S.P.), Aminuddin (Judiciary), etc., etc. metamorphosed themselves as politicians,¹⁹³² and were holding important political offices like the Governor Generalship, Governorship, Chief Ministership, Ministership, etc. All these developments prompted Abul Mansur Ahmed an A.L. M.P. to coin a new word, e.g. "officerocracy" to describe the Pakistan political system.¹⁹³³

Apparently, there was overwhelming evidence to suggest that the services got the better of the politicians during this period and sabotaged parliamentary institutions. But it will be indiscreet to hold that the Services as a whole were in collusion in a conspiracy against the politicians. Perhaps the nearest truth was that the few old, experienced and hide-bound civil servants who were brought up in the early administrative tradition grew restive at the slothful process of political development and wanted to inject efficiency and discipline. They entered the political arena by virtue of merit and serviceability. "I, Sir, am not *politician*."¹⁹³⁴ I am only a technician who was called to the service of the country to assist in dealing with financial and economic problems,¹⁹³⁵ said the Finance Minister, Golam Mohammad far back in 1949. The policy of civil servant recruitment for political jobs actually was founded on that criterion. Not all the intakes were a success. The embittered Dawn in a leader held: "If you play about with eugenics freak offspring often result; similarly if power tries artificial insemination

¹⁹²⁹ Herbet Morrison, *op.cit.*, p. 323.

¹⁹³⁰ Audit and Accounts.

¹⁹³¹ Indian Political Service.

¹⁹³² *Manchester Guardian*, October 27, 1954; also, *South China Morning Post*, October 27, 1954.

¹⁹³³ See Abdul Monsur's speech, *M.A.d.*, Vol. I, March 22, 1956, p. 345.

¹⁹³⁴ Writer's italics.

¹⁹³⁵ *C.A.D. (Leg.)*, Vol. I, February 28, 1949, p. 234.

with democracy, democratic institutions can become freaks.¹⁹³⁶ But then, all the alleged omissions and commissions on the part of the Services, particularly the dismissal of Nazimuddin and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I were not unalloyed events in that prominent political leaders were explicitly or implicitly involved in them (discussed earlier). If some of the public servants overacted their parts not conducive to the cause of Westminster system, the politicians also could be accused of both pampering and interfering with the administration.

To immunize administration completely against politics is an ideal yet to be fulfilled anywhere. Political parties, interest groups and private individuals all vie with each other for administrative services. Politicians are concerned with the political aspect of administration. The success or failure of their programmes determine their winning the elections. So parties in power are interested in strategic appointments and transfers of personnel. In Pakistan, the politicians did interfere in administration and transfer personnel, rather imprudently. Evidently, the practice seemed more frequent as there were short-lived Ministries in power and each incoming Ministry was prone to do the same thing for its interest. The use of civil servants by the politicians for their self-aggrandizement figured more prominently in West Pakistan than in East. In the Punjab election of 1951¹⁹³⁷ the M.L. politicians were alleged to have used the officials. The legend of Khuhro of Sindh was replete with stories of ill-use of officials.¹⁹³⁸ The Leghari Report of the Sargodha District Board elections of 1953 held that elections in 33 out of 47 constituencies were illegal and perverse as "the Daultana Ministry (Punjab) had drawn up a plan of winning the local bodies elections by hook or by crook," through the instrumentalities of the officers.¹⁹³⁹ The Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. suspended the D.C. of Mardan for having refused to reject the nomination papers of a member of the opposition.¹⁹⁴⁰ A remarkably wholesale transfer of top officials, particularly of P.S.P. officers took place under the Cabinet of Dr. Khan of West Pakistan what was thought to have been politically motivated.¹⁹⁴¹

The civil servants were not automatons, they were human too. They could not sit quietly outside the ring and watch this pulling and hauling. Some of them also acted as panders to the politicians' penchant for political advantage. For, after all, they had their Service interests too, and used the Ministers to their benefit on a mutual basis.¹⁹⁴² In this situation, it was inevitable that some officials were also identified with particular political parties, the development of which was, no doubt, a slur upon the tradition of dispassionate, neutral and anonymous public servants. But to lay blame squarely on the

¹⁹³⁶ *Dawn*, May 24, 1956 (Editorial) "This madhouse".

¹⁹³⁷ Major General Iskander Mirza told the writer that the first Prime Minister of Pakistan - Liaquat - asked the Inspector General of Police in his very presence to work for Daultana.

¹⁹³⁸ See Suhrawardy's exposition of "Khuhroism", *C.A.D.*, Vol. I, November 9, 1955, p. 1980.

¹⁹³⁹ See Report published in *Dawn*, August 13, 1954.

¹⁹⁴⁰ *Dawn*, September 13, 1954.

¹⁹⁴¹ See *Ibid.*, May 1, 1956.

¹⁹⁴² See *Ibid.*, May 18, 1958 (Editorial) "While the Sun Shines - I".

politicians for degenerating the executive agencies as the Constitution Commission (1961) did¹⁹⁴³ would be as rash a judgment as to suggest that the civil servants were cold blooded usurpers of the politicians' domain. Political interference in administration and vice versa were closely related and "which of the two parties first started", as is rightly maintained by Dr. Muneer "the vicious circle ... when and in what circumstances"¹⁹⁴⁴ could not be ascertained.

In regard to relationship between the politicians and public servants it drew analogy of a marriage that was not marked all with happiness but also anxiety. But the fact was the relationship did not fail irretrievably. Professor Morris-Jones seized upon the main psychology of the politicians' attitude towards the Services – "a relic of the past ... which put in prison a large number of those who are now the leading politicians".¹⁹⁴⁵ The Pakistan politicians were sub-consciously haunted by the ghost of old memories. But it seems to us that the disposition of the older class of public servants did not mellow down. either. The sheaves of the fortnightly letters written by General Mirza (I.P.S.) to the Governor General (A. & A.) are an important dossier which represent, among others, General Mirza's disagreeable disrespect for some of the most respected and popular politicians of East Pakistan. Here is the sample how he evaluated the standard of politicians: (1) *Mr. Fazlul Haq*: "Corrupt, unreliable and out and out enemy of Pakistan"; (2) *Bhasani*: "A mob leader *par excellence* ... out and out an enemy of Pakistan and the kindest thing I can suggest for him is that he be shot out of hand"; (3) *Mr. Azizul Haq*: "... is a man of doubtful integrity"; (4) *Mr. Ataur Rahman*: "... His provincialism is so intense that he can never be a good Pakistani"; (5) *Mr. Abdul Latif Biswas*: "... is a chameleon, i.e. changes his color quite often ... Nobody can depend on him"; (6) *Moulvi Ashrafuddin Chowdri*: "... I don't think he believes in Pakistan"; (7) *Mohan Mian*: "Politics is his main profession in life and the sole idea is to feather his own nest"; (8) *Abdur Salam*: "A man of doubtful integrity"; (9) *Abu Hossain Sarkar*: "Loyalty to Pakistan doubtful."¹⁹⁴⁶ These remorseless remarks about politicians, at best were highly controvertible, at worst biased. But, to our mind, these do represent the inner feelings of the hoary public servants towards politicians.

Apparently, the politician had always been suspicious and censorious of the public servants. Some carefree politicians traduced the bureaucracy with gay abandon. But it should be said to the credit of the politicians that despite the strain of their inherited attitude towards administrative establishments they did not fail themselves in observing parliamentary decorum vis-à-vis the Services. The Ministers throughout the period took in hand all the responsibilities for any act of omission on the part of the public servants, and defended them in the parliament to ensure their anonymity. The Premier Nazimuddin in 1952 defended and took upon himself all the blame for which a

¹⁹⁴³ See Constitution Commission, *loc. cit.*, pp. 5-13.

¹⁹⁴⁴ Muneer Ahmed, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* (Punjab University Press: 1964), p. 130.

¹⁹⁴⁵ Morris-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁹⁴⁶ Governor's letter, *loc. cit.*, (Top Secret) D.O. No. 101/PS, DF. 21.6.1954, pp. 9-12. Appendix 22.

central civil servant was heavily brought to book in the parliament.¹⁹⁴⁷ On a cut motion in respect of Cabinet when the C.S.P. as a class was being seriously goaded in the House for some lapses, a leading opposition leader put the discussions in proper perspective by saying: "After all there may be some corrupt officers as there are some corrupt politicians, some corrupt businessman; ... But to say that they (C.S.P.) are as a class corrupt is something which nobody can understand. It is not a good taste to say this ... pointedly when officers *are not in a position to defend themselves in the House*."¹⁹⁴⁸ In 1958, while again defending the activities of the Services the Prime Minister Noon gave one of the cogent reasons as to why the officials were frequently criticized. He said, "Unfortunately, in our country a feeling has arisen that so far as the public servants are concerned, they only work under government and the opposition members seem to think that these servants are not their servants, nor the servants of parliament."¹⁹⁴⁹ Again, when the opposition came to power they, as a rule, defended the Services. But the fact remains, that despite the presence of a seemingly uneasy relationship between the politicians and public servants they were not essentially punitive to each other. The officials on the whole remained responsible to their political bosses as the latter were kindred to the former.

However, in one sense, the amenability of the public servants to their political chiefs may appear as merely a ritual, once the inadequate parliamentary control over the services is taken into account. The administrative institutions and precisely the higher civil services i.e. the C.S.P., were well-entrenched and well-protected by the Constitutional provisions.¹⁹⁵⁰ The Ministers could, at best, transfer, suspend and withhold promotions of the officials, not fire them. The whole idea was to immunize bureaucracy from political influence, which led Goodnow to comment that "to protect competence, responsiveness was sacrificed".¹⁹⁵¹ The Constitutional protection enjoyed by the Services would not have mattered so much had the legislative organ been a powerful institution. Legislatures both national and provincial had been bedeviled by either dissolution or suspension for one reason or another factors which prevented them from consolidating their positions and holding sway over political life of the country. The Ministers could not keep the officials 'on their toes' as the central parliament suffered occasional enforced recesses. While the different ruling parties commanded little authority over the permanent establishment' of the government as they could not dispense large-scale patronage.¹⁹⁵² The result was while the top floor of the edifice of the government was often dismantled or repaired with the change of the government the main structure of the government remained unchanged.¹⁹⁵³ All these

¹⁹⁴⁷ See C.A.D. (Leg.), Vol. I, April 1, 1952.

¹⁹⁴⁸ N.A.D., Vol. I, February 15, 1957, p. 451.

¹⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, March 4, 1958, p. 756.

¹⁹⁵⁰ See Constitution, *loc.cit.*, pp. 119-131.

¹⁹⁵¹ Henry F. Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (Yale University Press: 1964), p. 213.

¹⁹⁵² Due to closed system of the Services.

¹⁹⁵³ See *New York Times*, September 16, 1956.

developments led one critic to say that in Pakistan 'The legislature is intermittent and administration is permanent'.

This does not, however, mean that the permanent establishment was unbridled and the parliament beguiled in its impotency. In the period 1947-54, when the opposition was very weak the Congress managed to move 10 cut motions in respect of Cabinet to animadvert the working of the Services. They seized upon every opportunity the parliament provided to expose excesses of the officials. There were instances where parliamentary criticism was responsible for setting aside questionable decisions of the C.S.P. officers.¹⁹⁵⁴ Even the reports of the Public Accounts Committee dwelt at length on the lacunae of financial management of the Services. The fact is that under the Pakistan political system the Services, however well safeguarded they were, could not but suffer some palpitations of the heart when their omissions were exposed in the parliament. The officials were given to know through criticism what the Public was not going to swallow. After the Constitution of the second Constituent Assembly, the politicians, undoubtedly, showed greater vigilance on the executive branch. As many as 22 cut motions in respect of Cabinet were moved in the N.A. where administrative institutions, and activities were discussed in some detail.¹⁹⁵⁵ When Suhrawardy's Cabinet was installed the *Times* commented "politicians regain upper hand".¹⁹⁵⁶ This was largely true.

Yet, it cannot be held that the parliament had an effective control over the Services as the politicians and political parties were yet to act as an equipoise against the 'institutionalized' services. The politicians still felt about the top C.S.P. cadre what had been felt by the Social Democrats and Republicans about the Prussian Civil Service in Germany. The bureaucratic dominance came to be more pronounced in West Pakistan, particularly after the amalgamation of provinces. Talking on the administration of the one-unit an M.P. observed in the N.A. "There is one Governor dealing with a population of four crores. Can he grant interview to him?¹⁹⁵⁷ The Governor being the representative of the President, can the victim approach your President? Can, Sir, he approach the Prime Minister? At what level is he to come across his own representatives? Freedom has given the people the right to be governed ... by their own chosen people; at what point are the unfortunate victims of West Pakistan bureaucracy to come face to face with their own representatives, within the framework of his new administration? If that consummation has now become impossible then you cannot but arrive at the conclusion that these four crores of people in West Pakistan today are at the mercy of bureaucracy."¹⁹⁵⁸ But this was not the machinations of the bureaucracy, but

¹⁹⁵⁴ See C.A.D (Leg.), Vol. I, April 26, p. 867.

¹⁹⁵⁵ See particularly, N.A.D., Vol. I, February 15, 1957, pp. 421-456.

¹⁹⁵⁶ *Times*, September 11, 1956.

¹⁹⁵⁷ A supposed Aggrieved person.

¹⁹⁵⁸ N.A.D. Vol. II, April 18, 1957, p. 667. For ever-growing powers of the officials, See *Dawn*, December 1, 1955 and May 30, 1956.

the corollary of the accomplishment of the one-unit scheme essentially a political objective. Proper administrative reforms could always be fashioned after democratic requirements. But the fact remains, that the social ecology of West Pakistan was such that democratic control over bureaucracy was a difficult task as the latter held "the concentrated revenue and capital resources of the community."¹⁹⁵⁹ And the landlords who were also leading politicians in league with the officials virtually ruled the masses of the people. It was only strong, resourceful, *mass-based political parties* which could act as *countervailing* power against the *officialdom*. And the most redeeming feature in an otherwise baffling situation was described in the words of the *Manchester Guardian*: "In West Pakistan the Muslim League is slowly but firmly coming up"¹⁹⁶⁰—a submission we have also made elsewhere.

