


Quaid-e-Azam

The Story of a Nation

G. Allana



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Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah The Story of A Nation

G. ALLANA
(1967)

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Sani H. Panhwar (2022)

*This book is dedicated
to the memory of those
unknown martyrs who
suffered or died in
the freedom struggle
for Pakistan*

PREFACE

It is heterogeneous sources that give birth to political theory, just as its origins lie in the scorched earth of political clash and conflict. This is true of the "Two-Nation Theory" advocated by the Muslims of India, which ultimately resulted in the establishment of Pakistan.

When frustration and despondency envelop a period of history like a blinding fog, there arises at times a genius among his people, whose confidence in himself and the cause he advocates become the solid foundation on which is built the magnificent mansion of immortal achievement. The first half of the twentieth century was one such period confronting the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, and Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah was their standard-bearer on the political battle-field, where they were fighting for their very existence as a Nation.

The role of genius is to give expression to those urges and emotions, which to a people are of the essence of their very being. They see mirrored in his words and deeds the reflection, of their own inner dreams, aspirations and ambitions. This was the relationship that subsisted between Quaid-e-Azam and our Nation, at the period of our great trial, which was also, incidentally, the time of our greatest peril. That he should have led our Nation, to its final rendezvous with Destiny stands to his eternal credit and establishes his right to be called Father of our Nation. Jinnah and Pakistan are so indistinguishably inter-linked that it is impossible to think of the one without remembering the other. Hence, the life of the Quaid is in fact the story of Pakistan.

In presenting this biography of the Quaid-e-Azam, I am aware of the shortcomings of my own scholarship. But having been associated with him, as a humble worker and follower, in our fight for freedom and for Pakistan, I had some opportunities of coming close to the Quaid. To me, in my youthful days, he appeared to be a giant. The passage of time has, however, not dimmed that image in any way.

If this book succeeds in making those Pakistanis, to whom Jinnah is a distant figure of history, realize that without his leadership Pakistan may have been impossible to establish, my two years of labor in compiling this biography will not have been in vain.

I am indeed most grateful to Mohtarama Miss Fatima Jinnah for having first roused my interest in a detailed study of the life of Quaid-e-Azam, when in March, 1964, she asked me to assist her in writing a biography of the Quaid. She was kind enough to say that she was asking me to do so, as, besides other reasons, I had been "associated with the Pakistan movement." Although I later on ceased to be associated with her project, during the time I worked with her, I had ample opportunities of obtaining from her very valuable details concerning the early life of the Quaid and some very important

information about their family, which are appearing in print for the first time in this book.

I have consulted about 200 books, some of them rare and out of print, in accomplishing my task. My acknowledgements are due to the authors of these books, the list of which I have refrained from giving, as it would have been far too unwieldy. But I wish to express my special gratitude to those over 100 books and publications, excerpts from which have been quoted in this biography. Their Bibliography appears at the end of this book.

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"LEFT SCHOOL ON MARRIAGE"

Towards the second half of the nineteenth century stars of the British Raj in India were in their ascendant. Starting their life on this sub-continent as merchants, seeking concessions, begging for friendly and favorable treatment, the foreigners had ended by becoming rulers, having set up an empire in India that was the most dazzling jewel in the Imperial Crown. The alien rulers believed their 'civilizing mission' had sobered the disgruntled and that *Pax Britannica* had cooled the? shouldering cinders of resistance and defiance among the 'natives.' On the surface everything appeared to be peaceful and propitious. The subterranean rumblings of hatred against foreign rule, however, escaped their notice, until in the year 1857 a mere spark ignited a mighty flame of rebellion, which came to be recorded as the first chapter in the book of India's long and difficult struggle for freedom from foreign domination. It was a stormy period of our history; many of our patriots lost their lives waging a war of liberation, and became martyrs in the cause of our country's freedom. This revolt although unsuccessful, left a profound impression on the minds of our people and its shadow continued to lengthen over the land in the succeeding years.

There were, however, some parts of India which were uninfluenced by the political conflagration that raged all around. Gondal, a princely State in Kathiawar, was one such spot. The Thakur Saheb of Gondal, in return for his unstinted loyalty to the British Crown, continued to rule in all his splendor over his subjects. It paid him to keep the clamor for revolt against the British out of his State, as rebellions are contagious, and he did not want the glamour and glitter of his own undisputed sway over his people to be threatened or diminished in any way. Under the protecting umbrella of the Thakur Saheb, the people of Gondal State went about their daily lives, undisturbed by the violent political upsurge that had enveloped India.

Gondal, the capital, was the biggest city in the State; but by far and large people of this principality lived in countless villages, leading a simple but contented life. Theirs was a narrow world, whose horizons were coextensive with the geographical boundaries of their respective villages; only the most enterprising, in those days when the bullock-cart was the common means of transportation, had adequate comprehension of Gondal State itself.

Paneli was one such village. Around the time the 1857 rebellion was sowing seeds of organized political opposition to the British, Paneli had a population of less than one thousand. In this sleepy little village lived an industrious old man, Poonjabhai, and there had lived and died before him his forefathers. He was one of the few inhabitants of Paneli who was not an agriculturist. He owned a few hand-loom, on which he worked long and tiring hours, and with the help of occasional hired hands he produced

coarse hand-woven cotton cloth, by the sale of which he made enough money to entitle his family to be ranked among the well-to-do families of Paneli.

He had three sons, Valjibhai, Nathoobhai, Jinnahbhai; and a daughter, Manbai. Jinnahbhai, the youngest, born around 1850, a few years before the first Indian rebellion, was more dynamic and more ambitious than his two elder brothers. To his youthful and ambitious mind, Paneli appeared not only a sluggish village with no prospects whatever, but also a place where life revolved round the meager trading in the village bazar, where bargains were difficult to strike, and round the gossip at the village well. He had been told Gondal was a big city, where life was brisk and business was big. Why should he waste his life in Paneli? Work with his two brothers on the family hand-loom! No. That was too small a venture and the returns were bound to be small. His eyes were set on Gondal, the big city, where the spirit of adventure beckoned him.

Having an analytical mind, and being cautious by temperament, Jinnahbhai was not a man to rush into a business venture in a hurry. His meager purse could ill-afford it. It did not take him long to find a few profitable lines in which he could do quick buying and selling. His flair for business and hard work soon helped him to make sufficient profits, enabling him to add substantially to his original capital. When he returned from Gondal to Paneli after some months, his father was happy to find his son had made good in a big city. Believing as they did in the old traditional values of life, they did not want his mind to be distracted from the lucrative business he had succeeded in establishing in such a short time. Moreover, they were getting on in years; their other two sons and daughter had been married, the only parental responsibility that remained was to get their youngest son married to a good girl, a girl from a respectable family of their own community, the Ismaili Khojas.

They began to Search for a suitable match, eager to get Jinnahbhai married before he left Paneli to settle down permanently to a new life in Gondal. Their search took them outside Paneli, and in Dhraffa, a village about 10 miles from Paneli, lived Mithibai, a girl from a respectable Khoja family; and they decided she would be a suitable spouse for their youngest son,. The parents of the girl were approached, who agreed to give their blessings to the proposed match, and Jinnahbhai was married to Mithibai in Dhraffa around 1814.¹

The business of Jinnahbhai in Gondal prospered, holding out for him an assured future. Urge for hard work and ambition to do bigger and better flowed in his veins. He believed in putting his shoulder to the wheel, in order to go forward on whatever path he chose to tread. Indolence and complacency he considered as hindrances;

¹ The above details of the family of Jinnahbhai Poonja are based on the information given to the Author by Bhanjibhai Hirji Panehwalla (age about 90 years) and his wife. Motibai.

consecration to duty and long and laborious toil were the price he was willing to pay in order to succeed in life. Before long, Jinnahbhai considered Gondal too small a place to contain his soaring dreams and ambitions.

He heard of that big city, Bombay, which was bursting with prosperity, where enormous fortunes were being amassed by big business families. He also heard encouraging reports of a smaller city, Karachi, which had during the last few years developed into an important seaport and a flourishing centre of trade. He began to debate in his mind whether he should migrate to Bombay or to Karachi, leaving Gondal behind for good. While greater chances of business in Bombay tempted his mind, destiny made a decision for him—a decision which resulted in Jinnahbhai, along with his wife, migrating from Gondal State to Karachi.

He had never seen a city as big as Karachi, having a population of about 50,000. Karachi at the time mainly consisted of Khadda, where sailing boats daily brought big catches of fish to be dried in the open under the sun before it was stocked in fish-godowns that littered the coastline; Kharadar, a cluster of mostly mud houses, where the brackish waters of the Arabian Sea wriggled on streets, lanes and bye-lanes; Mithadar, where the sweet waters of the Lyari and Malir rivers could be obtained by digging knee-deep wells; and Saddar, where British troops lived in barracks, and round which nestled the cantonment area of the city. Jinnahbhai rented a modest two room apartment in a building on Newnham Road in Kharadar, where a number of business families had their homes and offices, some of them being from Gujrat, Kathiawar and Cutch. The building was of stone masonry and lime mortar, its roof and flooring being of wooden planks. The apartment rented by Jinnahbhai was on the first floor, where a spacious wooden and iron balcony projected above the pavement, providing a cool and airy place to sit during the day and to spread a charpoy to sleep at night. The balcony and the rooms faced West, the best direction for Karachi buildings-to face in order to ensure cool sea breeze throughout the year.

The young Jinnahbhai Poonjabhai at first found it difficult to hit upon a trade that could offer an easy opening to set up a lucrative business. He tried his hand at different businesses by turn, and steadily went on adding to his modest pile. He seemed to have the golden touch; whatever business he handled, it brought him rich dividends. There were at that time in Karachi a few British firms, which exported the produce of Karachi's hinterland to Europe and the Far East, and imported consumer goods from England, Grahams Shipping and Trading Company being one such firm. Although Jinnahbhai did not have the benefit of a regular education at school in English, his diligence and natural aptitude enabled him to become fairly conversant with the English language. This was considered as quite an accomplishment; only a few merchants in Karachi were able to converse in English. It is likely it was his ability to speak English that brought him close to the General Manager of Grahams Shipping and

Trading Company, Frederick Leigh Croft, and this was to prove a great blessing for the rapid expansion of his business.

With business contacts established with Grahams Shipping and Trading Company, Jinnabhai started export business in isinglass and gum-Arabic, in addition to his other trading interests. He had by now business relations with a number of countries, in particular with England and Hong Kong. As correspondence with these countries had to be carried on in English, Jinnabhai taught himself to read and write the language.

In those days some of the merchants of Kharadar acted not only as businessmen., but also as bankers. The entire trade of Sindh, Baluchistan and the Punjab passed through the port of Karachi and, in the absence of adequate banking facilities, monetary transactions and transfers were usually conducted with the assistance of these-firms. Many families deposited on trust their private savings with these merchants, using their offices as we use the banks of times. Of course, the paraphernalia that goes with modern banking did not exist then; but these merchants were scrupulously honest, and their word was as good as a bond. The firm of Jinnabhai Poonjabhai was one such concern that enjoyed the trust and confidence of the people and of the business community of Karachi in general and of Kharadar in particular.

Mithibai was now with child, and Jinnabhai devoted all his attention and care to his young wife, both excited at the expected happy event. There was hardly a maternity home worth the name in Karachi, and the few good midwives that had established a reputation in their profession were in great demand. Being a rich locality there lived in Kharadar a few midwives who were considered to be among the best in the city, and it was one such midwife, trained in the medical college of everyday experience, that brought into the world the first child of the family—a boy; the day was a Sunday; the date, 25th December in the year 1876.

The baby boy was weak and tiny—slim, long hands, an elongated head. The parents were worried about his health, this little baby that was so much underweight. The doctors said, except for his weak appearance, there was nothing physically or organically wrong with him and his health should give them no cause for concern. But a doctor's assurances can scarcely set at rest a loving mother's fears and anxieties.

There arose the question of naming the child. So far, living in Kathiawar, the names of most of the male members of the family had been much akin to Hindu names. But Sindh was a Muslim province, and the children of their neighbors had Muslim names. The two were agreed that Mohammed Ali would be an auspicious name for their first born, and this was the name they gave him.

Mithibai was intensely fond of Mohammed Ali, and although six other children were born to her, she continued to the end of her life to look upon Mohammed Ali as her

favorite child. Rahemat, Maryam, Fatima, Shireen, Ahmed Ali and Bunde Ali were to be her other children—in all four daughters and three sons.

Cares of a flourishing business weighed heavily on the father's shoulders, who worked many hours at his desk. The mother, however, insisted that the two take Mohammed Ali to the *durgah* of Hassan Pir, at Ganod, ten miles from their village, Paneli, for the *aqiqah* ceremony. They had heard miraculous tales concerning devotees that believed in the supernatural powers of this Pir, who was buried at that *durgah*. A mother's intuition must have made her believe a great future awaited her Mohammed Ali and she wanted to take him to Hassan Pir's *durgah*, where in the traditional manner his head would be shaved ceremoniously and the mother would make a wish. At first Jinnahbhai tried to get himself excused, saying he could ill-afford to be away from Karachi for over a month; but his obduracy melted in the warmth of his wife's pleadings. And so, with their baby boy a few months old, the father and mother booked seats by a sail-boat that would carry them from Karachi to Verawal, a small port in Kathiawar, braving the rain and storms that may be encountered on the voyage.

When the boat anchored at Verawal port and they set foot on *terra firma*, they hired a bullock-cart to take them to Ganod, a distance of a few miles. After a stormy voyage across the Arabian Sea and a jolty bullock-cart journey, Mohammed Ali lay in the arms of his mother to have his head shaved at the, *durgah* of Hassan Pir.²

The facts about the life of Hassan Pir are so intricately mixed-up with legend that it is not possible to extricate the one from the other. However, it is established that the Pir came from Iran as an Ismaili missionary, through the overland route from Baluchistan, and for a while lived in Multan. His saintly and exemplary life won him an admiring following, and many non-Muslims accepted Islam at his hands. The wandering missionary then trekked into Sindh, continuing his conversion work, crossed into Cutch, and finally came to a place near Paneli, where he pitched his tent and devoted all his time propagating Islam among the non-Muslims of that area.

Legend has it that he had supernatural powers, many miraculous stories being attributed to him - the usual image woven round such figures, whose authentic life and work cannot be vouchsafed on historical and documentary evidence.

Hassan Pir is said to have followed in the footsteps of those Muslim *sufis*, who devote their days to the teaching of the Quran and the message of Islam and their nights on the mystic shores of meditation. It was his practice to sleep early, to wake up around two in the morning and to sit in contemplation outside his tent on the banks of Bhadhar River, until he had said his morning prayers. One night as he sat lost in communion with the

² Incidents connected with the early life of Quaid-e-Azam were narrated to the Author by Fatimabai Gangji Valji Poonja.

Unknown, a huge tidal wave lashed the banks of the river, penetrating far beyond the precarious embankments. The sudden onrush of the river waters dragged Hassan Pir, lost in meditation, into mid-river, and death by drowning ended his earthly life. His corpse floated leisurely under the cover of darkness from Paneli to the banks of the river near a village called Ganod, where the majority of the people were non-Muslims of the Rabari caste, their ancestral occupation being cow-breeding.

As some of the Rabaris came in the early morning to the banks of the Bhadhar, they found a dead body washed on to the shores by the receding waters of the river. They at once recognized the saintly person, whose reputation had spread beyond the geographical boundaries of Paneli village. A conference of their elders, seeing that chance had gifted the dead body of the Saint to them, decided to accord him a solemn and befitting burial and to build a mausoleum in the belief that his *durgah* would bring prosperity to their village.

And so it was that Hassan Pir came to be buried in Ganod. The lapse of many years has not damped the devotional enthusiasm of the people of Gondal State, and even to this day every year there is an *urs* or feast of the Saint at his *durgah*, where both Hindu and Muslim devotees gather.³

The *aqiqah* ceremony over, the father and mother took their bald little boy to their native village, Paneli, making the journey once again by bullock-cart. After staying in Paneli and Gondal for a few weeks, they returned to Karachi with their baby boy, and Jinnahbhai was again absorbed in the pre-occupations of a prosperous business, while the mother gave all her time and attention to Mohammed Ali.

Jinnahbhai Poonja was frugal in his living and careful with his money. A businessman, who was struggling to establish and expand his business in a new city, had to be careful with his pennies. Fortune is a capricious deity; it may smile on you today, but who knows what will be her mood tomorrow! The family lived a simple life; what they lacked in ostentatiousness was made up by the warmth of a happy family life.

Mohammed Ali was now about six years old, and his parents engaged a teacher to teach him Gujrati at home. They thought he was still too young to be sent to school, and the nearest school was quite a distance from their house, a distance which they thought was too much to be covered on foot by a boy of six. Smart and intelligent by nature, Mohammed Ali was not particularly fond of sitting through his lessons at home. He was more at home playing with the boys of his age of the neighborhood, among whom he established a reputation as being proficient at games. They in their childish minds

³ From a Gujrati book, Khoja Vartant, or, "A History of Khojas", by Sachedina Nanjiani, Assistant Revenue Commissioner of Cutch, p. 230; published in 1892.

looked upon him as their leader, and he intuitively felt he was their superior. However, when he was about nine, he was put in a primary school.⁴

A year later, Jinnahbhai thought it better to put Mohammed Ali in a school far from home, as his classmates at Kharadar had a disturbing influence on his attendance at school often tempting him to abandon books for games— marbles, tops, *gili danda* and cricket. It was decided to get him admitted in the Sindh Madressah-tul-Islam, a high school about a mile from their home on Newnham Road, founded by Khan Bahadur Hasanali Effendi, the pioneer educationist among Sindh Muslims. The change of school, however, did not change his attitude to his studies, and he continued to woo success and victory on the playground rather than at school.

The General Register of pupils attending the English Department of Sindh Madressah-tul-Islam shows that Mohammed Ali was the 11th boy to be admitted to that school on the 4th of July, 1887, other particulars shown are, "Name: Mohammed Ali Jinnah; Native Place: Karachi; Birthday: not given; Age, 14 years; Caste, Khoja; Previous instruction: Std. IV Gujrati; Paying or Free: Paying; Standard or class to which admitted: Std. 1". The school register records he left Sindh Madressah to go to Bombay, but there is no mention on what date he left school. Another entry, No. 178, in the register indicates Mohammed Ali Jinnah was readmitted on the 23rd of December, 1887, about five and a half months after he left Sindh Madressah for Bombay. His birthday is shown as being 20th, October, 1875, and in the column 'Previous Instruction' is mentioned "Anjuman Islam Bombay, Std. 1." From this it is clear he studied for a few months in that school in Bombay. It has not been possible to establish the reason why his parents sent him to Bombay, and again why he was called back to Karachi within five months. But entry No. 177 in the Sindh Madressah Register reveals that another boy, Karim Jaffer, "Caste: Khoja," also was admitted on the same day to that school, and his previous instruction was also "Standard I in Anjuman Islam "Bombay," his "Native Place" being "Bombay". Karim Jaffer, however, left Sindh Madressah on 18th May 1888, five months after joining it, the reason being "Left for Bombay." These two consecutive entries on the same day cannot be the result of mere coincidence, and it would be safe to presume that Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Karim Jaffer were related to one another: that Mohammad Ali stayed with the family of Karim Jaffer in Bombay; that the two came from Bombay together to Karachi; that Karim Jaffer stayed with the family of Jinnahbhai Poonja for about five months in Karachi and then left for Bombay. It has not been possible to establish what the relationship was between the two families.

On the 5th of January, 1891, Mohammed Ali ceased to be a student of Sindh Madressah, while he was in Std. IV, and the "Reason of withdrawal" is shown to be "Long Absence." The next evidence of his schooldays is entry No. 430 in the Register of Sindh Madressah,

⁴ The above incidents connected with the childhood of Quaid-e-Azam were narrated to the Author by Fatimabai Gangji Valji Poonja.

dated 9th February 1891, the entry records "Name: Mohammed Ali Jinnahbhoy: Native Place: Karachi" Birthday: 20th October 1875; Caste: Khoja; Previous instruction: Std. IV; Paying or Free: Paying; Standard or Class to which admitted: IV; Date of leaving: 30th January 1892; Standard from which left: Std- V; Reason of Withdrawal: Left for Cutch on Marriage."

From the above it becomes clear that Mohammed Ali Jinnah, after passing fourth standard Gujrati, studied in Sindh Madressah from the 4th of July, 1887, to the 30th of January 1892, a period of about four and a half years, including a brief period that he studied at Anjuman Islam, Bombay. He joined Std. I in 1887, and when he left in 1892 he was a student of Std. V. This indicates he passed all his examinations every year, in spite of his indifferent attendance at school.

His birthday is shown in two different entries to be 20th October, 1875, which tends to cast doubt on the accuracy of his official birthday, 25th December 1876. But nothing can be more authentic than the constant acceptance of a statement and it is a well known fact that Quaid-e-Azam had always celebrated the latter date as his birthday. The spelling of his name, as indicated in the register of Sindh Madressah, had undergone a change twice during the period he was a student of that school. It was to change further in his later life, until it finally came to be "Mohammed Ali Jinnah".

After the age of ten, Mohammed Ali developed a great liking for horses. His father owned a number of carriages, a sign of affluence in those days. In the stables of Jinnahbhai were a number of fine horses, and Mohammed Ali was quick to learn horse-riding, a sport he immensely enjoyed. He had a school friend, Karim Cassim, son of a merchant at Kharadar, and the two boys would go horse-riding for long distances every day.⁵

He loved his horses; they stood so gracefully, holding their heads high, symbolizing strength and confidence. He saw in all nature life mould itself on vertical lines. Horses stand erect, and so do the trees; also flowers on the bough; man walks upright, as most birds and beasts; minarets and domes aspire to the skies. He made it a principle of life not only to look ahead, but also to keep his chin up. He would not allow difficulties to bend him; he would rather accept their challenge and overcome them, like a giant pine, whom storms may toss, but cannot bend. He spent his days at school, and his evenings he devoted to horse-riding.

Mohammed Ali was already sixteen and he was only in the fifth standard, caring little for his studies and more for his games. It was enough to give his father an anxious time, but the mother's confidence in her son's future stood unshaken. The business of Jinnahbhai was flourishing and he was ranked among the leading businessmen of

⁵ Told to the Author by Karim Cassim.

Karachi, giving him all the more cause to worry about his eldest son, who must in the course of time join him to lighten his business responsibilities. He had substantial business dealings with Grahams Shipping and Trading Company, through whom he exported his goods »to Europe and the Far East, and he saw Frederick Leigh Croft, General Manager of that firm, frequently in connection with his business. Jinnahbhai sometimes discussed the future of Mohammed Ali with Croft, who advised him to send the young boy to London. After some discussion, the father was persuaded to agree in the hope that it may open a new chapter in the life of his son.

Mithibai was devoted to her son, and it was only natural that the mother should also willingly agree to this decision. After all, London was far, so far away! And it would take him two or three years to return! How could She be so long separated from Mohammed Ali!

It is obvious that his impending departure for Europe was the cause of his leaving Sindh Madressah in January, 1892, and the entry "Left for Cutch on marriage" indicates that his parents decided to get him married before he left for England.

The question arose as to whom he should marry.

The mother had a ready answer to this; she knew of an Ismaili Khoja family of Paneli who were distantly related to her, and they had a girl of marriageable age, Emi Bai; surely she would be a good match for Mohammed Ali. In those days it was the parents that arranged the marriages of their children, the boy and girl had no option but to trust the superior wisdom of their parents. Of course, the parents knew what was good for their children.⁶

It is probably the only important decision in the life of Quaid-e-Azam that he allowed to be made by others. He loved his mother so much, he could not refuse her He trusted his father's worldly wisdom so much, he was sure his father could not make a mistake. He acted as an obedient son, accepting the decision of his parents, and he thus came to be engaged to Emi Bai of Paneli,

He had a consuming hunger for experience gained through his own efforts and he, therefore, refused to be ordered about by others as to what to do and what not to do; neither did he like to be told as to what was good for him and what was not. This trait, developed as a child, was to be his compass and guide even during the most turbulent periods of his political life. But, paradoxically, he submitted completely in the matter of choice of a wife to the decision of his mother and father.

⁶ The above incidents are based on what the Author heard from Karim Cassim.

The father, mother, and Mohammed Ali left Karachi by sea for Verawal, and from there the marriage party proceeded by bullock-cart to Paneli. Distance lends enchantment, and the village folk of Paneli believed Jinnahbhai had become a multi-millionaire in that big city, Karachi, sending his goods to distant lands by big ships that crossed the oceans without sails. And then he had a big house, carriages and horses. Oh, yes, they gossiped, Jinnahbhai had made a big fortune. The Poonja family was proud of him.

Jinnahbhai was not going to disappoint his family, or the people of his village. He had brought with him a large number of presents, which were to be given as marriage gifts to relatives, friends, and to the head of each family of Paneli. Fire-crackers were ordered in plenty, so that sleepy Paneli would thunder with their booming, and their dazzle would light up the skies for miles around. Nakar-beaters, who played on a big semi-circular drum with two thin sticks, without musical accompaniment, made the echoes and re-echoes of their drums reverberate beyond the boundaries of Paneli.

The people of the entire village were invited to the community dinners and lunches. Unadorned and unattractive Paneli wore the garment of festivity, as if the village had suddenly woken one morning to find itself a bride among the villages of Gondal. Jinnahbhai did not mind the expense; after all, it was the wedding of his first-born and, who knows, his other children may be married in Karachi, or, maybe, in Bombay. This ostentatious wedding must have tremendously impressed the village folk of Paneli that Jinnahbhai had become a big businessman in a big city.

One can only imagine what must have been the thoughts of the bridegroom in the midst of all this festivity. He was hardly sixteen, and he was embarking on the uncharted waters of the matrimonial ocean. He had never seen the face of his bride, with whom he was expected to share his life; he had never spoken to her. All he must have been aware of was that he had made a departure from the way of life he had chalked out for himself—to go his own way, to make his own decisions. He was powerless before Destiny which, in the person of his mother, had decreed that he should marry Emibai.

Decked from head to foot in long flowing rows of flowers, strung with invisible white thread, he marched in procession from his grandfather's house to that of his father-in-law, where sat fourteen-year old Emibai, dressed in expensive new clothes, heavily bejeweled, her hands spotted with henna, her face and clothes heavily sprinkled with costly *ittar*. The *nikah* ceremony was performed, a few verses from the Holy Quran were recited, and the two became husband and wife.⁷

The bridal party returned to Karachi and Mohammed Ali and his bride, Emibai, stayed in the house of their parents on Newnham Road. As the date for his departure for

⁷ The above is based on information given to the Author by Bhanjibhnt Hirji Paneliwala and his wife, Motibai.

Europe approached he was busy preparing for a long journey that would take him to an unknown land.

"I WANT TO BE A BARRISTER"

While the ship carrying him across the seas to England kept its course with the help of charts and compass, Mohammed Ali Jinnah was embarking on the uncharted ocean of a new life in a country that was completely unknown to him. The presence of this boy of sixteen, unaccompanied and unchaperoned, in those far-off days, when a voyage to England was an event out of the ordinary in the life of an Indian, must have aroused the curiosity of many of his fellow-passengers.

Winter was in full blast, and Mohammed Ali found life in London rather depressing, not being used to such severe weather. Years later he said, "I found a strange country and unfamiliar surroundings. I did not know a soul, and the fogs and winter in London upset me a great deal, but I soon settled down and was quite happy."⁸

He was to live in London for quite some time, and staying in a hotel would be expensive; therefore, not advisable. One can well imagine young Mohammed Ali scanning the brief advertisement columns of daily newspapers, jotting down addresses of a few families willing to accept paying guests. His search ended when he found a family that was prepared to take in a paying guest, and he was soon living on 35, Russell Road, Kensington, opposite the present Olympia, an impressive building on High Street, built much later than 1892- Even now Russell Road is in a reasonably good residential locality of London, overlooking countless sections and cross-sections of railway lines, and in those years it must have been a much sought after residential quarter, The London County Council, only a few years ago, put up a plaque on the building on 35, Russell Road, which reads, "Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah 1876 1948. – Founder of Pakistan. Stayed here in 1895".

His eager mind was keen to benefit from his visit in England at a time when the spirit of British Liberalism was making such a profound impact on the minds of its people. He adopted the typically English habit of reading carefully his morning paper as he awoke and to complete reading it before finishing his breakfast. He read with undisguised admiration about the triumphs of great leaders dominating the political scene of England, and their speeches in and outside Parliament, which millions read with enthusiasm and adulation. Wherever he went, he heard conversation revolve round the latest utterances of these political leaders, whom people looked upon as men of destiny of that period of their history. If he returned to Karachi and joined his father's business, he may become a successful businessman and make money. Yes, money was important in life, but then he could never become a leader of men, a hero in the service of his country. Here in England the morning papers were loud with praise of political leaders.

⁸ *The Immortal Years*, by Sir Evelyn Wrench, p. 132: Hutchinson, London 1945.

He must have discovered that many of them had studied for the Bar, and that a sound knowledge of law had stood them in good stead in public life.

He had left Karachi for Europe in the beginning of 1892, while he was a student in Sindh Madressah in Standard fifth, with three years to go before he could pass his matriculation. In the face of this documentary evidence, it becomes difficult to accept the commonly held view that he had passed his matriculation examination and had gone to England to study for the Bar. The question arises what then was the purpose that had taken him to that country? This cannot be answered with any degree of authenticity. But it is said that when Mohammed Ali, as a young boy, saw an advocate for the first time robed in a black gown and bands, he said, "I want to be a barrister". This ambition, nursed since childhood, asserted itself in his early days in London.

There is no doubt, however, that this turned out to be one of the most momentous decisions that he took for himself, a decision that was to change the entire course of his life. His young mind had been ignited by the spark of ambition to carve out for himself a worthy place in the public life of his country, and to that end he devoted all his time and energy. A complete transformation seems to have come over him, and he joined Lincoln's Inn in 1893, preparing himself for a legal career.

While replying to a welcome address presented to him by the Karachi Bar Association some time before the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. he explained the reason why he preferred to join Lincoln's Inn rather than any other Inn in London. He said, as a Muslim, he had the greatest reverence for Muhammad, the great Prophet of Islam, who was one of the greatest statesmen the world has ever seen. He went on a chance visit to Lincoln's Inn one day in London, and saw an inscription on the entrance at Lincoln's Inn dedicated to the memory of the Prophet of Islam, "I joined Lincoln's Inn because there, on the main entrance, the name of the Prophet was included in the list of the great law-givers of the world".

Not long after the Quaid had left Karachi for England, his wife. Emi Bai, died. He had not lived long enough with his child-wife, whom he had married on the advice of parental authority. But when he received the news, while still studying at Lincoln's Inn, about the death of his mother, who died in childbirth, the shock was unbearable, for he loved her more than anything else in the world. He had a sensitive nature that felt intensely and, therefore, he suffered intensely. Far away from home, lonely, and not being with his mother in her last days, the shock must have been very great.

After the death of his mother, his father's business went on suffering one reverse after another. Jinnahbhai Poonja was a very worried man, a widower with six children to look after, Mohammed Ali, who alone of his children could be a support to him. was reading for the Bar in London.

The Quaid was about 18 when he lost his mother and his wife. Letters from home told him that the prosperous family business, so painstakingly built up by his father, was on the verge of collapse. Sometimes heavy reverses in life draw out untapped and unknown resources in certain individuals. The Quaid faced these disasters and losses with the courage of a Stoic, determined to succeed, to add luster to his family name.

While studying at Lincoln's Inn, he changed his name to read, "M.A. Jinnah". The horizons of his interests were being widened. He obtained a reader's ticket for the Library of the British Museum and devoted his time to enrich his mind with intensive and comprehensive reading. He would sometimes go on a Sunday morning to Hyde Park Corner to listen to the soap-box orators that have made that Corner into a world-famous institution, where rash and incoherent utterances of irresponsible speakers attack the Government of the day in most scathing terms. He was a constant visitor to the House of Commons, where he listened with unabated admiration to the speeches of such liberal statesmen as Gladstone, Lord Morley, Joseph Chamberlain, Balfour, T. P. O'Conour and others. Frequent visits to the Commons enabled him to acquaint himself with the art of parliamentary eloquence, which was to be his strongest weapon in later years.

By sheer dint of hard work, he passed his examinations at Lincoln's Inn in two years, and at the age of 18 he came to be the youngest Indian student ever to be called to the Bar. But he had still to wait in England for some time to obtain his cap and gown, as he had to complete the formality of attending a prescribed number of dinners. His Secretary, M.H. Saiyid asked him later on in life about studies at Lincoln's Inn at that time. Quaid-e-Azam made a joke of it, "It was no more difficult than to give a number of dinners, some twenty-two of them, in honor of some big members of the Inn or other lawyers of eminence".⁹

He was not one who would spend all his time browsing over study books to pass an examination. He plunged into the whirlpool of activities centring round Indian students in London, among whom there was great excitement in the very first year of his arrival, as Dadabhoy Naoroji, a veteran Parsee leader from Bombay, settled in London for the last many years as a businessman, was seeking election to the House of Commons from the Central Finsbury Constituency. He was the first Indian ever to launch on such an ambitious venture, and it was only natural that Indian students should be eager to work for him. Quaid-e-Azam threw himself heart and soul into this election campaign, and thereby caught the eye and won the esteem of Dadabhoy Naoroji, the Grand Old Man of India.

The candidature of Dadabhoy roused the ire of some prominent figures in the political life of England, who made this election a racial issue. Championing the cause of color

⁹ *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, by Matlub Hasan Saiyid, p. 3, 1945. Sh. Muhammed Ashraf, Lahore.

prejudice, Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister of England, in one of his speeches contemptuously called the Indian candidate "a black man". This deeply hurt the nationalist feelings of Indian students, most prominent among them being Mohammed Ali Jinnah and C.R. Das. It also won for Dadabhoy the active sympathies of many liberal-minded voters in his constituency, and according to P.C. Ray, "The affront was, therefore, taken not as a personal one but as an exhibition of racial arrogance. This set on edge the nerves of the electors of Central Finsbury and Naoroji easily walked into St. Stephens."¹⁰

Quaid-e-Azam developed great respect and admiration for Dadabhoy Naoroji, who was to exert such a great influence on his political personality in the years to come. He remained a devout friend of the Grand Old Man, though much younger than him in years, and the two together were to render yeoman service to the All-India Congress in the early years of its existence. The young Mohammed Ali was eagerly learning his first political lessons in the school of liberal ideas that were having a powerful impact on British public life. He realized forcefully the terrible disadvantage that is the inevitable lot of a subject nation, and his mind was already visualizing a massive struggle for the independence of India, in which he would wish to play an important role. An echo of this inner feeling is evident in a statement he was to make a few years later, "Bombay will be another Boston. Next time tea chests won't be chucked into the sea, but cartloads of live Britishers. On another occasion, showing justified impatience for India's freedom, and enthusiastic about Dadabhoy's work for India in the British Parliament, Jinnah said, "I want to be in London and enter Parliament, where I hope to wield some influence. There I shall meet British statesmen on a footing of equality. They will be accessible to me, not in the sense that I shall seek them and beg for interviews. They will want me and I shall want them more."¹¹

His days in England as a student made him realize the lack of close and frequent contacts among Indian students, without which he felt they could not organize themselves effectively to advocate their own or their country's cause. If only Indian students could organize themselves into an Association, offering a meeting place and a forum, he thought it would be of immense benefit to them. He pioneered this idea and approached a number of students, only to meet with opposition that this idea was too big to be shouldered by such a young and inexperienced student. However, this thought persisted in his mind, and when he visited England in 1913, no longer an unknown person, but an Indian leader of eminence, Indian students besieged him for guidance and advice. They arranged a meeting of Indian students at Caxton Hall in London, where the Quaid was asked to address them. He advised them to take a keen interest in political events and developments both in England and in India, but he warned them not to take active part in politics, while they were yet in the midst of their

¹⁰ *Life and Times of C. R. Das*, by P. C. Ray.

¹¹ Quoted in "*Leaders of India*," by Joachim Alva, p. 65, 1943: Thacker and Co. Ltd., Bombay.

studies. They should only be academic political thinkers, so that when they entered politics actively, they could act as missionaries of enlightenment and progress. The mind of a student is in a state of constant search, and they would find that opinions held by them would change as their experience went on widening. They should not hold any opinion to be: final, until and unless they had entered actual life and their beliefs had rubbed shoulders with the friction of active politics. He appealed to them to organize themselves into a well-knit body, and as a result the Central Association of Indian Students was formed in London.

His extensive reading had made him acquainted with the works of many writers and poets of the English language, some of whom he continued to read and enjoy till late in life. But the one who had the greatest fascination for him was Shakespeare. He was fond of the London theatre, but he could not afford to frequent it. He had to resist the temptation of the expensive pastime of the theatrical world in order to save his money, invest it in books, and to prepare patiently for the exacting studies at Lincoln's Inn. However, he sometimes went to see Shakespearean plays at the Old Vic, where he fell under the spell of the great Shakespearean actors of those days. For some time he toyed with the idea of taking to the stage seriously, but the only offer he got was to work in a minor capacity with the Shakespearean Dramatic Club.

His young mind in those four formative years of his life had been making, imperceptibly, momentous decisions that were to influence his life. Nature had gifted him with rich talent, and he did not want to lose himself in the narrow lanes of a mere sordid world; he wanted to discover himself on the highway of eminence and fame. In spite of his predilection for a career on the stage, he rejected it as too small for his soaring ambitions. The actor on a stage could win the applause of only the limited audience in the theatre; he would be a hero on a much bigger platform, where he could be the acclaimed leader of millions of his people.

The formalities of dinners at Lincoln's Inn were over, and he was now preparing, after a stay of about four years, to leave England to join his family in Karachi.

He was on his way back home, once again on one of those ships that did the voyage in three weeks, his future as inscrutable as the deep ocean. He was only aware of the cares and worries of a large family that had fallen on the enfeebled shoulders of his father, who hoped his eldest son would soon partly shift the responsibility on himself. His homecoming had for him a melancholic touch, for as he moved his searching eyes on the crowd that stood waiting on the pier at Karachi harbor as his ship sluggishly glided in to anchor, he could see his father, brothers and sisters, and a few relatives, but he missed his mother. How cruel the Fates had been to him! Only if she were there, now that he had returned from England, a Barrister, with a bright future. How proud she would have been of her Mohammed Ali!

On reaching home, the father was soon in conference with Mohammed Ali explaining to him that the family business was in ruins, and that he had to pay large sums of money to a number of business houses, some of whom had filed cases in law-courts-Here as a young and promising Banister whom the gloomy prospect of defending cases against his family business-house stared him in the face.

The father thought it best to get him appointed as a junior in the office of a flourishing advocate of Karachi, and in this connection he spoke to two firms who were also his lawyers, Harchandrai Vishandas and Company, and Lalchand and Company. The heads of both these firms were only too willing to take this young Muslim Barrister, newly returned from England, into their firm. After all, in those days, there were only a few Muslim Barristers in the Muslim province of Sindh, and the young Mohammed Ali, they were sure, would be an asset to them. But Mohammed Ali's mind was already made up. Instead of practicing in Karachi, where the bitter shadow of business failure of his family would darken his path, he decided to try his luck in Bombay, a city that he thought offered greater opportunities to one who was willing to work hard. The father wanted very much that his son should set up practice in Karachi, where his family had already made friends with a number of families, and the prospect of cutting away his roots from Karachi and to venture on a new life in Bombay did not appeal to him. He asked his personal friend and neighbor, Ramjibhai Pethabhai, to dissuade his son. In spite of Ramjibhai's best efforts, the young Barrister was adamant. He had made up his mind; he would go his own way; as usual, he wanted to learn the hard way - by hard knocks in life.¹²

Recounting these days of Quaid-e-Azam's early life, Sarojini Naidu writes, "This favorite of fortune, suddenly faced with unexpected poverty, set out to conquer the world equipped with nothing but the charmed missiles of his youth, his courage and ambition."¹³

Little did he know at the time that his decision to migrate to Bombay was to be an important milestone in his life and that it would profoundly influence his future. And so, bidding good-bye to his father, his brothers and sisters, he set sail for Bombay.

He took a room on long-term basis at a Hotel in Bombay and had his name enrolled in the Bombay High Court. These were mere formalities and easily disposed of. The real difficulty was to set himself up in an office, to secure briefs, and to have his reputation established as a dependable Barrister. This proved to be a heart-breaking ordeal. It was like scaling a steep and difficult mountain, the grip of his feet slipping at every step. This young man, with the proud look in his eyes, walked up and down the corridors of many courts, giving one the impression of being a leading legal luminary, but, in fact,

¹² The above is based on information given to the Author by Karim Cassim.

¹³ *An Ambassador of Unity*, by S. Naidu, p. 4, 1918: Ganesh and Co., Madras.

desperately in need of his first brief. He lived in majestic isolation on the roof of the castle that he had built for himself, while into the office of people of lesser talent in his profession poured in clients, ready to pay the fees that were demanded from them. He sat in the small one-room office he had hired in the Fort area, waiting for chance to usher in a client, browsing and brooding over his scanty stock of law-books.

It was bad enough to be enrolled as a Barrister in the Bombay High Court, to go round the courts daily, as if it was an inevitable routine, and to return to his cramped room in the hotel in the evening without receiving enough briefs to make the future look hopeful. But when the irksome months lengthened into three agonizing years, he felt miserable. Then there was his father and his family in Karachi facing litigation and difficulties, and he could not be of much help to them, contrary to his expectations when he left Karachi for Bombay. Disappointed and frustrated, he showed a stiff chin to the world outside, but within his heart there gnawed the rancor of an unsatisfied yearning. Portraying this characteristic of his, Joachim Alva wrote. "He will prefer to eat his heart away in the wilderness and retire into frigid silence than play second-fiddle to anybody."¹⁴

In spite of the difficult times through which he was passing, he kept up social contacts, frequenting some of the best clubs of Bombay, and very often a guest at parties in the homes of the elite. In his early twenties, he was an extremely attractive young man—tall, of commanding personality, a pair of small but penetrating eyes that bespoke a shrewd intellect, a face with a sharp Grecian profile, long limbs, with the bearing and poise of a born leader of men. A man of refined taste and manners, he was handsome to look at. Always well-groomed, he cut a distinguished figure, for he loved a fine appearance and was impeccable in sartorial perfection. This was a trait he kept up to the last days of his life. Many Viceroys, including Lord Hardinge, Lord Chelmsford and Lord Reading, were known to have said he was "The best dressed gentleman they had ever met in India". Nature had endowed him with charm and personality, but society was reluctant to supply him the wherewithal that would enable him to live an affluent life. While those that rubbed shoulders with him in the days of his struggle recognized in him a young man with a future, little did they know how few were the briefs coming his way in the present.

But, inadvertently, his social contacts proved to be a blessing and were responsible for a break-through. A friend of his, who held his talent and ability in high esteem, introduced him to Macpherson, who was at that time the acting Advocate-General of Bombay. The latter was impressed with the young Barrister, and he invited Jinnah to work under him, extending to him the privilege of utilizing his well-stocked library and of reading in his chambers. Quaid-e-Azam never forgot this magnanimous gesture on

¹⁴ *Leaders of India*, by Joachim Alva, p. 64.

the part of Macpherson, particularly as in those days it was very rare for an Englishman to extend such courtesies to Indian Barristers.

Macpherson soon discovered that the new recruit to his chambers was a young man of great charm, ability, perseverance, and integrity, and he was not slow to pass on some cases to the young Mohammed Ali Jinnah. At this time the Quaid toyed with the idea of taking a Government job, so that he could be reasonably assured of continuous financial security, uncertainty of success at the Bar being too dreadful to contemplate. When he placed this idea before Macpherson, he was only too willing to strongly recommend him to Sir Charles Ollivant, the Member in charge of the Judicial Department, and within a couple of weeks M. A. Jinnah was appointed a temporary Presidency Magistrate.

He felt success, which had so far eluded him, was now firmly in his grip. His exemplary conduct as a Magistrate won him praise from his superiors, and when the period of the temporary appointment was over, Sir Charles Ollivant offered him another and better judicial appointment on Rs. 1,500 a month, a princely salary then. "No, thank you, sir", he replied. "I will soon be able to earn that much in a single day."

After this incident, Sir Charles Ollivant went on a long holiday to England. A few years later, Sir Charles returned to India. Recalling one of his meetings with Sir Charles on his return, Quaid-e-Azam told his secretary, M. H. Saiyid, "After two years Sir Charles returned to India having spent some time in England. He was invited to the Orient Club in Bombay of which I was a member and I attended on the occasion. On seeing me there, he came over to me and enquired as to how I was doing in Law; and when I told him I was earning more than Rs. 2,000 a month, he congratulated me on my determination and courage, saying that I had done well to refuse his offer".¹⁵

Another English barrister, who helped Quaid-e-Azam in his early days was Sir George Lowndes, about whom he once said, "I went into the chamber of Sir George Lowndes, a penniless man. He was to me like a father and treated me as a son. When he was in the Imperial Legislative Council as the Law Member to the Government of India, I bitterly opposed him. Withal, we have maintained our friendship unbroken till this date..... Pandit Motilal and I used to fight like a pair of wild cats on the floor of the Legislative Assembly; yet on the same evening of our altercation, he used to dine with my wife, at my cost". Continuing his reminiscences, he said, "I bore no malice to anyone despite political differences."¹⁶

As soon as he resigned his post as acting Presidency Magistrate, he was approached by a number of people who entrusted their cases to him. He now opened his chambers in a

¹⁵ *Mohammed Ali Jinnah*, by M. H. Saiyid, pp. 10-11.

¹⁶ *Leaders of India*, by Joachim Alva, p. 66, 1943: Thacker and Co., Ltd., Bombay.

building where leading lawyers had their offices. He spared no money, within his limited means, in converting his office into an elegant and attractive one, which any lawyer would be proud to own. His feet were now set firmly on the ladder of success, and he sent letters and telegrams to his father to come over to Bombay with the family.

Jinnahbhai had lost his wife in Karachi; the business he had assiduously built up in the hope it would be passed on to his sons had crashed; and he was led to the conclusion that his stay in Karachi would only revive bitter memories in his mind. Moreover, now that his son was getting on well in Bombay, he decided it was better for his family to move to that city. And so, the family came to Bombay and rented a small two-room tenement in Khoja Mohalla at Khadak.

A hard and heart-breaking struggle had not dimmed his self-confidence, nor had it shaken the young barrister's belief in pursuing a life of complete independence, unbending and unyielding to patronage from his superiors and bullying from his seniors. It was for this reason that Sir Chimanlal Setalvad wrote, "Jinnah had always, even in his junior days, shown considerable independence and courage. He never allowed himself to be overborne either by the judge or the opposing Council".¹⁷

Strangman, an Englishman, was a senior and respected member of the Bar in Bombay. He and M. A. Jinnah were briefed together in a case, and on one occasion the young barrister had to go to Strangman's chamber for joint consultations. In those days it was not unusual for Englishmen to behave in an overbearing manner towards their Indian colleagues. Strangman talked to the Quaid in a tone and temper interpreted by the latter as being insulting and derogatory. From that day, he never went to Strangman's chamber, and even broke off exchanging greetings with him, whenever he met him in the Courts or outside.

As a freshly enrolled member of the Bombay Bar, he appeared once before Justice Mirza, and the opposing counsel was Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. While he was developing his arguments in a case, Justice Mirza interrupted him and snubbed him. The Quaid resented it, and thereafter began to address the judge in a manner which Justice Mirza felt was insulting. The Judge pulled up the young barrister and said, "Your tone and words could be held to be a contempt of Court". Turning towards Setalvad, he asked, "Don't you agree with me, Mr. Setalvad." Referring to this incident, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad writes, "It was indeed stupid of the Judge to have put such a question to me. I answered, "It is not for me to give an opinion whether Mr. Jinnah has committed contempt or not. It is your privilege to determine that. But I can say this that knowing Mr. Jinnah as I do, he would have never intended to insult the court!"¹⁸ Recalling this

¹⁷ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, 1946, p. 66.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 67.

incident in later years, the Quaid said, "After that day I decided never to appear before Justice Mirza".

His courage and sheer brilliance won him fame in the law courts of Bombay, and it was agreed on all hands that M. A. Jinnah would reach the heights of eminence as a barrister. His occasional encounters with the Judges, when he would indulge in forceful retaliation, were the talk of the Bar-room. His method of penetrating cross-examination, his gift of persuasive pleading, aided by irrefutable arguments and supported by law and cases, cast a spell in the court room, on "the judges, the juries, the solicitors and clients, all alike! As a counsel he has ever had his head erect, unruffled by the worst circumstances. He has been our boldest advocate; no judge dare bully him. He will not brook insult. Jinnah's ready tongue and brilliant advocacy have warded off all judicial storms and won him all-round admiration."¹⁹

Another Judge who insulted him and failed to get away with it was Sir Edward Marshall Hall. Narrating instances to illustrate this characteristic of Quaid-e-Azam, Joachim Alva sums up, "Clients and solicitors prize Jinnah's services for his matchless grit and courage to stand up for the causes he represents".²⁰

His independence and courage to hold his own against overpowering odds, even in his early days, won him praise from Sir William Wilson, at that time Home Member of the Government of India, who bitterly remarked, "You always attack us, ICS officers, as being arrogant. My dear fellow, I wish you to point to a single ICS officer who can approach Mr. Jinnah in arrogance, offensiveness and insulting treatment of others."

Mohammed Ali Jinnah was fast becoming the talk of the Bar and the Bench, and as he paced up and down the corridors of the court-rooms, clients and counsels admiringly pointed out to one another. "There goes Mr. M. A. Jinnah". Here was a fresh member of the Bar, they thought, who refuses to accept an office or patronage, but is determined to rise or fall on his own intrinsic merit. He was not one who would ask for favors, for he was determined to rise unaided. Even during his difficult days as Barrister he did no pandering to earn his living. It was the clients and solicitors who sought his advice and assistance; he did not run after them. Speaking of him as an advocate, Joachim Alva writes, "He will not grab money," but will stand for his just dues and no more ... Jinnah has preserved his position at the Bar intact and unsullied ... He is the embodiment of the highest standards of the Bar."²¹ Quaid-e-Azam kept up his reputation for his integrity and fearlessness and this was to win him acclaim all over the sub-continent as "The Lord Simon of the Indian Bar."

¹⁹ *Leaders of India*, by Joachim Alva. p. 79.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 79.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

Jinnah's feet were firmly set on the ladder of success and many recognized in him not only a rising Titan of the Bar but also one of the most brilliant young men on the Indian political scene. Sarojini Naidu wrote of him, "Tall and stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, languid and luxurious of habit, Mohammed Ali Jinnah's attenuated form is the deceptive sheathe of a spirit of exceptional vitality and endurance. Somewhat formal and fastidious and a little aloof and imperious of manner, the calm hauteur of his accustomed reserve but masks for those who know him, a naive and eager humanity, an intuition quick and tender as a woman's, a humor gay and winning as a child's—pre-eminently rational and practical, discreet and dispassionate in his esteem and acceptance of life, the obvious sanity and serenity of his worldly wisdom effectually disguise a shy and splendid idealism which is of the very essence of the man".²²

The young Mohammed Ali Jinnah now began to take more and more active interest in politics, and he created a deep impression on those that heard him propound his views in meetings on political problems of the day. His imposing personality and arresting delivery in a voice that was eloquent with sincerity and conviction stamped him in those early days as a brilliant and fearless advocate of public causes. His strongest points as a speaker were his persuasive manner, lucid presentation, penetrating analysis and uncanny foresight. He won recognition and encomium from those that heard him in political meetings and one of them, Sarojini Naidu, predicted, "Perchance it is written in the book of the future that he whose fair ambition it is to become the Muslim Gokhale may in some glorious and terrible crisis of our national struggle pass into immortality as the Mazzini of the Indian liberation."²³

²² *An Ambassador of Unity*, by Sarojini Naidu, p. 2. Ganesh and Co., Madras, 1918.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

THE MUSLIMS OF INDIA – A PERSPECTIVE

Some philosophers believe it is not through the movements of masses that history works itself out, but that they are merely the instruments that produce a hero, who leads the urges and aspirations of the masses to a point where they are crowned with success and victory. The hero in history is merely a symbol and expression of socio-historical forces and, using them as a means through which to achieve results, he leads his following to its goal and end. In appreciating, therefore, the source of Quaid-e-Azam's greatness, it is not enough to merely spotlight his personal qualities and traits and his achievements as a leader, but it is also important to analyze the society, culture and political climate of the times in which he was born. It thus becomes essential to give a brief outline of the historical perspective of the Muslims of India up to the end of the nineteenth century.

The course of history of a country is prone to be inevitably influenced by its geography, just as religion, social concepts and, what generally goes under the generic term, culture, influence political thinking and political institutions of a people. The physical contours of India, a massive triangle standing on its apex, are protected from the north-west to north-east by massive mountain barriers, dense jungles, and icy wastes, and its western, southern and eastern flanks by the deep waters of the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. While nature has thus implanted it in a protected position bordering on isolation, the mountain gateways in the north and ocean-navigation on the east and west coasts have acted as bridges in making for the indigenous peoples contacts with the outside world possible on the one hand, and on the other making it possible for foreign infiltration, to dribble through into the Indian crucible, resulting in a fusion of races, cultures, religions and languages. The different racial groups that came to India, like the Aryans, the Scythians, the Mongols, and the Dravidians sometimes intermingled with the indigenous inhabitants, and sometimes kept themselves aloof and apart. In the days of early invasions by these distinct racial groups each race brought with itself its own tales of mythology, its panorama of superstition, and its bagful of philosophy, and, in the absence of a universal creed, the tendency was towards antithesis instead of synthesis, towards heterogeneousness instead of homogeneousness. Commenting on the role the sea has played in India's contacts with the outside world, Dr. I. H. Qureshi writes. "The sea, in the earlier days, had been used by the Indians for commerce; but gradually the fear of losing caste because of the lack of facilities for observing their own taboos dissuaded them from seafaring, and contacts with the outside world decreased. A contempt for foreigners was the natural corollary of the exclusiveness which caste had created; a society which had divided itself into watertight compartments could not welcome contacts with outsiders".²⁴ It is interesting

²⁴ *History of the Freedom Movement*, Dr. I. H. Qureshi, Vol. I, p. 3, 1957.

to recall certain milestones in the course of this interaction and intermingling in order to arrive at an objective assessment of the political situation in the country as it prevailed at the end of the nineteenth century, when Quaid-e-Azam made his debut on the Indian political scene.

While the wealth and opulence of India have aroused the greed and avarice of outsiders to invade and raid India, its bracing climate in the north, and the fecundity of its soil, enabling one to make an easy and prosperous living, have acted as an enchantment to the spell of which fell foreign invaders and itinerants. While these outside elements were trying to strike roots in a foreign social milieu, the indigenous people, accustomed to speculative thinking and internally divided into castes and sub-castes, were unable to project a sheltering roof, under the shadow of which they could all live together as a brotherhood of man. In the absence of such religious bonds, conformism with a hidebound social code was the price that the individual had to pay in order to fit into his ordained place in society. And so the foreigners that settled down in India, even though retaining their own superstitions, religious beliefs and social customs, were able to live as separate sects in a land where every forehead was stamped with the mark of caste distinction.

With the invasion by the Greeks in 327 B.C., commences the external history of India, although it must be mentioned here that before this Homer had knowledge of articles of Indian merchandise, and that even the Hebrew scriptures mention quite a few products of Indian origin. The first Greek historians to record the existence of India in their works are Hekataios of Miletos (550 B.C.) and Herodotus (450 B.C.); Ktesias, the physician (400 B.C.) brought from Persia useful information about Indian herbs, dyes, fabrics, parrots and monkeys. However, India that lay beyond the east of the Indus came to be known for the first time by historians and physicians that accompanied Alexander the Great on his Indian adventure in 327 B.C.

Crossing the Indus above Attock, Alexander continued his victorious march across Taxila and found that the Punjab lived, politically speaking, an exhausted life, weakened by the internecine warfare between various rival kingdoms and principalities that ruled over that province. Where the river Jhelum takes a sharp bend, Porus, one of the local kings, gave fight to the invading Greek armies, only to find himself vanquished by the superior military skill of the Greeks. Porus, however, "tendered his submission and was confirmed in his kingdom, and became Alexander's trusted friend."²⁵

The heat of the Punjab summer and the hurricanes of the south-west monsoon broke the iron will of his armies and, before he had even crossed the frontier province of India, Alexander had to abandon his dream of conquering that country. His ambition

²⁵ *A Brief History of the Indian people*, by Sir W. W. Hunter, 1901, p. 87: Oxford University Press.

yielded to the clamor of his armies, and he made them set sail down the river Jhelum to Sindh, part of his army marching by the land route. He took Multan, the Capital of Sindh, by storm but was severely wounded in the fighting. After the victorious battle, he built a new town and named it Alexandria, the modern Uch, and brought the surrounding territory under his tutelage. Leaving a Greek Governor to rule over Sindh on his behalf, he set sail down the Indus southwards and founded a city, Putala, the modern Hyderabad. Part of his army, under the command of one of his generals, Nearchus, set sail along the Persian Gulf, and part of it he led himself through southern Baluchistan and Persia to Susa.

Thus ended the first foreign invasion of India, and W. W. Hunter writes, "The Greeks founded no kingdoms; and the only traces which the Greeks left in India were their science of astronomy, their beautiful sculptures, and their coins".²⁶

Almost two hundred years later, history records the invasion of India by the Scythians, who came from Central Asia, and some historians hold that Buddha himself was a Scythian. Around the year 126 B.C., a Scythian tribe drove out the Greek dynasty from Bactria, a kingdom northwest of the Himalayas. Pushing southwards, they set up small settlements in the Punjab, and at about the time that Christ was born, they had begun to rule over almost the entire Punjab. The most famous of the Scythian rulers was Kanishak, whose suzerainty extended over Kashmir, Agra, and Sindh; and over Yarkand and Khokand to the north of the Himalayas. "The Scythian monarchies of Northern India came in contact with the Buddhist kingdom under the successors of Asoka in Hindustan. The Scythians there had become Buddhists; but they made changes in that faith. Some scholars try to show that certain of the Rajput tribes are of Scythian origin. However this may be, it is clear that many Scythian inroads took place into India from the first century B.C. to the fifth century A.D."²⁷

Being born and brought up in a society that accepted caste-distinction as a part of religious observance, Indians found they could only cross the borders of their own country or sail across the seas to other lands at the cost of losing both their caste and religion. This fear acted as a deterrent, and the Indians gradually took to the sea less and less, and in the course of time lost the inter-maritime trade which they had set up.

With the advent of Islam, some fourteen hundred years ago, a new world force began to make its influence and impact felt, which was soon to change the course of history. Owing to its universal appeal, it spread far and fast, transcending the geographical barriers of Arabia, where it had its birth, to spread across countries and continents. At the beginning of the eighth century, the Arabs, a sea-faring people, had established trade relations in many parts of the world, carrying on their trade both by land-route

²⁶ *A Brief History of the Indian Peoples*, by Sir W. W. Hunter, p. 89.

²⁷ *Ibid.* P, 91.

and by ocean navigation. Their trade was a two-way traffic, one embracing the countries of the Middle East and the Far East, in which India was the strategic half-way house, and Ceylon an important island en route, where Arab boats would cast anchor to sell their merchandise and buy indigenous products for resale to other countries. The Governor of Baghdad, desirous of cementing further the bonds of friendship, sent costly gifts to the ruler of Ceylon, who, in token of his appreciation and in reciprocation, promptly dispatched princely presents to the Caliph. Many great events of history have been sparked by sheer accident, and the plundering by pirates off the coast of Sindh near Thatta of the boat carrying these gifts to Baghdad was to result in reprisals that were to completely alter the history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. This was not the first time that Arab ships had been thus molested by pirates off the coast of Sindh and, therefore, Mohammed Bin Qasim, a young Arab General, was entrusted with the task of making the ocean highway safe for their far-flung trade. The General, by brilliant war strategy and force of arms, succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on his enemies on the soil of Sindh, and he came to be the first Muslim to annex a part of the subcontinent to the Government at Baghdad. Thus, historically speaking, came to be written the first word in the first chapter of Muslim history in India.

Commenting on the impact of Islam in those days on Hinduism, Dr. I. H. Qureshi writes, "At this time religious debates were an important feature of life in South India; since Brahminism was adding coercion and even massacre to its methods of conversion, religion could not be a matter of indifference; a change in the religion of the Arabs must, therefore, have aroused curiosity. It is almost certain that Muslim ideas began to penetrate Southern Hinduism. Some Sivite sects seem to have come very much under this influence; even the teachings of the great Hindu thinker and religious teacher, *Sankar-acharya*, who found Hindu thought disorganized and chaotic and left it orderly and defined, and whose teachings molded Hinduism into a philosophical pattern bearing strong traces of Islamic thinking. Thus Islam influenced Hinduism at one of its most formative periods."²⁸

The Arab conquerors were beset with many problems in their relationship with their subjects inhabiting their newly acquired territory. The fact that they gave their subjects the status of protected people, allowing them full enjoyment of religious worship and freedom, entitling them to administer their own personal law, and permitting them to continue to hold the same position in Government service that they had hitherto held, reflects the liberal spirit with which the Arabs started their rule, when Islam took its roots on the sub-continent.

Almost three hundred years later, Indian history recorded another chapter of Muslim invasion. Jaipal was a Hindu ruler in the northern part of India, neighboring the Ghaznawid Kingdom of Sabuktigin, and the two neighboring kingdoms came to be

²⁸ History of the Freedom Movement, Dr. I. H. Qureshi, Vol. I. pp. 6 and 7, 1957.

interlocked in an armed conflict. On the death of Sabuktigin, his son, Mahmud of Ghazni, along with his father's throne, inherited the hostility of the Hindu ruler, King Jaipal. Supporting this point of view, Sir W.W. Hunter writes, "The first collision between Hinduism and Islam on the Punjab frontier was the act of the Hindu."²⁹ Mahmud, in the first Hush of his accession to the throne and aided by his youthful zeal to make his kingdom safe from outside aggression, carried the war into the enemy's territory by launching an all-out offensive. He succeeded in subjugating not only the kingdom of Jaipal, but also the entire Punjab, thus striking terror in the hearts of his other neighbors. The Punjab thus came into the orbit and under the influence of Muslim rulers. In the two neighboring provinces of Sindh and the Punjab flourished not only Muslim influence in the field of Government, but also in the realm of culture, language and literature. The Arabs from across the Arabian Ocean and Persians from the north-west brought into Sindh and the Punjab their highly developed thought, culture, language and literature, which in turn enriched Hindi, the indigenous language of the country. The fusion of these outside currents with local influences gave birth to a rich new culture, which came to be the distinctive feature of the Muslims of Sindh and the Punjab, soon to spread from across the boundaries of these two provinces to stride the entire subcontinent. With the spread of Islam in the subsequent centuries, Muslims, although absorbed in the political life and in the economic struggle of the country, continued to look upon themselves as a distinctive cultural group. This feeling of distinctiveness, ever present in their consciousness, was to later on make articulate their subconscious urge to look upon themselves as a separate nation.

The last of the Ghaznawid dynasty was Qutubudin Aibak, from whose feeble grasp, in the thirteenth century, Muizudin Sam found it so easy to snatch the sceptre and throne. This period is noted for the speedy expansion of Muslim power, which thrust itself southward and established its suzerainty over Bengal. Contemporaneously, Islam had been spreading in Central Asia and in many other parts of the world. But the barbaric Mongol hordes of Changiz Khan were to soon over-run the eastern part of the Muslim world, trampling under their ruthless military heels the accumulated cultural, social and economic gains which Muslim rule had been able to bestow on those countries. The Mongol armies pushed southwards through the northern mountainous passes to invade India, but the Muslim kingdom of Delhi successfully held ac bay the invasion of Mongol armies. This test of arms between the savage Mongols and the Muslim throne at Delhi continued for some time, and the sheer necessity of sustained, vigilance gave strength to the Muslim power in India, and in these periods of crises it was able to produce eminent scholars, statesmen and soldiers.

After the storm descended a calm, and Muslim scholars continued their efforts in all the branches of learning, while Muslim *sufis* and thinkers made rich contribution to the development of Islamic mysticism. The two languages, Hindi, spoken by the

²⁹ *A Brief History of the Indian Peoples*, by Sir W. W. Hunter, p. 113, 1901: Oxford University Press.

indigenous people, and Persian, brought by the Muslims, began to influence one another, and the inevitable compulsion of finding a common language gave birth to Urdu, which combined in itself the best of both of them. Urdu acted as a common bond between Hindus and Muslims, and continued to be a cementing force until the turn of the twentieth century, when Hindu desire to disown Urdu and to hold it up as representing an alien people and culture, brought about a rude disruption of the friendly ties that had subsisted between Hindus and Muslims. As the two main political organizations, the All-India Congress and the All-India Muslim League, gained in strength in the years to come, the controversy over Urdu versus Hindi became bitter and acrimonious.

The yawning chasm between Islam and Hinduism was sought to be bridged by the Muslim *sufis*, who not only preached the brotherhood of man as envisaged by Islam, but also recognized the soul of every individual to be part of the Cosmic Soul. *Sufism* influenced and inspired many thinkers and poets, notably Kabir, Mirabai, and Tulsi Das; and the exemplary life and conduct of Muslim *sufis* won many converts to Islam.

With the entrenchment of the Moghul dynasty on the throne of Delhi coincided the last of the waves of Muslim invasions of India. The Moghuls, completely identifying themselves with the interests of their conquered territory and peoples, ushered in a glorious chapter in the history of India which made lavish contribution in enriching the cultural heritage of India. The Moghul Emperor Akbar tried with the experiment of bringing about a synthesis of the two main religions of his peoples, Islam and Hinduism, which resulted in an era of unprecedented religious tolerance. He and his successors embodied the principles of tolerance and protection of the weak from religious and social tyranny in the code of their day-to-day administration. At times orthodoxy pitched the banner of revolt against heterodoxy in Islam, which they believed was the result of this tolerance; and among the first trends in this direction was the *Mujadid* movement, aimed at the revival of those early institutions that had lapsed due to external pressures. Under such conditions, an internecine clash among Muslims was inevitable, which in turn helped the rebellion of the warlike Rajputs and encouraged the Marhattas to give open battle to the Moghul empire. Starting as local skirmishes, the warfare started by the rising power of the Marhattas soon developed into a mighty conflagration, which ignited the imagination of the Hindus, who saw in its success an opportunity to lay the foundation of a Hindu Empire in Bharat.

With the weakening of the power at Delhi after the death of Aurangzeb, the Moghul empire was faced with the crisis of witnessing the fissures that were to lead to its ultimate downfall. Loss of power and territory did not sound the bugle-call for them to unite and stand firm to face the common enemy, and internal divisions hastened the empire towards its end. However, with the coming of Ahmad Shah Abdali on the scene, the Marhattas received a severe setback. What was won on the battlefield, however, could not be consolidated into political gains in the art of running a Government, thus

paving the way for foreign powers like the British, the French and the Portuguese to obtain firm footholds on the sub-continent. The period of decline of Muslims as a political force brought to the forefront, occasionally, heroes whom posterity recalls fondly as symbols of Muslim regeneration in India. Among these special mention must be made of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, who acted as the last line of defence to retain and restore Muslim power to its original stature. There also arose great religious reformers and visionaries who, through their teachings, sought to rejuvenate Muslim society. For instance, Sayid Ahmed Shahid tried through his work to bring the north-west under Muslim rule, as also did Maulana Ismail Shahid. The latter, because of his rigid religious outlook, invited against himself the opposition not only of the British but also of some of his own co-religionists.

Muslim rule in India had to contend itself with a difficulty that was inherent in the situation then prevailing, and in this connection Riazul Islam writes, "It started as the rule of an alien people over a vast population which had its own traditions of religion, culture and philosophy. The ancient Hindu civilization could not accept, without a struggle, a secondary position in its own habitat. In other lands the Muslim minority, after establishing its domination, strengthened its position by winning over the overwhelming majority of the people to Islam, and thus obliterated the distinction between the conquerors and the inhabitants. In India the task was too stupendous. The Hindu majority persisted; Islam was successful in gaining the allegiance of a large number of people to its broad principles but not to its creed. The Muslims succeeded in reconciling the population to their rule, but it was impossible to create that kind of loyalty which is based upon an identity of outlook and ideology. Indeed, all Hindu rebellions exploited to the full the religious feelings of the population."³⁰

After the close of the second half of the nineteenth century, discontentment began to grow among the Indian sepoy, whom the British had engaged to fight under the command of British officers. The rallying ground of Muslims in the British army was the suspicion that their foreign rulers were trying to subvert their religion by adopting subtle and underhand methods. This gradually an explosive pitch and, with the worked them up to feeble and aged Bahadar Shah, the last Moghul figurehead who sat on the throne of Delhi as their symbol of unity, the Muslim sepoy erupted into a bloody rebellion against the British rule in the year 1857. Although the more discerning among the Muslims realized that such a revolt had little chance of success against the wily and powerful English, they lent the rebellion their tacit support, wishing in their heart of hearts success to the sepoy mutiny

The failure of this revolt not only cost the fighting patriots many lives, it also brought upon the heads of Muslims all over India the wrath of the British ruling power. Many rich Muslim families were reduced to penury overnight, as their ancestral lands and

³⁰ *History of the Freedom Movement*, Dr. Riazul Islam, Vol. I. p. 65, 1957.

homes were confiscated by the foreign rulers, who looked upon every Muslim as a potential enemy. No foreign power can rule in any country without the support of at least a section of the indigenous population, and the British were busy modeling their educational and administrative policies with a view to woo the Hindus, keeping the Muslims in the chilly wilderness of suspicion and neglect.

In this connection, H.T. Lambrick writes, "The Muslims were looked upon as the natural enemies of Christianity and Britain."³¹ Commenting on the plight of the Muslims of the times, Hunter writes, "To this day, the Mussalmans exhibit at intervals their old intense feeling of nationality and capability of warlike enterprise; but in all other respects they are a race ruined under British rule."³² Advertisements in the press inviting applications for Government posts in those days, as a rule, made it abundantly clear that the vacancies would be given only to Hindus, thus excluding Muslims completely from Government service.

In these difficult days that confronted the Muslims, there was born Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan, a man of vision and foresight, a man who was brilliant both in the prosaic realm of academic studies as also in the colorful arena of dynamic public activity, where the cauldron of controversy is always simmering at boiling point. While his deep-rooted love and sympathy for his co-religionists shook him with intense emotion, his logic and penetrating intellect prompted him to caution them not to invite an open fight with the British rulers, and thereby face consequences that may be more disastrous than those that followed the unsuccessful rising of the Indian sepoy. He tried to persuade the prejudiced mind of the British to look upon Muslims with sympathy and respect rather than contempt, and at the same time beseeched the Muslims to profit by their recent experience to take wholeheartedly to Western education, which was the key to their progress in the changed circumstances. He labored with the zeal of a missionary, and after a hard struggle succeeded in establishing at Aligarh the Mohamedan Anglo-Oriental College, whose classrooms were soon to be filled with the scions of many noble Muslim families, with the children of the politically conscious upper middle class families, and with children of humble origin. The citadel of accumulated suspicion against Western education, a staunch ally of Christianity, which was looked upon as an anti-Muslim force, was gradually assaulted. In doing so Sir Sayed invited on himself the wrath of the ultraorthodox and the *maulvis*, who fulminated against him with devastating protestations. He launched an offensive against this combined attack by starting a periodical, *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq* through which he reached a wider public, acquainting them with his views on social, economic, political, educational and religious problems facing the Muslims of India.

³¹ *Sir Charles Napier and Sind*, by H. T. Lambrick. p. 28.

³² *Our Indian Mussalmans*. by Sir W. W. Hunter, p. 149.

His College became the rallying ground for those that agreed with his views and it symbolized the forces of liberalism and progress. Sir Sayed felt the necessity of raising the College to a Muslim University, but before he could clothe his dream with the flesh and blood of reality, he died. The work he left unfinished of founding the Muslim University at Aligarh was taken up by Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, and then by the Aga Khan, whose untiring efforts resulted in the establishment of that University. Aligarh has not only been a College and a University in the political evolution of the Muslims of India, it has been a movement, which gave Muslims the consciousness that they must organize themselves separately in order to safeguard their rights in all walks of life. It also proved to be the nursery which produced most of the eminent social, educational and political leaders among Muslims. Sir Sayed gave a lead which was taken up by others that followed him, and the path was paved for Muslim institutions and conferences so as to exclusively concern themselves with the welfare and progress of Muslims.

In this connection, the Aga Khan writes, "Often in civilized history a University has supplied the spring-board for a nation's intellectual and spiritual renaissance ... Who can assess the effect on Arab nationalism of the existence of the American University of Beirut? Aligarh is no exception to this rule. But we may claim with pride that Aligarh was the product of our own efforts and of no outside benevolence; and surely it may also be claimed that the independent, sovereign nation of Pakistan was born in the Muslim University of Aligarh."³³

In order to create a platform for the Muslims of India to gather annually and deliberate over their educational needs, Sir Sayed founded in 1886 the Mohammeden Educational Congress, and inaugurating its first session, he said, "I do not agree with those who think that we can make progress by discussing political problems. On the contrary, I believe that education alone can be the source of our progress ... We Muslims are called a single Nation, but the Muslim residents of one part of the subcontinent are as much ignorant of the conditions of those living in other parts as the people of foreign countries". At the Allahabad Session of the Congress in 1890, it was decided to change its name to "Mohammeden Educational Conference," and this institution was to play a dominant part in the educational renaissance of the Muslims of India and, through the spread of education among them, in their political regeneration.

The independence movement in India that saw its birth in the latter half of the nineteenth century and received a tremendous momentum in the first half of the twentieth century was the direct result of growing consciousness in the minds of educated Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, that the alien rule of the British over their motherland was a standing challenge to their sense of patriotism, as also an open repudiation of their competence to be a sovereign nation. The struggle between the

³³ *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, pp. 35 and 36. 1964.

rulers and the ruled that followed proved to be a long drawn-out one, in which the forces of progress and patriotism ultimately triumphed.