Unlike West Pakistan the bureaucratic sway in East Pakistan was not unchallenged. Contrary to the some of the areas of West Pakistan which were marked during British regime as non-regulated provinces, Bengal was a regulated one. And the Permanent Settlement Act largely freed the people from depending upon the officials in respect of revenue matter.¹⁹⁶¹ The passing of the State Acquisition Act (1951) was followed by further alleviation of the distress of the East Pakistani peasantry and their gaining more socio-political and economic freedom. The East Pakistanis from an early period had been accustomed to participating in the politics of local self-government. At independence, they demonstrated an added interest in politics. Bureaucratic rule could not prosper for long if democratic institutions were allowed a free play in East Pakistan. There had always been mass-backed political parties in East Pakistan to counterbalance the permanent services. If the once popular party, the M.L. had vanished into thin air its place was duly filled in by another popular organization, e.g. the A.L. The Chief Secretary Mr. N.M. Khan could not stay in the province to the displeasure of the U.F. Chief Minister¹⁹⁶²—a reverse example when the first Finance Minister of East Pakistan had to quit his office for which the then Secretary, Mr. Aziz Ahmed had positive contribution.¹⁹⁶³ Under the A.L. Administration (1956-58) the Services were well kept under political control. There could not be any temptation on the part of the officials to offend a popular government having "grass-root" foundation. The Chief Minister even went far enough to decree that the officials were prohibited from hobnobbing with party politicians to promote their interests and vice versa. The record of the politician-civil servant partnership during this period was fairly healthy.¹⁹⁶⁴

¹⁹⁵⁹ See Z.H. Zoberi, "The Problem of Governing Pakistan", *Eastern World* (June, 1955), p. 25.

¹⁹⁶⁰ See *Manchester Guardian*, August 17, 1958.

¹⁹⁶¹ O. Malley, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

¹⁹⁶² *New York Times*, October 26, 1955.

¹⁹⁶³ The writer was told by the ex-Minister himself.

¹⁹⁶⁴ For an illuminating discussion in regards to bureaucratic behavior vis-à-vis politicians in Pakistan in general and East Pakistan in particular, See A. Rahmen, *op.cit.*, pp. 113-177.

What then has really emerged from all our foregoing discussions? The Services reacted slowly to change. The contributions of the Services towards building the nation, particularly at the embryonic stage of Pakistan was commendable. But the administration also sagged under the strain of corruption, inefficiency and complacency. The vulnerable side was the relationship between the public servants and politicians. But, on balance, the former rendered themselves accountable to their political chiefs—save a number of aristocratic, egocentric, senior most civil servants—as the latter had also working rapport with the former. There is no foolproof evidence to suggest that the Services deliberately sabotaged the growth of parliamentarianism. But some of the practices of the administration were prejudicial to the growth of the parliamentary personality of the country. The D.C.s continued the earlier practice of deciding as to which political party was to hold a public meeting or take out a procession. There were a good many instances when the D.C.s withheld permission to such political exercises.¹⁹⁶⁵ And the maintenance of the huge establishment of the C.I.D. at the cost of large sums of money of which could not be scrutinized by the parliament mainly to watch potential enemies of Pakistan was also an incubus for the politicians;¹⁹⁶⁶ for, it was mostly they who were rightly or wrongly dogged after to be charge-sheeted later on. And in the absence of effective parliamentary control over the Services "during the decade after partition, the inner I.C.S—oriented bureaucracy reassembled, consolidated and enlarged its forces."¹⁹⁶⁷

But, side by side, the political development was also encouraging in that two major, mass-based political parties, the M.L. and A.L. from both parts of Pakistan were in the offing to act as the counter balancing power against the permanent establishment of the government. Then there was the judiciary which was ever willing "to rebuff the bureaucracy"¹⁹⁶⁸ in its excesses. What has been described as 'multiple foci of power and influence' vital to a democratic system were also developing. The private sector of the economy, the intelligentsia class outside of bureaucracy, various organized interest groups were also coming up¹⁹⁶⁹ to balance the bureaucratic sinews of power. The press was equally a great pointer to bureaucratic deviations and trespasses. But by far the greatest assurance could be obtained from the public servants themselves as they had the educational and intellectual capacity to fit themselves into the given requirements of the country. After all the socio-economic background of the majority of the public servants—including the C.S.P. cadre were middle-class and as such, according to Dr. G.A. H. Khan, "It is, therefore, but natural that this class should almost always be inclined to throw in its weight on the side of constitutional methods."¹⁹⁷⁰

¹⁹⁶⁵ See *Dawn*, December 4, 1955.

¹⁹⁶⁶ See Professor Chakravarty's speech, *C.A.D. (Leg.)*, Vol. II, January 4, 1950, p. 288; also F. Karim's speech, *N.A.D.*, Vol. II, March 4, 1958, pp. 770-771.

¹⁹⁶⁷ Braibanti, *op.cit.*, p. 381.

¹⁹⁶⁸ Birkhead, *op.cit.*, p. 71; also Braibanti, *op.cit.*, p. 409.

¹⁹⁶⁹ See Muneer Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 274; also M. Talukder, *op.cit.*, *The Pacific Affairs*.

¹⁹⁷⁰ Dr. G.A.H Khan, "The Development of Middle Class in Pakistan" (Seminar Paper) quoted in S.A. Jilani, *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (M.A. Thesis) The Punjab University, 1956, p. 77.

THE ARMY

Hobbes' saying that "covenants without swords are but words"¹⁹⁷¹ is a bitter truth in a political society. It is a crucial problem for any political government to bring military force under control. It is still crucial for the underdeveloped polities where political culture is at a low ebb. Like the civil bureaucracy, the military establishments were also farewell gifts of the departing British power. Perhaps, it is no more safe to emphasize that soldiers once trained in British tradition tend to be non-political, particularly on the context of what was prevailing in the surroundings of the Commonwealth countries. Apart from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the Naval Revolt in Bombay in 1946 the loyalty of the military force to the British regime had been unsullied and unimpeachable. A martial atmosphere had nourished the Muslims of the subcontinent for centuries, and the British, conscious of this Muslim attribute had built a powerful fighting army also a Navy and Air Force during the 2nd World War and more than 60 percent of its men came from areas which then formed West Pakistan.¹⁹⁷² This fighting machine gave a creditable account of itself in all the theatres of the two world wars and compelled admiration from the Kaiser, Rommel, Montgomery and Wavell.¹⁹⁷³

At independence, the army was split up like the country itself. But the reception accorded to the army by the partitioning countries i.e. India and Pakistan was psychologically significant. The army was dispassionately treated by the Indian politicians who, perhaps had Lord Salisbury's aphorism in mind: "If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large mixture of insipid commonsense."¹⁹⁷⁴ But in Pakistan the army was passionately idolized. Observers could see that in any national festivities in Pakistan there was hardly any display of industrial or agricultural accomplishments, nor a beauty parade. But an elaborate military parade was an imperative ritual. Crowds would, while watching, rain flower petals on the infantry, the sailors and even armored cars that roared by. What national resources Pakistan had might not be known to a sizeable portion of the populace, but any casual pedestrian or housewife would tell anybody that they had the army, the biggest asset. The battalions were named after the religious warriors of early centuries of Muslim history. Foreign observers were a little baffled at some non-military slogans by the soldiers, viz. *Allah-o-Akbar*,¹⁹⁷⁵ *Ya Ali*—a deterrent against Communism,¹⁹⁷⁶ thought an American newspaper when they would

¹⁹⁷¹ Quoted in Michael Howard (Edit.), *Soldiers and Governments* (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 11.

¹⁹⁷² *Times*, January 18, 1951.

¹⁹⁷³ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 7, 1953.

¹⁹⁷⁴ Howard, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁹⁷⁵ Allah is the greatest of all.

¹⁹⁷⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 7, 1953.

come to a combat position. But hidden lay the atavistic historical reality i.e. the essentially combatative, warlike and aggressive nature of the Pakistanis.¹⁹⁷⁷

Another immediate consideration was the psychopathic fear of Indian aggression the Kashmir issue, too was another factor – which prompted Pakistan to regard the army as the *Protector* of the nascent nation. In the budget session of 1949 the Finance Minister was on record as saying: "The requirements of defence has to be accorded precedence over all other expenditure, and no defence scheme of any importance was allowed to be affected by reasons of finance." This policy was continued uninterruptedly throughout the period from 1947 to 1958 and beyond. The Defence Secretariat was considered the most important and influential of the entire Pakistan government. The defence of the country ate up more than half of the budget money every year. At partition there were 3,374 army officers of which 584 were British who were retained to train the army.¹⁹⁷⁸ By 1951 the army became "the most efficient and closely integrated organization in the country."¹⁹⁷⁹ The nationalization of the army was complete by May, 1951. The breeding institution of army officers was the Military Academy at Kakul modelled after Sandhurst.

The Pakistan adoption of a positive foreign policy of involvement was a wholesome signal to the military forces in that the army was the greatest beneficiary. The massive dose of American Military Aid resulted in the army's being further retrained and rearmed with modern weapons. And in the last but one session of the parliament before martial law a complacent M.L. M. P. assured the House with these words: "as far as the Defence Forces are concerned, you may have spent a lot, but every penny that you have spent has given you value of a pound. It is a fact that it is one of the finest – one of the most patriotic, one of the most efficient, one of the most determined, and one of the technically expert armies in the world. (Applause)."¹⁹⁸⁰ The use of superlative degrees of the quoted statement apart, the fact remains that the army had become the most powerful, well-organized and well-kept institution holding an *independent power base* in society.

The question whether the army was politicized or non-political is to be approached cautiously, particularly in the face of instances like the abortive army coup of 1951 and the final army takeover of the government. The abortive army coup of 1951 was one of the greatest events of the country's short history in that some of the most high-placed persons and families were concerned. The secret trial which lasted many months resulted in the conviction of 11 important army officers. The record of the case comprised 4,000 pages including 1,000 pages containing the judgment and as many as

¹⁹⁷⁷ The Writer tends to apply this mainly to the then West Pakistanis.

¹⁹⁷⁸ *Times*, January 1, 1948.

¹⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, January 18, 1951.

¹⁹⁸⁰ *N.A.D.* Vol. II, March 3, 1958, p. 655.

1,300 important documents were produced before the tribunal.¹⁹⁸¹ But the salient point was that many of the questions asked at the time of disclosure of the plot remained unanswered. Was it believable that the army officers were akin to communism? What had the plot to do with Kashmir? Had the Russians a finger in the conspiracy?¹⁹⁸² But most enlightened guess would be that the driving cause of the abortive plot was mostly shared by a tiny minority of army officers who were completely cut off from the main stream of thought of the army as a whole, which was, no doubt, loyal to the political government. Gradually but imperceptibly the early loyalty of the army to the civilian government tottered as the latter showed various weaknesses in sharp contrast to the former's tight cohesion and ever-increasing firepower.

Actually, the force of various circumstances both national and international placed the army to the fore in Pakistan. In India the way the army was organized and allotted a place in the scheme of national activities by the politicians made it difficult for the army to develop extra-military ideas. Besides, the Indian "anti-militaristic" and "Non-Aligned" foreign policy also muzzled the inherent bellicosity of an army. Quite the contrary was the case with Pakistan. Unlike the Indian army, the Pakistan army though sharing the same origin, coursed through a different path following the partition of the subcontinent. The powerful military lobby always had the gullible politicians on its side, even in matters of broad policy, appertaining to military issues. Right from the start the army was given to understand that the civil administration would collapse if the former did not come to the rescue of the latter. The army had to be called in to tackle the avalanche of refugees that followed immediately after the independence. Was not the army there to quell the religious thuggery (1953) of anti-Ahmadyanism? Did not the army cater to the needs of the flood victims of East Pakistan in 1954? Did it not distribute food among the people of East Pakistan in 1956 when famine broke out? Who carried out the operation closed-door at the eastern border in 1957, but the Army? There was, however, nothing disagreeable about the army's being obliging to promote certain national causes in emergency when called upon to do so. But here also lay the germs of Caesarian ambition. For military seizure of power does not occur all on a sudden, but as the climax of its growing involvement in the domestic scene when "the military can blackmail governments out of existence."¹⁹⁸³

In the Pakistan situation the employment of army services for internal affairs was ingenious in all cases but the first one mentioned above the army involvement was largely initiated by General Mirza and the people could not discern the underlying message of it. Apparently, the impression gained ground among the people that the army was trusted to perform some of the functions which normally ought to have been done by the civil administrations. The army, however, was clearly drawn into politics when the army C-in-C, General Ayub, became the Minister of Defence in 1954 following

¹⁹⁸¹ See *Dawn* and *New York Times*, January 6, 1953.

¹⁹⁸² See *Manchester Guardian*, January 6, 1953 (Editorial) "Pakistan trial".

¹⁹⁸³ S.E. Finer, "Military Disengagement From Politics", *Institute of Commonwealth Studies*, 1966, p. 8.

the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I brought in its wake a first rate political crisis in the country, and the army support in the shape of General Ayub in the cabinet was deliberately engineered by the bureaucrats cum-politicians who were at the helm of affairs. The natural politicians had no other choice than to make the best of a bad bargain in a given situation. In fairness, the natural politicians had never used the army for partisan political purposes, The much publicized offer of an army takeover of the country's administration, if there was such an offer in reality, at all, which was allegedly made by the Governor General in 1954 and the Prime Minister in 1956 against the redoubtable refusal on the part of General Ayub¹⁹⁸⁴ was the act of two metamorphosed politicians who wanted to inject efficiency and discipline into the Pakistan body politic.

With the emergence of the second Constituent Assembly and the Constitution, General Ayub duly bowed out of the visible side of the arena of politics. But the irony was that "the pattern of government in Pakistan, with the Governor General later the President playing from the beginning an overt political role, worked to enlarge the implicit political significance of the military."¹⁹⁸⁵ Because, the Governor General—later the President, General Mirza himself being an old member of the British armed services¹⁹⁸⁶ felt spiritually kin to it, and, no doubt, harbored the desire of pulling his chestnuts of troubles out of the fire by the army, whenever such an occasion should arise.

This was precisely the case when martial law was declared in October, 1958 by General Mirza. One of the most baffling questions is why did the army comply with the Presidential decree, and having done so, why did it have the President eased out of the country, shortly afterwards? Was the so-called revolution a deliberate outcome of General Mirza's machinations or the usual pattern of army seizure of power that had been taking place in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries with rapid frequency, particularly in 1958? We have the strongest impression that the declaration of martial law was chiefly initiated by the President himself independently of army pressure,¹⁹⁸⁷ for, according to General Mirza "General Ayub is the greatest coward in uniform"¹⁹⁸⁸—a remark that was not without some validity. Sir P. Griffiths went to the heart of the matter when he penned an article saying "Two revolutions have taken place in three weeks ... the first of them was the less significant ... the first few days the administration was entirely civilian in character ... Gradually the army began to take a more active part in the business of government at all levels an army officer was put in parallel with the

¹⁹⁸⁴ Ayub, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-54.

¹⁹⁸⁵ *Times*, February 28, 1968 (Leader) "Must the military intervene in India?", Neville Maxwell.

¹⁹⁸⁶ He joined the I.P.S. later on, though.

¹⁹⁸⁷ Though, the C-in-C was surely kept in touch.

¹⁹⁸⁸ The writer was told by General Mirza himself in 1969 at his London residence.

civilian official, and day to day affairs began to be more and more controlled by inexperienced army officers ... *The disappearance of General Mirza diminished this hope.*¹⁹⁸⁹

General Mirza's love for the army was utilitarian. As the supreme C-in-C of Pakistan armed forces he decreed martial law and the army's obedience was the fulfillment of a legal order in its apparent and immediate sense. General Mirza wanted to reinforce his political position under the glare of military forces and to convince the politicians how essential he was in the scheme of things. Once he could have managed to have, perhaps, his way, he would have immediately withdrawn martial law and restored the country to normalcy the letter he wrote in reply to the British Prime Minister, Mr. McMillan corroborates this point of his willingness to withdraw martial law sooner. General Mirza himself showed anxiety for his legal position by a reference to the Chief Justice of Pakistan, who in an act of a last salvation operation and presumably to contain the powers of the chief martial law administrator—General Ayub—opined that, despite the abrogation of the Constitution General Mirza "remains the country's lawful President".¹⁹⁹⁰ Moreover, within three days of the so-called revolution the jurisdiction of all courts of law was restored.¹⁹⁹¹ Like a hero of a western film General Ayub proved himself the 'fastest gun' and struck General Mirza before he could unfold his designs. For once martial law was proved a success General Ayub could no longer play second fiddle to the President being the C-in-C of the army, as his concept of democracy was as good as that of Mirza's differing only in methodology. So he crowned himself on a second thought and governed the country for a period of well-nigh 4 years with martial law before he could invent a convenient facade of democratic institution to legitimize his regime.

This we say only to emphasize that the army takeover in Pakistan had an *individualistic* orientation rather than *collective* in that the army as a whole was not committed to the design in the sense that the politicized and indoctrinated soldiers of some of the Afro-Asian, Latin American and Middle eastern countries rationalized their usurping the governmental rein as an input side of political or economic development in the garb of some make-shift ideologies. Then why did the Pakistan army concur with a design it did not subscribe to collectively? That is precisely the point. In the first place the rank and file of the army were kept completely in the dark about the plot save three general Staff Officers. Even, were they in the know it would not have mattered much. Firstly, the sociology of the army was distinctly homogeneous. The East Pakistanis were insignificantly represented in the army because of their alleged non-martial nature. In regard to the Sindhi people the current saying was that "they are just good enough to bite off the noses of their wives when they catch them with another man but soldiers

¹⁹⁸⁹ *Sunday Times*, November 8, 1958 (Leader) "Pakistan Revolutions" Sir Percival Griffiths; See also *Manchester Guardian*, October 10, 1958 - General Ayub called the regime as "Presidential-cum-military".

¹⁹⁹⁰ *Dawn*, October 11, 1958 (Editorial) "Revolution".

¹⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

never".¹⁹⁹² As a result the armed forces were preeminently comprised of the Punjabis, Pathans and some Baluchis, and devoid of heterogeneous elements. And the elite corps i.e. the top brass army officers mainly hailed from the higher reaches of the Punjab and Pathan environment—an intake of Bengali officers would have incorporated restraining traits into the armed forces.

Undoubtedly, an input of Bengalis in the army would have retained *federal balance* and fostered restraint and sobering effect. Consequently, the military establishments would have crystallized into a *national* one thus maintaining *federal equilibrium*. This homogenous character of the army greatly facilitated the unity of action and, no doubt, gave rise to regional particularly East Pakistan—suspicion, jealousy and resentment. Perhaps, the political history would have been wrenched into different direction had there been a truly *federal army*. Secondly, the British tradition of military discipline and respect for hierarchical order left an indelible mark upon the Pakistan army. The dictum that 'the orders from the top down and obedience from the bottom up' was imbued in Pakistan tradition of soldiery. The validity of such an assertion is the fact that till now there has been no rise of "young Turks" among the army rank and file. The C-in-C was the symbol of the army and was obeyed by it unhesitatingly. This is to say the participation on the part of the army as a whole in the so-called revolution was *mechanical* not ideological. In other words, the army as a whole was not politicized or indoctrinated. It lent support mechanically to the High Command which brought about a revolution motivated by indigenous and promiscuous cause, personal, regional class, or corporate etc., rather than positive ones. When we say the army intervention of 1958 had no positive content we mean that its authors did not add any new values to the input side of political development, other than nuisance. Even a conservative evaluation should not dismiss Pakistan of 1958 as a society where, what according to Professor Finer's general diagnosis of military intervention "a crude order of political culture" prevailed so as to prompt the 'men on the horseback' to ride on to the Pakistan political arena.

The army came to power as it was strong and held fire power. Its entry into power did not even fit Hobbes' dictum about "clubs (army) being trumps in politics whenever no other card is agreed upon",¹⁹⁹³ as substantial consensus on national issues was achieved. It did not take advantage of its political position to bring about some meaningful changes in the social system to the benefit of the greatest number of the people like the land reform for whose purpose the parliamentary system of government was, by nature, hamstrung. The much-vaunted land reforms under martial law did not palpably change the pattern of ownership of the cultivated area—only 0.7 million acres were transferred to the ownership of tenants on payments in installments out of 2.3 million

¹⁹⁹² *Manchester Guardian*, January 8, 1955 (Leader) "Pakistan in Transition" II, Taya Zinkin.

¹⁹⁹³ Quoted in D.A. Rostow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics" in Sydney N. Fisher (edit.), *The Military in Middle East* (Ohio State University Press, 1963, p. 12.

acres which were acquired by the government.¹⁹⁹⁴ The land reforms were of little value when high ceilings on holdings were considered. And the worst part of it was that contrary to the recommendations of the Land Reforms Commission, state lands were distributed among the high officials, civil and military on liberal terms, at the expense of the peasant proprietors. As a result, "a new class of absentee landlords has been created ... and ... landlordism as an institution has been strengthened and has struck deeper and firmer roots in the bureaucracy and in the seats of political power."¹⁹⁹⁵ In sum, it was a case of *Gresham's law of army intervention* in Pakistan politics; and whatever form of government came into being as a result of that, at best it continued the work of the parliamentary regime in the socio-economic field with an aura of publicity, at worst, it clogged the life blood of freedom and creativity from circulating the body politic of Pakistan.

Then what were the sum total effects of the army intervention upon the future of Pakistan and parliamentary democracy? It did, no doubt, put a stop to the continuity of parliamentarianism. The post 1958 periods borne out one fact, in that the army was not regarded as *deus ex machina*. The country was demilitarized in 1962 when the new constitution was put into motion. The system of government offered by General Ayub was not accepted by the country with universal glee. The regime was still a 'suspect' to the people's eye and under the pressure of popular demands and movements mainly led by Suhrawardy many parts of the Constitution were democratized till at last in 1969 General Ayub completely surrendered to the phenomenal surge of popular movement led by the undisputed leader, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The army did not bail out its former chief from his political troubles, as the army chief General Yahiya seemingly refused to be drawn into politics.¹⁹⁹⁶ When General Yahiya imposed martial law (March 26, 1969), in the country General Ayub had to go in circumstances comparable to those associated with the exit of General Mirza. The declaration of the second martial law was qualitatively different, though not on the ground that the second dictator was bound to be a weaker one.

The second army intervention was again denuded of any revolutionary doctrinaire content, and unlike General Ayub, General Yahiya did not threaten to usher in a new system of government which he thought would be understandable to the people. On the contrary, he edicted dismemberment of the one-unit system and representation in the parliament on a population basis¹⁹⁹⁷ – the two most violently important popular demands since the dawn of the first martial law. In addition, he announced general elections for October, 1970¹⁹⁹⁸ steps towards the formation of a Constituent Assembly, a

¹⁹⁹⁴ Chowdhury Mohammad Ali "Pakistan's Economic Development", *op.cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹⁷ *The Sunday Times*, December 7, 1969 (Leader) "Army hold trump in Pakistan's house of cards". Neville Maxwell.

¹⁹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Constitution and subsequent making over power to civilian authority. The subsequent events and the diabolical role played by army in collusion with some *Byzantium* politicians of West Pakistan liquidating former Pakistan will be dealt with by the author in his forthcoming books mentioned earlier. As far as this period – 1947-58 is concerned the army did not appear to be revolutionary or doctrinaire like some of the countries belonging to Africa, Middle East or Latin America. It only had an axe to grind in the sphears of *corporate* and *regional* interest. Unequivocally, the army of Pakistan had no moral claim, like the armies of Burma, Spain, Algeria and Turkey which laid the foundation of their states, to be the arbiter of national issues other than a sheer stabilizing factor.

EPILOGUE

The pre-independence constitutional development in the Indian sub-continent during the British regime provided a political infrastructure from which the new states, namely India and Pakistan were to take-off, when powers were handed over to them. The British, at the outset, did not introduce representative institutions in India to the full requirements of the Westminster system, since the sub-continent was devoid of a viable, participating political community. In the words of Dr. Spear, the British accomplished a series of "enabling"¹⁹⁹⁹ plans in the sub-continent to organize its economic and political lives. Prior to independence, India did undergo and experience various crucial tests of political nature desiderative to self-government.

The principals of parliamentary institution were put into motion in India by 'Convention, precedents and statutes'. They were percolated through the filter of political evolution rather than developed in a moment. The effects of the constitutional developments initiated by a hosts of Acts, such as those of 1853, 1861, 1892, 1909 1919 and 1935,²⁰⁰⁰ oozed into the body politic of the sub-continent. Those statutes were the political landmarks towards the flowering of responsible parliamentary government in the subcontinent. This witnessed a palpable change in the ecology of society, the emergence of a solid middle class, business community, increasing literacy and an ever-rising political consciousness. The building up of political structure necessary for successful parliamentary government, on the eve of independence was quite commendable. The educated middle class, the business and student community, the intelligentsia and the legal profession demonstrably developed a sense of belonging to the Westminster system.

The graceful transfer of power in the subcontinent was unique in colonial history. The political legacy of India pertaining to Self-Government within the framework of the Westminster system agreeably coincided with the transfer of power.²⁰⁰¹ India has maintained the parliamentary tradition, so far, though not ideally. But why was the parliamentary situation topsy-turvied in the former Pakistan?

¹⁹⁹⁹ Percival Spear, *India Pakistan, and the West* (Oxford University Press : 1949), p. 149.

²⁰⁰⁰ Particularly the last three measures were of immense value.

²⁰⁰¹ For the history of constitutional developments and transfer of power in India see, Coupland, R., *Report on the India Constitutional Problem*, part I & II (Oxford University Press: 1943) & *India, A Restatement*, (Oxford University Press: 1945); Coatman, J., *India: The road to self-government*, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1942); Keith, A.B., *A Constitutional History of India*, (Metunen & Ltd., 1936); Morris-Jones, W.H., *Parliament in India* (Longmans: 1957); Lumby, E.W.R., *The Transfer of Power in India*, (George Allen and Unwin 1954); Menon, V.P., *The Transfer of Power in India* (Preinceton: 1957); Mosley, L., *The Last days of the British Raj*, (New York 1962); Hodson, H.V., *The Great Divide* (Hutchinson & Co.: 1969) etc., etc.

The Muslim political consciousness in India was a belated one. It surfaced in the last quarter of the 19th century. The Muslim landlords and the westernized middle and upper classes formed the nucleus of the Muslim nationalist movement which culminated in the formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. But the main activities of the M.L. clustered around the solitary goal i.e., the advancement of Muslim rights and privileges, rather than mastering the art of Self-Government. From 1937 onward, the M.L. was smarting under the psychic fear of Hindu dominion and wrenched its activities towards demanding a separate land for Muslim in India, meaning Pakistan.²⁰⁰²

What was the position of the Muslim majority provinces in India which later comprised the territory of Pakistan? The M.L. in 1937 was not a mass party the way the Congress was. The elections in 1937—under the Act of 1935—in Bengal were fought by the M.L. in an atmosphere of disunion among the Muslim leaders. In fact, the M.L. won only 40 seats out of 119 Muslim seats.²⁰⁰³ Mr. Haq formed a coalition government.²⁰⁰⁴ Because of Haq's coming closer to the M.L. there was some fleeting moment of Muslim solidarity and stability in the Ministry. Soon Haq incurred the displeasure of the M.L. After the resignation of Haq in 1943, Sir Nazimuddin (M.L.) formed a new Ministry only to be defeated himself in the House in March 1945, and Governor's rule was imposed. In the 1946 elections the M.L. captured 116 out of the 119 Muslim seats and Suhrawardy (M.L.) formed the new Ministry. Soon personal rivalries crept up, and Sir Nazimuddin became the leader of the M.L. Assembly party and later the new Chief Minister of East Bengal when the partition of Bengal took place in 1947.

In the Punjab Assembly the Unionist Party was dominant—the M.L. won only two seats in the elections of 1937. In the elections of 1946, the M.L. secured 79 out of 86 Muslim seats, but the Unionist party with the support of the Congress formed a coalition government. The M.L. took recourse to civil disobedience movements and the Unionist Ministry succumbed to violence in March 1947. Sindh became a brand-new province only under the India Act of 1935. The Sindh legislature had 34 Muslim seats out of a total of 60 members. Sindh was the sink of personal rivalries among the Muslim landlords. The rival political dramatis personae were Sir Hidayatullah, Allah Baksh, Bande Ali Khan, G.M, Syed and I. Khuhro. When the M.L. obtained 29 seats out of 34 Muslim seats the basic political situation did not improve as the Ministry remained notoriously instable throughout.²⁰⁰⁵ The N.W.F.P. until 1902 had different administrative arrangements compared to other provinces which had been subjected to

²⁰⁰² For details see, Husain Mahmood, (ed.) *The History of Freedom Movement* Vols. I-III, (Pakistan Historical Society: 1957); Chowdhury Mohammed Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Columbia University: 1967); Khaliqzaman, C., *Pathway to Pakistan*, (Longmans: 1961); Sayeed, K.B., *Pakistan: The Formative phase* (Pakistan Publishing House: 1960), etc., etc.

²⁰⁰³ Coupland, R., *Report on the constitutional problem in India*, (Oxford University Press: 1943) Part II, p. 27.

²⁰⁰⁴ With the Khasi Proza, the scheduled caste, non-congress caste Hindus.

²⁰⁰⁵ Coupland *op.cit.*, Part II, p. 42, 67.

constitutional reforms from time to time. Since the election of 1937 the Congress was dominant in the province. In the elections of 1946, Dr. Khan came out victorious and a Congress Ministry was formed. Eventually, the province voted overwhelmingly for Pakistan on a referendum which took place in July 1947. And finally the Congress Ministry was dismissed in August, 1947 by Jinnah. British Baluchistan was ruled by the tribal Jirga system. The states of Kalat, Makran, Las Bella and Karan did not experience any political reforms in their regions. The princely states such as, Khairpur, Bahawalpur, Chitral, Amb, Dir and Swat, which acceded to Pakistan after independence, had no iota of experience in the art of responsible government. In short, the Muslim majority areas of the then India which formed the geography of Pakistan, on balance, did not have much training in the art of parliamentary system of government.