Commenting on the plight of Muslims after the rebellion, Sir W. W. Hunter wrote, "In fact there is now scarcely an office in Calcutta in which Mussalmans can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots and mender of pens."³⁴

Torture inflicted on Muslims and the vast numbers of them killed and brutally done to death after the rebellion has been admitted even in books written by English historians. For instance, Kaye and Malleon write, "Volunteer hanging parties went out into the districts and amateur executioners were not wanting to the occasion. One gentleman boasted of the numbers he had finished off quite 'in an artistic manner', with mango trees for gibbets and elephants as drops, the victims of this wild justice being strung up, as though for pastime, in the form of eight."³⁵

And Holfes admits that English officers converted themselves into courts, and death by hanging could be awarded on mere suspicion. "Officers as they went to sit on the court martial swore that they would hang their prisoners guilty or innocent, and, if any dared to lift up his voice against such indiscriminate vengeance, he was instantly silenced by the clamors of his angry comrades. Prisoners condemned to death after a hasty trial were mocked at and tortured."³⁶

While the Muslims felt bitter and frustrated, the victory of the British over the rebels did not thus affect the Hindus. For instance, an intellectual leader of the All-India Congress, Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, wrote, The nobility, particularly the Muslim nobility, was practically crushed out of existence and there was not even a titular person left to serve as a rallying-point in any future adventure like that of 1857. The British rule came to be recognized as a dispensation of Providence and India settled down with that resignation which is one of our national characteristics.³⁷

Henry Harrington wrote in 1858, "I have stated that the Hindus were not the contrivers, the primary movers of the (1857) rebellion; I now shall attempt to show that it was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy ... The Muhammadans had other motives for seeking our destruction, besides their rooted anti-Christian feeling ... The Muhammadans planned and organized the rebellion..."³⁸ Such writings added fuel to the fire already raging in the minds of English colonial rulers, who perpetrated terrible atrocities on Muslims. In this connection, A. Aziz writes, "The British who hated the velour of the Muslims, disdained their religion, and considered their existence a

³⁴ *Our Indian Mussalmans*, by Sir W. W. Hunter.

³⁵ *History of the Indian Mutiny*, by Kaye and Malleon, Vol. IT, p. 177.

³⁶ *History of the Sepoy Wars*, by Holfes, p. 124.

³⁷ *History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, 1935, pp. 8 and 9.

³⁸ A pamphlet by Henry Harrington in 1858.

challenge to British Imperialism. A storm of terrible race-hatred ... burst forth with an unrelenting and atrocious fury. Without distinction of age and sex, Muslims were massacred and mowed down like hem or grass".³⁹

About twenty years after the 1857 revolt, Lord Lytton muzzled the vernacular press, denying it that measure of freedom of expression, however limited, that it had enjoyed along with the English press. He also passed the Arms Act that deprived Indians the right of bearing arms, a measure which hit hard particularly thousands of noble Muslim families who had been traditionally entitled to that privilege. The peasants in the fields groaned under notorious grievances and, as if this was not enough, they were further hard hit by conditions verging on famine. This inevitably led to agrarian riots, and the reprisals on the peasantry were swift and terrible.

The policy of the British in India had undergone a dramatic change after the Revolt. They patronized the Hindus and deliberately crushed the Muslims, in order to bring the two communities on the same socio-economic level, and then engaged in the policy of playing one against the other. Lt-Col. John Coke, the Commandant at Moradabad, wrote in one of his dispatches after the Revolt, "Our endeavor should be to uphold in full force the separation which exists between the different religions and races; not to endeavor to amalgamate them. *Divide et impera* should be the principle of the Indian Government." This advocacy is strengthened by no less an authority than Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, who wrote in his minute of 14th May, 1859. "*Divide et impera* was the old Roman motto; and it should be ours."

This policy of divide and rule saw its culmination during the viceroyalty of Lord Dufferin, who in 1885 invited Allan Octavian Hume, a retired civilian officer, to organize educated Indians into a body to be known as the Indian National Congress, and its first session took place in Bombay on 28th December, 1885, with W.C. Bannerjee as President. We have on the authority of W.C. Bannerjee, the first President of the Congress, that the power behind the coming of the Congress into being was the foreign Government of India, "It will probably be news to many that the Indian National Congress, as it was originally started and it has since been carried on, is in reality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, when that nobleman was the Governor-General of India ... Lord Dufferin had made it a condition with Hume that his name in connection with the scheme of the Congress should not be divulged so long as he remained in the country, and his condition was faithfully maintained."⁴⁰ Mr. Hume had succeeded in collecting under the banner of the Congress Indian intellectuals, and at the same time he was instrumental in inducing the officers of Government, especially the Englishmen, to arrange parties in honor of Congress delegates.

³⁹ *Discovery of Pakistan*, by A. Aziz, p. 285, 1946: Sh. Ghulam Ali, Lahore.

⁴⁰ *An Introduction to Indian Politics*, by W. C. Bannerjee, 1898.

Even a rabid anti-Muslim like Kailash Chandra, whose book vacillates in the precarious borderland that lies between insinuation and calumny, is constrained to admit, "The British Government in India had perhaps realized that one of the causes of the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857 (also called India's first War of Independence by Nationalist India), was the absolute apathy of the British bureaucrat towards the Indians, their views and aspirations. And it was right. The birth of the Indian National Congress was brought about with this object. The Viceroy of India at that time was expected to preside at the inauguration of the first session of the Congress at Bombay, but due to some more important engagement he could not do so and his place was taken up by the Governor of the Presidency of Bombay. For a few next years the British Government in India allowed (or perhaps directed) its officials and servants to keep in touch with the Congress."⁴¹

Even a Congress stalwart like Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya admits, "It is shrouded in mystery as to who originated this idea of All-India Congress."⁴² Dr. Sitaramayya goes on to analyze the Hindu revivalist movements that stirred the imagination of Hindus, the object being to make them realize that it was they who should be the rulers of India. Referring to this phenomenon, he writes, "All these movements were really so many threads in the strand of Indian Nationalism and the Nation's duty was to evolve a synthesis so as to be able to dispel prejudice and superstition, to renovate and purify the old faith (Hinduism), the Vedantic idealism, and reconcile it with the Nationalism of the new age. The Indian National Congress was destined to fulfill this great mission."⁴³

How this religious facet of the Congress was to manifest itself, time and again in the subsequent years, in spite of attempts to veil it or conceal it, forms an interesting chapter of recorded history.

The first important demand of the Congress in the field of Constitutional reforms was made in 1892, when it was urged that indirect election by local bodies to Legislative Councils should be held to be final and not subject to veto by the Government. However, the Congress "regretted that the 1892 Act itself did in terms concede to the people the right of electing their own representatives to the Councils." Thus the demand for direct election to legislative bodies was first voiced on this subcontinent in the year 1892.

The Congress continued to meet every year in its annual session as a "safety-valve" for Indian intellectuals, enabling the foreign rulers to know how their minds were working. When in the 1906 session of the Congress its President, Dadabhoi Naoroji, got a resolution passed that the political goal of India was Swarajya or "self-government status under the Crown", a new and progressive chapter came to be written in the pages

⁴¹ *Tragedy of Jinnah*, by Kailash Chandra, pp. 2 and 3., 1941: Sharma Publishers, Lahore.

⁴² *History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, 1935, p 16

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.22.

of its history. At that session Quaid-e-Azam was the unofficial honorary secretary of Dadabhoy Naoroji. He took an active part in the discussions that took place in meetings of the committees during private consultations and in the drafting of resolutions, but he made no speeches in the open sessions of the Congress.

Between the years 1885 to 1896, the Congress had elected two Muslims as Presidents, Budruddin Tyabji in 1887 and R.M. Sayani in 1896, the object being to boost the recruitment of Muslims into the ranks of that organization. This set Sir Sayed Ahmed thinking and he organized a political party known as the Mushtarka Jamait-e-Muhibban-e-Hind, and in connection with this party he wrote in 1888 to General Graham, "The aim of this party is to oppose the political ideals and activities of the Congress". In 1896 when Sayani was to preside over the annual session of the Congress in Calcutta, Sir Sayed inaugurated almost at the same time in the same city the Muslim Educational Congress, in order to prevent Muslims from joining the Congress.

On his entry into the Congress, B.G. Tilak unfurled the banner of Hindu extremism by organizing an anti-cow-killing agitation on an all-India basis and by preaching the cult of Sivaji, whom he held up as the Hindu hero to be emulated in order to exterminate Muslims. The seeds of discord thus sown went on yielding rich fruits, for the Muslims began to awaken to the realities of the situation with the result that in 1905 the number of Muslim delegates that attended the annual Congress session in Banares was only 17 out of a total 756. The life and work of Sir Sayed Ahmed had paved the way for a new awakening Muslims to strive for their political existence. In a Mohsin-ul-Mulk, undertook upon himself the task of rallying Muslims to strive for their political existence. In a meeting convened by him of Muslim leaders from all over India which met in Bombay, he was authorized to organize a deputation and to nominate its leader. "He selected 35 leading Mussalmans from different parts of India and proposed the name of His Highness the Aga Khan for leadership of the deputation. His Highness was on his way to China, but at Mohsin-ul-Mulk's request, he broke journey at Colombo and then came to Simla to lead the deputation which was received by the Viceroy on 1st October, 1906".⁴⁴ The deputation demanded separate electorates for Muslims. The efforts of this deputation succeeded and a constitutional provision was made conceding separate electorates to the Muslims. A vital concession had been won, and its gains could only be consolidated by starting a political party on a permanent basis, as it was felt that by this method alone Muslim rights could be secured and protected. With this end in view a meeting of leading Muslims from all over India was convened at Dacca on 30th December, 1906, and this resulted in bringing into being the All-India Muslim League. A resolution embodying its aims and objects, *inter alia*, stated that the League would "protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India ... and prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feelings of hostility

⁴⁴ *Muslim Political Movement*, by Jamiluddin Ahmed, 1963. p. 30.

towards other communities ..." The Aga Khan was elected the first President of the Muslim League and continued to be so until 1912.

It is here necessary to recount important constitutional changes from the time the East India Company received its first trading Charter in 1600 up to the year 1906.

India was to witness during this period an unprecedented accident of history, when the employees of a foreign trading company discarded ink and pen for gunpowder and cannon, enabling their absentee-employers to become rulers of far-flung territories on our sub-continent. The first word of the epitaph on this freak of history was written in the year 1858, when the Company incorporated by a Charter on 31st December, 1600, presented on a silver plate the gift of an Empire to the Queen of England, a gift that received the stamp of constitutional propriety and legality by an Act of Parliament. After 1600, when the East India Company began to operate on the Indian scene, the first important constitutional enactment was the Regulating Act of 1773, its purpose being to establish certain regulations "for the better management of the East India Company."⁴⁵ This Act resulted in the appointment of a Governor-General to be assisted by four nominated Councilors, who were vested with vast powers, transforming the Company which was hitherto merely a tax-collector on behalf of the Moghul Emperor of Delhi, into virtually the ruling authority of India, and thus the seeds of the future British Empire were sown. Warren Hastings, who was appointed the first Governor-General, was later on accused by Nand Kumar of bribery and corruption, alleging that Warren Hastings had received illegal gratification from the Begum of Mir Jaffer. Nand Kumar succeeded in getting a decision in the Council against Warren Hastings, and the echoes of this case were later on to be heard in the British Parliament, when the House of Lords exonerated Hastings of all charges. However, after instituting allegations against the Governor-General, Nand Kumar lived a miserable life, the spectre of a hidden hand dogging his steps, until he was held to be guilty on a trumped up charge of forgery, brought against him by a Marwari merchant of Calcutta: and in those days the penalty for forgery was death. Nand Kumar willingly paid the extreme penalty, a martyr to the cause of India's freedom. A convenient method of liquidating an inconvenient, but indomitable, political enemy.

In 1784, the British Parliament passed Pitt's India Act, under which a Board of Control was set up to control the territories of the East India Company. Two years later by an Act of Parliament the powers of the Governor General were enlarged, empowering him to veto the decisions of his Council, and authorizing him to act on his own initiative, in special circumstances, without consulting his Council. The period between that year to the end of the eighteenth century witnessed rapid expansion of the Company's influence as a political power, as vast territories were annexed and came under its direct control. By the Act of 1799, Parliament legalized the raising of troops in India by the

⁴⁵ *Indian Constitutional Documents*, by A. C. Banerjee, Calcutta, 1948.

Company, and thus the corner-stone was laid for a British army paid for by the Company and utilized by it for its territorial adventures, but legally and constitutionally under the control of the British Crown. When the Company's forces under Lord Lake had triumphantly marched into Delhi in 1803 and took the Moghul Emperor prisoner, the first phase came to be recorded of British domination in India as a Paramount Power.

The Charter Act of 1813 drastically curtailed the powers of the East India Company, bringing it in actual fact under the surveillance and control of the British Parliament. During the next twenty years, British sovereignty over the Company's Indian territories came to be exercised more and more directly and, although the Charter of the Company was renewed in 1833, it was obvious that the time was not far when the Company would be liquidated and in its place the British Crown would rule India as a colony. The Government of India Act of 1833 made provision for the inclusion of one more member in the Governor-General's Council, and this coincided with the period of Lord Macaulay initiating legislation and reforms that were to change the face of Indian administration.

After twenty years, when in 1853 the Charter of the Company lapsed, another Charter Act was passed under which trade with India was thrown open to all British subjects, thus ending the Company's trade monopoly of over two hundred and fifty years. The Council of the Governor-General was now to consist of twelve members, including the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Bengal. But there was no constitutional provision for an Indian to be a member of the Council. With the spread of British rule over India, discontentment spread far and wide, until the subterranean rumblings erupted in a volcanic outburst in 1857 in what has come to be known as India's First War of Independence, in which the Muslims played such a predominant part.

After the failure of this uprising, the British Parliament lost no time and passed the Act for the Better Government of India in 1858, under which India came to be governed directly and in the name of the British Crown. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 provided that in the Governor-General's Council there may be "non-officials, either Natives or Europeans, for legislative purpose only". The latter Act introduced for the first time the principle of inclusion of Indians in the Governor-General's Council, which was the repository of governmental power, although the inclusion of Indians was optional and not mandatory. In 1876-77 there broke out the terrible famine, stalking on its devastating legs from the Deccan to Cape Comorin, "the deaths from want of food, and from the diseases incidents to a famine-stricken population, were estimated at 5¼ millions."⁴⁶ A heavy price to pay, even for a subject nation! Probably, as a palliative. Queen Victoria held her Imperial Durbar in Delhi on 1st January, 1877, where she was proclaimed the Empress of India.

⁴⁶ *A Brief History of the Indian Peoples*, by Sir W. W. Hunter, p. 233 1901: Oxford University Press.

In 1892 the British Parliament passed an Act increasing the number of members of Legislative Councils, with a stronger non-official element. "The year 1893 will be memorable for the first general election of representative members to the Indian Legislative Council."⁴⁷ However, strangely, in the same year communal riots broke out on a gigantic scale, from Burma to the north-west and Bombay. In 1896 another famine ravaged India's countryside, claiming over six million deaths by starvation. It almost seemed like a repetition of Nero's classic story; while India lost millions of lives as a result of recurring famines, the English went on amassing fabulous fortunes in India and the British exchequer thrived at the expense of the impoverishment of India. Commenting on the increasing poverty of India, Romesh Dutt writes that India was converted into a vast farm, "and the tillers tilled and the laborers toiled in order that all the value of the produce might be annually exported to Europe."⁴⁸

This statement has been corroborated by Robert Richards who, while giving evidence before a Committee of Parliament, stated, "I am personally acquainted with instances where the revenue assessed upon certain lands has actually exceeded the gross produce". On the same subject Bishop Archer wrote in his Memoirs that the British demand more rent than any other native Prince does or has done before this, as a result of which he confesses that "the country is in a gradual state of impoverishment".⁴⁹ The most eloquent condemnation of British Raj was revealed in facts deposed in the impeachment of Warren Hastings, when it was stated, "Defaulters were confined in open cages; fathers were compelled to sell their children; troops were employed to prevent the flight of the peasants."

Terrible, indeed, is the price a nation has to pay that has lost its independence!

"Till 1908, there was no communal representation."⁵⁰ But under the Act of 1909, Legislative Councils were brought into being in the Punjab, Burma, East Bengal and Assam, and it also provided for the first time the principle of separate electorates, in accordance with the wishes of a Muslim deputation that, under the leadership of the Aga Khan, had waited on the Viceroy in 1906, by which Muslims were enabled to elect their own representatives to Legislative Councils. This was a political reform of a far-reaching magnitude, and it was in an election under the 1909 Act that the Quaid-e-Azam was to be later elected a member of the Viceroy's Council from a Muslim Constituency.

⁴⁷ *A Brief History of the Indian Peoples*, by Sir W. W. Hunter, p. 237, 1901: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁸ Romesh Dutt, *The Economic History of British India 1755-1837*, pp. 57-58. 1906.

⁴⁹ Memoirs of Bishop Archer.

⁵⁰ Constitutional Changes, by M. B. Ahmed. History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. II, p. 577.

IN UNITY LIES SALVATION

Almost simultaneously with the turn of the twentieth century there came about a change in the fortunes of the young and struggling barrister, Jinnah. As his reputation as a lawyer became well established and his income went on increasing from month to month, he gave up his room in the modest hotel and rented a spacious flat on Apollo-Bunder. He had the flat tastefully decorated, moved into it furniture that he had helped his furniture-maker to specially design for his house, and filled it with a well-stocked library; he now owned a luxurious flat, which was soon to become an important centre where problems connected with the public life of Bombay were often to be discussed

His father, brothers and sisters continued to live in Khoja Mohala, where he visited them every Sunday, without fail, as if it was a religious duty. His father was getting on in years, a dejected man, whose once prosperous business had failed. Jinnah volunteered to financially support his family, encouraging his brothers and sisters to take seriously to their studies, bearing all their educational expenses. Being the eldest son and the main support of the family, he came to be looked upon as the head of the family, his father having recoiled into a life of quietude. But the problem that worried the father most was the marriage of his eldest daughter, Rahematbai, who was already about twenty.

In a society, where arranged marriages were the order of the day, death of the mother added to the family responsibilities of the father, and Jinnahbhai Poonja constantly brooded over the future of his eldest daughter. An unexpected proposal, however, came to him from a young man of Calcutta, who was doing business with his father in that city, and his mother, anxious to look around for a suitable match for her son, had come to Bombay in this connection. She saw Rahematbai and decided that the girl would make a good daughter-in-law, and she made her desire known to Jinnahbhai Poonja through intermediaries. But as soon as the old man came to know that the family from Calcutta were Sunni Khojas and not Ismaili Khojas, he hesitated to give his consent to the proposal. Negotiations for the engagement, which otherwise would have successfully concluded, floundered on the formidable rocks of fear consequent on marrying his daughter outside his community.

When the Quaid-e-Azam came to see his family on a Sunday, as was his custom, he found his father unusually worried. On making inquiries, he learnt from his father that the young man from Calcutta belonged to a good and decent family, with whom it was desirable to enter into matrimonial relationship, but he was afraid if he married Rahematbai to a Sunni Khoja, he would be excommunicated by the Ismaili Khojas. The Quaid took charge of the situation, and went about it with his usual tact and thoroughness. He asked the prospective mother-in-law what her son was doing; what

education he had received; and if he could come down to Bombay. The mother gave the necessary details, but said that due to pressure of business engagements her son could not afford the time to visit Bombay, but he had fully empowered his mother to select a girl of her own choice. Quaid-e-Azam asked her if she had a photograph of her son, which was produced by the mother. The Quaid looked at the photo and thought the young man appeared quite healthy and good-looking. The fact that he came from a respectable and well-to-do family being an additional qualification.

He had a serious talk with his father and tried to persuade him to give his consent to the proposal. But his father once again pleaded his inability to agree as he feared excommunication at the hands of his community. The Quaid was liberal in his outlook on such matters, and he immediately sought an appointment with the Aga Khan, who happened to be in Bombay at that time. When the young Jinnah put the family problem before the Aga Khan, he forthwith agreed with the Quaid, and assured him that his followers would not excommunicate his father, if Rahematbai were to be married outside the community.

This assurance was conveyed by the Quaid to his father, who felt extremely relieved and happy, and the marriage of Rahematbai with the young man from Calcutta came to be solemnized soon thereafter..

The Aga Khan wrote, "I knew Jinnah for years, from the time he came back from England to Bombay to build up his legal practice there, until his death."⁵¹

The history of the Congress from its birth in 1885 to the close of the nineteenth century is a chapter that alternates between professions of loyalty to the British Government and respectful requests for administrative changes and political reforms. As against this the history of the British Rule during this period oscillated between Reaction and Reforms, the latter grudgingly 'granted by the rulers after realizing that popular resentment against the former had become impossible for them to suppress. Commenting on this attitude of the British, Gokhale once said, "Reforms delayed lose half their value and all their grace".

Anti-national legislation and reactionary measures by the Government were always followed by popular agitation. Agitation was sought to be put down by repression; and when the iron-rod failed to conquer the spirit of the people, partial measures towards meeting public demands were initiated. This policy is aptly demonstrated in the imposition and withdrawal of Lord Lytton's Press Act after it was imposed in 1870. With the introduction of retrogressive measures in the field of politics, the drain of Home charges increased in 30 years from 7 million pounds to 16 million pounds. Section 124 (A) and 153 (A) were introduced in 1897, increasing the disaffection of the

⁵¹ *The Memoirs of the Aga Khan*, p. 292, 1954: Cassell and Co. Ltd., London.

people against the Government, as did also the application of Section 108 and 144 to politicals. Secret Press Committees were established in 1898. The first five years after the close of the nineteenth century saw the curtailment of the powers of the Calcutta Corporation; introduction of the Official Secrets Act; and officialisation of the Universities, an inevitable consequence of which was that University education became costly, beyond the reach of almost all except the very rich. Dr. Gour, an eminent Indian educationist commented, "This policy has sealed up the portals of knowledge with golden locks which would open only to golden keys". Officialisation of Universities further converted the Universities into departments of Government, where the spirit of free inquiry, acceptance and rejection yielded place to an atmosphere of regimentation. To add insult to injury, Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy, said that Indians were "unequal to the responsibilities of high office under British Rule". By this statement Lord Curzon proved he was one of the forerunners of the racist policy of "White supremacy", which has in our times culminated in the apartheid policy of the Government of South Africa. What a pity that great English statesmen like Edmund Burke and Sheridan were not there to impeach Lord Curzon!

Due to legislative and administrative measures which humiliated Indians, the national spirit of the people was being gradually roused to strike for their rights with all their might. Many prominent and patriotic political leaders were being deported from India as undesirables, and editors of outspoken newspapers were being prosecuted under the Press Laws and their papers were forced to cease publication.

In the wake of severe repressive measures resorted to by the Government followed acts of open violence, resulting in the murder of many Europeans. The inflamed minds of young agitators openly preached terrorism and violence against the saner advice of elder political leaders for restraint and constitutional agitation. The Government, in the teeth of popular resentment, clamped in 1908 the Seditious Meetings Act and the Press Act, and in 1910 the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

While India was passing through this critical period of its history, Quaid-e-Azam was beginning to take an increasing part in the politics of his country. Being of a constitutional frame of mind, he had an abhorrence for violence and anti-constitutional measures as a means to achieve political objectives and he chose to tread the path of statesmen like Dadabhoy Naoroji, Gokhale, and Banerjee.

As a young student in London, he had played an important role in the election campaign of Dadabhoy Naoroji for a seat in Parliament from Finsbury constituency, and this had resulted on the one hand in the Grand Old Man of India looking upon the young student as one who had a great future in Indian politics and on the other in increasing Jinnah's respect for Dadabhoy as a patriot of towering personality; and he was determined to work under him so as to be inspired by the old man's burning passion for his country and his people. From those election days to the end of

Dadabhoi's life, Jinnah continued to look upon him as his ideal in politics. Dadabhoi's election to Parliament had enabled him to come into close contact with those members of Parliament from Ireland, who were pioneers in the struggle of their country for political freedom. When, after his election to Parliament, Dadabhoi was elected to preside over the 1893 Congress session to be held in Lahore, he read out a message to the following effect that he had personally brought for the people of India from the Irish Members of Parliament:-

"Don't forget to tell your colleagues at the Congress that every one of Ireland's Home Rule members in Parliament is at your back in the cause of the Indian people."

Dadabhoi was able to convince his Congress colleagues that supporters in Parliament for India's cause would strengthen their hands and help in the demands of the Congress being more sympathetically considered by the British Government. Accordingly, at his initiative, the Subjects Committee resolved to ask Alfred Webb, an Irish Member of Parliament, to preside over the Congress session to be held in 1896 in Madras.

Another person for whom the young Jinnah developed great admiration and respect was Gokhale, who presided over the Congress session of 1905 held at Benares. Gopal Krishna Gokhale had a burning passion for the "starving, shrunken, shriveled-up riot, toiling and moiling from dawn to dark to earn his sustenance; patient, resigned, forbearing beyond measure, entirely voiceless in the Parliament of his rulers and meekly prepared to bear whatever burdens God and man might be pleased to impose upon his back". In all his speeches as an elected member of the Council, Gokhale ably dealt with questions of taxation and expenditure, pleading the cause of the poverty-stricken masses of India. Gokhale once said of the Quaid, "Mr. Jinnah is one who has true stuff in him and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which makes him the best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity". On his part, Jinnah said his ambition was to be "The Muslim Gokhale."

He was also a great admirer of Sir Surendranath Banerjee. In the course of one of his speeches in the Assembly, the Quaid said, "Sir, I might say that I learnt my first lessons in politics at the feet of Sir Surendranath Banerjee. I was associated with him as one of his followers and I looked upon him as a leader. He commanded the utmost respect of a large body of people in the country and of my humble self. Sir, the only lesson I feel that one might draw from the career of this great man is this. In unity lies salvation".

In his formative years "his own political views had been shaped by Gokhale, Dadabhoi, Surendranath Banerjee and C.R. Das, whom he adopted as his political gurus and for whom he had the greatest respect."⁵² They inspired him to remain clean and above

⁵² *Meet Mr. Jinnah*, by A. A. Ravoof, p. 35, 1955: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore.

board in politics; not to compromise with principles even though the odds be heavily against one; to fight fearlessly as a patriot in the cause of freedom; to help to raise the standard of living of the emaciated and famished millions of his countrymen. And to those principles Quaid-e-Azam remained faithful to the end of his life.

In 1906 the Congress session was held at Calcutta, and Dadabhoy Naoroji was elected to preside over it, this being the third time that the Grand Old Man was so honored. By now Jinnah had begun to take active interest in Indian politics and, having been influenced as a student by the progressive ideas of the Liberals in England, he found the Congress of those days a congenial political organization in which he could actively participate for the political advancement of his people. He went to attend the Calcutta session of the Congress as the personal secretary of Dadabhoy Naoroji, staying with him as the guest of the Maharaja of Darbhanga at his Chowringhee House. Other guests included Chimanlal Setalvad and Pheroz Shah Mehta.

The Calcutta session of 1906 was to usher in a new era in the growing and progressive demands of the Congress in the field of reform and political objectives. The President of the session set the pace for the delegates in pitching their demands high, and behind the Grand Old Man's inspired speeches and moves, one could see the invisible hand of Jinnah, his youthful secretary. It is not a matter of recorded history how far Jinnah actually helped Dadabhoy, an ailing old man, in the drafting of his speeches and resolutions that were finally adopted; and so one can at best be content only to conjecture. Be that as it may, it is important to note it was at this session that for the first time the demand was made from the platform of a political party in India for self-government. In his now famous Swaraj Resolution of 1906, Dadabhoy Naoroji demanded:—

1. "Resolved that this Congress is of the opinion that the system of government obtaining in the self-governing British Colonies should be extended to India ... and urges the following reforms be immediately carried out:—
 - a) All examinations held in England only should be simultaneously held in India.
 - b) Adequate representation of Indians in the Council of the Secretary of State and the Executive Councils of the Governors of Madras and Bombay.
 - c) Expansion of the Supreme and Provincial Legislative Councils, allowing a larger and truly effective representation of the peoples.....

d) Powers of Local and Municipal Bodies should be extended..... "

On 7th August, 1905, the Congress had started its Boycott Movement by which Indians were encouraged to buy goods made in India, and to completely refrain from purchasing British goods. Although the original intention of the boycott was communal in its approach, in as much as it was inaugurated with the purpose of forcing the British Government to annul the partition of Bengal, a demand vociferously advocated by the Hindus of Bengal it became an effective instrument in the subsequent years to make Indians patronize Indian goods, thereby adding to the country's industrial and economic strength. The resolution on boycott adopted in 1905 reads: —

"Resolved that having regard to the fact that the people of this country have little or no voice in its administration, and that their representations to the Government do not receive due consideration, this Congress is of opinion that the Boycott Movement inaugurated in Bengal by way of protest against the partition of that Province was, and is, legitimate."

When the 1907 session of the Congress met at Nagpur, Tilak, leading a group of extremists, created such a furor that it was found impossible to hold the session, and the venue was changed to Surat, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose, the President-elect, being expected to preside over it. Although Tilak was present when the resolution for the change of venue was passed, he started an all-India agitation against Dr. Ghose as President and against Surat as the venue of the Congress session. On 27th December in that year, when the Congress met in Surat and the motion recommending Dr. Ghose for the presidency was proposed by Ambalal Sakharlal, Surendranath Banerjee rose to second the proposal. Tilak and his friends hooted the speaker down, and pandemonium reigned supreme in the Congress pandal. The session was adjourned and reassembled on the following day. After Surendranath Banerjee had spoken, Pundit Motilal Nehru supported the name of Dr. Ghose, which was carried with acclamation. As soon as Dr. Ghose rose to deliver his presidential address, Tilak mounted the dais and demanded that he be allowed to speak before the President read out his address. Tilak, on being persuaded to leave the platform, refused, and stood there before an excited crowd, some shouting approbation and others hurling abuse. Suddenly shoes were thrown at him from many quarters and the meeting broke up. M. Nevinson, an English journalist, who was present at this meeting described the scene as follows: —

"Suddenly something flew through the air. A shoe! a Marhatta shoe! reddish leather, pointed toe, sole studded with lead. It struck Surendranath Banerjee on the cheek, it cannoned off upon Sir Pheroze Shah Mehta. It flew, it fell, and at a given signal, white waves of turbaned men surged up the escarpment on the platform. Leaping, climbing, hissing the breath of fury, brandishing long sticks, they came, striking at any head that looked to them moderate, and in another moment, between brown legs standing upon

the green-baize table, I caught the glimpses of the Indian National Congress dissolving in chaos "

Tilak parted company with the Congress and kept out of it until he joined it again in 1916 at the Lucknow session, bringing with him a large number of his followers as delegates representing the Bombay Presidency. There was a wide divergence of opinion on the election to the Subjects Committee by members of the All-India Congress Committee from each province. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was not yet the power in the Congress that he was to be in later years. He was a newcomer and was seeking a place in the Subjects Committee from Bombay. Names were proposed in pairs for each seat, a Nationalist from Tilak's group against a Moderate from the other group. Tilak, having an absolute majority from that province, got each one of his nominees elected. It is interesting to mention that Gandhi's name was proposed as a Moderate against a Nationalist nominee of Tilak. Gandhi was defeated and could not find a place on the Subjects Committee of the Congress. But writes Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramaya, "Likewise when a Nationalist name was pitted against Gandhi, the latter was voted down; but Tilak declared that Gandhi was ejected."⁵³

Gandhi had returned to India from South Africa in 1914, crowned with the halo of respect for his spectacular work in the cause of Indians settled in South Africa. His novel technique of Satyagrah, a weapon he was to use constantly in the coming years in the fight against British rule in India, had caught the popular imagination, and a number of social events were arranged to honor him in Bombay. Among the earliest of these was a garden party given by Sir Jehangir B Petit at his Pedder Road House, where the elite of that city came in their hundreds, dressed elegantly for a glittering garden party, among prominent personalities present on that occasion being Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Eyebrows were raised, when the dwarfish Gandhi entered the party, and K. M. Munshi writes, "The guest arrived, barefooted, dressed in short dhoti, and a Kathiawari Angarkha and Sapha. He was the very image of insignificance. Aristocracy stood shocked beyond words".⁵⁴ It was at this party that for the first time met Jinnah and Gandhi, their handshake on being introduced to one another by the host, had a significance all its own. These two leaders were to change in the next thirty three years the entire course of history of this subcontinent, leading to India's complete independence from the British and creation of the Sovereign State of Pakistan.

Sometime later, the Gurjar Sabha presented a welcome address to Gandhi. This was a literary society, dedicated to the development of Gujrati language and literature, and Jinnah, one of its sympathizers, was asked to preside over this meeting. He welcomed Gandhi eulogizing his Services to the cause of Indians in South Africa. Munshi writes, "Gandhiji spoke in Gujrati. Mr. Jinnah, of course, in English."⁵⁵

⁵³ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 235,

⁵⁴ *I follow the Mahatma*, K. M. Munshi. p. 2. 1940.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Quaid-e-Azam was present at the stormy Nagpur session, witnessing wild scenes of political storm, and he was one of those who attended a convention of delegates on the following day, where it was resolved that their goal was attainment of self-governing Dominion Status for India, to be attained through strictly constitutional means.

When the Congress met at Allahabad in 1910, the Morely-Minto Reforms had already been announced, under which the principle of separate electorates for Muslims was accepted for the first time. At this session of the Congress, Jinnah moved the following resolution, seconded by Mazharul Huq and Hassan Imam, which was unanimously adopted:—

"While recognizing the necessity of providing for a fair and adequate representation in the Legislative Councils for the Mahomedan and other communities where they are in a minority, this Congress disapproves the Regulations promulgated last year to carry out this object by means of separate electorates, and in particular, urges upon the Government the justice and expediency of modifying the Regulations framed under the Indian Councils Act of 1909, before another election comes on, so as to remove anomalous distinctions between different sections of His Majesty's subjects in the matter of the franchise and the qualifications of the candidates and the arbitrary disqualifications and restrictions for candidates seeking election to the Councils. The Congress also urges a modification of Regulations, where necessary, relating to the composition of non-official majorities in the Provincial Councils, so as to render them effective for practical purposes"

When the Congress met at Allahabad with Sir William Wedderburn as President, the situation in the country was in a critical state; it was feared that general tension between Hindus and Muslims would grow far worse, as it was expected that separate electorates would be introduced in Municipalities and Local Bodies as well, a reform to which the Hindus objected. "Sir William Wedderburn, in collaboration with the Aga Khan, initiated a move that important representatives of the two communities should meet to adjust certain matters with a view to complete agreement between the two communities."⁵⁶ The Quaid attended this meeting and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu writes that he served "as a cross-bencher" at this convention, which had met "to consider a somewhat premature and artificial entente cordiale between the two communities still so sharply divided by a gulf of mutual dislike and distrust."⁵⁷ The convention came to an inconclusive end, unfortunately, mainly due to the extreme communal position adopted by some Hindu leaders, notably by Pandit Malaviya. "A golden opportunity was sacrificed at the altar of false pride," wrote Mohammad Noman commenting on the outcome of the convention.⁵⁸ In this connection Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya writes, "Mr.

⁵⁶ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. p. 23,1946.

⁵⁷ *Ambassador of Unity*, by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.

⁵⁸ *Muslim India*, by Mohammad Noman.

Jinnah of course deprecated the extension of separate electorates to Local Bodies".⁵⁹ It must, however, be remembered that the Quaid was among the foremost advocates of the time for Hindu-Muslim unity, and on every occasion he threw the entire weight of his astute leadership in backing every attempt in that direction. A study of the political history of those days leads one to the conclusion that Quaid-e-Azam was an inveterate and uncompromising enemy of foreign rule and wanted to see India achieve freedom through Hindu-Muslim understanding as early as possible.

As attempts were being made to bring Hindus and Muslims closer through discussion of common problems and mutual understanding, the Anglo-Indian Press was voicing its views against such moves, raising the bogey that such an alliance had only one aim, namely, to bring a speedy end to British rule in India.

Typical of Anglo-Indian Press comments on the Wedderburn, Aga Khan move for an agreement between Hindus and Muslims was the editorial of the *Pioneer* of Allahabad, which was believed to be the mouthpiece of the Civil Service. An excerpt from this editorial reads, "Why do these men want to unite the two communities, if it is not to unite them against the Government?" Commenting on this attitude of the Civil Service and the Anglo-Indian Press, Bishan Narayan Dhar, President of the Congress session held in 1911 at Calcutta said in his presidential address in reference to the above-mentioned Pioneer editorial, "This one remark throws a ghastly light upon the political situation in India".

The tempo of political consciousness among Hindus was accelerated under inspiration of the Congress after it had adopted the Swaraj resolution in 1906, and ever since then resolutions at each session became more and more forthright and outspoken in demanding political and other reforms for India. Although the Muslim League had come into existence much later than the Congress, it adjusted itself to the changed conditions that prevailed in the first decade of the twentieth century, in order to effectively voice demands for adequate Muslim representation in any scheme of new political reforms. Acceptance of the principle of separate electorates records its first great achievement in the cause of Muslim struggle for their independence. With the emergence of the Muslim League as a rising political force, many Muslims who had hitherto been in the Congress left that organization, only a few, however, continued to remain within its fold, "and to this section belonged Mohammad Ali Jinnah, faithful and loyal to his creed."⁶⁰

The annulment of the Partition of Bengal shocked Muslims beyond measure and they saw in its enactment that the mighty British Government had gone back on its solemnly given promises, due to the agitation launched by Hindu India. This spurred Muslim

⁵⁹ The History of the Congress", by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 73, 1935.

⁶⁰ *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, by Matlub Hasan Saiyid, p. 55, 1945: Sb. Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore.

politicians to strengthen the Muslim League in order to cope with the rising power of the Congress. At the same time those leaders among Hindus, who could rise to heights of statesmanship, realized that India's goal to Independence could not be reached, if the two communities continued to mistrust one another. Although the Allahabad convention of 1910 had failed to achieve the desired result, sincere believers in Hindu-Muslim unity continued to plod the difficult path, notable among them being Gokhale and Jinnah.

At about this time there came to the forefront two brilliant Muslim leaders, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who launched a double-pronged attack on the minds of Muslims through the *Comrade* and *Al-Hilal*, respectively, the former being in English and the latter in Urdu. The columns of *Comrade* and *Al-Hilal* inspired Muslims to shed fear from their minds about the might of the British Government, at the same time making them skeptical about British promises. "At a time when loyalty meant abject obedience, and disagreement with the policy of the Government was adduced to be unpardonable treason, they raised their voices high in revolt and attacked the citadel of the Government remorselessly."⁶¹

Their writings stirred the minds of young Muslims, who became ardent supporters of "the ideas of freedom, nationality and Self-Government". Muslim India was now in a state of ferment and the Muslim League, their only political organization, had to approach political problems in a more revolutionary manner in keeping with the spirit of the times. The Quaid had already emerged as a leader of all-India importance and although he was not yet formally enrolled as a member, the Muslim League looked up to him for advice and guidance. He was invited to address the meetings of the Council of the All-India Muslim League of 1910 and 1911. He breathed into the deliberations of the League the refreshing air of dynamism and progress, and it was clear that the League was now heading for more progressive objectives and demands. The Quaid kept up his collaboration with the leaders of the League thereafter, and they continued to listen to his views on Muslim politics with respect. The Quaid attended the League Council meeting in 1912, held under the Presidentship of the Aga Khan, when its constitution was revised and made more broad-based. His efforts saw their culmination when it was resolved at the Lucknow session of the League in 1913, held under the revised constitution, that its political objective was "attainment under the aegis of the British Crown a system of self-government suitable to India through constitutional means, by bringing about, amongst other things, a steady reform of the existing system of administration by working for national unity, by fostering public spirit among the people of India, and by cooperation with other communities for the said purpose." The prominent role that he played in getting this proposal and the resolution on the necessity of Hindu-Muslim unity adopted by the League is evident from the speech, of Sir Mohammad Shafi who, while supporting the proposal, said that the colonial form of

⁶¹ *Muslim League: Yesterday and Today*, by A. B. Rajput n 26 1948: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore.

Government suggested by some speakers that had preceded him was unsuitable to India and would be derogatory to our national prestige. Sir Shafi continued, "I am in entire agreement with my friend Hon. Mr. Jinnah in thinking that adoption of any course other than the one proposed by the Council would be absolutely unwise."

The day the Muslim League took the above decision, the Quaid must have felt happy that his untiring efforts had after all borne rich fruit.

He had by now already become an all-India figure, prominent in the leadership of the Congress and trusted and respected by the Muslim League. The exacting toil in the political field for the last few years, when India had passed through a period of turmoil and unrest, had told on his health, and he decided to indulge in the luxury of a holiday in Europe. Along with Gokhale, he sailed for London in April 1913, hoping to enjoy a well-earned rest and a long holiday. An active mind like his, devoted to public service, could not allow him to be bogged down in the lazy pastures of indolence or of indifference to public weal. He spent much of his time advising Indian students in London to organize themselves effectively and to act as worthy ambassadors of their country in England, as a result of which the Indian Central Association came into being, "it was mainly through his (Jinnah's) efforts that grievances of Indian students."

When the Aga Khan resigned in 1912 from the presidentship of the League, having held that position for six years since its inception, Raja Mohammad Ali Mohammad Khan of Mahmudabad was elected in his place. Syed Wazir Hasan was elected its Secretary General and the central office of the League was shifted from Aligarh to Lucknow.

At about this time an ancient mosque at Cawnpore was demolished under Government orders, an act of indiscretion that deeply hurt the religious susceptibilities of Muslims, who decided to rebuild the mosque on the original site. The temper of an unsympathetic Government is easily roused on the slightest pretext, and very soon there was a large police force threatening Muslim devotees who were building the mosque, ordering them to desist and to disperse. Muslims refused to leave and continued to occupy themselves in the task of mosque-building. This infuriated the touchy ego of the foreign Government, who interpreted this act as defiance of their authority and ordered that the peaceful Muslims in and around the mosque be fired upon. There were some casualties and many were seriously injured, and the anger of the Muslims was roused all over India against this ruthless act of savagery.

The All-India Muslim League took serious note of this incident and condemned the Government for loss of innocent lives. In September 1913 the League deputed Maulana Mohammad Ali and Sayed Wazir Hasan to visit England to bring to the attention of the British public the Cawnpore Mosque incident, as also to ventilate other political grievances of the Muslims of India. Sir Sayed Amir Ali, President of the London Branch of the Muslim League, could not see eye to eye with the two League nominees from

India and he tendered his resignation from the President's post. The Secretary of State trotted out an' excuse that smacked of red-tapism, refusing to see the two representatives of the League on the ground that they had not applied for an interview with him through the Government of India. The fearless pen of Maulana Mohammad Ali reeled off a number of articles and letters to the London Press, and the British Government reluctantly ordered the restoration of the Cawnpore Mosque and the release of persons arrested for defiance of Government orders.

After a few months stay in England, when the Quaid was about to leave for India, he was approached by Maulana Mohammad Ali and Sayed Wazir Hasan, two Muslim League stalwarts, to get himself enrolled as a member of the League. He consented on the understanding that this would not prevent him from continuing to be a member of the Congress. Mrs. Naidu writes, "His two sponsors were required to make a solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated."⁶²

He came thus to occupy a unique position by which he could act as a bridge between the two most powerful national organizations and this is reflected in the observation made by Bupendranath Basu in his presidential address on. 27th December 1913 at the Karachi session of the Congress, when he said he was very happy that the Muslim League had adopted self-government for India as their political objective, and he reciprocated wholeheartedly the League's desire for an understanding between Hindus and Muslims. He concluded, "If there had been misunderstandings in the past, let us forget them".

At the Karachi Congress session Jinnah moved a resolution which, while criticizing the India Council as it was at that time constituted, pleaded for its reorientation on more nationalistic and progressive lines. He prefaced his speech with the following words, "You do not know what pleasure it gives me to stand on this platform in this city of Karachi, where I was born, where I have found by my side, after my arrival in this city, personal friends with whom I played in my boyhood". The main feature of his proposal was that the salary of the Secretary of State for India should be charged on the British Exchequer, that there should be election by members of the Indian Legislative Council to the Viceroy's Council in order to ensure its independence and that the Council should be an advisory body and all administrative functions which it enjoyed should be taken away from it, as it amounted to undue interference with the details of administration. At present, he said, the Secretary of State for India is a greater Moghul than any known to history. At the Agra session of the Muslim League, he advocated the same point of view. While in London, as a member of the Congress delegation to educate public opinion regarding the Indian point of view on the coming reforms he

⁶² *The Ambassador of Unity*, by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.

wrote to the *London Times*, "I cannot but say that the provisions contained there are most disappointing and I feel sure that is how the people of India will receive it; what hope can measures like this inspire the people of India who are looking forward to bigger and more substantial reforms in time to come when in matters such as reforms of the Council of the Secretary of the State for India, which is after all more advisory in its character than anything else, the just proposals of the Deputation appointed by the Indian National Congress have not been accepted?"

The new orientation in the outlook of the Muslim League reflected in its "Self-Government" resolution of March 1913, brought about a complete change in the approach of Muslim-India to the political problems of the day. While advocating Swaraj, goal of the Congress resolution of 1906, they emphasized that its achievement could only come about through a complete accord between Muslims and Hindus, and that the majority community must fully realize that Muslims cannot be expected to play a subservient role in a self-governing India. In December 1913, Sir Ibrahim Rahemtoola, presiding over the Agra session, of the League, said that brotherly relations between the two communities cannot stand on a one-sided arrangement, and that the elder brother should search in his heart whether he has been fair and generous to the younger brother. Sir Rahemtoola continued that a country like India cannot always remain under political subjugation and that a day will come when it will be completely free.

The above observations of the League President symbolized the thinking of politically conscious Muslims. To the Congress concept of Swaraj they gave a new dimension, making it abundantly clear that the surest and quickest way to Swaraj was through Hindu-Muslim unity. These two objectives mirrored the idealism that had activated the entire political life and work of Jinnah and, being a member of both the Congress and the League, he endeavored to the best of his ability to cement the bonds of friendship between the two main political parties of India, and it was his ambition that the spirit of unity should continue to reverberate across the entire length and breadth of India.

The following year a small spark ignited at Sarajevo engulfed Europe and Asia in the First World War, and Britain had to lean heavily on India for men and money in this life-and-death struggle for its very survival. Asquith, the British Prime Minister, made conciliatory statements in order to win the confidence of India in so far as Britain's ultimate intentions were concerned about that country, to be followed by Lloyd George who, as Prime Minister, declared that Britain was determined to give the status of a self-governing dominion to India. The question before Indian leaders was whether they should support the Allied War efforts or frustrate them, and this issue brought about a wide divergence of opinion among them. Gandhi worked hard to support the war efforts and helped in the recruitment of volunteers for the army, receiving the Kaiser-i-Hind decoration for his services to the war efforts. Explaining his conduct, Gandhi said in helping the British in the time of their difficulty, India will have "make out an unanswerable case for the granting of Home Rule, not in any distant or near future, but

immediately". Maulana Mohammad Ali, realizing the delicate situation confronting Muslim-India, as Turkey was fighting against the Allies, pleaded with the Allied Powers not to attack the holy places of Islam. Regarding Indian political reforms, he wrote that war was not the time to embarrass the British, in spite of Muslim grievances, hoping that after the war was over British statesmanship would not fail India and the Muslim world, concluding an important editorial in the *Comrade* with the words, "Concessions are asked for and accepted in peace. We are not Russian Poles. We need no bribes." Mohammad Ali's paper, the *Comrade*, was asked to furnish security and it was not difficult to foresee that the Government would take more drastic steps against its editor, and the *Comrade* ceased publication. An oppressive Government becomes more tough, when it is gripped with panic, and the Government swooped down upon Muslims who were of Mohammad Ali's way of thinking, with the result that the two brothers, Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, along with Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Maulana Hasrat Mohani were arrested and interned.

Political activities had received a setback due to war, and the Muslim League could not hold its annual session in 1914. In December of the following year the Congress was to hold its session in Bombay. Jinnah saw in this an admirable opportunity to convert the friendly feelings that had recently begun to manifest themselves between Hindus and Muslims into a solid political alliance. He called a meeting of leading Muslims of Bombay at his residence, and it was resolved to invite the Muslim League to hold its annual session in that city at the same time as the Congress. Every Government sees in the collaboration of parties in the opposition a new challenge to the *status quo*; the Government of India made no secret of its apprehension at this move initiated by Jinnah, and they set afoot machinations to prevent the holding of the sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League in Bombay. Jinnah took this as a challenge to himself personally and became all the more active in the accomplishment of his task. He issued statements nailing the lie that had been insidiously circulated, under the inspiration of bureaucracy, that the joint session would end up in liquidation of the Muslim League and its ultimate merger with the Congress. He assured the Muslims, 'A Conference in collaboration, if possible, is the object ... Can we not bury our differences, show a united front and acquit ourselves with credit and honor?'

The Police Commissioner of Bombay at the time was Edwardes, an officer brought up in the old barbaric tradition that the most effective way to deal with defiant colonial subjects was to break the iron rod over their heads. He called a number of leading Muslims of the city and urged them to bring to naught attempts being made by Jinnah for a joint Congress-League session, threatening them with dire consequences if they allowed Jinnah to succeed. On learning this, Jinnah promptly saw Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, and lodged a strong protest against the undesirable activities of the Police Commissioner. To keep up an air of impartiality, a meeting of leading Muslim citizens was called by Lord Willingdon at Government House, where it was agreed that the oppositionists would stop their agitation against holding of the League

session in Bombay, and a Press Note embodying the arrangements arrived at was issued by the Government and published in the Bombay Government Gazette. "In spite of this settlement", wrote Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, "the oppositionists came to the meeting, created a disturbance and broke up the meeting. I was present on the platform as a visitor at the time".⁶³ Seeds of discord and disagreement were sown between Jinnah and Lord Willingdon, and this was to climax shortly in a spectacular public demonstration bringing the two strong personalities to a head-on clash.

Contrary to the wishes of the Government, the two organizations were in session in Bombay, the President of the League session being Mazharul Huq. In the presence of Congress leaders like Sinha, Wacha, Surendranath Banerjee, Gandhi, Chimanlal Setalvad and Sarojini Naidu, who sat on the dais at the League session, Mazharul Huq severely criticized the British for not having prepared India to bear her own burdens as a result of which India did not enjoy the respect that it deserved among the nations of the world. He concluded his presidential address by saying that it was only through a National Government based on the will of the people that India's honor could be restored.

The enthusiasm roused in the minds of the people by this session can be judged by the following account of an eye-witness, "Seldom has the pageant of times unrolled a scene so touching, so thrilling, so magnificent with drama and dressing as was enacted in the afternoon of December 30, 1915, when amidst the cheers and applause of the gathered multitude the veteran heroes of the National Congress entered in a body to greet and bless the comrades of the Muslim League."⁶⁴

Bureaucracy was flabbergasted at the obvious success that would crown the joint session of the Congress and the League, and bureaucracy hates to accept defeat lying down. It redoubled its efforts at disruption, even if they had to make an alliance with roughnecks and hooligans of Bombay for their success. On the second day of the League session, while a large police force stood threateningly outside the pandal, hundreds of history sheeters stormed the meeting that was being held inside, interrupting the peaceful proceedings on one pretext or the other, making it impossible for an orderly meeting to take place. The organizers asked for police help to clear the intruders and mischief-makers, a request that was refused by the police. The proceedings were abandoned, and the session: met the following day at the Taj Mahal Hotel, where admission was strictly by permission of the organizers.

In this sitting, Jinnah moved a resolution which advocated the setting up of a League committee which, in consultation with other political organizations, should draw up a scheme of political reforms which, while fully satisfying Muslims and protecting their

⁶³ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. p. 285, 1946.

⁶⁴ *Meet Mr. Jinnah*, by A. A. Ravoof, p. 54. 1946

interests, would take India onward on its march to Swaraj. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, then an active member of the Muslim League, was one of those that made a forceful speech in support of the resolution of his leader, Jinnah. Amidst scenes of wild rejoicings, in which both Hindus and Muslims present enthusiastically participated, this resolution was unanimously adopted. Jinnah, the rising colossus of Indian politics, had demonstrated his own and the community's good-will in putting their shoulders to the wheel of political progress.

On its part the Congress also appointed a committee to collaborate with its League counterpart for the above purpose. After protracted meetings and discussions, the two committees jointly agreed on proposals for political reforms at their meeting held in Calcutta in November 1916. Jinnah was not content with this achievement, which in perception and depth swept the imagination of politically conscious India by storm. He instituted a move that this Congress-League accord should be backed by elected Indians of the Imperial Legislative Council. As a result of this a memorandum was prepared, signed and submitted in September 1916 by nineteen members, including Jinnah, to the Viceroy, embodying proposals for post-war reforms.

It must be noted that the Congress-League understanding accepted separate electorates as the basis of elections, as did the memorandum of the nineteen; so that when the Quaid presided over the Bombay Provincial Political Conference in 1916 at Ahmadabad, he exhorted the Hindus to treat the separate electorates issue as a settled fact, never to be opened again or opposed, "I can understand", he said, "the demand for separate electorates is not a matter of policy but of necessity to the Muslims, who require to be removed from the coma and torpor into which they had fallen so long. I would, therefore, appeal to my Hindu brethren that in the present state they should try to win the confidence and trust of Muslims, who were, after all, in the minority in the country." The core of the Indian problem, he said, was "transfer of power from the bureaucracy to democracy," a millennium which could only be achieved through Hindu-Muslim unity.

Once again the Congress and the League decided to hold their annual session simultaneously, this time the venue being Lucknow. The Quaid was elected President of the League session in order to bring to a fruitful culmination the Congress-League understanding. On December 30 and 31, the League session met at Quaiser Bagh, with Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad as the Chairman of the Reception Committee.

The Quaid in his presidential address said, "I have been a staunch Congressman throughout my public life, and have been no lover of sectarian cries... It appears to me that the reproach of separatism sometimes leveled at Musalmans is singularly inapt and wide of the mark when I see this communal organization rapidly growing into a powerful factor for the birth of united India."

This was reciprocated by Ambika Charan Mazumdar, President of the Congress Session at Lucknow, who said in his opening address, "The Hindu-Muslim question has been settled and the Hindus and Muslims have agreed to make a united demand for self-government. The All-India Congress Committee and the representatives of the Muslim League who recently met in conference at Calcutta, have after two days' deliberation in one voice resolved to make a joint demand for a representative Government in India.

In the following words the Quaid set the seal of approval on the Congress-League concord, "In its general outlook and ideals as regards the future, the All-India Muslim League stands abreast of the Indian National Congress and is ready to participate in any patriotic efforts for the advancement of the country as a whole".

Proposals drawn up by the joint Committee of Congress and League, which had already accomplished its task, were notified separately to the annual sessions of both the organizations and, expressing his joy over the success of what at one time seemed an impossible task, the Quaid said, "I rejoice to think that a final settlement has at last been reached which sets the seal on Hindu-Muslim cooperation and opens a new era in the history of our country." He continued that the most formidable obstacle in India's march to success had been overcome and "the battle may be said to have been half won already." He demanded from the British Government they now declare that they had decided to grant India "Self-Government within a reasonable time." Addressing his fellow coreligionists he said, "With regard to our own affairs we can depend upon nobody but ourselves ... We should maintain a sustained loyalty to and cooperation with each other. We should sink our personal differences and sub-ordinate personal ambitions to the well-being of the community."

The understanding arrived at Lucknow between the Congress and the League came to be known as the Lucknow Pact, and it was this Pact that considerably influenced the shaping of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.

During the period between 1900 and 1916, Jinnah had not only forged ahead and emerged as a political leader of All-India importance, he had also established himself as a leading luminary of the Bombay Bar. It may be interesting to particularly recall two cases in which he appeared, as they had a special political significance about them.

Elections to the Bombay Municipal Corporation were to take place in 1907, and one of the constituencies was for Justices of the Peace of that city, all nominated by the Government and most of them Europeans, and they had to elect 16 members. That constituency had been returning consistently Sir Pherozshah Mehta for the last many years, and he was once again seeking election to the Municipality from the same constituency. Pherozshah. By his integrity, fearlessness and a robust sense of dedication to public duty, had rendered sterling account of himself as member of the Municipality. But his outspokenness won for him the enmity of bureaucracy that controlled the affairs

of Bombay Municipality, with the result that Sheppard, the Municipal Commissioner, Harrison, the Accountant-General, Gell the Police Commissioner, and Fraser, Editor of the pro-Government paper, *The Times of India*, formed a clique, which came to be known as "Caucus," to put up a card of their own Sixteen nominees, in order to defeat Sir Pherozshah Mehta; and the entire Government machinery moved into action to rally support for the sixteen "Caucus" candidates.

Excitement ran high in the city as election day drew near, and public resentment mounted when the people of Bombay came to know of the unholy alliance to defeat their popular leader, Sir Pherozshah, who had been chiefly instrumental in giving the constitution of the Municipality a progressive shape, and in raising its prestige and efficiency. When, the meeting took place in the Municipal Hall on 21st February, 1907, with Sheppard in the Chair, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad raised a point of order that the meeting was illegal, as the Municipal Commissioner had altered the date of election after it had been officially notified for the 20th, and that the Commissioner was not competent to do so. Sheppard overruled the point of order, the election was held on the spot, and Sir Pherozshah stood seventeenth on the list, the sixteen "Caucus candidates" having won all the seats. The sixteenth member to get elected was Suleman Abdul Waheed, who happened to be a municipal contractor. An election petition was filed before the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, who held Suleman Abdul Waheed to be disqualified, and decreed that the vacant seat would go to Sir Pherozshah, who was the seventeenth on the list.

Bhaishanker Nanabhai filed a case before a Special Bench consisting of Sir Lawrence Jenkins, the Chief Justice, and Justice Batty, that the elections were invalid *ab initio* since the date of election had been changed illegally by the Municipal Commissioner. The Special Bench held that the matter should first be decided by the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court and, therefore, they dismissed the case with costs. Accordingly Sir Balchandra Krishna, Hormusji Wadia, and Sir Jehangir R. Petit filed a case before the Chief Judge challenging the legality of the elections, Jinnah appearing as the lawyer for the plaintiffs. His legal acumen and his rapier-like cross-examination, tearing to pieces the evidence of witnesses of his opponents, brought him great fame, establishing him as one of the foremost members of the Bar. Commenting on this, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad writes, "Some incidents were witnessed, some damaging disclosures were made, and some Justices had to look foolish."⁶⁵

The Chief Judge, however, upheld the election, and this was followed by a citizens' representation to the Government, alleging official interference in elections and condemning it as "grossly improper". On 7th April, 1907, a mass meeting was held at Madhav Bagh, presided over by Gokhale, Jinnah being one of the speakers. He condemned Government interference in elections as an assault on the rights of the

⁶⁵ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. p. 93, 1946.

public. As a result of this meeting, a memorandum was submitted to the Viceroy, signed among others by Jinnah; the Viceroy pleaded his inability to interfere, as the Law Courts had already decided the issue. The 'Caucus' clique came out victorious, the Government being compelled perforce to shield bureaucratic misdeeds.

On 27th July, 1897, the Government of India had instituted a prosecution against Tilak under Section 124 A for seditious writings in the columns of the Mahrathi newspaper, *Kesari*, edited by Tilak. In the judgment delivered in this case, Tilak was found guilty on all charges filed by the Government, and he was accordingly sentenced. Although the appeal went from one legal jurisdiction to another until it was finally heard by the Privy Council, where Mr. Asquith, later Lord Asquith, appeared for Tilak, the decision at every stage went against Tilak.

Recalling the year 1897. when Tilak had been arrested under the same Sections 124A and 153A. Jinnah said that Justice Tayabji on that occasion had released Tilak on bail. Continuing his arguments, Jinnah said that the leading principle of jurisprudence was that a man was to be presumed innocent until he had a fair trial and was found to be guilty. In spite of these convincing arguments, Tilak's biographer writes that "these arguments fell on deaf ears and that the judge, Justice Davar, was acting on instructions".⁶⁶ It is interesting to remember that on the previous occasion, Davar had been Tilak's counsel before Justice Tayabji. On the present occasion, he was, however, in the pay of the Government, and not paid by Tilak to defend him. It is for this reason, perhaps, that realizing the overwhelming arguments of the Quaid in favor of granting bail, Justice Davar wrote in his judgment, "I think it would be wise, under the present circumstances, not to give any reason, or enter into a discussion of the considerations weighing with me in refusing the (bail) application."

Again in July 1908, Tilak was prosecuted under Sections 124A and 153A for certain articles in the *Kesari*. Jinnah made an application for bail on his behalf, which was refused and the trial opened before Justice Davar and a special jury. In the trial itself, seven of the jury, who were Europeans returned a verdict of guilty, while two of them who were Indians gave a verdict of not guilty. After Tilak's conviction the Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, on 31st July, 1909 wrote to Sydenham, the Governor of Bombay, "I won't go over the Tilak ground again beyond saying that, if you had done me the honor to seek my advice as well as that of your lawyers, I am clear that it should not have been so dangerous as the mischief that will be done by his sentence. Of course, the milk is now spilled and there is an end of it".

Sydenham put in writing his point of view to the Secretary of State, defending the prosecution and conviction of Tilak, only to receive a mild rebuff from Lord Morley in a letter dated 7th August, "Your vindication of the proceedings against Tilak does not

⁶⁶ *Lokmanya Tilak*, by D. V. Tahamankar, pp. 178-9, 1965: John Murray, London.

shake me. That they were morally and legally justifiable is true enough and that the result may bring certain advantages at the moment is also true. But the balance of gain and loss, when the whole ultimate consequences are counted up, that is the only political fact. Time must show."

Popular agitation against Tilak's conviction compelled Lord Morley to issue orders that in future before a political prosecution is launched, prior permission of the Government of India should be obtained.

The Caucus Case and the Tilak Case enhanced further the reputation of Jinnah, both as a lawyer and as a fearless champion of the rights of the public.

Support of the Quaid was thereafter sought by Bombay citizens in every matter that was of special interest to the city. At the time of the Caucus Case, it had become clear that an English daily, entirely controlled by Indians, was in the best interests of that great city, as the *Times of India*, the mouthpiece of the Government, always suppressed the point of view of the public. Sir Pherozshah Mehta took up this cause, and in 1912 he started the Indian Newspapers Company, with himself as the Chairman of the Board of Directors, which decided to float an English daily, the *Bombay Chronicle*, to be edited by B. G. Horniman. The first issue of the daily came out on 4th March 1913, and the *Chronicle* became a success on its very first appearance. Moreover, as *The Times of India* was being sold at four annas per copy, and the *Chronicle* at one anna, the latter soon became the most popular and powerful daily of Bombay. After the death of Sir Pherozshah, differences over current political issues arose between the Board of Directors and Horniman, who, without prior notice, walked out of the Editorial office along with the majority of the staff, after he had printed an editorial in the next morning's paper, denouncing the reactionary political attitude of the Directors. The shareholders upheld the stand of Horniman, and demanded the convening of a special general body meeting of shareholders to consider the situation. The Directors sought refuge in resignation, rather than defend their conduct in the meeting of the general body. Thereafter, the shareholders elected a new Board of Directors with Jinnah as Chairman, and the *Chronicle* once again became the leading daily under the general policy control of the Quaid, who succeeded in quickly restoring harmony between the staff and management of the *Bombay Chronicle*, and by encouraging the editorial staff to be steadfast in their pro-people policy.

Admirers of Tilak in July 1916 decided to present a public address along with a purse of Rs. 100,000 on his sixty-first birthday. The Government arrested him for his speeches at Belgaum and Ahmednagar in reply to public addresses on these occasions and demanded from him surety for Rs. 40,000 for 'good behavior'. Tilak appealed against this order to the High Court at Bombay, with Jinnah as his counsel, who argued that Tilak was being prosecuted for inciting the people to be disloyal to the Government established by law. Tilak, however, had made a distinction between Government

established by law, which is a permanent institution, and the administration, which was subject to change. As the personnel of the administration changed, the nature of their work also changed. Jinnah, by brilliant analysis of law and fact, aided by his irrefutable arguments, clinched the issue for his client, and, Justice Batchelor and Justice Shah accepted the point of view of Jinnah, noting in their judgment that Tilak's speeches did not amount to sedition. The Tilak case brought fresh laurels to Jinnah as a Barrister, whose legal acumen few could match.

Gokhale and Sir Pherozshah Mehta died in 1915, leaving a vacuum in the national life of the country, for no leader could come up to their stature. At such a time, Mrs. Annie Besant flashed on the political scene like a brilliant meteor, jumping from the speculative sphere of religion into the active arena of political strife; from Theosophy to Home Rule. She was a remarkably talented woman, a deep thinker, a brilliant writer and a fiery speaker, capturing by storm the imagination of the youth and the progressive elements in the country. She started a daily, *New India*, through the columns of which she fearlessly attacked the economic and political exploitation of India by her own countrymen, and expressed dissatisfaction with the tardy and halting attitude of the Congress towards India's fight for freedom.

On 1st September 1916 in the Gokhale Hall in Madras, Mrs. Besant launched officially the All-India Home Rule League, with a dynamic programme and manifesto that made no bones about her intentions that India must be immediately granted Home Rule or Self-Government. The war cry of Home Rule reached the remotest comers of this sub-continent, as a result of Mrs. Besant's whirlwind tours all over the country and her impassioned writings and speeches which reached a very wide and appreciative public. Students in their thousands, hundreds of professors, lawyers, doctors and journalists joined the Home Rule League. It was probably for the first time that the women of India demonstrated their growing political consciousness, when thousands of them joined the Home Rule League. It was probably for the first time that the "The strength of the Home Rule movement was rendered ten-fold greater by the adhesion to it of a large number of women, who brought to its helping the uncalculating heroism, the endurance, the self-sacrifice, of the feminine nature. Our League's best recruits and recruiters are amongst the women of India".

On 15th June 1917, Mrs. Annie Besant and her two colleagues. Dr. G. S. Arundale and B. P. Wadia were interned in Coimbatore and Ootacamund. The internment of these three leaders, by a Government which believed that it was best to chop off the head of an agitation if it is to be immediately stopped, had the opposite result. The Home Rule League became all the more popular; the three leaders became the battle-cry to rally all the progressive political elements on one platform, and Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya writes. "Mr. Jinnah joined the Home Rule League immediately after".⁶⁷ Addressing a

⁶⁷ *History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, 1935.

mass meeting held at Allahabad under the auspices of the Home Rule League of that city, he explained why he had joined the Home Rule League, "I wish to say why it was that I joined the Home Rule League. When representations were made and resolutions passed year after year by the National Congress, then their demands were pressed last year in that carefully drafted memorandum of the nineteen members of the Imperial Council, it was said that was only the demand of a few educated agitators and lawyers, but that the masses were not ready for any such reform. It was to meet that attack which was made in this country as well as in England, it was to remove that misrepresentation that they resolved that there would be an educative propaganda and that they should reach the masses and put the verdict of the masses not only before the bureaucracy but before the democracy of Great Britain and I am happy to find not less than ten thousand persons have come here for the purpose of vindicating their claim, to show that not only a few educated agitators and lawyers but the masses wanted this reform". Jinnah became the first elected President of the Bombay branch of the Home Rule League, a responsibility that he shouldered with his customary zeal and devotion. A press statement of Jinnah explained the object of the Home Rule League. "Repression with one hand and concessions with the other is a policy which no self-respecting people can accept ... I notice that already interested parties are setting people against the Home Rule League, which is being misrepresented as going beyond the demands of the Congress and the League. As President of the Bombay Home Rule League, I can but repeat that all that we want, and all that our organization is devoted to, is the realization of the scheme of reforms adopted at Lucknow, with this difference that the Home Rule League is an educationist propaganda and the Congress is a mere deliberative body..." Internment of leaders, followed in turn by popular agitation and repressive measures, made the situation in India very tense, and Montague, the Secretary of State for India, wrote in his *Diary*, "I particularly liked that Shiva who cut his wife into 52 pieces, only to discover that he had 52; wives. This is really what happened to the Government of India when it interned Mrs. Annie Besant."

It was by accident that the Quaid got elected to the Supreme Legislative Council in the autumn of 1909, when elections were being held for the first time under the Morley-Minto Reforms, which had conceded separate electorates to Muslims. Muslims of Bombay city had one seat in the Council, and the Electoral College was a restricted one, confined to those that possessed certain specified qualifications. Jinnah was already a well-known figure in the public life of Bombay, but the Electoral College being small, it left hardly any scope for a person of real merit to get elected, and two very wealthy Muslims were rival candidates. The Muslims were, generally speaking, aware that their political evolution stood at a stage when it was only the very best who could really safeguard their interests in the legislatures. There was all-round criticism against the competence of the two candidates, whose only qualification was their big bank-balances, each of whom was adamant, determined that the other shall not win. Some well-wishers of the community approached the two candidates for a compromise, and it was agreed that both should withdraw, making unanimous election of a suitable and

generally acceptable candidate possible. The field was clear, and some names were suggested for the seat, but after weighing the merits of candidates considered suitable, it was agreed with one voice that the best person to represent Bombay Muslims on the Council would be the young Barrister, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who was elected to the Council unopposed, and he never gave an opportunity to his Constituents to regret their choice. It was his first term as a legislator, and the nation elected him time and again for the next thirty-eight years, enabling him to add a deathless page to the annals of India's legislative history.

One of his earliest speeches in the Council was on 25th February 1910 when, speaking on the Resolution on Indenture Labour for Natal, he said he was taking the floor as he felt that the resolution was important, "It is a most painful question—a question which has roused the feelings of all classes in the country to the highest pitch of indignation and horror at the harsh and cruel treatment that is meted out to Indians in South Africa." Lord Minto, President of the Council, called him to order saying that the words "cruel treatment" were too harsh to be used for a friendly part of the Empire. But Jinnah stood his ground, "My Lord, I should feel much inclined to use much stronger language. But I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment. But I do say that the treatment meted out to Indians is the harshest and the feeling in this country is unanimous". This passage-at-arms between the powerful President of the Council and the new legislator was prominently headlined in the press.

Speaking in March 1912 on Bhupendranath Basu's resolution on Police Administration, Jinnah mentioned a specific instance to add to the long list of grievances narrated by the mover against the excesses committed by the police of those days. He said the Chief of Hothi had been implicated by the Police in an abduction case, the Presidency Magistrate had refused to grant bail, and the Chief of Hothi was committed to the Session. But the Advocate-General, finding that there was no case against Hothi, withdrew the prosecution against him, and the presiding Judge was constrained to remark, "Such a case should never have been brought before the Court at all". Summing up his arguments, the Quaid demanded that a Commission be appointed to inquire into the evils that had crept into the Police Administration.

In the following month, Gokhale introduced his Elementary Education Bill, which was opposed, among other reasons, on the ground that education breeds sedition among educated young men. While supporting the Bill, Jinnah strongly repudiated this insinuation and he thundered, "Do you really think that education means sedition? I say, sir, that a frank and independent criticism of the Government or the measures of the Government is the duty of every member of the State ... Surely, fair, true and independent criticism of the Government does not constitute sedition". Ridiculing those members, who were opposed to such a beneficial Bill, he said, "In the Council, as it is constituted now, we know perfectly well that the intention is not that in this Council we

can defeat the Government and replace the Government Bench by the people of this country, by non-official members. In the Council, as it is constituted now, it is well understood that it is impossible to appeal to the Council and ask them to vote on any resolution or measure according to their own convictions; but the sole function of the non-official members—a minority—is only to express their views on all questions that come before this Council".

It needs a gullible mind to believe that the Bill was being opposed by Hindus, because they felt that education was the root-cause of all sedition. In this connection, Patrick Lacey writes, "The Muslims wanted it: the biggest Hindu party, backed by the Congress Press, resisted it strenuously. The opposition's assistant stage-manager was an old Hindu who in earlier times had been a firebrand of the patriotic movement. I said to him. "You don't like the Bill, because you're afraid it may make the Muslims as well educated as your own people?" "Well," he said, "perhaps that's it."⁶⁸

The same year the Government of India introduced the controversial Criminal Law Amendment Bill. Jinnah in unequivocal words voiced his disapproval of laws that deny inalienable rights to the people, at the same time he condemned all acts of violence and defiance of authority, "Every attempt on the part of my countrymen to undermine the authority of the Government and to disturb law and order, in my opinion, deserves the strongest condemnation and the highest punishment. Those men who have a desire to undermine the authority of the Government, those men who have a desire to disturb law and order are, in my opinion, the biggest enemies of my country and my people ... Let those men who still have these misguided ideas, let those men who have these hallucinations realize that by anarchism, by dastardly crimes they cannot bring about good Government, let them realize that these methods have not succeeded in any country in the world, and they are not likely to succeed in India". But he made a distinction between valid criticism of Government misdeeds and acts of violence, "I believe in criticizing the Government freely and frankly, but at the same time it is the duty of every educated man to support and help the Government, when the Government is right." He said the Government must also take a certain amount of blame for the misguided violence of the people. "Just as there are in India certain people who are responsible for a great deal of mischief, you have certain people who claim to be supporters of or belong to the rank and file of the Government, who were also responsible for a great deal of mischief." He read a long extract from *The Times of London* and the President called him to order that a newspaper was not a Government document. The Quaid replied, "Yes, sir, I know that, but I only wish to point out that there is this kind of mischief going on ... Just as you (the Government) wish us to cooperate with you, just as you expect us to stand by you, in the same way you must stand by us and condemn those who are creating this mischief— just as you condemn

⁶⁸ *Fascist India*, by Patrick Lacey, p. 47.

these men among us ... so you must condemn your men who are also guilty of misdeeds...."

In 1913 he tabled The Wakf Validating Bill, but before he could move it, his term as a member of the Council was over. Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, nominated him for an extra term to enable him to pilot his Bill, which he did with great skill and tact, thus earning for himself the honor of being the first member to have succeeded in getting a private member's bill enacted into law.

Jinnah had proved by his consistently good and devoted work as a member of the Council that there were few in the country to equal him in parliamentary eloquence and political foresight. So that when the elections were once again held in 1917, he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council from the Muslim Constituency of the Bombay Legislative Council. Raffiudin Ahmed, who had opposed him and was defeated, filed an election petition challenging Jinnah's election for alleged malpractices. The inquiry was conducted by Percival, the District and Sessions Judge at Poona. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad writes, "At the inquiry, I gave evidence on behalf of Jinnah as I was present at the bungalow where Jinnah had put up, on the evening on which it was alleged that incidents took place".⁶⁹ The case was dismissed and the allegations were held to be entirely baseless.

⁶⁹ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Sir Chamanlal Setalvad, pp. 254-55, 1946.

I FUNKED JINNAH

The Congress-League Pact of 1916 was a spectacular demonstration of the growing political consciousness in India. Hindu-Muslim differences, the greatest hurdle that stood in the way towards self-government, had been overcome, denying British Imperialism its oft-advanced excuse that violent disagreement between the two communities on political objectives prevented them from taking a decision on the scheme of reforms to be granted to India. In the meantime political pressure on the British was being increased through internal agitation, and the year 1917 saw an unwilling authority constrained to declare that new reforms were in the offing. There was speculation that the Congress and League would jointly launch a Mass Civil Disobedience Movement to accelerate the advent of reforms, and various branches of the two were asked to submit their recommendations on the question of Passive Resistance to their respective headquarters within six weeks, when a final decision was expected to be taken on the subject. In the meantime, a joint session of the two organizations, convened on 28th July 1917, resolved to send to England a deputation consisting of M. A. Jinnah, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Srinivasa Sastri and Wazir Hasani to explain to the British public and politicians the necessity of granting to India reforms contemplated in the Congress-League Scheme, which was fully backed by the Memorandum of the Nineteen. This deputation left for England in September and did much useful work, which brought about greater awareness in England regarding granting of immediate and liberal reforms to India. The die-hards among British politicians, however, expressed their indignation that while Whitehall and Delhi were exchanging secret notes on the coming reforms, the Congress and League and the Nineteen should have made public a whole scheme of Reforms. Lord Chelmsford said the Pact advocated "catastrophic changes;" and Lord Sydenham denounced it as containing "revolutionary proposals, inspired by German intrigue". Their echoes were taken up by reactionaries like Sir Michael O'Dwyer of the Punjab and Lord Pentland of Madras, who had the audacity to insinuate that the only answer to Congress-League understanding was to adopt "a tough line in India".

The hidden hand of bureaucracy had a long reach; scores of articles appeared in newspapers in England, and a number of books were published in that country to project a false image of India, with a view to dissuade the Government from granting reforms to India. A typical example was a book by William Archer, who wrote, "Barbarism, barbarians, barbarous is the essence of the situation ... There are of course many thousands of individuals who have risen and are rising above it (barbarism), but the plain truth concerning the mass of the (Indian) population—and not the poorer classes alone— is that they are not civilized people."⁷⁰

⁷⁰ *India and The Future*, by William Archer.

The Times, London, gave the book a warm welcome and called it timely, approving the work as establishing that Indian culture does not provide anywhere any great moral or spiritual concept capable of uplifting nation.⁷¹ It may be recalled as a historical oddity that the 1901 Census of India described Hinduism as "Animism more or less tempered by philosophy ... or ... magic, tempered by metaphysics," and, commenting on this, Sir John Woodroffe wrote, "It is somewhat of a surprise to learn from this book (*India and The Future*) that it is thought to be part of the business of Census officers to pass judgments on the religions of this country."⁷² The spirit of Asia was in revolt against Western arrogance, and countless books came to be written at this time which extolled the historical past of Asia, many of them by Indian writers, hoping that a time would soon come when Asia would once again lead the world. Dr. Yujiro Miyake, a Japanese thinker, wrote, "The lands where Confucius, Buddha, Christ and Mohamed were born and taught (and wherein, we may add, the immortal Upanishads appeared) are possessed of a power greater than military force and may yet be able to change the face of the whole world. They have not much money or anything that visibly impresses worshippers of the things of this world, but they have vast numbers of people, many of whom have brains and souls more significant of real manhood and real living than all the wealth of occidental materialism."⁷³

In the meantime the agony and strain of a prolonged war was having a devastating effect on the nerves of our foreign rulers. At about this time certain public disclosures spotlighted attention of the British public on Mesopotamia. A heated debate took place in the House of Commons on the Mesopotamia issue and Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, was mercilessly criticized by E. S. Montague, who accused the Government of India as, "Far too wooden, far too iron, far too inelastic and far too anti-diluvian to subserve its purpose in modern times". The debate brought about the resignation of Chamberlain, and in his place Montague, a brilliant young man of 36, was appointed as the Secretary of State for India. Speaking at Cambridge on "Prestige", Montague had said, "And as for Prestige. Oh! India, how much happier would have been your history if that word had been left out of the English vocabulary ... We do not hold India by invoking this well-mouthed word, we must hold it by just institutions, and as more and more time goes on, by the consent of the governed".

Montague's elevation to this high office raised hopes in the minds of Indians that under him India would surely get reforms that would largely satisfy Indian aspirations, approximating those outlined in the Congress-League Pact. Immediately on assumption of office, Montague declared on 20th August, "The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India is in complete accord, is ... the progressive

⁷¹ Cited in "*Is India Civilised?*" by Sir John Woodroffe, p. 122, 1918.

⁷² *Ibid*, 126, 1918.

⁷³ *The future of India*, by Dr. Yujiro Miyake.

realization of Responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."

There was a joint session of the Congress and League at Allahabad on 6th October, when it was resolved to drop the launching of the Passive Resistance Movement; instead it was resolved to send a deputation to England, and also to submit a joint memorandum to the Government, which was presented by a joint deputation of the League and Congress to Lord Chelmsford and Montague in November 1917, signed among others by M. A. Jinnah. The memorandum, inter alia, stated, "At all times and in all circumstances the position of a mere dependency is corroding to the self-respect of a people who ... have shown great capacity for government and administration ... As long as the Government of India is a subordinate Government, not representative of, nor responsible to, the people of India ... Indians will derive what at best must be a very qualified satisfaction from the recognition that is accorded to their Government, as distinguished from themselves".

Towards the end of 1917, Lord Chelmsford and Montague were touring the country, receiving memoranda and deputations. Montague showed his personal predilection to bodily accept the Congress-League Pact, and leaders like the Quaid felt happy that their efforts would be rewarded, after all. But British diplomacy had been at work with its accustomed thoroughness, maintaining on the one hand an air of open-mindedness and fair play, and on the other manipulating things under the table to suit their own ends. "It may be news to many", Paittabhi Sitaramayya writes, "that the whole of the Montague-Chelmsford Scheme, so-called, was worked out in every detail by March 1916. The fact was that Lord Chelmsford was a Major in the Army in the Territorial Force in India, when the order reached him of his appointment as Viceroy. When he went to England in March 1916, he was shown the full-blown scheme readymade".⁷⁴

Hindu and Muslim leaders were working actively for securing maximum support for the Congress-League Pact, so as to force the hands of an unwilling Government to part with at least some power. On the joint initiative of Jinnah and Gandhi, the Pact was translated into various Indian languages, and a campaign was launched to obtain signatures on it all over the country. Within a few months over a million people signed it in token of their support for it, much to the chagrin of reactionaries both in India and in England.

However, His Majesty's Government made an announcement that the ultimate aim of British Raj in India was to transfer power to responsible Government in India, but it was silent on the question of date and details, covering this promise with a somber shroud, as if it was going to be a stillborn child. The main resolution of the Congress session held in 1917 at Calcutta under the presidentship of Dr. Annie Besant, while

⁷⁴ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Paittabhi Sitaramayya, p. 233 1935.

welcoming the principle of setting up a responsible Government, said, "This Congress is emphatically of opinion that the Congress-League Scheme of Reforms ought to be immediately introduced by the Statute as the first step in the progress". It may be interesting to recall here that the Congress at this session resolved that the Telugu speaking districts of the Madras Presidency be constituted into a separate Congress Province," and on 6th October, 1917 the same principle was conceded in the case of Sindh and Kamatak. Dr. Pattabhi writes, "Gandhi thought that the question might await the implementation of the Reforms, but Lokmanya Tilak saw the point, namely, that the linguistic Provinces were an essential condition prerequisite to real Provincial Autonomy".⁷⁵ However, it must be noted here that in spite of this resolution of 1917, Congress on every occasion opposed the creation of Sindh as an autonomous province, until the Government of India Act of 1935 separated it from Bombay and gave it provincial autonomy.

The policy of collaboration between the League and Congress, initiated by the Quaid, continued to forge links of friendship between the two organizations and once again the A.I.C.C. and the Council of the Muslim League met jointly on 6th October, 1917 to review the political situation in the country. Montague, the Secretary of State for India, on arrival in India found, thanks to the efforts of leaders like Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the greatest measure of agreement between the two most representative political organizations, the Congress and the League. Commenting on this, Montague wrote in his diary, "We were face to face now with the real giants of the Indian political world. We had not these dupes and adherents from the Province, but we had here a collection of first-class politicians of the various Provinces. Old Surendranath Banerjee, the veteran from Bengal, read the address,, which was beautifully written and beautifully read. There was Mudholkar from the Central Provinces, Mohammad Ali Jinnah from Bombay, Mazhar-ul-Huq and Hasan Imam from Bihar and Orissa, Gandhi, Mrs. Besant, Kesava Pillai and so on. All the brains of the movement were there." Writing of his impressions of M. A. Jinnah, Montague wrote, "They were followed by Jinnah, young, perfectly mannered, impressive looking, armed to the teeth with dialectics, and insistent upon the whole of his scheme. All its shortcomings, all its drawbacks.—the elected members of the Executive Council, the power of the minority to hold up finance—all these were defended as the best makeshifts they could devise short of responsible Government. Nothing else would satisfy them. They would rather have nothing if they could not get the whole lot. I was rather tired and I funked him. Chelmsford tried to argue with him, and was tied up into knots. Jinnah is a very clever man, and it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running, the affairs of his own country."⁷⁶

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 250-251.

⁷⁶ Mr. Montague's Diary.

The Secretary of State and the Viceroy found that Congress and League stood solidly behind the Lucknow Pact as irreducible minimum that the two organizations would accept, and Government machinations were not slow to detract from the importance of this joint stand. Englishmen in India, Anglo-Indians and the bureaucracy were the spear-head of the attack; and to express popular resentment against this move a mass public meeting was held in Bombay in November 1917, with Jinnah in the chair. He fearlessly exposed the unholy conspiracy and warned the Government of the disastrous consequences that would follow, if the expectations of the people were not fully met. Ridiculing the statement of Lord Sydenham, leader of the opposition to India's right to self-government, who had said that the British would hand over sovereignty in India to its people as soon as they were ready, Jinnah retorted, Well, ladies and gentlemen, all I am saying is this. When the masses are fit for self-government, they will not go to Lord Sydenham for self-government. That is my answer to Lord Sydenham."

In December 1917, when the joint session of the League and Congress met at Calcutta, Jinnah was working whole-heartedly and tirelessly for Hindu-Muslim Unity and for self-government. The main resolution before the Muslim League session, in drafting which Jinnah played a major part, said that the League welcomed the statement of His Majesty's Government that Britain's aim was "increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and gradual development of Responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The resolution demanded "immediate introduction of a Bill embodying the reforms contained in the Congress-League Scheme of December 1916," with a view to establish complete Responsible Government within a fixed date line, "provided always that the principle of adequate and effective representation of the Muslim Community is made a *sine qua non* in any scheme of reforms." Speaking on this resolution. Quaid-e-Azam said, "Do you think that Government could be conducted by ballot boxes?" He said Muslims should not have the fear that Hindus can pass any legislation, as they are in a majority, and that would be the end of the matter, "If seventy million Muslims do not approve of a measure which is carried by a ballot-box, do you think that it could be carried out and administered in this country? If this country is not to be governed by the Hindus, let me tell you in the same spirit, it is not to be governed by the Muslims either and certainly not by the English. It is to be governed by the people and the sons of this country and I, standing here,—I believe I am voicing the feelings of the whole of India—say that what we demand is the immediate transfer of the substantial power of Government of this country and that is the principal demand of our scheme of reforms."

At the Congress session held at the same time a similar resolution was also moved, Jinnah being both on the drafting committee and one of the main speakers supporting the adoption of this resolution. His arguments in support of it were identical as those that he had advanced at the League session.

History has taught imperialists a lesson that so long as there is division in the ranks of a subject nation, foreign rulers can continue to rule. The British were perturbed at the success of Jinnah in accomplishing the impossible – complete Hindu-Muslim accord in politics. A whispering campaign was let loose all over the country to rouse one community against the other on the false plea of religious desecration. Wild rumors were insidiously set afloat that incensed minds of religious fanatics, and there were communal riots in a number of places, one such place being Arrah in the U.P., where Muslims for no fault whatsoever, had become victims of Hindu frenzy. Strangely, the Congress session, of 1917 at Calcutta remained silent over it. while Sayed Sir Raza Ali of the United Provinces moved a resolution at the League session condemning Hindus of wantonly attacking Muslims. Sayed Raza Ali regretted that Hindu leaders of Arrah had secretly put arms at the disposal of the Hindu community, and expressed his indignation at the failure of the police to protect innocent citizens, and at the inefficiency of the C.I.D. in not getting timely information to nip the mischief in the bud. He accused the local authority of criminal negligence by showing weakness in not arresting the mischief makers. It was no use, he said, of blaming the Government; the majority community should act like elder brothers and protect members of the minority community, and the two communities should not allow enemies of the country to disturb communal friendship and peace.

While such were the feelings and sentiments of Muslims over Hindu-Muslim riots, which invariably had their roots in slaughter of cows by Muslims on, especially, ordained festive days, or in protests from Muslims against Hindus playing music before mosques at time of prayers, it is strange to find Gandhi write in the *Statesman* of Calcutta, "Worship of the cow is ingrained in the Hindu nature ... But contrary to the genius of Hinduism as I know it, the Hindu would not mind forcing even at the point of the sword either the Christian or the Muhammadan to abandon cow-slaughter." These were not the words of a soldier, but of Gandhi, who had by now come to be a power be reckoned with in politics, a person to whom respect and reverence were being shown by millions of Hindus who looked upon him as 'Mahatma', while others had elevated him in their minds to the status of an *Avatar*, or incarnation of the deity, and it was, therefore, obvious that his spoken and written word had a special emotional appeal for the general mass of Hindus. And, there stood in contrast Jinnah, holding steadfast to his lifelong dream of bringing the two communities together through the cold logic of political accord and friendly social intermingling, divorced from religious, sectional or racial antagonisms and prejudices that traditionally tended to divide Hindus and Muslims. "Jinnah was essentially a practical politician." wrote M.A. Mehtar of Durban, contrasting the two personalities. "Gandhi was a visionary with a distinction – showmanship was second nature to him. Jinnah never minced words ... Gandhi speaks in riddles."⁷⁷ The Congress depended for its strength on Hindus for financial support, as did the League on Muslims; and inspite of repeated appeals by far-sighted statesmen

⁷⁷ *Whys of the Great Indian Conflict?* by M. A. Mehtar, p. 13, 1947.

like Jinnah, the communal cauldron continued to simmer and to screech at times when it reached boiling point.

Gandhi was now treading the political stage like a colossus, and his peculiar philosophy and tactics often plunged millions of people in struggle and turmoil, and at times into untold misery and suffering. In case of failure, he would own his "Himalayan blunders" as being responsible for human sorrow, and he would parade on public platforms and in his weekly columns as a penitent; of course, success, whether partial or complete, would inflate the dimensions of the ring of halo with which a credulous people adorned him in their minds.

A typical example was the way Gandhi championed the cause of the riots of Champaran, which is the land of King Janaka (a mythological Hindu king and the father of the Hindu Goddess, Sita) which abounds in mango groves just as it used to be full of indigo plantations until the year 1917. The Champaran tenant was bound by law to plant three out of every twenty parts of his land with indigo for his landlord."⁷⁸ Commenting on his fight for the rights of the riots of Champaran, his private secretary Indulal Yajnik wrote. "It was this system and the evils associated with it that he wanted to destroy."⁷⁹ British Imperialism in India, which had its roots in trade and economic exploitation, continued to look upon commercial interests as its guiding star. Britain was in the midst of a war, and Germany, its foe was the main source of supply of indigo. In order to make up for the loss of this source of supply, the imperial whip crashed on the backs of the riots of Champaran, and indigo acreage, which had dwindled to 100 acres in 1914 due to competition of artificial indigo from Germany, began to spectacularly shoot up. until it reached 21,900 acres in 1916 and 26,848 acres in 1917. "Therefore," wrote Indulal Yajnik, "Mr. Gandhi set out to abolish the compulsory system of indigo plantation and also the additional tax which had been levied on the tenants letting them grow what they liked on the land let out to them."⁸⁰ The arbitrary decisions of English plantation-owners, ruthlessly carried out, brought about clashes between the Indian riots and English planters, resulting in bloodshed and killings.

When Gandhi entered the explosive scene at Champaran, he was served with a notice to leave the place, an order which he refused to obey. Speaking before the Magistrate for defiance of the order served on him, in the course of his written statement, Gandhi said, "As a law abiding citizen, my first instinct would be to obey the order served on me; but that I would not do without doing violence to my cause of duty to them for whom I have come here." Gandhi had undertaken his mission to Champaran in his individual capacity, and Indulal Yajnik wrote, "He had decided that nothing should be done in the name of the Congress."⁸¹ Subsequent events were to prove that this technique was to

⁷⁸ Mr. Gandhi in his Autobiography.

⁷⁹ *Gandhi As I Know Him*, by Indulal Yajnik, p. 24, 1943.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p. 26, 1943.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 27, 1943.

succeed in making him bigger than the Congress itself. Although a male labourer's wage did not exceed ten pice a day, a female's did not exceed six pice, and a child's three pice; Gandhi, however, did not bother about such mundane things as raising the wages of these poverty-stricken riots. "He did not do anything of the sort. Instead he only contented himself by establishing six schools in 6 out of the 2,841 villages of the district! He secured most of the teachers from our Province of Gujrat. Some of them were uneducated ladies who were hardly fitted to teach their own vernacular, much less Hindi in Bihar. But he himself explained to these ladies and other teachers that they were expected to teach the children not so much grammar and the three R's as cleanliness and good manners."⁸²

On his return to Bombay, congratulatory addresses were presented to him at mammoth public meetings, and the mill-owners rallied round him, promising to freely contribute to his funds, to enable him to carry on the battle against economic exploitation by the British in India. The World War was being fought on an unprecedented scale on a global basis; the Viceroy convened a War Conference at Delhi, and among the invitees were Gandhi and Jinnah. Gandhi's conduct at Champaran and then at Kaira in the defence of peasantry is in glaring contrast to what he wrote to the Viceroy in answer to the invitation to attend the Delhi Conference, "I would make India offer all her able bodied sons as a sacrifice to the Empire at its critical moment In Champaran by resisting an age-long tyranny I have shown the ultimate sovereignty of British Justice ... In another letter that soon followed the first one, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy that he had finally decided to attend the Conference, "if for no other reason than certainly out of my regard for yourself (the Viceroy) I write this, because I love the English nation, and I wish to evoke in every Indian the loyalty of the Englishman."

Gandhi had a mind as unpredictable as the English weather, whirling in a storm of contradiction, who took contrary stands with such bewildering rapidity that it was not possible for one to know whether he was on one's right or left. He was preparing himself to be the sole spokesman of the Congress, which to him meant the whole of India. And, there on the opposite horizon, was arising the figure of Jinnah, his contrast in every respect; a man who expressed his views freely and frankly, without concealment or casuistry, dissecting every issue with the precision and certitude of a trained surgeon's knife. Differences between these two contrary personalities were to become frequent and serious, and the tremors generated by their clashes were to dictate the course of the pen that wrote the History of India.

Gandhi began to habitually adopt an overbearing attitude towards his colleagues of the Congress, while those outside that organization looked upon him as a political freak. At times he assumed a dictatorial attitude and in unmistakable terms indicated that he was the repository of all political wisdom. A few years later, to be exact, in 1922, when his

⁸² Ibid. p. 29, 1943.

Civil Disobedience Movement was in full swing, on 5th February a Congress procession was wending its way through the streets of Chauri Chaura, near Gorakhpur in the United Provinces. The mob, drunk with intoxication of its own power and importance, unceremoniously rushed 21 constables and a Sub-Inspector to a Police Station and, as if in an ancient barbaric ritual, they set fire to the police station, burning to ashes in demoniacal joy all the trapped policemen. Everyone, including a great number of Congressmen, condemned the Chauri Chaura incident, and "there was an outcry against Gandhi that he should have switched off the whole current and made the movement no longer a live wire. Long letters were written from behind the bars by Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai. They took Gandhi to task for punishing the whole country for the sins of a place."⁸³ Dr. Sitaramayya continued, "In reply Gandhi had but one word to say, namely, that those who went to jail were civilly dead and could not claim or be expected to advise those outside."⁸⁴

Jinnah, a Congressman, was one of those outside a prison house, and he had been witnessing for some time the antics of this man, whom some called 'a political charlatan in the garb of a religious ascetic'. Jinnah felt intuitively that Gandhi wanted to set himself up as a dictator of the Congress; if possible, of the whole of India. But Jinnah was not made to make obeisance to dictators.

The War Conference was held in Delhi on 30th April 1918 Jinnah moved a resolution on constitutional reforms, linking India's participation in the war efforts with Britain's promise for reforms to India. But his resolution was ruled out of order, creating bitterness and suspicion in the minds of leaders like Jinnah. On the other hand Gandhi whole-heartedly supported the resolution to get Indians recruited in the Army and followed it up by actively engaging himself in the recruiting work. However, differences between him and Tilak were brought into the open over India's war efforts, as Tilak wanted more concrete guarantees than mere words from the British that India would get her due share of reforms on the lines of the Lucknow Pact. Jinnah's predilection was for the stand taken by Tilak, and he organized a public meeting at Shantaram's Chawl in Bombay on 8th April under the auspices of the Home Rule League to lodge a protest against Government refusing Tilak permission to proceed to England to explain the point of view of the Home Rule League *vis-a-vis* the war efforts. In his presidential address Jinnah asked, "Are not India's representatives to be allowed to present their views and case to the statesmen and people of Great Britain...? Is India's case to be decided ex-parte? ... Just as the war was a matter of life and death for the Empire ... so was the question of the constitutional reforms of the Government of India a matter of life and death to the people of India...."

⁸³ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, pp. 399-400, 1935.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 400.

Harsh and indignant words sometimes fail to strike a sympathetic chord in hearts that are closed to enlightenment, and the Government persisted in its refusal to allow the Home Rule delegation to proceed to England to put India's case before the English Democracy. Even a personal telegram that Jinnah sent to the Viceroy in this connection evoked no favorable response, and he issued a press statement on 24th April 1918, signed along with him by Dr. Annie Besant and Tilak, in which they said the links that history had accidentally forged between India and England had turned out to be to their mutual advantage. But the statement struck a defiant note, "We cannot ask our young men to fight for principles, the application of which is denied to their own country. A subject race cannot fight for others with the heart and energy with which a free race can fight for the freedom of itself and others. Let full responsible Government be established in India within a definite period to be fixed by Statute with the Congress-League Scheme as the first stage and a Bill to that effect be introduced in Parliament at once ... Be true to us and we will be true to you. Do not ask us to give everything, while you give us nothing; to trust you, while you distrust us; and try to use us for your own advantage only ... Let us fight under the banner of liberty. For nothing less than that will nerve our men to fight and our women to sacrifice."

Lord Willingdon, presiding over the Bombay Provincial War Conference held at the Town Hall on 10th June 1918, said, "There are a certain number of gentlemen, some of whom have considerable influence with the public, many of the members of the political organization called the Home Rule League whose activities have been such of late years that I cannot honestly feel sure of the sincerity of their support Their object seems to have been at every available opportunity to increase the difficulties and embarrassment of Government whenever and wherever they could ... In every country there must always be an advanced party, the extreme left of political life, which is generally opposed to Government...." There can be little doubt in one's mind that Lord Willingdon identified Jinnah, President of the Home Rule League of the city, as belonging to "the extreme left, generally opposed to Government", while the attitude of Gandhi at the Delhi War Conference and his subsequent statements and actions had endeared him to British Imperialism. Lord Willingdon bluntly told 'these gentlemen of the extreme left' that it was not possible for him or the Viceroy to make any promise of grant of Home Rule within a specified number of years, an assurance which Jinnah demanded from the British, if they wanted India's whole-hearted cooperation in the war efforts, and which assurance, according to Gandhi's way of thinking, could wait until after the war was over. At the end of his speech, Lord Willingdon expressed the hope that the official resolution he had moved supporting the Allied cause would be unanimously adopted by the Bombay Provincial War Conference.

The irrepressible and dauntless Tilak immediately took the floor thereafter and sought to move an amendment to the resolution proposed by Lord Willingdon, who ruled Tilak out of order; according to him an amendment could not be moved to amend or modify an official resolution, it being expected that the resolution would be adopted as

it stood. Unruffled, Tilak ignored the ruling of the Chairman, and proceeded to say there could be no department to run "Home Defence without Home Rule." On this Lord Willingdon appeared visibly irritated, and once again held Tilak out of order, saying he would not allow any political discussion at the meeting. Tilak retorted that the question under consideration was a political problem and, therefore, political discussion was inevitable. Lord Willingdon remained adamant and rebuffed Tilak's insistence to explain the conduct and programme of the Home Rule League, although its members had been attacked and accused by him as Chairman of the meeting. The irritable Tilak, along with some of his friends, abruptly left the meeting as a mark of protest against the arbitrary and unfair conduct of Lord Willingdon. Referring to this incident, Dr. Pattabhi wrote. "Tilak had hardly spoken for two minutes, when he was stopped from proceeding further. The fact was that he began to answer Lord Willingdon's remarks against Home Rulers."⁸⁵

Although Jinnah sympathized with the stand taken by his colleague, Tilak, he did not leave the meeting, but as soon as order was restored after Tilak and his friend had left, Jinnah rose to speak. He made a frontal attack on the conduct of Lord Willingdon in throttling fair and full discussion, "I must say I am pained, very much pained, that His Excellency should have thought it fit to cast doubts on the sincerity and loyalty of the Home Rule League Party... I must enter my emphatic protest against that ... The Government has its own Scheme, namely, the recruitment of sepoy's ... They (the Home Rule League) wanted a national army, or, in other words, a citizen army and not a purely mercenary army ... You say that we should be treated and made real partners in the Empire. When? We don't want words . We want action and immediate deeds ... We would not succeed in helping the Empire, unless India is made a partner of the Empire and well treated."

Lord Willingdon expected docility and obedience; he was intolerant of opposition, as is customary with foreign rulers. The bureaucratic oracle had opened its mouth, and all must obey. He pulled up the Quaid, saying that he better go and plead all that with the Central Government. Jinnah reacted sharply, and in suitable words ridiculed the argument of Lord Willingdon, saying it was open to any one of those present to support the resolution in *toto*, or support only such part of the resolution which was acceptable to them; and he was merely exercising that right which is inherent to all those that participate in discussions, a right that is inalienable for those that sit in a meeting of free men.

Lord Willingdon once again raised his voice and said that Jinnah was questioning and challenging the ruling given by him as Chairman of the meeting. Jinnah was not to be cowed, and he continued to say that the procedure adopted by Lord Willingdon in refusing to allow amendments to a resolution was unheard of. However, he said he

⁸⁵ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 165, 1935.

would bow to the ruling of the Chair, how much so ever he may differ from its legality and propriety. With the hammer of authority as Chairman in his hand. Lord Willingdon could easily suppress Jinnah; but the latter was soon to prove to the Governor of Bombay that he who has popular backing could easily lay his adversary flat on his back on the mat in the political wrestling ring.

Sometime after the above meeting, another meeting was convened regarding the South African question, and once again Lord Willingdon was to preside over it. Invitations were issued to four leaders, of the Home Rule League' to Jinnah, Jayakar, Bhulabhai Desai and Homiman to speak on the occasion. A special meeting of the Executive Committee of the Home Rule League was held to consider the desirability or otherwise of accepting Lord Willingdon's invitation. At this meeting the conduct of the Governor as Chairman of the Provincial War Conference came under severe criticism, particularly his decision not to allow Tilak to speak. It was resolved to refuse to address or to attend the meeting. This decision did not find favor with Bhulabhai Desai who was some years later to become leader of the Congress Party in the Central Legislative Assembly. "As a result of this (decision) Bhulabhai Desai resigned his membership of the (Home Rule) League and attended the meeting (which was presided over by Lord Willingdon) and took part in it."⁸⁶

The Home Rule League, mainly under the inspiration of Jinnah, was determined to have a show-down with Lord Willingdon, who had gratuitously insulted the organization and its leaders. A popular demonstration was arranged when most of the markets and shops were closed, which means Bombay observed *hartal* for the first time on a wide scale, a weapon which was to be persistently used thereafter in India's political struggle against the British. Processions started from the sea-beach at Chowpatty, led by leaders with Home Rule League flags in their hands, prominent among them being Jinnah, and wending their way through important streets and roads, the processions converged on Shantaram's Chawl, where a huge public meeting was held, with Gandhi in the Chair. Jinnah moved the main resolution which, inter alia, stated, "the officials in charge of respective departments fail to seek in a spirit of equality the cooperation of the people in the prosecution of the war." His main target of attack was Lord Willingdon, who, Jinnah said, had blundered in handling the question of soliciting India's support to the war efforts, "Lord Willingdon had undoubtedly ... insulted the Home Rule League ... So long as Lord Willingdon did not withdraw his insult, they could not possibly attend any meeting over which he was presiding ... Lord Willingdon has said that the support of the Home Rule Party is halfhearted. My answer is this," retorted Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "that your policy is more than half-hearted to get the fullest man-power of India. You are playing with the, people, and you are not in earnest. Your methods and policy are all wrong. I cannot believe that even a bureaucrat is so blind as not to see it".

⁸⁶ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Setalvad, p. 458, 1946.

Jinnah concluded his speech, "I say, unless you change your policy, you will not enable us to help you to the fullest of our power".

By now Lord Willingdon's time of office was about to expire, and under the inspired lead of Sir Stanley Read, then editor of *The Times Of India* a hand-picked committee of citizens was formed, which asked the Sheriff of Bombay for permission to arrange a citizens' farewell reception to Lord Willingdon "for his excellent work as the Governor of Bombay." Jinnah was looked upon as the registrar of public grievances in the city of his adoption, and he was not going to allow a false impression to be created that people of the Presidency had been happy under that Governor. He drafted a letter addressed to Sir Stanley Read on 8th November, obtained signatures on it from twenty-nine other prominent citizens, protesting against the impression sought to be created through the proposed meeting as if the entire city was backing the move. The letter demanded that it was the constitutional and legal right of the signatories, as citizens of Bombay to be informed, officially, when and where the meeting was to be held and what resolution was proposed to be adopted, so that they could come prepared to move any amendments they thought fit, to oppose the resolution, or to demand a poll, if they deemed it necessary. The letter concluded, "We have thought it desirable to make this request in order that the proceedings may be conducted with the decorum and order, according to recognized rules and procedure of public meetings."

To stalk the lion in his own den, the thirty colleagues of Jinnah wrote to the Sheriff of Bombay, demanding that they be given permission to hold a protest meeting against the disgraceful regime of Lord Willingdon as Governor of Bombay.

Officialdom and its hangers-on were on the horns of a dilemma, not knowing what to do, while Jinnah was an excellent strategist and proved to be master of the situation. He got a number of public meetings arranged to educate public opinion about this fight between an arbitrary official and the will of the people. In one such protest meeting, B.G. Horniman was the main speaker. He recalled the role played by Edwardes, the Police Commissioner, in trying to break up the Muslim League session in Bombay; about Lord Willingdon's dual policy of reprimanding that police officer in public and in private supporting the man for breaking up the League session; and about the great and courageous role played by that eminent citizen, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in fighting without flinching the entire might of bureaucracy, which sat entrenched in the security that the iron-gates of the Governor's House extended to it. Horniman reminded the audience that the Bombay Presidency Association lodged a protest with the Governor some time ago against the disgraceful behavior of Edwardes, the Police and the administration of Bombay, but the letter remained unacknowledged. Horniman continued, "In that letter a deliberate charge was made against the Bombay Police of instigating the breaking up of the Muslim League meeting. Would any self-respecting Government sit quiet under such a charge? Did Lord Willingdon send for his police

officers and say that was a most reprehensible thing, a most disgraceful thing and that there must be an enquiry into the matter? No. For a very long time the Presidency Association did not receive a reply from the Government, and ultimately the Government wrote that they did not propose to hold any enquiry. So they rested under that unrefuted charge to this day that their police went to the meeting and helped to break it up. That was the sort of Governor to whom they were asked to give a certificate, and were they going to give it? ("No, no.")"

A lively debate ensued in the protected columns of safe newspapers, giving the impression as if Lord Willingdon had been a very popular Governor, opposition to him being only from a few extremists like Jinnah and his friends, and that a "Willingdon Memorial" be set up to suitably record the gratitude of the city for his memorable services as Governor of Bombay. However, the fateful day came, 11th December 1918, when a meeting of the "citizens of Bombay" was called in the Town Hall to accord farewell to a popular Governor."

Although the meeting was to be held at five in the afternoon there were long queues waiting outside the closed gates of the Hall from seven in the morning, trusted baby-sitters taking positions in the foremost places in the queues for such leaders as Jinnah, K. M. Munshi, Pothan Joseph, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and others. People from the two rival groups stood side by side in the queues or rubbed shoulders against one another in the nearly Elphinstone Gardens, like combustible material near a naked flame. As soon as bureaucracy felt safe that pro-Government supporters had succeeded in entrenching themselves near the closed gates of the Town Hall, then at ten in the morning suddenly, the doors were opened; there was a scramble for seats. Jinnah and his colleagues, having taken over places from their friends in the queues, were among the first to enter the Hall, full seven hours before the meeting was scheduled to commence.

Following the un-written law of first come first served at such public meetings, Jinnah and some of his friends occupied seats in the first row, but this was not to the liking of the police. Certain well known patrons of bad characters and goondas of Bombay picked a quarrel with Jinnah and his friends, seeking to push them out of the seats they had occupied in the front row. Tempers ran high, and hastily hands were raised to strike at one another, sticks and other lethal weapons leaped to life from their places of concealment. An ugly situation developed, and there would have been trouble, had it not been for an unwritten truce which was arrived at between the two warring groups. Under this, Jinnah and his friends vacated the front seats and a limited number of them were allowed to sit in the centre of the hall, others contenting themselves by sitting on the last fringes of the hall. Lunch-boxes containing delicacies went round among supporters of the Government; while Jinnah and his supporters had to content themselves with a dry lunch from the modest Durbar Hotel on Church Gate Street. It must be mentioned that all through this battle with the rough-necks of Bombay, Mrs.

Ruttibai Jinnah, his newly wedded wife, was beside him, fighting for a popular public cause with the unflinching passion of a suffragette.

As the hands of the Town Hall clock slowly, but inexorably, moved towards five o'clock, the atmosphere was surcharged with tremendous tension, anything from breaking chairs to breaking heads and hands being within the bounds of possibility. The zero hour for the fight to start had arrived. The Sheriff of Bombay entered the Hall ceremoniously to be appropriately greeted by Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Government flunkies who were jam-packed on the dais and the front rows, and to be booed by anti-Willingdonians. In the mixed reception, the Sheriff rose to announce the official communiqué, summoning the public meeting, and immediately B. G. Horniman mounted the dais to raise a point of order and to question the legality of the meeting. His voice was drowned in the threatening storm of shouts raised to hoot him down. While Horniman still stood his ground demanding his constitutional right to be heard, Sir Dinshaw Wacha rose, proposed the name of Sir Jamshedji Jijibhoy to preside over the meeting. The latter gentleman, without waiting for the essential formality of the proposal being put to vote, walked up to the empty presidential chair and occupied it, as if afraid someone else might do so before he could usurp it. Horniman proposed the name of K. T. Telang, a veteran Indian leader and an eminent Home Rule Leaguer, soon to be followed by uproarious scenes, Jinnah and his supporters shouting "No, no" to all that Sir Jijibhoy rose to say or explain.

A fully armed police posse entered the hall, led by a European police officer, who mounted the dais as if to say that the oppositionists better behave themselves, otherwise club wielding police would discipline their bodies and heads. Sir Jamshedji, under the protecting shadow of the illegally raised hand of law, moved a resolution, appreciating the services of Lord Willingdon, and, not even waiting for it to be so much as seconded. "The President declared the proposition carried and he and his supporters made a hasty retreat."⁸⁷ Angry shouts protesting against the decision of the usurper chairman rent the Hall, and this was a signal for the police to freely mix with the crowd in the hall, and to beat and kick their 'picked men'. The Quaid was among those that were assaulted by the police, and he was not one who would forget this insult, or to forgive the police or Lord Willingdon.

As soon as the anti-Requisitionists, led by Jinnah, emerged out of the Town Hall, a surging mass of humanity, shouting adulatory slogans, rushed towards them, carrying the brave leaders on their shoulders. Jinnah announced to the admiring crowd that a protest meeting would be held that night at Shantaram's Chwl, where an eye-witness account of the Town Hall meeting would be narrated. At the protest meeting that night, Jinnah said, "Gentlemen, you are citizens of Bombay. You have today scored a great triumph of democracy. Your (triumph today has made it clear that even the combined

⁸⁷ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Sctalvad, p. 458, 1946

forces of bureaucracy and autocracy could not overawe you. December the 11th is a Red-Letter Day in the history of Bombay. Gentlemen, go and rejoice over the day that has secured us the triumph of democracy."

At this meeting a resolution was unanimously passed protesting against the conduct of the Sheriff of Bombay and against his disgraceful behavior in refusing the oppositionists to address the Town Hall Meeting. The resolution passed scathing strictures against the police and concluded with the words, "This meeting of the citizens of Bombay condemns the administration of Lord Willingdon and protests against the proposal to raise any sort of memorial to Lord Willingdon for his services." Syed Husain, while supporting the resolution, singled out Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the embodiment of the spirit of the citizens of Bombay, of whom not only his city but the whole of India was proud.

His courage in fighting a powerful Governor, backed by a ruthless bureaucracy, won for him respect of his fellow-citizens, and they feted him with laudatory addresses, garden-parties and receptions. B. D. Lam wrote a letter in the *Bombay Chronicle*, suggesting, "If, as a result of the meeting, anybody deserves a memorial it is Mr. Jinnah, whose fine leadership and fearless courage have marked a great epoch in the public life of Bombay. He has shown the spirit of our late lamented leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale.

"We should mark our great appreciation of Mr. Jinnah's service by raising a fund in which each of his supporters should contribute one rupee. That rupee will come not from a man's pocket but from his heart. If we had our own way we would raise a statue of Mr. Jinnah to be placed in the Town Hall of Bombay, for Mr. Jinnah has forever laid low the tyranny of Town Hall meetings held in the name of the public. His name will be cherished for ever as the great Indian who stood for the rights of the people. Town Halls in every city are symbols of their true public spirit. That spirit never existed in Bombay, but Mr. Jinnah has established it on firm basis in yesterday's proceedings."

Lam's appeal received enthusiastic support and rupees poured in their thousands from all over Bombay city, and even from far off cities like Karachi and Calcutta. It demonstrated the will of the people that whoever of them was daring enough to defy bureaucracy, he is the hero the people would follow. Out of this incessant dribbling in of single rupees a huge amount was collected, and soon Jinnah People's Memorial Hall was built in Bombay, to commemorate the occasion, when Jinnah so successfully led that city to make officialdom, out to insult the public, to lick the dust of defeat and humiliation.

Jinnah was in England on the day the opening ceremony of this Hall was performed by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, who made an eloquent and poetic speech, typical of her public utterances, eulogizing Jinnah's services to his city and his country. After the opening

ceremony, Mrs. Naidu sent a telegram to Jinnah, which read, "A Prophet is honored in his own country and in his own time."

Many years later John Gunther wrote, that the Congress call the People's Jinnah Hall simply the 'P. J. Hall, because they hate to use Jinnah's name.⁸⁸

The political pulse of India was throbbing with vigor and health, and all over the sub-continent there were sporadic outbreaks, sometimes admittedly violent, to protest against an alien Government that refused to grant reforms that India asked for. The Government appointed a committee in 1918, with Sir Sidney Rowlatt as Chairman and its report came up for discussion in the form of a Bill before the Imperial Council. Jinnah, the champion of popular causes outside the House also took up the cudgels on behalf of the people inside the House, attacking the provision of the Bill relentlessly. He said, "The sole purpose of appointing the Rowlatt Committee was not to discover that here were criminal conspiracies in the land. They are there. They have existed ... We are concerned more with the part which recommends the measures that we should adopt ... You must remember that in India before 1905 there was no such thing as criminal conspiracies of a revolutionary character. I believe that the first bomb that was thrown in India was after 1906 ... And why is it that since 1906 up to 1918 you have these vast developments of anarchist movements? ... There is discontent, there is dissatisfaction; there is unrest ... partly. My Lord, due to your policy ... Nobody is more anxious to prevent these crimes than we are ... My Lord, that is an aspect which no speaker has put before the Council. The whole question has been dealt with on the footing as if some criminal tribes had sprung up in our midst and were a source of danger which it was the duty and business of everybody, without considering any further or anything more in connection with it, to lay down laws and the moment you enact laws on the Statute Book you think you have solved the problem. I say, my Lord, that no amount of laying down of laws on the Statute Book would solve this problem. You will have also to change your policy, and considerably, before you can remove the causes. Well, my Lord, with some of the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee I may agree, but there are others which, I am quite sure, no civilized Government will accept. No civilized Government will ever dream of putting these recommendations in the form of laws, and I refer particularly to the preventive measures which the Rowlatt Committee has recommended."

Jinnah's vigorous opposition against the Rowlatt Bill stamped him as a leader, uncompromising in his principles, steadfast in his love for the people, however difficult the odds that faced him.

On 8th July 1918, Government published the Montague Chelmsford Reforms Scheme, and they received a mixed reception. The Reforms considerably differed from those

⁸⁸ *Inside Asia*, by John Gunther.

incorporated in the Lucknow Pact and the Memorandum of the Nineteen. Jinnah was among the first to issue a press statement on 23rd July, 1918, which gave the lead to the country as to what should be done and how the scheme differed from the demands made by the Congress and League. He said that the Lucknow Pact was the crystallization of Indian National Opinion, but he was not prepared to summarily reject the reforms, although he was not fully satisfied with them. "The proposals are not like the laws of the Persians and the Medes, but they may be modified upon further discussion..." He proceeded to say he was prepared to accept that for the time being law and order may be reserved to the Government, but only as a temporary measure. He regretted, "under the Reforms the Assembly as a whole and the representatives of the public in the Council of State had been reduced to the position of irresponsible critics, because the certificate of the Governor-General-in-Council can carry a measure through, regardless of the opinion of the representatives ... The budget will be introduced in the Legislative Assembly, but the Assembly will not vote it..." Jinnah went on to make a masterly analysis of the essential difference between the Memorandum of the Nineteen and the Congress-League Scheme on the one hand and the Montford Scheme on the other as follows: –

- (1) In the Government of India representatives have no control over the Executive.
- (2) Any measure initiated by the Government can pass through on the certificate of the Governor-General in-Council.
- (3) Fiscal policy of the Government cannot be touched and in matters of fiscal policy the Government of India will be subject to the Control of the Parliament and we know that India has lost more than once on the floor of Parliament because His Majesty's Government, either Liberal or Conservative, cannot resist British interests as can be cited with reference to Manchester and Lancashire.
- (4) The budget as whole or any allotments in it cannot be changed or altered by the legislature.

Therefore, the position of the representatives of the people in the Government of India will practically remain the same; namely, what the authors of the report are pleased to call, 'influencing the Government' which we have been doing since 1892 "

However, Jinnah did not call upon his countrymen to disown the reforms and refuse to run them. For, his statement said that the difference between the two projects (Congress-League Scheme and the Montford Scheme) is more of procedure than of principle. Both aim at establishing responsible Government within a reasonable time ... I am confident when this report has been fully and carefully considered in India, the bulk

of the people will recognize that the recommendations go a substantial distance ... To the illustrious role of British statesmen who have labored for India ... will be assuredly added the names of Montague and Chelmsford.⁸⁹

Jinnah had never disguised his dislike for Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy of India, while he had been on cordial terms with his predecessor, Lord Hardinge. In his usual manner of attacking his political opponent without mincing words, he had some caustic remarks to make against Lord Chelmsford, while addressing a big public meeting in Bombay in July 1917. He said Lord Chelmsford was "maintaining a studied silence, while India was stirred to its very depths"; however, he hoped his words "would penetrate the rarified atmosphere of Simla". It is doubtful whether he knew that Lord Chelmsford had confidentially written to His Majesty the King as follows on 4th October 1918:

"We have here an educated class, 95% of whom are inimical to us, and I venture to assert that every student in every University is growing up with a hatred of us. These are, of course, at present a mere fraction of the population, but each year sees the number augmented, and it may well be imagined that their potentialities for mischief are infinite. If we can win these men over to our side, I am convinced that we can only do it by inviting and enlisting their cooperation."⁹⁰

Dr. Pattabhi writes, "The Montford Report was a masterpiece of literature. The general belief about the report was that it was largely drafted by Lord Meston and Sir W. M. Marris while Mr. Lionel Curtis (a Round Tabler) greatly assisted the task".⁹¹ The Montford Scheme came to be discussed in the Imperial Legislative Council in September 1918 when, after a full and lengthy debate, at the end of which a resolution moved by Surendranath Banerjee, recommending the appointment of a committee of all non-officials to consider the scheme and send their report to the Government of India was carried, with only four dissenting votes. Edwin Samuel Montague proceeded to place them before the House of Commons and two committees were appointed to go into a detailed study of the scheme, headed by Lord Southborough and Mr. Feetham. They came to be known as the Southborough and Feetham Committees.

By now the Armistice ushered in an uneasy peace, which proved to have the seeds in it of a Second World War. The armistice was signed on 11th November 1918, and the war had come to an end. The following month the Congress and the League met in Delhi, the former under Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya and the latter under A. K. Fazlul Huq, who later on came to be endearingly called by Muslim Leaguers as "The Lion of Bengal". While the Muslim League ended with a resolution partly accepting the

⁸⁹ Cited in, "*Speeches and Writings of Lord Sinha*", 1919, pp. 177 to 180.

⁹⁰ *King George V. His Life and Reign*, by Harold Nicholson, p. 503.

⁹¹ *The History of the Congress*, by Pattabhi Sittaramayya, pp. 255-57, 1935.

Scheme, making certain strong reservations and demanding the safety and restoration of Muslim States in the Middle East, the Congress was caught between two warring groups, the Moderates and the Extremists. Gandhi was present at the Congress Session; the Montford Scheme was rejected in *toto*, and it was resolved to send a delegation to England to explain the Congress point of view, While Britain acted in a niggardly manner in granting reforms, wide differences of opinion were apparent among the two main political organizations, and among their leaders themselves. To aggravate the situation, there were communal riots in the country, violent anti-British demonstrations, and unprecedented awakening to bring to a speedy end the hated foreign rule.

Bureaucracy, stung to the quick, retaliated by introducing in the Council an amendment in the Criminal Law Act, leading to the hated Rowlatt Act, empowering the Government to assume extraordinary powers to deal with political agitations. The most outspoken speech in the Imperial Council, condemning this mediaeval and retrograde measure, was made by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who in the course of the debate on the Bill said, "My first ground is this that it is against the fundamental principle of law and justice, namely, that no man should lose his liberty or be deprived of his liberty, without a judicial trial in accordance with the accepted rules of evidence and procedure ... My third ground is that the powers which are going to be assumed by the executive, which means substitution of executive for judicial, such powers are likely to be abused, and in the past we have instances where such powers have been abused. My fourth ground is that there is no precedent or parallel that I know of in any other civilized country where you have laws of this character enacted".

The Council of those days was packed with nominated members, Government members, and such Indians, who would support the Government on all matters. The Bill was passed with a comfortable majority. It must stand to the credit of Indian leaders like Jinnah and Vithalbai J. Patel that they kept the banner of opposition aloft, voicing the real voice of the peoples.

Gandhi issued his famous Satyagrah Pledge from his headquarters at Sabarmati Ashram, which read, "Believing conscientiously Bill No. I of 1919 and others are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community, as a whole and the State itself is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property."

Jinnah, the constitutionalist, wrote an open letter to the Viceroy on 28th March 1919 against anti-peoples Bills, which the Government was rushing through in the Imperial Council:

"Your Excellency. The passing of the Rowlatt Bill by the Government of India, and the assent given to it by your Excellency as Governor-General against the will of the people, has severely shaken the trust reposed by them in British justice. Further, it has clearly demonstrated the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council, which is a legislature but in name—a machine propelled by a foreign Executive. Neither the unanimous opinion of the non-official Indian members nor the entire public opinion and feeling outside has met with the least respect ... The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State by an over fretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion and their sole plea is that the powers when they have assumed will not be abused. I, therefore, as a protest against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was passed tender my resignation as a member of the Imperial Legislative Council for I feel that under the prevailing conditions I can be of no use to my people in the Council nor consistently with one's self-respect possibly cooperate with a Government that shows such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people in the Council Chamber, and for the feelings and sentiments of the people outside. In my opinion, a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilized Government and I still hope that the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montague will advise His Majesty to signify his disallowance to this Black Act.

Yours truly,
M.A. Jinnah."

His resignation from the Imperial Council proved, if proof were needed, that Jinnah valued above everything else his self-respect and the esteem of his people. A practical man, he lodged his protest in a constitutional manner, and withdrew his cooperation from a Government that seemed to have no regard and respect for popular opinion—Gandhi, who was experimenting in the undeveloped field of using moral force as a weapon in political warfare, plunged deeper and deeper on the uncharted highways of Mass Civil Disobedience and *Ahimsa*, taking his people with him to walk that new and untrodden path.

Gandhi appealed to the peoples of India to Observe 30th March as a protest day and to observe complete *Hartal* but latter changed it to 6th April. The news of the change of date did not reach Delhi in time, and it witnessed scenes of bloody rioting on its streets, when the police opened fire. Not being able to control the riots, police invoked the aid of the army, whose officers ordered immediate firing to disperse the rioting mobs. The police and military firing resulted in a number of deaths and many were seriously

wounded. Gandhi warned the nation against violence, saying it was against the cardinal principle of Satyagrah and *Ahimsa*.

On the 6th of April a complete all-India *Hartal* was observed, when inflammatory speeches were delivered by political leaders in meetings all over the country, where a common resolution drafted by Gandhi himself was adopted and copies of it sent to the Viceroy. Gandhi attended the Bombay meeting in this connection, left next day for Delhi on his way to the Punjab. The Government of the Punjab served him with a notice on a border station, while he was still in the train, not to enter that province, and on his refusal to obey the orders, he was taken back to Bombay under police custody.

News of Gandhi's arrest infuriated the masses and they indulged in indiscriminate acts of hooliganism, taking the law into their own hands, attacking Europeans that strayed on the streets in cars or on foot, and punishing those that refused to obey them. An undeclared war seemed to have started with the officers responsible for maintaining law and order by the mobs that were bent on having their own way to show their resentment against the Government. In this conflict, there were many incidents of loot and arson, and some police officers and an English sergeant were killed. The situation continued to wear an ugly look and had gone beyond the control of civilian authorities, resulting in the declaration of Martial Law in some cities.

On 11th April a huge crowd gathered at a police-station in Amritsar, demanding the release of some political leaders that had been arrested. They were pushed back by club swinging police, and the crowd squatted on the ground, with loud cries of mourning as if someone had been killed. It is not possible to determine whether it was the work of agents provocateurs or an ugly incident that compelled the police to open fire on a defenseless crowd, resulting in several deaths. The shout of revenge was loud on the streets of Amritsar, and an infuriated mob set fire to a number of Government buildings and the Railway Station. Five Englishmen were brutally slain by the crowd and an Englishwoman, Miss Sherwood, who was being molested by some hooligans was rescued by a brave Indian, at the risk of his own life.

Next morning life was as usual; people went about their lives, as if nothing had happened the previous day, frayed tempers had cooled down, and tension had disappeared. But a foolish act of display of force by a bureaucracy that had lost its head ignited a spark that was to engulf Amritsar in a tragedy, which is remembered even to this day as one of the darkest acts of vandalism in the history of the British in India.

General Dyer, on being summoned, arrived in Amritsar on the evening of the 12th and the following day a Sunday, General Dyer and his men took over the city. The citizens had already called a protest meeting for Sunday at Jallianwala Bagh, a garden that boasts of a large lawn, around which stand high walls like sentries. Entrance and exit to the Bagh was only through five narrow gates, and some twenty thousand people had

collected there in sympathy with the victims of police and military firing of Friday. The ruthless English soldier, General Dyer, moved his men into Jallianwala Bagh, ready with rifles and bayonets, and even machineguns. How easy it must have been for an English General to mow down a swarm of Indians, completely unarmed and trapped by steep walls, with guns and bullets and bayonets behind him! He ordered forty men to shoot indiscriminately into the crowd, which panicked and screamed for mercy. When his ammunition was exhausted, General Dyer withdrew his men, leaving hundreds of dead and dying. He had not the decency to arrange for first-aid or medical attendance or for the removal of those that were seriously injured to hospitals, so that their lives could be saved. He was an English soldier and he believed his job was to teach these "Bloody Indians" a lesson they would never forget. Those grievously wounded and in the jaws of death shouted for water on a night that was suffocating with unbearable heat. But there was not a drop of water to be found!

The situation had not gone so much out of control as to warrant handing over Amritsar to the army. However, it was done, and this bungling was to cost many Indian lives and much suffering, and a loss to the British of a good deal of their prestige. Sir Valentine Chirol wrote that the surrender of civil authority to the military first at Amritsar, and then, under orders from Simla, at Lahore and elsewhere was, as His Majesty's Government afterwards acknowledged, a disastrous departure from the best traditions of the Indian Civil Service.⁹²

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre ushered in a reign of terror and Martial Law was clamped on the Punjab. Unprecedented atrocities became the order of the day; insults and humiliations were heaped on every Indian; and the British tommies, feeling very brave and powerful with their machine-guns in the midst of an unarmed population, paraded the streets with the arrogance typical of the army of a foreign tyrant, who has newly subjugated a nation. Gandhi partially called off his *satyagrah* movement, and announced his call for Mass *Satyagrah* was a "Himalayan miscalculation."

All over the Punjab Martial Law erupted with the fury of a devouring volcano, and thousands of people in cities and villages were killed, while British soldiers were having shooting practice with human beings as targets!

Analyzing the causes of the widespread discontent and violence, B. G. Horniman says after having helped the Allies with men and women, Indians hardly believed that the British would pass 'drastic legislation (Rowlatt Act and Criminal Law Amendments) depriving peoples of their most elementary human rights and unparalleled in the laws of any modern civilized State.'⁹³ Horniman explains although Government's intention in passing such vicious legislation may have been to gag dangerous agitators, yet even

⁹² *India Old and New*, by Sir Valentine, Chirol, p. 184. 1921: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London.

⁹³ *Amritsar and Our Duty to India*, by B. G. Horniman, p. 49, 1920.

well-meaning political leaders may not escape their all-embracing tentacles. "Meticulous accuracy on the platform, when speakers are dealing with complicated matters in the heat of a great popular agitation, is not characteristic of the politics of any country in the world".⁹⁴

Resentment against the happenings of Jallianwala Bagh reached boiling point, and violent demonstrations were witnessed at Lahore, Gujranwala and Kasur, where Government property was looted and set on fire, and some police were killed and injured. Vengeance and reprisals by the British under the cover of Martial Law were terrible in the extreme and came with the swiftness of lightning.

Dr. I. H. Qureshi writes how public opinion was outraged by these brutalities heaped upon Indians under the protecting umbrella of Martial Law, "The enactment of the Rowlatt Act, which provided for the incarceration of suspected terrorists and conspirators against the British rule without an open and proper trial set off an agitation of vast proportions. The firing in Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, where a large crowd assembled in an area enclosed by high walls and few exits, the proclamation of Martial Law in Amritsar and Lahore, the infliction of humiliating punishments—like orders to crawl on the ground—upon innocent citizens, infuriated Indian public opinion."⁹⁵

In 1920, a White Paper was issued to the British Parliament. which admitted Martial Law was "more intensive" in Lahore than elsewhere. The reason is that the Martial Law Commander for Lahore was Lt-Col. Frank Johnson, who had learnt to administer Martial Law in Africa and to shoot "the bloody blackies" in Bechuanaland at sight, if they showed any signs of defiance, and he was not ashamed to admit in his evidence before the Hunter Committee, which was appointed to go into the Jallianwala tragedy and the subsequent events in the Punjab, that "he had been hoping for an opportunity to show to the people of the Punjab the might of Martial Law", and that he "used his opportunity to the full".⁹⁶ He went on to explain to the committee that he "entered Lahore at the head of his soldiers, with aeroplanes proceeding at lower attitudes with orders to drop bombs on unarmed civilian population the moment the signal was given by the firing of the troops"⁹⁷ Wherever Lt.-Col. Johnson found shops closed, he ordered them to be opened, "the alternates were either being shot or being forcibly opened and their contents distributed free to the public."⁹⁸ Students were ordered to report four times a day to the military authorities at different places, sometimes being compelled to walk for over four miles, making students walk for sixteen miles a day in a hot April when the temperature was over 100°F, in the shade, and all that the brave Lt.-Col. Johnson said was, "it keeps them out of mischief". A Martial Law notice was removed

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁹⁵ *History of the Freedom Movement*, by Dr. I. H. Qureshi, Vol. I, p. 51, 1957.

⁹⁶ Cited in "*Amritsar and Our Duty to India*", by B. G. Homiman, pp. 132-3, 1920.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

from the walls of a college, and as a penalty the Principal and staff were kept in military custody for three days. *Langars* or public-kitchens, opened to feed the sufferers, were forcibly closed, and under Lt.-Col. Johnson's orders, an elderly man, who was caught tending his cow outside his shop-door in a side lane after 8 P M., was seized and flogged for this breach of the Curfew order!⁹⁹ Even villages like Narwar, Muridke and Kamoke were bombed from the air and the village headmen flogged and whipped publicly "for obstructive behavior" and "for their own punishment and for the edification of the village."¹⁰⁰

After six weeks of hell let loose on Lahore and the nearby country-side. Lt-Col. Johnson was given a big farewell dinner by the Europeans of Lahore and they commended him as "the protector of the poor". He replied that he had acted "as a kindly and benevolent tyrant, who castigated the people for their own good".¹⁰¹

Col. O'Brien, who administered Martial Law in Gujranwala, Capt. Doveton in Kasur, and Bosworth-Smith in Sheikhpura were most inhuman in administering Martial Law in the areas under their respective commands. When the news of disturbances at Gujranwala reached Lahore, the Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michel O'Daver, dispatched aeroplanes to Gujranwala, which was bombed from the air with Major Carberry and Lt. Dodkins in charge of operations.¹⁰²

Among the most infamous deeds by the British was the "Crawling Order" imposed by General Dyer in Amritsar, under which everyone, passing through the street in which Miss Sherwood was assaulted, was made to crawl! with his belly to the ground; even respectable citizens living on that street were not exempt from this humiliating "Crawling Order". Many alleged offenders were brought to this street and publicly flogged by British tommies to teach "the black natives a lesson; and let them learn it the hard way".

General Dyer had ordered the firing at Jallianwala Bagh and had stopped holding of public meetings, although "he had no authority for what he did ... for ... Martial Law had not been proclaimed".¹⁰³ He had also ordered the cutting of water and electric supply to the city of Amritsar, without having the authority to do so.

The War Diary of the 16th Division in an entry on 14th April reads, "At a Conference at Government House, General Dyer's report on the action at Amritsar was considered and action taken was approved by the Lt.-Governor".

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

For his "wonderful work"(!) in Amritsar, General Dyer received a telegram, which was dispatched to him with the assent of the Lt.-General of the Punjab, which read. "Your action correct. Lt.-Governor approves."¹⁰⁴ The same Governor stopped entry into the Punjab to advocates and barristers from outside, who had been engaged to defend "offenders" under Martial Law orders.

And after the Martial Law storm had subsided. "The Government of India have passed an Act of Indemnity, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to sue or prosecute them in Indian Courts".¹⁰⁵

What a heavy price our patriots had to pay, in order to free their nation from the bondage of foreign rule!

A rigid censorship prevented Punjab atrocities becoming known to the people outside, and the declaration of the Third Afghan War, involving the necessity of recruiting men from the Punjab into the army, complicated matters for the Government. The Viceroy in September 1919 appointed a commission to inquire into the causes of the disorders, and this commission, presided over by Lord Hunter, came to be known as the Hunter Committee.

Jinnah was at that time in the Congress, in the Home Rule League, as also in the Muslim League. To silence critics of the Rowlatt Act, Mrs. Besant had once declared, "When the mob begins to pelt them (soldiers) with brickbats, it is merely merciful to order the soldiers to fire a few volleys of buck-shots," and this led to her being called "The lady who believes in bullets for brick-bats". Jinnah's loyalty to Mrs. Besant and the Home Rule League was badly shaken, as the atrocities and brutalities which Muslims in the Punjab were made to suffer, as well as the Hindus, had deeply hurt his sensitive mind. Gandhi, on the other hand, who had been the instigator of these disturbances, in a sense, atoned for the staggering human and material loss by uttering confusing and contradictory casuistic platitudes, and Dr. Pattabhi writes, "A definite cleavage of parties ... came into existence since April 1919."¹⁰⁶

Jinnah was shocked beyond measure at the sufferings of Muslims in the Punjab under Martial Law and their tale of woes in the disturbances in other parts of India, a catastrophe that had befallen them under a leadership with whose methods he felt he could never be in agreement. But an individual, caught in the vortex of circumstances, takes time to disentangle himself. Commenting on the plight of Muslims, Homiman wrote, "The Mohammadan community especially suffered."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-81.

¹⁰⁶ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 291.

¹⁰⁷ *Amritsar and Our Duty to India*, by B. G. Homiman, p. 32. 1920.

The editors of Indian newspapers appointed Rev. C. F. Andrews, an Englishman, but friend of India, to inquire into the Punjab disturbances, who was promptly prevented by the Government from entering the Punjab. B.G. Horniman who, as editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, was exposing the Punjab brutalities, was deported from India by the Government. The exit of Horniman from the Indian scene prompted Gandhi to take over the editorship of *Young India*, which he continued to edit for a number of years thereafter.

The Hunter Committee, appointed on 14th October 1919, was occupied with the inquiry into the Punjab riots, having started its work on 29th October in Delhi, sitting thereafter in Lahore, Bombay and Ahmadabad. One of the Muslim League resolutions called it "A whitewashing commission of inquiry ... without any representation from the Indian National Congress and the Indian Muslim League." Among the Congress representatives that appeared before it on behalf of those in detention or on trial under Martial Law was that great Indian, Chitranjan Das of Bengal. Das demanded that certain persons in custody be allowed to appear before the Hunter Committee to give evidence, which was refused, and the Congress withdrew its participation. The Congress forthwith prepared a non-official report on the Martial Law, in which, *inter alia*; it was stated "The admission made by General Dyer before the Hunter Commission established beyond dispute that his action of 13th April was nothing but a cold-blooded, calculated, massacre of innocent, unoffending, unarmed men and children, unparalleled for its heartless and cowardly brutality in modern times"

The diabolical mind of General Dyer can be judged from his own admission that he had taken an armored car to shoot people in Jallianwala Bagh, but found that the passage to the Bagh would not admit it, and so he left it behind.

We have it on the authority of Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, one of the members of the Hunter Committee, that relationship between English and Indian members was far from cordial. It must be remembered that the Government of India had refused to appoint representatives from the Congress and the Muslim League on the Committee, and hence the commission had forfeited the confidence of the leaders and masses due to its very composition. However, after completing its inquiry, the Committee met at Agra to draft its report, the members staying at the Government Guest House. From the very beginning sharp differences became apparent between European and Indian members on the justification and application of Martial Law and its continuance for such a long period. Commenting on the way the Europeans behaved on this occasion, particularly Lord Hunter, Sir Chimanlal wrote, "The discussions which were on occasions heated led to some unpleasantness, particularly because of the intolerant attitude adopted by Lord Hunter towards any difference of opinion. During one of the discussions I had with Lord Hunter, he lost his temper and said, "You people (meaning myself and my Indian, colleagues) want to drive the British out of the country." This naturally annoyed me very much and I said: "It is perfectly legitimate for Indians to

wish to be free of foreign rule and Indian independence can be accomplished by mutual understanding and goodwill. The driving out process will only become necessary if the British are represented in this country by people as short-sighted and intolerant as yourself". After this, though under the same roof, we, the Indian members, ceased to talk to Lord Hunter."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ *Recollections and Reflections'*, by Chimanlal Sctalvad, p. 311, 1946.

SWARAJ STINKS IN MY NOSTRILS

There was no unanimity in the Hunter Committee over the report to be submitted to Government; the three Indian members, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, Pandit Jagat Narain and Sahebzada Sultan Ahmad Khan signed a minority report, separate from the one submitted to the Government of India by the European members, who were in a majority. The Government of India studied the two reports, recorded their conclusions, heavily in favor of the European report, and forwarded the matter to the British Cabinet through the Secretary of State for India.

During the ensuing Budget Session in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Carson moved a cut motion to censure the Government on its handling of the situation in India, the Martial Law in the Punjab, and the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy. Winston Churchill in his inimitable style thundered against certain objectionable features of the Martial Law regime, while Montague took the floor to make some scathing remarks against the military rule. Churchill said that General Dyer's handling of the situation reminded Englishmen of the word "frightfulness – and frightfulness is not a remedy known to the British Pharmacopeia."

The cut motion, on being put to the vote, was defeated by 247 to 37 votes, but the Government of India came out of the Parliamentary debate badly shaken and mauled.

However, General Dyer was ultimately asked to resign and, it is believed, he was given half pension.

This had its echo in the House of Lords on 19th July 1920, when Lord Finlay moved a censure motion against the Government "for the orders passed regarding General Dyer". During the course of the debate, Lord Finlay accused Indian members of the Hunter Committee of partisanship. This brought out a spirited defence of the three Indian members by Lord Sinha, the first and only Indian to have been raised to the peerage and who was now a member of the House of Lords. Lord Sinha dwelt at length on the spotless public career of these three gentlemen.

An unusually violent debate followed, and it was obvious that the House was almost evenly divided over the issue. Ultimately Lord Curzon, with his acknowledged understanding of Indian problems, rose to oppose the motion and to defend the Government. The censure motion was carried by the House of Lords by 129 votes to 86.

The British press played up the debates in the two Houses over General Dyer's conduct in the Punjab, and a reactionary press, controlled by British Big Business, built him up into a national hero. He was looked upon as representing that breed of pioneering

Englishmen who, by their ruthlessness, had helped to build up the mighty British Empire. He was not "weak-kneed" nor a "sulker". A powerful press can easily inflate the image of a mediocre to assume heroic proportions, and General Dyer came to be looked upon as a national hero, who had suffered at the hands of a colonial people. Invariably, all causes, good, bad or indifferent, can draw round them sympathizers if backed by the press; and some people opened a public subscription list as a result of which a purse was presented to General Dyer from "An admiring public".

Even some British historians and political commentators were constrained to write that presenting a purse to General Dyer and his adulation in the press were reprehensible acts and would lead to bitterness between themselves and the ruled. Sir Valentine Chirol commented that Indian feeling had run tremendously high, that the people of India were angry at the stifling of discussion in the Indian Legislature and above all the unprecedented public subscriptions in England and in India for the glorification of General Dyer, whilst the Punjab Government was still haggling over doles to the widows and orphans of Jallianwala Bagh.¹⁰⁹

In the meantime the Home Rule League and the Congress were undergoing changes of a far-reaching magnitude due to the emergence of Gandhi, who seemed to out-strip other leaders in capturing these two organizations. He had returned to India in 1914; founded the Sabarmati Ashram on 25th May 1915, which he converted into a laboratory for his experiments in Satyagraha; compelled the Government in 1917 to revise its policy regarding indentured labor in South Africa; initiated Civil Disobedience at Champaran in 1917, to be followed in 1918 at Koira; successfully led in March 1918 labor strike in that gigantic citadel of industrial might, Ahmadabad, after having gone on hunger-strike for a number of days. When Montague visited India he noted, "He (Gandhi) dressed like a coolie, forswears all personal advancement, lives practically on air, and is a pure visionary."¹¹⁰

At about this time, Mrs. Annie Besant was losing her popularity, and some leaders began to suspect even her *bona fides* to the cause of India; her English nationality being at the bottom of this suspicion. A powerful band of Home Rulers got together to oust her from the presidentship of the Home Rule League and to get Gandhi elected in her place, one of them being Kanaya Lal Munshi, who wrote, "I was one of the last to yield on the point; I then considered Gandhiji's ways uncertain, arbitrary and unpractical."¹¹¹

However, Gandhi was elected President and Mrs. Besant had to make a forced bow to an organization that she had created and nursed. Those that had succeeded in installing him as President learnt to their bitter cost, very soon, that Gandhi was more arbitrary and autocratic than Mrs. Besant; and K. M. Munshi writes, "no resolution would-be

¹⁰⁹ *India Old and New*, by Sir Valentine Chirol, pp. 184-85, 1921: Macmillan and Co., Limited, London.

¹¹⁰ From the Diary of Mr. Montague.

¹¹¹ *Follow the Mahatma*, by, K. M. Munshi. p. 6, 1940.

adopted, unless it was drafted by him. We had no chance to have votes taken; a few minutes' discussion reduced everyone to passive acquiescence ... We were aghast, our sense of democracy was shocked. What was the use of a committee, we argued, if every member threatened to resign, if outvoted...."¹¹²

Montague, a shrewd judge of political trends, had stated during his visit to India, "I wish I would get the damned bureaucracy to realize that we are sitting on a volcano." Montague had come and gone, and a foreign bureaucracy, drunk with its own power, trampled on the streets of India like a drunken giant. Defiance of authority and uprisings were witnessed; the Rowlatt Act and Criminal Law Amendments were clamped; Gandhi had let loose his weapon of Satyagrah; Jilianwala Bagh tragedy had cost India about 2,000 dead, according to some estimates. "But suddenly" writes Munshi, "the Prophet of Revolution appeared to turn pale. He was shocked. He admitted that he had blundered; confessed that the blunder was "Himalayan". He suspended the movement; and undertook a fast like a penitent sinner, and I felt deeply humiliated at having a leader who, I thought, had not the courage to face the natural consequences of his plans."¹¹³

At this time Jinnah was a member of the Home Rule League as also a member of the Congress, and Gandhi had collared both these organizations as if he were their undisputed dictator.

Gandhi at the end of the war was a disillusioned man, who found the British lukewarm to India's demand for self-government, although he had thrown his whole might on the side of war efforts in the hope that Britain would sympathetically consider India's claims, as contained in the Congress-League Scheme of Reforms. Bureaucracy, weakened due to the stress and strain imposed on its arbitrary powers after the war, was out to strengthen its hold over the situation with a vengeance, while India was confronted with a situation when the will of one man, Gandhi, appeared to take decision on behalf of a whole sub-continent. Such a state of affairs, vesting unlimited powers in the hands of one individual, could not be to the liking of Jinnah, who was a born democrat and a constitutionalist.

Gandhi's ambitious mind was devising ways and means to make his hold over the Home Rule League complete and he sponsored a proposal that the aims and objects of the All-India Home Rule League be changed.

The Changes proposed by Gandhi came up for discussion in a General Meeting in Bombay of the Home Rule League on 3rd October, 1920. Jinnah was among the few who had the courage to fearlessly oppose Gandhi's suggestions for change in the aims

¹¹² *I Follow the Mahatma*, by K. M. Munshi, p. 6-7, 1940.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 9.

and objects of the Home Rule League. Jinnah was supported by M. R. Jayakar, K. M. Munshi, Mangaldas Pakvasa, and Jamnadas Dwarkadas. A first-rate debate ensued and both sides lashed out at one another. Jinnah raised a point of order, challenging the validity of the proposal moved by Gandhi to change the constitution. Gandhi was in the chair, and he gave a ruling that the proposal was in order. It was a palpably wrong ruling and these leaders, having already lost their patience with the whims and caprices of Gandhi, resigned *in bloc* from the Home Rule League.

The seceders, among whom were Jinnah, Jayakar, Munshi, Divatia, Dwarkadas, N. T. Master, Jamnadas M. Mehta and Pakvasa, in their joint letter of resignation protested, *inter alia*, "The new constitution (of the Home Rule League) deliberately omitted any reference to the British connection and was clearly permissive of unconstitutional and illegal activities, provided they were peaceful and effective".

Gandhi replied to the letter of resignation in a press statement, in which among other things he said, "I want my country to have Swaraj whether with or without the British connection. I am not opposed to the connection by itself but I do not wish to make a fetish of it. I will not keep India for a single minute under slavery for the sake of that connection. But I and those who think with me have limited our ambition in order that we can carry the Congress with, us and be thus enabled to remain affiliated to that body ... To disregard a tyrannical administrative order may be contrary to law but it is not in my opinion an illegal activity.

"To make strong speeches amounting in the opinion of an erratic judge to sedition is not an illegal activity.... If you wish to take your share in the new life that has opened up before the country, and benefit the country by your experience and guidance, and if you do not consider that there" is anything fundamentally opposed to your conscience I invite you and your co-signatories to reconsider your resignation."

The dissenting group, however, stayed out. Thus came to an end Jinnah's connection with the Home Rule League, in spreading whose popularity he had played such an important role.

Gandhi was a visionary, a Utopian; Jinnah, a realist, a down-to-earth individual. In the stormy days of the second decade of the twentieth century, the characters of the two personalities came into sharp conflict. The tempo of political consciousness and organization had quickened. The war brought about a greater awareness regarding the absolute necessity of self-government; reforms were in the offing, and there was the smoke of death and devastation hovering over Indian skies as a result of Martial Law in the Punjab and suppression of the people by a ruthless Government. Gandhi jumped into the battle-field of every dispute, without a clear picture in his mind as to the ends that he was aiming at, except to take refuge in words that amounted to moral discourses; while Jinnah's mind methodically stored neatly deduced solutions to

current problems. Dr. Annie Besant once said that Gandhi's approach was abrupt in as much as he seemed to love suffering and, therefore, he could not be happy if he could reach his goal through normal evolutionary methods.¹¹⁴

A special session of the Muslim League under the Presidentship of Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad, and of the Congress under Syed Hasan Imam had and recorded an unfavorable decision on the Montford Reforms, both the organizations passing almost identical resolutions, demonstrating unanimity among politically conscious Indians on the Reforms. On the other hand, the British were equally resolved to enforce them on an unwilling people. The Southborough and Feetham Committees were already at work on the details under the contemplated reforms – on Functions and Franchise. To create favorable conditions for the acceptance of reforms, the Defence of India Act, counterpart of Dora in England, was vigorously in operation, arming a panicky bureaucracy with wide powers to send persons to jail on the slightest or even on an imaginary pretext. Maulana Mohammad Ali, Editor of the powerful *Comrade*, and his elder brother, Maulana Shaukat Ali, editor of the equally vocal *Hamdard* in Urdu, were thus spending an arbitrary and enforced sojourn in jail, languishing behind prison-walls, while their countrymen were in a violent political ferment. The reason why the former was in prison was that he wrote an article. "Evacuate Egypt" in which he fearlessly exposed allied strategy in the Middle East to divide the world of Islam and to leave it in a state of exhaustion and weakness at the end of the War. The two brothers rotted in jail until the Royal Proclamation, announced after the Armistice, gave amnesty to many political prisoners, among them the Ali Brothers, releasing them on 25th December 1919.