Prior to 1940, the Muslims of the sub-continent did not have mass-based political parties. The elections of the Muslim majority provinces were fought on personal and communal lines rather than on political programme. When the Muslim political awareness reached to its zenith around 1945-1946 it was fundamentally orientated towards one transcending cause, namely the carving out of the sub-continent a haven for the Muslim community. The vision of Pakistan captured the mind of the Muslim leaders and for that matter the masses and the M.L. became the "Nationalistic-coalition" of heterogeneous Muslim groups. The M.L. leadership did not envisage in detail a full social, economic, political and ideological programme for the future state, Pakistan. The Muslim leadership was solely engrossed in the struggle for achieving Pakistan, rather than in the art of self-government, and all other considerations, vis-à-vis the potential new state, were left to the future. So, when Pakistan came into being in August, 1947 it had the marginal characteristics of a developed polity. But when considered on a broader socio-psychological approach to the concept of political development, we should grant that Pakistan during the period 1947-1958, registered tangible improvements characteristic of a developed polity.

The first significant index of political development was Pakistan's achieving a general ideological consensus and resolution of regional cleavages in the country. During the period 1951-1954 three successive formulas were presented by the B.P.C. of the Constituent Assembly I. But disagreements among regional leaders frustrated the emergence of national consensus. Nevertheless, the years 1947-1954 were not altogether barren. They paved the way for future developments, as the errors of 1947-1954 were not repeated by the Second Constituent Assembly. The period 1954-1958 was definitely an improvement upon the preceding one, 1947-1954. The former period was creative and productive.

On the question of integrative institution-building, the amalgamation of all units of West Pakistan into one unified province was a political landmark. The formula of parity between the two wings in all matters and the machineries for implementing it were

duly incorporated in the constitution. Proper machinery for deciding disputes over secular versus Islamic issues were also envisaged by the constitution. In sum the Constitution of 1956 laid the foundation of Pakistan nationhood.

The period 1956-1958 witnessed further strengthening of institutions which were created. The one-unit scheme was further solidified. The centrifugal forces were not all negative and the grievances of the former smaller units of West Pakistan were attended to. The perennial demand for provincial autonomy had always been there as a constant *countervailing pressure*, but it was never unbridled, unreasonable and out of bound. The controversy over the definition of the Pakistan state, whether it would be secular or Islamic was also finally solved with the ushering of a joint electorate system. It can be thus maintained that within the period 1954-1958, the regional and ideological cleavages were greatly resolved paving the way for a 'Common value orientation' – the desideratum for a developed polity.

Apart from this, there occurred a significant change in the political system, in that the early domination of the Services was on the wane. The Hindus which were looked upon with jaundiced eye in the early period were given a sense of partnership with the majority community in the use of political power. Important national leaders developed a national outlook far above the level of subnationalism. The political development was also visible in another directions, in that various groups of people with different interests took an associational character to push forward to their causes²⁰⁰⁶ a moving away from the anomalistic representation of grievances.

Similarly, the parliament in the period 1956-1958 made some headway towards the right direction.²⁰⁰⁷ What is more, the trends were identifiable in that, the two parties namely, the M.L. and A.L. were emerging as the two major political parties of Pakistan. We have a hunch that if general election could have taken place in early 1958, the popular support for the two major parties would have been reflected in the legislatures of the country which might have acted as deterrent to army take-over. However, despite all these achievements towards political development, Pakistan could not retain the parliamentary apparatus on the Westminster model, not because she was incapacitated by any built-in causes or intrinsically disorientated toward parliamentary institution, but because some small group of people who happened to have their fingers on the triggers of power, had no commitment to democratic institutions. This small group of people who veered round the President Mirza sabotaged the working of the parliamentary government in Pakistan.

²⁰⁰⁶ See *op.cit.*, Maniruzzaman, pp. 17-35.

²⁰⁰⁷ See The author's book, Shamsul Huda Harun. *The Parliamentary behaviour in a multi-national state* (Bangladesh Asiatic Society), 1987.

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PERSON'S INTERVIEWED BY THE WRITER

Azizoor Rahman Shah

A prominent Muslim league leader of East Pakistan

Abdul Qaiyum Khan

Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P (1947-53), President of the M.L. (1957-58).

Ayub Khuhro

Chief Minister of Sindh (Several Times).

Ambrose, Sir Dandrus

Inspector General, Frontier Corps, (1945-47), Sometimes acting Governor of The N.W.F.P.

***Bourne, Sir Frederick**

Governor of East Bengal (1947-50)

Begum Liaquat

The wife of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Begum Taz

Wife to the A.D.C. of the Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammed.

Bhutto Zulfikar Ali

A leader of the Sindhi Youth Front, (Later Central Foreign Minister under Ayub's regime and then President and Prime Minister of Pakistan)

**** Chowdhury Mohammad Ali**

The Prime Minister of Pakistan (1955-56)

Chowdhury G.W.

Head, Department of Political Science, University of Dacca, now a Central Minister

Daulatana Mamtaz

Chief Minister of the Punjab (1951-53)

Dewan Mahboob

A Prominent N.A.P. Leader.

Ezaz Ahmed

A high ranking C.S.P. officer.

***Gurmani M. Ahmed**

Governor, West Pakistan (1955-57)

Hamidul Haq Chowdhury

Member Constituent Assembly I (1947-54), M.P. (1955-58), East Pakistan Finance Minister (1947-49), and a prominent K.S.P. leader.

Haq, Dr. Mazharul A

An advisor to the State Bank of Pakistan.

Ispahani, Hasan

A diplomat, politician, writer and an industrialist.

***Lady V. Noon**

Wife to the last Prime Minister of Pakistan Sir Feroz Khan Noon.

***Mudie, Sir Francis**

Governor of Sindh (1946-47) and the Punjab (1947-49)

Mujiboor Rahman Sheikh

A Prominent leader of the Awami League (General Secretary) Later on Bangabandhu, the archived of independent Bangladesh.

Mustaqu Ahmed Khondakar

A Leader of the Awami League (Vice President)

****Mirza Iskander**

President of Pakistan (1956-58)

Monem Khan

Member, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan I, later Governor of East Pakistan during Ayub's regime.

Moudoodi Allama

Amir, Jamat-i-Islami Party, a foremost religious leader.

Musa Mohammed

A top C.S.P Officer

Moshiur Rahman

A Prominent N.A.P. Leader

***Moon, Sir Feroze**

Prime Minister of Pakistan, (1957-58)

Raja of Mahmoodabad

A prominent old time Muslim Leaguer, a close associate to Mr. Jinnah.

Sultanuzzaman, M.

Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministries of law and of parliamentary affairs, (1951-58)

***Nelson, Sir Edward**

A high ranking C.S.P. officer.

Shoobert, Sir Harold

Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Health (1949), and Ministry of Communication (1950-51)

Syed Amjad Ali

A diplomat, politician and industrialist. Central Finance Minister (1955-58)

Wahiduzzaman

Member, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947-54), later a Central Minister under the regime of Ayub.

Youssof Haroon

A diplomat, politician and industrialist.

Zafrullah, Sir Khan

Central Foreign Minister of Pakistan, (1947-53).

* One asterisk indicates that the Writer corresponded with them only, whereas two asterisks indicate that the writer had both interviews and correspondences with them.

True Copies of excerpts from original letters

APPENDIX - 1

.... is specially bad. It is a factory for producing anti Pakistan and subversive elements. The feeling against the west is being persistently created by the professors and lecturers some of whom, I understand, are extreme communists. It is surprising that quite a few of them come from Calcutta and amongst the real bad ones Muslims preponderate. They are really working for their masters in India. A Mahasabite and communalist in India, on arriving here, becomes a communist but both work for the same end—the destruction of Muslims and disintegration of Pakistan.

APPENDIX-2

11. The lesson of the general elections held in India where the congress emerged victorious because of the many parties opposing it, was noted and it was realized that unless there was unity amongst the various parties opposing the Muslim League, their chances of success were slender.

12. In June, 1953 the East Bengal Provincial Organizing committee adopted a resolution on the method of forging the United Democratic Front as envisaged in the Draft Programme of the Party issued in 1951. The P.O.C. held that a stable United Democratic Front could be forged amongst the parties who had an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist outlook.

APPENDIX - 3

17. The motives which prompted the C.P. of East Bengal to forge this party are part of a general plan. In the book "Organizational weapon"—a study in Bolshevik strategy and tactics the term "United Front" is explained as follows:—

18. 'To assert this so-called interest in other peoples' problems, the Bolshevik frequently resorts to the tactics of the United front. This offers many opportunities to pursue his assorted but inter-related Bolshevik aims, access to sources of power and the opportunity to train agents.

APPENDIX - 4

EFFORTS OF THE C.P. TO INFILTRATE IN THE UNITED FRONT.

19. having succeeded in the efforts to form the United Front the C.P. called for the observance of "United front Day" on 4-12-53. Being closely concerned with the growth of the East Pakistan A.M.L. since its inception, the C.P. had many powerful friends in

the newly formed Joint Front. It went about very cleverly in selecting its unknown workers and getting them nominated to contest the elections on the joint platforms.

APPENDIX - 5

20. The idea of establishing an all parties anti-Muslim League workers' camp, called the "Karmi sibir", was mooted for the first time in a document issued by the East Bengal P.O.C. On 18-12-53 captioned "Election affairs and our immediate task".

APPENDIX - 6

14. There are Communist cells in almost all industrial concerns and in colleges. Good many professors and lecturers who come from Calcutta are communists. The main plank of attack by Communists is on parochial lines. They are bolstering up a provincial Ideology and anti west and anti

Urdu. The American Consulate here the other day was given notice to discharge all Urdu speaking employees. American Military Aid is attacked day in and day out. Indian newspapers are the greatest supporters of Communist activities in this province. In fact most of...

APPENDIX-7

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

Do. No, 127/PS

Dated the 26th July, 1954.

Your Excellency,

This is the fourth letter of the series. LAW AND ...

2. Improvement continues though I have kept the Army deployed. If the problem was one of East Bengal alone, I would have allowed normal re-grouping but I have to keep one eye on west Bengal specially Calcutta. I don't think Delhi now wants trouble, but west Bengal has not accepted the separation of East Bengal and, if not actually encouraging disruptionist activities, is not at all unhappy to canalize the Communists towards us, and the length of the border is such that infiltration is not difficult. Active agitation against 92-A is to-day in Calcutta and Agarthala. The frenzy of the Calcutta Hindu Press is unabated despite protests by us. The theme is the same. America is supposed to have compelled us to take action under Section 92-A and I am supposed to have established a Military administration.

APPENDIX - 8

15. The political scene in East Bengal upto this time was confused. There were several parties who sought to contest the elections independently. The most important of these were the Awami Muslim League and the Krishak Sramik party. The latter party was led by Mr. A. K. Fazlul Huq and mainly consisted of Muslim league secessionists while the Awami Muslim League led by Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy was composed of energetic young men with leftist tendencies.

16. Realizing the immense popularity enjoyed by Mr. Huq in the country and the obvious advantages in uniting with him, Mr. Suhrawardy desired to form a United Front consisting mainly of these two parties. But due to the unceasing efforts of Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani it was decided to include in this Front all parties who were opposed to the Muslim League and this party finally came into being on 4-12-53.

17. It had powerful friends in Maulana Bhasani and Sh. Mujibur Rahman and a section of the younger elements with leftist tendencies who were pillars of strength to the party. The danger of the infiltration was not recognized before, much less during the elections. The communists did not openly enter the party as communists, but invariably under the guise of men belonging to some other party.

18. The part played by the party in the formation of the United Front had gained for it many friends, chief amongst whom was Maulana Bhashani. This gentleman seems to have been impressed.....

THOSE WHO OPPOSED.

19. The old guard of the A.M.L. Led by Messrs H.S. Suhrawardy and Abdus Salam Khan, Mr. Fazlul Huq and his supporters of the K.S.P., Mr. Abdul Hashem of the Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party, Mr. Ashrafuddin Ahmad Chaudhury of Nizam-e-Islam and Maulana Ather Ali of Jamiatul Ulma-e-Islam were vehemently opposed to the inclusion of the party in the United front. They were apprehensive of the machinations of the C.P. and feared that this would give a handle to the Muslim League to discredit the front and carry on adverse propaganda in the country. It was also feared and with good reason that the aggressive and vociferous tactics of the C.P. would push in the background the older parties and their leaders specially as the communists had able and disciplined members who knew what they wanted and were determined to get it. The C.P. was officially kept out of the United Front.

APPENDIX-9

..... the active agitation against 92-A and pro Fazlul Huq is today concentrated in Calcutta.

15. The Communist menace has deep roots and Islamic approach will not eradicate it. If Pakistan has decided to line up with the anti Communist forces and this is the only logical corollary to accepting American Military Aid and Turko Pakistan Pact, then the only safe course is to ban the Communist Party as an unlawful organization. We cannot tinker with the problem nor play politics with the Communist as Mr. Amin did to his cost.

POLITICAL.

APPENDIX - 10

.... an off-shoot of the Communist Party of India. It takes its directives from Calcutta and the west Bengal Government are quite happy to canalize the activities of their Communists towards East Bengal. It has its ramifications in Colleges, Schools and Labor Unions. We asked the Central Government for an all Pakistan ban on this party on June 7th but as the problem is not really serious in west Pakistan and does not present any law and order problem there, we interpreted the time lapse as one indicating that the Centre were not keen on accepting our request, and we banned the Communist Party in East Bengal under the Criminal Law Amendment Act. We regard this problem as purely a law and order problem, while from a telegram received from the Cabinet Secretariat it seems that the Cabinet regard it as a major political problem.

APPENDIX - 11

Take to the villages the call of the integrity of Pakistan, then dissolve the Assembly and have fresh elections. Right thinking people should fight under the appellation of Pakistan Front. You may be able to resuscitate the Muslim League sometime in the future but not early.

This letter has grown longer than I expected but I hope it would not bore your excellency.

APPENDIX - 12

11. Government must seriously consider the problem of Communists. Nowhere in the world are Communists tackled through the medium of the ordinary Police or Police

Intelligences. In America there is the FBI; in England there is the MI(5). We must waste no time in creating an organization controlled centrally to deal with the Communists. The head of this organization must be a first class man and must be sent to America to study methods of anti-Communist operations. To do this he must have a complete knowledge of how the Communists operate. In America a very deep study of all this has been made and the Americans have promised to place all their knowledge and research at our disposal.