When Parliament reopened in 1919, Montague lost no time in introducing a Bill embodying the reforms that the Government wished to give to India. In introducing the Bill in the House of Commons, Montagu said, "If we hold on to power in India, and stand fast to the policy of subordination, race-friction will continue and ought to continue. If we surrender our trusteeship to the great provinces of India as speedily as they are ready to take it over, then Indians will have something better and more worth doing than fiercely and impotently to criticize those who are at present the agents of Parliament". He said the Bill was "a bridge between Government by agents of Parliament and Government by representation of the peoples of India". It was not enough to give to a people law and order, he said; India must be helped on the path of nationality.

On the other hand, Indians felt the reforms were not comprehensive and progressive enough, while Englishmen hailed them as very generous and far-reaching. Younghusband wrote that after a hundred years of wavering, the British had at last clearly envisaged, and firmly set before themselves, and taken a great stride, not a step,

¹¹⁴ *Gandhiji*, by Kanji Dwarkadas, p. 22.

towards self-government.¹¹⁵ The debate that ensued on the First and Second Reading of the Bill eloquently demonstrated how the atmosphere in the House of Commons utterly failed to portray feelings of the peoples of India on the proposed reforms. At the end of the Second Reading, the Bill was referred to a joint committee of the two Houses to examine the Bill in the light of the debate, to take evidence from appropriate persons and report to Parliament, the committee being headed by Lord Selbome, the only Indian finding a place on the committee was Lord Sinha, who was a member of the House of Lords.

Although political India had lost faith in Britain's pledges and the Montford Scheme had proved to be far below their expectations, yet a number of representative deputations, as also Government inspired individuals, left for England to appear before the Parliamentary Committee to give their views on the reforms. All shades of opinion, varying between total rejection to complete acceptance, were heard by the committee, as also the point of view that women be granted the right to vote, which was eloquently advocated by Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. The Muslim League sent a deputation with Jinnah as the leader, and G. M. Bhurghri of Sindh and Yakub Hasan as two other members. Jinnah, brilliant as usual, greatly impressed the Parliamentary Committee with his arguments and parliamentary talents. There is always a wide divergence of opinion between the rulers and the ruled, however liberal-minded the former may be, and all the members of the Committee being Englishmen, except Lord Sinha, the fate of the Report to Parliament was a foregone conclusion. History records that on all such occasions it is not the morality or righteousness of a cause or the overwhelming logic and justification of a stand that dictates ultimate decisions, but disguised or unabashed self-interest; and so was the fate of the Report of this committee. Its findings were submitted to Parliament in November 1919. Government with the steam-rolling strength of its brute majority, rushed through the Third Reading of the Bill, based on an obliging Committee's Report. Though the House of Commons had raised some objections, yet Lord Sinha, who was Under Secretary of State for India, successfully piloted the Bill through that citadel of diehardism, the House of Lords.

The Bill received assent on 23rd December and came to be thus placed on the Statute. This was followed by a Royal Proclamation ushering in with fanfare the high-sounding platitudes of the Government of India Act of 1919, round which was to evolve the future political development of this sub-continent.

Turkey had fought on the side of Germany in the War and this had generated conflict of loyalties in the minds of Indian Muslims. On the one hand, being citizens of the British Empire, their loyalty was supposed to be on the side of the British, and on the other, being members of the World Brotherhood of Islam, they did not wish any harm to Turkey, a Muslim Power. However, their intercession with the British, as well as of

¹¹⁵ *Dawn in India*, by Sir Francis Younghusband, p. 124, 1930: John Murray, London.

some other Muslim parts of the British Empire, had succeeded in obtaining promises from the British Government that the holy cities of Islam would remain inviolable and that Turkey would not be dissected and her dismembered parts distributed among allied powers as war booty. However, the victorious nations were sitting on a peace table like vultures feasting on a carcass, each trying to grab as much as it could of Turkey and of other Muslim territories. Muslims of this sub-continent stood disillusioned, as there was fear of their holy places and shrines falling under non-Muslim suzerainty. To add to the difficulties of Muslims of the Middle East, the Jewish voice was potently influencing allied decision to the detriment of the world of Islam. It became obvious that Turkey, the seat of the Caliph, was in danger of being reduced to a satellite; Muslims were bound to emphatically and violently protest against the unholy conspiracy against Muslim countries.

Almost a year earlier than the signing of the Armistice, the eleventh session of the League was held at Delhi, A. K. Fazlul Huq presiding over it. He proved to be far-sighted, when he said in his presidential address, "I will not therefore be surprised, if they (the Allies) take this opportunity finally to dispose of Turkey ... above all we should renounce any lurking spirit of strife and quarrel with other communities, and seek their help and assistance in our troubles and difficulties..."

It is interesting, historically speaking, to recall that even before the establishment of Pakistan, Muslims of this sub-continent under the guidance of the Quaid had always thrown in their lot with Muslims of other countries on the question of foreign relations. Pakistanis even today continue to think on the same lines; it is thus the history and tradition of its people that prompt Pakistan to be on the best and friendliest of terms with all Muslim countries.

The terrible prospect that stared Turkey in the face made Muslims to ponder seriously over the situation and to devise appropriate measures to force the hands of the victorious Allied Powers, through political pressure on the British, to give Turkey a fair deal. In the process, a very powerful political force was born, which came to be known as the Khilafat Movement, ostensibly the purpose being to save the Khilafat from being liquidated. Maulanas Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali and some of their colleagues had gone through the fiery path of jail-life; they were both volatile, highly emotional, and by training and upbringing prone to be rigid in their approach to religious issues.

The emergence of the Ali brothers on the political scene coincides with a time when Gandhi had already established himself as the most powerful individual in the Congress and in the Home Rule League. In the month of the Armistice, a Khilafat Conference of Hindu and Muslim leaders was called at Delhi, the object of the conference being to discuss the Khilafat issue and the question of cow-protection. The Conference proved to be a great success, and further enhanced the reputation of Gandhi as an all-India leader of great eminence. In spite of vehement opposition, Gandhi

succeeded in getting his point of view incorporated in the final resolution, calling upon India to non-cooperate with the Government. Strangely enough, and paradoxical as it may seem, when the League and Congress met separately in sessions at Amritsar only a month later, while the former passed a resolution on the same lines as the one passed by the Khilafat Conference, the Congress, once again under Gandhi's inspiration, adopted a resolution recommending working of the new constitution and called upon the people to cooperate with the Government. Jinnah, who had returned to India after having led the League deputation in England to give evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, attended both the Delhi and Amritsar meetings, and he wondered at the absolute ease with which this Indian leader, Gandhi, could change his opinions and convictions, with the elasticity of an acrobat. With all that Gandhi would have the audacity to defend his contrary stands by invoking morality and other worldliness as his defence.

At the Khilafat Conference in Delhi, while Gandhi plunged headlong into carrying war against the British for the preservation of the Khilafat, showing that he was more anti-British in his attitude on this question than many Muslims present at the Conference, his friends and close Hindu associates cracked jokes, in private, over Gandhi's religious fervor over the Khilafat issue. "Imagine," Vallobhai Patel told Indulal Yajnik, Gandhi's secretary, "Our fighting for the Independence of Arabs of Arabia and Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, when we ourselves are held as slaves under the British bayonets in our own land. Isn't it funny beyond words?" Commenting on this Conference, Indulal wrote, "But real politics was at a discount in these gatherings, which shouted hoarsely on the other hand to restore political as well as the religious sovereignty of an effete and corrupt Sultan (Caliph) against whom no less than against the Britishers his own erstwhile subjects had already raised their standard of rebellion."¹¹⁶

The Ali brothers, ever ready to jump into the ring where brave men were needed to right a wrong, backed by orthodox Muslims and Hindus under the leadership of Gandhi and Swami Shradhanand, a bigoted Hindu leader, whose anti-Muslim sentiments and utterances were to earn him so much notoriety, easily persuaded the Conference to launch a raging and tearing propaganda against the British for the restoration of the Khilafat. As a mark of protest against the British policy over Turkey, the Conference decided to boycott the Armistice celebrations fixed for 11th November. Gandhi wrote in *Young India*, "There was a suggestion that the Punjab Question (Martial Law) should be tackled with the Khilafat wrong. I opposed the proposal..." His own secretary wrote, "And yet not a few months passed before Mr. Gandhi appealed to the country to start a campaign of non-violent non-cooperation against the joint wrong of the Punjab and the Khilafat."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ *Gandhi As I Know Him*, by Indulal Yajnik, p. 112. 1943

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Criticizing Gandhi's newspaper articles of these days, Vallabhai Patel often said to Indulal Yainik, "Gandhiji is writing once again with full steam, but his articles today miss the fire and lack the point of his rousing appeals issued during the Rowlatt Act campaign last year."¹¹⁸

Khilafat, although exclusively a Muslim issue, came to be under the guidance and control of Gandhi, Khilafatist Muslims willingly accepting him as their commander-in-chief, presenting an unparalleled instance in their chequered history, when a Hindu led their politico-religious fight. Gandhi did his utmost to enlist Hindu support for the Khilafat, but met with very limited success. This compelled him to include in his political fight against the British the question of the Punjab, non-cooperation and cow slaughter. A. B. Rajput, commenting on this historical freak writes, "The occasion demanded the lead of a seasoned veteran. Abul Kalam Azad was awry of prominence, and Muhammad Ali, himself being passionate to the boiling point, could hardly be expected to control the masses in the grip of agitation. Who was then to give the required lead? It was M. K. Gandhi."¹¹⁹

To add insult to injury, on the proposed terms of Peace with Turkey being published on 14th May 1920, the Viceroy issued a statement recognizing how deeply the Treaty would hurt the susceptibilities of Indian Muslims, but exhorted them to bear this misfortune with fortitude and patience. How easy it is to preach to others to tread a difficult path, when one has not to set one's feet on that road at all!

Lloyd George, the British War Premier, had given solemn pledges to Indian Muslims, "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race " These promises remained unfulfilled, and Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine, with their holy places instead of remaining under the Caliph of Islam, were being dismembered. Thrace went to Greece, Britain and France divided among themselves Asiatic portions of the Turkish Empire, and the Caliph became a virtual prisoner. This betrayal on the part of the British Premier angered the Muslims, "who depending on them went and fought against their brothers in Islam."¹²⁰

Muslims had been tried to the limit to bear the indignities and hardships heaped on their heads by the British. Maulana Muhammad Ali who, according to Afzal Iqbal, "had the heart of Napoleon, the tongue of Burke, and the pen of Macaulay,"¹²¹ while addressing a meeting organized in Paris on the Khilafat question on 21st March 1920 said, "We have come here merely to ask you to spare us the one thing which to us is more than territories; the one thing which is more than all financial resources, that is the

¹¹⁸ *Gandhi As I Know Him*, by Indulal Yajnik, p. 255, 1943.

¹¹⁹ *Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, by A. B. Rajput, p. 30, 1948.

¹²⁰ *The history of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. D 319. 1935.

¹²¹ *Writings and Speeches of Maulana Muhammad Ali*, by Afzal Iqbal p. XII, 1944.

liberty of our conscience Khilafait is not merely a Turkish question. It is an Islamic question, an Indian question, an Algerian question and a Tunisian question. It is the preservation of the Khilafat ..." Returning to India, Maulana Muhammad Ali said, "The political conditions of India, just before the advent of the Mahatma resembled those of Judea on the eve of the advent of Jesus. Quaid-e-Azam did not show any enthusiasm whatsoever for Gandhi's leadership of the Khilafat movement, while Maulana Muhammad Ali seemed to have fallen under Gandhi's spell, who became the sole dictator of the Khilafat movement, "and thus the destinies of a hundred million Muslims of the country were voluntarily placed in the hands of a man who, only by a stretch of the imagination, could be regarded as their well-wisher."¹²²

Gandhi, dictator of the Khilafat movement, enunciated his programme of non-violent non-cooperation to fight the battle for restoration of the Khilafat, including boycott of British goods; voters were not to vote at elections; boycott of litigations and courts by lawyers and litigants; labor strikes on an all-India basis; students were to boycott schools and colleges. In their enthusiasm Muslims supported Gandhi's programme, including Aligarh, the intellectual citadel of Muslim-India, where hundreds of students gave up their studies, while its counterpart, the Hindu University at Banares, kept its students and professors away from the frolics of their Mahatma. To climax it, Gandhi said, "And if the Khilafat wrong still remained unredressed, the Muslims were to migrate *en masse* from India". The fact that this last item in the programme of Gandhi appealed to thousands of Muslims, who fell into the trap laid by him, as a measure of the confidence they had in his honesty and sincerity. They did not pause to think whether or not this Hindu leader was aiming at getting rid of Muslims from India, under the Khilafat pretext, in order to make India safe for the Hindus.

At this period of our history commence what is now recorded as the *Hijrat* (flight) Movement, and about twenty thousand Muslims were leaving India on their way to Afghanistan, a neighboring Muslim country. Sindh was the province that gave the lead to the *Hijrat* movement and Maulana Taj Mohammed Sindhi of Amrot Sharif and Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi played an important role in this movement. In this movement, Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi earned for himself the distinction of having to spend most of his life in exile outside India, only to return to Sindh, when the sun of his life was about to set, while the former spent many years in Ratangiri Jail. The first caravan left Sindh for Afghanistan under the leadership of Jan Mohammed Junejo, a barrister of Larkana. The *Hijrat* movement spread from Sindh to the North-West Frontier and the Punjab, confronting Afghan authorities with the problem of mass immigration into its territories from India. Ultimately the Government of Afghanistan issued an order forbidding entry under this mass exodus movement, and terrible indeed was the loss in money and life suffered by Muslims under the leadership of Gandhi.

¹²² *Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, by A. B. Rajput, p. 32, 1948.

In September 1920 the Congress and the League met simultaneously at Calcutta, the former under the Presidentship of Lala Lajpajt Rai and the latter under Jinnah, with a view to discuss questions such as the Khilafat and non-cooperation. The Quaid in his presidential address said, "We have met here principally to consider the situations that have arisen owing to the studied and persistent policy of the Government since the signing of the Armistice. First came the Rowlatt Bill—accompanied by the Punjab atrocities—and then came the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire (cries of shame) and the Khilafat. The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith. Now, every country has two principal and vital functions to perform—one to assert its voice in the international policy, and the other to maintain internally the highest ideals of justice and humanity. But one must have one's own administration in one's own hands (hear, hear) to carry it on to one's own satisfaction ... The result was that notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Musalmans, and in breach of the Prime Minister's solemn pledges unchivalrous and outrageous terms have been imposed upon Turkey (shame) and the Ottoman Empire has served for plunder and broken up by the Allies under the guise of Mandates. This, thank God, has at last convinced us, one and all, that we can no longer abide our trust either in the Government of India or in the Government of His Majesty the King of England (applause) to represent India in matters international" He continued to say that, supported by the authority of the Khilafat Conference, Gandhi had placed before the League his programme of non-cooperation, and it was for the League to give its verdict on this issue. He did not make an appeal to support non-cooperation, but warned them, "It rests with you alone to measure your strength and to weigh the pros and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision." Subsequent events were to prove that he was opposed to non-cooperation, but a born democrat, he allowed his following to make their own decision. Approached by a press correspondent after the conference to give his unequivocal views on non-cooperation, he said, "I have not been able to study the programme of the movement, and until I have done so, I cannot make a categorical pronouncement."

The dividing line between Jinnah and Gandhi had become clearly marked and visible; it was only now a matter of time when the two would part political company and each go his own way.

The following month Jinnah resigned from the Home Rule League, along with 19 others, as a protest against Gandhi's palpably wrong ruling as the chairman of a Home Rule Meeting. Gandhi wrote to him to reconsider his decision, but Jinnah's mind stood now on the brink of momentous decisions, which were to introduce new dimensions in the politics of this sub-continent, and it is, therefore, important to note that Jinnah wrote to Gandhi in reply, "I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me 'to take my share in the new life that has opened up before the country'. If by 'new life' you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster. But the actual new life that has opened up before

the country is that we are faced with a Government that pays no heed to the grievances, feelings and sentiments of the people, that our own countrymen are divided; the Moderate Party is still going wrong; that your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons; people generally are desperate all over the country and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganization and chaos. What the consequence of this may be, I shudder to contemplate; but I for one am convinced that the present policy of the Government is the primary cause of it, and unless that cause is removed, the effects must continue. I have no voice or power to remove the cause; but at the same time I do not wish my countrymen to be dragged to the brink of a precipice in order to be shattered. The only way for the Nationalists is to unite and work for a programme which is universally acceptable for the early attainment of complete responsible Government. Such a programme cannot be dictated by any single individual, but must have the approval and support of all the prominent nationalist leaders in the country, and to achieve this end I am sure my colleagues and myself shall continue to work."

By the time the Congress and League session met simultaneously at Nagpur in December 1920, the Khilafat movement and Congress were so much under the influence of Gandhi, that he had become a powerful force; and the Muslim League had comparatively become weaker in the face of this combination. The politically and religiously extreme sections of Muslims were with the Khilafat and, therefore, under Gandhi's influence; their stand had made the Muslim League a weakened force in the country. The Congress session met in an atmosphere of great rejoicing and enthusiasm, success always inflates the image and importance of an organization in the minds of its following. C. Vijayaragavachariar of South India was in the chair, and the open session was attended by over fifty thousand people, and along with Congress leaders on the dais were sitting Col. Wedgewood, Holford Knight and Ben Spooner, representing the British Labour Party as fraternal delegates.

The special session of the Congress held at Calcutta on 4th to 9th September 1920 had adopted a resolution in deference to Gandhi's wishes, in spite of bitter opposition from some delegates, a resolution calling upon Congressmen to refrain from contesting elections under the new reforms and the voters from recording their votes. C.R. Das and Bepin Chandra Pal along with the Bengal contingent bitterly opposed Gandhi's lead sought to be given to the Congress in this direction, and Jinnah was still a member of the Congress. It is in view of this background, probably, that Dr. Sitaramayya writes that the year 1920 opened with a definite cleavage of parties in Indian politics. However, when the elections were held, about eighty percent of the voters, Hindus and Muslims, groaning under the atrocities of the Punjab and frustrated at Britain's betrayal of Muslims over the Khilafat question, boycotted the polls, and in very many cases

absolute third raters were returned to the Legislatures, and Government was constrained to admit, "It is rather in connection with boycott of the new councils that Mr. Gandhi's campaign of N.C.O. seems destined to exercise a potential influence upon the history of the next few years."

The Nagpur Session was largely responsible for the subsequent cleavage between Congress and League, as Gandhi with almost religious rigidity forced those that did not agree with his views to embrace his creed and to accept him as a resurrected Messiah. The president of the session, Vijayaraghavachariar was a weak person, who, although deferring from Gandhi's views, vacated the chair whenever a resolution with which he did not agree came up for discussion. C. R. Das, spending from his pocket a huge sum of money had brought about 250 delegates from Bengal to endeavor to right the Calcutta wrong. However, an omnibus resolution drafted by Gandhi was adopted, changing the creed of the Congress, inspite of opposition from those that were not of his way of thinking. Jinnah made a violent attack on the resolution as a whole and on some specific features of it with his usual shrewd analysis of the political situation and the future that was in store for India as he saw it But when fifty thousand people congregate, it is easier to sway their minds with emotion than with logic, and Gandhi won an overwhelming vote in favor of his programme. As Jinnah rose to address that vast ocean of humanity, his first words were, "I rise to oppose the resolution..." Hooting, shouting and catcalls drowned his voice, leaving him in no doubt that his way of thinking was not acceptable to the huge audience. He stood there, without twitching a muscle, and when the shouting died down, he again said, "I rise to oppose the motion..." Once again he was prevented from speaking. But he kept his ground, undaunted by the hoarse and hysterical cries of the mob. He was a leader, he was not to be dictated by others. He knew his mind. On his third attempt, he raised his voice all the more and thundered his opposition to the resolution. Gradually his courage and his heroic temperament quietened his audience and he proceeded to express his views amidst complete silence. He had won their admiration for his courage, for everyone loves a hero, but he did not win their votes.

The creed of the Congress up to the Nagpur session had been "to bring about by constitutional means a steady reform of the existing system of administration and by national unity," and Gandhi's resolution sought to change it to, "The object of the Indian National Congress is the attainment of Swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means". Setalvad writes, "Jinnah strongly opposed this change and boldly stood his ground inspite of violent opposition from a large part of the audience. After this Jinnah parted with the Congress."¹²³

Gandhi's leadership of Muslims over the Khilafat agitation did strike some contemporary Muslim leaders as something utterly odd; but in our times, looking back

¹²³ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal H. Setalvad, p. 315. 1946.

over the years, it is a phenomenon which is difficult to explain away satisfactorily. It seems strange that Muslims should have agreed to place their destinies over the Khilafat in the hands of a man who wrote, "I call myself a Sanatani (orthodox) Hindu, because, firstly, I believe in the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Puranas, and all that goes in the name of Hindu scriptures...; secondly, I believe in the Vamashrama Dharma (the law of the caste-system) in its Vedic forms; thirdly, I believe in the protection of the cow as an article of faith, and fourthly, I do not disbelieve in idol worship."¹²⁴ Dr. Sitaramayya writes. "The session was a personal triumph for Gandhi ... Seasoned men like Pal and Malaviya and Jinnah and Khaparde, stalwarts like Das and Lalaji were simply overpowered..."¹²⁵ The two outstanding political personalities of the time, Jinnah and Gandhi, were coming more and more into clash with one another's views, and they were soon to be at the parting of the ways.

Just as Jinnah was the most outspoken opponent of Gandhi's boycott and non-violent, non-cooperation resolution, as he wanted the fight against Imperialism to be constitutional—in the schools and colleges, in the Legislative Assemblies and in the Local Bodies—there was another Muslim, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, who stood at the other extreme. He rose to oppose Gandhi's resolution, saying what India needed was a programme of violence, not of non-violence, if Indian independence was to be brought within their grasp. Such platitudes, such half-hearted measures, tinged with religious superstition, as suggested by Gandhi, would not win them freedom, he warned. In this connection he said that India must learn a lesson from events in Ireland.

Jinnah was in a defiant mood at the Nagpur session, scornful of the sensibility of his colleagues and the masses towards this one man, who had clouded their minds with a superstition stronger than the force of totem and taboo on primitive minds. He was fighting Gandhi on his own ground; Gandhi was surrounded by the security of an iron-wall fencing thrown round him by an admiring following; Jinnah intuitively believed it was just the time for him to be more daring and forthright than ever before. He deliberately dropped the title "Mahatma" while referring to Gandhi, and preferred to call him plain "Mr. Gandhi." He seemed to have raised a hornets' nest round his head, for thousands of voices shouted, "Call him Mahatma, Call him Mahatma". But he continued to address the central figure on the dais as "Mr. Gandhi", without being overawed or concerned by the hooting of the crowd. During the course of the speech, as he proceeded he referred to Maulana Mohammad Ali as "Mr. Mohammad Ali." The vast crowd was infuriated at what they considered to be a double affront, and they once again shouted, "No. No. Call him Maulana Mohammad Ali", and that huge gathering continued to mouth this slogan for quite a few minutes. When their shouting lapsed into silence, he raced his eyes across the audience with a scornful look, and with a thundering voice, he shouted, firmly, unflinchingly, "I refuse to be dictated by you. I am

¹²⁴ *Young India*, 12th October, 1921. Editorial by M. K. Gandhi.

¹²⁵ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 348

entitled to use my discretion to call a man by whatever designation I choose, provided it is parliamentary. I do not recognize Mr. Mohammad Ali's claim to be Maulana".¹²⁶ He had tamed the mob with the whip of his rebuke, and he continued to refer to both of them as instead of the usual titles prefixed before their names. "It is said that the Big Brother, Maulana Shaukat Ali, was outraged at this rebuke. His blood boiled as he considered his brothers insult as his own and he rushed to Mr. Jinnah with a stick; but it was fortunate that the cult of non-violence came in their way."¹²⁷

A couple of months later, on 21st February 1921, citizens of Bombay arranged a public meeting to commemorate the death anniversary of that great patriot Gokhale in the premises of the Servants of India Society, which Gokhale had helped to found and to flourish in his days. Dr. R. P. Paranjpye, who had succeeded Gokhale as Principal of Fergusson College, was in the chair and Jinnah, Gokhale's admirer, was one of the main speakers. As he rose to speak, Jinnah, the hero of many public causes in the city of Bombay, received a tremendous ovation. At first he dwelt on the excellent qualities of Gokhale, his positive contribution to India's advance in its march towards its political goals, and won round after round of applause from the crowd when he turned his attention to the current political situation in the country and in this connection referred to Gandhi's role in politics and his forcing the Congress to accept his mischievous resolution at the Nagpur session, a resolution that Jinnah had vehemently opposed. The audience got restive and shouted cries of disapproval, but Jinnah was not to be bullied and silenced. He reminded them that the Government of India was hostile to the aspirations of the Indian people. It was an unsympathetic Government, presided over by a bureaucracy that held on tenaciously to the *status quo*, as any concessions to the people would mean a reduction in the vast powers, that they enjoyed, and so an alien officialdom rewarded them with obnoxious gifts like the Rowlatt Act, although every non-official member had opposed this anti-peoples legislation.

Commenting on the non-cooperation and boycott programme of Gandhi. Jinnah said he was convinced in his mind that Gandhi was wrong, utterly wrong, "I have great respect and admiration for him, but I am sure he is taking the country to a wrong channel". These words brought a volley of protest from those present, but Jinnah, unruffled, continued to say that if he had agreed with Gandhi's programme, he would have been one of his followers in the non-cooperation and boycott fight "In my opinion what we want is a real political movement based on real political principles and based on the fire which burnt in the heart of every man for his motherland. So long as they had not that as the basis, our programme is defective " Disagreeing with Gandh's call to boycott the elections, he said if they had contested, they would have been able to return about thirty of their best men in the Imperial Legislative Assembly and they could have let the Government know on all important problems what the peoples of India really thought

¹²⁶ *Meet Mr. Jinnah*, by A. A. Ravoof, p. 235, 1955.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

and wanted. Someone in the audience shouted, "The Government would not bother." Jinnah was brilliant, when provoked to repartee in debate, and he retorted that those thirty would have made things so difficult for the Government, that the Government would have been compelled to suspend the Assembly. He gave the example of Russia, where an autocratic Czar suspended the Duma, when he found it no longer docile and servile to his wishes. Comparing conditions in India with those of Egypt, he applauded the work of Zaghul Pasha in advancing the cause of his peoples, through higher and higher educational levels. On the contrary, Gandhi wanted our boys and girls to boycott schools and colleges, to give up educating the illiterate masses of India, who were steeped in superstition and poverty.

Jinnah then spoke about Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, "If we are going to regulate everything in our country by the doctrine of non-violent non-cooperation, then I am afraid we are forgetting human nature". Once again his words were greeted with loud cries of "No, no". Unawed, Jinnah maintained his stand and said he was convinced Gandhi was leading them to a wrong path, and he was, therefore, not going to cooperate under any circumstance with Gandhi's new gospel of non-cooperation.

He had dared to disagree with Gandhi openly, and it was not everyone who could do so in those days, when a mere nod of the head from Gandhi meant eclipse for political leaders. Jinnah, in parting company with Gandhi had parted company with the Congress, an organization to which he had shown loyalty for about two decades. It is easy to swim with the tide; delectable to be with the crowd: but it requires moral courage to take a stand on a public issue which is in conflict with that which is held to be popular. But the Quaid was made of stem stuff; he could defy those with whom he disagreed, and tread a hazardous path on the uncertain battle-field of politics.

While Gandhi's non-cooperation movement swept across the sub-continent, there were some political leaders who stood aloof, Jinnah being one of them. By about the end of 1921, the Government of India issued feelers to enlist their support in order to counter Gandhi, but Jinnah promptly disdained this offer in a press statement, "The non-cooperation movement is only a symptom and expression of general dissatisfaction, owing to the utter disregard of public opinion and of outstanding grievances ... Leave alone the bulk of the people, even the intellectual and reasonable section is far from satisfied with the present policy of the Government ... Is it possible for them to support or stand by the Government, when the Government has paid no heed even to what they have urged for the last nine months?"

Arrests of leaders and workers followed the call to non-cooperation as a malarial epidemic follows rains in a mosquito-infested area, and over thirty thousand were suffering patiently the hardships that are inevitable in jail-life. Even the spark of a slight disturbance adds fuel to panic in the minds of an embarrassed and embittered Government, and on the slightest pretext, men, women and children were clubbed and

tear-gassed by the police and taken into the safe custody of prison walls, where they, the mob, would cease to trouble. On 8th of July, 1921 took place at Karachi the all-India Conference, and Maulana Mohammad Ali read his presidential address, which was among the most provoking speeches ever delivered by an Indian. This speech became famous as the "Karachi Speech of Maulana Mohammad Ali". Among the resolutions passed at this conference, it was resolved to hoist the flag of the Indian Republic at the Ahmadabad session of the Congress and called upon Muslims to start *en masse* civil disobedience, if the British fought the Government of Angora. Another resolution of the Conference said, it was "unlawful for any faithful Muslim to serve from that day in the army or help or acquiesce in their recruitment." The Government of India arrested the leading participants of the conference. Maulanas Mohammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Hussain Ahmed, Nisar Ahmed, Pir Ghulam Muladid Sindhi, Dr. Kitchlew, Jagatguru Shiri Shankaracharya of Srada; they were tried before a Special Magistrate, and the Khalikdina Hall in Karachi was converted into an improvised special court for the purpose. The speech that Maulana Mohammad Ali delivered in his defence before the Special Magistrate is remembered to this day as his famous Karachi Case Speech, and after they were sentenced to jail it was read from thousands of platforms all over India, in sympathy with the convicted – prisoners in the eyes of the Government, but patriots in the eyes of the people. It may be interesting to recall that after the conviction of the Khilafat leaders, the Working Committee of the Congress "assured Muslim States that when India attained self-government, her foreign policy would naturally be so guided as to respect the religious obligations imposed upon Muslims by Islam".

When Maulana Mohammad Ali was released from jail under a general amnesty for non-violent political prisoners, he was given a tremendous reception and a mammoth procession paraded on the streets of Amritsar, with Maulana Mohammad Ali as the centre of attraction, like a conquering Roman hero. In reply to the overwhelming reception given to him by the people, he spoke words which became a classic phrase with all those who were out to defy Government restrictions. Maulana Mohammad Ali said, "I have returned from Chindwara Gaol with a return ticket in my pocket."

The difficulty with Gandhi's movement was that while it continued to be, non-cooperation, it had ceased to be non-violent, exactly as had been predicted by leaders like Quaid-e-Azam. Outbursts of violence by the non-violent Congress "volunteers and workers" became the order of the day. Echoes of non-violent non-cooperation reached the ears of Muslims Moplahs on the Malabar Coast in Kerala, where they were in large number in Walvanad and in Emad districts. The Moplahs, original descendants of Arabs, are traditionally volatile and easily roused to defiance, if an appeal is made to their religious sentiments. The clash and clamor over the Khilafat issue had reached their ears, as also news of the arrests of many Muslim political and religious leaders. Government clamped with severity the Moplah Outrages Act to suppress popular uprisings on the Malabar Coast; but it produced the opposite effect; and by August 1921 the insult offered by the police to the *Thangals* or religious leaders of the Moplahs gave

rise to bloody riots by the Moplahs, many of whom had swords, and some even firearms. Clashes between them and the Government "developed on a military scale", and the Moplahs gave the Government a protracted fight, by resorting to guerilla warfare. In October a ruthless Martial Law gripped all the territory where the Moplahs lived. This rising of the Muslims on the Malabar Coast cost them many lives and resulted in monetary loss running into a colossal figure.

During this period, the British perpetrated on the Moplahs a barbarity like the historic Black Hole of Calcutta, earning for themselves one more chapter of notoriety, but enabling the people to write another deathless page of glory in their struggle for independence. The British bureaucratic and military administrators, callous of Indian feelings, were bent on bringing the unbending Moplahs to their knees. To set an example that they were going to be most ruthless in putting them down, they shut about one hundred Moplahs in a closed railway wagon, like sardines packed in a tin. The heat on the Malabar Coast can be very oppressive, when the metallic wagons bum, inside and outside, like a well-fed oven. When the ill-fated wagon reached its destination, seventy brave Moplahs were found dead – death due to suffocation was the verdict.

On 17th November, the Prince of Wales, now the Duke of Windsor, arrived in India. The call went forth to boycott his arrival and functions to be given in his honor. His arrival in Bombay seemed to be a signal for violent disturbances in the city, and innocent human blood ran on the streets of that cosmopolitan city, where 53 persons lay dead and over 500 were wounded. Gandhi, the preacher of Ahimsa and non-violence, happened to be in Bombay and, going round the city and seeing with his own eyes the misery, suffering and blood that his movement had cost one city in one day, he said, "Swaraj stinks in my nostrils."¹²⁸

Jinnah, a practical man, had predicted that non-violent non-cooperation would not succeed, so long as men in the mass continued to be plain human beings, subject to human sentiments and emotions; and his prediction proved to be right.

Official celebrations to welcome the Prince of Wales were scheduled to be held in Calcutta on 25th December, and the Government was in jitters that there may be a total boycott of the functions. Pandit Malaviya acted as an intermediary between the Government and the Congress, whose President, C. R. Das, was in Alipore jail, while Gandhi was in Ahmadabad. As a result of these negotiations, in return for Congress calling off the boycott, Government agreed to release civil disobedience prisoners and to call a Round Table Conference on March 22nd between the Congress and Government. Gandhi and Das, however, demanded release of all prisoners, without distinction. Some prominent political leaders acted as intermediaries between the

¹²⁸ The History of the Congress, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 373.

Government and Congress for a settlement, Jinnah and Pandit Malaviya being most prominent among them. But their efforts did not succeed, and the boycott programme of the Prince's visit was observed all over India.

Jinnah was not to be daunted in his cherished dream that Swaraj could be achieved most speedily only through Hindu-Muslim understanding on the one hand, and then an agreement between that symbolized unity of the peoples and the Government on the other hand. Mainly due to his efforts an All-Parties Conference was convened in Bombay on 14th, 15th and 16th January 1922, with Sir M. Visvesvarayya as Chairman and Jinnah as one of the three secretaries. The Conference adopted a unanimous resolution condemning the repressive policy of the Government and demanded a Round Table Conference between the Government and the Congress over the release of prisoners, over the Khilafat question and Martial Law in the Punjab and the all-important question of Swaraj. In order to create, favorable conditions for the convening of such a conference, it was demanded that Criminal Law Amendments and the Seditious Meetings Act be forthwith withdrawn. The work and resolution of the conference were severely criticized by Sir S. Nair; while Jinnah, along with the other two secretaries, Jayakar and Nataranjan, gave a spirited statement to the press in reply, defending decisions arrived at by the All-Parties Conference.

AN INTERLUDE

The years that heralded the dawn of the twentieth century were the years that brought Jinnah fame at the Bar; the ten years that followed show his emergence as a political leader; and the next decade brought to him a stormy life as an unexpected gift. Temperamentally, he was not suited for the noise and din of political battles fought by demagogues in the open *maidans* of India; on the other hand, he was perfectly at home in Legislative Assemblies, whose geographical boundaries were potentially coextensive with the country itself. However, a political career is a capricious goddess, and it gifted the peace-loving Jinnah years of tempestuous life, compelling him to political boxing gloves almost continuously. It was only his extremely disciplined mind, probably due to his assiduous training as a barrister, that kept his nature under check, although the explosive twenty years after the turn of the twentieth century were enough to convert him into a filebrand or a tub-thumper. The invisible hand of destiny was guiding his steps, inexorably, up the ladder of immortality.

In spite of a busy life in the law-courts, and his spare hours consumed by the flame of patriotism that goaded him on to work tirelessly in the political field, Jinnah kept in close contact with his family, which continued to live in Khoja Mohalla. His father, Jinnahbhai Poonja, had lived to see Mohammed Ali, his eldest son, become an important figure in that big city, Bombay; but fate denied him the pleasure of seeing his son rise to be one of the most prominent leaders of his country, for he died while Jinnah was still in the process of coming to be ranked among the foremost nation-builders of the twentieth century of this subcontinent. After the death of his father, the question of the education of his sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, was uppermost in his mind. He was alone, running his house; he was living a busy life that frequently carried him across the length and breadth of India, both on professional and on public work. He began to look around for a decent school where his sister could be admitted. Although there were a number of suitable schools nearby, yet none of them was a boarding-school, and he had decided it was only the latter that could solve the twin problem of her education and giving her a substitute for a home. Jinnah went personally to examine a Catholic convent at Bandra, quite a distance from the heart of the city. He found the standard of education high and the girls staying in the convent being very well looked after; he lost no time in getting her admitted to the Bandra convent. As long as his sister continued to study at the convent, he visited her every Sunday, often travelling all the way from Bombay to Bandra on horseback. During the vacation, Miss Fatima Jinnah sometimes stayed with her brother, if he was in Bombay, otherwise she stayed with her elder married sister. In spite of his crowded life, he never forgot his family responsibilities as the eldest member of the family.

Jinnah had married in 1892, when he was about to leave for Europe, and his child-wife, Emibai, died a little after he had left Karachi. He was only sixteen then, having lived with her just a few weeks before his departure for Europe. It was already 1917, a quarter of a century since the death of his first wife, and he was still a bachelor. He was a little over forty, but he still maintained a youthful freshness about him, which, helped by his aristocratic bearing and good looks, may have made him a desirable target in the eyes of many eligible brides. None of them, however, had succeeded in awakening within him that wish which alone can open the gates of wedlock. His personal life has always been a closed book, as if he had laid down a law for himself that his personal affairs were no business of any one to inquire into. In the case of historical celebrities who have lived such lives, gossip and imagination have supplied material, at times authentic, often fictitious, to fill in the gaps. He lived an upright life. To the world outside he was a very successful man; to himself, a very lonely man, grappling with the problems of life, and yet so far from it. Upto forty years he had lived alone; no breath of romance had penetrated his solitary world.

But Cupid has no written laws, entering the human heart through countless pathways. Jinnah was at that time very popular with the Parsis of Bombay, an exclusive, but extremely rich community. The traditional life of this community has been socially emancipated; marriages outside the community, however, being frowned upon. The Parsis of Bombay had an exclusive Club, where most of the millionaires of the community gathered every evening, and membership of the Club was not open to non-Parsis. Members, however, could bring non-Parsis as guests. At this Club, Jinnah was a constant guest, which gave him a welcome entry into the homes of most of the rich families that used the Club as a social rendezvous. Jinnah soon became very popular with some leading members of the Club. He often met at the Club Sir Dinshaw and Lady Petit, at whose house he was a frequent guest at dinner parties. Jinnah was not only a brilliant advocate at the Bar, but also a fascinating conversationalist. If he found himself amidst people whom he did not think desirable to talk on equal or intimate terms with, he would remain quiet, giving one the impression as if he was reticent, uncommunicative, even abrupt. But among friends, his conversation sparkled with wit and humor; he could tell good jokes and had the capacity of enjoying a good one. He was equally at home, if the conversation became serious and revolved round weighty problems.

The Petits had a pretty daughter, Ruttenbai, about seventeen. She was wise beyond her years and her adolescent mind eagerly followed the brilliant and witty, sometimes serious, conversation that freely flowed in her father's dining and drawing rooms. She had a flair for political work, being a suffragette, with all the warmth and passion that motivated them to strive and win their rights; political work of a daring nature in those difficult and distant days. At first her interest in Jinnah was that of a young admirer for a scintillating personality of the public platform, whose ideas on women's emancipation

and political rights had a special appeal for her suffragette nature. But the two soon discovered that they had a common interest in life to which both were especially devoted. They were passionately fond of horse-riding, and often early mornings the two went out horse-riding for miles, on the Choupaty Sands, away from the noise and din of the life of a big, busy city.

Sir Dinshaw and Lady Petit were going to a hill station for the summer vacation with their daughter, and they suggested, casually, to Jinnah that he should pass his vacation at the same resort instead of at some other hill-station. The Petits and he met frequently at the summer resort, and often he and Miss Petit went out riding. The echoes of the fleeting feet of their horses awakened the sleepy hills and dales as they galloped towards uncharted destinations. It was just friendship, rooted in a common interest – horse-riding. Returning back to Bombay, Jinnah was absorbed in his work; none the less, he continued to be an occasional guest at the house of the Petits.

Summer vacation had once again come round. The Petits had decided that year to spend it somewhere else and they suggested to Jinnah to go to the same hill-station, where the Petits and Jinnah met almost every day. Frequently Ruttenbai and Jinnah went out galloping on horseback. In a picturesque hill-station, nestling at the foot of the mountains, the two discovered that friendship had developed into attachment. The two decided that they would convey the news to Sir Dinshaw and Lady Petit to obtain their blessings for their marriage.

When they returned to Bombay, she informed her parents of her love. The parents were shocked beyond measure, for, to these orthodox Parsi parents, marriage of their daughter outside the community seemed something they could never tolerate. They were annoyed with their daughter; they explained to her the consequences of a marriage between a girl of 17 and a man of 41; they even invoked the usage and tradition of their community; reminding her that daughters of good families do not marry outside the community. But, she had made up her mind, and nothing could alter her plans. The two parents, in despair, invoked the aid of the law on their side, saying as she was not yet eighteen, she could not marry against the wishes of her parents. The parents thought one year away from him would cool her infatuation for a man more than twice her age. Even in this matter concerning the heart, he was as legalistic as he was when dealing with problems of the head. He admitted, inwardly, that the Petits were right. If their daughter by the time she reached the age of consent were to decide not to marry him, it would certainly be a tragedy for him. But she had a right to make her own choice, freely. And, so, he waited for a year, hoping.

Days of anxious waiting were, however, over. Ruttenbai was now eighteen. But time had not cooled her love for him; she was as determined as ever to marry the man of her choice, who had awakened in her heart the spark of true love. Her parents thought it best to reconcile themselves to the inevitable, and on 19th April, 1918, the *Statesman*

announced, "Miss Ruttenbai, only daughter of Sir Dinshaw Petit, yesterday underwent conversion to Islam, and is today to be married to the Hon. M.A. Jinnah."

Love had overcome all obstacles.

His young bride moved into his new house on Mount Pleasant Road, and her aptitude for internal decoration and her keen aesthetic sense prompted her to give deft touches to beautify the elegant house of a bachelor, who was too busy with his professional work and politics to have enough time to devote attention to such petty details. She purchased a number of objects of art and antiques to create a classic atmosphere in a house where opulence was visible, but which woefully needed a trained eye and an artistic hand to give the few final but important and necessary touches. The husband was happy and he did not mind the expenses that such transformation necessarily involves. "She was the flower of Bombay. She was so lively, so witty, so full of ideas and jokes"¹²⁹

Before Ruttenbai married the Quaid, his house was being run by a well trusted and devoted servant, Visan by name, who served the Quaid-e-Azam for very many years. He was his valet, his cashier for running the household budget, his bearer, the servant in charge and in command of the entire household staff—rolled into one. The Quaid had only to instruct Visan so many guests were to come for lunch or dinner on so and so date, and he would make all the necessary arrangements. Even when he married Ruttenbai, Visan continued his customary duties to the entire satisfaction of his boss and his newly wedded wife.

"The first exciting weeks passed in pleasure and harmony; the husband of forty-one came home in the evening, with his talk of the law-courts; the wife of eighteen waited ... But old cronies called and interrupted them ... She had to listen to their long stories when she wished to be out..."¹³⁰

Although relationship between Jinnah and Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, had been far from cordial, yet Jinnah, ranked eminent among the notable citizens of Bombay, was sometimes invited to the Government House for social events. Bolitho writes, "He was invited, with his wife, to dine at Government House. The story is that Mrs. Jinnah wore a low-cut dress that did not please her hostess; that, while they were seated at the dining-table, Lady Willingdon asked an A.D.C. to bring a wrap for Mrs. Jinnah, in case she felt cold. Jinnah is said to have risen, and said, "When Mrs. Jinnah feels cold, she will say so, and ask for a wrap herself." Then he led his wife from the dining-room; and, from that time, refused to go to Government House again."¹³¹

¹²⁹ *Jinnah*, by Hector Bolitho, p. 74, 1954.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 75, 1954.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 75, 1954.

Mrs. Jinnah was a brilliant conversationalist; her talk sparkled with wit and humor, and she could hold her own against the best in repartee. An interesting anecdote is related that soon after her marriage, she was in Delhi with her husband, who was there in connection with his duties as a member of the Imperial Council. In those days Lord Chelmsford sat enthroned in the Viceregal Lodge as the Viceroy of India, and he had invited a few distinguished guests to dinner, including Mr. and Mrs. Jinnah. According to protocol of those ancient days, as soon as the A.D.C. announced the arrival of the Viceroy and the Vicerene, the guests stood to attention; each one walked to the hosts to be presented personally, each lady making an appropriate bow to the Vicerene, as is customary for the English to do before ladies of the Royal Family. When Mrs. Jinnah was introduced to the Viceroy and his wife, she saluted them in the manner customary with Muslim women. The A.D.Cs. watched, exasperated; and the Viceroy turned red under the collar; but the hosts concealed their anger at this "rank arrogance", maintaining serenity on the surface.

However, as soon as dinner was over, and the guests and hosts mixed freely, the Viceroy got Mrs. Jinnah summoned to his presence, "Your husband, Mrs. Jinnah, has a great future awaiting him, and you should not mar his chances. You did not greet us in the manner customary at the Viceregal Lodge. In Rome, you must do as the Romans do". Mrs. Jinnah did not flinch; all smiles, she looked straight at the all-powerful Viceroy and said. "Your Excellency, that is exactly what I did. You are in India and I greeted you the way Indian women do."

It is not recorded for the benefit of posterity whether the Viceroy was provoked to anger by such brilliant repartee. Nor is there authentic evidence as to how her husband reacted to his wife's reply to the Viceroy, that some would interpret as an affront to that powerful personage. But, knowing his character and temperament as we do, it is easy to imagine how delighted he must have been that his wife would not bend, or cringe, or be servile, just because someone happened to be high in authority.

Jinnah was, on the contrary, on friendly terms with Lord Reading, the Viceroy of India, who had respect for his talent, integrity and devotion to public duty. A story goes that Lord Reading tried to tempt Jinnah at first with a Judgeship of the High Court, and then with the offer of being the Law Member in the Viceroy's Cabinet. He promptly turned down both offers. Later on, Lord Reading sounded him if he would accept knighthood in the following Honors List. The Quaid was not a person who could be purchased, or be a henchman of the British; the Lost Leader to his people. He is reported to have said, "I prefer to be plain Mr. Jinnah than Sir Mohammad Ali Jinnah". At a social function, Lord Reading asked Mrs. Jinnah if she would not like to be addressed as "Lady Jinnah". The lady dashed forth her reply: "If my husband accepts knighthood, I will take a separation from him."

On another occasion, she was sitting next to Lord Reading over a dinner at his table. The conversation drifted to personal reminiscences of Lord Reading, who recalled his student days in Germany before the War, and said it was a great pity he could not go to Germany, although he was really anxious to do so. Mrs. Jinnah asked, "Why not, Your Excellency?" The Viceroy replied, "You see, the Germans will not like us, the British particularly after the War and so I cannot go there." She was a born fighter, having the fervor of a patriot, like her illustrious husband, and she retorted, "How is it, then. Your Excellency, that you came to India?"

Ruttenbai had a weakness for good clothes, and she had the reputation of being one of the best dressed ladies of Bombay. Her favorite tailor had a smart fashion shop on Hornby Road, opposite the University building, known by the name of its European owner, Emile Windgrove. Once she had gone to her tailors to try out a new dress she had ordered, and as soon as she stepped out, a poignant incident greeted her. She saw that a *ghatan* (Mahratta) old woman was coming towards her, her legs tottering under the staggering weight of a big basket of bananas that she was carrying on her shoulders. The fruit-seller put the basket down with difficulty on the footpath outside Emile's shop, and requested Mrs. Jinnah to buy some fruit from her. Just then a white-skinned police-officer appeared on the scene, and was annoyed to see someone squat outside a fashion shop on Hornby Road, which was the shopping preserve of Europeans and the rich in those days. Without ceremony, he muttered a curse under his breath, "You....! Get out from here," and he continued to rebuke her in Hindustani that he had learnt in the Bombay lock-ups. "Get away, if you have any respect for your body?" The bananas scattered about her on the ground, the poor woman looked appealingly into the eyes of the police officer, which were eloquent with anger.

Mrs. Jinnah jumped into the fray, faced the officer and said, "You have no business to behave like this with the public. You better collect all the bananas; put them in her basket; and let her go. Otherwise I will make you regret this day." The puzzled officer looked at this unknown, but attractive young lady, who spoke with the spirit of a suffragette and with the voice of authority; he hastily made amends with the fruit-vendor, and helped to put the basket on her head again.

Mrs. Jinnah walked to the woman and put a five rupee note in her hand.

Like her husband, she championed the cause of the weak; she stood up against oppression.¹³²

The idyll rolled on and the two strolled hand in hand in their Eden of happiness and sunshine. Wherever he went, she was with him; whether it was in Delhi or in some other city to attend meetings of the Muslim League or other political organizations. It

¹³² Related to the author by H. Mesiah, who was in the same School as Ruttenbai in Bombay.

was obvious they were so devoted to one another, living their lives as inseparables. Sir Dinshaw and Lady Petit, the protesting in-laws, had reconciled themselves to the inevitable and were now on friendly terms with their only daughter and their son-in-law. He had found an ideal life-companion and happiness at home; the future seemed to beckon him with signs of great promise.

On 15th August, 1919 was born Dina, the only child of this love marriage; and it was only natural that the two showered all their love and care on her. But even this firm bond of attachment proved too feeble to keep together two such strong personalities as Jinnah and Ruttonbai. He was too independent, too strong-willed to take orders from others; and paradoxical as it may seem, he had formed a personal code of conduct not to order people, however close to him, about their own personal affairs. One wonders if it will ever be told as to what were the real causes that sowed the seeds of dissension between the two; and what was the immediate and final cause of the two drifting apart, permanently. But the stormy romance seemed to be heading for the rocks.

Once the Quaid had gone to Delhi along with his wife for an Assembly Session, and when the two returned to Bombay, the wife took a car at the station to go straight to the Taj Hotel, where she was to live continuously for some years, separate from her husband. Although they lived apart, they continued to be on visiting terms; and who knows, both of them may have felt unhappy over differences that had compelled them to part company, and both of them may have had a lurking wish in their hearts to arrive at a reconciliation. But in the meantime the yawning chasm of separation stood sorrowfully between husband and wife.

Dina began to live with the Quaid and he was anxious to give her the best education. When she was about twelve, he took her to England and put her in a boarding school. Whenever he visited England with his sister Miss Fatima Jinnah during Dina's schooldays, she would spend her holidays with her father and aunt. He loved her with all the passion of a father, who had lost the love that gave him the child. Young Dina became deeply attached to her father, an attachment which was to span the decades up to the end of the Quaid-e-Azam's life. He was not happy, however, when Dina married Neville Wadia, a young Parsi of Bombay.

The Quaid bore his family ruptures with the calm and resignation characteristic of a Stoic.

He did not disclose the anguish of his mind to any one over his separation from a wife, whom he had once so dearly loved. But an interesting incident is told that when he was on one of his annual visits to England, his mother-in-law took her daughter there in the hope that she may succeed in bringing about a reconciliation between the two in an atmosphere, where voices of the past, which had been the cause of their

misunderstanding, may stand aside on the sidelines of their consciousness like forgotten echoes.

Diwan Chiman Lal was a personal friend of Jinnah, and happened to be on the same ship that was taking both of them to England that year. Chiman Lal wrote, "Today, he is frankly disgusted ... Jinnah is frankly in despondent mood ... He is the loneliest of men".

When the ship glided alongside its berth in Southampton Harbour, Jinnah went to Ireland and Chiman Lal to Paris, where he learnt that Mrs. Jinnah was lying dangerously ill in a Paris hospital. Without loss of time, he went to see her in the hospital, and Hector Bolitho writes Diwan Chiman Lal told him, "I had always admired Ruttie Jinnah so much; there is not a woman in the world today to hold a candle to her for beauty and charm. She was a lovely, spoiled child, and Jinnah was inherently incapable of understanding her." Mrs. Jinnah gave Lal a book of poems of Oscar Wilde, and asked him to read to her one of them. While Chiman Lal was still with her, she fell into a coma. He rushed out to call the doctor and sent a cable to Ireland, which immediately brought Jinnah beside his ailing wife's bedside. While he was alone with his wife for two and a half hours, Lal waited outside, happy, and hoping that his two friends would once again be reconciled and would forget the past. Emerging from his wife's room, he told Chiman Lal, "I think we can save her; we'll change the doctor and take her to another hospital. I am sure she will pull through."¹³³

Later Diwan Chiman Lal went to Canada, and when he returned to Paris after some weeks, he visited Paris and found Jinnah alone. "Where is Ruttie?" Lal asked. Jinnah said in a sad tone, "We quarreled: she has gone back to Bombay."¹³⁴

When she returned to India, Mrs. Jinnah went to live with her brother in Bombay, instead of going to her husband's palatial house on Mount Pleasant Road. Perhaps, temperamentally they were so different that life under one roof for them was an impossibility.

Incidentally that peerless Urdu short-story writer, Saadat Hasan Minto, has given a graphic account of the personal life of the Quaid-e-Azam in his book *Ganje Firishte*, or "The Bald Angels". His first sketch in that book is *Mera Saheb* or "My Boss" based on what Minto heard from Muhammad Hanif Azad, one of the trusted chauffeurs of the Quaid, who had served him for many years. Azad trekked into Pakistan after partition along with millions of refugees from India, and when Minto met him, Azad was working on odd jobs around a film studio in Lahore. Azad was in a reminiscent mood and he recounted to Minto the years he had spent working as Quaid-e-Azam's chauffeur in Bombay. Like millions of Muslims all over India in the mid-thirties, Azad

¹³³ *Jinnah*, by Hector Bolitho, p. 92, 1954.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 92.

was a great admirer of the Quaid-e-Azam and one of his ardent followers, a fact which was well known to all the stars and extras that worked in a studio in Bombay, where Azad was a casual employee. "One day," says Azad, "that famous hero of the Indian screen, D. Billimoria, threw over to me a copy of the *Times of India*, saying here is your leader." I scanned the pages of the daily, and found no picture of the Quaid-e-Azam; as for what was written in it, I could make no head or tail of it, being completely ignorant of the English language. I asked Billimoria what he meant by throwing the paper to me and he said, "Your Leader wants a motor mechanic. There is an advertisement to that effect. Why don't you apply for it and be near your Hero?"

Azad applied for the job, although it was only recently that he had secured a motor-drivers license, and to his great surprise he received a letter from the Quaid's Secretary, Matlub H. Saiyid, to present himself for an interview at the Quaid's house on Mount Pleasant Road at a particular time. Minto dwells upon the feelings of jubilation at this great triumph in the life of Azad, who was after all going to be near his hero, whom he had so far admired from a distance. On the appointed date and time, Azad found himself one of about a dozen applicants that were called for an interview, and they stood talking to one another near the porch, on the lawns. After some time, the Quaid made a grand entrance, and a hushed silence descended on the applicants. The Quaid's eyes scanned one applicant after another, and they seemed to linger on the person of Azad, who towered over the others in his smart white turban. His right forefinger shot forward, as if to pull the trigger of a revolver, and he said, "Yes, you, there. You will be alright". Azad was surprised at the Quaid's choice, more than all the others put together, and he related to Minto, "His finger had pulled the trigger. The 303 bullet shot through my chest and I recoiled under its terrific impact. I wanted to confess, frankly unabashed, that I was only a beginner, and that I was no good at the steering wheel. But he had about turned, went inside his house, and the entrance gate was closed. Fate had decided my future." Continuing his story to Minto, Azad said, "During my long years of service with the Quaid, I discovered that he liked tall people, with towering personality; just as he was. Probably it was also my turban. He had a special liking for those that dressed smartly."

Jinnah had at that time four chauffeurs and mechanics for his four cars, and he would send a word through his secretary as to which car and which chauffeur he wanted for a particular day. The following day Matlub conveyed the wishes of the Boss to Azad that he should be ready under the porch with the new white Packard, as the Boss wanted Azad to drive him that day. Azad said, "The Boss took his seat along with his sister in the car, and I drove out of the bungalow, shivering with fright. I was driving my Hero; the Hero of millions of Muslims. At the very first traffic light, I realized a split second too late that the light was against me and I was committing a traffic offence. I jammed the brakes with all the might of my powerful right foot, and with a terrific jerk the car came to a stop, the engine coughed and stopped. The Boss was smoking a big cigar, freshly lit, and it fell from the grip of his lips as his body jolted forward. I was

immediately ordered to turn and go back home. The Boss asked for another car and another chauffeur, and I thought it was the end of my career as Quaid-e-Azam's chauffeur ... For full six months, I was never asked even once to drive the Quaid, and I worked in humbler fields, as a motor mechanic in the garage; working, unsung and unheard, in the garage, and not driving the Quaid on the highways of Bombay and Delhi, with my mighty chest puffed up with pride. I shrank into myself ... until one day, about six months later, I received a summons through Matlub that the Boss wanted me to drive him that day ... I did very well; the Boss was pleased, but did not say so. What a sight I must have looked with my over six foot height, my broad shoulders, my white, shining, long turban! Thereafter, I frequently was at the wheel, as the Quaid sat behind ... Yes, those were the years of my glory....

In order to draw out his reminiscences, Minto asked Azad more and more questions, and Azad said, "The Quaid ate very little. If I were to eat as little as he did, all my fat would have melted within a week, and I would have been unfit for the job I was holding ... Every day there would be about four chickens to be cooked, out of which all that the Boss helped himself to would be a small cup of chicken soup and a few morsels of chicken. Yes, there was plenty of fruit and other things to eat. The Boss ate so little; it seemed to us servants as if it was every day Eid for us ... for we had plenty to eat ... He was fond of good eating, but he did not eat much at all ... He had two cooks— one for European dishes, and one for Indian cooking. The latter's services were rarely invoked, as the Boss liked European style food ... For a change, he would sometimes go to the Taj Hotel for a meal, as he liked to eat there. He was an excellent host. He felt very happy when he played the host at parties at his house, and on such occasions he would order special dishes, and many of them, so that his guests could enjoy eating them...."

Azad went on to say to Minto that the Quaid's personal and private life was a closed book; his life as a politician was all that people knew. "He had lost his wife, whom he loved. His only child had married a Parsi, contrary to his wishes and desire ... For about a fortnight after the marriage of his daughter, he wore a worried look. He almost lived by himself. He must have smoked hundreds of cigars in that period, and walked hundreds of miles, pacing up and down the spacious verandas, corridors and rooms of his house...."

Azad narrated to Minto his Boss was very fond of good shoes, and had scores of pairs of them. He had a billiard table at home, at which he sometimes played, but mostly alone, by himself. "He would take a cue in his hand, survey the balls on the top of the table, very, very carefully and fondly rub his fingers on the end of the cue, as a *sarangi*-player strokes the strings of his instrument, and then he would take his shot. He would be so happy that he had hit correctly and scored...."

Sometime in 1928, the Quaid was in Delhi attending a Session of the Imperial Assembly, when he received a telegram saying Mrs. Jinnah was very seriously ill. He left all his

work and rushed back to Bombay, only to reach that city too late. He sat in sorrowful silence for some time beside her dead body, and then accompanied the funeral procession to Aram Bagh in Bombay, where she lies buried.

When her body was lowered to be surrendered to mother-earth, Jinnah could not restrain himself. He broke down.

Azad narrated to Minto a pathetic incident, "You know, servants in a household come to know everything that is going around them. Sometimes, more than twelve years after Begum Jinnah's death, the Boss would order at dead of night a huge ancient wooden chest to be opened, in which were stored clothes of his dead wife and his married daughter. He would intently look into those clothes, as they were taken out of the box and were spread on the carpets. He would gaze at them for long with eloquent silence. Then his eyes would moisten...."¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Most of the above chapter is largely based on Muhammad Hanif Azad's narrative to Saadat Hasan Minto, as cited in his book, *Ganje Firishte* or "The Bald Angels", pp. 9 to 36, 1955: Muktaba-e-Jadid, Lahore.

LEAVING JINNAH HIGH AND DRY

Emphasis by prominent leaders on Hindu-Muslim understanding to avoid communal disturbances was indicative of the fact that the political atmosphere had been vitiated by recent happenings; gone were the days when ideals advocated by leaders like Dadabhoy Naoroji, Gokhale, Surendranath Banerjee and Jinnah of "Swaraj through Hindu-Muslim Unity" held the field. Gandhi was now the sole dictator of the Congress, the Khilafat and the Home Rule League; and his theory of non-violent non-cooperation was the political weapon that was sought to be used to win independence. But it had only resulted in violence and bloodshed; in Hindu-Muslim riots; in senseless acts of arson and loot of Government properties. At this time, in February 1922, Gandhi wrote, "The vast majority of Hindus and Muhammadans have joined the struggle believing it to be religious. The Mussalmans join it because they want to save the Khilafat and he will shun the Congress; tell the Hindu he cannot save the Cow, if he joins the Congress, he will to a man leave the Congress." This was an unequivocal statement, conceding that the greatest motivating force in Indian politics, both among Hindus and Muslims, was religion. The Congress, in spite of this confession by Gandhi as Supreme Commander of the Congress Army, was to repudiate this theory time and gain; however, the reorganization of the Muslim League was to henceforth proceed on communal lines. Except for sporadic Hindu-Muslim Unity Conferences and All-Parties Conferences, Indian politics hereafter bear the definite stamp of being run and organized on communal basis, and no political party was an exception to this generalization, whatever the Congress may have to say about it. The Muslim League began to admit it, in whispers at first and then openly and loudly; Congress protesting most vociferously against this charge against itself.

There occurred in the same year a serious split in the Congress on the question of Council entry, a programme advocated by its President, C. R. Das, and opposed by the 'No-changers' under Gandhi's leadership. Das left the Congress and organized the Swaraj Party with a view to run candidates for elections to the Assemblies.

When the elections to the Imperial Council were to take place in September 1923, the Quaid announced his candidature from the Muslim Constituency of Bombay. He issued his manifesto saying he was aware there were differences of opinion among individual leaders and political parties over the question of Council entry and that in spite of this controversy he had decided to contest for a seat in the Council, as he sincerely believed in capturing rather than boycotting the Assemblies. He wrote that his public life was before his voters, since he first took part in the 1906 session of the Congress. He ended the appeal to his voters on a note typical of him, "I have no desire to ask any post or position or title from the Government. My sole object is to serve the cause of the country as best as I can."

The Swarajists, who by now had come to an understanding with the Congress, put up a candidate against Jinnah, and there was one independent candidate, thus involving the Quaid in a triangular fight. The pro-Congress newspapers of Bombay carried on a severe campaign against him, while the *Bombay Chronicle*, an independent daily, supported his candidature. Commenting on the keen contest that Bombay was witnessing the *Chronicle*, wrote editorially, "If Mr. Jinnah is not today a Congressman, he had not, like many others, either betrayed the cause of his country or exploited his disagreement with the Congress for purposes of personal aggrandizement." A wordy warfare typical of a keen election contest was waged on public platforms of Bombay, and their echoes were taken up by the press. Certain interested persons were bent on defeating the Quaid and they were prepared to finance the candidates opposing him. But he was not a man who could be bullied into submission, disdaining all offers and overtures to come to terms with his political opponents in order to ensure his election. He depended on the support of the Muslims of Bombay, rather than on political intrigue and chicanery, making his views known through his speeches that he would stand by his principles, without dreaming of making compromises in order to win a seat in the Central Assembly. He was going to climb the ladder of political success not through deceit and dishonesty, but by placing his cards on the table with their faces up. It stands to the credit of the voters in his electoral college that they rallied round him, in spite of a stormy and besmearing campaign let loose against him. His opponents, both individually and as political parties, saw the wisdom of not inviting sure defeat on their heads, so impregnable was the Quaid's position. His two opposing candidates sought refuge in prudence by withdrawing their candidature thus enabling him to get elected unopposed to the Central Legislative Assembly.

That year treatment meted out to Indians settled in Kenya gave rise to justified protests from the press and the public, and this question assumed first class national importance, particularly as the Imperial Conference was discussing problems pertaining to all parts of the British Commonwealth, and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was nominated by the British to represent India at this Conference. It was not the elected representatives of India in the Central Assembly who were asked to elect India's representatives at the Conference, but India was to be represented through nomination by the British. Protests were lodged against this procedure, and pressure was brought to bear on Sapru to resign. But Jinnah did not agree with this line of action, maintaining that he refused to acknowledge Sapru as representing India at the Conference, therefore, the question of his being asked to resign from the Conference did not arise. However, in a press statement he severely condemned the action of the British in inflicting inequities and humiliations on Indians settled in Kenya. "India and Indians," he said, "wherever they be, will not command any respect so long as India remains a dependency of Great Britain." Analyzing the grievances of Indians in Kenya, he said, "The decision is clearly based on the ground of White Domination and the assumed inferiority of Indians." He hit out hard at the divisions that existed in the political ranks

of India. "The first thing we require is unity amongst, at any rate, the leaders of various class interests in the country ... Swaraj cannot be attained by representations nor will it ever be realized so long as we remain divided ... On purely political basis we should declare openly that 'India is for Indians and carry on the struggle for true attainment of Swaraj.'"

At that time the Muslim leader who was closest to the Congress was Maulana Mohammad Ali, and he was presiding over its Cocanada session. He and some of his colleagues of the Khilafat movement believed in Pan-Islamism, and a Pan-Asian movement was merely an extension in that dimension in the realm of political thinking and action. For the first time in the history of Indian National Congress, Maulana Mohammad Ali, as its President, sent fraternal greetings to Japan and other Asian countries, and made mention in his presidential address about the necessity of India's close association with the countries of Asia, a practice which was followed by the Congress for many years thereafter.

In the early twenties of the twentieth century Hindu Muslim relations were strained, and those balmy days of the previous two decades appeared to have vanished into thin air. As the Quaid had said Gandhi's strategy had alienated not only political parties, inter se, but had also driven a wedge between leaders of the two major communities among themselves. Among Muslims, while those that were for Council entry were aligned with the Muslim League, those that were opposed to it were under the control of the Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. Those that believed in the former as best suited to the interests of Muslims decided at a meeting of the Council of the League held in Delhi in March 1924 that the All-India Muslim League should take upon itself the responsibility of organizing work of that school of thought among Muslims on an All-India basis. Accordingly it was decided to hold an open session of the League in Lahore at the end of May under the Presidentship of the Quaid, who in a press statement explained that the main problems to be tackled by the session would be "Amendment of the constitution of India; to bring about a friendly understanding in the Punjab in particular, where ... a great deal of misunderstanding has been created between Hindus and Muslims, and to bring about ...once more a complete settlement between Hindus and Muslims as was done at Lucknow in 1916 ... The League will not accept a policy or programme ...antagonistic to the Indian National Congress, the Khilafat organization or Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. On the contrary, it will proceed to foster general national interests, not forgetting particular interests of the Muslim community". He expressed his profound and deep sorrow that Hindu-Muslim riots that had recently flared up in various parts of India had harmed the cause of unity, the root cause of which were the *Shuddhi* and *Sanghatan* movements. The two communities, he said, must learn "to live and let live". He concluded his press statement, "I would appeal to all prominent Muslims, whether members of the League or not, to attend the League session."

The Lahore session of the League met in an atmosphere of anxiety and concern to the Quaid, as he wished to wean back his countrymen to the path of Hindu-Muslim unity, which he said was a *sine qua non* for any constitutional advancement in India. He said so long as the peoples remained divided, foreign rule would continue, and India would remain in bondage, "Swaraj is almost interchangeable with Hindu-Muslim unity". He was still steadfast in his lifelong ideal that India's salvation lay through unity, a creed in which patriarchs of Indian politics had always believed, but which in theory had recently been put in cold storage.

The League session, appointed a committee to propose, in collaboration with other political parties, if possible, a scheme of constitutional reforms, for the consideration of the next session of the League. Gandhi said, "I agree with Mr. Jinnah that Hindu-Muslim unity means Swaraj". However, Maulana Mohammad Ali issued a statement doubting the representative character of the Muslim League and of Jinnah. This brought forth a spirited reply from the latter who said, "I would appeal to my Hindu friends not to be carried away by the antics of Mr. Mohammed Ali ... I still stand a tried nationalist and if Muslims are to be organized, it is not with a view to prejudicing national advance, or national interest" In his accustomed breezy manner, Maulana Mohammad Ali retorted with a scathing attack on the League and the Quaid. The two Mohammad Alis, the two giants of Muslim politics, had crossed swords in public, and the cause of Indian Muslims received a rude jolt.

Jinnah concentrated his attention on his work within the Assembly, as a member of the Nationalist party, and on the floor of the House he threw his weight on the side of popular causes such as Indianisation of the Army, a revision of constitutional reforms, holding of I.C.S. examinations simultaneously in India and in England, grant of Dominion Status, return of B. G. Homiman to India who had been exiled from India five years earlier. By dint of sheer hard and brilliant work, he proved that work within the Assemblies was as important as political work outside. His frequent attacks on the Government of India Act, under which Indian administration was being run, exposed the weakness of the Act, and an unwilling bureaucracy was compelled to agree that it needed changes and modifications in order to satisfy public demand. Accordingly, the Muddiman Committee was appointed with Sir Alexander Muddiman, the Home Member, as Chairman, Sir Muahmmad Shafi, Law Member, the Quaid, three Europeans and some non-official Indians to report to the Government whether the existing Act needed modifications, and if so, what should be the recommendations of the House; or whether a new Act alone would satisfy Indian aspirations.

The Government of India Act of 1919 had sanctified the perpetuation of dyarchy in the provinces with some subjects, specified for the purpose, to be treated as transferred subjects to be administered by the Governors on the advice of Ministers responsible to the Legislature consisting almost entirely of elected non-official majority. The Congress had, officially speaking, boycotted the Legislatures under their no-entry programme;

however, when the Swarajist Party was formed three years later under Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das, Congressmen came to the Assemblies as Swarajists, while there were Independents like Jinnah, who sat on opposition benches. Section 41 of the Act of 1919 provided that at the expiration of ten years' that is towards 1929, a Royal Commission would be appointed "for purpose of inquiring into the working of the system of Government," as also into the "development of representative institutions in British India," and this commission was to suggest measures to Parliament in what respects the Act was to be modified after ten years' experience. The Central Assembly held the time lag of ten years to be too long, particularly as the 1919 Act already fell short of Indian aspirations, and it was therefore that the Muddiman Committee was appointed as the Reforms Enquiry Committee.

The Muddiman Committee toured India in the middle of 1924 to collect evidence, to receive deputations and memoranda on the necessity of political reforms in India. Jinnah fought like a Trojan against the reactionary President and three European members of the committee, and it was obvious that the report of the Committee would not be unanimous. Jinnah wrote a note of dissent to the majority report, and he along with three other members. Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, and Dr. R. P. Paranjpye appended a minority report, the main contention of their report being that the political situation in the country cannot be changed for the better without fundamental changes in the existing constitution itself. Commenting on the minority report. Sir P. C. Ray wrote, "Their (Nationalists) absence from the first Council under the new constitution did incalculable harm in the cause of India and did not allow the people to get a glimpse of the defect of Dyarchy in good time."¹³⁶

The two reports of the Muddiman Committee came up for discussion in the Assembly in September 1925, and a Government motion was tabled to accept the majority report, to which a long amendment was tabled by Pandit Motilal Nehru, the main purpose of which was the immediate setting up a fully responsible Government. The Quaid delivered a speech strongly defending the amendment, but insisting that in all constitutional advances "Due regard must be made to the interests of the minorities". After two days of heated debates, the amendment was carried amidst wild scenes of enthusiasm by 72 votes to 45. Jinnah's stand that it was wiser to capture the Councils, than to boycott them stood vindicated.

A Government, not based on the will of the people, has to continue to be indifferent to the wishes of the people in order to protect its own existence, and so it was with the Government of India. The vote on the Muddiman Committee, which had been adverse, remained a dead letter, no action being taken on the decision of the House. Pandit Motilal Nehru, on 8th March 1925, reminded the Government that they had entered the Assemblies to cooperate with the Government, although, politically speaking, they

¹³⁶ Life and Times of C. R. Das, by P. C. Ray.

stood behind Gandhi's non-cooperation movement. But if the Government did not lift even its little finger to cooperate with them, his party would be compelled to enter the wilderness of non-cooperation. He declared he and his Swaraj Party had decided to withdraw from the House. On this the President of the Central Assembly, Vithal Patel, expressed his apprehension that after the withdrawal of Motilal Nehru's Party, the opposition had ceased to exist in the House and under the changed circumstances he advised the Government not to bring into the House controversial legislation, otherwise he would be compelled to exercise his powers and adjourn the House *sine die*, every time he found it necessary and in the interests of India to do so.

While political developments proceeded to pipe a minor note, communal riots were raging all over the country, devastating in their maddened frenzy all vestiges of Unity, for which the Quaid and leaders like him had worked all their lives.

It must stand to the credit of leaders like Dadabhoi Naoroji, Gokhale, Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Jinnah that they had been able to keep the tempers of the two communities under control; and Hindus and Muslims were able to work in close cooperation. But, while Jinnah continued to work for Hindu-Muslim unity and the other three had passed away, there was communal tension all over India about ten years after the historic Lucknow Pact. In July 1925 there were bloody communal riots in Delhi, Calcutta and Allahabad and in many smaller cities, where scores of lives were lost and hundreds were injured in pitched battles on the streets. The worst rioting was at a place called Hamunabad in Hyderabad Deccan where during the Eid-uz-Zuha celebrations Hindus raided Muslims *mohallas* and shops, bent on murder, loot and arson. Commenting on the riots, Gandhi said in Calcutta, "If it is to be our lot that before we can come together, we must shed one another's blood, I say, the sooner we do so, the better it is for us."

About a year later there was violent rioting in the streets of Calcutta, where scenes of murder and stabbings marred the good name of that city for over six weeks, when death and assassination lurked and lingered in the lanes and bye-lanes. The immediate cause of the riots was a vociferous disturbance outside a mosque in Calcutta, engineered by the Arya Samajists, a militant Hindu sect under the leadership of Swami Shardhanand, bent on exterminating Muslims of India. The police were soon on the spot and were compelled to open fire to stop the rioting. In about six weeks there were over one hundred attacks on mosques and temples, leaving about 125 dead and over a thousand seriously injured. The situation was so tense and explosive that Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, issued an appeal for communal harmony "in the name of Indian national life and of Religion."

A few months later Ghazi Abdul Rashid killed Swami Shardhanand for his scrupulous and blasphemous writings against Islam and its Holy Prophet (on whom be the Peace of God).

May 1927 was ablaze with the frenzied lust of communal riots, proving that no patchwork would prevent them, until the causes that lay deep at the root of political antagonism between Hindus and Muslims were removed once and for all. There were riots between 3rd and 7th May 1927 in Lahore, when about thirty people were killed and about three hundred injured. These were followed by equally bloody riots in Multan in the Punjab, in Bareilly in the U P., and in a number of places in Bihar. In the Central Provinces, Nagpur was in the grip of riots, which resulted in twenty killed and 125 injured. The root cause of most of these rioting was the violent outbursts of Arya Samajists, calculated to injure the religious susceptibilities of Muslims. As an example, a notorious pamphlet called Rangila Rasul may be mentioned as having deeply wounded the religious feelings of Muslims all over India. Such pamphlets were being issued by the Arya Samaj headquarters with impunity, and Muslims were expected to see them in print and in circulation, without the offenders being punished for their heinous offences. As a result of protests from Muslims, a Bill was introduced in the Central Assembly in August 1927. Its operative part read, "Whoever with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of His Majesty's subjects, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, insults or attempts to insult religion or religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with 2 years' imprisonment, or with fine, or with both." The Bill was debated and passed with utmost expedition, and within two days it was put on the Statute Book.

Within two years about thirty riots had taken place, and thousands had been killed or injured. In the wake of the Bill being passed by the Assembly, there were held Unity Conferences to settle the communal problem. But it must be admitted not much was achieved by the so-called Unity Conferences. Communal peace proved to be an elusive goal; political leaders, perhaps, closed their eyes to the fact that there was something deep down wrong in the political life of the country, and that a mere cut here and a stitch there would not do.

Some books and articles written by Hindus against Islam and Muslims in pursuance of their anti-Muslim Policy in Indian politics make grotesque reading, and they sound to be unbelievable today. Ratish Mohan Agarwala's book could be quoted as an example, and it is strange that a professor and scholar like him could dream of suggesting, "It is never too late to do the right thing, however. Let some representative body of the 'Hindus', therefore, say the 'Hindu Mahasabha' or an 'All-India Conference' of the 'Hindus' specially called for the purpose immediately appoint a 'Supreme Council for Hinduising all Foreign Religions'. This 'Council' should then find out suitable 'Hindu' names for all the four foreign-born, religions that at present require to be 'Hinduised'. We suggest that 'Islam' may be referred to as the 'Nirakar Samaj'; 'Christianity' as the 'Anglo-Pujak Samaj'; and 'Hebrewism' as the 'Pavitra Samaj'.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ *The Hindu-Muslim Riots*, by Ratish Mohan Agarwala, p. 85.

The same writer says in another place, "This is specially to be regretted when it is remembered that there were only four such religions that required to be taken note of, namely, 'Islam', 'Christianity', 'Zoroasterism' and 'Hebrewism'. If the 'Hindu' leaders had Hinduised these religions as soon after they had been born as possible, all those 'Hindus' who might have preferred any one of them to any of the existing 'Hindu' creeds would thereby have been enabled to adopt them without ceasing to be Hindus and all those foreign adherents of these religions that might have come to India could easily be made 'Hindu' and incorporated into the 'Hindu Nation' without giving up or having to give up their own religions."

Anti-Muslim sentiments and literature by the Arya Samaj and other extremist Hindus infuriated the Muslims. Quaid-e-Azam, who was once known as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, admitted in 1926 at the Muslim League session, "There is no escaping the fact that communalism does exist in this country. By mere sentiment and talk it cannot be removed. Nationalism cannot be created by merely having mixed electorates".

Reasons for cleavage between the two nations were far more deep-rooted.

The communal situation was explosive, and frantic efforts were being made to evolve schemes and measures to put a stop to mob violence. The Congress drew up a communal settlement plan, which was throttled by the polite method of referring it to a committee, which never reported back on it to the main body. However, the plan of C. R. Das on the same subject was debated, and it did not receive approval as it was believed to be conceding too much to the Muslims. In the meantime the communal cauldron kept itself burning; the fuel being supplied by the number of riots that involved the two communities in a sort of undeclared war on one another.

Jinnah, who even at that period continued to believe in Hindu-Muslim unity being an inevitable precedent to winning Swaraj, was very much pained at observing that riots had spread their eerie fingers far and wide. He said in a press statement that as Congress felt itself unequal to the task, it shelved the issue of unity. He appealed to the press, which was largely controlled by the Hindus, to rise to the occasion and play a constructive and conciliatory role. He suggested that Muslims should organize themselves politically, and leaders of the two communities should meet over a Round Table Conference to settle all those problems, which give rise to communal riots. He concluded that his life's ambition was to bring about a lasting unity and understanding between Hindus and Muslims.

An All-Parties Conference was held in November of that year in Bombay, which resulted in the appointment of a high powered committee to suggest a line of action for the speedy achievement of Swaraj and for a permanent communal settlement. Jinnah towered head and shoulders above the rest in his sincere desire to find a speedy and

effective settlement to the Hindu-Muslim problem, which had retarded the march of India to its goal of Swaraj.

When Lord Birkenhead, as Secretary of State for India, announced in the House of Lords in December 1925 that a Royal Commission was being appointed immediately to inquire into Indian Reforms, instead of in 1928 as provided in the Government of India Act of 1919, many Indian leaders interpreted it as victory for a popular Indian demand. But historical documents that saw the light of day years later reveal that it suited the then Government of Great Britain to accelerate the appointment of the Royal Commission. In a private letter to Lord Reading, the Viceroy of India, Lord Birkenhead wrote on 10th December 1925, "I always had it plainly in mind that we could not afford to run the slightest risk that the nomination of 1928 Commission should be in the hands of our successors. You can readily imagine what kind of a Commission in its personnel would have been appointed by Col. Wedgewood and his friends. I have, therefore, throughout been of the clear opinion that it would be necessary for us as a matter of elementary prudence to appoint a Commission not later than the summer of 1927. I should, therefore, like to receive your advice if at any moment you discern an opportunity for making this a useful bargain counter or for further disintegrating the Swarajist Party". He further said: "I am sure that having regard to political contingencies in this country, we must keep the nomination of the personnel of the Commission in our own hands. In this matter, we cannot run the slightest risk. My present view, therefore, is – and I believe that the Prime Minister shares it – that we shall in any event, be playing for a safety if we are driven to nominate the Commission in the middle of 1927. If such an acceleration affords you any bargaining value, use it to the full and with the knowledge that you will be supported by the Government."

The Commission was announced, and it was found to be an all-White Commission, with no Indians associated with it as members. There was a hue and cry in India and great resentment prevailed in all parts of the sub-continent. But the excuse against the inclusion of Indians given by the Government was that the intention of the India Act of 1919 was that its members would be only from among members of Parliament. In the meantime Lord Irwin succeeded Lord Reading as the Viceroy of India, and his cabinet gave official approval to the appointment of an All-White Commission. Sir Mohammad Habibullah was at that time a member of the Viceroy's Council, and he was the only one to have strongly opposed the exclusion of Indians from the Commission. However, his solitary voice was drowned in the chorus of approval of his colleagues.

The all-White Commission was headed by Sir John Simon and its composition and terms of reference were announced by the Secretary of State for India in November 1927. The declaration was greeted with loud protests from all shades of political opinion in the country. The Quaid, as usual, was in the forefront of all such causes, whenever complete unanimity between political parties and communities was essential. He contacted leaders of other political organizations. Sir Ali Imam, Sir Abdur Rahim, Sir

Sivaswamy Aiyar, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Sir H. P. Mody and Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. He believed that on such occasions it is always best to confront the Government with a resolution passed at citizens' public meetings, and he gave the lead to India in this direction by convening a public meeting in Bombay on 19th November 1927, with Sir Dinshaw Petit in the chair. The meeting was held at Sir Cowasji Jehangir Hall, and the Quaid moved the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted:-

"This public meeting of the citizens of Bombay emphatically declares that the Statutory Commission which has been announced is unacceptable to the people of India as it most flagrantly denies the right of the Indian people to participate on equal terms in framing the future constitution of the country. This meeting further resolves that under the circumstances Indians throughout the country should have nothing to do with the Commission at any state or in any form."

When reports of the debate in the House Commons on the appointment of the Simon Commission were published in the press, Jinnah immediately issued a press statement on 28th November, in which he condemned in scathing terms the decision of Parliament. The first public meeting had given the lead to India; he wanted to keep up the agitation, and with that end in view he was mainly instrumental in holding another citizens' meeting on 3rd December, the other co-sponsors being the same as those that had called the previous citizens' meeting. Moving the main resolution, Jinnah said in reference to the attitude of certain Muslims, "Believe me and I am not exaggerating when I say that it is because they are misled and because they do not understand the issue properly that some of them are still wavering. I expect and I have every hope that they will not lag behind the Hindus in any way, but will work with Hindus, Parsis and Christians and go through the ordeal of a united people. I warn those who want to exploit Mohammadans to leave off this dirty game. If they try it, they will fail miserably as they have failed in the past. I appeal to you, Hindus, not to pass your judgment on the Mussalmans prematurely. Don't doubt them or blame them. I appeal to you, the major community, to be true to your faith, and if you do that, let me tell you that the minor communities, including the Mussalman community, will follow you".

The British were busy winning over political saboteurs to gain support for the acceptance of the Simon Commission. To counteract the influence of the Quaid with the Muslims, they succeeded with some of their Muslim stooges in the Punjab and Bengal to have statements issued against Jinnah's advice to the Muslim community. In answer to this "insidious and mischievous propaganda to seduce Indian Muslims by false and unworthy arguments in favor of accepting the statutory Commission", he issued a manifesto on 11th December to the press in which, *inter alia*, he stated, "Therefore, whether you take the broad principle of national self-respect or the petty and short-sighted consideration of self-interest, the Mussalmans cannot stand to gain by accepting the present Commission. They will only go down in history as disloyal to the country at

a critical juncture of its political development, justly accused by other communities of having played false not only to them but to their own motherland. I am confident that my community will not adopt any such course or go astray, however much interested persons may press them to do so".

The British were busy at their old game of *divide et impera*. In a secret letter in February 1928 to the Viceroy, Lord Birkenhead wrote, "The whole policy now is obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission is going to be got hold of by the Muslims and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position, thereby securing a solid Muslim support, and leaving Jinnah high and dry". These words of advice smack of the counsel of divide and rule that must delight a Machiavellian mind.

The Simon caravan was on the move, and the finger of fate having drawn the palm-lines of India when the Royal Commission was appointed, Simon and his colleagues did not bother about protests by representative Indian public opinion. In a lengthy press statement, Jinnah again warned the British, "If he (Lord Birkenhead) has convinced the British people and Parliament that India is a museum of differing communities and interests and that she is seething with warring factions, then India's case for responsible Government stands condemned. And what is the good of going through the farce of appointing a Parliamentary Commission by a cabinet, whose spokesman has summed up the position of India and condemned it in advance? ... The underlying idea is the arrogant assertion of the principle that Indians cannot be allowed to share in the responsibility or in the decisions that are taken concerning the future constitution of India ... One word about Lord Reading. He condemns all the politicians because at one time or other they had been parties to formulating proposals towards further advance in the constitution of India. Does he mean to suggest that the members of the Commission appointed have no views with regard to the future constitution for India? ... For these reasons amongst others, India cannot participate in this policy and share in the work of the Commission in any form or at any stage, because it is a complete negation of India's status as partner, which has been so repeatedly acknowledged by British statesmen".

The Simon Commission landed in Bombay on 3rd February, and the leader issued a statement after having been greeted by black-flags on his arrival in India, and after having heard loud-throated slogans of "Simon go back" on the streets of Bombay, as he and his men drove from the Ballard Pier to the Governor's House, "The Commission is in no sense an instrument either of the Government of India or of the British Government but enters on the duty laid upon it by the King Emperor as a completely independent and unfettered body comprising of Members of Parliament, who approach the Indian Legislators as colleagues." But the loud cries "Simon go back" from Karachi to Calcutta gave Simon and his men no chance of being acceptable to India as impartial arbiters of their destiny. In order to give further impetus to the boycott movement,

Jinnah issued another statement on 20th February, in which he said he was convinced, after reading Sir John Simon's and the Viceroy's statements, that no equality of status was vouchsafed to the Indian Committee that would collaborate with the Commission. He continued, "The recording of some evidence in camera, the inability of Indian members to vote at the proceedings of the Commission, the power reserved to the Chairman to allow or not to allow members of the Central Committee to examine the witnesses in a province, and the secondary place assigned to the Indian Committee's report, make it abundantly plain that the Committees can at best play a subordinate part ... In the circumstances, we appeal to public men of all parties and to all political organizations in India to unite together (1) settling sectional or communal differences, which we have every confidence will be settled soon to the satisfaction of all parties, (2) to prepare a draft constitution with the maximum amount of agreement, and to adopt it at a Convention and (3) to work for its establishment".

Wherever the Simon Commission went, it was greeted with black flags and hostile slogans, and they could have no doubt in their minds that it was an unwelcome Commission, in whom the peoples had no confidence whatsoever. But, they had received orders, and they were there to carry them out, whether the people whose fate they were to decide liked it or not.

Bombay had greeted their landing on Indian soil with a complete *hartal* and an all-out boycott in Madras a huge crowd collected outside the High Court building, and the police opened fire on it, resulting in some casualties and many injured. In Calcutta, there were scores of clashes between students and the police, in which students received a severe beating at the hands of the armed police. Delhi was the first city the Commission visited officially, and there the Commission heard tumultuous shouts of "Simon go back", wherever they went. Lala Lajpat Rai led a procession in Lahore to demonstrate their disapproval against the Simon Commission. The police swinging clubs and charging their horses broke up the peaceful ranks of the procession, and many received serious injuries. It is alleged that injuries received on this occasion by Lala Lajpat Rai hastened his death. A public inquiry to go into police excesses was demanded, but the protecting hand of Government extended its solicitude to cover the misdeeds of a faithful and loyal arm of the bureaucracy. Probably the city to suffer most on this occasion was Lucknow, where for four consecutive days the police mercilessly charged into processions to teach the demonstrators a lesson by breaking their heads with batons or the ribs by charging their horses into the crowds. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was one of them that received grievous injury on this occasion. In Patna a gathering of over 50,000 turned up at the railway station with black flags and anti-Commission placards when their train steamed into Patna station.

On 6th February Sir John Simon wrote a letter to the Viceroy proposing that the seven representatives of the British Parliament were prepared to sit with seven Indians to be elected by the Central Assembly, and then the fourteen would jointly take evidence,

Indians sitting as free and equal members on the commission. The non-official members, mainly on the initiative of Jinnah, met and decided that they would refuse to elect their seven nominees. Accordingly, on 16th February a resolution was tabled saying that the composition and work of the Commission were wholly unacceptable "to the Assembly which should have nothing to do with it, at any stage, or in any form". This was carried by 68 votes for and 62 against; a victory for progressive forces in the country.

The Simon Commission left Indian shores on 31st March, as Sir John said "after establishing personal contact with all communities and classes in various parts of India". This was far from true. In contradiction to this statement, the official report of the Commission records that political leaders and parties were "pledged to the boycott of the Commission not only officially, but also to the length of boycotting it socially". The Simon Commission came as unwelcome guests, and left India empty-handed, their mission unfulfilled.

The Quaid had thrown his entire weight against the Commission, and on 5th May 1928, he left India for a holiday in England—a very tired and worn-out political leader, who had worked for long and tiring hours every day for many months in the cause of political advancement of India.

He sailed from Bombay on S.S. Rajputana, and there were two other eminent political leaders on the same boat, Srinivasa Aiyangar and Diwan Chiman Lal. The latter wrote about this voyage, "We have leisure to eat, a blessing that our politicians seem seldom to experience judging by their physique. We have leisure to watch humanity swimming, diving, playing deck-tennis or bridge, dancing and drinking. And above all we have leisure to talk. For we have on board two of the best talkers in India—Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Srinivasa Aiyangar. It is no doubt their profession is to talk, but here, away from the political restrictions of their second profession, they talk freely and with refreshing frankness ... I said at the commencement of this article that we have had plenty of talk on board the ship. A great deal of it has been of a political nature. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, it must be acknowledged, saved the situation in the Legislative Assembly over the Simon Commission. He expected no doubt that the spirit of amicability engendered in the Chamber would be productive of real unity. Today he is, unfortunately, frankly disgusted. Minor differences over Sindh and majority representations by reservation and reforms for the North-West Frontier Province have wrecked, for the moment, all chances of unity. 'Give me,' says Mohammad Ali Jinnah, three leaders to join me over a united programme, which was all but accepted at Delhi, Swaraj will not be a mere dream but a matter brought within the realm of real politics. I asked him to name the four men. He said: 'Pandit Motilal Nehru, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai'. He added, "The first problem to solve and settle is the problem of Hindu-Muslim unity. This is not a mere phrase. It is a concrete proposition. I have talked even on board the ship with Indians belonging to every conceivable

political group and each one deplores the intransigence of the leaders in not arriving at a settlement regarding the three issues named by me. Will the nation go to wreck and ruin if compromises and even surrender take place on these issues? And suppose we did settle the problem. I say that, then the united "ice of the nation would be irresistible' ... We talked of Gandhi. Humorously he alluded to the frantic attempts made by Mahatma Gandhi and Umar Sobhani to rope him into the non-cooperation movement. He said he felt that the movement would fail. I said he was mistaken. The movement nearly succeeded. It failed merely because the Mahatma has not the touch of a Lenin in him; the history of the last few years would have been different. 'Gandhi,' he said, 'is not a politician' – but he added, 'I wish he had been'.

The intimate insight into Jinnah's mind on the recent political happenings in India, and particularly his views on Gandhi's politics, reveal his innermost thoughts, which he could share only with a friend like Diwan Chiman Lal in the intimacy of an upper deck of a luxury liner, merrily cutting its course across the seas to places, where he hoped to enjoy a well earned peace and quiet; a holiday from his daily diet of political worries.

COFFIN MARKED 'THREE SEATS'

The late twenties were plagued with bitter wrangling among political leaders and parties over political settlement, with a view to present a united front to the British over constitutional reforms. Various attempts were made in this direction, the most notable among these being a conference initiated by the Quaid on 20th March 1927 at Delhi, to which Muslim leaders of all shades of opinion were invited. He presided over the conference, and was mainly instrumental in drafting a resolution, which was finally adopted unanimously by the conference. The resolution, inter alia, stated that "Muslims should accept a settlement on the basis of the following principles ... (1) Sindh should be separated from Bombay and constituted into a separate province. (2) Reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F. Province and in Baluchistan on the same footing as in any other Province." The conference demanded weightage in assemblies in those provinces, where Muslims were in minority; reciprocally, it accepted weightage for Hindus in Sindh, Frontier and Baluchistan; while in the Punjab and in Bengal representation to the two communities was to be strictly in proportion to their population. However, the resolution demanded, "In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation should not be less than a third (33%), and that also, by a mixed electorate."

The Delhi Conference was a great personal triumph for Jinnah, who had succeeded in bringing Muslims on one platform and to adopt a common policy in so far as the future reforms were concerned, with particular reference to Muslim representation. M. C. Chagla enthusiastically exclaimed Jinnah as a great leader, saying it was "the magic wand that Jinnah alone can wield that brought about what seemed an impossible achievement". Even Hindu leaders of all shades of opinion were full of praise for Jinnah, whom Mrs. Naidu had idolized as "The Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity."

The resolution of the Delhi Conference could be effective only if the League, the Congress and other parties ratified it. The Working Committee of the Congress was favorably disposed, and referred it to the A.I.C.C., which met under the presidentship of Srinivasa Aiyangar, and after a detailed discussion ultimately adopted the Delhi Muslim proposals. Many Hindu leaders and the Hindu press attacked the decisions arrived at by the League and the Congress support for the Delhi proposals; and Jinnah was compelled to issue a press statement on 30th May in which he said misunderstanding was being deliberately created to divide Muslims, and he wished, therefore, that it should be clearly understood that Muslims would accept joint electorates with reservation of seats only if and after the Hindus had accepted all other proposals in the Delhi resolution, namely (1) Separation of Sindh from Bombay and its constitution into a separate province, as also full application of reforms in the new provinces of the Frontier and Baluchistan, "It is in the event of these conditions being

accepted that the Muslims would agree to joint electorates with reservation of seats in all the provinces ... In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of representation should be in accordance with population. In the centre, Muslims should have 33% of the total seats. This offer can only be accepted or rejected in its entirety.... Separate electorates can only be got rid of by a thorough adoption of the system of give and take—I think there are advantages and disadvantages in the system. Yet I am not prepared to subscribe to the view that separate electorates will constitute an effective bar to the growth and development of a representative Government ... No time should be lost in bringing about a speedy settlement at this critical juncture."

It was, in all probability, as a result of this statement that he was requested by the Khilafat Committee to preside over a Unity Conference in August, as a result of whose endeavors a Unity Committee was appointed. In September the committee met in Simla, but its deliberations resulted in deadlock. However, before adjourning sine die it empowered Jinnah to take all steps he thought necessary in the interest of a Hindu-Muslim understanding, and issued an appeal "to use their best endeavors to prevent riots, to put an end to communal tension"

Although he was then the undisputed leader of the Muslims of India, he still clung to his cherished desire that India's independence could be won speedily and effectively through Hindu-Muslim Unity. With all this, a section of the powerful Hindu press and extreme Hindu political opinion accused him as being an enemy of Indian unity and Indian independence. It has been the lot of many great historical figures to be misunderstood and accused by their contemporaries, although they were the only ones gifted with vision and foresight. Jinnah read the daily press statements against him and reports of public speeches attacking him bitterly with a tinge of sorrow mixed with bewilderment. He could clearly see his was the only way out of the blind alley of darkness into which contemporary thinking was inevitably leading his countrymen. It is also a truism of history that such individuals must suffer at the hands of men of lesser mettle, until the storm blows over, and calm returns to restore equipoise to biased and poisoned minds.

The Madras session of the Congress had appointed a committee in accordance with the resolution adopted by the All-Parties Conference held at Bombay in May 1928, and this committee came to be known as the Nehru (Motilal) Committee, which was to consider the suggestions made at the All-Parties Conference of Delhi, whose proposals came to be known as "the Muslim Proposals under, the leadership of Mr. Jinnah." The Nehru Committee had also to take into account, incidentally, the decisions of the Communal Unity Conference and the Hindu Mahasabha, an extremist communal organization of Hindus, one of whose important leaders was Dr. Moonje. The Nehru Report proceeds in a conciliatory tone to the "Muslim Proposals," and records, "The principal change suggested on behalf of the Hindu leaders present was that Sindh should not be separated on communal grounds, but on general grounds applicable to all provinces. A

change in the wording of the resolution removed this objection and it was passed unanimously." The Report went on to say, "The Communal controversies are of no very great importance. But ... they occupy men's minds much more than matters of greater import and cast shadow over all political work ... The Muslims ... fear that the majority may harass them, and to remove this difficulty, they have made a novel suggestion that they should at least dominate in some parts of India... In spite of their (Hindus) All-India Majority, they are afraid of the Muslims in Bengal, the Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the N W F. Province ... We are sure that Hindus of Sindh are perhaps the most enterprising and adventurous. The traveler meets them in the four quarters of the world, carrying on prosperous business and enriching their people at home by their earnings abroad. No one can take away this spirit of adventure from the Hindus of Sindh, and so long as they have it, their future is assured ... If, however, there is still some ground of fear, that is a matter of safeguards, not of opposing a just demand." Then the Report goes on to argue the Muslim demand for one-third representation in the Central Assembly. They turned down this recommendation, saying, "The principle we have adopted that wherever such reservation has to be made for the Muslim minority, it must be in strict proportion to its population. The Muslims are a little less than one-fourth of the total population of British India; and they cannot be allowed reservation over and above that proportion in the Central Legislature." This sowed seeds of discord in the Committee itself and Shoaib Qureshi, one of its Muslim members, forthwith resigned from the Committee and refused to sign the Nehru Report. Then followed a number of Unity Conferences, in which the Nehru Report was discussed in the light of Muslim proposals, and the situation lay in the shadowed land of a stalemate.

Jinnah, who had been holidaying in Europe, returned by "Razmak" to Bombay on 26th October 1928, and in a press interview said he had not had enough time to digest the Nehru Report. Obviously, he was being cautious. He said. "My position as President of All-India Muslim League is one which does not permit me to anticipate decisions of the League ... The Congress, as usual, and the League will be meeting in December next; and I am hopeful that we shall yet find solution of this critical question ... I would particularly appeal to the Muslims not to be alarmed. Muslims should organize themselves and stand united." Pressed to comment on the controversy, whether India should demand complete independence or dominion responsible Government, he said the former was an extreme demand, and Indians could not succeed in getting it accepted; he was, therefore, in favor of the latter.

An All-Parties National Convention was announced to meet at Calcutta on 22nd December 1928, to which Jinnah was invited but he refused saying he could not do so until the Council of the League had discussed the Nehru Report, and given him a mandate for the Convention. However, he said, am sure, with little patience and further efforts on both sides for a communal settlement, our endeavors will be crowned with

success. Because, it is only by bringing together the two communities that India can make further progress."

A few weeks earlier the Council of the Bombay Provincial Muslim League had met to consider the Nehru Report. A heated debate took place on the proposals contained in the Report. Jinnah was in the Chair and conducted the proceedings with his usual tact and efficiency. Seeing a sharp cleavage of opinion among the members, he cautioned them to leave the question undecided until the Council of the League, which was to meet shortly, took a decision on it. M. C. Chagla was the leader of the group that supported the Nehru Report in this meeting, and when the Council decided by a resolution to reject the Report, Chagla tendered his resignation from the secretaryship of the Bombay League. For a while, Chagla's loyalty oscillated between the League and Congress, until he was to finally drift into the Congress fold.

Sharp cracks were visible in the ranks of the Muslim League, when it assembled at Calcutta in December, under the presidentship of Jinnah, who realized more than ever that on him had fallen the responsibility of keeping Muslim leaders solidly behind the League. Chagla was once again active, and he moved a resolution that a strong committee under Jinnah should represent the League at the Convention, which was to be held shortly. The League session adopted Chagla's resolution.

A battle royal took place in the Convention, over the question whether the Muslim proposals should be incorporated in the Nehru Report, or whether the latter should be adopted without a change. Jinnah moved an amendment in the Report to meet the Muslim point of view and said that times were very critical for the whole of India, and that it was absolutely essential to arrive at a communal settlement, "No country has succeeded ... in establishing representative institutions without giving guarantees for the security of the minorities ... Majorities are apt to be oppressive and tyrannical, and minorities always, dread and fear that their interests and rights ... would suffer and be prejudiced." He, therefore, made an impassioned plea that his suggestions must be accepted, his main amendment being that in the Central Legislature Muslim representation should be one-third and not one-fourth, as recommended by the Nehru Report. He continued, "Besides counting of heads, there are other weighty and important considerations, which must not be lost sight of ... Our next proposal is that the form of the constitution should be federal with residuary powers vested with provinces ... Clause 13-A of the Nehru Report is most pernicious and should be deleted (as it gave residuary powers to the Centre and not to the provinces) ... With regard to the separation of Sindh and N.W.F. Provinces, we cannot agree that they should wait until the Indian Constitution is established with adult suffrage.... " Summing up the demands of the Muslims, he said that postponing decisions on such issues make them "feel it is shelving the issue and postponing their insistent demand till doomsday."

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru followed Jinnah, and supported the latter's demand for 33% representation in the Centre instead of 27%, "Speaking for myself, I would like you to picture Mr. Jinnah, whom I have known intimately for fifteen years, as a spoilt child. If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child, I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it. I am going to ask him to be reasonable but we must, as practical statesmen, try to solve the problem and not be misled by arithmetical figures."

Immediately thereafter, M. R. Jayakar took the floor and struck an extremely pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim note, "I have also known Mr. Jinnah for the last sixteen years in close association as a colleague in nationalist life and I can assure you that he comes before us today neither as a naughty boy nor as a spoiled child but as a fearless and lucid advocate of the small minority of Muslims whose claims he has put forward in the course of his speech. He has every right to be heard on the merits of his case and I do hope you will not misjudge his claims by accepting the interpretation Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has put on them. The main question before us is to consider how far Mr. Jinnah's claims are legitimate and necessary in the true interests of the country. How far have the Muslim interests, as safeguarded by the Nehru Committee Report, been secured and how far further concessions should be made to them as demanded by Mr. Jinnah". Throwing an apple of discord, Jayakar reminded the convention that there were Muslims like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam, Dr. Kitchlew, who supported the Nehru Report, "Mr. Jinnah, therefore, represents, if I may say so without offence, a small minority of Muslims ... A large bulk of Muslims are with Sir Muhammad Shafi, who is entirely opposed to joint electorates."

Jayakar's speech had been calculated to be offensive to Muslims, and Jinnah once again rose to address the convention, "I will not follow the style or manner of my friend, Mr. Jayakar ... His position is an ultimatum." Referring to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, he said, "I know the spirit in which he meant it and others have put a childish interpretation upon it. But I think it cannot be denied and I hope that Mr. Jayakar and others will agree with me that every country struggling for freedom and desirous of establishing a democratic system of Government has had to face the problem of minorities wherever they existed and no constitution, however idealistic it may be, and however perfect from the theoretical point of view it may seem, will ever receive the support of the minorities unless they can feel that they, as an entity, are secure under the proposed constitution and Government, and whether a constitution will succeed or not must necessarily depend, as a matter of acid test, on whether the minorities are in fact secure. Otherwise no proper constitution will last but result in revolution and civil war ... Do you want or do you not want Muslim India to go along with you? ... Minorities cannot give anything to the majority ... I am not asking for these modifications, because I am a naughty child ... I am asking you for this adjustment, because I think it is the best and fair to the Muslims... We are all sons of this land. We have to live together ... If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ; but let us part as friends...."

When the convention defeated all amendments moved by Jinnah on behalf of Muslims, it made these words of Jinnah sound prophetic in 1947 – Hindu India and Muslim India parted, and parted forever.

The Nehru Report had conceded to Muslims only 25% in the Central Assembly, while the Muslims wanted 33%. Enlightened and far-sighted Hindu leaders pleaded with their coreligionists to concede this Muslim demand and to save the Unity Talk. But Motilal Nehru and his friends looked at the question from the narrow Hindu angle, and not in the broader perspective of Indian unity. They were prepared to agree to 27%; but 33%? Certainly, no. That is too much, they argued. So, a difference of 6% more or less seats in the Centre stood between complete Indian unity and permanent division. Those that wanted to give less at the conference table won on the strength of their votes, but lost forever in the watchful eyes of history. They lost much more than they could dream of at that time. Strangely, the main attack against legitimate Muslim demands came from Pandit Motilal Nehru, about whom Gandhi had recently said, "He is a man for honorable compromise. The country is in need of it and is in the mood for it". Both the man and mood, which Gandhi considered propitious, failed India at the crucial time. Jinnah, who directed all his energies for a settlement on honorable terms, stood disillusioned; and Indian unity was to lie shattered on the sidelines of history.

When the Report of the Nehru Committee came up for discussion in the Central Assembly in March 1929. Jinnah said that differences between Hindus and Muslims over the Report remained unresolved and, therefore, as a result, "the attempt of making an agreed constitution for India became a dead issue". Many voices were raised in the Assembly, claiming Jinnah as representing himself alone, or at best a few Muslims, not the entire Muslim community, The Hindu press launched a vitriolic attack on Jinnah, and dubbed him as "anti-national" and "an enemy of Indian constitutional progress," and this war of vilification by the Hindu press continued unabated against him, until partition in 1947, when many Hindus realized, as they looked back in retrospect, that the seeds of separation were to be found in conferences and unity talks that had taken place years earlier. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad writes that Pakistan is of "Congress Parentage," and traces its origin to the fact that, "Congress leaders said that there was no communal problem in India and if there was, it could be settled after India got Independence, forgetting that for the very purpose of getting Independence, communal unity was essential."¹³⁸

When the adjourned session of the League met at Delhi in March 1929, that organization found itself torn by internecine differences. The dissidents were led by Sir Mohammad Shafi, who differed from the official stand of the Muslim League over the boycott of the Simon Commission. Another group broke away from the parent body, and formed a new organization, the Muslim Conference, under the leadership of the

¹³⁸ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Setalvad.

Aga Khan. A third group broke away as it did not agree to joint electorates, however great the compelling need for unity. Yet another group banded together under the name and style of All-India Nationalist Muslim Party under the leadership of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, fully backing the Nehru Report; T. A. K. Sherwani was the secretary of this group, and it was further strengthened by Dr. Ansari joining its ranks. The group headed by Jinnah stood for Hindu-Muslim unity, but not at any cost; in this regard their opposition to the Nehru Report being proof of their solicitude for Muslim rights and interests, and this section continued to be the official Muslim League.

Jinnah was a very disappointed man. He had entered politics dreaming of acting as a bridge between Hindus and Muslims. The first essential for the achievement of his object was to make Muslims rally together on one platform, in which he had very nearly succeeded. But, then, here he was. Unity was a distant dream; Muslim solidarity a ship that was wrecked. And he was only the leader of a splinter group of Muslims, who tenaciously hugged the Muslim League as their sheet-anchor.

Mohammad Afzal Huque, one of the twenty-three Muslim delegates to the All-Parties National Convention at Calcutta that discussed the Nehru Report, wrote, I have still with me a few scribbled notes of this historic meeting ... Several days prior to the League session, Mr. Jinnah had informal discussions almost day and night with delegates from different provinces. The persuasive arguments of Mr. Jinnah ultimately held the field ... No one could have been a better advocate than Mr. Jinnah, who carried all (the delegates with him ... After these preliminary discussions, the League held its plenary session under the presidentship of the Maharaja of Mahmudabad. It was resolved formally that the League do take part in the deliberations of the National Convention and the following 23 delegates were elected:

1. The Maharaja of Mahmudabad;
2. Mr. M. A. Jinnah;
3. Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew;
4. Mr. M.C. Chagla;
5. Malik Barkat Ali;
6. Maulvi Abdul Hamid;
7. Maulvi Mujibur Rahman;
8. Dr. Mahmood;
9. Mr. Hissamuddin;
10. Maulvi Mohammad Akram Khan;
11. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan;
12. Seth Yakub Hasan;
13. Ghazi Abdul Rahman;
14. Syed Abdullah Brelvi;
15. Mr. Tassaduq Ahmed Khan Sherwani;
16. Choudhri Khaliquzzaman

17. Nawab Liaquat Ali Khan;
18. Mr. Mazhar Ali;
19. Shah Mohammad Zubair;
20. Mr. Abdul Karim;
21. Mr. Mohammad Aslam;
22. Mr. M. Azizul Huque;
23. Mr. Fazinoor Ali

While entering the *pandal* of the National Convention, I remember to this day the buoyant enthusiasm with which all of us hoped a final settlement Mr. Jinnah made an able and comprehensive exposition of the Muslim case before the Convention. He referred to the divergent views expressed in the political discussions in the country on the electorate question. He mentioned the fact that the Muslims of India had been almost entirely in favor of separate electorates for about two decades. He then referred to the necessity of composing the conflicting views of all communities in order to come to an agreed settlement. The Muslims, he said, were not guided by any narrow selfish motives. They had come there in the true spirit of cooperation to frame the future constitution. In spite of their decided views to the contrary, the Muslims had agreed to the principle of joint electorates with the reservation of seats where necessary, but they claimed one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature. They also pressed for 33½ percent of seats instead of 30 percent which was then the representation of the Muslims in the Central Legislature. The other communities taken together would thus have 66½ percent of seats instead of 70 percent. Mr. Jinnah referred to the historic parallels in support of the demand such as that of the French in the time of the Canadian Settlement. And of the Copts in Egypt and appealed to the Convention to have due regard to the unwritten law of countries that had cared to safeguard the rights of the minorities. He emphasized that in the onward march of India's struggle for political freedom, no paper constitution would be of any avail unless the seven crores of Muslims join the twenty-two crores of Hindus in a spirit of comradeship and trust. To an interjection as to why Mr. Jinnah himself did not lead the people of India in their struggle for freedom and why did he not come forward with his support for joint electorates without any condition or reservation. Mr. Jinnah promptly replied that the question was not of his coming forward, but of the seven crores of Muslims coming out with him in support of an agreed and acceptable constitution for India" Commenting on the differences between the League and Congress, Mohammad Afzal Huque writes, "They were referred to a small committee, which met immediately and continued till long after midnight Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Mr. Jairamdas Daulatram, Master Tara Singh, Dr. Chintamani and other distinguished leaders numbering about 30 met together to consider the whole question. Mr. Jinnah pleaded the cause of the League at this Conference and my notes taken at the meeting itself state as follows about Mr. Jinnah's statement. 'Eloquent yet impassioned, sweet yet emphatic, polite and courteous yet meeting the bitterest opponent at the highest level of political thought.' The main contention was the

question of Muslim representation at the Centre. Whether they would have 33 seats or 30. After Mr. Jinnah had made his statement Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya advised the Muslims not to press for it on the ground that Lala Lajpat Rai who was one of the original members of the Nehru Committee and who had breathed his last just before the session of the National Convention as also the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha had repeatedly expressed their views that the existing proportion of Muslims in the Legislatures of the country was the maximum that could be permitted. The Muslim case was bitterly opposed by Mr. Jairamdas Daulatram." Huque then refers in his scribbled notes to the role of Gandhi. "Mr. Gandhi while saying that he was inclined to concede the Muslim demand stated that it was difficult to do so in view of Sikh objections. On behalf of the Central Sikh League, it was stated that the Sikhs could not agree to a Muslim majority in the Punjab. Mr. Gandhi stated that no t such contingency was contemplated. For hours, the question of 'three more seats' was discussed and debated. Evening shaded into night and night into midnight, but the Muslims could not get the three seats surrendered in their favor. Eventually the political future of India was buried in a coffin marked 'Three Seats!'" He continues "In the long run the Muslim delegates, who for weeks and months had pleaded with their co-religionists to accept joint electorates as a token of goodwill and amity failed to get any response from the Conference. The decision was that the Muslims would have joint electorates and representation according to their numerical strength and nothing more." Huque concluded, "One delegate, while coming out of the convention remarked, 'my country is doomed; I do not know where it will end. For me it is the end of my politics. I have not the heart to join again!'"

It will bear repeating, even after a lapse of many years, that the best epitaph on the Nehru Report was in the words of Afzal Huque, "A coffin marked three seats".

When the adjourned session of the League met at Delhi in March 1929, it met as a very weakened organization, its representative character challenged by a hostile press, and Jinnah had to steer the ship of the League's destiny through stormy weather. But he was not dejected, he faced the situation with his characteristic fortitude, when confronted with a crisis. For the purpose of retrieving a difficult situation and succeeding in rallying round the League the maximum support possible from Muslims, he drafted a compromise resolution for adoption in the open session of the League, the preamble of which explained the origin and progress of the Nehru Committee and the All-Parties Convention and continued, "And whereas the reasonable and moderate proposals put forward by the delegates of the All-India Muslim League at the Convention in modification were not accepted, the Muslim League is unable to accept the Nehru Report." The operative part of the resolution contained fourteen "basic principles to ... safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims." These fourteen provisions, *inter alia* demanded "not less than one-third representation for Muslims in the Central Legislature; separate electorates; liberty of religious belief, worship and observance to all communities; Sindh shall be a separate province; reforms to be introduced in the

Frontier Province and Baluchistan; adequate share to Muslims in the services; adequate provision in the constitution to safeguard and protect Muslim culture; promotion of Muslim education, language, religion personal law; one-third Muslim representation in all cabinets, Central and Provincial".

The resolution demanded continuance of separate electorates guaranteed to Muslims since 1909 "till such time as the Muslims chose to abandon it; the Muslims will not accept joint electorates unless Sindh is actually constituted into a separate province and reforms in fact are introduced in the N.-W.F. Province and Baluchistan. The question of weightage to Muslims in minority provinces was to be considered hereafter." The resolution, after being moved and debated, was referred to a committee consisting of Jinnah, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Malik Barkat Ali, Nawab Ismail Khan, Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan and Dr. Kitchlew.

Describing this session of the League, Noman writes, "Unfortunately, Mr. Jinnah's appeal and his efforts could not bring about any reconciliation. The open session of the League was due to meet in the morning. Mr. Jinnah was busy conferring with the various representatives who had assembled for this purpose at Hakeem Ajmal Khan's residence. The supporters of the Nehru Report who were sent to the League for the sole purpose of getting the Nehru Report accepted, in their enthusiasm did not wait for Mr. Jinnah and proposed Dr. Mohammad Alam to take the chair. This was the signal for scenes of disturbance. The audience rose almost to a man and a number of them waived their hands and sticks to show that they did not want Dr. Alam as president. Dr. Alam, however, in this pandemonium, called Mr. Abdul Rahman Ghazi to move his main resolution which he did, amidst shouts and yells, without making a speech, and Mr. T. A. K. Sherwani seconded, also without a speech, and soon after this Dr. Mohammad Alam was heard declaring it passed; and he dissolved the session. Just at this moment Mr. Jinnah returned and once again pin drop silence prevailed. Mr. Jinnah decided to adjourn this session and thus averted a great trouble."¹³⁹

The resolution dealt with in detail above and drafted by the Quaid came to be popularly known in the course of time as "Jinnah's Fourteen Points".

When the Nehru Report came up for discussion before the Congress, Gandhi gave the lead by drafting a resolution and having it adopted by the Congress which threatened the Government with a country-wide non-violent non-cooperation campaign, if the British Parliament did not fully implement the recommendations of the Nehru Report before 31st December 1929, as the Nehru Report represented "The will of the Nation".

During the course of his speech in support of his resolution, Gandhi said, "As Dr. Ansari has pointed out, if you attack the central theme of the Report you stab the heart

¹³⁹ *Muslim India*, by M. Noman.

itself and the central theme is what is known as Dominion Status. I suggest to you that it will be a grievous blunder to pit Independence against Dominion Status and compare the two and suggest that Dominion Status carries humiliation with it and that Independence is something that is triumphant."

Congress leadership was more keen on getting the Nehru Committee Report accepted, than on seeing India keep unalterably on her course to complete Independence through Hindu-Muslim unity.

Hindu deputations from Sindh, Baluchistan and the Frontier were lobbying against Jinnah's Fourteen Points, and Jairamdas Dualatram of Sindh, who was a member of the Working Committee of the Congress, vehemently opposed on their behalf separation of Sindh and introduction of Reforms in Baluchistan and the Frontier.

Allama Iqbal presided over the Allahabad session of the League in December 1930, and delivered a historic address, which indicated guidelines for the future constitutional development of India, in so far as Muslims were concerned. He boldly declared he was ready to stake his all for the freedom of India, if the Muslims of India were assured of their own homeland by the amalgamation of the Punjab, Sindh, Frontier and Baluchistan into a single "Muslim State". He continued, "To base a constitution on the conception of a homogeneous India or to apply to India the principle dictated by British democratic sentiments is to unwittingly prepare her for a civil war ... Self-government with the British Empire or without it, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of Muslims, at least of North-West India I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting for an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its laws, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times".

Iqbal then dwelt at length on the lengthy debates that were taking place at the Round Table Conference in London and said, "But the discussion at the Round Table Conference of the Communal question had demonstrated more clearly than ever the essential disparity between the two great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations".

In May 1929, England was in the midst of General Elections, as a result of which the Labour Party for the first time came into power, with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister and Col. Wedgwood Benn as Secretary of State for India. The Conservative Party was defeated, and Lord Birkenhead proved to be a politician of great foresight in

having taken certain steps in advance while the going was good for his party on the constitutional problem of India. The Simon Commission had submitted its report and the Labour Party became the final arbiter of His Majesty's Government's decision on that important document. In the meantime, the Congress launched an all-out offensive for the boycott of foreign cloth, for which the textile mill owners of Bombay and Ahmadabad gave them all financial assistance. Along with this, Gandhi had succeeded in making the Congress accept his creed for the removal of untouchability, in order to reclaim millions of *harijans* or the Scheduled Caste people to the fold of orthodox Hinduism. *Harijan* leaders saw in this fraternization movement of the Congress an opportunity to pitch their demands high, and most of them asked for the Scheduled Castes to be recognized as a minority community like the Muslims. Dr. Ambedkar, the harijan leader, playing an important role in this movement.

The Quaid had known Ramsay MacDonald personally, due to his frequent visits to England in connection with his political work. In order to inform the Prime Minister of the Muslim viewpoint on the report of the Simon Commission. Jinnah wrote a letter to MacDonald on 19th June 1929 requesting him to take into serious consideration the Muslim point of view before his Government came to a final decision. He warned the Prime Minister that the present position was a very serious deadlock and would prove disastrous, if allowed to continue. He said, "The exclusion of Indians from the personnel of the Commission from start to finish relegated the Indians to the position of suppliants and assessors, and let me tell you, whatever you may hear to the contrary, you will never get political India to cooperate with the scheme further if the various stages of the scheme are adhered to strictly." He told the Prime Minister in unambiguous words, "So far as India is concerned, we have done with it and when its report, whatever it may be, is published in due course, every effort will be made in India to damn it". Objecting to the announcement of the Prime Minister that the report of the Round Table Conference would be considered by a Joint Parliamentary Committee before Parliament took a final decision, he wrote, "What chance of success is there in their efforts to get at that stage any modifications of a substantial character at the hands of the Joint Parliamentary Committee? ... India has lost faith in the words of Great Britain ... Those, therefore, who preach that a new generation has arisen in England which seeks to explain away the significance of the 1917 declaration are, consciously or unconsciously but none the less really misrepresenting the purpose of Great Britain and poisoning the wells by which the common life of India and Great Britain is supported and sustained." He minced no words and wrote that the policy of Great Britain followed since 1924 had confirmed every party and political leader in their belief that they could expect no fair deal at the hands of Britain. He continued, "This being a short summary of the position, I would most earnestly urge upon you at this moment to persuade His Majesty's Government without delay to make a declaration that Great Britain is unequivocally pledged to the policy of granting to India full responsible Government with Dominion Status". He concluded his letter on a constructive note. "May I suggest a solution, which I think would most probably be

acceptable to India. His Majesty's Government before they formulate their proposals and after they are in receipt of the Simon Commission Report and the views of the Government of India, and so, before they formulate their proposals, should invite representatives of India, who would be in a position to deliver the goods, (because completely unanimous opinion in India is not possible at present), to sit in conference with them with a view to reaching a solution which might carry, to use the words of the Viceroy, the 'willing assent of political India'. If such an invitation comes directly from the Prime Minister on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I feel that it will be irresistible, and if such a conference is held with men who are in the front and the foremost rank of political India, I am not unhopeful that a solution may be reached satisfactory to Great Britain and India".

Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, returned to India after a leave of a few months in October 1929, and issued a statement refuting the charges of malefide against His Majesty's Government, and his statement concluded, "I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status". This statement made it known to the people of India that a conference was to be convened in which His Majesty's Government would meet representatives both of British India and of the States for arriving at proposals incorporating maximum measure of agreement between them, so that His Majesty's Government, after consulting a Joint Parliamentary Committee, may take its own decision.

The Quaid got busy immediately after the Viceroy's declaration, convinced it was a big opportunity for India, and he should contribute his best in India's struggle for freedom. At his invitation, a meeting of prominent political leaders was held in Bombay in the Chambers of Sir Chimanlal Setalvad. After careful consideration of the Prime Minister's statement, this meeting of leaders issued a statement, to which Jinnah was a signatory, "We have", said the statement, "carefully considered the statement issued by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government and we are of opinion that the declaration that the natural issue of Indian constitutional progress is the attainment of Dominion Status is satisfactory. We appreciate the fundamental change of procedure whereby the representatives of India will be invited to meet His Majesty's Government in conference for the purpose of arriving at the greatest possible measure of agreement regarding the proposals to be submitted to Parliament for the attainment of Dominion Status by India and thereby reaching a solution which might carry the willing assent of political India. We trust that the representatives of India who will be invited to meet His Majesty's Government will be such as will command the confidence of the people of India". M. C. Chagla, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, M. R. Jayakar, and Chimanlal Setalvad were among others that signed the above statement.

The Congress met simultaneously at Delhi and issued a press statement that Congress would participate in the Round Table Conference in London only if it was previously agreed that India would be granted full Dominion Status; if the majority of India's representatives at the Conference were Congressmen; and grant of general amnesty to all political prisoners. Years later, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote, "The Congress people considered them to be essential, the *sine qua non*, without which there could be no cooperation. For them they represented the minimum required. It was well known that Government was not likely to accept the conditions laid down by us, and our position would thus be stronger and we could easily carry our Right Wing with us."¹⁴⁰

Jinnah in a letter pleaded with Motilal Nehru that the Congress should abjure such a position, which they knew was unacceptable, lest the chance of India fighting her battle at the Round Table Conference in London should receive a grievous setback, as indicated by recent debates in the House of Lords.

The Viceroy was in a serious predicament, as the Congress had rejected the offer made by the Prime Minister. Lord Irwin was one of those few Viceroys, who were sincere friends of India, and he was anxious to have opportunities to meet Indian leaders like Jinnah, the two Nehrus, and particularly Gandhi.

Jinnah, a shrewd student of Indian constitutional advancement, realized that Gandhi had given a lead to the congress which was harmful in the larger interests of India. He got into touch with Valabh Patel, President of the Central Assembly, and both together undertook the journey to Sabarmati Ashram, near Ahmadabad, where Gandhi had his headquarters, living a life of extreme austerity. They met him on 12th December and pleaded and argued with Gandhi, trying to convince him that his stand was detrimental to India and that he should allow the Congress to be represented at the Round Table Conference, without laying down prerequisite conditions, which he knew full well the British would never accept. Their mission did not succeed in view of Gandhi's obduracy over obtaining prior commitment from the British for grant of Dominion Status. However, the two leaders, along with Pandit Motilal Nehru, proceeded to Delhi to meet Lord Irwin. In the meantime tempers of some young revolutionaries had been roused all over India, and a bomb attempt was made on the life of Lord Irwin as his train moved on its way to Delhi. The creed of violence was rearing its head, in spite of Gandhi's belief that non-cooperation would continue to be non-violent. However, the three leaders met the Viceroy on 23rd December and they conveyed to him the views of Gandhi. Lord Irwin was prepared to go as far as he could, conceding Gandhi's demand for releasing all political prisoners, but saying that the declaration for guarantee of Dominion Status was outside his competence. Gandhi was in no mood to yield either to requests by such eminent Indian leaders as Jinnah, Nehru and Patel or to the assurance of the Viceroy to trust him to do his best in the interests of India, and the talks failed.

¹⁴⁰ Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru.

The decision of the Congress session when it met at Lahore on 31st December was, therefore, a foregone conclusion, and it adopted an extreme resolution, with complete independence as its creed, and threatened to launch an all-India campaign for "non-payment of taxes" and a more intensified Civil Disobedience offensive. Jinnah was disappointed and issued a press statement expressing his sense of sorrow over the Congress stand, saying it was Gandhi who was responsible for the outbursts of political hysteria and that he was mentally and constitutionally incapable of learning and unlearning things". He expressed the hope that enlightened Indian opinion would, however, not lose this opportunity and accept the Viceroy's offer.

Gandhi stood so well entrenched in the Congress that he was literally its dictator, and no resolution could be moved without his prior approval, or adopted if he opposed it, and so he could afford to ignore Jinnah. Explaining his rejection of the peace moves, Gandhi wrote that he was not afraid of the dire consequences that were threatened by the bureaucracy, and that he had taken into account that factor. "Both have counted the cost. They are out for suffering ... I know (that the non-violent revolutionary like me impedes the progress of the violent revolutionary ... I must admit my inconsistencies ... As for my leadership, if I have it, it has not come for any seeking, it is a fruit of faithful service. A man can as little discard such leadership as he can the color of his skin. And since I have become an integral part of the nation, it has to keep me with all my faults and shortcomings, of some of which I am painfully conscious and of many others of which candid critics, thanks be to them, never fail to remind me".

Jinnah was bewildered at the attitude of this man, who had so much political power in his hands, but who was out to use it to achieve political objectives through the eccentricity of his own methods. He got busy, working with his own colleagues, with the result that when the All-India Muslim League Council met in February, it welcomed the declaration of the Viceroy, thus assuring its cooperation in the R.T.C. talks.

On the other hand in the same month the Congress launched its Civil Disobedience Movement and Gandhi thundered with an ultimatum that unless within seven days the Viceroy acceded to all his eleven points, he would ask the entire country to launch an all-out civil resistance movement. The ultimatum period was over, and his points had not been accepted, and he began his march to Dandi, on foot, to break selected laws. Two months later, he discovered that his campaign was not yielding the results he had anticipated and wrote that the campaign was not with a view to win independence, "But to arm the people with the power to do so "

India was in a state of turmoil due to the Civil Disobedience Movement, and the hand of authority at the centre seemed to have weakened, when suddenly on 5th May Gandhi was arrested and lodged in jail.

While Gandhi's movement for the eradication of untouchability, as a result of which Hinduism would stand consolidated, invited on him and the Congress opposition of caste-Hindus, it strengthened his hands on the other hand by various socio-reformist movements that came into being as a result of his efforts. There was an unprecedented awakening among *harijans* and on the crest of the wave of this regeneration. Dr. Ambedkar came to the forefront as a political leader of All-India importance.

A new organization, known as the Muslim Conference, was announced under the presidentship of Maulvi Mohammad Yacub to consider what should be the stand of Muslims at the proposed Round Table Conference; and there was also called an All-Parties Conference, under the presidentship of Tej Bahadur Sapru to discuss the same subject.

In the meantime the Viceroy made an announcement before a joint session of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Central Legislature defining the status and powers of Indian representatives at the R.T.C., as also the scope of discussions at the Conference. He assured the Central Legislators that the views of Indian representatives would receive due consideration, and after they have been taken into full account, His Majesty's Government would pronounce its decision on the Scheme of New Reforms to be introduced in India. This was received with mixed feelings in the country, and different political parties reacted to it differently. Jinnah and his associates were among those that felt satisfied at the assurances held out by the Viceroy, and he along with his friends accepted to attend the First Round Table Conference to be held in London.

His Majesty's Government nominated, besides the Indian States delegation, fifty-seven leaders to represent British India. Sixteen of them were Muslims, notable among them being the Quaid, the Aga Khan, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Fazlul Huq. Begum Shah Nawaz was the only Muslim lady representative, while Mrs. Subbarayan represented Hindu women. The Conference was inaugurated by His Majesty the King Emperor at a public session in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords on 12th November 1930.

Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister of England, was elected Chairman of the Conference, who concluded his opening speech by saying, "We must now begin our labors. Things have been said in the past, whether in anger, in blindness or for mischief, which we had better forget at this table. Whatever be the story that is to be written of this Conference, be assured a story will be written. Let us strive to make it worthy of the best political genius of our peoples and to add it to the respect paid by the world to both our nations."

Jinnah was among the first to take the floor on the opening day and, while reciprocating sentiments of sincerity expressed by the Prime Minister, he said, "India expects translation and fulfillment of these declarations into action ... I hope that all parties and interests and communities concerned will bring to bear upon the task before us all

the assurances of mutual trust, practical sagacity and statesmanship which they can command ... I am glad we are here to witness the birth of a New Dominion of India..."

The formalities of the opening ceremony over, the Conference started general discussion in the plenary session whether India should have a federal or a unitary form of Government. On 20th November. Jinnah took part in the debate and his introductory remarks gave clear indication that he was at the R.T C. to do some plain talking to the British, "The first point I should like to deal with is the point with regard to the moral claims of Great Britain on the one side and the sins of omission and commission by Great Britain on the other In a Conference like this, one should put our point of view frankly ... and without wounding anybody's feelings and, therefore, I shall avoid any kind of bitterness." He indicated there were people in the British Indian delegation, who would not hesitate to advocate India's claims fearlessly. Replying to the fears expressed by Lord Peel that the Congress had boycotted the Conference and would wreck the reforms, and, therefore, Britain should pause and think before embarking on a fresh constitutional scheme, he replied "Let me tell you ... without mincing words there is no section ... there is not one section in India that has not emphatically declared that India must have a full measure of self-government." Speaking about the reforms, he said, "We must have regard to facts and realities ... We are here to hammer out a constitution for India, which will satisfy the people of India". Defining his concept of self-government, he said it was "not an abstract thing, it is a business proposition." Dwelling at length on a constitution suitable for India, he said, "You cannot possibly frame any constitution, unless you have provided safeguards for the rights and interests which exist in India. First, there is the minority question ... and unless you secure willing cooperation and allegiance to the State (of the minorities), no Constitution that you may frame will work successfully ... The Mussalmans demand safeguards for their community."

After the general discussion, the Conference broke up into nine committees, and Jinnah opted to serve on three of them—the Committees on Federal Structure, Defence, and Sindh. His greatest contribution was in the work of the committees, which laid the basis for the future constitution of India

Under the contemplated reforms, it was for the first time that the British were agreeable to allow Defence to go partially out of their control in India. Jinnah was anxious to pin the representative of Britain in the Committee on Defence, in order to get the necessary concessions out of them. He said, "Sir, I want to make it clear that under this paragraph what I understand is that when you say that the Governor-General shall be responsible for Defence, as far as I am concerned it will only mean that so far as the control of the military is concerned it will rest with him, but there will be many other questions which will come under the word Defence, such as the question of Indianisation, the question of the reconstitution or reorganization of the Army, the question of the financial adjustments that may have to be made, the question of the use of the troops, questions with regard to the policy and legislation which may relate to Defence. All those

questions cannot be taken away from the purview of the Legislature. To what extent what is covered by this general word "Defence" will be distributed between the different bodies which are contemplated in the constitution, such as the Cabinet, the Legislature and the Crown, is a matter which will require a definite scheme to be framed, and a scheme which will enable these different authorities to coordinate for these various purposes. That is all I have to say with regard to this paragraph."

In the Committee of the whole Conference, when it was discussing the Report of the Committee on Federal structure on 15th January 1931, Jinnah said in regard to the powers of the Governor-General, "Sir, this paragraph deals with the Governor-General's special powers. Now, sir, with regard to this I wish it be noted that the Governor-General should not have any power to legislate by means of ordinances. The only power that should be given to the Governor-General which he can exercise should be intervention in the case of grave emergency which is likely to endanger the peace and tranquility of the country. I agree to no other power in the Governor-General".

He proceeded to say he did not agree that the Governor-General's previous sanction should be necessary for the Central Legislature to introduce a Bill to amend the Currency and Coinage Acts. He also opposed giving powers to the Governor-General pending coming into being of the Reserve Bank of India. He continued, "There is one more word I want to say and then I have done. If you are going to put safeguards of this character, I say it is born of suspicion and distrust. If you are going to have a responsible ministry composed of 7 men, and if you are going to have the representatives of British India chosen as is contemplated in this report, and so on—it is true you have not definitely fixed the franchise, but I think I am right in saying that the general opinion was that the present franchise should not be disturbed—if you have this composite form of Executive and Legislature, and still you want to give these over-riding special powers to the Governor-General to interfere with the entire financial policy of the Government of India, I say that is born of suspicion and mistrust".

He opposed the provision for the dismissal of a ministry by two-thirds majority, and gave his reasons, saying, "With regard to this paragraph on the vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet, I have no hesitation in saying that I cannot agree to two-thirds. You will make your Ministry practically irremovable. I do not want to go into the arguments, but I am strongly opposed to that. Then the next point was made by one of the speakers, and that point was this – that he was not wedded to two-thirds, but that there should be some specific majority. I am equally opposed to that, and I say that you must allow your Legislature to determine. as it is stated here, not by a snatch-vote but as a responsible Legislature. I think that any responsible Legislature is not likely to turn out a Ministry by one vote in the ordinary course. It is possible. I do not know whether you, Mr. Prime Minister, remember any occasion on which the Cabinet in this country went out of office by one vote only. I say in the ordinary course it is not practical. It says here. "But the sub-committee are of opinion that some means should be devised whereby, in

the interests of stability an adverse vote should not on every occasion necessarily involve the resignation of the Ministry, and that the subject should be further explored". Sir, I am absolutely opposed to a majority of two-thirds or any specific majority being laid down in the Statute".

Speaking in the committee on Burma, he said he was in agreement that Burma should be separated, as the people of Burma wanted to separate. He said, "All I have to say is this. On the occasion when the sub-committee was formed we had not got a great deal of information which has reached us since, and information from very responsible quarters. I entirely agree, speaking for myself, that I understood it was the universal desire of the Burmese people to separate from British India, and if that is the universal desire of the Burmese people I, as representing India, cannot object to it".

The First Round Table Conference was over on 19th January 1931, after adopting the following resolution" –

"The Conference sitting in Plenary Session has received and noted the Reports of the nine sub-committees submitted by the Committee of the whole Conference, with comments thereon. These Reports, provisional though they are, together with the recorded notes attached to them, afford in the opinion of the Conference material of the highest value for use in the framing of a constitution for India, embodying as they do a substantial measure of agreement on the main ground plan, and many helpful indications of the points of detail to be further pursued; and the Conference feels that arrangements should be made to pursue without interruption the work upon which it has been engaged, including the provision in the constitution of adequate safeguards for the Mussalmans, Depressed Classes, Sikhs and all other important minorities."

Sincere efforts were being made by some leading delegates to the First Round Table Conference to settle their differences and present a united front to the British delegation. Quaid-e-Azam, accompanied by his sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, was staying at the Ritz Hotel in London where the Aga Khan, leader of the Muslim delegation, had his permanent suite. It was, therefore, decided to open an office of the Muslim delegation at the same hotel. The Nawab of Bhopal had his own house in London, and his residence became, along with the Aga Khan's suite at the Ritz, the centre for all conciliation meetings, for which Muslim delegates had nominated the Quaid and the Aga Khan to represent their community. Many hours were spent at these confabulations, at which, except the extremist Hindus, all showed a conciliatory spirit to approach every issue in a helpful manner in order to arrive at unanimity. There appeared to be only surface harmony among the Indian delegates; deep-rooted suspicions and divergences of views and outlook were apparent underneath. The Muslim delegation itself was divided in its opinion on the question of Federation, as those that opposed it believed that with the Princes coming into the Federation at a later date, Muslims

would be completely sunk under an overwhelming Hindu majority, thus diminishing the existing political importance of Muslims. Jinnah was opposed to the idea of Federation, but ultimately he yielded to the majority view in the Muslim delegation, and the Aga Khan wrote, "I am happy to think that when within the Muslim delegation we had made our decision in favor of Federation, Mr. Jinnah, who had been its doughtiest opponent, was an inflexibly loyal and irreproachably helpful colleague throughout all the subsequent discussions and negotiations."¹⁴¹

Both the Quaid and the Aga Khan on behalf of the Muslims went to the furthest limit to accommodate the Hindus, among whom similar sentiment was reciprocated by a large number of Hindu representatives. Muslims were even prepared to accept joint electorates, but militant Hindu delegates did not yield to the just demands of the Muslims. Chimanlal Setalvad wrote about these negotiations, "Sapru, Sastri and myself would have agreed immediately to these demands and secured joint electorates. We were, however, seriously disappointed in the attitude of Jayakar and Moonje. We first took up the question of Sindh being made a separate province. Jayakar and Moonje brought forward various conditions which in their view should be fulfilled before Sindh could be a separate province. We occupied several evenings on this one question alone.¹⁴² On his side, the Aga Khan records, "I am certain that Sapru and Sastri, in their heart of hearts, wanted to accept our Muslim proposals, but that they were afraid of their Hindu colleagues and, above all, of the influence of the Mahasabha".¹⁴³

In the absence of Hindu Muslim unity, the real foundation for progressive reforms was lacking; Hindu Mahasabhites failed to rise to the occasion. The Aga Khan writes, "That acceptance denied us, the rest of the first Round Table Conference was not of much essential or practical importance, since the foundation on which its deliberations should have been built was vague and fragile, instead of strong and firm."¹⁴⁴ Setalvad admits, "A great opportunity was thus lost. If Sapru, and myself could have helped it, we would have at once conceded the demands of the Aga Khan and made him and other Muslim representatives sign for joint electorates. If this had happened, the subsequent political history of India would have taken a different turn."¹⁴⁵

When the Second Round Table Conference met in the Autumn of 1931, there had been a change of Government, the King having summoned Ramsay MacDonald to head a National Government, to face a financial and economic crisis that confronted Britain. Lord Irwin was at the time the Viceroy of India and he succeeded in personally persuading Gandhi that the Congress must attend the Second Round Table Conference. Gandhi left for London, as the sole representative of the Congress, and stayed in the

¹⁴¹ *Memoirs*, by the Aga Khan. p. 217, 1954.

¹⁴² *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Setalvad, p. 358, 1946.

¹⁴³ *Memoirs*, by the Aga Khan, p. 218, 1954.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

¹⁴⁵ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Setalvad, p. 359, 1946.

East End with Muriel Lester, one of his English admirers. Setalvad records an interesting incident at one of the meetings of Hindu leaders, where Gandhi was present, "On another occasion when he (Gandhi) said something which betrayed want of knowledge of the bearings of the question that was being discussed, I asked him whether he had ever read the Government of India Act of 1919. He said he had not! Then I put to him, If so, how do you consider yourself competent to express an opinion on the present question the consideration of which requires knowledge of the existing law".¹⁴⁶

The Minorities Committee of the Conference met on 28th September 1931, and on the request of Gandhi, it was agreed to adjourn it as he was in negotiation with the Quaid and the Aga Khan over this question. "This preliminary talk," writes the Aga Khan, "did not take us far Therefore we had a further series of conversation—usually at midnight in my rooms at the Ritz—I myself presiding as host, and Mr. Jinnah and Sir Muhammad Shafi negotiating on one side and Mahatma Gandhi on the other. The story of these discussions is long and not, alas, particularly fruitful. They were informal talks and no record was kept. I said little and left the bulk of the discussion to Mr. Jinnah ... The (Congress) held stubbornly to their one-nation theory, which we knew to be historically insupportable."¹⁴⁷

The Aga Khan despaired over the attitude of the Congress, and Dr. Sitaramayya explains, "He (Gandhi) wanted an assurance from his Mussalman and Sikh friends that they would agree to any future constitution of India being fashioned, only on the basis of Indian Nationalism untainted by any communal considerations."¹⁴⁸ This stand appear so childlike; it was preposterous to expect Muslims to subscribe to this view and thereby commit political suicide.

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal was one of the Muslim delegates to the Second Round Table Conference. With the detached mind of a philosopher, he witnessed the squabbles of warring politicians, engaged in endless hair-splitting. When he took the floor, he spoke eloquently about the mission of the Muslim nation in India. He said, "To base a constitution on the conception of a homogenous India, or to apply the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments, is un-wittingly to prepare her for a civil war.... I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan, amalgamated into a single state ... the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims...."

One wonders how seriously his colleagues took Iqbal's words. One wonders whether in those years of the early thirties, they realized that these words were being spoken by a

¹⁴⁶ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Setalvad, pp. 365-66. 1946.

¹⁴⁷ *Memoirs*, by the Aga Khan, p. 228, 1954.

¹⁴⁸ *The History of the Congress*, by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, p. 859, 1935.

visionary, whom time would prove to be gifted to foresee events before they actually occurred.

Gandhi insisted that before Muslims ask for any guarantees, they should accept the Congress interpretation of Swaraj as the goal of India. Jinnah retorted that as Gandhi was not imposing this condition on the other Hindu members attending the Conference, it was not a fair demand to make. This dialogue went on for quite a few days, and the Aga Khan writes, "Mahatma Gandhi fully recognized the importance of having us in his camp. Who knows – perhaps he might have seen his way to accept our viewpoint, but Pandit Malaviya and the Hindu Mahasabha exerted great pressure against us, deploying arguments based on abstract political doctrines and principles which – as the Partition of 1947 proved – were totally unrelated to the realities of India".¹⁴⁹

When the Minorities Committee assembled on 8th October, Gandhi said, "It is with deep regret and deeper humiliation I have to announce that the negotiations had fallen through," and he proposed that the discussions be adjourned *sine die*. Dr. Ambedkar, leader of the Depressed Classes, replied to Gandhi's proposal, saying, "The Mahatma has been always claiming that the Congress stands for the depressed classes and that the Congress represents depressed classes more than I or my colleagues can do. To that claim, I can only say that it is one of the many false claims which irresponsible people keep on making although the persons concerned with regard to these claims have been invariably denying them".

The meeting was adjourned to meet on 13th November, when the Aga Khan on behalf of the Muslims, Depressed Classes, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and the British community presented a memorandum to the Chairman, embodying their agreement on the minorities issue. Gandhi rose immediately to declare that he and the Congress would have nothing to do with this document and they rejected it outright. Gandhi said, "The Congress will wander, no matter how many years, in the wilderness rather than lend itself to this proposal."

While the first Round Table Conference had been a partial success, the second was a dismal failure. Except for many speeches and very little common agreement, much statistical data collected and little by way of agreed solutions, nothing was achieved by it.

Regarding the Quaid's attempts at Hindu-Muslim understanding, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote, "Mr. Jinnah's position at the Round Table Conference was unique. The Hindus thought he was a Muslim communalist, the Muslims took him to be pro-Hindu,

¹⁴⁹ *Memoirs*, by the Aga Khan, p. 229, 1954.

the Princes deemed him to be too democratic. The Britishers considered him a rabid extremist - with the result that he was everywhere but nowhere. None wanted him".

To his work at the two Round Table Conferences, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu paid glowing tribute; she wrote that he was endowed with "the triple assets of a magnetic presence, an impressive delivery and a voice which while lacking in volume has an arresting timbre. He has the cogent force of a brilliant advocate and at Round Table Conferences his genius finds the fullest scope. His extraordinary powers of persuasion, his luminous exposition, his searching arguments, and his impeccable judgment are revealed at their best when he graces a committee with his august presence."

Then came the Third Round Table Conference, officially known as the Joint Select Committee, appointed by Parliament, with the Marquess of Linlithgow as its Chairman, to draw up the Indian Federal Constitution. This Committee met in London in the spring of 1934. Jinnah was not on this Committee and the Congress had boycotted it with the result that Quaid and Gandhi, the only two persons that could speak authoritatively being absent, the Committee failed to achieve the desired result, namely, an agreed constitution through unity. The Aga Khan confessed, "It was, I think, extremely unfortunate that we Muslims did not insist on having Mr. Jinnah with us; had he been a member of the delegation, he might have subscribed to what I consider was the most valuable result of these Round Table Conferences. This was the Joint Memorandum which—for the first time in the history of Indo-British relations—put before the British Government a united demand on behalf of all communities, covering practically every political point at issue."¹⁵⁰

The Aga Khan further writes, "The Muslims" sense of their own political needs and aspirations had been justified and developed by years of discussion and negotiation with British officials and Congress representatives, and the Muslims very rightly followed and gave their full confidence to Jinnah."¹⁵¹

The Joint Memorandum, signed by all non-official Indian delegates, was rejected by the Congress, and, therefore, the British found an excuse to disown, it, and in its place they were busy drafting the Government of India Act of 1935, which was to manifest in its working too many loopholes, enabling the British to interfere in the affairs of India, although rightfully they should have fallen entirely within the competence of the Government of India and the provincial Governments to decide.

In his final summing up, Ramsay MacDonald said to the Conference, "If you cannot present us with a settlement acceptable to all parties as the foundations upon which to build, in that event His Majesty's Government would be compelled to apply a

¹⁵⁰ *Memoirs, by the Aga Khan*, p. 232, 1954.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

provisional scheme, for they are determined that even this disability shall not be permitted to be a bar to progress. This would mean that His Majesty's Government would have to settle for you, not only your I problems of representation but also to decide as wisely and justly as possible what checks and balances the constitution is to contain to protect minorities from an unrestricted and tyrannical use of the democratic principle expressing itself solely through majority power."

On 4th August, 1932, Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, announced in London on behalf of His Majesty's Government the Communal Award by which Muslims obtained certain weightage in the Central and Provincial Assemblies, and it also made certain concessions in so far as the demands of the depressed classes were concerned. The Communal Award, *inter alia*, stated, "(1) In the statement made by the Prime Minister on December last, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, at the close of the second session of the Round Table Conference which was immediately afterwards endorsed by both Houses of Parliament, it made plain that, if the communities in India were unable to reach a settlement acceptable to all parties on communal questions which the Conference had failed to solve, His Majesty's Government were determined that India's constitutional advance should not on that account be frustrated, and they would remove this obstacle by devising and applying themselves a provisional scheme. (2) On March 19 last, His Majesty's Government, having been informed that the continued failure of the communities to reach an agreement was blocking the progress of plans for the framing of the new constitution, stated that they were engaged upon a careful re-examination of the difficult and controversial questions which arise. They are now satisfied that, without the decision at least some aspects of the problems connected with the position of the minorities under the new constitution no further progress can be made with the framing of the constitution. (3) His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that they will include provisions to give effect to the scheme set out below in the proposals relating to the Indian constitution to be laid in due course before Parliament. The scope of this scheme is purposely confined to the arrangements to be made for the representation of British Indian communities in Provincial Legislatures, consideration of representation in the Legislature at the Centre being deferred for the reason given in paragraph 20 below. The decision to limit the scope of the scheme does not imply a failure to realize that the framing of the constitution will necessitate the decision of a number of other problems of great importance to minorities, but has been taken in the hope that, once a pronouncement has been made upon the basic question of the method and proportions of representation, the communities themselves may find it possible to arrive at a *modus vivendi* on the other communal problems which have not as yet received the examination they require. (4) His Majesty's Government wish it be most clearly understood that they themselves can be no parties to any negotiations which may be initiated with a view to the revision of their decision, and will not be prepared to give consideration to any representation aimed at securing a modification of it, which is not supported by all the parties affected. But they are most desirous to close no door to an agreed settlement, should such

happily be forthcoming. If, therefore, before the new Government of India Act is passed into law, they are satisfied that the communities who are concerned are mutually agreed upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of any one or more of the Governor's Provinces, or in respect of the whole of British India, they will be prepared to recommend to Parliament that the alternative should be substituted for the provisions now outlined."

As soon as this statement was issued, Gandhi wrote to the Prime Minister that he would start a fast unto death from 28th September at 12 noon, unless the Award was modified as he desired.