APPENDIX - 13

.... vast numbers that its loss should not seriously hurt our economy. All I can assure Your Excellency is that whatever is humanly possible will be done. I cannot say I am not worried. We were getting control. We had created confidence and the 92-A administration was getting popular amongst the masses as opposed to the politicals. Now we will be judged by our flood relief operations—a gigantic task but I am optimistic as the officers are working with enthusiasm and determination. I would beg the Centre not to give more money than absolutely necessary. This system of doles will make this nation a nation of 'Shukrana Khors" and this must be avoided at all costs. If we need more money, we will ask for it. But we would prefer help in kind rather than in cash.

APPENDIX - 14

16. There is very considerable activity amongst politicians. I came here in the hope that as soon as administration was stabilized, I would be able to do something to form a Government from amongst the United Front. But I have been completely disillusioned. It is my considered opinion that the United Front leaders are the enemies of Pakistan and cannot be trusted.....


APPENDIX - 15

It is for this reason I have so far desisted from taking harsh measures against the students. Nobody will be more unhappy than me if I have to shoot, but if Pakistan's integrity is endangered, I will shoot and shoot till the last round. But believe me Excellency, Pakistan's integrity can only be maintained for all times to come, if we are able to solve the economic and human difficulties of these simple and sentimental people here. The officers you send here must have qualities of sympathy and humanity to a very high degree.

10. Finally, I request Your Excellency to have the possibility of reserving as much land as possible in Sindh and the Punjab for emigrants from East Pakistan. If this is possible, I suggest an announcement to this effect should be made by the Prime Minister from

Karachi. This would not only relieve economic pressure in this province, but will also demonstrate that Karachi is keenly interested in the well-being of the people of this Province.....

Yours sincerely,



(Iskander Mirza)

Yours sincerely,
(Iskander Mirza)

His Excellency Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, Governor General of Pakistan, Camp ABBOTTABAD.

APPENDIX - 16

17. The introduction of adult franchise was the biggest crime against the integrity of Pakistan. The fact is that since the inception of Pakistan this part of the world has been the happy hunting ground of the professional politicians. 98% of the population has been exploited and ruined for the benefit of the remaining 2%. These are hard words and a severe criticism of the existing state of affairs.

APPENDIX - 17

(12) SHAIKH MUJIB-UR-REHMAN. Has been in prison several times, Is a remarkably good organizer. Has guts. Holds extreme views in politics. Is an experienced agitator. May be described as the stormy petrel of the Awami League. A dangerous gentleman who is best in jail.

APPENDIX - 18

The union is practically controlled by the Dacca D.O.C. of the C.P. One Sunil Kumar Ray carried on organisational work amongst the mill laborers: (b) L.N.C. Mills workers union.

This union is also controlled by the Dacca D.O.C. of the C.P. The Assistant Secretary of this union is Lutfar Rahman, a prominent C.P. member. There is a C.P. cell in this union and workers are taught communism.

(c) Home Transport workers' union.

This union came under the influence of the C.P. and the party has succeeded in forming a cell in the workshop to preach communist doctrines amongst the workers. The prominent C.P. workers are:—

Shamsul Huq (Cp) – General Secretary.
Shahaj uddin (Cp) – Treasurer of the union.

(d) Printing press workers union

The C.P. preponderates in this union. The party workers viz Kali Das Chakrabarty, Habibur Rahman and Abdul Jalil have been deputed to work within the union. C.P. literature is distributed amongst the workers The office bearers of the union are: –

President – Khundkar Ghulam Mustafa (Cp)

Vice-president – Habibur Rahman (Cp)

Secretary – Abdul Jalil (Cp)

(e) East Pakistan Railway Employees League

In March 1954 Abdus Samad (Cp) formed a party cell in the East Pakistan Railway Employees League under the direct guidance of the Dacca D.O.C. of the C.P. The following persons have been selected to do party work amongst the members of the League: –

(1) Md. Serajul Huq (Cp supporter)

(2) Shahar Ali (Cp)

(3) Suna Miah

(4) Nuruddin (Cp)

(5) Abdul karim (Cp supporter)

President of the EPREL is Maulana Bhasani.

APPENDIX- 19

The communist prisoners detained in the various jails have drawn up a code of conduct for themselves and are following it systematically.. Study classes, cultural classes and discussions are held where Marx-Lenin-Stalinist philosophy is discussed. Physical exercise has not been over-looked. Attempts to establish link between security prisoners in jail and comrades outside continue.

APPENDIX - 20

All the machinations of the politicians and specially of the U. F. Ministers. The officer from the west considers himself a superior being. This is an unpardonable offence and has done incalculable harm to Pakistan. I will eradicate this even if I have to take the most severe disciplinary action. The Nurul Amin Ministry went about the other way. Being aware of its administrative inefficiency, it pampered the officers. There were no rules for touring and if there were, nobody worried about them. District Magistrates never did court work, criminal or revenue. How they got to know their districts is an enigma to me. The calibre of the officers too is extraordinarily low. In British days the majority would not have rise beyond a Deputy Magistrate.

APPENDIX -21

..... inevitable in a political setup where the politicians idea of administration is to make the police dance to their tune. It will take time to get the police Force of 40,000 men to a reasonable state of efficiency. We must start by getting the officers to look after the men. Habits of high police officers are bad. They expect lavish entertainments from their subordinates when on tour. Naturally the subordinates expect entertainment from villagers and in the end the hard pressed peasant pays. Police are starting a cooperative store on the lines of the Army canteen. I only hope it will run as honestly and efficiently otherwise the cure will be worse than the disease.

APPENDIX - 22

THE UNITED FRONT LEADERS.

(1) Mr. Fazlul Huq

..... Corrupt, unreliable and out & out enemy of Pakistan. He was chairman of a company of cheats who swindled the poor of lacs of rupees. I am having this case examined and will run him in if a prima facie case is disclosed. His game was a simple one and reports are that he got substantial sums from Hindus and promises of unlimited amounts. He had ideas of declaring the independence of East Pakistan and in the resultant chaos to invite west Bengal to march in and face the world with a united Bengal. It is because of this plan the creation of posts at Murshidabad and Burdwan is becoming clearer. I was very puzzled to start with D-day was to be between June 6th and 16th. The influx of Marwaris during the U.F. regime was tremendous. Unfortunately I cannot prove anything as the old man is quite wily.

(2) BHASHANI.

Though not in the Ministry was able to lead the U.F. Ministry by the nose. A mob leader per excellence, and if he had a few months more, he would have destroyed all the industries. The job he was given to play by the Hindus was to disrupt key industries, create so much turmoil then it would be made apparent to America that Pakistan was not a stable country and the decision to give Military Aid should be rescinded. The Hindus of Bengal have gone mad over the American Military Aid. Bhasani's Mazdoor. Unions recognized by the U.F. Government, were nothing else but Communist cells. They had bodies known as "Storm Troops" to browbeat saner elements in labor. These Unions in an year's time would have brought Industry to a dead stop and enabled Bhasani to expropriate factories like the Adamjee Jute Mills. It is significant that he did not go near a Hindu concern. He must have had some arrangements with the Hindus. He is reported to have stayed six months in Assam where he was well treated. He is out and out an enemy of Pakistan and the kindest thing I can suggest for him is that he be shot out of hand.

(3) Mr. SAYED AZIZUL HUQ. ex. Minister of Education

Nephew of Mr. Fazlul Huq. Was in the service of West Bengal Government until two years ago. Supposed to have his legs in both countries. Is a man of doubtful integrity. Mr. Fazlul Huq. used to negotiate all his dubious deals through him. It is because of him it is said here, that nepotism is a derivation of nephewism. He was present during the Narayanganj murders but did nothing to stop the riot. If he had not been present, the other officers might have acted.

(4) Mr. ATTAUR RAHMAN.

Gained popularity amongst the students when he openly espoused their cause in the language controversy, Is a staunch follower of Mr. Suhrawardy and Bhashani. Has been working very hard to organize the Awami League since its inception. Very provincial minded and at the moment, the most vocal amongst the Awami Leaguers. Is an aspirant to the post of chief Minister. His provincialism is so intense that he can never be a good Pakistani. Communism would probably flourish in his regime. He is really a leftist. Has the reputation of being honest.

(5) Mr. KAFILUDDIN CHOWDRY.

Has not been politically very active until recently when he was selected as one of the Joint Secretaries of the United Front. Has a reputation for honesty and integrity but does not command much public support.

(6) Mr. ABDUL LATIF BISWAS.

It is alleged that he gave money to Fazlul Huq to become a Minister. Is a chameleon, i.e. changes his color quite often. Was a Swarajist Member of the old Assembly before 1935. From 1937-45 was a Muslim League M.L.A. and changed his allegiance and was responsible for the downfall of the then Sir Nazimuddin League Ministry. In 1946 contested the election against Muslim League and was defeated. He again joined Muslim League after Partition which he gave up just before the last general elections and joined the Krishak Sramik Party. Nobody can depend on him but he is more Fazlul Huq's man than anybody else's.

(7) Mr. ABUL MANSUR AHMED.

Is a reputed Journalist. Has always been associated with Mr. Suhrawardy. Since Partition always opposed to the Muslim League. Nothing detrimental to his character ever reported against him.

(8) KHAN BAHADUR MUAZZAM UDDIN HOSSAIN.

Wields considerable influence in his constituency. Very energetic for his age. Honest and upright character. An old Muslim Leaguer who has held many public offices since his retirement from Government service. Left the Muslim League and joined the Jamat-e-Islam Party. His patriotism cannot be doubted. Unfortunately, does not command much influence amongst the young M.L.A's of the United Front.

(9) MQULVIE ASHRAFUDDIN AHMED CHOUDRI.

A disciple of Subhas Chandra Bose. Belonged to the extreme wing of the Congress and was opposed to Pakistan.

After Partition, went into seclusion and came up during the last election. Has always been a supporter of the minority community. Very anxious to become Chief Minister now. His loyalty to Pakistan is doubtful. I don't think he believes in Pakistan. He is anti Communist and personally known for his honesty and integrity.

(10) MOULVIE YUSUF ALI CHOWDRY alias Mohan Miah. Politics is his main profession in life and the sole idea is to feather his own nest. Has no intellectual capacity being semi literate. He, however, has plenty of energy and organizing capacity. Completely unscrupulous financially and is known to have utilized District Board Funds and Government grant for his own use. He would have been in trouble long ago but his political utility saved him. He is now being run in under section 409 I.P.C.

APPENDIX -*

Attaur Rehman had convened a memorial meeting for Stalin and has been to Communist inspired "peace" meetings in Europe. I would have arrested him, but it is necessary to have one man out in the camp of the enemy to enable us to know the intentions of the enemy. This is an old trick of the now defunct political Department of the old Government of India. It has worked in the past and so far I have no reason to grumble. My advice is that Government decide once for all never to allow the United Front to form a Government. The name, United Front, I am sure has been inspired by Lenin's United Front which he created, if my memory does not fail me, about 1921.

APPENDIX-***

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE KARMI SIBIRS.

21. On 9-1-54 Maulana Bhasani formed the Karmi Sibir or the All Party workers' Camp to conduct the election campaign against the Muslim League. Young men both students and others were recruited and trained for the purpose of working in the countryside and bring to the people the message of the United front specially the 21-point programme. These workers were also trained to malign and vilify the Muslim League Government particularly Mr. Nurul Amin who was painted as the man solely responsible for all the troubles, economic, social and educational which affected the province. The Central Committee of the Karmi Sibir was formed with following office bearers:

(i) President: — Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani (A.M.L.)

(ii) Joint Secretaries. — K.M. Illias (C.P.) brother of Yar Mohd. Khan, M.L.A. (G.D.)

(iii) Members: –
Abdus Samad (C.P.)
Abdul Halim (C.P.)
Golam Mustafa (C.P.)
Laila Samad (C.P.) and others.

APPENDIX ****

Hence this organization become the target for infiltration since its inception. It is now controlled by the C.P. and has been referred to as the recruiting base and the 2nd front of the party.

The office bearers of the Central Executive Committee as well as the District and Sub divisional Committees of the Youth League were periodically re-shuffled and in the last annual council meeting held in December, 1953 a large number of communists became office bearers viz.,

President: Mohd. Toha (C. P.)

Vice-Presidents:

Oli Ahad (C. P.)
Khairat Ahmad (C. P.)
Shamsuzzoha (C. P.)

General Secretary:

Imadullah (C. P./Y. L.)

Joint Secretaries

Samaddar (C. P./Y.L.)
Sultan Ahmad (C. P./Y. L.)

True Copies of excerpts from original letters

APPENDIX I

(True Copy)

86-D/1, Gulberg 3 Lahore,
December 12, 1968.

My dear Harun,

I have received your letter of November 24 and shall try to answer your question briefly. There are many things happening here these days and I am kept rather busy.

(1) As a rule Cabinet meetings were held once a week, but if the need arose, two or three meetings were also held. This was particularly the case in the early days of Pakistan when sometimes meetings were held every day. The mode of arriving at decision was one of discussion until a general consensus was reached. I do not remember a single occasion when it was necessary to take votes. The Cabinet Secretariat was responsible for preparing the agenda and for submitting well-prepared memoranda on the subjects under discussion. The memoranda was of course prepared by the Ministry concerned after such consultation as was necessary with other Ministries. The general pattern followed was that of the British Parliamentary system. There were no significant variations except such as arise in any body of man meeting in a committee for purposes of consultation and decision. The British Cabinet is a much bigger body than the Pakistan Cabinet was at any time therefore there was no need for an inner cabinet. Cabinet Committees dealing with various specialized subjects were a different matter but their reports were considered by the whole Cabinet. Although Ministers of State were not formally members of the Cabinet, they were usually present.


(2) Parliamentary institutions did provide useful training for younger politicians. Deputy Ministerships were expressly created to provide such training, that is, they were not really needed for the transaction of business but they provided useful winnowing ground. Party meetings afford another occasion for training. Those who were too shy or to speak in the parliament found it useful experience in party meeting where the atmosphere was informal and friendly. To give one example of a politician who benefitted by such training, when Moulvi Farid Ahmed who is today universally acknowledged to be an outstanding parliamentarian came to the Constituent Assembly for the first time in 1955, he was under thirty and fairly new and inexperienced. Within a few years he had matured considerably.

(3) The stock comment about pre-1958 politics is the result of ten years of one-sided propoganda by an authoritarian government which controls the press, the radio and all

means of publicity and has used them ruthlessly to denigrate the pre-1958 regimes in order to justify its own mode of coming i. to existence and to glorify its achievements, whatever they are, by contrast. Not that there were no set-backs to democratic ideals and institutions during that time, but on any fair reckoning the achievements far outweigh the evils. The fact that there were a number of Parties is by itself not as great an evil as is usually imagined. The testing time for these parties was due when the elections scheduled for February 1959 under the 1956 Constitution would have been held. It is only then that the 1956 Constitution would have come fully into operation and the public would have the opportunity to pass judgment on the various parties. a process of winnowing would have taken place. The present regime has taken the Country back at least fifty years.