I LIKE STRAIGHT PLAY

Termination of the Round Table Conference coincided almost with the end of Lord Irwin's term as the Viceroy of India, who was to be succeeded by Lord Willingdon. Deliberations over the Conference Table had been a bitter revelation to the Quaid, who could clearly see Hindu ambition at work to dominate Indian politics through sheer force of numbers, in utter disregard of Muslim grievances and aspirations. He also realized it would be the British Government that would now play a decisive role in shaping India's destiny through the new constitutional reforms. He was in two minds whether he should return to India, where the political climate was not congenial to his own way of thinking, or whether he should stay in England. Ultimately he decided to adopt the latter course, and he took up residence at White Hall Court in London, in order to practice before the Privy Council. In a letter dated 31st March 1931 from London, he wrote to Mr. Abdul Matin Choudhury of Assam, "I have come to the conclusion that I can do more useful work here, at any rate for the present. The centre of gravity is here and in next two or three years London will be the most important scene of Indian drama of constitutional reforms. However, I am coming to India in August in any case, and shall consider how the land lies then. You must have got a copy of the blue book showing what my attitude was at the R.T.C."

- (1) Responsibility at the Centre provided Hindu Muslim question is settled.
- (2) Federation, if it can be genuine real one, not artificial or fictitious.
- (3) Safeguards, only those which are necessary to the interests of India.
- (4) Defence—definite scheme which will lead to India taking it over within a reasonable time.

"I have not agreed to safeguards proposed nor to the all India Federation on the lines so far explored. These two questions require all the care and statesmanship to handle. Now, with regard to the Assembly. Well I am glad to find that you and others have such regard for me. I appreciate it more than I can express in words, but I think I can do more useful work here at present. You must have read that they have decided to hold a meeting of the Federal Structure Committee here in summer and R.T.C. soon thereafter. I think, our people if they are well advised should not allow any delay but agree to meet here in May, and proceed with the R.T.C. soon thereafter. Our opponents are playing for time and wish to put off the matter and we should not play in their hands."

Jinnah came to India in September and in a public meeting in Bombay, he said, "I am an Indian first, and a Muslim afterwards. But at the same time I agree that no Indian can ever serve his country if he neglects the interests of the Muslims, because it is by making Muslims strong, by bringing them together, by encouraging them and by making them useful citizens of the State that you will be able to serve your country. What is a State? What is representative Government? Does it mean that the seventy million Muslims should be tied hand and foot in a constitution where a particular class of Hindus can possibly tyrannize over and deal with them as they like? Is that representative Government? Is that democratic Government? Certainly not".

He warned the Hindus not to ignore the Muslims and the untouchables, but to befriend them by being generous towards them. He continued, "I have no eye on any party. I have no mind for popularity. I can tell you honestly that the Hindus are foolish, utterly foolish in the attitude they have adapted today". He said he was glad to learn that Gandhi would be attending the Second Round Table Conference in London, and so would he. Dwelling on the role of certain Hindu leaders at the First Round Table Conference, he said, "The bulk of the Hindus have lost their heads and their mentality, perhaps you may not know, but I know it. I assure you that unless Hindus will have the courage and confidence—they are afraid of Muslims - this India will never get Swaraj. It is not the joint or separate electorates or five or ten seats. Hindus have not the necessary courage and Hindus are afraid of Muslims."

He deplored the attitude of Hindus over the question of Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal, "I like straight play. Tell me that I do not want to give you a majority in the Punjab and Bengal. Hindus do not say that. They say, you can have a majority with joint electorates, Hindus know perfectly well that Muslims have got only forty percent of voters in these provinces."

After staying in India for a while, he was once again leaving for London, and in an interview to the Times of India, he said, "The success or failure of the Round Table Conference is entirely dependent upon the consideration of the Hindu-Muslim question. I hope that we may be able to settle the question and further trust that the demands of every minority will be met in a manner that will give that particular community a sense of security and secure its willing allegiance to the constitution. The problem of the future constitution of India is stupendous and one feels there are rocks ahead, but given good-will and determination, we may yet find a solution which will bring peace and prosperity to the people of India. I am not likely to return for a considerably long time. Nevertheless, India's welfare and her future progress will be constantly nearest my heart. I shall spare no efforts to serve India."

He was a lawyer by profession, and after the Second Round Table Conference he was busy with his work before the Privy Council, but his heart was in Indian politics, which was his true love. Away from the Indian scene, he must have constantly thought of the

future of Muslims, and about the fate of India's freedom. An insight into his mind is revealed in a letter he wrote to Abdul Matin Choudhury on 2nd March 1932 from London, "It never rains but pours so suddenly. I have got two letters from you, one after the other. I was pleased to hear from you and learn the news. Do keep me in touch with things. Of course, we get news every day of the happenings in India but it is not the same. Yet one can read between the lines. The Mussalmans must stand united and I agree that there should be one organization. I hope you would succeed in the amalgamation scheme. If the Muslim leaders know how to play their cards, I am sure the community will get what they want and after all it is not much. You cannot live on safeguards, but on your own merits and exertions. The community is very backward and has to make up a lot. As regards the Hindus I think they are very ill-advised not to concede to the Mahomedans their safeguards. They are creating more difficulties in their own way and postponing the day when India shall get her freedom and very much strengthening those who are opposed to self-government. However, there it is! The only course open to the Mussalmans now is that they must with one voice stand by 14 points and not be made a tool in the hands of anyone. Responsibility at the Centre, provided our safeguards are incorporated in the Constitution. But don't fall into the trap of Provincial Autonomy First and Central responsibility will be considered later. It will not succeed. The British want our cooperation and support, it can only be on our safeguards plus responsibility at the Centre being agreed to. If Hindus want our cooperation and support it can only be on their agreeing to our safeguards and Self-Government within the British Commonwealth of Nations. We cannot support one or the other except on these terms. If we are not wanted by either, let them do what they like and we shall not be a consenting party. I am sure they cannot ignore 80 millions, especially if they stand together to organize themselves. With kind regards from my sister and self. Dina is at School".

The correspondence between the Quaid and Choudhury, during the period of his self-imposed exile in England, indicates he trusted Matin Choudhury more than anyone else for a proper and impartial appraisal of the Indian situation. On 5th May 1932, he wrote to Choudhury, "Many thanks for yours of the 16th April. I am now looking to you for supplying me with the information regarding the situation in India. I know I can rely upon you more than anybody else for its correctness. So far your letters have been very useful and I hope you will continue without fail.

"I have nothing fresh to add to what I wrote to you some time ago. Of course, here the Government is marking time and awaiting the reports of the three committees.

"The winter is over and we are having a nice time now. I am more settled, doing my work and I am getting on nicely, but my heart is in India."

In another letter from West Heath House, West Heath Road, Hampstead, he wrote to Choudhury on 1st December 32, "My thanks for your letter which was very useful, as

you explain matters so clearly ... Keep me in touch with what is going on ... With kind regards from Miss Jinnah and myself."

Alan Campbell-Johnson writes that as he was to accompany Lord Mountbatten to India, he was preparing himself to become acquainted with the political background of the country. In this connection he met a number of people in England, among whom was Sir George Schuster, who at one time was Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, when Lord Halifax had been the Viceroy of India. Based on his talks with Sir Schuster, Campbell-Johnson writes, "He (Schuster) felt that the tragedy was the lack of first-class Moslem leadership. He recalled that Jinnah had been a complete failure at the Round Table Conference in 1930—so much so, that he did not see fit to return to India for some time afterwards, but instead lived in semi-retirement in Scotland with his sister, where Schuster recalls encountering them on more than one occasion."¹⁵² It is obvious from Quaid's letters to Abdul Matin Choudhury at the time that his residential address during that period was London, where he was practicing before the Privy Council, and not Scotland. Sir George Schuster's information about the residence of the Quaid from 1931 to 1934 is as inaccurate as his estimate of his qualities of leadership and of his work at the Round Table Conference.

In the meantime the absence of Jinnah was being felt by Muslims, for they lacked a leader of his caliber to keep them together, and they had already split asunder into many factional political groups, each running counter to the other. It was at this stage that Abdul Matin Choudhury wrote to the Quaid to return to India and to take up the leadership of the Muslims and to unite them on one platform. In reply to his pleadings, the Quaid wrote to him on 30th March 33, "My congratulations. I was so pleased that you have succeeded in getting the Deputy Presidentship.

"As regards other matters, I thank you for all the information. Yes, I have received a telegram, and of course I appreciate the compliment paid to me by the League, but I cannot return to India before December next. Besides I don't see what I can do there at present. You very rightly suggest that I should enter the Assembly. But is there much hope in doing anything there? These are questions which still make me feel that there is no room for my services in India, yet I am sorry to repeat, but there is no chance of doing anything to save India till the Hindus realize the true position. It is within their power to change the situation. The reactionary forces must and will flourish. They are increasing and will gain more and more ground. Mussalmans are driven away and must fall into the hands of our opponents. The key is held by the Hindus and they alone can turn the tide by a wise and bold stroke of policy. The position with regard to the future constitutional developments is obvious. Provincial Autonomy only, Federation will remain suspended in the air. The Hindus are being fooled. But if by chance any

¹⁵² *Mission With Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 32, 1951: Robert Hale Ltd., London.

scheme goes through, it will be worse than what is at present and those who are now supporting will find that they have been deceived.

"Thank you for four suggestion that I should try and stand for election as Sir Ibrahim is going to resign. Well! I can't say till I come to India as I am to in December, at any rate for a few months.

"I gather from the newspapers that the Hindu attitude is changing, though somewhat slowly, but things are moving too fast here; and it would be too late.

"It is said that all our efforts have gone in vain and there is a tremendous setback, but at present there is nothing to save the situation. We are not capable of swift actions, and too slow to retrace our steps. It is inorganic state of society and divided political schools of thought that is responsible for it. But do keep me in touch with things. Your letters are very informing and most useful to me."¹⁵³

Once again Choudhury wrote to him that a large section of Muslims wanted him back and Jinnah wrote on 27th April 1933, "I was asked to come to India. But to do what? There is nothing concrete."

However, Quaid returned to India in April 1934 and he immediately plunged himself in active politics. Pyarelal writes, "Jinnah who had retired from politics and taken to Privy Council practice in England after the Second Round Table Conference was invited to return to lead the Muslims".¹⁵⁴ Presiding over the meeting of the Council of All-India Muslim League in the same month, he exhorted the Muslims of India to sink their differences and to join the League which alone could safeguard their rights and interests. The question before the Council was to define its attitude on the Communal Award, and its resolution on the subject accepted it "so far as it goes until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities and parties." He paid a glowing tribute to the growing political consciousness of Muslim India in condemning the Communal Award, and said in a press statement, "The problem of problems which still confronts us is how to avert the Award being foisted upon India. That cannot be achieved, until there is unity between Hindus and Muslims. Nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete cooperation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims," for which he said he had the solid backing of Muslims. He continued, "Muslims are in no way behind any other Community in their demand for national self-government. The crux of the whole issue, therefore, is whether we can completely assure Muslims that safeguards to which they attach vital importance will be embodied in the future constitution of India".

¹⁵³ The above letters are taken from the *Eastern Herald*, Sylhet, dated 28th December, 1963.

¹⁵⁴ *Mahatma Gandhi*, by Pyarelal, p. 79, 1956: Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmadabad.

He got into touch with some Hindu leaders to bring into being a common platform between Hindus and Muslims to force the hands of the British before the reforms were announced. But all his efforts resulted in no concrete achievement. He was bitterly disappointed and he felt the fate of his country was doomed because of continued bitterness that the Hindus had for Muslims, who would rather have the perpetuation of British Raj in India than accede to the demands of the Muslims in order to allay their fears. Unhappy over the state of affairs in India, he soon left for England.

Towards the end of 1934, India was once again in the midst of elections to the Central Legislative Assembly. The left wing of the Congress was powerful, and Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, young, energetic, with socialist leanings, came to play an important role in the shaping of Congress policies. Gandhi was giving attention to his work in the wilder field of socio-economic service than to work within the legislatures, and the Congress was a divided house. At this time the Hindu Mahasabha emerged as a powerful force and decided to enter its own party candidates for the Assembly. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Aney left the Congress due to their differences with the Congress on the Communal Award and started building up a party of their own for the Assembly elections.

In 1933 Gandhi had undertaken a fast unto death, as the Communal Award had granted separate representation to the depressed classes. His fast had entered its fifth day; Congress and Hindu leaders redoubled their efforts to bring about an understanding with the depressed classes over the Communal Award. A conference was convened in Poona, where Congress, Hindu, and Scheduled Caste leaders under Dr. Ambedkar came to an agreement known as the Poona Pact, whereby the depressed classes had to forego separate electorates and to content themselves with contesting in the general constituencies of Hindus, with certain safeguards. The Poona agreement was accepted by the British Government, and Gandhi, by a threat of fast unto death, kept the depressed classes, politically speaking, within the Hindu fold.

India was passing through a period of increasing political unrest, and the Government was ruling the country through ordinances, in utter disregard of popular sentiment. Some Congress leaders began to realize the futility of boycotting the legislatures and there was a growing feeling among them as the 1934 general elections were approaching that they must enter the Council with a view to fight an unsympathetic Government. With this end in view the Congress resolved that such of the Congressmen as believed in entering the Assemblies should organize the All-India Swaraj Party and fight the elections on two main issues—to get repressive laws repealed and the White Paper rejected. Ultimately in the general elections the Congress Party captured 44 seats and the Congress Nationalist Party 11 seats.

Muslims, by far and large, were divided into two rival parties, the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. But saner counsels prevailed among

Muslims, and the executive of the two organizations met at Simla, to organize a common platform and to fight the elections jointly. A joint election manifesto was drafted, which exhorted the Muslims all over India to stand united; to demand separate electorates; to agitate for adequate representation of Muslims in Government services; to continue to press for the creation of Sindh into a separate province; for reforms in Baluchistan.

Muslim unity thus achieved, it was felt there would be no one adequately suited to lead the Muslims in the Assembly, and the absence of Jinnah from the Indian scene was painfully felt by all politically conscious Muslims. Abdul Matin Choudhury had begged the Quaid to return to India and to lead the Muslims, as also did some other leaders, including Liaquat Ali Khan, who saw the Quaid personally in London in this connection. In the meantime his constituency, Bombay, was most anxious to have him represent it in the Assembly. With this end in view a meeting of leading Muslims was convened at the residence of Abu Bucker Beg Mohammad, and it was unanimously decided to send a telegram to Jinnah in London to give his consent, so that his nomination paper could be filed in time. The Quaid agreed and on the date of scrutiny of nomination papers, 11th October 1934, he was the only one to have filed his nomination, and consequently he was returned unopposed to the Central Assembly.

Most of the Muslim members elected joined the Independent Party, whose total strength was 22, 18 of them were Muslims, and the Quaid was elected its leader. The Government of India was in a dilemma, for it could muster maximum strength of some 55 members, while the Hindus, the Congress and the Congress Swaraj Party could also command about an equal number of votes. Thus the Independent Party of 22 occupied a key position in the new Legislature, and on its attitude largely depended the fate of all questions that came up for decision in the House.

As soon as the House met, Sir N. N. Sircar, on behalf of the Government, moved that the House do consider the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on constitutional Reforms for India. There was keen lobbying, and the various parties initiated conciliatory talks with other groups and parties. Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Congress Party, had moved a number of amendments to the main proposition, the burden of which was that the reforms denied a real measure of transfer of power from British to Indian hands and that it was merely a palliative by the Imperial rulers to lull the sense of growing consciousness of the Indian masses.

On behalf of the Independent Party, the Quaid moved amendments to the effect that the Communal Award was to be accepted until the various communities of India come forward with an agreed solution. The amendment expressed its disapproval of the Scheme of Provincial Government; it condemned the grant of special powers to the Governors and keeping the departments of secret service and Intelligence under the direct control of the Governors, thus making Provincial Assemblies ineffective. As

regards Federation, the amendment said, "With respect to the scheme of the Central Government, called 'All-India Federation', this House is clearly of opinion that it is fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable to the people of British India, and therefore recommends to the Government of India to advise His Majesty's Government not to proceed with any legislation based on this scheme and urges that immediate efforts should be made to consider how best to establish in British India alone a real and complete Responsible Government, and with that view, take steps to review the whole position in consultation with Indian opinion without delay".

Moving his amendment, Jinnah explained that his party was accepting the Communal Award in the absence of an agreed and willing alternate solution, and as soon as it was forthcoming they would scrap the Award. "My self-respect will never be satisfied until we produce our own scheme. Do not relegate me only to God, but take me into consideration also".

Speaking in the Central Assembly on his amendments on 7th February 1935, Jinnah said, "I was not invited to the later sittings of the (Round Table) Conference, because I was the strongest opponent of the (Federal) Scheme." He made a brilliant exposition why he was not accepting the scheme for Federation, which the Congress was inclined to accept, and he said, "When it suits the Home Member, when it suits the Government, they say that the Congress represents the whole of India. When it suits them, they say that the Congress is only rebels and a minority in this country. Where do I come in?" He made a magnanimous gesture towards those Indian representatives, who had associated themselves with the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, "I do not challenge for a single moment that some of the Indian gentlemen, who associated with the Joint Parliamentary Committee were patriots. They were men for whom I have respect, however much I may disagree with them. They tried their very best". He concluded his speech by making an impressioned appeal to the Congress. "Modify the Provincial Scheme; drop the Central Scheme, and review the whole position in consultation with Muslim opinion with a view to establishing complete responsible Government in British India".

Sharp differences in the viewpoint of the Congress and of the Independent Party, most of whom were Muslims, became apparent from the first day the debate started. Jinnah piloted the Muslim viewpoint in this all-important discussion with the consummate skill of a formidable parliamentarian. The Congress was outvoted in all divisions, and Jinnah asked that his three amendments should be separately voted upon. The procedure was adopted by the House, and all the three amendments were adopted, thus giving Jinnah great personal triumph at a critical period of the history of the Muslims of India. He proved in this debate that the Muslims were solidly with the League, and looked upon the Congress as an organization hostile to their legitimate demands.

The Assembly adopted the amendment moved by Jinnah on the Communal Award, the Congress amendment on the same having been defeated. The second and third clauses of the Quaid's amendment were put together and were carried by 74 votes against 58. Speaking on the latter two paras, the Law Member, Sircar, said, "Now, sir, I was going to say that instead of the honest, direct and frontal attack which comes from my friend, Mr. Desai, we have this disingenuous and indirect attack from my Hon. friend Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, although directed on the identical purpose. My Hon. friend knows perfectly well that although, in form, it is an attack only on half, yet in substance, in effect, there is no difference in the amendment of my Hon. friend, Mr. Jinnah, and the amendment of the Congress leaders."

The Congress realized the importance of coming to terms with the Muslims, for the R.T.C. talks and the assembly debate had convinced them they could not ride roughshod over the Muslim point of view. Babu Rajendra Prasad, Congress President, approached Quaid-e-Azam with a view to evolving a scheme acceptable to the Congress and the League. The Unity talks between the two leaders took place in January and February 1935. The two leaders were sincere in their efforts and so were most of their colleagues. But the vested interests of the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal, backed by the impossible stand of the Sikhs, brought the Unity talks to an unsuccessful end, and the two organizations drifted apart. The Unity talks ended, "Much to the disappointment of the country", comments Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya.

Jinnah had won on the floor of the House, but outside he had to face a hostile press, which was preponderantly pro-Congress, and some of his own co-religionists also expressed fears that his stand in the debate over the Communal Award in the Assembly had not been correct or wise. Explaining his reasons, he said in a public meeting in Delhi that he was for Hindu-Muslim unity, that he had always been for it, all his life. "If we can achieve this unity, believe me, half the battle of the country's freedom is won. So long as Hindus and Muslims are not united, there is no hope for India, and we shall both remain slaves of foreign domination." On another occasion, addressing a meeting in Bombay, he said he was sorry there were some Congressmen who doubted the patriotism of Muslims, but he wanted to assure them that this was far from being true, "The Hindu Mahasabha has made the position of both Muslims and of the Congress difficult". It was this Hindu mentality, he said, which must undergo a complete change, "When this great country gets self-government, are we to be under the rule of the Hindus? ... It is not going to be a Hindu Government, but an Indian Government, in which Muslims will not only have a fair and just share, but they will also be treated as equals of Hindus." But the press continued its tirade of vilification against him as an 'enemy' of India's fight for freedom. Towards the end of April 1935, he left Bombay once again and sailed by the Italian boat *Conte Verde* for Europe, to continue his practice before the Privy Council.

While Jinnah was in England, His Majesty's Government enacted the Government of India Act of 1935, which received the Royal assent on 2nd July 1935, and it appeared to him that the cause of India had received a severe setback in the face of this retrogressive Act. It is necessary to recall that the Conservative Government, with Sir Samuel Hoare as the Secretary of State for India, had eliminated from the list of invitees to the Third Round Table Conference the name of the Quaid. According to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, the reason they "dropped Jinnah was that they found him and others like Sastri, Chintamani and myself too unyielding for them."¹⁵⁵

As the Quaid studied the Government of India Act, he found that the Joint Memorandum submitted by the British Indian delegation, headed by the Aga Khan, had been completely ignored by the British Government. Among the demands made in the Memorandum was that the preamble of the contemplated Act should contain a provision that the goal of political constitution of India was full Dominion Status. Experts as the British were at stifling Indian aspirations, they resorted to an ingenious device by saying that the preamble of the 1919 Act was quite sufficient for the purpose, and a most unusual course was adopted by the British Parliament by repealing the entire Act of 1919, but retaining its preamble, thus obviating the constitutional necessity of having any preamble in the 1935 Act. Among other anti-Indian features of the Act, it made stringent provisions to safeguard the vested commercial interests of the British in India, and in this regard it deprived the Indian Legislatures from passing any laws detrimental to British shipping and trading interests.

It must be mentioned here that the Working Committee of the Congress after carefully studying the White Paper had rejected it in *toto*, making severe strictures against the Communal Award and condemning it in no unmistakable terms. The resolution, among other things stated, "The only satisfactory alternative to the White Paper is a constitution drawn up by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage The White Paper lapsing, the Communal Award must lapse automatically." When the Joint Parliamentary Committee Scheme was published, the Working Committee of the Congress called it as being even worse than the proposals in the White Paper.

The Quaid returned to Bombay from England on 24th October 1935, and he told the press, "The Government of India Bill has now become an Act, and we all know that the Constitution has been forced upon us. It is now the duty of various leaders to put their heads together and chalk out a definite and common policy with regard to the constitution." He took up threads of Indian politics from where he had left them, and he was soon in close contact with Muslim leaders and others. He resumed his duties as a member of the Central Assembly with his usual zeal and was in the forefront in attacking Government policies, whenever the occasion demanded. At that time an Imperial Preference Conference was to be held in Ottawa in Canada and India was to be

¹⁵⁵ *Recollections and Rejections*, by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, p. 383,

represented by non-official delegates. The Quaid was apprehensive that Indian commercial and economic interests would be adversely effected by the Ottawa Agreement and he condemned the British in forcing India to accept an Agreement which would be obviously against her own interests.

In the meantime an event in Lahore brought about an ugly communal situation, and Muslims and Sikhs were engaged in mutual recriminations. There was a mosque in Lahore, Shahidganj Mosque, which was in the possession of Sikhs, and the Muslims wanted to get it back so as to continue to use it as a mosque. Communal tempers ran high and the situation was taking an ugly and dangerous turn. Jinnah rushed to Lahore to use his personal influence with the two communities in bringing about an agreed solution. He warned the Muslims that with the advent of the 1935 Act, Muslims must remain united and give all their attention to the political problems facing them. He sympathized with Muslim sentiments and could well understand why they had started a full-scale civil disobedience movement over the Shahidganj Mosque.

He acted as the representative of Muslims to negotiate with the Government and the Sikhs with a view to arrive at a settlement. His first demand was that the Government must set free all prisoners arrested in connection with the Shahidganj agitation in order to make them receptive to any reasonable compromise. The Government agreed and all prisoners, except those that had been found guilty of violence, were to be released. Action taken against the Muslim press was also to be revoked and an atmosphere congenial for carrying on negotiations was created. Upon this the Muslims abandoned the civil disobedience movement and the province was once again returning to normal. On this Jinnah said, "I am personally thankful to the Governor and the Government of the Punjab for giving me all help and assistance." Addressing a huge congregation of Muslims at Badshahi Mosque, he said, "While we are not going to give up our claim for Shahidganj Mosque, we are going to make every effort for an honorable understanding with the sister-community. We shall seek all remedies by means of constitutional and peaceful methods". A Shahidganj Conciliation Committee, consisting of representatives of the three communities was appointed, and Jinnah left Lahore on 7th March 1936 to attend a session of the Central Assembly in Delhi. On his departure, he issued a press statement in which he once again appealed to the two communities to maintain a peaceful atmosphere in the province. "This is not a dispute between two individuals, but between two great communities, and it must take some time to ascertain the general wishes of the people". Among the Muslim representatives on this Conciliation Committee were Allama Iqbal and Nawab Ahmed Yar Khan Daultana. On the appointment of the Conciliation Committee, the Governor of the Punjab, said, "I am greatly indebted to the efforts of Mr. Jinnah for this improvement in the situation. I wish to pay an unqualified tribute to the work he has done and is doing".

The question that faced the Congress was whether they would contest the elections to the Assemblies under the 1935 Act after having rejected the Communal Award.

Congress opinion at first oscillated between various possibilities, and it was now crystallizing in favor of capturing the Assemblies. On Jinnah fell the responsibility of giving a lead to the Muslims in this regard. He had unequivocally expressed his views against the contemplated Federation and against certain other features of the Act. "The Government has foisted these reforms against the will of all parties, because Indians were not united and they failed to settle their domestic quarrels", he said. He appealed to all political parties, even at that late hour, to try to settle their differences, to evolve an agreed scheme, which would take the place of the 1935 Act. He said, "No constitution is permanent, Constitutions are made by men, but men are not made by constitutions We will fight until we have that replaced by a constitution which, we think, is the right one." He urged the Muslims to organize themselves and to stand united, if they wanted to win the respect of the other communities, "Organize yourselves and play your part ... Do not listen to the taunts. I am helping 80 million people...."

When the All-India Muslim League met in Bombay, Jinnah moved a resolution protesting that the 1935 Act was being forced on an unwilling India. However, the resolution called upon the Muslims to utilize the Provincial part of the scheme for what it was worth, and it condemned the Federal scheme envisaged in the Act. The resolution concluded, "The League considers that the British Parliament should still take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh regarding the Central scheme before it is inaugurated; or else the League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace and contentment to the people, but on the contrary it will lead to disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entirely unworkable in the interests of India and her people."

Moving his resolution, Jinnah narrated the history of the previous twenty years in India's struggle towards self-government, only to find that a retrogressive measure like the 1935 Act was being foisted upon it, in which India was given only 2 percent responsibility and 98 percent was embodied in the entrenched citadel of safeguards and special powers of the Governor-General. The Constitution was so disguised, he argued, that even a moderate programme of beneficial legislation and reforms could not be passed in the First House. In the Upper House the position was far worse. However, he blamed all the parties in the country for this, saying that they were quarrelling like cats, then went to the clever monkey, the British, to compose their deference's and to give his award. The Constitution was, therefore, he said, merely the perpetuation of a fraud and against the honor of India. But what were the Muslims to do under the circumstances, he asked. "If I have to submit to it I shall submit to it under protest. I shall see what use I can make of it. The German nation, when it was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, signed it. If I have to deal with this Constitution as the Germans dealt with the Versailles Treaty, I shall begin by tearing off as many pages as the Government of India Act has, and we shall not rest content until that Constitution is replaced by a Constitution which is acceptable to us".

Criticizing the Congress attitude towards the Act, he said the Congress appeared to tell the Muslims, "If you like to come with us, you may; or stay away, if you choose. We will remain neutral and we are marching towards our goal. But the Congress will never reach the goal they desire and we desire, unless they appeal to the Muslims."

By another resolution this session of the All-India Muslim League empowered Jinnah to appoint a Central Election Board and to affiliate provincial Boards. This resolution was moved by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and it called upon the Muslims to organize themselves as one party, with a progressive political programme. For the first time the Muslim League by this resolution decided to contest elections as an organized party.

In April 1936 Lord Linlithgow came to India as the Viceroy and immediately issued a press statement urging Indians to work the new Constitution, as it presented to all political parties an unprecedented opportunity to work for the political advancement of India.

The Quaid made a point to point reply to the Viceroy's statement. Referring to the justification advanced by the Viceroy in amending the Criminal Law in order to meet the growing tendency for breaking of law at the instigation of political parties, he said, "The Viceroy must look to the causes, which disturb law and order, and not take it for granted that suddenly large classes of people in India have become criminals and, therefore, the ordinary judicial procedure should be departed from and that the only method of dealing with it is by repressive measures, executive orders and detention of people without trial". Referring to the Viceroy's approval of the Provincial and Federal Scheme as spelt out in the 1935 Act, the Quaid said, "Surely, His Excellency must have seen information that the scheme of so-called provincial autonomy is not acceptable to the people, and that the natural crown of All-India Federation has been totally condemned by every section of public opinion. His pronouncement amounts to this, "That the British Parliament has forced the Constitution upon India, and, therefore, we must accept it". Replying to the Viceroy for Indian cooperation, he said. "I hope His Excellency will not follow the usual definition of cooperation and goodwill, namely, 'Submit and do as we tell you'."

The Muslim League had given its support to the Communal Award, only until an agreed settlement was arrived at between all the communities to replace it, and it had expressed its opinion against the Provincial and the Federal Scheme. The Hindu Press opened the flood-gates of their columns to vilify the League, and particularly Jinnah, who, they said, was solely responsible for dividing the unity of the Indian nation. At this time the Quaid undertook an extensive tour of India, in order to educate Muslim public opinion regarding the stand of the Muslim League, and to organize them under the auspices of the League for the forthcoming elections by setting up League Parliamentary Boards. Muslims presented themselves as if they were a heterogeneous

entity, when Muslims in different provinces took different stands, most of them playing into the hands of the Congress and the Hindus. Sir Fazli Hussain, who was the leader of Muslims of the Punjab, had in union with the Hindus originated the Unionist Party, just as in Sindh many Muslims were with the Sindh United Party, under the leadership of Sir Abdullah Haroon. In Bengal also Muslims were allied with the Krishak Proja Party, consisting of both Hindus and Muslims. In the Frontier the two brothers, Dr. Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were openly against Jinnah and the Muslim League. There was some support for the Muslim League in most of the Muslim minority provinces, particularly in the U.P. and Bombay.

Jinnah made his first experiment in the Punjab in setting up election machinery to contest the polls on Muslim League Party ticket. In June 1936 he was in Lahore, presiding over the Parliamentary Board meeting. Before coming to the Punjab, the Quaid had been receiving encouraging letters from Allama Iqbal, who wrote to him on 23rd May 1936, "I am glad to see that your work is progressing. I do hope that the Punjab parties – specially the Ahrars and the Ittihad Millat – will eventually, after some bickering, join you". In another letter, on 9th June, Iqbal wrote to Jinnah, "It (the Muslim League) must warn the Muslims of India that unless the present scheme is adopted, the Muslims will lose all that they have gained during the last 15 years...." This shows that the two giants of Muslim politics of those days, the Quaid and the poet of Pakistan, Iqbal, saw eye to eye on what the Muslim stand should be regarding the 1935 Act. In the same letter, Iqbal suggested to the Quaid that his statement in the Punjab on the new reforms should bring out the facts that: –

"1. Indirect election to the Central Assembly has made it absolutely essential that the Muslim representatives returned to the Provincial Assemblies should be bound by an All-India Muslim policy and programme so that they should return to the Central Assembly only those Muslims, who would be pledged to support the specific Muslim questions connected with the Central subjects and arising out of their position as the second great nation of India. Those who are now for Provincial policies and programmes were themselves instrumental in getting indirect elections for the Central Assembly introduced into the Constitution obviously because this suited a foreign Government. Now when the community wants to make the best use of this misfortune (i.e., indirect elections) by proposing an All-India Scheme of elections (e.g., League Scheme) to be adhered to by the Provincial candidates, the same men, again at the instance of a foreign Government, have come out to defeat the community in their efforts to retain its solidarity as a nation.

"2. Question of Wakf Law arising out of Shahidganj., culture, language, mosques and personal law."

At the conclusion of its deliberations, the Parliamentary Board in Lahore issued a statement which contained the programme of work that those elected to the Assemblies

on the Muslim League ticket should undertake, and also fully explained the League stand on the Government of India Act 1935. After the meeting of the Board, Jinnah was once again on his tour, organizing Muslims of India under the auspices of the League. Allama Iqbal continued to inform him through his letters about the Punjab situation and to share with him his personal views on some important contemporary events and problems. On 25th June Iqbal wrote to Jinnah, "Sir Sikandar Hayat left Lahore a day or two ago. I think he will meet you at Bombay and have a talk with you about certain matters of importance. Daultana saw me yesterday evening. He tells me that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party are prepared to make the following declaration:

"That in all matters specific to the Muslim community as an All-India minority they will be bound by the decision of the League and will never make any pact with any non-Muslim group in the Provincial Assembly,

"Provided the League (Provincial) makes the following declaration:

" 'That those returned to the Provincial Assembly on the League ticket will cooperate with that party or group which has the largest number of Muslims'.

"Please let me know at your earliest convenience what you think of this proposal. Also let me know the result of your talk with Sir Sikandar Hayat. If you succeed in convincing him he may come to our side".

In the meantime Iqbal was doing his best to see that Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan allowed Punjab leaders to unconditionally support the League. He seemed to run into difficulties, as the Unionists were not in a mood to disband their party and to join the Muslim League. On 23rd August 1936, Iqbal wrote to the Quaid, "I hope my letter reached you all right. There is some talk of an understanding between the Punjab Parliamentary Board and the Unionist Party. I should like you to let me know what you think of such a compromise and to suggest conditions for the same. I read in the papers that you have brought about a compromise between the Bengal Proja Party and the Parliamentary Board. I should like to know the terms and the conditions. Since the Proja Party is non-communal like the Unionist, your compromise in Bengal may be helpful to you."

While Jinnah was travelling all over India, Iqbal was concentrating his energies on the Muslims of the Punjab, so that at least Muslims of the majority provinces should stand solidly behind the League. In the beginning of 1937, Allama Iqbal began to have serious trouble with his eyes. Nevertheless, he continued to write to Jinnah, placing before him his views. In a letter dated 30th March 1937, he wrote, "I have got this letter written by a friend, as my eyesight is getting bad". The poet, in spite of his failing health, continued to indomitably play his part for the national regeneration of the Muslim Nation. The letter said, "I suppose you have read Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's address to the All-India

National Convention and that you fully realize the policy underlying it in so far as Indian Muslims are concerned. I believe you are also aware that the new constitution has at least brought a unique opportunity to Indian Muslims for self-organization in view of the future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia. While we are ready to cooperate with other Progressive Parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organization of Indian Muslims. I therefore suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All-India National Convention. You should immediately hold an All-India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this convention you must restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem. If you could hold this convention, it would test the credentials of those Muslim Legislators who have formed parties contrary to the aims and aspirations of Indian Muslims. It would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity. I am coming to Delhi in a few days' time and hope to have a talk with you on this important matter. I shall be staying in the Afghan Consulate. If you could spare a few moments, we should meet there. Please drop a line in reply to this letter as early as possible."

In his letter, 22nd April 1937, Iqbal warned Jinnah, "As the situation is becoming grave and the Muslim feeling in the Punjab is rapidly becoming pro-Congress for reasons which it is unnecessary to detail."

The first general elections had been fought in February 1937 under the Government of India Act 1935, and the Congress had secured absolute majorities in five out of eleven provinces, while the Muslim League had not fared well. The situation confronting Muslims was very grave, and the Congress was drunk with the wine of its own importance Iqbal had already realized that unless the Muslim masses joined the League, they could not hope to establish their legitimate importance in Indian politics. He wrote to the Quaid on 28th May 1937, "Thank you so much for your letter which reached me in due course. I am glad to hear that you will bear in mind what I wrote to you about the changes in the constitution and programme of the League. I have no doubt that you fully realize the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned. The League will have to finally decide whether it v/ill remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it. Personally I believe that a political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses."

"Under the new constitution the higher posts go to the sons of upper classes; the smaller ones go to the friends or relatives of the ministers. In other matters too our political institutions have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally. The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises I am sure the Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before. Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at last the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. I fear that in certain parts of the country, e.g., N.W. India, Palestine may be repeated. Also the insertion of Jawaharlal's socialism into the body-politic of Hinduism is likely to cause much bloodshed among the Hindus themselves. The issue between social democracy and Brahmanism is not dissimilar to the one between Brahmanism and Buddhism. Whether the fate of socialism will be the same as the fate of Buddhism in India I cannot say. But it is clear to my mind that if Hinduism accepts social democracy it must necessarily cease to be Hinduism. For Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam. The modern problems therefore are far more easy to solve for the Muslims than for the Hindus. But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve the problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived? Perhaps this is the best reply you can give to the atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru.

"Anyhow I have given you my own thoughts in the hope that you will give them serious consideration either in your address or in the discussions of the coming session of the League. Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties."

In another letter soon after Iqbal wrote to Jinnah, "You are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look for safe guidance through the storm

which is coming to North-West India, and, perhaps, to the whole of India. I tell you that we are actually living in a state of civil war...."

Iqbal seemed to heave a sigh of relief over the Punjab situation and he appeared to be full of hope. For, he wrote to the Quaid on 11th August "The enthusiasm, for the League is rapidly increasing in the Punjab, and I have no doubt that the holding of the session in Lahore will be a turning point in the history of the League and an important step towards mass contact."

Unfortunately the replies of the Quaid to Allama Iqbal have not been preserved or published, and it is, therefore, not possible to have an insight into Jinnah's mind at this critical juncture in Muslim politics, for Iqbal was the one man at the time to whom he could open his mind without any reservation. However, on 30th October 1937, Iqbal once again wrote to him, "We must carry on the work of organization more vigorously than ever and should not rest till Muslim Governments are established in the five provinces and reforms are granted to Baluchistan. The rumor is that part of the Unionist Party does not mean to sign the League creed. So far Sir Sikandar and his party have not signed."¹⁵⁶

It is important to recall here an important event in connection with the Communal Award of 1932. The Communal Award had left the question of number of seats to be allotted to Muslims in the Central Legislature open for a subsequent decision, and separation of Sindh from Bombay and its creation into a separate province had been made subject to ways and means being found for its satisfactory financial resources. It had given, unconditionally, however, a preponderant weightage to the microscopic European minority in Bengal. The All-Parties Muslim Conference convened at Lucknow had accepted the suggestion of Pandit Malaviya to jointly approach the Bengal Europeans to forego some of their seats; and a joint deputation was on its way to Calcutta. In the meantime Sir Samuel Hoare, the then Secretary of State for India, announced that His Majesty's Government had decided to allocate 33½ percent of British Indian seats in the Central Legislative Assembly to Muslims, and to constitute Sindh into a separate province, by providing an adequate central subvention to the new province to overcome its initial financial difficulties. Commenting on this, Babu Rajendra Prasad writes that the efforts made by the various communities to arrive at an understanding "were cruelly dashed to pieces".¹⁵⁷

The Congress and the League were becoming more and more antagonistic to one another after the 1935 Act had been announced. Attempts were being made, however, to resolve their differences and to see if the bitter controversy between the two over the Communal Award could be resolved by presenting the British with an agreed solution;

¹⁵⁶ Excerpts of these letters are taken from the book, *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, 1963: Published by Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore.

¹⁵⁷ *India Divided*, by Babu Rajendra Prasad, p. 141, 1947: Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay.

to utilize the constitution for what it was worth, and to evolve a more satisfactory constitution. With this end in view Babu Rajendra Prasad, representing the Congress, met the Quaid in Delhi in July 1937. The negotiations failed, and Rajendra Prasad issued an offer for a settlement through a press statement. The Quaid resented this method of arriving at a settlement and he said in a press statement, "Surely, if a substitute for the Communal Award, which the Mussalmans have accepted, is to be proposed, it can only come from the Hindu and Sikh leaders, who are opposed to it, and the two communities directly concerned."

The Congress had attempted to bring about a rift in the Muslim League ranks in the U.P. by adopting devious methods, and Jinnah expressed his disapproval of such tactics, "What is being reported in newspapers about a few Muslims in the U.P. threatening to leave the Muslim League, if I do not carry out what Babu Rajendra Prasad has enjoined me to do, leads me to suspect that it is not a genuine device for an honorable settlement, but it is an attempt to divide the Muslims, to split the Muslim League, and to strike a blow at unity among the Muslims, for which I have been working." He exposed the Congress game of wanting "Mussalmans to join the Congress unconditionally and to sign their pledge. After the Congress was flushed with its majority in six provinces, it deliberately decided to ignore, nay, decided to non-cooperate with the Muslim League Parties in the various Provincial Legislatures, and they have in forming the Ministries vindicated the justice and the fair treatment to the minorities urged and promised by Mahatma Gandhi very recently by having made a good feast of all the loaves and fishes that are at present available for the Congress Party in the various Legislatures and getting a stray Mussalman to exchange a pledge overnight to accept Ministry the next morning."

The Quaid expressed his annoyance at Jawaharlal Nehru, who, as President of the Congress, had issued an arrogant statement against the Muslims, the League and Jinnah. "What can I say to that busy-body President? ... He seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose in everything, except minding his own business." The Quaid said he had even contacted Gandhi to bring about a communal settlement, but the latter had expressed his utter helplessness. In concluding his press statement, he warned those Muslims, who were about to fall for the crumbs that the Congress was ready to give them as a reward for deserting the Muslim League, "In conclusion I want to say a word to Musalmans. Those few waverers who are ready or about to betray us for jobs need not seek excuses or loopholes to justify their threatened secession from the All-India Muslim League. They may go, but those members of the League, if they have a shred of conscience left, should tender their resignations and contest the seats again on Congress ticket. I am sure that the All-India Muslim League will be all the better without such men. To those who suffer from defeatist mentality I say, have courage and faith, *Delhi dur nest*; and I say to all Mussalmans of India to organize, consolidate and establish solidarity and unity.

Service, suffering and sacrifice are absolutely essential conditions before we can achieve anything big and secure our right place in the national life of our country."

THERE IS A THIRD PARTY

The British Government, during the Round Table Conference deliberations, had clearly indicated that if the various communities of India failed to arrive at an agreed solution of the communal problem, they would not allow that to stand in the way of Constitutional Reforms for India. The deplorable attitude of some extremist Hindu leaders at the R T C. had dashed to the ground all hopes of an acceptable solution, and the British Prime Minister announced the Communal Award in August 1932, with the promise that the Award would be substituted for or amended in accordance with any subsequent decisions freely and willingly arrived at between the different communities. The Reforms Bill, however, was not rushed through in Parliament after the Award was announced, and the matter was debated in the British Cabinet and in the two Houses for a long time, until in June 1935 the Government of India Act was put on the Statute.

Gandhi had endeavored to get the Award altered to suit the wishes of the Congress by undertaking a fast unto death. The result was the Poona Pact, by which Hindus and depressed classes came to a settlement. But in so far as it concerned the Muslims as a minority, the Award remained unaltered. Pandit Malaviya approached Maulana Shaukat Ali to work a substitute for the Award, while Gandhi was in jail. Maulana Shaukat Ali approached the Viceroy to either release Gandhi from jail, or to allow them facilities to interview him in jail for the unity talks. This roused the anger of All-Parties Muslim Conference, who on 7th October 1932 issued a statement disowning the leadership of Shaukat Ali and saying that Muslims would not give up separate electorates and special safeguards guaranteed to them in the Award, until and unless the majority community itself offered to Muslims equivalent guarantees and constitutional safeguards. On 27th October, the Viceroy replied to Maulana Shaukat Ali that until Gandhi disassociated himself from the Civil Disobedience Movement he had started, the request for interviewing Gandhi in jail could not be considered.

On its part, the All-Parties Muslim Conference met at Lucknow on 16th October, and unanimously resolved to appoint a committee for discussing the communal question with the Hindus and Sikhs. Nothing came out of the Unity Conference that subsequently followed and which met at Allahabad in November. Hindus and the Congress, having refused to grasp the hand of friendship extended to them by Jinnah at the R.T.C. on behalf of the Muslims, must have realized that a golden opportunity had been lost by them.

When the Congress Session met in Bombay in October 1934, it took no definite stand on the Communal Award, leaving the question open, and covering up their stand on the controversial issue by clever words and cleverer resolutions. Soon after came the elections to the Central Assembly, and the Congress attitude of indecision over the

Award came in for severe criticism. Congress itself was so badly divided over the subject that it allowed its representatives that got elected from Bengal on Congress ticket to take any stand each individual member desired on the Award.

When once again in 1935 Unity talks were announced between the Quaid and the President of the Congress, Jinnah went to the furthest limit to arrive at a settlement. But every concession made by him brought in its wake further intolerable demands from the Congress, which were rooted in its Hindu mentality, an inevitable development in its outlook due to the preponderance of its Hindu membership.

After the 1935 Act was enacted, the All-India Muslim League met in Bombay in April 1936 and passed a resolution emphatically protesting against the policy of the British in forcing on India a Constitution against the wishes of its people. However, the League resolved to work the Provincial Scheme of the new Reforms for what it was worth, in spite of the fact that it was not acceptable to the Muslims of India, as it nullified real control and responsibility of the provincial legislatures by vesting special powers in the Governors of the provinces. The resolution also condemned the Federal part of the 1935 Act as being against the interests of the Muslims of India. By another resolution the Muslim League appointed a Central Parliamentary Board, authorizing this Board to issue an election manifesto. It was on the basis of this election manifesto that the League fought elections in all the provinces in the first general elections under the Government of India Act of 1935. The manifesto of the League stated, "The main principles on which we expect our representatives in various Legislatures to work be (1) that the present Provincial Constitution and the proposed Central Constitution should be replaced immediately by democratic full self-government; (2) and that in the meantime, representatives of the Muslim League in the various Legislatures will utilize the Legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit out of the constitution for the uplift of the people in the various spheres of national life. The Muslim League Party must be formed as a corollary so long as separate electorates exist, but there will be free cooperation with any group or groups whose aims and ideals are approximately the same as those of the League party".

The manifesto also laid down that the League parties would protect the religious rights of Muslims and would devise measures to ameliorate the general condition of the Muslims. It promised the electorate colleges that the Muslim League Parties would lend their support in all legislatures to get repressive laws repealed; to throw their weight against measures detrimental to the interests of India and calculated to deny the people their fundamental liberties; to stop the economic exploitation of India; to have the cost of administration reduced; to work for the uplift of the rural population; to get more allocations in provincial budgets for nation-building activities, to get industries developed so as to benefit the peoples of India.

It was for the first time that the Muslim League put up its own candidates in a general election on the basis of an election manifesto. The Congress did likewise, and the two parties faced one another in an election that was fought all over India in the winter of 1936-1937. The party position of the League and the Congress is revealed in the following table :—

Provinces	Total No. of seats	No. of seats won by Congress	Total No. of Muslim Seats	No. of seats won by Muslim League	No. of seats won by other Muslim groups
Madras	215	159	28	11	17
Bombay	175	86	29	20	9
Bengal	250	54	117	40	77
U.P.	228	134	64	27	37
Punjab	175	18	84	1	83
Bihar	152	98	39	-	39
C.P.	112	70	14	-	14
N.-W.F.P.	50	19	36	-	36
Assam	108	33	34	9	25
Orissa	60	36	4	-	4
Sindh	60	7	35	-	35
Total	1585	714	484	108	376

The Congress thus captured absolute majorities in Madras, U P, Bihar, C.P., and Orissa, while some members elected as independents joined its ranks in Bombay and Frontier Assemblies, and thus assured in the latter two provinces a working majority to the Congress. On the other hand the Muslim League did not enjoy a majority in any province, having secured only 41 seats out of 272 Muslim seats in the Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab, Bengal, Sindh and the Frontier. Formation of a League ministry was, therefore, out of the question in any province of India, while Congress had majorities in seven out of eleven provinces. The Congress decided not to accept office, until and unless "the leader of the Congress Party in the Legislature is satisfied and is able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of his Ministers in regard to Constitutional activities." The Governors, however, did not agree to give the necessary assurances, which gave rise to a constitutional deadlock in these provinces. The assurances that the Congress had asked for concerned the 'special responsibilities' of the Governor, which according to Chintamani and Masani amounted to, "The cumulative effect of the list of special responsibilities justifies the statement of Sir Samuel Hoare that it covers the entire field of administration, the prevention of any grave menace to the peace and tranquility of the province, the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities, the

safeguarding of the rights and legitimate interests, whatever that may mean, of the members of the Public Services and their dependants, the prevention in the sphere of executive action, of discrimination against Britishers and British concerns, the peace and good Government of partially excluded areas, the protection of the rights of States and the Rulers, and the execution of orders or direction of the Governor-General in his discretion".¹⁵⁸

Among the special responsibilities of the Governor was to protect the interests of the minorities, including Muslims, and Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, commented on the Congress demand for assurances from provincial Governors, "A reduction in the number of schools for a minority community by a ministry would be clearly within the Congress formula, for it would be legal and could not be described as other than a constitutional activity. So the Governor would no longer be free to protect the minority. It was precisely because it was realized that such an action would be possible within the constitution that Parliament had inserted the safeguards."

The Muslims were also apprehensive that, under 'special circumstances, due to pressure of Hindu public opinion, a Congress ministry may be compelled to ride rough-shod over Muslim interests.

Negotiations proceeded between the Congress and the Viceroy for some time over this issue, and the deadlock was resolved in July 1937, which enabled the Congress to accept office in seven provinces. The Congress was anxious to rope in some Muslim Leaguers in four provincial cabinets, by dangling the ministerial carrot before their eyes, except in Bihar, Orissa and C.P., where there was not a single Muslim League M.L.A. in the provincial legislature. The League held that as Muslim ministers would be taken as representatives of the Muslim community, and not in their individual capacity, it was only a majority vote of the Muslim members of the House that should decide as to who should represent Muslims in the Cabinet. In the United Provinces the picture was slightly different. Before the elections were fought, there had been an understanding between the Congress and the Muslims of that province, which was openly repudiated by the former after the elections. Richard Symonds writes, "But in the Hindu-majority provinces where the League captured a substantial number of Muslim seats, it evidently expected to be asked to form coalition ministries with the Congress. This was particularly true of the United Provinces, where the League's candidates had run on a common platform with the Congress, had more Muslim seats than any other party, and had received what it considered to be definite assurances of coalition before the elections. When the results were declared and Congress found itself with an overall majority, however, it offered the League terms which no independent political party could have accepted".¹⁵⁹ The Muslim League, as an organization, was sought to be

¹⁵⁸ *India, Constitution At Work*, by Chiotamani and Masani, pp. 91 and 92.

¹⁵⁹ *The Making of Pakistan*, by Richard Symonds, p. 53, 1950: Faber and Faber, London.

ignored and by-passed by the Congress, and they counted on the age-old principle of tempting individuals with the prize of office, asking them in return to surrender their loyalty to the League. Symonds writes, "No single event did more than this to bring Pakistan into being. Men such as Khaliqzaman, the League leader in the United Provinces, who had combined membership of the League with membership of the Congress for twenty-five years, found themselves bound to choose between the two. They felt betrayed and indignant...."¹⁶⁰ On that same subject, Rajendra Prasad writes; "In the United Provinces and Bombay effort was made, which, however, did not bear fruit."¹⁶¹ Defending the Congress stand, Prasad writes that Congress in adopting this policy stood by the well-known and well-understood constitutional principle to have homogenous ministries composed of its own members. Pyarelal, on the contrary, writes. "This decision of the Congress High Command taken against Gandhiji's best judgment proved to be a tactical error of the first magnitude".¹⁶²

The Quaid in his Presidential address clarified the stand of the Muslim League in its annual session held at Lucknow in October 1937. He said the League, having undertaken its mass contact programme in its session held on 12th April 1936, decided to run its own candidates in the general elections, and the League had carried away about 60 to 70 percent of the seats that it had contested. He continued, "The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Mussalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the Governments in six provinces where they are in a majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more and more that the Mussalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands. Wherever they are in majority and wherever it suited them, they refused to cooperate with the Muslim League Parties and demanded unconditional surrender and signing of their pledges."

He blamed the British Government for deciding to give up special responsibilities of the Governors, as after that the Congress ministries had worked in such a way that Muslims were groaning under anti-Muslim activities, such as thrusting Hindi on Muslims, against their will; singing of *Bande Matram*, a pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim song making Muslims salute the Congress flag; and other measures that had deeply injured the feelings of the Muslims all over India. Raising his voice, he said, "I want the Mussalmans to believe in themselves and take their destiny in their own hands. We want men of faith and resolution who have the courage and determination and who would fight single-handed for their convictions, though at the moment the whole world may be against them. We must develop power and strength, till the Mussalmans are fully organized and have acquired that power and strength which must come from the solidarity and the unity of people."

¹⁶⁰ *The Making of Pakistan*, by Richard Symonds, p. 54.

¹⁶¹ *India Divided*, by Babu Rajendra Prasad, p. 145, 1947: Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay.

¹⁶² *Mahatma Gandhi*, by Pyarelal, p. 80. 1956. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmadabad.

He concluded his presidential address, "To the Mussalmans of India in every province, in every district, in every tehsil, in every town, I say your foremost duty is to formulate a constructive and ameliorative programme of work for the people's welfare and to devise ways and means of social, economic and political uplift of the Mussalmans. We shall not hesitate to cooperate with any party or group in any practical and constructive programme for the welfare and advance of the provinces or the country. I entreat and implore that every man, woman and child should rally round one common platform and flag of the All-India Muslim League. Enlist yourselves by hundreds and thousands as quickly as you can as members of the All-India Muslim League, Provincial Leagues and District Leagues. Organize yourselves, establish your solidarity and complete unity. Equip yourselves as trained and disciplined soldiers. Create the feeling of esprit de corps, and of comradeship amongst yourselves. Work loyally, and for the cause of your people and your country. No individual or people can achieve anything without industry, suffering and sacrifice. There are forces which may bully you, tyrannize over you and intimidate you and you may even have to suffer. But it is by going through this crucible of fire of persecution which may be leveled against you, tyranny that may be exercised, the threats and intimidations that may unnerve you, and it is by resisting, by overcoming, by facing these disadvantages, hardships, and by suffering and maintaining your true convictions and loyalty that a nation will emerge worthy of its past glory and history and will live to make the future history greater and more glorious not only of India but in the annals of the world. Eighty millions of Mussalmans in India have nothing to fear. They have their destiny in their hands, and as a well-knit, solid, organized, united force can face any danger, and withstand any opposition to its united front and wishes. There is the magic power in your own hands. Take your vital decisions—they may be grave and momentous and far-reaching in their consequences. Think hundred times before you take any decision, but once a decision is taken, stand by it as one man. Be true and loyal, and I feel confident that success is with you".

Prior to Jinnah's participation in the Lucknow session, Iqbal had written to him to say, "We are living in difficult times and the Indian Muslims expect that your address will give them the clearest possible lead in all matters relating to the future of the community." The political leader accepted the advice of the poet and in unmistakable terms he condemned the nationalism of the Congress, warning Muslims to beware of temptations that the Congress was placing before Muslim leaders to divide their ranks. In another letter Iqbal wrote to Jinnah, "We must carry on the work of organization more vigorously than ever and should not rest till Muslim Governments are established in the five provinces and reforms are granted to Baluchistan". The Quaid's presidential address at the Lucknow session also dwelt on these two problems that confronted the Muslims of India. The Quaid appears to have asked Iqbal to use his good offices with Sir Sikandar Hayat, Chief Minister of the Punjab, to sign the League pledge and thereby establish a League ministry in that province. It is, perhaps, in reference to this suggestion that Iqbal wrote to Jinnah on 10th November 1937, "After having several

talks with Sir Sikandar and his friends, I am now definitely of the opinion that Sir Sikandar wants nothing less than the complete control of the League and the Provincial Parliamentary Board ... All this to my mind amounts to capturing of the League and then killing it ... cannot take the responsibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar and his friends."

The presidential address of the Quaid was a major declaration by the Muslim League, which was to be the guideline for all its future policies and activities. Gandhi was shrewd enough to see through the address that the League wanted itself to be accepted as the sole and only spokesman of the Muslims of India, thus placing the Congress in its proper place as a mere Hindu organization. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah, "As I read it (the presidential address), the whole of your speech is a declaration of war."

Congress ministries had been in office for over eight months, and the Muslim League received an endless stream of letters from Congress majority provinces complaining against Hindu and Congress atrocities and injustices. The Council of the All-India Muslim League took into account all these complaints, and on 20th March 1938, it resolved to appoint a committee, with Raja Saheb of Pirpur as its chairman. The members of this committee were asked to tour the Congress majority provinces, to investigate into the grievances received and to report to the All-India Muslim League. On 15th November 1938, the Pirpur Report was submitted. It said that Muslims were compelled to sing *Bande Matram*, certain stanzas of which were undoubtedly derogatory to Muslims and injured their religious susceptibilities. There is no doubt that the complaint was justified, as the Congress itself after the publication of the Pirpur Report resolved that only the first two stanzas of the song should be sung, and the other stanzas which gave offence to Muslims should be dropped. The report went on to say that Muslims were forced to salute the Congress flag, which is in fact the Hindu flag, injuring deeply the feelings of Muslims that were compelled to salute it. The report also condemned the Muslim mass contact movement initiated by the Congress, which was bringing about cleavage among Muslims and was designed to divide and weaken Muslims. The Wardha Scheme of Basic Education launched by the Congress came in for severe criticism in the Pirpur Report. It was Gandhi, who had originated the Wardha Scheme, and it was he who had convened a conference that prepared the scheme. Unfortunately, two eminent Muslim educationists, Dr. Zakir Hussain and Khwaja G. Sayyadain, had taken part in the conference convened by Gandhi, and the Congress never tired of defending the Wardha Scheme on the ground that two outstanding Muslim educationists had participated and agreed to the scheme. The Pirpur Report condemned in scathing terms the Vidya Mandir Scheme of the Central Provinces, which under the cover of removing illiteracy in that province, was making Muslim boys and girls to conform to practices bordering on idol worship, which was definitely repugnant to Islam. Hindu-Muslim riots, that were sporadically engineered by Hindus, resulting in the killing and looting of Muslims in minority provinces, were another target of attack in the Pirpur Report. Quoting one instance the Report gave details of an atrocious

attempt by Hindus in Berar on Muslims, and it quoted some remarks from the judgment of the High Court which had tried that case. The Report said, "The Chief Minister must commit suicide or retire from public life". The Pirpur Report also dwelt extensively as to how Congress ministries, under the guise of encouraging Hindi, were aiming at the extermination of Urdu as a language. The Quaid in his speeches and press statements, subsequent to the Pirpur Report, spoke vehemently against Congress atrocities and its anti-Muslim attitude, as clearly indicated in the Pirpur Report, which was based on irrefutable evidence that the committee had collected.

The accusations leveled by the Pirpur Report disturbed the complacency of the Congress High Command, although they continued to put up a brave face, repudiating allegations made against Congress ministries. Both Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose, the Congress President, took upon themselves the role of negotiating with Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, in order to arrive at a satisfactory settlement over Muslim grievances mentioned in the Pirpur Report. Bose, as Congress President, made his desire known to meet Jinnah for this purpose, and the Quaid issued a press statement, which, among other things, said, "To say that the Congress is ready and willing to negotiate a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question with the Muslim League in one breath and in another to say that the Muslim League is not a representative organization of the Muslims is so transparently ridiculous, and yet the Congress President, Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, arrogates to himself, on behalf of the Congress, the right to say that Congress is the one organization not only able to deliver goods but also to discuss with the British Government a final solution of the Indian problem."

The two Presidents, however, met in order to determine as to what should be the basis of these talks. Jinnah insisted that the basis should be that "The Congress and the All-India Muslim League, as the authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India, have hereby agreed to the following terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a Pact". By this it was made abundantly clear that the Muslim League was the only authoritative political organization that was entitled to speak on behalf of the Muslims of India.

On 14th May 1938, Bose handed to Jinnah an exhaustive note on behalf of the Congress, which contained the Congress point of view on all outstanding disputes. The Quaid replied to Bose he would place the same before the Council of the Muslim League. In June the Council of the Muslim League met and passed the following resolutions, which were promptly conveyed by its President to the President of the Congress :

Resolution No. 1

"The Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League has considered the note handed by the President, Mr. Subhas C. Bose, on behalf of the Congress to Mr. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, on the 14th May and his letter of the 15th

May, 1938, and find that it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress, the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India.

Resolution No. 2

The Council have also considered the letter of Mr. Gandhi, dated the 22nd May 1938, and are of opinion that it is not desirable to include any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed committee that may be appointed by the Congress.

Resolution No. 3

The Executive Council wish to make it clear that it is the declared policy of the All-India Muslim League that all other minorities should have their rights and interests safeguarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence and the All-India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such minorities and any other interests as may be involved, when necessary."

The League Resolutions were considered by the Working Committee of the Congress and its decisions were conveyed to the Quaid by Bose in a letter dated 25th June 1938, in which the Congress refused to acknowledge "The exclusive status of the Muslim League." This decision of the Congress nullified any hope that Jinnah had entertained of coming to a settlement with the Congress. The Congress also rejected the second resolution saying it was "not possible for the Congress Working Committee to conform to the desire expressed therein." Regarding the third resolution, the Congress replied, "The Working Committee is unable to understand (it). So far as the Working Committee is concerned, the Muslim League is a purely communal organization"

Jinnah replied to Bose on 2nd August from Bombay saying his letter was considered by the Council of the Muslim League. He wrote, "The Council is fully convinced that the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Mussalmans of India. This position was accepted when the Congress League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at Lucknow and ever since till 1935 when Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad conversation took place, it has not been questioned. The All-India Muslim League, therefore, does not require any admission or recognition from the Congress, nor did the resolution of the Executive Council at Bombay. But in view of the fact that the position—in fact the very existence—of the League had been questioned by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then President of the Congress, in one of his statements, wherein he asserted that there were only two parties in the country, viz., the British Government and the Congress, it was considered necessary by the Executive Council to inform the Congress of the basis on which the negotiations between the two organizations could proceed." The letter went on to say that in the opinion of the League those few Muslims, who have associated themselves with the Congress, "have disabled themselves from representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim

community." Regarding other Muslim organizations to which Bose had made a reference in his letter, Jinnah wrote, "If they collectively or individually had been in a position to speak on behalf of the Mussalmans of India, the negotiations with the Muslim League for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question would not have been initiated by the President of the Congress and Mr. Gandhi." In view of this, the letter went on to say, the Council deemed it undesirable that the Congress should include Muslims as its own nominees on the conciliation committee. However, the League was prepared to discuss the matter with representatives of minorities other than the Muslim community.

Bose replied to Jinnah on 16th August communicating the decision of the Working Committee of the Congress, which "did not find it possible to agree with the Council of the Muslim League as to the basis of the negotiation", and, therefore, the Working Committee "are not in a position to do anything further in the direction of starting negotiations with the League with a view to arriving at a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question".¹⁶³

While he was in correspondence with Bose, the Quaid wrote to Gandhi on 3rd March 1938, "We have reached a stage when no doubt is left. You recognize the All-India Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Muslims in India, and on the other hand you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is on that basis we can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach."

Gandhi not only refused to accept Jinnah's suggestion, but also prompted the Congress to reject the League formula. The Unity Talks thus became infructuous.

This was probably the last opportunity that presented itself to the Congress, before the partition of India in 1947, to come to a permanent settlement with the Muslims of India. But as Babu Rajendra Prasad, writes, "The negotiations did not succeed even in getting a formulation of the demands of the Muslim League."¹⁶⁴ History was to unfold that what the Congress refused to concede in 1938, it accepted in 1947, when the new State of Pakistan was created as a result of the demand of the All-India Muslim League that it was the sole representative organization of the Muslims of India, and the Congress became a party to the scheme of partition. Commenting on the attitude of the Congress towards the League at this period, Frank Moraes writes, "Had the Congress handled the League more tactfully after the elections, Pakistan might never have come into being. A divided Hindu and Muslim India represented a gospel of frustration. Jinnah certainly created Pakistan. But the Congress by its sins of commission and omission also helped to make it possibly. Misreading the poor showing of the Muslim League at the polls –

¹⁶³ The above excerpts from the correspondence between Jinnah and Bose are taken from *Subhas Bose and His Ideas*, by Jagat S. Bright. 1946: Indian Printing Works, Lahore.

¹⁶⁴ *India Divided*, by Babu Rajendra Prasad, p. 153. 1947.

the League candidates secured less than 5 percent of the total Muslim votes cast and were not able to gain a single seat in the overwhelmingly Muslim province of the North-West Frontier – the Congress spurned Muslim League overtures for a coalition. The result was not to drive the League into the political wilderness but to strengthen Jinnah's hands as the foremost champion of Muslim claims and rights."¹⁶⁵ Moraes continues, "As a political tactician he (Jinnah) was superlative – ready to pounce upon and capitalize on every mistake of Congress. And in this period the Congress made several mistakes."¹⁶⁶

At this time, Jawaharlal Nehru was playing a dominant role in Congress politics. As a matter of fact, his influence in the Congress was next in importance to only, that of Gandhi. But he always suffered from an excessive sense of self-importance. He was combative, explosive, proud, sensitive and assertive. In a fit of arrogance, he threw a challenge, when he said, "There are only two parties in the country – the Congress and the British."

The Quaid accepted the challenge. "No", he thundered in protest, "There is a third party – namely the Mussalmans. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody ... We are not going to be camp-followers of any party".

Gandhi had termed Jinnah's presidential address at the Lucknow session as a declaration of war. On the other hand, the Quaid took Jawaharlal's taunt that there were only two parties in India as 'a declaration of war'. The two organizations and their leaders had reached the point of no return.

In the meantime Europe began to reverberate with the rumblings of war. Two dictators, Hitler and Mussolini, rode the European scene like Titans, and the two brought into being in September 1936 the Rome-Berlin Axis, which was to be the pivot round which revolved the politics of Europe. The Spanish Civil War had dragged itself on into many agonizing months, and the patriotic forces fighting on the side of Spain routed Mussolini's forces at Guadalajara in March 1937. From that time it was the German army that came to strengthen the army of the Italian Fascist Dictator, and Mussolini began to play second fiddle to Hitler. In July of that year, Japan intensified its offensive against China in violation of the decision of the League of Nations, and by the beginning of 1938, Japan had come to occupy a good portion of Chinese territory. Birds of a feather flock together, so do people that subscribe to a totalitarian ideology, and Japan soon became a partner of the Rome-Berlin Axis. In the middle of the year 1938, Hitler's armies were on the move and his demands became insatiable, each success breeding a new ambition. Hitler demanded that Sudetan Germans be given to the German Reich, and in September of that year Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister

¹⁶⁵ *Jawaharlal Nehru*, by Frank Moraes, p. 268, 1956, Macmillan Co., New York.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-9.

of England, bought European peace at Munich by paying the price of surrender, as it seemed, of traditional British prestige. Suddenly, on 15th March 1939 the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia and entered its capital, Prague, and a month later Mussolini invaded Albania. Hitler's triumph in Czechoslovakia emboldened him to march his armies into Danzig and Poland, and on 1st September it was obvious that Europe had taken the plunge, and a full-fledged world war was just round the corner. Soon the British entered the war against the Rome. Berlin Axis, and a Second World War of an unprecedented magnitude was on the heads of peoples all over the world.

Declaration of war by Britain, constitutionally speaking, meant that India was also at war with the Axis. Within a few years of its inauguration, the Government of India Act of 1935 proved how inadequate it was in safeguarding the prestige and self-respect of India. The peoples of India should have been consulted, previous to the declaration of war, through their elected representatives in the Central Assembly. But, where imperial interests were at stake, Britain did not bother about such niceties as taking a willing India with it into a war. It was sufficient that Britain was at war, and it was India's duty and responsibility to support the war efforts—that seemed to be the thinking of our foreign rulers. And Indian public opinion became sharply divided over the war issue. However, the inadequacy of the constitutional reforms stood thoroughly exposed.

Towards the end of 1939, negotiations started between the League and the Congress to arrive at a united stand on India's attitude to the war efforts. But nothing came out of them, and Pandit Jawaharlal wrote an epitaph on these talks, "Unfortunately, we never seem to reach even the proper discussion of these problems, as various hurdles and obstructions in the shape of conditions precedent come in our way..... As the hurdles continue and others are added to them, I am compelled to think that the real difficulty is the difference in the political outlook and objectives."

The Muslim League had condemned the Federal part of the 1935 Act and it had not been implemented with the introduction of the Provincial part of the Act. The League continued to demand that it be scratched completely. On 11th September 1939, the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, declared that the Federal Scheme would remain suspended during the pendency of the war. The Working Committee of the League in its meeting soon after this announcement expressed its appreciation of the Government policy as enunciated by the Viceroy, but demanded that it should be completely abandoned and that India's constitutional problem should be examined *de novo*. This resolution drafted by the Quaid-e-Azam also demanded, "An assurance that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India Muslim League; nor should any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval". The Viceroy responded with a favorable assurance, and soon thereafter there followed a meeting between the Quaid and the Viceroy. The official communiqué covering these talks stated, "His Excellency

assured Mr. Jinnah that His Majesty's Government were fully alive to the necessity for safeguarding the legitimate interests of all minorities and that he need be under no apprehension that the importance of these subjects will be lost sight of". Jinnah considered this statement to be inadequate and halting, and on 23rd February 1940, he wrote to the Viceroy, "I regret to say this does not meet the point raised by the Muslim League, because it still leaves the position of 90 millions in India only in the region of consultation and counsel and vests final decision in the hands of Great Britain to determine the fate and future of British India. We regret we cannot accept this position ... No commitment should be made with regard to the future constitution of India or any interim settlement with any other party without our approval or consent". These negotiations, ending in a stalemate, heard their echoes in the House of Lords, where the Secretary of State for India made a statement on 1st April 1940, and the assurances it contained were communicated to Jinnah by the Viceroy. The Working Committee of the League met to consider the statement of the Secretary of State and the letter of the Viceroy, and this was followed by another meeting between Jinnah and the Viceroy on 21st April.

The Quaid followed this up by sending in writing to the Viceroy on 1st July the points that he had raised:

1. No statement should be made by the Government, which would in any way militate against the basic principles of the Lahore Resolution, regarding creation of Muslim States in the North-Western and Eastern Zones.
2. The Government will not implement any interim or final scheme without the prior approval and consent of the Muslim League.
3. War efforts can only be strengthened, if the Government associated Muslim leadership as equal partners in the Central and Provincial Governments.
4. During the pendency of the War, the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be enlarged so that Muslim representation is equal to that of the Hindus, if Congress agrees to come in, otherwise Muslims should have a majority.
5. A War Council be appointed of not less than 15 members, with the Viceroy as President. Muslims to have equal seats (seven), as also the Hindus, if the Congress comes in; otherwise they should have a majority.
6. All Muslim representatives to be chosen only by the Muslim League, as the sole representative organization of the Muslims of India.

On 6th July 1940 the Viceroy issued a statement which amounted to a rejection of the demands made by the Muslim League. He promised, however, on behalf of His Majesty's Government that at the conclusion of the War, a body, representative of all the principle elements in India's national life would be appointed to draw up the framework of a new constitution. This was followed by a detailed explanation of British Governments stand on the League demands, when Amery made a comprehensive summary in the House of Commons on the Indian situation and on the Jinnah-Viceroy talks.

The Working Committee of the League met to consider Amery's statement and the Viceroy's assurances. It resolved that the Viceroy's declaration concerning the future constitution was satisfactory, but rejected his offer for the appointment of two members to the Executive Council out of a panel of four to be submitted by the League. It also rejected a similar offer regarding the Advisory War Council. Further negotiations followed between Jinnah and the Viceroy, but did not take matters far. On 29th September 1940, the Quaid in a meeting of the All-India Muslim League explained that the British Government had no intention to part with power, that they were callous to the demands of the Muslim nation of 90 millions. He warned the Congress and the British that henceforth Muslims were to be treated as "a separate nation".

Towards the end of 1940, the Congress launched its individual Civil Disobedience Movement, with a view to compel the Government to come to terms with it over the War efforts and the constitutional advancement of India. The Quaid was apprehensive that Britain, being desperately in need of India's help in the midst of a devastating war, might yield to Congress pressure. Under his presidentship the Muslim League Council resolved that the motive of the Civil Disobedience Movement of the Congress was to bully the Government into submission, so that a settlement may be arrived at between them, ignoring the Muslim League altogether. It warned the Government that if they surrendered to the pressure tactics of the Congress, the League would launch an offensive to safeguard Muslim interests.

Congress had won in 1937 absolute majorities in five out of eleven provinces, and in two others it had obtained majorities with the help of other Hindu political parties or individuals. They were safely in the saddle and their rule had given rise to many complaints of a serious nature against their anti-Muslim policies. In Bengal and in the Punjab, while there were two Muslim Chief Ministers, Maulvi Fazlul Huq and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, respectively, their ministries were not League ministries. Depending on Hindu support in order to have a working majority in the House, the two Assembly Parties kept out of the Muslim League. After the general elections, the Muslim League was gaining popularity with the Muslims in leaps and bounds, and Muslim public opinion in these two important provinces was gradually veering round to the League point of view. But trends outside the Legislative Assembly are not

necessarily reflected in the composition of the House itself, so that while by far and large Muslim masses continued to be pro-League, their legislators belonged to parties consisting of both Hindus and Muslims.

The emergence of the League as the coming power in Indian politics was beyond doubt, when the League session met in Lucknow in October 1937, and many Muslim legislators from the Punjab and Bengal came to attend the League session. Although the Chief Ministers of those two provinces were not officially members of the Muslim League, yet they attended the Lucknow session and were prominently seated on the dais. A new chapter was being written in the history of the League. The Quaid was active in enlisting their support for the League, and before they left Lucknow, both Maulvi Fazlul Huq and Sikandar, along with their supporters who were in Lucknow, signed the League pledge. This, however, did not bring them under any obligation to disband their non-communal parties in the legislatures and to set up Muslim League parties, and a sort of working arrangement was arrived at between them and the Quaid. In Bengal along with Fazlul Huq, there were emerging as all-India leaders Shahid Suhrawardy and Khwaja Nazimuddin, and these three were later to play a very important role not only in bringing Muslims of Bengal within the fold of the League, but also in the freedom struggle of Muslims for Pakistan.

In the Frontier, the two brothers, Dr. Khan Sahib and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had definite leanings towards the Congress. They along with their party, the Khudai Khidmatgars, gradually identified themselves with the Congress, with the result that in the Muslim majority province of the Frontier there was functioning a Congress ministry, with Dr. Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister. Politics in the Frontier continued to be a source of grave concern to the Muslim League, as the Chief Minister of that Province and his party made no secret of their anti-League attitude.

In Sindh, another Muslim majority province, the picture was confusing after the 1937 elections. Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon had organized the Sindh United Party to fight the elections, and this party, organized on the lines of the Unionist Party of the Punjab, had won 22 seats in a House of 60. However, both the leaders of the Party, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and the Deputy leader, Sir Haroon, had been defeated. The Congress had secured only seven seats, but its strength was raised to eleven, as some independent Hindus joined it later on. Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah's Muslim Political Party had secured 3 seats, while Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi's Azad Party had three followers. The Governor of Sindh called Sir Ghulam Husain to form the Ministry and the first session of the Sindh Assembly met on 27th April 1937. From the very first day it became apparent that the Ministry had no clear-cut political programme or policy. The Sindh United Party, under the leadership of K. B. Allah Bux, sat on the opposition benches, as also the Congress Party. Sir Ghulam Husain sought the support of the United Party, by offering them two ministerships, but the latter claimed three seats in the Sindh Cabinet. Negotiations failed, and this failure

cost Sir Ghulam Husain his Chief Ministership. His fall was brought about by a combination of the Sindh United Party and the Congress, with the result that K. B. Allah Bux was called upon to form the Ministry. The Congress did not coalesce, but promised their support to the Allah Bux Ministry. This support made Allah Bux lean heavily on the Congress, and there was little to distinguish him from a full-fledged Congress Chief Minister—so heavy was his dependence on Congress support. Sardar Patel and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad visited Sindh to increase the strength of the Allah Bux Ministry, and the Congress influence increased within the policy-making field of the Sindh Government.

The Lucknow session had authorized the President of the League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "to take all necessary steps to form a Muslim League Party in the Central Legislature at an early date, with power ... to coalesce with any other party or group whose policy ... is approximately the same as that of the All-India Muslim League ". In the Provincial sphere also the President was authorized to bring into being Muslim League Parties in provincial legislatures.

A little later, reviewing the work entrusted to him in this field, he said in his presidential address at Calcutta, "There are Muslim League Parties functioning inside seven out of eleven Provincial Legislatures. A large majority of Muslim members in all these seven Assemblies belong to the Muslim League Parties and the membership of these parties is increasing every day. The Muslim League contested with great success a number of by-elections to the Legislative Assemblies in various provinces."

He utilized his presence in Karachi, which he visited in October 1938, to preside over the Sindh Provincial Conference of the Muslim League, in order to consolidate the Muslim M.L.As. into one United Muslim League Party, so that at least in one province there could be a full-fledged Muslim League Ministry. Khan Bahadur Allah Bux was the Chief Minister of Sindh at the time, who saw the Quaid on being invited, and in the presence of Maulvi Fazlul Haq and Sir Sikandar, the Premiers of Bengal and the Punjab, Allah Bux signed the League pledge, agreeing that he would resign and the League Party should unanimously elect their leader, or in the absence of unanimity, Jinnah should nominate the Chief Minister. But the Congress High Command made overtures to Allah Bux, who backed out of the agreement the next day, saying, He would agree only if it was previously accepted that he would continue to be the Chief Minister. The Quaid wanted Muslim unity at all costs, and on his advice, twenty-seven Muslim M.L.As. signed a declaration, accepting the conditions of Allah Bux, although the conditions were one-sided. However, the pull of the Congress, for some unexplained reasons, was so great on Allah Bux, that he rejected even this surrender on behalf of the Muslim M.L.As. On leaving Karachi, the Quaid said, "So far as we are concerned, I am glad we have formed a Muslim League Party in the Assembly."

Out of the twenty-seven M.L.As that had signed the League pledge, twenty deserted it and joined Allah Bux's party. Only seven members remained loyal to the League; K. B. Khurro, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi. G. M. Sayed, Mrs. J. G. Allana and Sayed Khair Shah were among the seven that kept the Muslim League Party flag flying. The party gradually gained in strength, and within a short time, K. B. Allah Bux was defeated, enabling a full-fledged Muslim League Ministry, the first League Ministry in India, to be sworn into office in the province of Sindh.

When the League met in its annual session at Patna it adopted resolutions on the death of Allama Iqbal as also of Maulana Shaukat Ali and Kamal Ata Turk. Speaking on the resolution and paying tribute to Iqbal, Jinnah said, "His death is an irreparable loss to Muslim India. He was a personal friend of mine and composer of the finest poetry in the world. He will live as long as Islam will live. His noble poetry interprets the true aspirations of Muslims. It will remain an inspiration for us and for generations after us". In his presidential address he referred to the injustices inflicted by Congress ministries upon the Muslims and said they were nothing short of tyrannies. But the Muslims would not be cowed down. "I say the Muslims and the Muslim League have only one ally—and that ally is the Muslim Nation ... Muslims are face to face with a life and death struggle. It is a great pleasure for me to see that a great awakening has taken place among the Muslims. If you now harness your energies and mobilize your forces like a disciplined army, victory will be yours."

The Muslims were on the march. They no longer looked upon themselves as a minority, which had to beg for safeguards and concessions. The horizons of their political thinking had widened, and a new dimension had been introduced in their political objectives. Ninety million Muslims could be a powerful force, if they stood united. He believed in their destiny; and he believed it was his destiny to lead them to their ultimate goal. And to that end he began to work with renewed vigor and faith, with that single-mindedness of purpose that distinguishes the man with a mission from others.

MUSLIMS ARE A NATION

Important landmarks of history do not reach their culmination without a long chain of precedent causes and events that imperceptibly direct the course of history to that final fulfillment. During the transition period, even the vision of the ultimate goal may at times be blurred; but the blind forces of historical causation continue their inexorable march, and this feeling of obliteration of ends, which sometimes grips the human mind, may suddenly be transformed into one of conscious striving for a cause, as if the lingering clouds of darkness have moved on, and once again sunshine has penetrated the gloom, bringing with it cheer and light and hope. The struggle of the Muslims of this sub-continent for recognition as a separate nation, leading to the establishment of Pakistan, has undergone many vicissitudes and has witnessed many phases. It has seen its periods of despondency; it has throbbed with the ecstasy of hope.

Since the advent of Islam in India, Muslims found themselves in a difficult predicament. They had become sons of the soil and owed their secular loyalty to it. But the overwhelming indigenous population was so rigid and narrow-minded in its outlook that Muslims found they had no place of honor in a caste-ridden society, it was an accident of history that had at first directed their steps towards India; and subsequently it was the desire for conquest of a land whose name was synonymous with fabulous wealth. Muslim arms clashed with those of Hindu armies, and local kingdoms toppled, making way for foreign dynasties to take their place. Islam, being a proselytizing religion, made rapid strides and heavy inroads among the local population and soon went on winning an increasing number of converts. The gulf between the two communities continued to widen until an ocean seemed to yawn threateningly between Hindus and Muslims. Some Hindu kingdoms and families that arose after the first Muslim conquests avenged defeat, and many Muslim dynasties came under their sway. This crisscross course of victory and defeat introduced an element of mutual aversion and hate, and in the seventeenth century India presented itself as a happy hunting ground to Western powers for economic exploitation and possible armed conquest.

After a period of acute rivalry, chiefly between England, France and Portugal, the British established their supremacy in commerce and trade, paving the way for their ultimate political domination. Internecine quarrels, dynastic wars, aided by well rewarded treachery, made India fall like a ripe plum into the lap of the British, and the Union Jack fluttered proudly over India, making it a British possession. The system of Government established by the British gave to India a political unity on the surface, which was buttressed by ingenious political institutions set up by them, completing the Imperial circle and fastening the bonds of political slavery on the Indian sub-continent. A subjugated nation was expected by the British to praise the glittering chains of slavery fastened round its neck, and it was not difficult for the imperial masters to find

obliging slaves that were only too willing to do their bidding. However an occasional voice of protest was heard here and there in the wilderness of complacency, but soon the tongue that raised that voice was silenced forever by the tyranny of our foreign masters. Oppression, imprisonment and, occasionally, the gallows were the gifts that our patriots received as a reward for their refusal to surrender to foreign rule.

The struggle of the Muslims in this direction was on two fronts. Against British Imperialism, and against the rising desire of militant Hinduism to establish for themselves Hindu domination over Muslims under the cover of majority rule, which was sanctified by Western political institutions set up by the British. Superiority in, numbers, helped by superior social, economic and political organization and power, enabled Hindus to hold a dominating position in all walks of life over their Muslim compatriots, giving rise to a permanent cause of friction between the two communities. There arose, during this period, Muslim thinkers and political leaders, who were gifted with foresight, who saw that Muslims would never live a life of dignity and self-respect in a united India, under the type of democracy that the British had established in India. Some of them were apprehensive that under such conditions Muslims could live as citizens of a common nation, only by merging their identity in the Indian national pool, by depriving themselves of their own exclusive individuality, and thus willingly accepting a position of a permanent minority.

This was the dilemma that confronted Muslim political thinkers, and they groped for a way out of the blind-alley marked, "A minority community." For about a hundred years the search went on in minds troubled with this nightmare. Guarded whispers were at first heard, warning Muslims of these dangers; sometimes a voice rose above the prison-house of fear and begged that Muslims be treated as a separate nation to solve India's political problems on a permanent basis and, finally, under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam, millions of Muslims with one voice shouted "We want Pakistan", parading the streets and highways in the cities, and combing the countryside, carrying the banner of the Muslim League, promising the Muslim nation their own homeland – Pakistan

While the British ruled over India, every time they deliberated over the slow-moving process of reforms, they came face to face with the Hindu-Muslim problem, and in 1909 for the first time they conceded representation in legislatures to Muslims by electoral colleges, composed exclusively of Muslims—a device, which came to be known as representation through separate electorates. But much earlier than that year, there arose far-sighted leaders on the British political scene, who clearly saw that maintaining Indian Unity under the British flag under the Westminster pattern of democracy was not the final solution for that unhappy sub-continent. For instance, that great master of parliamentary eloquence, John Bright, said in a speech in the House of Commons on 4th June 1858, "How long does England propose to govern India? Nobody can answer that question. But be it 50 or 100 or 500 years, does any man with the smallest glimmering of

common sense believe that so great a country, with its 20 different nationalities and its 20 different languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire confine? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible."¹⁶⁷

It was not in 500 years, as John Bright had predicted, but in less than a hundred years after his statement in the Commons, that India came to be divided into two parts—Pakistan and Hindustan.

As far as recorded speeches and statements are concerned, probably the first Muslim, who visualized the ultimate division of India, was Sir Sayed Ahmed. He was the father of the educational regeneration of Muslim India, but his interests embraced the political advancement of Muslims as well. On his clarion call to Muslims for their educational progress was built their political edifice, and it was not a mere accident that the Muslim League succeeded the Mohammadan Educational Conference as an inevitable corollary. Sir Sayed said in 1867, "It was now impossible for Hindus and Muslims to progress as a single nation". Despondent over the future of Muslims in India, he said in 1882 to a students' gathering at Ludhiana that the Muslims were a nation, "All individuals, joining the fold of Islam, together constitute a Nation of the Muslims ... Remember it is by keeping up Islam that our nation is a nation." These are the known unequivocal declarations that Muslims of India constitute a nation.

It is not on record whether he was taken seriously on that occasion or not, even by his co-religionists. But his mind had a clear glimpse of the ultimate fate of the political unity of India that had been concocted under the British. He again said in 1887, "When our Hindu brethren ... wish to make a move which involves a loss to us and humiliation to our nation, we cannot remain friendly, and it is our duty to protect our nation".

It is only when one has complete faith in what one says that one is bold enough to repeat it, even though none is prepared to agree with one. Sir Sayed seems to have had that faith in the destiny of Muslims, for once again he wrote in 1893 in an article in the Pioneer of Allahabad, "In a form of Government, which depends for its functioning on majorities, it is necessary that the people should have no differences in the matter of nationality...."

Sir Sayed Amir Ali, a renowned Muslim scholar and historian, author of that monumental work, *The Spirit of Islam*, addressing a gathering in London in 1910 said, "It is only by remembering that the two elements (Muslims and Hindus) deserve equal consideration, that both of them are important factors in the administration of the country, by endeavoring to understand the idiosyncrasies of the two nations, by not

¹⁶⁷ Quoted in "*Verdict on India*", by Beverley Nichols, p. 192, 1946: Thacker & Co., Bombay.

allowing the interests of the one to be subordinated to the interests or ambitions of the other that you will make the projected reforms successful".¹⁶⁸

At the time when the Morley-Minto Reforms were being debated in the House of Commons, Lord Morley was the Secretary of State for India (1905-1910). He was a scholar of high eminence, who had made a thorough study of the communal tangle in India. He was irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that there was hardly anything in common between Hindus and Muslims, and it was the political unity imposed by the British that alone held them together. On one occasion he said, "Let us not forget that the difference between Mohammedanism and Hinduism is not a mere difference of articles of religious faith and dogma. It is a difference of life, in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well as articles of belief that constitute a community, what makes it interesting and even exciting. Do not let us forget that in talking of Hindus and Mohammedans, we are dealing with, and are brought face to face with, vast historic issues. We are dealing with the very mightiest forces that through all the centuries and ages have molded the fortunes of great States and the destinies of countless millions of mankind".

Asquith, as Prime Minister of England, said at the time when grant of separate electorates was being discussed, "The distinction between Hindus and Muslims is not merely religious; but it cuts deep down into the traditions of the historic past, and is also differentiated by the habits and social customs of the community."

While the First World War was being fought in all its fury, resulting in a hitherto unprecedented holocaust, and the Socialist International met in Stockholm in 1917, the main item on its agenda was to devise ways and means of restoring world peace, and making it broad-based and lasting. The Indian delegation to this conference consisted of four students, Virendranath Chatopadhyaya, M. Acharya, Jabbar Kheiri and Sattar Kheiri. The first two said they represented the revolutionary groups of India that demanded complete independence from the British. They advocated that at any international conference on world peace, the Indian Nation should be represented "by a delegation having the complete confidence of the Indian people."

Jabbar and Sattar Kheiri, commonly known as the Kheiri Brothers, circulated a memorandum to the delegates at the conference on behalf of the Central Committee of the Patriotic Mussalmans of India. This note said that the peace that would follow the War could not be permanent, so long as all nations were not free. The British had no right to oppress India and to hold that country in bondage—a country of 325 millions, constituting "one-fifth of the total population of the world". The Kheiri Brothers maintained that Indians were capable of "governing themselves, and that the argument

¹⁶⁸ Quoted in "*Final Phase of Struggle for Pakistan*", by Jamibud-din Ahmad, P. 117, 1964: Published by the author in Karachi.

against Indian independence that it is a land of many religions and languages is merely a pretext to deny to India what is her birthright". The form of Government they advocated was a federation of different sovereign provinces. The memorandum said in conclusion, "For the sake of justice, it would be necessary to re-establish some of the Mussalman States, which were abolished, like, for instance, the Principalities of Bengal, Oudh, Sindh, Kamatic, Madras, Mysore etc., not forgetting Delhi."¹⁶⁹

The plan for a free India advocated by the Kheiri Brothers does not approximate to what ultimately came to be the demand for Pakistan. They spoke in terms of a Federation of India, which is the very antithesis of Pakistan. But they certainly introduced in the perspective of Indian Federation independent sovereign Muslim States, and it is clear from the spirit of their memorandum that they did believe that Muslims could not be and should not be relegated to a position of inferiority by calling them a minority community of India.

After the War, Sattar Kheiri returned to India, was shadowed by the police, and had to suffer heavily for his courageous political views, which he had the audacity to advocate as a student in Europe. However, he worked as a Professor at Aligarh University, where he taught German and French for some years, and later became President of the Aligarh branch of the Muslim League. Professor Sattar Kheiri had to pay the penalty for his revolutionary ideas; in actual fact that penalty had been looked upon as a reward that every patriot has received for raising his voice against the tyranny of foreign rule. Those that boldly advocated Indian independence were put in prison by the British, and Sattar Kheiri belongs to that brotherhood of fearless patriots. He was interned in Dehra Dun Jail for two years during the Second World War, where Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was also a prisoner. Professor Sattar Kheiri died in September 1945, just two years before Pakistan was established.

The concept of Muslims being a separate nation was ever present in the mind of Allama Iqbal; and his writings, speeches and poetry deal eloquently with this theme, which is constantly recurring in his works. It appears that the idea of Muslims being a separate nation, politically speaking, quite distinct from other communities and races of India, was slowly taking shape in his mind. Gigantic dreams and ideals, such as this, take time to reveal themselves fully, as a clear picture, however keen and intense the search. The poetic mind of Iqbal, with its universal sweep, glimpsed the future of his people more ably and clearly than his contemporaries did. It took time to make the message of that inner vision articulate, until in 1930, while presiding over the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, Iqbal said in his presidential address that the Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab, the Frontier, Sindh and Baluchistan should be grouped together and made a single homeland for the Muslims of North-West India, where they

¹⁶⁹ The above is from a book published in French by Camille Huysmann, Secretary General of the Socialist International of 1917, which is a record of the proceedings of that Conference.

could live their lives as a distinct national entity, so that the fear of Hindu domination may be eliminated for all time to come. It is doubtful if many people took Iqbal's idea seriously at that time. However, he continued to develop this idea, whenever the occasion arose, and one such opportunity presented itself to him, when he was invited to attend the Round Table Conference. In one of his speeches at the Conference he declared if the British were to quit India, making way for a majority form of Government, then they would be leaving that country to the tender mercies of a bloody civil war. If such an eventuality was to be avoided, then the establishment of a Muslim homeland was inevitable.

The concept of a Muslim Nation in the mind of Iqbal is clearly glimpsed in his presidential address of 1930, "The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore, the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim ... The unity of an Indian Nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and cooperation of the many ... And it is on the discovery of unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as Asia really depends".

He continued, "I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own homeland is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India".

With the vision of a gifted person, he advocated, "The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. The exclusion of Ambala Division, and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population ... Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion one of ideas or of bayonets ... To my mind a unitary form of Government is simply unthinkable in self-governing India. What are called residuary powers must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of Federal States".

At the time the Round Table Conferences were being held in London, there studied a young Muslim student at Cambridge. His name was Choudhary Rahmat Ali. His mind was obsessed with the political future of Indian Muslims and he appeared to have

devoted much, of his time and, work to this problem. He naturally met Muslim leaders that came to represent their community at the Round Table Conference, the poet-philosopher Iqbal being an important personality among those that he met in company with his fellow-students. Choudhary Rahmat Ali is generally credited with having coined the word Pakistan. However, there are some that hold the view that it is Iqbal who should be given credit for it, as he was the first to suggest it.

A graphic pen-picture of Choudhary Rahmat Ali is given by Halide Edib, a Turkish writer, who interviewed him in London and Paris in 1936, when he was in his early forties. She writes, "Mr. Rahmat Ali finished his education in England, obtaining M A. and LLB. with honors from the Universities of Cambridge and Dublin. He was an able lawyer, interested in the creative side of political history but he had forsaken the legal field and had founded the Pakistan National Movement in 1933. At the moment the dominating passion of Mr. Rahmat Ali's life seems to be the Muslim destiny in India. He can speak of it with the kind of eloquence which reminds one of a lawyer pleading a case, but he can also speak of it with simplicity and feeling. The writer noticed that whatever bitterness he might have had against the anti-Muslim Hindu mentality which had hurt him in his youth, he does not allow it to influence his outlook in regard to Pakistan. Whether the Pakistan National Movement will ever have a practical value in the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem is a huge interrogation point. But an impartial student of present India has to keep it in sight, for the forces which uphold the two nations idea in India are still considerable".¹⁷⁰

Halide Edib inquired from Rahmat Ali what was the origin of the Pakistan National Movement. He replied, "For a satisfactory answer I want to go through the history of the last eighty years First the Muslims had their homelands in Pakistan; that is, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (also called Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan. The name Pakistan I derived from the names of the five provinces. The Mussalmans have lived there for over twelve hundred years, and possess a history, a civilization, and a culture of their own ... I want you, Madam, to clearly understand this basic point. The Muslims in Pakistan are in their national home ... The distinction between Pakistan and Hindustan (India proper) has been, and shall ever be clear as the mid-day sun". Choudhary Rahmat Ali explained to Halide Edib that at the Round Table Conference the idea of Indian Federation held the field, "Thus the Pakistanis were to be reduced to a mere minority community belonging to the Hindu Nation and subordinated to the supremacy of Hindustan. It is this grave menace to the national existence which has led us to create the Pakistan National Movement, which is founded on a political scheme based on an age-old reality hitherto ignored ... We proposed it to the Round Table Conferences as well as to the Hindu delegates, and finally appealed to the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee. But both the British and the Hindus rejected our demand for national honor and justice. However, we are irrevocably determined to

¹⁷⁰ *Inside India*, by Halide Edib, p. 352, 1937: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

fight to the last ... I admit that in the present struggle our back is to the wall, but we remember that in this very land our forefathers successfully faced far worse situations than we have to meet today. For us it is a question of "To be, or not to be". We know that Pakistan is our destiny."

Halide Edib asked Choudhary Rahmat Ali what his Movement was doing for the achievement of Pakistan. He replied that they had branches all over Pakistan; they issued pamphlets and a weekly called, *Pakistan*. He continued, "The present may frown upon us, but I have my eyes fixed on the future, which is sure to smile on our sacred cause". Propounding his views to Halide Edib regarding the clash of ideas between Hindus and Muslims, Choudhary Rahmat Ali said, "The clash is neither inter-religious, nor even economic. It is, in fact, an international conflict between two national ambitions—Muslim for survival, and Hindu for supremacy ... Times come when, even brothers have to part. Cruel as such times naturally are, the highest good of the Millat must come before everything else".

She asked Rahmat Ali if 'one Indian nationhood' was not the solution. He said, "No, Madam, certainly not? We are not Indians; we are Pakistanis ... To unite India is one thing, to usurp Pakistan another ... Therefore for us to seal our national doom in the interests of 'One Indian Nationhood' would be a treachery against our posterity, a betrayal of our history, and a crime against humanity for which there could be no salvation."¹⁷¹

Some years back Miss E. Brummer carried on research at the Colindale Newspaper Reference Library, the British Museum and at other libraries, in order to ascertain how the word "Pakistan" originated and to whom should go the credit for this word. The research revealed that 'Pakistan' had been first used in 1933 by Choudhary Rahmat Ali in a pamphlet entitled, "*Now or Never*", subtitled, "Are we to live or perish forever?" There was no trace of this pamphlet in any of the libraries. The search was assisted by Miss G. M. Briggs of the Bodelian Library staff, Sir Olaf Caroe, an eminent scholar of Pushto, Dr. Percival Spear and E. Welbome. Master of Emmanuel College. In spite of their best efforts they could not get a copy of "*Now or Never*". As a result of their combined efforts a note appeared on the "Etymology of Pakistan" in the April 1960 issue of *Notes and Queries*, London, saying that "The term Pakistan began its life as a cluster of initials artificially compounded to form a euphonious name ... The term Pakistan was apparently coined by Choudhary Rahmat Ali at some time before 1933, and is said by him to have been published in a cyclostyled pamphlet entitled "*Now or Never*",¹⁷² which he issued to his supporters in January 1933. A wide search for this pamphlet in libraries in Britain and abroad proved unavailing".

¹⁷¹ *Inside India*, by Halide Edib, pp. 352 to 362, 1937.

¹⁷² *Notes and Queries*, p. 124, April 1960: Oxford University Press. London.

In order to help this research to bear fruit, Khwaja A. Waheed of Karachi and Editor of the Fortnightly *Al-Islam*, sent a copy of "Now or Never" to Notes and Queries and gave them permission to keep a photographed copy of the pamphlet in the Bodelian Library. Khwaja Waheed wrote to the magazine that this pamphlet had been reproduced in the Fortnightly *Al-Islam*, Lahore, in April 1938. The original pamphlet has been subsequently bequeathed by Khwaja Abdul Waheed to the National Museum of Pakistan located in Karachi, along with other pamphlets and maps, published by Choudhary Rahmat Ali.

"*Now or Never*" was published in 1933 by the Pakistan National Movement, 16, Montague Road, Cambridge, and printed by Messrs. Foister and Jagg, Cambridge. This pamphlet was issued by Choudhary Rahmat Ali in his capacity as Founder of "Pakistan National Movement". The signatories at the end of the printed pamphlet are Choudhary Rahmat Ali, Khan Mohammad Aslam Khan Khattak, an Oxford student, Sahibzada Sheikh Mohammad Sadiq, a student at one of the Inns of London, and Khan Inayatullah Khan, a student at a veterinary College in London. In the preface to this pamphlet there is mention of "Pakistan". It says, "I am enclosing herewith an appeal on behalf of the thirty million Muslims of Pakistan, who live in the five Northern Units of India—Punjab, North-West Frontier (Afghan) Province, Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan. It embodies their demand for the recognition of their national status, as distinct from the other inhabitants of India, by the grant to Pakistan of a separate Federal Constitution on religious, social, and historical grounds".¹⁷³

In another place, the pamphlet says, "At this solemn hour in the history of India, when British and Indian delegates are laying the foundations of a Federal Constitution for that sub-continent, we address this appeal to you, in the name of our common heritage, and on behalf of our thirty million Muslim brethren who live in Pakistan by which we mean the five Northern units of India, viz: Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan. And we ask for your sympathy and support in our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and national annihilation."¹⁷⁴

In this pamphlet Choudhary Rahmat Ali and his friends advocate Pakistan in no ambiguous terms, "India, constituted as it is at the present moment, is not the name of one single country; nor the home of one single nation. It is, in fact, the designation of a State created by the British for the first time in history. It includes peoples who have never previously formed part of the Indian nation at any period of its history, but who have, on the contrary, from the dawn of history till the advent of the British, possessed and retained distinct nationalities of their own.

¹⁷³ *Now or Never*, by Choudhary Rahmat Ali and others, 1933: Foister and Jaggs, Cambridge.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

"One of such peoples is our own nation." The pamphlet continues, "These are facts—hard facts and historic realities which we challenge anybody to contradict. It is on the basis of such facts and realities that we assert without fear of contradiction that we, the Muslims of Pakistan, do possess a distinct nationality from that of the Hindus of India, who constitute the Hindu nation and live—and have every right to live—in most of India; and that we deserve—and demand—the recognition of our national status by the grant to Pakistan of a Federal Constitution, separate from that of the rest of India". An unequivocal demand was for "Pakistan", having its own "Federal Constitution". The pamphlet concluded with the words, "Let us make no mistake about it. The issue is now or never, either we live or perish forever. The future is ours, if we live up to our faith. It does not lie in the lap of the gods: it rests in our own hands. We alone can make or mar it. The history of the last century is full of open warnings to us, and they are as plain as were ever given to any nation. Shall it be said of us that we ignored all those warnings, betrayed our ancient nationhood into the Indian Federation, and let our Islamic heritage perish throughout the Sub-continent of India?"

For the first time the idea of "Pakistan" as a separate homeland for Muslims came before the public. It was also for the first time that a public demand was made for a "Separate Federal Constitution on religious, social, historical grounds." The pamphlet was distributed by Choudhary Rahmat Ali and his friends among the British and Indian members of the Round Table conference, and it appears that they followed it up by personally explaining their point of view to some delegates. This lobbying resulted in the contents and the scheme propounded by them to come under discussion and investigation. It was quite a novel idea, advocated in a pamphlet of students, who appeared to have been carried away by their enthusiasm and their youthful years. Therefore, no one took them seriously. But Sir Reginald Craddock, a British representative to the R.T.C., seems to have taken note of its contents, as is evident from the questions that he asked from his colleagues, the Muslim delegates:

Question 9598, Sir Reginald Craddock. — "If any of the delegates or the witnesses would like to answer, will they tell me whether there is a scheme for Federation of Provinces under the name of Pakistan?"

Answer 9598. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, C.B.E.:—"As far as I know it is only a student's scheme; no responsible people have put it forward."

Sir Reginald Craddock — "They have not so far, but, as you say, you advance very quickly in India, and it may be, when those students grow up it will be put forward; that scheme must be in the minds of the people, anyhow."

Mr. Zafrullah Khan:—"What is the question?"

Sir Reginald Craddock:—"I wanted to know whether the witnesses had acquaintance with a scheme which was drawn up for what is called Pakistan."

Mr. Zafrullah Khan:—"We have already had the reply that it was a student's scheme and there is nothing in it."

"What is the further question?"

Question 9599. Mr. Isaac Foot:—"What is Pakistan?"

Answer 9599. Mr. Zafrullah Khan:—"So far as we have considered it, we have considered it chimerical and impracticable. It means the Federation of certain Provinces."

Question 9600. Sir Reginald Craddock:—"I have received communications about the proposal of forming certain Muslim states under the name of Pakistan."

Answer 9600. Dr. Khalifa Shujaiddin—"Perhaps it will be enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentleman or association so far."¹⁷⁵

In his book, published in 1940, *Pakistan, the Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, Rahmat Ali writes, "It was in this declaration ('Now or Never' 1933) that I first used for our Indian homelands the name Pakistan, which I had invented for our combined Indian and Asia homeland ... So much for the invention of the name Pakistan. Now a word about its composition. 'Pakistan' is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands—'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is, Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kach and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. It means the land of the Paks — the spiritually pure and clean".¹⁷⁶

In another pamphlet published by Choudhary Rahmat Ali in 1940, as Founder of Pakistan National Movement, he wrote the response that his scheme for Pakistan had received was very encouraging and that "encourages us not only to continue our labors in that sphere, but also to initiate the second part of the programme, the part pertaining to Bengal and to Usmanistan (Hyderabad-Deccan)".¹⁷⁷ He continues, "For, in all human certainty, if once we agree to remain in their India', we shall, forever, rot in subjection to 'Indianism'.¹⁷⁸ Rahmet Ali argues that to accept the 'territorial unity of India would be to fasten 'the tyrannical yoke of Indianism on the Millat.' That is why he advocated

¹⁷⁵ Minutes of Evidence given before the Joint-Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms. Vol. II, p. 1406: Published by H.M.G'S. Stationery Office, London, 1934.

¹⁷⁶ *Pakistan—The Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, 1947: Foister and Jaggs, Cambridge.

¹⁷⁷ *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of Indianism*, p. I. 1940: Foister and Jaggs, Cambridge.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Pakistan, Bangsamistan, and Usmanistan, and he writes, "When this is done, we must—and we will—build on solid and secure foundations of Pakistan, Bengal and Usmanistan, three independent nations, which will be larger, bigger, and more powerful than any that existed in history".¹⁷⁹

Choudhary Rahmat Ali kept the map of India before him and, with different colored pencils in his hand, he drew lines across the sub-continent, in order to show what was in his mind, when he demanded the creation of Pakistan, as a separate and sovereign State. The original of this map, along with some of his pamphlets, are now in the National Museum of Pakistan. Babu Rajendra Prasad wrote about Choudhary Rahmat Ali, "The author (Rahmat Ali) is thus a most uncompromising protagonist of the two-nation theory."¹⁸⁰

Choudhary Rahmat Ali had told Halide Edib in 1937 that Pakistan may not come in his lifetime, but he would continue to fight for it. However, Pakistan was established in 1947, while Rahmat Ali yet lived.

He visited Pakistan in 1948, and lived in Lahore, a life bordering on anonymity. After a brief sojourn, due to some unknown reasons, he left for England, never to return again, for he died in England somewhere in 1951. About his death and burial, Mr. Anwar writes, "He lies buried in Working, without even an epitaph on his grave. This son of Pakistan, who fought for Pakistan in exile, also lies dead in exile. He deserved a niche of honor in, the land of Pakistan. Will we take steps to revive the memory of the 'Forgotten Hero', and build in his memory a memorial worthy of his place in the history of Pakistan?"¹⁸¹

Another scheme which was advocated in the forties was, "Confederacy of India" by 'A Punjabi'. He advocated the setting up of (1) "*The Indus Regions' Federation*", comprising the Punjab, Sindh, the N.-W.F. Province, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala, and Malerkotla; Muslim population in this area would be approximately 82%, Sikhs 6%, and Hindus 8%. (2) "*The Hindu India Federation*" with the U.P., C.P., Bihar, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay, and certain Indian State. Hindu population in this area would be 83.72% while Muslims would constitute 11%. (3) "*The Rajistan Federation*" with the various States of Rajistan and Central India. Population, Hindus 86.39%: Muslims 8.09%. (4) "*The Deccan States Federation*." with Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar States, as its component parts. Muslim population in this area would be 8.90%, as against Hindu population of 85.82%. (5) "*The Bengal Federation*," comprising the Muslim tracts of Eastern Bengal, Goalpara, Sylhet districts of Assam, Tripura and other States adjoining Eastern Bengal, Muslims in this

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁰ *India Divided*, by Babu Rajendra Prasad, p. 185, 1947: Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay.

¹⁸¹ *The Forgotten Hero*, by M. Anwar: *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore. 23-3-1964.

Federation would be 66.1%, and Hindus 32.6%. The five Federations would agree to form a Confederacy of India'.

Another scheme published was known as "The Aligarh Professors' Scheme" propounded by Professors Syed Zafrul Hasan and Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh. Their scheme was to divide India into six main divisions as "Wholly independent and Sovereign States". (1) "Pakistan", consisting of the Punjab, the N.W.F.P, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kashmir and Jammu States. Mandi, Chamba, Sakit, Sumin. Kapurthala, Maler, kotla, Chitral, Dir, Kalat, Loharu, Bilaspur, Simla Hill-tracts, Bahawalpur etc., where the Muslim population would be approximately 60.3%. (2) "Bengal", including Purnea District of Bihar and Sylhet Division of Assam. Muslim population 57%. (3) "Hindustan", consisting of the rest of India and Indian States, where Muslim population would be 9.7% (4) "Hyderabad," consisting of Hyderabad, Bevar and Kamatak, Muslims 7.5%. (5) "Delhi", including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhund Division and the District of Aligarh. Muslims 28%. (6) "Malabar", to include Malabar and South Kanara. Muslim population 27%. The scheme suggested a sort of confederation between the above six units.

Then there was the scheme advocated by Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, Deccan. He has explained his scheme in his book. *The Muslim Problem in India*. He claimed it to be based on a pattern that would unify India on natural lines, wherein a federation of culturally homogeneous States was to be set up to form one Indian Nation, more or less on the lines of Canada, where two different races, speaking two different languages, work together. Dr. Latif advocated that "India may be divided into four cultural zones for the Muslims where homogeneity may be introduced, and at least eleven for the Hindus. The Indian States interspersed all over the country may be distributed between the different zones in accordance with their natural affinities. Each such zone will form a homogeneous state with a highly decentralized form of Government within, wherever more than a unit should compose the zone, but fitting along with similar states into an all-India Federation."¹⁸²

The Muslim cultural zones contemplated by Dr. Latif were.—(1) "The North-West Block" consisting of Sindh, Baluchistan, the Punjab, the Frontier Province, Khairpur and Bahawalpur, with a population of about twenty-five million Muslims. (2) "The North-West Block", comprising Eastern Bengal, to include Calcutta and Assam, with a Muslim population of thirty million. (3) "The Delhi-Lucknow Block". (4) "The Deccan Block". There were to be seven Hindu cultural zones, such as, (1) "Portions of Bengal". (2) "Orissa". (3) "West Bihar and the United Provinces", up to the line of the Delhi-Lucknow zones, extending from the Himalayas down south up to the Vindhya. (4) "The Rajput States". (5) "Gujrat," "Mohrattas". (7) "Canarese". (8) "Andhra". (9) "The Tamilian Zone". (10) "Malayali". (11) "A Hindu-Sikh Block including a portion of Kashmir in the North-

¹⁸² *The Muslim Problem in India*, by Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif, p. 30.

West Muslim Block. A sort of exchange of Hindu and Muslim population, in mutual agreement, was another feature of the scheme of Dr. S. A. Latif; he also supported the continuation of separate electorates in all the zones.

Dr. Latif's scheme came in for severe criticism, as it advocated the political unity of India, which was being gradually given up by Muslims all over India. As a result, when Dr. Latif wrote his book in 1943, *"The Pakistan Issue"*, he offered apologies for advocating a zonal scheme for a unified India. He wrote, 'I do not oppose Pakistan, or the formation of sovereign States in the North-West and the North-East, where the Muslims form a predominant majority in population. Let that be clear to everybody.'¹⁸³ On 10th January 1940, Dr. Latif attempted in a letter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to persuade the latter to accept the zonal scheme, "The idea of cultural zones is a mild idea compared with that of Pakistan. But that will be thrown into the limbo of oblivion, and the specter of Pakistan alone will stare you in the face tomorrow, if today you fail to use your opportunities to frame a constitution for the country agreeable to all."¹⁸⁴

Yet another scheme was the one outlined by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in a pamphlet, entitled "Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation." India was to be divided into seven zones (1) Assam and Bengal, (2) Bihar and Orissa, (3) United Provinces, (4) Madras, Travancore, Coorg and Madras States, (5) Bombay, Hyderabad, Mysore and C.P. States, (6) Rajputana States, (7) The Punjab, Sindh, N.-W. Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Kashmir, and Punjab States. After outlining the boundaries of the proposed federation, the scheme deals elaborately with the powers of the Legislatures, of the Governors and of the Viceroy, as also with communal representation in the services and in the legislatures.

When the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference met in Karachi on 7th October 1938, under the Presidentship of the Quaid, the question of the shape of future constitutional reforms that would be in the best interests of Muslims of India engaged the attention of top Muslim leaders that had gathered there from all parts of India. Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon was the main spirit behind the conference, and he had strong views on the future of Muslim politics. As a result of the deliberations of these leaders the Conference adopted a resolution, the operative part of which said. "This Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interest of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindu and Muslims, to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honorable and legitimate status due to them, and that this conference therefore

¹⁸³ *The Pakistan Issue*, by Dr. S. A. Latif, pp. VI to VII, 1943: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore.

¹⁸⁴ *The Pakistan Issue*, by Dr. S. A. Latif, p. 25, 1943: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore.

recommends to the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence."

The above resolution was moved by Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, and seconded by Nawab Gurmani. It was further supported by Haji Abdullah Haroon and Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah of C P.

While recalling various schemes that were formulated at this time, the one known as "Sir Abdullah Haroon Committee's Scheme" may also be mentioned. According to this scheme there were to be two Muslim States - one in the North-West, with a Muslim population of about 63%; and another in the North-East, where Muslims were to be approximately 54%.

Towards the end of the thirties of the twentieth century, the future political status of Muslims seriously engaged the attention of all political leaders and parties, as they had come to realize that Muslims were no longer content to be treated as a minority community. Apart from the Congress, the party that vehemently opposed the demands of the Muslim League at this time was the Hindu Mahasabha, which had no rival in its extreme anti-Muslim attitude. Some of its important members went to the length of advocating that Indian Muslims were aliens and that they were not entitled to full citizenship rights. At this time, the leader of the Mahasabha was V.D. Savarkar. In his presidential address to the Hindu Mahasabha, Savarkar said in December 1939, "Let us bravely face the unpleasant facts. There are two nations in India, the Hindus and the Muslims". Savarkar was bitterly attacked in the press, and his own lieutenants disowned his contention. Of course, Savarkar did not realize that history would take him at his word, and the year 1947 would come to see the logical conclusion of his statement put into effect, namely, the division of India into two independent sovereign States.

In the meantime the Congress Ministries that had assumed power in 1937 carried on merrily the control of the entire Government machinery to the utter detriment of Muslims. Protests Voiced by the League against Congress "atrocities" went unheard, and when the annual session of the League met at Patna in December 1938, the Quaid in his presidential address accused Gandhi as the evil genius behind the Congress. He said Gandhi was out to destroy the ideal, of Hindu-Muslim unity, which was the main reason why the Congress had been brought into existence. In its place, Gandhi had given a new twist to the ideology of the Congress, and under the shelter of clever words and high-sounding verbiage, Gandhi was wanting the Congress to establish "Hindu Raj in India". His speech prompted the League to adopt a resolution of "Direct Action against Congress atrocities". He narrated the grievances of Muslims against Congress ministries and in March 1939, while speaking on the Finance Bill, he said, "We are not going to support the Government, because the British Government has failed even to secure us our elementary rights of citizenship, and those special powers which were

assumed under the guise of the Governors and the Governor-General being the protectors and the trustees of minorities have proved to be a fraud; worse than a fraud".

At about this time, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, as the Chief Minister of the Punjab, issued statements to the press regarding the war efforts and certain other matters, which the Congress eagerly pounced upon, and the Hindu press played up Sir Sikandar as being against the Muslim League. It was a clever device to divide the Muslims. The Congress High Command never tired of saying that Muslims were divided, and that the League represented, at best, only a minority of Muslims, and that its claim of being the sole spokesmen of Muslim India was preposterous in the extreme. Jinnah read these statements against him and against the League with undisguised contempt, and his mind seemed to tremble on the threshold of momentous decisions. An insight into his thinking is evident in his address to the Old Boys of Osmania University in September 1939, "The words Nationalism and Nationalist have undergone many changes in their definition and significance. Some people have a dictionary of their own ... I say to every Mussalman that Islam expects you, one and all, to do your duty and stand by your people as a nation."

Congress ministries had begun to run into difficulties, as the Governors in some provinces were not prepared to fall in line with their interpretation of the 1935 Act. On 22nd October 1939 the Congress resigned and Section 93 of the Act was imposed, under which the Assemblies were suspended. Jinnah issued an appeal to the Muslims of India to observe 22nd December as "the day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased to function." His instructions were carried out enthusiastically by the Muslims all over India. Gandhi was pained, and wrote an article in his weekly, the *Harijan*. He sent a copy of it to the Quaid, and asked him to comment on it. Jinnah wrote to Gandhi on 1st January 1940 saying Gandhi was being dictated by his "Inner Voice" and not by practical politics. Jinnah said, "India is a Sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations ... You cannot divide social, economic, political and purely religious work into watertight compartments. I do not know any religion apart from human activity...."

In an atmosphere surcharged with communal tension and open antagonism between the League and Congress, the annual session of the League met in Lahore on 22nd March 1940. That province was still in the grip of Unionists, but by far and large mass public opinion, had veered round to the League point of view. On the opening day, Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot delivered his welcome address, narrating important political developments that had taken place recently, with particular emphasis on the situation in the Punjab. Almost all the top Muslim leaders from all parts of India were present, and behind closed doors they sat, informally, to discuss the political situation; the central pivot of these deliberations being the Quaid-e-Azam. He had all along believed it was through Hindu-Muslim unity atone that India could win her independence, and after that had been achieved, internal differences between the

various communities could be settled. But decades of active political life had gradually made him come to the conclusion that unity meant one thing to him and those of his way of thinking, and it meant quite another thing to the Hindu Congress. He wanted it to be a means for achieving an honored place for his co-religionists, while the Hindus wanted to use it to perpetuate their stranglehold on the politics of the country. Muslim leadership had been disillusioned about Congress intentions after seeing Congress Ministries in action, which convinced them, "When you scratch a Congressman, you find a Hindu underneath". The Quaid realized that the Muslims now stood at the crossroads of history, and they must take a decision worthy of Muslims as a nation.

There had been, unchannelised talk recently about "Pakistan", a homeland for the Muslims of India. Could Muslims live an honored life as a nation within a unified India, where majority rule would prevail, both in the Centre and in the provinces? Congress Ministries had provided the answer to this question. Therefore, the thinking of the Quaid and of his colleagues abandoned the beaten track, and headed for a new and bold path, to openly demand that Muslims were a separate nation, and their national aspirations should be met. In the background of this thinking, leaders of the Muslims League sat to draft a resolution, which would unambiguously set before Muslims their political goal. Slowly and gradually they glimpsed the outlines of Muslim objectives in terms of a new dimension, and the main resolution to be moved in the Lahore session began to take shape. It opened new vistas in their minds, widened their mental horizons, and they were ready to take the plunge with confidence, on the path that would lead them to a separate homeland for the Muslims of India.

With this background in his mind, the Quaid rose to deliver his presidential address. It was not a set speech read from a prepared text; probably, he wanted to wait and see what final shape the resolution embodying Muslim demands would take. Now he knew what his colleagues and he would agree upon. He prefaced his speech by narrating what had been achieved since the last session had met at Patna. In every province, branches of the League had been opened. Almost all the by-elections had been won by the League. A ladies' section of the League had been organized, because, he said, "I believe that it is absolutely essential for us to give every opportunity to our women to participate in our struggle of life and work". He dwelt on the anti-Muslim rule of Congress Ministries, and said, "We have learnt many lessons. We are now, therefore, very apprehensive and can trust nobody ... I never dreamt that the Congress would come down so low as that..." He recalled that it was for the first time that the Viceroy of India had thought of inviting him for consultations, along with Gandhi. "What was responsible for this change in the mind of the Viceroy?" he asked. "The answer is," he said, "The All-India Muslim League, whose President I happen to be". Dealing with the problem of future constitution, he said, "Our position is that, as soon as circumstances permit or immediately after the war at the latest, the whole problem of India's future constitution must be examined de novo and the Act of 1935 must go, once for all". Ridiculing Gandhi, who, while advocating a Constituent Assembly for framing India's

Constitution, had said that Jinnah was his brother, the Quaid said, "The only difference is this—brother Gandhi has three votes; and I have only one vote."

Then he gave his attention to the number of constitutional schemes that had been drawn up by individuals and organizations for the future political advancement of India. He said, "It has always been taken for granted, mistakenly, that Mussalmans are a minority; and, of course, we have got used to it for such a long time, that those settled notions sometimes are very difficult to move. The Mussalmans are not a minority. The Mussalmans are a nation by any definition ... We find ... we occupy large parts of this country, where the Mussalmans are in a majority ... such as Bengal, the Punjab. N.-W.F. Province, Sindh and Baluchistan ... The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international character, and it must be treated as such ... If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this subcontinent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states ... To yoke together two such nations (Hindus and Muslims') under a single State one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the Government of such a State ... Muslim India cannot accept any constitution, which must result in Hindu majority Government..."

In the end he made an impassioned appeal to the intelligentsia. "Do you realize that you cannot get freedom or independence by mere arguments? I should appeal to the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia in all countries have been pioneers in all movements for freedom. What does the Muslim intelligentsia propose to do?" He exhorted them to roll up their sleeves and to work for the betterment of the Muslim Nation.¹⁸⁵

On 23rd March 1940, the following resolution was moved by Maulvi Fazlul Haque, the Chief Minister of Bengal, and it was adopted unanimously: "While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935. is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is

¹⁸⁵ The above excerpts are taken from *Speeches and Writing of Mr. Jinnah*, by Jamiluddin Ahmed, p. 143, Vol. I, 1960: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore.

based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, *viz.*, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

"That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

"This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."

The resolution was seconded by Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, and supported, among others, by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, Nawab Ismail Khan, Qazi Mohammad Isa, and I. I. Chundrigar. The resolution passed in Lahore on 23rd March created a scare in the minds of Hindus and the Congress. They could read in between the lines, and they were sure that the Muslim League had now openly advocated the division of India into "Independent States". They were furious. Editorial after editorial in the Hindu press condemned it; Hindu leaders fulminated at it; ridicule was showered on it; and the Quaid was the main target of their attack. But he remained restrained, dignified, happy that the Muslims were now well set towards their destiny. The Hindus, with a view to damn the resolution, contemptuously called it the resolution that demanded "Pakistan, an impossible goal, which only a madman could believe in". The Muslim League relished the accusation, and named it "The Pakistan Resolution of 23rd March 1940".

The Quaid told his Secretary, M. H. Saiyid. after the passing of the resolution, "Iqbal is no more among us. But had he been alive, he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do."¹⁸⁶

Gandhi and Rajoeopalacharia said the Lahore Resolution was aimed at the "Vivisection of India", and at "Cutting the body into two halves". Jinnah replied, "India is divided and partitioned by Nature ... Where is the country, which is being divided? Where is the Nation, which is denationalized? ... Indian Nation and Central Government do not exist..."

The Muslim demand for Pakistan became more and more vocal and the League better organized. In April 1942, Mr. Amery, as Secretary of State for India, was constrained to admit in the House of Commons, "Our ideal remains a united India but we would sooner see India ... divided and free, than keep her various elements for ever chafing against us and against each other, under a sense of impotent frustration."

Two years later, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah that Muslims and Hindus were not two nations, but one. He wrote that Jinnah's contention was "Wholly unreal. I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock". Jinnah replied, "Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition at test as a nation ... By all the canons of international law, Muslims are a Nation"

Ever since the Pakistan Resolution was passed, demands were made in the press that Jinnah should explain the details and implications of the scheme embodied in the Resolution. The Quaid refused to oblige his adversaries. His contention was that the principle of separation must first be accepted and then the time would come for deciding on the details. The Hindus wanted to have the details first. Babu Rajendra Prasad said, "It is difficult to understand this reluctance on the part of the President of the League to disclose the scheme in its entirety, if there is a scheme ready". The Quaid remained unruffled and refused to be drawn into the controversy, in spite of the storm that raged around him.

In 1943, Beverley Nichols came to visit India and to meet Indian leaders in connection with a book that he was writing. After meeting all of them, he wrote, "I have called Mr. Jinnah, the most important man in Asia." In an interview that Beverley Nichols had with the Quaid, he reminded him that the common accusation against him was that the League had failed to define Pakistan. The document embodying the terms of separation was approximately ten lines ... All the details were left to the Future – and the Future is often an admirable arbitrator. "Well, I've already given the world a good deal more than ten lines to indicate the principles and practice of Pakistan, but it is beyond the power of

¹⁸⁶ Quoted in *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, by M. H. Saiyid. p. 699, 1945: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore.

any man to provide, in advances a blue-print in which every detail is settled ... Where was the blue-print when the question of Burma's separation was decided at the Round Table Conference? Where was the blue-print, when Sindh was separated from Bombay? ... The vital point was that the principle of separation was accepted; the rest followed automatically". Beverley Nichols asked the Quaid how he would describe the vital principles of Pakistan? "In five words," replied the Quaid: "The Muslims are a Nation". He went on to say, "The one thing which keeps the British in India is the false idea of a United India, as preached by Gandhi. A United India, I repeat, is a British creation—a myth which will cause endless strife. As long as that strife exists the British have an excuse for remaining. For once in a way divide and rule does not apply". Nichols asked him if he wanted the British to "Divide and Quit." Jinnah replied, "You have put it very neatly."¹⁸⁷

After studying the Indian scene on the spot, Beverley Nichols wrote, "For those who like statistics, the figures are overwhelmingly convincing. With only one exception, every single by-election fought by the Muslims anywhere in India during the last seven years has been won by League candidates. They were cent percent pro-Pakistan, their programme contained not the faintest shadow of the suggestion of compromise or prevarication, and they swept the board every time, everywhere, in Bengal, in Assam, in the North-West Frontier, in Sindh, in all the provinces, in fact, which Pakistan will eventually absorb. In the Central Legislature itself, out of 30 Muslim seats, 28 are held by vehement Leaguers."¹⁸⁸

Under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam, Muslims were nearing their goal. From one end of India to the other, in the cities and villages, in the fields and factories, millions of Muslims including women and children, shouted, "Divide and Quit," "Pakistan Zindabad".

¹⁸⁷ *Verdict on India*, by Beverley Nichols, pp. 189 to 193, 1946: Thacker & Co., Ltd., Bombay.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 196 and 197.

YOU CANNOT BREAK US

In the first quarter of 1940, the fortunes of War were going heavily against the Allies, as the hordes of Hitler and Mussolini had brought a large portion of Europe under the iron-heels of the Rome-Berlin axis. France, the last bastion of democracy on the European continent, was on the verge of collapse, and it dragged on its precarious existence, until it fell in June as a conquered territory before the onslaught of Nazi armies. This was followed by a hurried retreat of the British Expeditionary Force, which has come to be known as the "Disaster at Dunkirk". The British Isles were in imminent danger, and the very existence of Britain as an independent State was a big question mark. Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister of England, and the Marquess of Zetland was succeeded by L.-S. Amery as Secretary of State for India. In order to make provision for all eventualities, so desperate was the situation, the British Parliament hurriedly adopted the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, by which it was decided that in the event of complete breakdown of all communications, the Viceroy would exercise all the powers that were hitherto vested in the Secretary of State for India.

There was a feeling of foreboding about future events in India, and Congress Ministries that had resigned earlier showed no signs of resuming office. Gandhi, however, said that Congress did "not seek our independence out of Britain's ruin", and Jawaharlal, while condemning the Fascist dictators, said, "England's difficulty was not India's opportunity." Jinnah, in his capacity as President of the League, issued a statement to the press, "Up to the present moment, we have not created any difficulty nor have we embarrassed the British Government in the prosecution of the War. The Provinces, where the Muslim League has a dominant voice, have been left free to cooperate with the British Government, pending their consideration with regard to the assurances we have asked for ... " Working Committee of the League endorsed this statement by a resolution in Bombay on 17th June, 1940. The resolution, however, said, "The grave world situation demands serious efforts on the part of every Indian for the defence of his country ... Unless a satisfactory basis for close cooperation is agreed upon on an all-India basis ... between the Government and the Muslim League and such other parties as are willing to undertake responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of imminent danger the real purpose and objective will not be served and achieved".

The Viceroy, armed with additional powers, surveyed the situation and was convinced that, although the Congress would not accept office, they would not hamper the War efforts; the Muslim League also would not create any difficulties in regard to the War. The Viceroy kept the British Cabinet fully informed of the situation. However, Amery, Secretary of State for India, wanted a break-through and did not feel happy at this attitude of benevolent neutrality of the two major political parties. He was of the

opinion that a committee, consisting of a few selected leaders, should examine the entire field of constitutional reforms, both with regard to provincial autonomy as also in the broader field of an All-India Federation. The Viceroy was firmly of the opinion that although the Muslims alone were running provincial Governments, and the Muslims constituted over 60% of the Indian army, yet it was not the right time to present an opportunity to Indian leaders and parties for political quarrels and wranglings. As a result of this correspondence, the Viceroy was instructed to hold prior consultations with Jinnah, Gandhi and other political leaders. The Working Committee of the League, having authorized their President to meet the Viceroy, the Quaid met the Viceroy on 27th June, and Gandhi on the 29th.

Jinnah informed the Viceroy that the League was prepared to help, but they could do so only if they were associated actively in provincial and central cabinets, and that the Viceroy must not make this conditional on the Congress also accepting the offer. He left the Viceroy in no doubt and demanded that future constitutional reforms in India should be solely on the basis of two independent and sovereign States. After the interview, the Quaid repeated this demand in a written memorandum he sent to the Viceroy, saying no settlement should "prejudice the two-nation theory, which had become the universal faith of the Muslims of India". He further insisted that no interim or final settlement should be arrived at without the prior consent and approval of the Muslim League. The Viceroy in his reply did not agree with the stand that only Muslim League nominees should be taken on the expanded Executive Council, although he was prepared to consider the names that may be suggested for inclusion in the Executive Council and in the War Council that he wanted to set up.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, met Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in Delhi on 8th July with a view to wean him away from supporting the Muslim League, which had recently begun to demand openly the division of India. The Quaid asked Sir Sikandar by telegram not to come to any decision with any individual or party, and that it was only the League that had the right to do so. On this, Maulana Azad sent a cable to Jinnah asking him if it was the position of the League that no provisional agreement that was not based on the two-nation theory would be acceptable to the League. The Quaid replied to Azad, "I refuse to discuss with you by correspondence or otherwise, as you have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India. Can you not realize you are made a Muslim show-boy Congress President to give it color that it is national and deceive foreign countries? You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu body. If you have self-respect, resign at once...."

After this Azad was commonly referred to as "The Congress show-boy" in innumerable public meetings held by the League all over India.

Having studied the report of the Viceroy regarding his talks with various political leaders, the Secretary of State sent a statement, which was to be announced by the

Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government The announcement made by the Viceroy on 8th August came to be known as "The August Offer." It said it was necessary to forge Indian Unity, "as would enable her to make the fullest possible contribution in the world struggle against tyranny and aggression." The Offer said the ultimate goal to be reached was Dominion Status, and in the absence of an agreement between the Viceroy and the political parties the expansion of his Council could not be delayed. Therefore, the Viceroy would go ahead with the expansion of the Council and set up a War Advisory Council. As far as the safeguards of minorities were concerned, the August Offer said His Majesty's Government would not be a party to making them submit to a system of Government to which they had serious objections.

When the contents of the Offer became known, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy that it had made him sad, "Its implications frighten me". Jinnah met the Viceroy on 11th and 13th August and asked for further amplification and clarification. Amery speaking in the House of Commons on 14th August said, 'India's future house of freedom must have room for many mansions". On the Congress demand for complete independence, he said it prejudged the issue in a sense favored by the Congress and "rejected by the minorities", the Congress Working Committee decided to call a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay in September, and Rajagopalchari made known his "Sporting Offer," the purpose of which was to come to terms with the League. According to his offer if the British agreed to set up a Provisional National Government at the Centre, he would "undertake to persuade my colleagues to agree to the Muslim League being invited to nominate the Prime Minister and to let him form a Government as he would consider best". The All-India Congress resolved, "The offer Great Britain has made through the Viceroy is not worth looking at".

The Working Committee of the League that met in Bombay from 31st August to 2nd September resolved, "The Committee consider that these pronouncements constitute a considerable progressive advance towards the approach of the point of view and the position taken up by the All-India Muslim League on behalf of Muslim India regarding the problem of the future constitution of India; and the committee also note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government have, on the whole, practically met the demand of the Muslim League for a clear assurance to the effect, that no future constitution, interim or final, should be adopted by the British Government without their approval and consent." In another resolution, the Working Committee resolved, "Some of the observations, made in the statement of His Excellency the Viceroy and also in the speech of the Secretary of State for India, with regard to the theory of unity of national life, which does not exist, are historically inaccurate and self-contradictory. Such observations are calculated to raise apprehensions in the minds of the Mussalmans of India and. therefore, the committee deem it necessary to reaffirm and make the position clear once more, that the committee stand by the Lahore Resolution and the basic principles underlying the terms thereof, proposing the division of India and the creation of independent states in the North-West and Eastern Zones of India, where the

Muslims are in a majority; and the committee declare their determination, firm resolve and faith that the Partition of India is the only solution of the most difficult and complex problem of India's future constitution and are glad to note that the vital importance and the true aspect of this question are being fully realized by the British Parliament, and that His Majesty's Government are now fully apprised and seized of the realities of the situation.

"The Muslim League again makes its position clear that the Muslims of India are a nation by themselves and will exercise their right to self-determination and that they alone are the final judges and arbiters of their own future destiny."

Jinnah had a long interview with the Viceroy on 24th September. But nothing came out of it, and on the 26th the Quaid wrote to the Viceroy that the latter had failed to meet the League point of view on a vital issue, namely, "That in the event of any other party deciding later on to be associated with the Executive Council to assist in the prosecution of the War, it should be allowed to do so on terms that may be approved of and accepted by the Muslim League Party, as we were entering into, so to say, 'A War Contract'."

The Working Committee and the Council of the Muslim League, meeting in Delhi, at the end of September rejected the 'August. Offer' on the grounds:-

"The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League in its meeting at Bombay on the 2nd of September 1940, after considering the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy dated the 14th of August 1940 addressed to the President, containing the specific offer regarding the proposed expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council and the establishment of a War Advisory Council, had requested H. E. the Viceroy, to reconsider the matter and authorized the President to seek further information and clarification, particularly on the points set out in the resolutions before the committee could deal with the offer. As a result of the communication of these resolutions to H. E. the Viceroy, he invited the President to meet him on the 24th of September and after full and free discussion of the points arising out of those resolutions, H. E. was pleased to send a formal reply dated the 25th of September, 1940. After giving their most earnest and careful consideration to the whole matter, the committee, notwithstanding their desire from the very beginning to help in the prosecution of the War and the defence of India, regret that they are unable to accept the present offer for the following reasons:-

1. "That the inclusion of only 2 representatives of the Muslim League in the proposed expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council, of which neither the total strength nor the number of additional members has so far been definitely determined, does not give any real and substantial share in the authority of the Government at the Centre.

2. "That no indication has been given as to what would be the position of the Muslim League representation in the event of any other party deciding at a later stage to assist in the prosecution of the War, and the Government agreeing to associate it with the Executive Council, which may involve a substantial modification and reshuffling of the Executive.

3. "That so far, the Government do not propose to appoint non-official advisers in those provinces which are being administered by the Governors, under Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935. The Committee feel that without the association of the Muslim League representatives in the administration of those provinces it will not be possible to secure real and effective cooperation of the Mussalmans.

4. "That the proposed War Advisory Council is yet in embryo and no information is available as to its constitution, composition and functions, except that it will probably consist of about 20 members and that the question of setting it up will be considered after the expansion of the Executive Council is complete."

Both the League and Congress having rejected the August Offer, the Viceroy began to look around for individual Muslims that may be prepared to accept seats on his Executive Council and on the War Advisory Council. But V. P. Menon writes, "The Viceroy could see no prospect of getting any Muslim League leader who would be prepared to disregard the League's mandate."¹⁸⁹ This confession is a measure of the tremendous power and hold that the League had by now come to acquire with the Muslims of India, and this solidarity, so difficult to achieve in the past, was to continue unhampered under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam, leading to the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947.

On 20th November, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, addressing both Houses at the Centre said that as the major political parties had refused to work the offer made by His Majesty's Government, it had been decided not to proceed on the basis of that offer. The very next day, the Secretary of State for India informed the House of Commons of the break-down of the Viceroy's talks and he made an ap. peal to Indians to give further consideration to the problems that faced India and the world. The Hindu press interpreted certain passages of his speech as justifying the Muslim demand for the partition of India. Towards the end of December when the Hindu Mahasabha met in its annual session in Madras, vitriolic speeches were made against Jinnah and the Muslim League, and one of its resolutions condemned the demand for Pakistan as being unpatriotic and anti-India.

The policy of repression continued against leaders whose speeches tended to impede the war efforts, directly or indirectly, and they were sent to jail in their hundreds.

¹⁸⁹ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 102. 1957: Orient Longmans, Bombay.

Maulana Azad, the Congress President, was convicted and imprisoned in January 1941 for a speech that he had made. In the same month Subhas Chandra Bose, who had been released on parole, disappeared mysteriously from his house in Calcutta. Towards the end of February, the Working Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution disapproving the pronouncements of Amery as they gave the impression that the British were still thinking in terms of framing the future constitution on "The economic and political unity of India". The resolution further reiterated that the Lahore Resolution "is the only solution of India's constitutional problem". The Unionists under Sir Sikandar were constantly coming under pressure from their Hindu party-men, and they felt, their Muslim League membership was a source of embarrassment to them. They began to falter under Hindu attacks, and Sir Sikandar in a debate in the Punjab Assembly in March 1941 said Muslims were afraid of a powerful Centre, as they would be in a minority there, and, therefore, they were for strong provinces. He continued, "I say, give complete autonomy and freedom to the units and let them be demarcated into regions or zones on a territorial basis ... If you want real freedom for the Punjab, that is to say a Punjab in which every community will have its due share ... then that Punjab will not be Pakistan, but just Punjab, land of the five rivers; Punjab is Punjab and will always remain Punjab whatever anybody may say..."¹⁹⁰

The Quaid did not like the tone and temper of Sikandar's speech, nor could he be complacent regarding the growing opposition among Muslim Unionists in the Punjab against the demand for Pakistan. It was, probably, with a view to making Pakistan an article of faith with every Muslim Leaguer that, when the twentieth session, of All-India Muslim League Council met in Madras from 12th to 15th April under his presidency, that a resolution was moved incorporating the objectives of the Lahore Resolution in "the aims and objects of the All-India Muslim League". It was moved by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and seconded by Haji Abdus Sattar Sait, and was unanimously adopted.

In the same month the British Parliament decided that Section 93 of the 1935 Act, under which Congress ministries in some provinces had been suspended, should continue to operate for another one year. Amery, as Secretary of State for India, said on this occasion that in the absence of agreement between the two major political parties, the reconstruction of the Viceroy's Executive Council could not be contemplated.

At this time, Jinnah was anxious to strengthen the position of the Muslim League, as it was already indirectly conceded by the British Government that no constitutional changes would take place, unless the Muslim League was a party to it. In this connection, he carried on negotiations with the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, that they, as a party, would not "stab the Muslim

¹⁹⁰ Quoted in *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 105, 1957: Orient Longmans, Bombay.

League in the back". Reciprocally, Jinnah was prepared to assure the Princes that the League would be only too willing to hold consultations with the Chamber of Princes, whenever an opportunity for discussing constitutional changes arose. Although no definite pact was arrived at as a result of these talks, yet it indicates the Quaid's anxiety to maintain the advantageous position in which the Muslim League was now placed.

Towards the middle of 1941, it seemed as if the shadow of Nazism was spreading so as to envelop in darkness the whole world. Hitler had risen to power in Germany; a political party had become the Government of that country, and Hitler was the State. But Germany was too small to contain his ambitions; he wanted to establish a world domination of Nazism, with himself as the super-Dictator. Yugoslavia had recently fallen under the iron-heels of the Huns, who had over-run Greece, annexing to the German Reich the islands that dot the Aegean Sea. There was serious trouble for the Allies in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Palestine. On the African Continent things were not going well for them, and the German General, Rommel, with his powerful forces was heading for the Suez Canal, and once his men reached there, the Allies would be hampered, considerably, in supplying men and materials to the various theatres of War in the Middle and Far East. The Viceroy, realizing the desperate situation in which British interests were placed, on the one hand by non-cooperation from the two main political parties and on the other by the increasing advance of the Axis armies, decided in July, in consultation with His Majesty's Government, to expand his Executive Council. The Indian members of the Council were to be increased from 3 to 8, and in the absence of response from the League and the Congress, he decided to take Indian members from outside these two parties. At the same time, a National Defence Council was set up. The Secretary of State, in a speech in Parliament, supported these moves initiated by the Viceroy. Gandhi, on behalf of the Congress, issued a statement saying the Congress would not participate in the work of the Executive Council or of the Defence Council. In a strongly worded statement, Jinnah also accused the Viceroy of by-passing the League and said his party would have nothing to do with the Viceroy's offers.

However, Jinnah soon found his unequivocal condemnation of the Viceroy could not carry conviction in view of the fact that the Viceroy had succeeded in inducing some Muslim Leaguers to accept office, both in his Council as also in the Defence Council. At this critical moment, he summoned a meeting of the Working Committee, which met on 24th August in Bombay to discuss the situation. The Working Committee resolved that Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Huq and Muhammad Saddullah, Muslim premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, should resign from the National Defence Council. While the Working Committee sat for three days, both Sir Sikandar and Sir Saadullah informed the Committee by telephone that they would forthwith resign, in deference to the wishes of the Muslim League; but Fazlul Huq asked for time to consider the matter. He was asked by a resolution to take a favorable decision within the next ten days, "Failing the receipt of a satisfactory reply from Mr. Fazlul Huq by the President within the time

aforesaid, the committee hereby fully authorizes the President to take such action as he may deem proper and necessary.

By three other resolutions, the Working Committee called upon the Nawab of Chatari, Begum Shah Nawaz, and Sir Sultan Ahmed, members of the Council of the League, to resign from the National Defence Council. On their failure to do so, the President was authorized "to take such action as he deems necessary and proper."

The Premier of Bengal obeyed the League mandate and resigned from the Defence Council, but at the same time he resigned his membership of the Council and the Working Committee of the League. Begum Shah Nawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmad refused to do so, and the two were, therefore, expelled from the Muslim League. This action of the President was ratified by a resolution of the All-India Muslim League Council, which met at the Anglo-Arabic College in Delhi on 26th and 27th October, and the resolution, after condemning the Viceroy's action, declared, "The Mussalmans taken in the expanded Council of H. E. the Viceroy and the so-called National Defence Council, were in no way the representatives of the Mussalmans and cannot in any way represent their interests. This Council further condemns the attitude of the Government in this connection, which was meant to create a rift within the ranks of the Mussalmans."¹⁹¹

However, on 14th November, Fazlul Huq wrote a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan, Hon. Secretary of the League, saying he had immense respect for the President of the League and was a loyal Leaguer, "It is an irony of fate that of all those who have given their best to build up the only national organization of Muslim India, I should have been the object of so much misunderstanding and so much uninformed criticism". He assured in his letter that he had not meant to insult any individual, "Nothing was further from my intention than to hurt the feelings of or to cast aspersions on any one and I hope that my assurance in this respect will be accepted and the matter considered as closed." The Working Committee resolved that Fazlul Huq's "assurance should be accepted; it is hereby resolved that no further action be taken in the matter." And this incident closed on a happy note.

At about this time, when the Central Legislative Assembly met the Quaid made a statement on the floor of the House, in terms of the decisions taken by the Muslim League, and condemned the Viceroy for trying to create a rift in the ranks of the Muslims. In conclusion, he declared that the Muslim League Party had decided as a protest to boycott the proceedings of the House. At the end of his speech, he walked out of the Assembly, followed by all the members of the Muslim League Party.

¹⁹¹ Excerpts of resolutions of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League and of its Council are taken from the official compilations published by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan as Honorary Secretary of the All-India Muslim League.

In the beginning of December was launched what is now known as the attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese, drawing the Pacific Ocean within the effective orbit of the Second World War. Pearl Harbour brought the United States of America actively into the War on the side of the Allies. Within a matter of hours, the Japanese overran Shanghai, Thailand, and were menacingly posed for a full occupation of Malaya. With this war-setting as the background, the Working Committee of the League met at Nagpur on 26th and 27th December, with Jinnah in the Chair, to consider the latest situation. In its first resolution the Working Committee took note of the Viceroy's statement of 15th December 1941, in which he had reiterated the principles underlying the "August Offer", which had been reaffirmed by the Secretary of State for India in a speech in Parliament on 22nd April 1941. The resolution said, "Since then, responsible Ministers of the Crown, Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India and Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister, have, from time to time, amplified and confirmed the policy underlying the declaration, thereby assuring 100 million Mussalmans of India, that the British Government was fully alive to the realities of the political situation in India and realized that any decision opposed to the natural aspirations of Mussalmans as a separate entity would hasten a catastrophe and make peaceful administration impossible". It further expressed apprehension there were indications in the recent past that the above noted principles may be given up, in order to appease the Congress, and, therefore, the Working Committee considered it necessary "to warn the British public and Government that any departure from the policy and the solemn declaration of the 8th August 1940, and the pledges given therein to the Mussalmans, would constitute a gross breach of faith with Muslim India, and that any revision of policy or any fresh declaration, which adversely affects the demand of Pakistan or proceeds on the basis of a Central Government with India as one single unit and Mussalmans as an All-India minority, shall be strongly resented by the Muslims who will be compelled to resist it with all the force at their command,, which would at this critical juncture, among other things, necessarily result in the serious impediment of the country's war efforts, which have so far been largely carried on with the help and support of the Mussalmans because of the policy and attitude hitherto adopted by the Muslim League in order not to embarrass or impede war efforts as far as possible".

By another resolution, the Working Committee expressed concern at the entry of Japan into the War, which had increased the War danger to India. It concluded, "The Committee are of the view that unless a satisfactory basis for close cooperation is agreed upon on an All-India basis, and not province-wise, between the Government and the Muslim League, such other parties as are willing to undertake the responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of the imminent danger, the real purpose and objective will not be served and achieved.

"The Working Committee once more declare that they are ready and willing as before to shoulder the burden of the defence of the country, singly or in cooperation with other parties on the basis that real share and responsibility is given in the authority of the

Government at the centre and the provinces within the framework of the present constitution, but without prejudice to the major political issues involved in the framing of the future constitution."

By another resolution the Working Committee appealed to the Muslim M.L.As. of Bengal to strengthen the Muslim League Party and "not to rest content," until a Muslim League Ministry was formed in that key Province.

At the beginning of 1942, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Jayakar, S. Radhakrishna and some other non-Congress Hindus appealed to the British in a press statement "to act, while there is still time for such action, so that India may line up with others ... for the freedom of humanity."

This statement was prompted by the seriousness of the situation. So far the roar and thunder of war seemed far away, very far away. But Japan's entry into the War had brought it to the very door-steps of India, where public morale began to fall, giving rise to fear, nervousness and panic. Calcutta and the surrounding parts of India were in the grip of a nightmare, and the threat of air-bombing by the Japanese was an immediate possibility. The much boosted British defenses in Malaya had collapsed like ninepins; Singapore was under Japanese occupation; in the beginning of March 1942, Rangoon also fell to the Japanese. The shadow of defeat seemed to lengthen in the direction of India. Marshall Chiang Kai-shek was on a visit to India to discuss matters of common interest with the Government of India. He took the opportunity to meet Jinnah and Gandhi, and there were rumors that Chiang Kai-shek was preparing to obtain political asylum in India, should China surrender to Japan.

The Japanese threat to India was not without its international repercussions. The United States of America, a powerful ally of England, was apprehensive that without the willing support of the Indian nation, Japanese aggression would be difficult to check. Similar opinion was held by a large number of top political leaders of Britain. Even Churchill, a Tory diehard and an imperialist in his capacity as Prime Minister was constrained to prepare a scheme of reforms, and to hold out promises for the future, in order to placate public opinion in India over Britain's intentions after the War. However, Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy sent a dispatch to White Hall that a mere pronouncement, sugar-coated with promises, would not help, and that a more concrete step in the form of actual and immediate implementation of changes may help matters. As a result the India Committee of the British Cabinet was established, with Attlee as its Chairman and Viscount Simon, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir James Grigg and Sir John Anderson as members. This Committee drew up a draft declaration and the Viceroy commented on it as being more favorable than the contemplated announcement by Prime Minister Churchill. Negotiations between the Viceroy and the Cabinet Committee could not result in common agreement on any draft pronouncement to be made by the Viceroy. As an alternative it was decided by the Cabinet to send out Sir

Stafford Cripps to India, who would endeavor, in consultation with Indian leaders, to find the greatest measure of agreement regarding the policy that Britain should follow in the field of constitutional reforms, and Churchill made a declaration to this effect in Parliament on 11th March. He informed the House, "The crisis in the affairs of India, arising out of the Japanese advance, has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader." While Churchill talked of helping India to enable her to defend herself from foreign aggression, he ignored the pre-requisite condition of independence, which Indian patriots of all shades of opinion demanded.

It is interesting to recall that at the time when the Congress had refused to accept office after the 1937 elections, Sir Stafford Cripps in a public meeting in England had applauded their decision, saying, "There is no greater danger to the Congress Party than getting entangled with the imperialist machinery of Government." This man, who had indirectly denounced imperialism in 1937, was coming to India in 1942 on an imperialist mission.