(4) The institutions for the operation of democracy are (i) a sound constitutional structure having the free and willing support of the Country (ii) free elections in an atmosphere of freedom of press and speech and association, (iii) patriotic political parties. All these requisites were present in 1958. The 1956 Constitution had been freely accepted by both East and West Pakistan: the fundamental rights and freedom of the press etc., had been made justiciable and none of the political parties there in existence could have been accused of lack of patriotism. Universal literacy is not an essential condition for working of democratic institutions as the example of India shows. It is desirable but not essential.

Your sincerely



Mohammed Ali

Your sincerely
Mohammed Ali

Source: Private Papers.

APPENDIX I

16-3/11, Gillingham

Luton

December 3, 1956

My dear Vernon,

I have received your letter of November 24 and shall try to answer your questions shortly. There are many things happening here these days and I am kept rather busy.

As a rule cabinet meetings were held on a week, but of the week were two or three meetings were also held. This was particularly the case in the early days of Peirce when cabinet meetings were held every day. The mode of working as a domain was one of discussion with a great emphasis on the verbal. I do not remember a single case when it was necessary to see with the Chief Minister was refused for preparing to report and for submitting well prepared memoranda on the subject under discussion. The memoranda were of course prepared by the Ministry concerned after much consultation as was necessary with the Ministers. The general pattern followed was that of the British parliamentary system. There were no significant variations except with the case on any day of one meeting - a committee for preparing consultation and decision. The British Cabinet is a much bigger body than the Peirce Cabinet was at any time; perhaps there was no need for an inner cabinet. Cabinet Committees dealing with various administrative subjects were different to the extent were considered by the whole Cabinet. Most of the Ministers of the day were not formally members of the Cabinet, they were merely friends.

Administrative institutions did provide useful training for young politicians. Deputy Ministers were especially useful to provide such training, this is. They were not really needed for the training of Ministers but they provided useful training ground. Party meetings offered another occasion for training. Some who were too busy to attend to appear in the political field as useful advisers to appear in party meetings where the atmosphere was informal and friendly. To give one example of a politician who benefited by such training, when Martin Friel Peirce who is today universally acknowledged to be an outstanding political figure came to the Communist Assembly first time in 1955, he was under thirty and fairly raw and inexperienced. Within a few years he had entered considerably

APPENDIX - II

(True Copy)

Dear Prime Minister,

After, considerable heart searching I have come to the conclusion that it is my duty to give you my views for what they are worth, on the present condition of the country and the rapidly deteriorating situation.


1. The problems created by your personal enemies including mullahs, if not dealt with firmly and now will destroy the administration and the country. Lately I have been sending my own intelligence men to meetings etc. in Karachi—the abuses hurled on you and the Government are of such a violent and offensive nature that the prestige of the Government in Karachi to-day is at its lowest ebb. What the feeling is in the capital to-day will be the feeling in the whole country to-morrow. Such a thing as loyalty and team work does not exist in your Government, both in the Centre and the Provinces. By want of action and Government directive encouragement is being given to all disloyal elements and selfish and dishonest careerists.

3. Though I am not a very religious man, I have the greatest respect for your religious beliefs and realize your hesitation and dislike for vigorous action against those persons who are working against you in the garb of religion. But is it religion to destroy the very foundation of the administration of the premier Muslims State. In Cairo Sir Zafrullah Khan is being received with the utmost honor and respect. He is also meeting the heads of all the Arab countries where he has a very high reputation. Whereas in Karachi he is being abused in public meeting and his photographs are being spit upon. last night he has been cartooned with a Donkey's body. Can anybody say all this is not being reported to all the Foreign Capitals? What then is the position of Pakistan to-day internationally and you can imagine the disgust created by all this.

4. There is a school of thought which believes in the doctrine of Masterly inactivity. This school harps ad nauseum on our economic situations, on the dangers of wholesale rising, the food crisis etc. No administration can exist on basis of fear specially if it has got to rule Muslims.

5. Don't think for a moment that you have no friends. There are people who will stand by you till the last. I guarantee the Armed Forces will carry out any directive you may choose to give. For god's sake become a courageous leader and take decisive action. Once you do this the whole country with the exception of rascals will rally round you and the prestige of Pakistan will go up. The country will be saved.

Yours sincerely,



(Iskandr Mirza)

Yours sincerely,
(Iskandr Mirza)

The Hon'ble Alhaj Khawaja Nazimuddin,
Prime Minister of Pakistan
Karachi.

APPENDIX II

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

Ministry of Defence

D.O. No.

KARACHI, (in _____)


- 2 -

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Yours sincerely,



(Iskander Mirza)

The Hon'ble Alhaj Khawaja Nasimuddin,
Prime Minister of Pakistan,
KARACHI.

APPENDIX II

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

Ministry of Defense

S.P. No. 52/78

KARACHI, on 26th February 1953.

My dear Prime Minister,

After considerable heart searching I have come to the conclusion that it is my duty to give you my views for what they are worth, on the present condition of the country and the rapidly deteriorating situation.

2. The problems created by your personal enemies including Mallahs, if not dealt with firmly and now will destroy the administration and the country. Lately I have been sending my own Intelligence men to meetings etc. in Karachi - the abuses hurled on you and the Government are of such a violent and offensive nature that the prestige of the Government in Karachi to-day is at its lowest ebb. What the feeling is in the capital to-day will be the feeling in the whole country to-morrow. Such a thing as loyalty and team work does not exist in your Government, both in the Centre and the Provinces. By want of action and Government directive-encouragement is being given to all disloyal elements and selfish and dishonest careerists.

3. Though I am not a very religious man, I have the greatest respect for your religious beliefs and realize your hesitation and dislike for vigorous action against those persons who are working against you in the garb of religion. But is it religion to destroy the very foundation of the administration of the premier Muslim State. In Cairo Sir Isfullah Khan is being received with the utmost honour and respect. He is also meeting the heads of all the Arab countries where he has a very high reputation. Whereas in Karachi he is being abused in public meetings and his photographs are being spat upon. Last night he has been cortoned with a Turkey's body. Can anybody say all this is not being reported to all the Foreign Capitals? What then is the position of Pakistan to-day internationally and you can imagine the disgust

APPENDIX III

The United Front Party, if voted to power will fulfill the following programme within the next five years of its regime:

There will be no enactment in the House which is repugnant to the fundamental principle of Holy Quran and Sunnah, and provisions will be made for the citizens to live their lives on the basis of Islamic equality and brotherhood;

1. To make Bengali one of the state languages of Pakistan;
2. To abolish without compensation all rent receiving interest in land and to distribute the surplus lands among the landless cultivators and bring down the rent to a fair level and abolish the certificate procedure for realizing rent;
3. To nationalize jute trade; to make arrangements for giving to jutegrowers fair price of jute and to investigate into the jute bungling during the Muslim League regime, to punish those who will be found responsible for the bungling and to forfeit all their properties earned thereby;
4. To introduce co-operative farming and to improve the conditions of cottage industries and manual works;
5. To start salt industries, both cottage and big, in order to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in the supply of salt;
6. To immediately rehabilitate all refugees, particularly those who are artisans and technicians;
7. To improve the irrigation system and save the country from flood and famine;
8. To industrialize East Pakistan and to guarantee the economic and social rights of industrial labor, according to the I.L.O. conventions;
9. To introduce free and compulsory primary education and to arrange for a just pay and allowance for the teachers;
10. To reorient the entire secondary education system by abolishing the discrimination between Government and private schools, and to introduce only the mother tongue as the medium of instructions;

11. To do away with all the reactionary black laws of Dacca and Rajshahi Universities and to make them autonomous institutions;
12. To make an all-out curtailment of the administration and to rationalize the pay scale of high and low-paid Government servants; United Front Ministers shall not accept more than Rs. 1,000 as their monthly salary;
13. To eradicate corruption, nepotism, and bribery and with this end in view, to take stock of the properties of all Government officers and businessmen for the year 1940 onward and forfeit all unexplained properties;
14. To release all security prisoners who are detained in jail under various public safety acts and ordinances, and to guarantee freedom of the Press, speech and associations;
15. To separate the executive from the judiciary;
16. To convert Burdwan House for the present into a student's residence and afterwards to a research institute of Bengali language and literature;
17. To erect a martyrs' monument to commemorate the sacred memory of those who gave their lives for the Bengali language and literature;
18. To declare February 21 as "Shahid Day" and to observe it as a public holiday;
19. In accordance with the historic Lahore Resolution, to secure full and complete autonomy and bring all subjects under the jurisdiction of East Pakistan, leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency under the jurisdiction of the center, even in the matter of defence, arrangement shall be such as to have the headquarters of Army in West Pakistan and the Headquarters of Navy in East Pakistan and to establish ordnance factories in East Pakistan, with a view to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in the matter of defence and also to convert the present Ansars into full-fledged militia;
20. United Front Cabinets shall on no account extend the life of the Legislature and the Ministry shall resign six months before the general election and shall arrange for a free and fair election through the agency of an Election Commissioner;
21. All casual vacancies in the Legislature shall be filled up through by-elections within three months of the date of the vacancies, and if the United Front nominees are defeated in three successive by-elections, the Ministry shall voluntarily resign from office.

Source: Dawn, April 4, 1954.

APPENDIX IV

The Communist Party Election Manifesto as published on December 3, 1953.

1. To establish autonomy in East Bengal. All matters except Defence, Foreign Policy and Currency will be under the control of the Provincial Government.
2. To make Bengali as one of the State languages.
3. Abolition of Zamindari system without compensation and distribution of land to the cultivators (with arrangements for the maintenance of small zamindars when this step is taken).
4. To save the indigenous industry from the foreign competition and to arrange for its expansion.
5. To increase the pay and allowances of laborers, middle class employees and Primary Teachers and to stop retrenchment.
6. To arrange for payment or reasonable price of the jute and other cash crops to the cultivators.
7. Reduction of 50% of the rent of debt, remission of arrears rent, introduction of the system of Tebhaga (1/3rd of the product instead of Adhi Bargah (1/2 of the produce), (consideration of the cases of poor landlords at the time of reforming the right of Adhiars to the land and introducing Tebhaga system.)
8. To increase the wages of the peasants.
9. To develop cottage industry and render help to the artisans.
10. To give freedom to every person for following religion according to his conscience.
11. Removal of differential treatment to the religious minority and granting them equal right like other people and to introduce the joint electorate system.
12. To make special arrangement for the education and betterment of the Scheduled castes and tribal people.
13. Abrogation of the Safety Act and all repressive laws, release of all political prisoners, guarantee of freedom of speech, Press and physical security.

14. To arrange for bread, employment and residence for refugees and facility for education through the medium of their mother tongue.
15. To supply commodities for daily consumption and food at cheap price.
16. To arrange for extensive free primary and compulsory education and improvement of the educational system.
17. Employment or allowance for the unemployed.
18. To construct buildings in town and hospitals in the countryside.
19. Excavation of rivers and canals and the arrangement for irrigation.
20. To improve the roads of the towns, water supply etc., and to make a number of new roads in the villages.
21. To oppose the Pak-U.S. Military Pact, to demand quitting of the British Commonwealth by Pakistan, to follow the principle of peace in respect of foreign policy, to demand Pak-Bharat amity and cancellation of Pak-Bharat Passport cum-visa system.
22. To arrange for free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir for peaceful solution of problem outside the influence of the imperialists.

Source: Private Papers.

APPENDIX - V

Dear Sir,

Will you kindly send to us information's and report on the following points as early as possible.

1. The names of the other candidates in your constituency with notes on their influence, names of their principal supporters and their chances of success.
2. A note of your own work; for instance, how many unions there are in your Constituency; how many you have covered yourself in how many are your workers working; what are the difficulties in your way; should we write to any particular person to help you; your own chances of success etc;
3. Nature of the propaganda against you e.g. are there candidates misusing the name of the United Front or that they will join Mr. Huq's party if they succeed, are they defaming you or the voters with hell-fire or are there any Maulvis or Pirs working against you and for the Muslim League.
4. Are there any leaflets in circulation in favor of their candidates alleged to have been signed by any of the leaders.
5. What is your symbol? If you have not got "BOAT" as our symbol, you have time upto February 17th to apply to the election Commissioner for the symbol. If however any other candidate used the "BOAT" symbol, you must obtain his consent to the transfer. So you should try to get that consent.
6. Detailed report of the Progress you have made so far. Have you met with any difficulties? If so, suggest means to get over the same, if you have not been able to surmount them already.

Yours Truly,

(H.S. Suhrawardy)

United Front Party Office 56,
Simpson Road, Dacca

Dear Sir,

Dated, 15th March 1954

Now that the elections are over and matters must still be fresh in your minds it is very important that we collect for future reference some important data. We would request you to devote some time and attention to the collection of material and to let us know the replies as soon as possible. The replies may be sent in two batches, one batch in regard to questions which you can immediately answer, and the other in regard to questions which may require some time to reply.

We would like to have information on the following points: –

1. Names of contestant candidates with particulars of whether
 - (a) they had applied to the Muslim League
 - (b) whether they had applied to the United Front
 - (c) whether they claimed to be nominees of any particular person
 - (d) whether they issued pamphlets signed or purporting to have been signed by any particular leader of the United Front or any other Party
 - (e) any important particulars
2. Can you send the leaflets produced by all parties, particularly: –
 - (a) Leaflets containing a Fatwa or recommendation of the Pir of Furfura. This was actually issued by the late Pir Sahib in 1945 and has been re-issued by the Muslim League on this occasion to mislead the people.
 - (b) the Fatwas of Maulana Shamsul Huq and the Pir Sahib of Sarsina stating that a Vote against the Muslim League is against the Quoran and the Sunnah.
 - (c) Any other leaflets calculated to mislead the people.
3. The names of those who worked on behalf of yourself and on behalf of the Muslim League and in behalf of other candidates, Union by Union, and preferably village by village. Names of important and influential people need only be given (This information is required.)
4. Names of important workers not associated with the Union or village but working in the Centre may also be given.
5. Particulars of persons arrested before the elections – whether under Public Safety Act or in any specific case; if in detention, when election held also, who amongst them are communists, and who are your workers.
6. Names of persons who should have supported us but did not do so.

7. Of the workers of the Muslim League many were violent characters and Goondas. Their names may also be supplied with short notes.

8. Some information regarding polling whether any difficulties were placed in the way.

9. Any comments regarding Female Voting.

10. Was the Polling Station placed where it should have been or was there anything wrong with its location.

11. Has your Constituency been properly constituted or should your Constituency have been differently constituted in the interests of contiguous or Polling facilities.

12. Was the Muslim League candidate rich/ What were his antecedents and did he spend much money. Give any particulars regarding his method of work.

I would very much like a note regarding –

(a) Partial or impartial officers in your Constituency and their behavior.

(b) a note on the requirements of your Constituency and its grievances and what should be done to improve your Area and give some satisfaction to the people.

Please consider this to be of the utmost importance and reply as soon as possible.

Yours Sincerely

APPENDIX V

40) ~~कृपया इस पत्र को ध्यानपूर्वक पढ़ें -~~ ~~कृपया जवाब दें -~~ ~~कृपया जवाब दें -~~

~~कृपया इस पत्र को ध्यानपूर्वक पढ़ें -~~
85, 11-130 ROAD, DELHI

Sir,
Will you kindly send to us information and report on the following points as early as possible.

1. The names of the other candidates in your constituency (with names of their influencers, names of their principal supporters & their chances of success).
2. A note of your own work; for instance, how many doors there are in your constituency; how many you have covered; in how many are your workers working; what are the difficulties in your area; should we write to any particular person to help you; your own chances of success etc.
3. Reports of the propaganda against you e.g. are there any candidate who are of the United Front or do they all join Mr. Rao's party if they succeed, are they defaming you & threatening the voters with hell-fire or are there any "Wallis & Pirbright" against you and for the "Wallis Lecture".
4. Are there any leaflets in circulation in favour of any candidate alleged to have been signed by any of the leaders.
5. What is your symbol? If you have not got "HAT" as your symbol, you have till 10th February 1958 to apply to the election officer for the symbol. If however, any other candidate has the "HAT" symbol, you must obtain his consent to the matter. So you should try to get that consent.
6. Detailed report of the progress you have made since the last election. Are you met with any difficulties? If so, suggest ways to get over them, if you have not been able to surmount them already.

Yours truly,

M. Subramanyam
(H.S. SUHRAWARDY)

2-2-58

APPENDIX V

- 2 -

10) Was the Polling Station placed where it should have been or was there anything wrong with its location.

11) Has your Constituency been properly constituted or should your Constituency have been differently constituted in the interests of contiguous or Polling facilities.

12) Was the Muslim League candidate rich? What were his antecedents and did he spend much money. Give any particulars regarding his method of work.

I would very much like a note regarding --

(a) Partial or impartial officers in your Constituency and their behaviour

(b) a note on the requirements of your Constituency and its grievances and what should be done to improve your Area and give some satisfaction to the people.

Please consider this to be of the Utmost importance and reply as soon as possible.

400.

Yours sincerely

Shahid Suhrawardy

APPENDIX V

উপস্থিত বিষয়ে সঠিক তথ্যের
সন্ধান

স্মারক নং

১৫/৩/৫১ - ১১১

UNITED FRONT PARTY OFFICE,
56, BRISBANE ROAD, Dacca

Dated, 15th March 1951.

Dear Sir,

Now that the elections are over and matters must still be fresh in your minds it is very important that we collect for future reference some important data. We would request you to devote some time and attention to the collection of material and to let us know the replies as soon as possible. The replies may be sent in two batches, one batch in regard to questions which you can immediately answer and the other in regard to questions which may -- require some time to reply.

We would like to have information on the following points : --

1) Names of contestant candidates with particulars of whether --

- { a } they had applied to the Muslim League
- { b } Whether they had applied to the United Front
- { c } Whether they claimed to be nominees of any particular person

{ d } Whether they issued pamphlets signed or pretended to have been signed by any particular leader of the United Front or any other Party

{ e } Any important publications

2) Can you send the leaflets produced by all parties particularly --

APPENDIX VI

1. There can be no question that on the the transfer of power in 1947 the governor General of Pakistan had to be a Pakistani and that only Mr. Jinnah would be acceptable in that office. I believe had Mountbatten thought it possible that he would be Governor General in both dominions But I have never met anyone who agreed with that idea. Mr. Jinnah never interfered so far as I was concerned in provincial affairs. He no doubt kept in touch with our proceedings, but my direct contact with him were minimal.

2. I naturally wondered how the new situation would work out when I arrived at Dacca. I was most agreeably surprised to find no little change from what I regarded as normal. I was fortunate in that Mr. Nazimuddin my Prime Minister had been Prime Minister of Bengal and was prepared to carry on the same form and tradition in Bengal as he had inherited from his predecessors there. He and the two or three Ministers he had chosen in the first instance were most friendly and Co-operative. We had an unpretentious out graceful and dignified taking over ceremony and I was mode to feel at home from the start.

3. I have no knowledge of how the governors in the other provinces of Pakistan settled in but I have no reason to suppose there was any important difference. Except in some regrettable Hindu-Muslim riots in 1950 I had no Particular complain about race relations. I certainly saw no sign of hostility to myself or any other British Officers who had stayed on after the transfer of powers. I realized from the start that I was only there as a (Temporary arrangement) and I was agreeably surprised that I was not asked to go sooner than I did. When I was first requested I did not agree to stay longer than six months or a year. The word communist was hardly heard in those days in East Bengal and I do not think anything in the name of a communist party existed there. The East Bengalis I met on tour were mostly very hard working cultivators, boatman and Fishermen whom I regarded for their courage and endurance. Most of them did not give politics as much thought. The province in which served most of my time was Punjab and I regarded Punjabis generally are more politically advanced than the East Bengalis were.

4. I am not sure what is meant by a "Islamic State". But I have no doubt that Mr. Jinnah being a convinced and honest Muslim and therefore. sharing many of the ethical and moral standards what we regard as Christian desired those standards to prevail in Pakistan In his death his principal assistants and advisers tried to carry on the movement on the same lines But they were handicapped by personal differences and rivalries which Mr. Jinnah's recognized superiority had kept underground. It was

fortunate for us all that when these rivalries became uncontrollable such a thoughtful and well balanced soldier like as Mohammad Ayub Khan took matters in hand.

APPENDIX VI

EACHER HILL
BURTON,
LICKFIELD,
SURREY.
BURTON 3108

19 Feb. 1969

My dear Norman

Your letter of 16 Feb. (under
subject of that name) is the question you
raise - copied out by me and the
writing is the next one will that
mean. I do not mind being quoted by
you in your book in connection with
conversations, but I should like not
appear to have in a formal (strictly
written) - typical British "air"
or something of that sort.

are you to show what is
possible that commences?

Yours sincerely

H. P. Brown

APPENDIX VII

The Def. Secretary is to be commended for a very frank & realistic assessment of the situation as it existed when this letter was written. That - while professing full faith & loyalty & support, he recognises the PM of the dangers inherent in "mixing" with the fanatical elements in the country - is a sign that he was actuated by a high sense of patriotism & devotion to duty. He tried to make the P.M. see the writings on the wall & exhorted him to try correctly, to fight the which was threatening the safety & security of Pakistan.

Our country is safe, so long as we can count on such selfless devotion & ^{to duty} loyalty of such an officer like the Def. Secy.

Yours truly,
Mud Ali.

- 618153

APPENDIX VIII

(True copy)

At about 7.00 P.M. the Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain asked my Military Secretary for an interview urgently. I saw him immediately and he showed me a telegram from Sir Anthony Eden informing me that British and French troops would be landing in Port Said and will ensure the safety of the Suez Canal passage. The Egyptian had advanced close to the canal and the war had to be stopped. At that time I had no idea of any design, of the Israelis, the French and the British. If we had earlier information of this Anglo-French adventure on Egypt we would in conjunction with Iran, Turkey and Iraq expressed our apprehensions and tried our best to dissuade any premature move. But with limited knowledge and faced with a 'fait accompli' I decided which in my view was the best thing I could. I sent a telegram to His Imperial Majesty giving the facts as were in my knowledge and requested if his Imperial Majesty agreed to request the Prime Minister of Turkey and Iraq to come to Tehran. Before I flew off for Tehran I got a message that the two Prime Ministers would be in Tehran.

When I got to Tehran after the usual ceremonies His Imperial Majesty informed me that a meeting would be held next morning.

The net result of this episode was that most of my time in Tehran was spent in meetings. These meetings were conducted by his imperial Majesty with great ability. He was able to keep the Bagdad Pact forces together. The British and French Armies due to world opinion, specially American anger stopped at Port Said and ultimately withdrawn from Egypt. There was the constant advice of the Muslim Powers of the Bagdad Pact for restraint which unfortunately precipitous Anglo French adventure have thrust President Nasser more into the arms of the Soviet and messed up the situation in the Middle East completely. There were some excitement in Karachi and the usual demonstration. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, threatened to walk out of the Commonwealth. I sent an airoplane to fetch him to Tehran and after talks with his Imperial Majesty, the Shahen Shah. Mr. Ala, the Iranian Prime Minister, Mr. Menderes the Turkish Prime Minister and Nuris Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, he fell in line and the Bagdad Pact was able to demonstrate its influences. The Arab Ambassadors in Tehran informed their appropriate authorities of what we were doing. It was only later that the Arab leaders decided to attack the Muslim members of the Bagdad Pact. There was absolutely no substance in their campaign of vilification. Their facts were wrong and therefore their conclusion.

Source: Private Papers.

APPENDIX VIII

r French Mission also to United opinion, opening of Russian
lines stopped at Port Said & ultimately withdrawal from
Egypt. This was the constant theme of the Muslim League
of the Baghdad Pact & unfortunately the participation Anglo. The
have that point of view was into the hands of the
Soviets & around up the situation in the Middle East
completely. There was some excitement in Karachi & the
small demonstrations. The Pakistan Press Minister, Mr. Zia-ur-
Rehman & with out of the Government, went
aboard to fetch him to Tehran & after talks with
Mr. Hajj Majidi, ^{Moskowsky} the Alta the Muslim Press Minister, Mr.
Munir the Turkish Press Minister & the Muslim League
Press Minister, he felt in line, & the Baghdad
Pact was able to demonstrate its importance. The
Arab Ambassador in Tehran expressed this opinion
of what we were doing. It was my hope that the
Arab leaders decided to attack the Muslim League
of the Baghdad Pact, there was absolutely no
welcome in their campaign of disaffection. Their
facts were wrong & therefore their conclusions.
While in Iran I was able to bring
a visit to Mehd to do things at the

APPENDIX IX

(True Copy)

C/o. H.E. Aroleshir Zahidi,
Ministry of Foreign Affaire,
Tehran, Iran.

8.3.69.

My dear Haroon,

I got your kind letter of Feb. 12 a few days ago. Many thanks. I could not reply earlier as Khanum suddenly developed Appendicitis & had to be operated upon. The operation was not an easy one & I had a very worrying time. She is thanks God taken a turn for the better, but will have to be in hospital for some days more.

I have been reading of the troubles in Pakistan with utmost feelings that farce of Basic Democracy had to go, But the complete breakdown of all administration & law and order is a dangerous augury for the future of the country. Before respect for Govt. is established there is going to be lot of troubles & loss of valuable lives. Again there are some ... parties in the opposition, are they going to unite on some firm basis? there is a demand for a Federation of East & West Pakistan. Will this not being a demand for the breakup of the one unit system in West Pakistan. Frontier, Baluchistan & Sindh are not viable States ... Federated States of United States Presuppose that every state is viable. The Panjabis have run the one unit in such a selfish manner that there is great hatred of them in Sindh, Frontier and Baluchistan. If you break up there is no course left but to rejoin India as a Suppliant—a terrible eventuality.

Your next President should also be carefully selected. I for one do not believe the Westminster type of Democracy will ever succeed in Pakistan. The 1956 Constitution nearly created a jungle. The American system with amendments required for conditions in Pakistan will be much more suitable. There must be a very strong centre with complete plenary powers in the matters of Foreign Policy, Defence & Finance, & that the President must not be a Show boy. Pay the President well so that he regards Financial probity a sine qua non. Amongst Muslims there is a fuss to hanker after the Khalafat-a-Rashida. There were four Khalips in this period. Two were murdered ... & the Khalips were complete autocrats. In fact if you all sincerely want the Muslim way of life you must accept complete autocracy.

I hoped to return by the middle of March but owing to Khanum's illness this is not possible.

Hope you are well & happy.... the climate here is very healthy & I am very well. Iran's progress is fantastic

Yours sincerely.

Iskander Mirza.

(The letter has not been edited by the Writer).

Source: Private Papers.

APPENDIX IX

c/o N P Pradhan Zaidi
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministry
Islamabad
D. 2. 69.

My dear Haroon,

I got your kind letter of Feb 11

a few days ago. May I think I could not reply
earlier as I have not yet developed
appreciation & had to be qualified upon
the question was not an easy one &
I had a very long time. So in short
God take a care of the letter & I will
be in hospital for some days now

I have been reading of the
troubles in Pakistan with much feeling.
That form of mass democracy had to go
at the expense of the best interests of all
administration & the people is a dangerous
error for the future of the country. Major support
for Govt. is established that is going to be
a lot of trouble & loss of valuable time. Again

APPENDIX IX

The 2nd one has been in the opposition
As the 1st one has been in the government

The 1st one has been in the government + the 2nd one
was in the opposition. It is not if you are actually
not the main way of life you must accept
people's authority.

I hope to enter of the world of -Hence
let my 6th class system this is not
possible

Hope you are well + happy. I hope
my son + daughter are well. There is
a little bit of a problem in my life. I am
feeling a little bit of a problem in my life. I am
feeling a little bit of a problem in my life.

2nd one

APPENDIX X
(True Copy)

86-D/1, Gulberg 3
Lahore,
June 2, 1959.

My dear Harun,

I am afraid my answers to your questions are going to be extremely brief. I am leaving for Karachi day after tomorrow and partly for this reason am very busy. However, here they are for what they are worth.

(1) The economic situation in 1958 was not bright but it was not at all as dark as was painted by the Martial Law regime which never cared much for truth. I am sending you by separate post my pamphlet—An Appraisal of Pakistan's Economic Development—which gives the true facts.

(2) During 1958 there was a vigorous political fight going on in both the West Pakistan and East Pakistan Provincial Assemblies in the former between the Republican and the Muslim league and in the latter between the Awami league and K.S.P. together with its affiliates. The fight was unedifying to a degree. Its sole object was to gain control of the provincial administration so as to be able to rig the forthcoming elections. No scruples were observed and no holds were barred. The injury to the Deputy Speaker which resulted in his death was accidental, but there is no question that a scuffle was going on between the two contending factions. In West Pakistan, the Republicans and the Muslim leaguers were so evenly matched that they were prepared to do anything to win the support of the tiny N.A.P. which in this situation accidentally held the balance of power and exploited it to its own advantage. It too had no scruple as to which side it allied itself. To complicate the situation crossing of the floor was a daily spectacle. It is impossible to say which Parties would have come out successful in the elections if they had been held. There was little likelihood of any one party having the majority if the elections had been fair and free—but this is a big and extremely doubtful if, since the main contestants in East and West Pakistan were determined not to have fair and free elections. Hence the desperate character of the struggle to have the administrative machinery under one's control before and during the elections. This is not a pleasant picture, but truth is sometimes bitter.

(3) I have not the slightest doubt that if elections under the 1956 Constitution had been held and East Pakistan Politicians had control of economic development in that province as provided in that Constitution, there would not have been the movement towards secession which stemmed fundamentally from a denial of democratic political

rights. There would still have been many grievances and much noise and agitation because of the 'revolution of rising expectations'. Indeed, no underdeveloped country with a democratic set up can be immune from agitational politics, but that is the only way in which the people can be educated politically; and it is only over a period of time that they can be made to understand fully the economic realities of the situation. To some extent this is true of every democracy, developed or developing.

(4) The fundamental cause of discontent with the one unit is the administration and centralization of Ayub Khan's regions for which people fasten the blame on the one-unit. It was an essential part of the concept of one-unit that administration would be decentralized on the maximum extent so that 99 percent problems could be settled on the spot. This was not only not done; on the contrary, such decentralization and devolution of powers as was before reversed, and no decision could be taken without the Governor's and sometimes the President's approval. Personal dictatorship are always characterized by the exercise of personal power and patronage. Then there was the appalling corruption, the grant of lands to high officials, the autocratic behavior of the Deputy Commissioners and others each of whom become in his turn a little dictator. All this was laid at the door of the one-unit.

(5) Justice Shahabuddin who was Chairman of the Constitution Commission 1961 is a highly esteemable person and he and his colleagues tried their best to produce a democratic Constitution subject to one limitation. They knew that Ayub Khan's mind was made up in favour of the presidential and against the Parliamentary system; and that unless they worked for a Presidential system—of course with all the checks and balances which are an essential feature of it in the U.S.A., there was not the slightest chance of their recommendations being accepted by Ayub Khan. But since Ayub Khan wanted an authoritarian system under cover of a Presidential system he rejected their main recommendations all the same.

I have so strong an aversion to writing about myself that even the few references to my role as Secretary General in the early years of Pakistan were inserted at the insistence of the Columbia University Press who published my book—The Emergence of Pakistan which I imagine you have seen. I am sorry I cannot help you there.

With best wishes for the completion of your work.

Yours sincerely,



Mohammad Ali

Yours sincerely,
Mohammad Ali

APPENDIX X

86-D/1, Gulberg 3
Lahore
June 2, 1964

My dear Harun,

I am afraid my answers to your questions are going to be extremely brief. I am leaving for Karachi day after tomorrow and partly for this reason am very busy. Harun, here they are for what they are worth.

(i) The economic situation in 1958 was not bright but it was not at all as dark as was painted by the Market Law regime which was aimed much for truth. I am sending you by separate post my pamphlet — An Appraisal of Pakistan's Economic Development — which gives the true facts.

(ii) During 1958 there was a vigorous political fight going on in both the West Pakistan and East Pakistan Provincial Assemblies — in the former between the Republicans and the Muslim League and in the latter between the Awami League and K.S.P together with its affiliates. The fight was unedifying to a degree. Its sole object was to gain control of the

APPENDIX X

at the insistence of The Columbia University
Press who published my book - 'The Emergence
of Pakistan' which I imagine you have seen.
I am sorry I cannot help you there.

With best wishes for its completion
of your work.

Yours sincerely

Mohammed Ali Jinnah

APPENDIX XI

3-3-1967

Dear Mr. Nazim,

I regret the delay in answering your letter as I had to collect the required information. For your convenience I have had the Authoritative statements on the subject printed in a booklet and this took some time. I am sending you the booklet entitled 'The unification of West Pakistan' under separate cover. I hope that you will find the answers to your many queries therein. The Prime Minister who initiated the proposal for the unification of West Pakistan in his Broadcast speech on November 22, 1954 was Mr. Mohd. Ali of Bogra who hailed from East Pakistan. You will perhaps find it useful to go through the Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the Integration of West Pakistan bill for the months of September & October 1955. These should be available in the library of the Pakistan High Commission as also in the British Museum. You will find all the arguments for or against the proposal in the Debates & will be able to draw your own conclusions. To my mind the Integration of West Pakistan Act was the corner stone of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan framed in 1956 by the second constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

It is unfortunate that certain vested interests did not permit the full implementation of the various important parts of the scheme such as the decentralisation of the administration, association of people's representatives with the administration at various levels, unification of laws etc. etc. Some important promises made at the time of integration were also not implemented and these factors caused resentment and lack of faith in certain parts of the province. One important factor over which the framers of the Scheme had little control was the abrogation of the constitution in 1958 and the consequent political vacuum that followed. Had the scheme been faithfully implemented the results would have been very different. I have no doubt that even now if the scheme is fully implemented and certain modifications are made in the light of experience gained, therein it should be an unqualified success. The economic development which has taken place as a result of unification is amazing and the overall progress made in the social & economic fields, especially in the smaller regions is phenomenal. I am collecting the necessary information in this regard and will let you have it as soon as it becomes available in a tabulated form. As regards your question about the Republican Party, I think it was the outcome of an unfortunate split between two groups of the Muslim League resulting from tussle for power. Since elections to the legislature had been unduly delayed it was perhaps, inevitable that the only dominant political party at the time of the attainment of independence namely, the Muslim League which had championed the the Muslim Freedom Movement, should split into various splinter groups and factions under different names. Most of them were in the nature of parliamentary groups with hardly any ramifications in the country. Many of these 'Political Parties' have not progressed beyond the stage of having called met in an adhoc preliminary meeting styled as 'Convention' and having a self styled convenor and a small group of persons nominated by him as the Party Executive. The remedy lies in direct & periodical elections to the legislature and local bodies held at regular intervals, which will give a sense of reality to political activity & facilitate the proper growth of political parties as has been the case elsewhere. I shall be glad if I can be of any further assistance to you. Best wishes.

Handwritten note: *Handwritten note: (in margin)*
 The Muslim League Party split into two groups (one was the Muslim League and the other was the Muslim League Party)

APPENDIX XII

Surplus and Deficit in Foreign Trade, Pakistan.
(In Thousand Rupees)

Year	Pakistan	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
1947-48	344,208	137,441	206,767
1948-49	-501,491	-648,269	146,778
1949-50	-103,005	-347,048	244,043
1950-51	933,559	176,421	758,138
1951-52	-228,788	551,961	323,173
1952-53	126,236	-149,882	276,118
1953-54	167,987	-183,319	351,306
1954-55	119,692	-291,660	411,352
1955-56	458,561	-222,044	680,605
1956-57	-726,984	-817,817	90,833
1957-58	-628,316	-880,750	252,435

(Minus indicates deficit.)

Source: Dr. Aleem Al-Razee, *Process of Economic Disparity*, (Dacca, Ferdoush Publications), n.d. p. 22.

Also *The Pakistan Observer*, (Dacca) April 27, 1963.

APPENDIX XIII

(Secretariat)

	Punjab	Sindh	N.W.F.P.	Other Areas	Total Posts
Secretaries	36	27	18	3	84
Asst. Secretaries	104	44	40	33	221
Superintendents	41	20	10	10	81
Asst. Superintendents	196	92	47	34	369
Clerks	271	128	65	76	540
Stenographers	47	22	11	10	90

Source: *Dawn*: September 5, 1955, Also *CAD*, Vol. 1, September 15, p. 801.

(1947-58)

Position	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Secretaries	19	0
Joint Secretaries	38	4
Deputy Secretaries	123	10
Under Secretaries	510	38

Source: *op.cit.* Dr. Aleem AI-Razee, p. 29.

ARMY

Position	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
General	1	0
Lt. Generals	3	0
Major-Generals	20	1
Brigadiers	35	0
Colonels	50	0
Lt. Colonels	198	2
Majors	590	10
Naval Officers	693	7
Air Force Officers	640	60

Source: *CAD* Vol. I, January 16 & 17, 1950, pp. 1818-1845.
Dawn: January 18, 1956. Abul Mansur's Speech quoted.

APPENDIX-XIV

Top Secret

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked to send you the following personal message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: –

"I thank you Mr. President for your message received through the united kingdom High Commissioner In Karachi. You may be confident of the close and continuing interest of the Government of the United Kingdom in the prosperity and progress of Pakistan. I note that the continuance of Martial Law will be for the shortest period possible and I am glad to have your assurance that Pakistan will continue to honor all her commitments and to remain loyal to the free world."

Major-General Iskander Mirza,
President of Pakistan,
Karachi.

APPENDIX XIV



UNITED KINGDOM HIGH COMMISSIONER,
KARACHI.

9th October, 1958.

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked to send you the following
personal message from the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom:-

"I thank you Mr. President for your message
received through the United Kingdom High Commissioner
in Karachi. You may be confident of the close and
continuing interest of the Government of the
United Kingdom in the prosperity and progress of
Pakistan. I note that the continuance of
Martial Law will be for the shortest period
possible and I am glad to have your assurance that
Pakistan will continue to honour all her
commitments and to remain loyal to the free
world."

Yours sincerely
Alexander Syme

Major-General Iskander Mirza,
President of Pakistan,
KARACHI.

APPENDIX - XV

"My Dear president,

Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up of the Defence Forces. In doing so you have shown tremendous courage, and wisdom, and have done the Defence Forces and the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud of you. I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come up to your expectations. I can promise you my very best effort.

"Once again, I thank you and the Khanam for your kind hospitality during my stay here. As usual, I have been very comfortable.

With respects,
Yours sincerely,
M.A. Khan"

APPENDIX XV

President's House,
Karachi.
2nd April, '55

My dear President,

27 APRIL 1955

Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up of the Defence Forces. In doing so you have shown tremendous courage, and wisdom, and have done the Defence Forces and the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud of you : I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come up to your expectations. I can promise you my very best effort.

Once again, I thank you and the Khanan for your kind hospitality during my stay here. As usual, I have been very comfortable.

With respects,

Yours sincerely,

W.A. Khan. "

APPENDIX XVI
(True Copy)

The M.L. Membership 'Form'

I _____ S/o _____ resident of _____ do solemnly affirm that I will be loyal to the Pakistan Muslim League and will abide by its constitution, rules, bye-laws, regulations and directions and that I will do my best to achieve the aims and objects of the organisation. I further affirm that I am not a member of any other Political or unlawful party or organization.

Signature _____

Signature of the person in whose presence the 'Form' was signed.

Place _____

Date _____

Source: The Constitution of the Muslim League. (Dacca: The Art Press), p. 36. n.d.

APPENDIX XVII

I _____ do solemnly take the oath of membership that I (a) shall try my level best to realize the aims and objectives of the Nizam-i-Islam party and subject myself to the organizational discipline;

(b) Shall not maintain connections with other political parties;

(c) Shall devote at least two hours a week to the cause of the party and thereby the people;

(d) Shall not seek out party offices;

(e) Shall follow the unassuming philosophy of public service based on the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the holy Quran and the Summah;

(f) And shall not default in paying the annual membership fee.

Signature _____

Date _____

Source: The Constitution of Nizam-i-Isman Party, (Dhaka: Shahin Press: 1967) 2nd edit. p. 22. (Translated from Bengali into English by the writer).

APPENDIX XVIII

I _____ S/o _____ do hereby swear in the name of Allah, the almighty the oath of membership of the Jamat-i-Islam Party that I

(1) Shall lay the greatest emphasis on my loyalty to Allah and His Messenger, the prophet Mohamed and pay the strictest adherence to their behests and saying;

(2) Shall subject myself unhesitatingly to the rules and regulations and above all, the discipline of the Jamat;

(3) Shall on no account absent myself from the Jamat Meetings except on grounds of "Shariat";

(4) Shall ever remain steadfast to my conscience and sense of righteousness in putting forward my views uninhibited by any considerations;

(5) Shall endeavor to point out any failings in the organization and work for their removal.

I beseech Allah, the omnipotent to give me prudence and strength to fulfil / the above mentioned undertakings, Amen

Signature _____

Date _____

Source: The Constitution of the Jamat-I-Islami (Dacca, Forward Printing works: 1966), 4th edit., p. 78. (Translated from Bengali into English by the writer)

APPENDIX *

(August 11, 1955, – September 12, 1956)

Government		Opposition	
M.L.	33	A.L.	13
U.F.	16	Independents	7 (3 Noon Group)
P.N.C.	4		20
S.C.F.	3		
U.P.P.	2		
Independents	2		
60			

(September 12, 1956 – October 18, 1957)

R.P.	27	M.L.	12
A.L.	13	N.I.P.	3
P.N.C	4	K.S.P.	7
S.C.F.	3	N.A.P.	7
U.P.P.	2	Chowdhury Mohammed Ali Group	5
	49		31

(October 18, 1957 December 16, 1957)

R.P.	21	A.L.	13
M.L.	12	P.N.C.	4
K.S.P.	4 (Sarkar Group)	N.A.P.	4
N.I.P.	3	S.C.F.	3
Independents	4	U.P.P.	2
K.S.P.	1 Haq Group	K.S.P.	2 (Haq Group)
		Chowdhury Mohammed Ali group	5
	45		54

(December 16, 1957 – October 7, 1958)

Government		Opposition	
R.P.	21	M.L.	15
A.L.	14	Chowdhury Mohammed Ali Group	5
P.N.C.	4	N.I.P.	3
N.A.P.	4	K.S.P.	4 (Sarkar Group)
S.C.F.	3		
U.P.P.	2		
K.S.P.	3 (Haq Group)		
Independents	2		
	35		

Source: *Dawn*, June 23, 1955; September 14, 1956; December 3 and 24, 1957; March 5, 1958 and October 1958

APPENDIX **

Central Government Development outlay in East and West Pakistan

1947-48 – 1960-61 (Rs. in crores)

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Investment	Rs. 172	Rs. 430
Loans	Rs. 184	Rs. 224
Crants-in-Aid	Rs. 76	Rs. 101

Private Account of Machinery through Central Government Licensing

(1951-60) (Rs. in crores)

East Pakistan	Percent	West Pakistan	Percent
Rs. 64.1	28	Rs. 162.4	72

Region wise Breakdown of Allocation of Foreign Aid and Loans

(up to June 30, 1960) (Rs. in crores)

	East Pakistan	percent	West Pakistan	percent	Centre unallocable	percent
Foreign Development Aid	Rs. 93.89	17	Rs. 335.22	62	Rs. 113.03	21
U.S. Commodity Aid	Rs. 29.00	30	Rs. 262.00	64	Rs. 18.00	6

Regional Allocation of Import Licenses for raw materials and spare parts

(1951-1958) (in thousands of Rupees)

Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1951	52,400	88,981
1952	42,579	1,37,468
1953	45,525	82,242
1954	43,227	1,04,608
1955	51,072	1,04,201
1956	84,782	84,178
1957	94,123	94,854
1958	84,832	87,266

Source: Economic Disparities between East and West Pakistan, Government of East Pakistan, Government Press, Dhaka, 1963, pp. 17-21.