Although the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India had the external facade of making Indian leaders to gainfully participate "in the counsels of their country", yet Indians could not help feel that the real intention was "to bring India into the War". In the absence of prior agreement between the Viceroy and the British Cabinet, and in the absence of clear-cut instructions to Cripps regarding the shape of things to come in the constitutional sphere, discerning political observers saw that the mission was foredoomed to failure. Undoubtedly Sir Stafford stood high in the British hierarchy, being Lord Privy Seal, as also, a personal friend of leading Congressmen. He had the added halo of socialism around him, which shone in contradistinction to the traditional reactionaryism of the Conservative Party. But personal equations seldom resolve political tangles, particularly if they are as complex as Indian politics were at that time.

Jinnah surveyed the situation and felt that the Muslim League was in an advantageous position, as the last offer of the British, the "August Offer", approximated to the League policies. Cripps may fall, he thought, for the mere glittering slogan of Indian independence with a unified India as the basis of the entire edifice of freedom. The demand for a Muslim homeland had been raised in 1940, but there was so much all-round hostility to it from non-Muslims, and so much mudslinging at the concept, that the entire issue was sought to be clouded by doubt and skepticism. It all depended on what opinion Cripps would form, as on his report would be based the thinking of the War Cabinet in England. How could Cripps gauge public opinion on such important issues as war, Pakistan and Indian Independence within the short time that he would stay in India? Professor Coupland, who accompanied Cripps to India and who was working on his staff, answering this question, writes, "Public opinion (in India) ... is

shaped mainly by the politicians on the platform and in the Press".¹⁹² And the Press, which after all gives publicity to what is said on political platforms, was dominantly controlled by the Congress and the Hindus. What chance, under these circumstances had the Muslim League in influencing the mind of Sir Stafford Cripps? Fortunately, the Muslims had Jinnah as their leader, and he was their only symbol of hope.

Cripps, accompanied by his staff, arrived in New Delhi on 22nd March. The same day he addressed a Press conference, saying he had been always a great friend of India, and he thought it his duty as a member of the War Cabinet to visit India to help her at a time of crisis. It was obvious he wanted a settlement, and he was in a hurry about it, for he said, "There is no time to lose and no time for long discussions ... My intention is to stay at Delhi for two weeks ... and I believe that within that time, with energy and goodwill, the essentials of success can be achieved". That was, indeed, being over-optimistic. He confessed he was a "friend" of the Congress, and that he knew other leaders and parties less intimately, but that he had an open mind. He was frank enough to admit that no radical change of policy was contemplated, nor could "real, major, fundamental changes" be made.

After staying for three days at the Viceroy's House, he moved to a house at 3, Queen Victoria Road in New Delhi, where his conference with Indian leaders would be held. Gandhi came to see him in his individual capacity, not as a representative of the Congress, while Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President, and Jawaharlal Nehru saw him jointly on behalf of that party. Jinnah had been accredited as the sole representative of the Muslim League to see Sir Cripps, and the interests of Muslim India were safe in his hands. The Jam Sahib of Nawanager and the Maharaja of Bikaner represented Indian States. To each delegation and to Gandhi, Sir Stafford Cripps gave a copy of the Draft Declaration that he had brought with him, marked "confidential". Contents of the document began to leak out in the Press, and Cripps thought it wise to call a Press conference on 24th March to release to the public what he intended to discuss in private with political leaders of the country. It said His Majesty's Government "have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India". For this purpose, it was proposed to set up, "After the cessation of hostilities ... an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India", in which Indian States would be associated. His Majesty's Government would "accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:— The right of any Province of British India ... to retain its present constitutional position", but such a Province could subsequently accede, "if it so decides". The other proviso was in regard to "The protection to racial and religious minorities". The Draft Declaration laying down the procedure and the composition of the constitution-making body, said that after the War

¹⁹² *The Cripps Mission*, by R. Coupland, p. 7, 1942: Oxford University Press, Bombay.

general elections would be held to all Provincial Assemblies, and these Assemblies thereafter would elect the Constituent Assembly, "by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college".

Gandhi approached the Draft Declaration, essentially, from the point of view of independence of India with Indian unity left unimpaired. Although the Declaration made mention of Indian Independence within the British Commonwealth, it was to be seriously considered only after the cessation of hostilities. Gandhi was in a hurry and he could not trust British pledges. Probably, as the War was going against the British, he was not sure as to what would be the position of the British at the end of the War. Would it survive or go under? Gandhi said British promises at such a period of uncertainty were "a post-dated cheque on a bank that was obviously crashing".

After the Press Conference, Cripps had frequent meetings and consultations with Azad and Nehru, representing the Congress; and Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, had to bide his time, waiting and watching the situation. The Congress Working Committee in its meeting on 2nd April resolved to reject Cripps proposals as they amounted to acceptance of the principle of partition of India, and this was communicated by Azad to Cripps. Having rejected the long-term proposals, the Congress wanted the appointment of an Indian Defence Member, while the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would continue to be an Englishman. On this point Cripps wrote to Azad and Jinnah on 7th April that the War Cabinet would agree to the Commander-in-Chief retaining his seat on the Viceroy's Executive Council and that the Indian Defence Member could have control over certain specified subjects, connected with India's War efforts, two annexures being included with the letter to elucidate the details.

The Congress replied through Azad's letter to Cripps on 10th April that they would be prepared to cooperate, in spite of their definite views on the future of Constitutional Reforms in India, "provided a truly National Government is formed with full powers, and it must not merely be a continuation of the Viceroy's Executive Council". Cripps rejected this suggestion, saying a Cabinet Government would mean "an absolute dictatorship of the majority". Muslim League circles felt happy, as this forthright statement seemed to repudiate the possibility of a unified Central Government in India, with a permanent Hindu majority.

Prof. Coupland writes, "The reaction of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to this part of the scheme was naturally favorable. They can scarcely have expected, indeed, that the British Government would go so far to meet their claim, since for months past they had made no secret of their anxiety lest the Congress demand for the ruling-out of Pakistan from all discussions of the future should be conceded ... The scales, (they the non-Muslims) said, were being weighted still more heavily in favor of partition.. But it apparently contented Mr. Jinnah His one serious complaint was that it did not

explicitly pronounce in favor of Pakistan ... The Draft Declaration, in fact, went some way to meet the Moslem case, but not far enough. To the Congress minds, on the other hand, it went much too far".¹⁹³

The Muslim League expressed its disappointment that the demand for Pakistan had not been expressly and unequivocally conceded. Therefore, when the Working Committee of the Muslim League met at New Delhi and at Allahabad from 27th March to 11th April 1942, lengthy resolutions were passed rejecting the Cripps proposals, mainly on the ground that "While expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognized by implication by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions of India, regret that the proposals of His Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamentals, are not open to any modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals are invited ... The Committee have no alternative, but to say that the proposals in their present form are unacceptable to them for reasons given below". Among the reason given, (1) "It is neither just nor possible, in the interests of peace and happiness of the two peoples, to compel them to constitute one Indian Union." (2) "It will, therefore, be unfair to the Mussalmans to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body, whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union." The constitution-making body would "take decisions by a bare majority", and "the Mussalmans would be at the entire mercy of the constitution-making body, in which they will be a minority of about twenty-five percent". The resolution in the end reiterated its adherence to the Lahore Resolution, "which is now the creed of the All-India Muslim League", and until the right of the Muslims to self-determination is unequivocally agreed upon, "it is not possible for the Muslim League to accept any proposal or scheme regarding the future".¹⁹⁴

The Quaid bitterly complained about the attitude of Sir Stafford Cripps, "The talks had been, carried on with the Congress leaders over the heads of the Muslims, and other parties had been utterly ignored".

Cripps, who had undertaken a one-man mission in a spirit of optimize came to India, but had failed to dispel the ingrained prejudices of centuries in Indian minds against British designs and intentions regarding the independence of India. He must have felt crestfallen, for he was at the height of his career, having recently achieved brilliant success on an important diplomatic mission, in Russia. On the night of 11th April, Cripps broadcast from all-India Radio, Delhi that the declaration framed by the War Cabinet "With the object of convincing the Indian peoples and world public opinion of the sincerity of their desire to offer freedom to India at the earliest practicable moment had been rejected by Indians ... We have tried by the offer I brought to help India along

¹⁹³ *The Cripps Mission*, by R. Coupland, pp. 36 and 37, 1942: Oxford University Press, Bombay.

¹⁹⁴ These excerpts are from the book "*Resolution of the All-India Muslim League*", published by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, as its Hon. Secretary.

her road to victory and to freedom. But, for the moment, past distrust had proved too strong to allow of present agreement".

The following day, 12th April, Sir Stafford Cripps was on his way back to England. The Congress appeared despondent that Cripps should have ended his negotiations so abruptly. Menon writes, "Even in Congress circles there was a sense of disappointment and surprise that Sir Stafford Cripps should have left so suddenly, without making any further attempt to reach a settlement."¹⁹⁵

On the departure of Cripps for England, Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan*, it was "a thousand pities" that Sir Stafford Cripps, "a radical", had been burdened with the task to sell to India a scheme, which the Congress would not accept. He went on to say, "It contemplated Pakistan, and yet not the Pakistan of the Muslim League's conception ... If the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation having nothing in common with the Hindus and others, no power on earth can compel them to think otherwise".

The Quaid-e-Azam stood vindicated. What Gandhi now admitted, Jinnah had been saying for the past few years.

On 13th April, Quaid-e-Azam, addressing a Press conference, explained why the Muslim League had rejected the Cripps offer. He said, "The proposals of H.M's Government were in their fundamentals not subject to modification. Therefore, after clarification by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Muslim League examined them, carefully. I was told that they should be accepted in *toto*, but not in parts. We could not, therefore, discard the future and deal with the present. Further, that the immediate present could only be considered if the future was agreed upon ... That being the position, we examined the whole of the proposal as one document and came to the conclusion that, as regards the future, the principle of Partition (Pakistan) was not conceded, but there was possibility for a province or provinces to stand out. The machinery provided for that purpose was such that we came to the conclusion that in two Muslim majority provinces the rules of procedure laid down were such that the fate of ninety million Mussalmans would be decided by a few votes in the provincial legislatures where the Muslims are, as in Bengal and the Punjab, in a minority in this legislature – these being the major Muslim provinces. Similarly, in the Muslim majority provinces, N.W.F.P. and Sindh, the weightage given to non-Muslims would make it extremely difficult for the Mussalmans to realize their goal. In effect Pakistan was not conceded unequivocally and the right of Muslim self-determination was denied. We, therefore, did not accept the proposals regarding the future, although we recognize that the same may constitute the foundations of British policy as a historic document".

¹⁹⁵ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V.- P. Menon, p. 135, 1957: Orient Longmans, Bombay.

The recognition given to the principle of partition, however, was very much appreciated by Muslim India. He went on to condemn the Congress insistence on having majority rule in the Centre, which means that the Congress wanted to constitute themselves as "the Fascist Grand Council" of India, and hold the minorities at their mercy. Repudiating the charge that the League was against independence, he said, "We stand for freedom and independence, yielding to none in that respect, but the Congress scheme will not bring freedom and independence for the Mussalmans and other minorities of India who will be at the entire mercy of the caucus cabinet. Therefore, we hold that the Congress proposals are short-circuiting the paramount and vital issues in the name of National Government. This has been from the beginning and that is what we have been resisting". He declared in unequivocal terms that the League stood for an independent Pakistan. "So far as Pakistan is not agreed to, we cannot agree to any present adjustment which will in any way militate against or prejudge the Pakistan demand. The demand of the Congress, as explained by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the Press conference as disclosed in the correspondence with Sir Stafford Cripps, does definitely prejudge and militate against the Pakistan demand and is therefore, unacceptable to us".¹⁹⁶

Commenting on the failure of the Cripps' Mission, R. Coupland writes, "Some of their (Congress) leaders, at any rate, had never abandoned the claim that Congress represented all India, including the Moslems. Having won the election in seven provinces in 1937, they had insisted on purely Congress Governments. But in the National Government now contemplated they could not even be in a majority; for room would have to be found in it not only for the Muslim League, which claimed equality with the Congress, but for the other minorities as well". He goes on to say that Cripps' proposals may have been accepted, if offered a few years earlier, "and, now that the enemy was almost in sight, it might well seem too late ... It was considerations of that sort which had convinced the pessimists' before the mission began its work that any agreement would prove impossible, and, whatever the real reasons of the breakdown may have been, their pessimism had been justified".¹⁹⁷

But in certain quarters the blame for the failure of the mission was laid squarely on the shoulders of Sir Stafford Cripps himself. Strangely, one of his bitter-most critics turned out to be an Indian Socialist, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, who wrote, "What sort of a man is Cripps, A single occurrence answers this question better than any other. During the Italo-Ethiopian War, Sir Stafford Cripps outlined his position as a socialist and refused to take sides in what he said was a struggle between Italian capitalism and Ethiopian feudalism. Such an attitude is revelatory of a man's general outlook on life as also his level of education and mental maturity. Although a socialist, Cripps showed himself up in this attitude as a European and not as a world-citizen. There are many men in Europe

¹⁹⁶ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. T, by Jamiluddin Ahmed, pp. 379-83, 1960: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore.

¹⁹⁷ *The Cripps Mission*, by R. Coupland, pp. 61 and 62. 1942: Oxford University Press, Bombay.

who, in spite of all their sincere professions of racial equality, cannot rid themselves of the white man's burden. It is part of their subconscious make-up. If one told them about it, they would honestly feel wronged. But they have such an illimitable faith in the attainments of European civilization that they must needs be crusaders in the cause of Europe. They are the more modest, the less blood-and-iron and the more arguing species of imperialists. Sir Stafford Cripps is one of them."¹⁹⁸

Non-Congress Hindus blamed the Congress for rejecting the offer. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad writes, "Many leading Congressmen now regret the fatal mistake committed in rejecting the Cripps offer."¹⁹⁹

There were undoubtedly some Indians who felt that the failure of Cripps was disadvantageous to India's march towards its goal for independence. The most outspoken among them was Rajagopalchari, about whom Dr. Lohia wrote at the time of Cripps' Mission, "Sir Rajagopalchari is perhaps the only grand manner politician in India who has the unobjectivity of a free people and the nonchalance of a rich country".²⁰⁰ Before the arrival of Cripps, Rajagopalchari had endeavored to bring about an understanding between the Congress and the Government, in which he failed. And after the failure of Cripps, he firmly believed that India could not march forward, if the Congress and the League could not come to terms on the future of constitutional advancement. The Congress in their arrogance had closed the door for an understanding with the League, and Rajagopalchari wanted to break the deadlock. His ministry in Madras had given up office, but he rallied the Congress M.L.As. to pass a resolution which recommended to the Congress to accept Jinnah's demand for separation, and that the Congress should "arrive at an agreement (with the Muslim League) and secure the installation of a national Government to meet the present emergency". The resolution said it was not wise "to sacrifice the chances of the function of a national Government for the doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the unity of India". The Congress was furious at this, while the Muslim League felt happy that their demand for Pakistan had begun to get serious consideration, and was no longer being treated as a stunt, and that an important section of the Congress itself had unambiguously supported it. When the All-India Congress Committee met towards the end of April at Allahabad, this recommendation was contemptuously rejected and fiery speeches were made against Jinnah and Pakistan. The Congress was determined to win the unity of India, even if it lost in the struggle for the independence of India.

The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 14th July in which they demanded immediate withdrawal of the British from India, failing which, they decided to launch a mass movement. The Quaid reacted sharply to this decision and in a press

¹⁹⁸ *The Mystery of Sir Stafford Cripps*, by Ram Manohar Lohia, pp. 1 and 2, 1942: Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay.

¹⁹⁹ *Recollections and Reflections*, by Chimanlal Setalvad, p. 396, 1946.

²⁰⁰ *The Mystery of Sir Stafford Cripps*, by Ram Manohar Lohia, p. 8, 1942.

statement he said that the intention of the Congress clearly was to "Establish a Hindu Raj ... throwing the Muslims ... at the mercy of the Congress Raj".

While the Congress and League took up contrary stands on the question of partition, the Viceroy gave no indication as to the intentions of the British Government. However, in a letter to Sapru, the Viceroy said that the question should remain an open issue and be decided finally after the War had ended. Questions such as the independence of India and giving to Muslims a homeland in this subcontinent were not important issues in so far as British strategy and intentions were concerned. What mattered to them was how to get the maximum help from India to win the War that was going against them.

Towards the end of December 1942, Sir Sikandar Hayat, Premier of the Punjab, who had not fully identified himself with the idea of Pakistan, died. It was expected in League quarters that Muslim politics in the Punjab would now go in favor of the League, and greater attention, began to be paid in strengthening the organization in that province. In the meanwhile G. M. Sayed had moved a private member's resolution in the Sindh Assembly supporting the Muslim demand for Pakistan. In the teeth of Hindu and Congress opposition, this resolution was adopted by the Assembly, and Sindh became the first Muslim majority province to endorse the demand for Pakistan. The fact that a bright and more hopeful future faced the League in the Punjab and in Bengal is reflected in the resolution passed in a meeting of the Council of the League on 7th March 1943 at the Anglo-Arabic College, Delhi, which approved "the decision of the Sindh Provincial Legislative Assembly in endorsing the principle of Pakistan scheme adopted by the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League on the 23rd of March 1940 and feels confident that before long the other Muslim majority provinces will follow suit."

In the following month, the annual Session of the Muslim League reiterated the demand for Pakistan and warned the British Government not to comply with the Congress Scheme of one federation for the whole of India. It exhorted the 100 million Muslims of India to be prepared for "willing sacrifices" and to iron themselves with "grim determination," and "to acquire the requisite strength for such an undertaking".

On 26th July 1943, the Quaid was in Bombay, his hometown, busy with his correspondence and the organization work of his party. Shortly after mid-day, a stranger walked into his house, demanding that he should be immediately taken to the Quaid whom he wanted to see. The Pathan watchman, guarding the main gate, brought him to Jinnah's Secretary, Mutloob Saiyid, who was informed by the visitor that he must be allowed to see the Quaid immediately. The Secretary tried to calm down the insistent stranger that the Quaid saw people by appointment, and that if he put down on paper the purpose of his interview, he would try to obtain a date and time from the Quaid and communicate his decision to the visitor. Just then the Quaid walked into his Secretary's room, as he wanted to obtain a particular file from him. The visitor on seeing

the Quaid was visibly agitated and began to address him insultingly, demanding that he must have a few minutes talk with him. The Quaid politely replied he was too busy that day and his Secretary would give him an appointment, when he would be only too willing to see him. Thereupon the visitor drew out a knife, concealed in his pocket, and rushed to stab the Quaid in the neck. Quaid-e-Azam raised his hand to avert the blow, and fortunately the murderous weapon missed its mark. None the less before he could be overpowered by the Secretary and the Pathan watchman, the visitor succeeded in inflicting Injuries on the Quaid's face and hands.

Police was summoned on the telephone and the criminal was handed over to them. Police investigations revealed that his name was Mohammad Rafiq; that he had come to Bombay from Lahore; and that he was a member of the Khaksar movement, which was an avowed enemy of the Muslim League. Was he instigated to carry out this nefarious deed as a political vendetta or was it the act of one irresponsible individual? The police tried to find an answer to this question.

Muslim India was both pained and shocked when newspapers carried the news under banner headlines. The Quaid issued a press statement, "Although it was a serious and well-planned attack, by the grace of God, no serious injury has been inflicted on me. I don't want to say anything just now but I appeal to the Muslims to remain calm and cool and let us all thank Providence for this miraculous escape. I regret that this cowardly assault should have been made on me by a man who, I understand, is a Muslim".

Hundreds of anxious telegrams poured in from all parts of India, inquiring after the health of the Quaid. Just then a League delegation was on a visit to the Frontier Province, where a bye-election was being fought. A large crowd of Pathans, worry writ large on their faces, stormed the place in Peshawar where the League leaders were staying. They insisted they would like to hear personally from the Quaid that he was alright and assurances in newspapers to that effect were not enough. A telephone call was booked to Bombay, and across the wires the voice of the Quaid assured the people of the Frontier, "Forget what has happened to me. Concentrate your energies on winning the election, which we are fighting on the basis of Pakistan".

A review of ministerial tangles in Assam, Sindh, the Punjab and Bengal may throw some light on the growing popularity of the League at this period of our history. After resignation of the Congress Ministries in Assam, Sir Mohammad Saadullah was called upon to form the Government. He continued for some time, but when his Education Minister, Rohini Kumar Choudhury, resigned and walked out of the Government party, Sir Saadullah lost his majority and had to resign. After some time, to be exact in August 1942, Sir Saadullah was once again asked to form the ministry, and he was now safely in the saddle in his province. Although it was not a League ministry, the League had the satisfaction that in place of a Congress Ministry in Assam, there was a ministry

under a Muslim Chief Minister. The Chief Minister of Sindh, K. B. Allah Bux, who was holding his office by virtue of Congress support, was dismissed by Sir Hugh Dow on renouncing his title of "Khan Bahadur", upon which Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah was asked to form the ministry. He could not do so, unless the Muslim League party supported him. The All-India Muslim League sent instructions to its Sindh Assembly Party to lend their support to Hidayatullah. Non-Congress Hindu Ministers that had joined his cabinet were put under severe social pressure by their co-religionists. Their houses were picketed and their families were subjected to social boycott. Sir Ghulam Husain declared this to be blackmail on the part of the Congress and the Hindus, and he along with his supporters joined the Muslim League. Sindh thus came to be the first province in India to have a full-fledged Muslim League Ministry, and continued to be under successive Muslim League Ministries until partition. The Quaid-e-Azam played an important role in molding Sindh politics to make Sindh voice the demand for Pakistan. With the introduction of provincial autonomy in Bengal, Fazlul Huq had become the Chief Minister of that Province. His Krishak Proja Party mainly represented the interests of Bengal peasantry. As the Muslim League influence increased, many leading Muslim leaders joined its ranks. Fazlul Huq also began to take an increasing interest in League politics, and thus helped the organization to become powerful in Bengal. Towards the end of 1941, he resigned from the League, however, consequent upon differences between him and the League, and formed a coalition ministry. This ministry was in difficulties. On the advice of the Governor of Bengal, Sir John Herbert, he signed a letter saying as there was a possibility of the formation of a ministry on his resignation, "I hereby tender my resignation of my office as Chief Minister in the sincere hope that this will prove to be in the best interests of the people of Bengal". As this letter was signed towards the end of March, the provincial budget could not be passed, and Section 93 was imposed, whereby Governors rule came into force in Bengal. However, on 24th April the deadlock was resolved, and Khwaja Nazimuddin was sworn in as Chief Minister, the Government party consisting predominantly of Muslim League members. Thereafter Bengal politics continued to be dominated by the Muslim League until Partition. The Frontier Assembly consisted of fifty members, twenty-two of whom belonged to the Congress party. Ten of the latter were in prison towards the end of 1942, and seven seats were vacant. Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, a prominent Muslim League leader, succeeded in getting a majority in the House, and he was sworn in as Chief Minister of that province.

It was obvious that the Punjab was of vital importance in the struggle for Pakistan, and it was the Unionist Party that dominated the politics of that crucial province. Sir Sikandar continued to be Chief Minister of the Punjab from 1937 to 1942, and on his death Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana was elected leader of the Unionist Party, and by virtue of that office he became the Chief Minister of that province. In April of that year, when the Quaid visited Lahore, he tried to persuade the Unionist Muslim M.L.As. that it should be called a "Muslim League Coalition" Ministry instead of "Unionist Ministry". Khizr Hayat was entirely in the hands of Hindu members of his party, who encouraged

him to defy Jinnah; and the negotiations failed. Khizr Hayat had taken into his cabinet Shaukat Hayat Khan, son of Sir Sikandar. Shaukat Hayat was an ardent supporter of the Quaid, and he threatened the Premier that he would have no alternative but to cross the floor with his supporters. if the Quaid's advice was not followed by Khizr Hayat. But the latter was in no mood to fall in line with that suggestion, and there followed political intrigue, which ultimately resulted in the Governor of the Punjab dismissing Shaukat Hayat Khan from the provincial cabinet. The Committee of Action appointed by the League took up this matter in their hands and after investigation called upon Khizr Hayat to submit his explanation which he refused to do. He said he owed his loyalty to the Unionist Party and not to the League. He was, therefore, expelled from the Muslim League Party. Partly under pressure from him and partly in deference to the wishes of their Hindu Cabinet Colleagues, Muslim Ministers in the Khizr Cabinet resigned from the League and a large number of Muslim supporters continued to be members of Khizr's Assembly Party. Thus the domination of the Unionist Party over the Punjab became complete, and this party redoubled its efforts to fight against the establishment of Pakistan.

Jinnah undertook constant journeys to Bengal, the Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier at this crucial period of Muslim politics, and it was as a result of his astute leadership that the Muslim League began to dominate the politics of those Muslim majority provinces, except the Punjab, which province presented a political paradox. While the majority of Muslims in the Punjab Assembly were members of the Unionist Party and anti-League, Muslim masses of the Punjab were openly and devoutly behind the Quaid and the League in the struggle for Pakistan. Congress and Hindus were better organized; they were more vocal, were more resourceful than Muslims in these provinces. Jinnah knew that these provinces were vital in the struggle for Pakistan, and he worked tirelessly to win them over to the Muslim League. The fact that he succeeded in spite of heavy handicaps and overpowering odds is a tribute of his towering personality as a Muslim leader and to his uncanny political foresight, which alone in the last analysis lifts an individual to heights of greatness.

Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, laid down the reins of office on 20th October 1943, to be succeeded by Field Marshal Viscount Wavell. As Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Wavell had played an active role in the successive waves of suppression instituted by the Government of India with the help of armed forces. Amery, the Secretary of State, however, assured Indians in a speech in the Commons that the appointment of Wavell did not involve any change of policy, nor was any change contemplated so long as the War continued. When Wavell took over as Viceroy, the War had turned round a dangerous comer, and an Allied victory seemed almost assured.

On 17th February, 1944, Lord Wavell addressed a Joint Session of the Central Legislature, in which he said, "The winning of the War is our first task. But it must not

exclude preparation for the future". It was obvious that the main, anxiety of the British in everything they did was to get India to support fully the War efforts. Speaking about Indian Unity, Lord Wavell said, "You cannot alter geography ... India is a natural unit". This remark was rightly resented by the Muslim League, and the *Dawn*, the official organ of the Party, wrote in its editorial, "This drawing in of geography, without reference to history and psychology is a poor compliment to Lord Wavell's gift of statesmanship". The Quaid was more pointed and piquant in his comments, "Lord Wavell is fishing in Congress waters".

On 24th December 1943, the Quaid made an important speech, while presiding over the All-India Muslim League session held in Karachi. He said that recent achievements of Muslims had proved that they were "a Nation". He continued, "We have survived opposition, which came first from the Government and the bureaucracy, when we undertook to reorganize our movement". The onslaught that came from the Congress had been successfully repulsed, and "Muslim League and Muslim India have now become shockproof, slogan-proof, stunt-proof ... You cannot break us ... We have got millions behind us; we have got our flag and our platform, and what is more, we have our definite goal of Pakistan". He said in order to achieve Pakistan, it was not necessary to have an army, a navy and an air force; all that was needed was "the will and determination and unflagging" faith and unity—faith in your cause." Speaking to that mammoth gathering, he confessed the work of the League had grown to such dimensions recently that he could not cope with it and that it was telling on his health. He hinted, "The stage has come when it is absolutely essential that you must have a Committee of Action ... Not less than five and not more than seven". He informed the gathering that he had invited the Chief Ministers of the five Muslim majority Provinces in Delhi on 15th and 16th November to discuss with them the food problem. They had all come, except Sir Saadullah of Assam, who had deputed Abdul Matin Choudhary to represent him and "There was entire agreement among all those five provinces ... We are ready and willing ... in the name of humanity, to do everything in our power to avert the scourge of famine and the shadow of death". He ridiculed the accusation that the demand for Pakistan delayed the Independence of India, "Can you achieve Pakistan without the Independence of India? When we say Pakistan ... (we mean) not our independence only but the independence of Hindus also". In this statement, he eloquently demonstrated the solidarity of the Muslims with the movement for the freedom of the whole of India. If the Hindus wanted to malign the Muslims of India, he said, it was their business, but "they cannot and will not be able to prevent us from seizing Pakistan". Explaining the policy of the League in forming ministries in Muslim majority provinces, he said, "It is not for the sake of getting jobs that ministries were being formed and functioning where Muslims are in the majority, but to help the cause of Pakistan".

He gave in the Karachi session a new slogan to the Muslim Nation, which was to be their guideline on the future of the British in India. He said the British must "Divide and

Quit". His words were repeated all over India by the Muslims. He wanted the British to divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan and to leave the shores of India.

The name of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was once again proposed at the Karachi session as Honorary General Secretary of the Muslim League. The Quaid in putting the motion to vote said that Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was his "right hand man". Paying compliments to his work, he said Liaquat Ali "worked and served the League day and night", and that it was not possible for anyone to have any idea of the burden of work that he was called upon to do. He concluded that Nawabzada Liaquat Ali commanded universal respect and confidence of the Muslims of India.

Quaid-e-Azam's suggestion for forming a "Committee of Action" was adopted in a resolution moved in the annual session on 26th December, authorizing the President to appoint a committee, "of not less than five and not more than seven members ... to prepare them (Muslims) for the coming struggle for the achievement of Pakistan". This resolution was moved by Choudhary Khaliquzzaman and supported by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.

By another resolution it was resolved to authorize the President to appoint a committee to prepare a report "for the economic and social uplift, industrialization in Pakistan zones; introduction of free primary basic education, reform of land system; stabilization of rent; security of tenure; improvement in the conditions of labor and agriculture, and control of money-lending". This indeed was a resolution that promised to the Muslims of Pakistan progressive reforms and guaranteed them social security. It stands to the credit of the Quaid that he could get such a revolutionary resolution adopted by a political organization, which had so many gentlemen of the landed aristocracy as its members. The resolution was moved by Z. H. Lari and seconded by Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan and Hamid Nizami, editor of *Nawa-e-Waqt*.

Congress had succeeded in rousing the people to defy the Government and its laws; to court arrest; to unflinchingly face police batons; their slogan was "Quit India", which was sprawled on public and private buildings, in schools and colleges, in all cities. Congressmen wanted the British to "Quit India" so that Congress could establish Hindu Raj when they left. The Muslim League, under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam, replied that before the British leave, the country should be partitioned into two independent States, Pakistan and Hindustan. Muslims all over India with one voice replied "Divide and Quit". "You cannot break us".

WE WILL NEVER SURRENDER

There was a deadlock in Indian politics at the end of the year 1943, British offers of halting constitutional advance having been rightly turned down by the League and Congress. There was Governor's rule in seven provinces, and Congress leaders, including Gandhi, were in jail. There appeared no possibility of resolving the All-India stalemate. Jinnah, however, kept himself engrossed in consolidating the position of the Muslim League, having made it abundantly clear that he was not prepared to take part in any discussions or be a party to any decisions, except on the basis that the Muslim League was the sole representative organization of the Muslims of India.

Under these circumstances, with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru as the moving spirit, a Non-party Conference was convened at Lucknow. On behalf of the Conference, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, its President, submitted a memorandum to the Viceroy in the light of resolutions adopted by the Conference. He pleaded with the Viceroy that ministerial Governments be restored and Section 93 be lifted; an Indian Prime Minister to head a truly national Government at the Centre; all Congress prisoners be released forthwith; and election to the Central and Provincial legislatures be held. The memorandum said that out of 18 provincial advisers in the provinces, only 3 were Indians, and this had kept the provincial Government completely divorced from Indian influence and advice. Lord Wavell turned down all these suggestions and replied that none of these could be fulfilled unless the Congress agreed to cooperate with the Government.

This prompted Gandhi to write from his prison cell to the Viceroy on 17th June 1944 that he should be permitted to see his colleagues of the Congress in order to find a solution to the prevailing deadlock and that thereafter he would wish to see the Viceroy with definite proposals. Lord Wavell was in no mood to oblige Gandhi or the Congress and his correspondence with Gandhi was released to the press.

At this time, in spite of his advancing years, the Quaid was covering the sub-continent like a storm on two legs, blasting the accusation of the Congress that the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims of India. Wherever he went, Muslims turned out in their thousands to listen to him, and they looked upon him as their liberator. He held the Muslims spell-bound with the flood of his oratory, and they intuitively felt he was giving voice to their own inner feelings and thoughts, which lay dormant in the world of their sub-consciousness. He gave them a message of courage and hope; in return they gave him their unstinted loyalty and support. The name of Jinnah, the Quaid-e-Azam, had by now become a household word: his face familiar through hundreds of thousands of photographs that were hung in homes and shops; the Muslim League had reached Muslim masses in towns and villages, in fields and factories, in schools and

colleges; Pakistan had a magic appeal for the Muslims of India, who saw in it the end of decades of humiliation, suffering, frustration and suppression.

From now on his speeches gave indication that he was asking the Muslims to equip themselves to assume responsibilities in a free Pakistan, which no power on earth could deny them. Addressing a gathering of students at Aligarh University on 10th March 1944, he said, "We are getting nearer and nearer our goal (Pakistan) ... You must divert attention now from mere clerkships ... So far all big business has been in the hands of Hindus or Europeans. But I have of late noticed a real desire among Muslim businessmen to enter the field of commerce and industry on modern and scientific lines ... Together you should make your preparations...." Turning his attention to the problems confronting Muslims, he said, "Another very important matter which I wish to impress on you is that no nation can rise to the height of glory unless your women are side by side with you. We are victims of evil customs. It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of the houses as prisoners. I do not mean that we should imitate the evils of Western life. But let us try to raise the status of our women according to our own Islamic ideas and standards, There is no sanction anywhere for the deplorable conditions in which our women have to live. You should take your women along with you as comrades in every sphere of life, avoiding the corrupt practices of Western society. You cannot expect a woman who is herself ignorant to bring up your children properly. The woman has the power to bring up children on right lines. Let us not throw away this asset"

In a message on the occasion of Pakistan Day on 23rd March 1944, the Quaid said, "We are nearer realization of our goal of Pakistan and the achievement of our freedom than ever before Muslim India will not rest content until we have realized our goal For us Pakistan means our defence, our deliverance, and our destiny". The Congress Press replied, Pakistan was a mere dream of politicians obsessed with a minority complex; the Hindu Mahasabha screamed Pakistan would be achieved only over their dead bodies; Muslims thundered back "We want Pakistan". Quietly, but untiringly, the Quaid continued to lead the Muslim Nation nearer and nearer its goal.

But things were far from being favorable in the vital province of the Punjab, where Malik Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana was the Unionist Chief Minister. The Quaid visited the Punjab in April 1944 and had frequent discussions with Khizr to find a formula whereby a Muslim League Ministry could be formed in the Punjab. Khizr at first reacted favorably. Machinations of the Unionists, however, succeeded, and Khizr was checkmated. On 27th April, the Quaid issued a press statement that his talk with Khizr had failed; although he had asked Khizr in the last meeting with him to send him his final reply in writing, and although Khizr had promised to do so, he did not keep his promise and that "Much to my surprise, on telephone he informed me that he had no reply to give except what he had told me verbally". On this, the statement went on to say, he sent a written letter to Khizr through the Nawab of Mamdot and Mumtaz

Daultana to be delivered to Khizr personally. The latter accepted the letter from the two emissaries but refused to give its acknowledgement in writing. Explaining the proposals that he gave to Khizr for a compromise, the Quaid said, "Every member of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly should declare that he owes his allegiance solely to the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and not to the Unionist Party or to any other party ... and that the name of the proposed coalition should be the Muslim League Coalition Party ... As Malik Khizr Hayat has not replied to me yet, it is now for the Muslim League to decide what course of action they should take". The matter was referred to the Action Committee of the League, and there ensued an exchange of letters between the Committee and Khizr Hayat. Seeing that the Punjab Premier was reluctant to hold himself answerable to the directives issued by the League, Khizr was expelled from the membership of the Muslim League. On 6th June, the Punjab Premier issued a press statement in which he tried to explain away his reluctance to accept the League Party mandate by saying that he adhered to the principle underlying the Lahore Resolution.

Negotiations between Gandhi and Lord Wavell for resolving the deadlock having failed, Rajagopalchari approached Jinnah with a formula for a compromise between the League and Congress. On 10th July, Rajagopalchari released to the press his formula, according to which both Congress and League should declare for immediate complete independence for India and thereafter a plebiscite of all the inhabitants be held in North-West and North-East to determine whether they wanted to separate from Hindustan. This meant that in determining the future of Muslims, it was permissible for Hindus also to canvass support for a United India and to take part in voting in the plebiscite. Jinnah refused to commit himself and said he would place it before the League. However, on 17th July, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah that the two should meet to discuss the political situation, "Do not regard me as an enemy of Islam or of Indian Muslims. I have always been a servant and friend to you and to mankind. Do not disappoint me". To this the Quaid replied he would be pleased to receive Gandhi in his house in Bombay after his return from Kashmir. The meeting of the Working Committee held in Lahore on 30th July authorized Quaid-e-Azam to negotiate with Gandhi. In his presidential address at the Council of the All-India Muslim League on the same day, the Quaid, referring to Rajagopalchari's formula and to Gandhi's letters said, "At last, and it is all to the good and conducive to further progress that Mr. Gandhi has at any rate in his personal capacity accepted the principle of Pakistan". This statement was greeted with thunderous applause, for members of the Council realized that great progress had been made in getting the demand for Pakistan finally accepted by the Congress and the British. The Quaid commented in great detail on the correspondence that had taken place between himself and Gandhi recently. He said it was clear that Gandhi and the Congress at first tried to by-pass and ignore the Muslim League, begging the Viceroy to come to a unilateral settlement with the Congress. But finding that they did not succeed with the British, and their intention was to blast the demand for Pakistan, they now want to negotiate with the League. He referred to the

Hindu press and quoted some passages to show to what depths the Hindu press had sunk in abusing him. Then he referred to Rajagopalchari's formula, which had been given to him on "take it, or leave it" basis. He said, "This is pure and simple dictation and not a sincere desire to negotiate". Commenting on the formula, the Quaid said, "His formula is a parody, and a negation of, and intended to torpedo the Muslim League's resolution of March 1940". Making an unequivocal declaration that the League stood for complete independence, he said, "Let Mr. Gandhi join hands with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan in plain and unequivocal language, and we shall be nearer independence for the peoples of India". He warned the Congress and Gandhi to remember that 1944 is not 1940 or 1942, and that what Gandhi offered to the Muslims under the garb of accepting the demand for Pakistan was a hoax, "As regards the merits of the proposal, Mr. Gandhi is offering a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan, and thus trying to pass off as having met our Pakistan scheme and the Muslim demand".

Gandhi came to see the Quaid in his house in Bombay on 9th September, and these talks between the two leaders continued until the 27th when the public was informed through a press statement that the talks had ended in failure, and Jinnah-Gandhi correspondence that had taken place during the talks was released to the press. It transpired that although Gandhi posed that he was accepting the principle of Pakistan, his precedent condition that it should be accepted by a plebiscite of all peoples of North-West and North-East was a negation of the fundamental basis of Pakistan, which was the right of Muslims to determine for themselves their own future as a separate nation. "By all canons of international law, we are a nation," the Quaid said to Gandhi. He further wrote, "But when you (Gandhi) proceed to say that you aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India, I regret I cannot accept that statement of yours. It is quite clear that you represent nobody else but the Hindus ... I am convinced that the true welfare not only of Muslims but of the rest of India lies in the division of India as proposed in the Lahore Resolution". Gandhi wrote in reply, "If your letter is the final word, there is little hope. Can we not agree to differ on the question of two nations, and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination Jinnah replied that Gandhi was laboring under a misconception, "Can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim Nation, which is our birthright?" Gandhi replied he did not accept that Muslims were a separate nation. However, Gandhi admitted that if there was to be partition, "Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be". But this was hedged in with a clever proviso, when Gandhi continued to say, "I can be no willing party to a division which does not provide for the simultaneous safeguarding of common interests, such as defence, foreign affairs and the like". The Quaid, replying to Gandhi's suggestion of division between "two brothers", wrote "I really do not know what this means, and shall like you to elaborate this proposal and give me some rough outlines of this new idea of yours". But Gandhi in his letter to the Quaid, dated 24th September resoled from that

position, "I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations, but as one family consisting of many members". The Quaid retorted in his letter of 25th September, "I find that the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips, and it does not come from your heart". To this letter Gandhi replied that Jinnah was "too technical", and requested "If you will accept my advice and permit me, I would attend the open session (of the Muslim League) and address it". Jinnah replied, "Let me inform you that only a member or delegate is entitled to participate in the deliberations of the meeting of the Council or in the open session respectively I regret I have failed to convince you and convert you, as I was hopeful of doing so".

At the end of Jinnah-Gandhi talks, the Quaid said to the press it was not possible to reach an agreement with Gandhi, but added "We trust that this is not the final end of our efforts". Gandhi said, "The breakdown is only so-called. It is an adjournment sine die". Commenting on these talks, Menon writes, "The only practical result of these talks was to reveal, for the first time, the concrete features of the demand which the Muslim League had been pressing without so far defining—and further to enhance Jinnah's position and prestige amongst the Muslims generally."²⁰¹

Explaining the reasons for the failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks, Louis Fischer wrote, "The wall between Gandhi and Jinnah was the two-nation theory."²⁰²

On 4th October, the Quaid called a Press Conference to explain his point of view on the failure of his talks with Gandhi, as the latter had issued a press statement on the talks on 29th September. A reporter asked Jinnah, "Is there any possibility of your meeting Mr. Gandhi in the near future?" The Quaid humorously replied, "Mr. Gandhi says that it depends on his inner voice. I have no admission to that place. I cannot say".

Towards the middle of October, the Quaid explained in Bombay in an interview to the correspondent of the *Daily Worker*, a London daily, the concept of Pakistan according to the stand taken by the Muslim League, "Pakistan will not tolerate any outside design or aggression on this sub-continent. We will observe something like Monroe Doctrine". He emphasized, "When they (the British) say United India, they mean perpetuation of British Imperialist domination ... They want us to take all the burden and responsibilities (of the war efforts) as subservient, while keeping power in their own hands". He concluded his statement saying Pakistan was the only lasting solution of India for all parties and interests concerned.

On the failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks, Lord Wavell called a conference of Governors in August 1944, when the tide had turned in favor of the Allies and the end of the War did

²⁰¹ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 166.

²⁰² *Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, Part II, by Louis Fischer, p. 195, 1951: Hindustan Cellulose & Paper Co., Ltd., Bombay.

not appear to be so far away. The Viceroy realized that, with the end of the War all emergency laws would lapse, that Indian unrest, which was so far being put down with an iron hand under the pretext of threat of War, would erupt with the force of a volcano; and that economic discontent and unemployment, due to demobilization, would add further fuel to the fire of resentment. The Governors were unanimous in their recommendation that in the absence of an agreed settlement between the League and Congress, the initiative should be taken by the Government in resolving the deadlock, so that normal Governments could start functioning in all provinces to face the after-effects of the War on Indian economy. The Viceroy formulated his proposals based on the suggestions made at this conference and transmitted them to the Secretary of State for India, saying it was better to face the difficulties inherent in arriving at an agreed solution between different political parties than to allow the situation to stagnate and deteriorate. In reply, the Secretary of State while rejecting Lord Wavell's plan, suggested an alternate plan, which would by-pass the League and Congress. It was assumed the conference would succeed, as it was to be a conference between leaders of minor parties and minorities other than Muslims, who would present no insurmountable difficulties, particularly as the Chief Ministers of those provinces, where Section 93 was not in force, would also be present. Lord Wavell foresaw the futility of such a conference and frankly communicated his views to Amery, the Secretary of State for India.

Amery, actuated by a desire to help bring to a speedy end the War on the Far Eastern Front, where Japanese aggression was on the decline, thought of a bold suggestion – to declare that India would have full independence, and that an international settlement between nations themselves could no longer be a pre-requisite condition. Armed with the views of Amery, Lord Wavell sent to the British Cabinet, headed by Churchill, a dispatch, which was, from the British point of view, quite revolutionary in its approach and application. The Secretary of State let it be known to the Prime Minister that he fully backed the Viceroy's stand, which was in the best interests of Britain's short-term and long-term plans.

Political situation in India in the meantime had so badly deteriorated that open threats of "Civil War between Hindus and Muslims" were being raised on various platforms and in the columns of certain communal newspapers. At this stage Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, in order to prevent a general communal conflagration, approached Gandhi with a suggestion that the Standing Committee of the Non-party Conference should set up a Committee in order to prevent communal unrest from spreading further and that the Congress and League should agree to cooperate with that committee. Gandhi agreed in principle, but suggested all participants should be non-party men, who had not committed themselves either to the Congress or to the League. The Standing Committee of the non-Party Conference, meeting on 19th November, decided to set up a committee "to examine the whole communal and minorities question from a constitutional and political point of view". Sapru was authorized to name the committee, and he

announced the names of members of the committee on 3rd December. Sapru now approached Jinnah, writing a letter to him on 10th December, "The committee will study carefully the full implications of the Muslim League in regard to Pakistan as well as the full import of the proposals made by Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. C. Rajagopalchari during the recent Gandhi-Jinnah talks", In the end Sapru requested the Quaid to fix a date, when the members of the committee could call on him and discuss the matters in detail. The Quaid replied on the 14th, saying he did not recognize the Non-Party Conference or its Standing Committee or the Special Committee appointed by it, "However ... I would have been glad to see you". Dr. Ambedkar, leader of the Scheduled Castes, at first showed inclination to cooperate with the committee, but later on refused to do so. Sapru's mission failed.

In 1944, when the Congress Party resumed its participation in the Central Legislature, its leader was Bhulabhai Desai. He was frequently in touch with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan in connection with the Assembly work and the two were on cordial terms. In the beginning of 1945, Desai suggested a formula to resolve the political deadlock, which came to be known as the "Desai-Liaquat Pact". The main features of the plan envisaged that the Viceroy would call upon Jinnah and Desai to form an interim Government at the centre; the two would suggest names to constitute the Executive Council of the Viceroy; forty percent of the seats would go to each of the two parties, the Congress and the League, and twenty percent for the rest; all the members would be Indians; disputes involving long term settlement would be tackled after the Council was inducted into office; in provinces where Section 93 was in force, there would be League and Congress coalition ministries. Desai interviewed Sir Evan Jenkins, Private Secretary of the Viceroy, on 13th January and said that Liaquat Ali Khan had given his consent to the "Desai Plan". The Viceroy reacted favorably and recommended its acceptance to the Secretary of State. The British Cabinet asked for clarification and the Viceroy was asked to meet Jinnah and Desai and to report back to the Cabinet. When Jinnah realized that silence on his part and the League might be interpreted as if they had given their consent to the Desai-Liaquat Pact, he issued a statement saying neither he nor the League had any knowledge of the Pact, and no commitments made under it were binding on the League. Lord Wavell requested Jinnah through Sir John Colville, the Governor of Bombay, to see him in Delhi before March. The Quaid informed the Governor of Bombay that he knew nothing about the Desai-Liaquat Pact and that any commitment, if at all, had no sanctions behind it. However, he visited Delhi in March, but, unfortunately, he fell sick, thus preventing him from seeing the Viceroy.

Commenting on Liaquat-Desai talks, Pyarelal, the official biographer of Gandhi, writes, "But in spite of Gandhiji's repeated warnings that he should get everything reduced in writing before committing himself to anything, and further to see to it that it had Jinnah's approval, Bhulabhai, it seems, allowed his over-eagerness for results to get the better of his legal acumen and foresight and failed to take the elementary precautions that had been suggested to him". From this it is clear that Liaquat Ali had not signed

any pact, nor was Quaid's consent obtained to any proposals. Liaquat Ali Khan issued a press statement, denying he had signed any document, "Mr. Desai knows full well that there is no Pact, but mere proposals, which were only a basis for discussion". As to Quaid-e-Azam's knowledge of these talks, Liaquat Ali said, "I made it plain to him (Bhulabhai Desai) that whatever I said was my personal view and that I had no occasion to consult Mr. Jinnah about the matter".

A few weeks earlier, due to release of Congress prisoners and their participation in Assemblies, provincial policies underwent drastic changes. The Muslim League Ministry, which had been functioning in the North-West Frontier Province since May 1943, was defeated by 24 votes to 18, and Dr. Khan Sahib, leader of the Congress Party, was sworn in as Chief Minister of that province, after having given assurance to the Governor that his ministry would ' whole-heartedly support the War efforts. In Assam, Sir Saddullah Khan came to terms with Gopinath Bardolai, leader of the Congress Party, as a consequence of which he had to reshuffle his cabinet. In Sindh, Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah's ministry suffered defeat during the Budget Session of the Assembly in February 1945, due to deflection of some Muslim League members of Sir Ghulam's League Party. In order to strengthen his position, he included Khan Bahadur Moula Bux, brother of Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, as a minister in his cabinet, as Moula Bux brought with him four independent Muslims to the Government Party. Jinnah took serious objection to the inclusion of Moula Bux, a non-League Muslim, into a League Ministry and insisted that Moula Bux sign the League pledge. On Moula Bux's refusal to join the League, there was another crisis, and a new ministry was sworn in on 14th March. Khan Bahadur Moula Bux was excluded, while Sir Ghulam continued to be the Premier. In Bengal, Kiran Shankar Roy, leader of the Congress Party, approached Khawaja Nazimuddin, the Premier of Bengal, for a League-Congress coalition. While these talks were in progress, Nazimuddin ministry was defeated on 28th March on a budget demand under "agriculture". No new ministry could be formed to get the budget passed before 31st March, and the Governor imposed Section 93 in Bengal.

Ever since the failure of the so-called Desai-Liaquat Pact, Lord Wavell had been insisting that he be allowed to visit England, in order to personally discuss matters with the Secretary of State. He reached London on 23rd March and was in continuous consultations with the British Cabinet, as a result of which he was authorized to convene a conference of not only Congress and League leaders, but also leaders of other parties and of other minority communities; to release Congress prisoners still in detention; to give an assurance that External Affairs would be entrusted to an Indian member of the Viceroy's Council; that there would be parity between Hindu and Muslim Members of the Council. During the pendency of these talks, Germany surrendered to the Allied Powers on 7th May, and there was every reason to believe that this surrender would hasten the end of Japan as a belligerent nation. With the outline of a Cabinet Plan in his pocket, Lord Wavell reached Delhi on 4th June. On the day that Lord Wavell left London for India, Amery informed the House of Commons

that the Viceroy had been given a plan, whereby he was empowered to form an interim Government, which, it was hoped, would satisfy all parties.

On 14th June, Lord Wavell announced these proposals in a talk relayed from all stations of All-India Radio. He said it was not attempted to impose a constitutional settlement, but it was hoped that Indian parties would come to an agreement among themselves, and to this end he said he was inviting "Indian leaders to take counsel with me with a view to the formation of a new Executive Council" which would "include equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims ... It would be an entirely Indian Council, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief". The Council would "work within the framework of the present constitution", and its formation was merely an interim measure, without prejudice "to the final constitutional settlement". Lord Wavell announced he would invite to the conference those who were Provincial Premiers at the time; ex-Premiers of those provinces where Section 93 was in operation; Leaders and Deputy Leaders of the League and Congress Parties in the Central Legislatures; leaders of the Nationalist Party and the European Group; Gandhi and Jinnah as "the recognized leaders of the two main political parties"; Siva Raj to represent the Scheduled Castes; Master Tara Singh as the representative of the Sikh community. He declared in case the conference failed, the *status quo* would continue both at the Centre and in the Provinces, but "I can assure them (Muslims) that there is behind this proposal a most genuine desire on the part of all responsible leaders in the United Kingdom and of the British people as a whole to help India towards her goal". He further declared that all members of the Congress Working Committee still in detention were being immediately released. In the end Lord Wavell made an earnest appeal for the success of the conference, "There is on all sides something to forgive and forget. I believe in the future of India, and as far as in me lies will further her greatness. I ask you all for your cooperation and goodwill".

Simultaneously, the Secretary of State made a statement in the House of Commons, "His Majesty's Government are, however, most anxious to make any contribution that is practicable to the breaking of the political deadlock in India it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to introduce any change contrary to the wishes of the major Indian communities". He elaborated on the proposed interim changes indicated in Lord Wavell's broadcast to the Indian Nation, and said that the Viceroy had been authorized by His Majesty's Government to do so. He concluded his statement, "His Majesty's Government feel certain that, given goodwill and a genuine desire to cooperate on all sides, both British and Indian, those proposals can mark a genuine step forward in the collaboration of the British and Indian peoples towards Indian self-government and can assert the rightful position, and strengthen the influence of India in the counsels of the nations."

Lord Wavell promptly dispatched invitations to the conference participants, and Gandhi replied that as he did not represent the Congress, its President, Azad, should be invited. The Viceroy complied with this request. In press statements, commenting on

Wavell's proposals, Gandhi deplored it was not explicitly mentioned that India's goal to be achieved was complete independence, and that there had been parity between Caste Hindus and Muslims, to give color as if the Congress represented Caste Hindus. The Congress Working Committee, however, meeting in Bombay in the third week of June, decided that all Congress invitees should attend the conference.

On June 15th the Quaid sent a telegram to Lord Wavell seeking clarification and requested the Viceroy to postpone the date of the conference, 25th June, by a few weeks to enable him to consult his Working Committee, after he had received the clarification from the Viceroy. At the same time, he warned Lord Wavell that if any changes were made in the plan as announced without consulting the League, he should not be held responsible if the conference failed. The Viceroy promptly replied he would be pleased to see him on the 24th in Simla, one day before the conference, and give verbal explanations that he had sought. In the meantime he requested Jinnah to agree to attend the conference along with other Muslim League invitees.

On the 24th as arranged, the Viceroy had separate interviews with Jinnah, Gandhi and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. In his talks with the Viceroy, Azad protested against the principle that the Muslim League alone would be entitled to give names of Muslims for inclusion in the Viceroy's Council. Gandhi took a similar attitude on this question, but said while he would stay on in Simla and be available for consultations, he would not attend the conference. However, in principle, both Gandhi and Azad expressed their approval for holding such a conference.

Jinnah informed the Viceroy that under the proposals as announced, Muslims would be in a minority, as the non-Congress Hindus would always vote with the Hindus. In order to allay these fears, the Quaid suggested if the majority of Muslim members opposed any measure, it should be automatically dropped. The Viceroy explained, according to him it would be contrary to democratic principles and practice. Another point raised by the Quaid was that only names suggested by the League should be selected for Muslim seats, and the League would never accept any Punjab Unionist or Congress Muslim to represent Muslims in the Viceroy's Council. In the end, Quaid-e-Azam demanded that the League should have an adequate share in the important portfolios.

The conference, now known as "The Simla Conference", met at 11 o'clock in the morning of 25th June in the Viceregal Lodge in Simla. Among the twenty-one representatives that attended the conference, Muslim Leaguers were: –

1. Jinnah, President of the Muslim League.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan, Deputy Leader of the Muslim League Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly.
3. Khawaja Nazimuddin, ex-Premier of Bengal.

4. Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, Premier of Sindh.
5. Sir Muhammad Saadullah, Premier of Assam.
6. Hussain Imam, Leader of the Muslim League Party in the Council of State.

Other Muslim invitees were: –

1. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, President of the Congress.
2. Khizr Hayat Khan. Premier of the Punjab.
3. Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of the North-West Frontier Province.

Thus in a conference of 21, only 6 were Muslim Leaguers, who would be opposed in so far as Pakistan ideology was concerned by three non-League Muslims. The Viceroy made his introductory speech and appealed for cooperation of the great Indian leaders who had assembled there, "The statesmanship, wisdom and goodwill of all of us," he said, "is here on trial, not merely in the eyes of India but before the whole world". He explained that in order to maintain secrecy, the press had been excluded from the sittings of the conference, but a prepared press communiqué would be issued at the end of each sitting.

On behalf of the Congress, Maulana Azad said the Congress would not be party to any proposals that would tend to reduce the Congress to the status of a communal organization. He demanded complete independence of India should be the objective of the Conference and sought clarification from the Viceroy on the following points: –

1. What would be the powers of the proposed External Affairs Department.
2. What policy would the Allied Powers adopt for the independence of the countries of South-East Asia after the termination of the War.
3. What would be done to make the Indian Army truly national and to bring it close to the people.
4. What would be the relationship between the proposed National Government at the Centre and the Indian Princes and their peoples.

Azad made it clear that any commitments made by Congress representatives at the conference would be only provisional subject to being accepted and ratified by the All-India Congress Committee.

The Quaid promptly intervened and severely criticized some of the observations made by Azad and said they were absolutely irrelevant. He said he would make his detailed observations after he had heard the replies of the Viceroy to Azad's questions.

Thereafter, Lord Wavell made point-to-point replies to Azad's statement, the most important of which was that the Viceroy conceded there was no limit set on India's unfettered right to take any decision regarding her own destiny and that this would only ensue if a constitution were to be framed by Indians themselves, provided that the important elements in the national life of India were willing and consenting parties to such a constitution. The Viceroy ended his intervention with the assurance to Azad that the proposals did not intend to brand the Congress as a communal organization.

The Quaid lost no time in objecting to the last observation of the Viceroy and said according to him and the Muslims of India, the Congress could only claim to represent Hindus and not Muslims. On this Dr. Khan Sahib, a Congressman, said in his usual insolent manner that Jinnah was wrong and that the Congress did represent Muslims also. This only proved the fears of the Quaid that non-League Muslims would throw their weight on the side of the Congress to the detriment of the cause of Pakistan, were well founded. Menon, writing about this incident, says, "The Viceroy observed that the Congress evidently represented its members, and Jinnah said that he accepted this".²⁰³

The Quaid made a comprehensive statement on behalf of the Muslim League. He said the presence of League representatives should convince all concerned of their sincerity to find a settlement acceptable to all, and that it was no use for anyone to indulge in derogatory remarks against individuals or political parties. But it must be conceded by all that Congress represented about 90 percent of Hindus, just as the Muslim League represented about 90 percent or more of Muslims, He made it abundantly clear in so far as the Muslim League was concerned it would accept no constitution, which did not specifically provide for the establishment of Pakistan, and in that regard the League was bitterly opposed to the Congress demand for a united independent India. He reminded the Conference the Working Committee of the League had adopted a resolution on 30th August 1942, wherein the League had said it was ready to sit with any party on a footing of equality to "setting up a provisional Government of India in order to mobilize the resources of the country for the purpose of the defence of India and the successful prosecution of the War." He agreed it would be a long process to frame a constitution for Pakistan, and therefore, as practical politicians, they did not demand it be drawn up at that very minute, unlike the Congress which insisted on independence for a unified India being granted here and now. To him, he said, the question of communal parity in the interim Council was of paramount importance and the details for this should be such as would be acceptable to the Muslim League.

As the Conference proceeded, Lord Wavell was able to obtain agreement that the new Executive Council to be formed would publicly commit itself to the purposes set forth in the Viceroy's broadcast; that they would be selected from the names recommended to the Viceroy by the conference: that all portfolios would be held by Indians, except the

²⁰³ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 196.

War Portfolio, which would be under the charge of the Commander-in-Chief. But when the Conference took up discussion on communal parity in the Executive Council, violent divergence of views began to manifest itself. Representatives of the Congress, the Nationalists and the Scheduled Castes objected: their main contention being that it brought on the same level representation to a community of 250 million with that of a community of 100 million. Hindu objections were supplemented by Azad and Dr. Khan Saheb, the latter saying that the communal problem should be killed once and for all by a revolutionary movement. Jinnah defended the principle of parity and explained at length the point of view of the Muslim League on this all important problem. It was obvious the Conference was heading towards a blind-alley, and Pandit Pant of the Congress called on Jinnah to discuss the matter with him personally, away from the heated atmosphere of the Conference room. As a result of these talks, Jinnah called on the Viceroy on the 27th and assured him if it was conceded in principle that no Muslim would be taken on the Executive Council who did not belong to the League, he would be prepared to approach his Working Committee with any alternate and just plan that the Viceroy may have to suggest.

When the Conference met on the 29th it learnt, in spite of their best efforts, the talks between Jinnah and Pant had broken down, and no basis was arrived at for a rapprochement between the League and the Congress. All avenues of an agreed solution had been explored but without success, and Lord Wavell confessed openly the Conference had ended in a deadlock. He, however said in spite of it he would have to proceed with some arrangement on the basis he had already indicated. In this connection he requested all parties and interests represented at the Conference to give him a list of names for his consideration, but the names suggested should belong to that particular party or interest. Maulana Azad said the Congress would send names not only of Hindus, but also of Muslims, Christians and Scheduled Caste Hindus. The Quaid said he was still in the dark regarding certain points and, therefore, he could not commit himself to send the list asked for, until he had the authority to do so from the League. Explaining the League point of view, the Quaid said Pakistan and United India were poles apart, and a wide gulf divided the ideologies of the League and the Congress. The League, he said, would come into the interim Government, only if it was publicly agreed that the Muslims had "the right to self-determination". He gave a warning that Lord Wavell's proposals, if implemented, would be detrimental to the interests of Muslims. Probably, he had in mind that the Viceroy's formula gave Khizr Hayat and Dr. Khan Saheb the right to recommend names of Muslims, who were not Muslim Leaguers. The Muslim concept of a Nation was different, he said, from that of the other communities, and since the Muslim League had to bear responsibility for matters affecting Muslims, the League was fully entitled to claim full choice in so far as Muslim representation in the interim Government was concerned.

At a press conference the Quaid declared, "on a final examination and analysis of the Wavell Plan, we found that it was a snare ... Finally we broke as Lord Wavell insisted

upon his having one non-League Muslim nominee of Khizr Hayat Khan, representing Punjab Muslims ... If we had accepted this position as represented to us by Lord Wavell, we would have emerged out of this Conference minus everything, and we would have betrayed our people. It would have been an abject surrender on our part for all we stand for, and it would have been the death-knell of the Muslim League".

On the same day, Lord Wavell in his concluding address to the Conference said he had discussed in private with many members of the Conference, but, "When I explained my solution to Mr. Jinnah, he told me that it was not acceptable to the Muslim League, and he was so decided that I felt it would be useless to continue the discussions ... The Conference has, therefore, failed". The Congress, the Hindus and a handful of anti-League Muslims took up the Viceroy's refrain and condemned the Quaid for the failure of the Simla Conference. But the Muslim Nation acclaimed him as their savior, and applauded him for having adroitly handled the case of 100 million Muslims. If the Quaid had wavered or compromised at the Simla Conference, the case for Pakistan would have received a mortal blow. It was his firmness and unbending attitude, when it came to yielding on fundamentals, that saved the Muslim Nation. Although written with a view to arriving at a different deduction, the following words of Menon bear eloquent testimony to the service rendered by the Quaid in saving the issue of Pakistan. Menon laments, "The Simla Conference afforded a last opportunity to the forces of nationalism to fight a rear-guard action to preserve the integrity of the country, and when the battle was lost the waves of communalism quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobson's Choice of partition was left".²⁰⁴

For the Muslims, it proved to be to their enduring advantage that it ended in the manner it did.

At the end of the Conference, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy, "It grieves me to think that the Conference which began so happily and so hopefully should have ended in apparent failure, due exactly, as it would seem, to the same cause as before". The insinuation was, obviously, against the stand taken by the Quaid. This is clear from a letter M. R. Jayakar wrote to Gandhi at that time, "He (Jinnah) puts two conditions as precedent to his assent, viz. (1) assurance about Pakistan and (2) equality of the Muslim vote with all the other interests in India. True to his habit, intensified by frequent success, he swallows the concessions Muslims have received, viz., parity between caste Hindus and Muslims, and now wants parity between Muslims and all other interests put together, i.e. 50 for the rest of India—a mathematical monstrosity that 27 equals seventy-three".²⁰⁵ For the Hindus and their leaders, the Quaid's reasoning was a wrong equation in arithmetic; for the Muslims, it was the sheet-anchor of their very existence.

²⁰⁴ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 215.

²⁰⁵ The above two excerpts are taken from *Mahatma Gandhi: the Last Phase*, by Pyarelal; pp. 136-137: Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmadabad.

Louis Fischer, an ardent admirer of Gandhi, analyzing the causes of failure of the Simla Conference, writes, "The Moslem League had gained strength during the war and won most elections against Moslem candidates who were not in the League. But neither Wavell nor Gandhi, who made Congress policy behind the Simla scenes, could admit Jinnah's claim to represent Moslem India. There were many Muslims in Congress; President Azad was a Muslim and Congress wanted him in the Viceroy's Council. Khizr Hayat Khan, former Premier of the Punjab was anti-Jinnah and anti-Pakistan ... Congress would have been untrue to its secular nature and to Gandhi's principles if it had accepted the role of a purely Hindu organization ... On this rock, the Simla Conference foundered."²⁰⁶

The ship of a united India where Hindus would perpetually dominate, foundered on the rocks and sunk finally. The credit for it goes entirely to the Quaid-e-Azam.

When the leaders left Simla for their respective destinations, the Quaid was greeted by thousands of admiring and slogan-raising Muslims at all railway stations, hailing him as the one that had saved the Muslim Nation at the Simla Conference. On the contrary, Maulana Azad, who had played an anti-Muslim League role, was greeted with black flags by Muslims at all stations, from Simla to Calcutta. "The Muslims of Calcutta," writes Jamiluddin Ahmed, "showed their resentment by removing him from Imamat (leadership) of Eid congregational prayers".²⁰⁷

While the Simla Conference was in progress, the political scene in England was undergoing changes of a far-reaching nature, ending in the holding of general elections. As a result of this, the Labour Party was for the first time voted into office, securing an absolute majority in Parliament. The War Cabinet of Churchill handed over the seal of office to Clement Attlee, who was asked by His Majesty the King to form the Government. Lord Pethick-Lawrence assumed office as Secretary of State for India in the new Cabinet.

At about this time, for the first time in history, an atom bomb was thrown and the city of Hiroshima in Japan was crimson with human blood. Japan trembled with fear under its frightening echoes, sapping the will of that nation to continue the War any longer. And in about a week after the holocaust of Hiroshima, that is on 16th August, Japan surrendered and lay prostrate before the victorious armies of the Allied forces.

With the end of the War there was no excuse for the British to seek an interim solution and to put off the permanent settlement of the Indian problem. Sir Stafford Cripps suggested in a press statement that the demand for Pakistan must form an integral part of any discussions that would take place thereafter. It was quite natural that while the

²⁰⁶ *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, by Louis Fischer, p 204, 1953: Hindustan Cellulose and Paper Co. Ltd., Bombay.

²⁰⁷ *Final Phase of Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 17, 1964: Published by the Author.

League supported the statement of Cripps, the Congress launched a scathing attack on it, as it indirectly conceded the righteousness of the Muslim case for Pakistan. The Muslim League Working Committee passed a resolution demanding the holding of general elections both at the centre and in the provinces. The Quaid in a public meeting held in Bombay on 6th August explained the Muslim League's point of view. "Mr. Gandhi is an enigma. When it suits him, he represents nobody, he can talk in his individual capacity ... Yet when it suits him, he is the Supreme Dictator of the Congress. He thinks he represents the whole of India". Jinnah declared that the Simla Conference was not only a failure, but it was buried, and never would its echoes be heard hereafter. Speaking about constitutional reforms, he said, "Let us go ahead with measures for a permanent constitutional settlement. Pakistan must be decided, if the issue of freedom and independence of India is to be decided. We will never surrender ... Our claim is a just and righteous one and is the only solution for India. We want to fight the elections, so that they may once for all convince those who doubt our representative character".

The last elections to the Central Assembly had been held in 1939, and to the Provincial Assemblies in 1936. And it was already 1945. His Majesty's Government could no more put them off, and they instructed the Viceroy to go ahead with the preparations for holding elections for the provincial and central legislatures. Accordingly on 21st August the Viceroy announced that general elections would be held in the coming cold weather. Three days later, the Viceroy left for England to hold consultations in London. Lord Wavell returned to India in the middle of September, and issued a statement on the 19th that His Majesty's Government had authorized him to state that the Government wanted to find ways and means to realize as early as possible the goal of full self-government for India, in consultation with Indian leaders. He reiterated his earlier decision to hold general elections in the winter. The Viceroy said he would, after the elections, consult representatives of Provincial Assemblies and that a constitution-making body would be set up. He concluded his statement, "His Majesty's Government have, therefore, further authorized me, as soon as the results of the provincial elections are published, to take steps to bring into being an Executive Council, which will have the support of the main Indian parties". On the same day, in a radio broadcast, Prime Minister Attlee endorsed the statement made by Lord Wavell.

A meeting of the All-India Congress Committee took place in Bombay on the 21st of September, in which a resolution was adopted lamenting that the Viceroy's proposals were not clear enough and they fell short of Congress expectations. However, the A.I.C.C. issued directions to the branches of the Congress all over the country to organize for the elections and to win as many seats as possible as a massive demonstration of the will of the people for immediate independence. On behalf of the Muslim League, Jinnah announced that unless Pakistan was an integral part of it, no solution would be acceptable to the Muslims. On another occasion he dwelt upon the same question and said what the Muslims wanted was that the demand for Pakistan must be first conceded, before Muslims could be expected to sit in any constitution-

making body and that there should be two separate constitution-making bodies, one for Pakistan and another for Hindustan.

After the escape of Subhas Chandra Bose from his sick bed in Calcutta, it was common knowledge he was helping Japan in her war against the Allies. Bose was hoping that, with victory going to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, India would be immediately granted complete independence, while the British would never give up their political domination over that country. With her initial successes in the War, Japan had captured thousands of Indian soldiers and officers. These war prisoners agreed to band themselves into an "Indian National Army", with Bose as their Chief. This came to be known as the I.N.A., and there were thousands of Muslim officers and men who joined it, believing they were fighting for the independence of their country. Many stories were woven around the real and supposed heroic exploits of the Indian National Army, and its name captured the imagination of untold young men, who held the I.N.A. to be the liberator of India. After the fall of Japan, 20,000 men of the Indian National Army were sent back to India, and many of them faced imprisonment and harassment in the country that they had sought to liberate. Some of the officers and men of the Indian National Army were sent up for a public trial in the Red Fort in Delhi.

The three chief accused were Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan of the Punjab Regiment, Capt. P.K. Sahgal of the Baluch Regiment and Lieut. Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon of the Punjab Regiment. The main charges against them were that they "Waged war in Singapore, Malaya and Burma between the months of September 1942 and the 26th day of April 1945 against His Majesty the King Emperor of India", that they committed "murder of Hari Singh on or about 6th March 1945 at or near Popa Hill in Burma", and then followed a long list of names of other soldiers and officers whom they were alleged to have murdered. They were brought before a General Court Martial on 17th September 1945 to answer these charges.

Some of the documents, which were filed with the Court Martial as exhibits in the case, make it abundantly clear that Bose and his men organized the I.N.A. for the liberation of India. Exhibit 'W' was "Special Order of the Day" issued by Bose on 14th August 1944 from Burma, and a passage in it reads, "Our units, with their better training and discipline and unshakable determination to do or die on the path of India's Freedom, soon established their superiority over the enemy, whose morale deteriorated with each defeat". Exhibit 'X' was a congratulatory telegram, dated 7th July, 1944, received by Lt.-Col. Habibur Rahman, Assistant Chief of Staff, from His Excellency Thakin-Nu, the Foreign Minister of Burma, to be transmitted to Bose. One of the exhibits reveals Muslim influence in the names of Awards and Decorations which the I.N.A. conferred on its men – "Shaheed-e-Bharat", "Sher-e-Hind," "Sardar-e Jang", "Taghma-e-Bahaduri". Similarly, the exhibits show that the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was called by the I.N.A as "*Sadar Daftar, Ala Kaman, Azad Hind Fauj*". Another exhibit was a document, "Most Secret" dated 8th August 1943, signed by Lt.-Col. Shah Nawaz Khan,

in which he informed the Commander of the Reinforcement Group, "Many Indian soldiers will walk over to our side, when operations start on the Indo-Burma border".

Exhibit "U U U" was entitled, "The charge of the Immortals". It is a message of encouragement to the men of the I.N.A., pregnant with patriotic fervor. A passage from it reads, "Leading the assault, he shouted slogans '*Inquilab Zindabad*', '*Azad Hindustan Zindabad*'. All the men responded to slogans, which echoed above the enemy fire. This was the only support which these heroes had against the superior armament of the enemy (the British) In Free India the spirit of these heroes, who knew no defeat, will be worshipped for generations to come and will inspire the future sons of India to live up to such high ideals."²⁰⁸

These brave patriots were now facing charges that may well end in death sentences. Their goal had not been reached, for India was not free. All political parties stood behind them, in appreciation of their heroic patriotism. Both the Muslim League and the Congress decided to make arrangements for the defence of the accused, and violent demonstrations were held against the Government, demanding that the accused be set free. In some cities Police had to open fire on screaming and defying mobs, resulting in some casualties and injuries to hundreds. All the accused were held guilty by the Special Court and severe sentences were passed against them. But public agitation continued unabated, and in the end sentences passed against the officers and men of the I.N.A. were remitted. An unpopular Government faced severe condemnation for holding these trials only to find that, when all was said and done, the prisoners were set free, and public hatred against it had become all the more bitter.

The mass movement set afoot by the Congress to defy laws was getting out of control and it caused worry even to some Congress leaders. The British Government received alarming reports from the Viceroy about the Indian situation and the Secretary of State for India made a statement in the House of Lords on 4th December that the proposed constitution-making body was intended to enable Indians to decide for themselves the future constitutional set-up in India as they thought best. In this connection he said it would help matters if some members of Parliament could visit India and personally assure Indian leaders that both the British Government and people desired India be given a position in the British Commonwealth as an independent partner. Reverting to the mass civil disobedience movement and acts of violence, the Secretary of State, however, warned that the Government would have to adopt all measures to maintain law and order. In this connection he said His Majesty's Government would fully back the Government of India so that "their servants are protected in the performance of their duty and that the future constitution of India shall not be called into being by force or threat of force"

²⁰⁸ The above excerpts are taken from the book, "*Formation and Growth of I.N.A.*", by Durlab Singh, 1946: Hero Publications, Lahore.

The Quaid issued a statement in which he made it very clear that the constitution-making body should enter the scene only after the demand for Pakistan had been conceded, and that there should be one constitution-making body for Pakistan and one for Hindustan. He said, "I, therefore, resolutely commend to His Majesty's Government to declare their resolute resignation to the establishment of Pakistan ... If the Labour Government wishes to prove its bona fides to give freedom to the peoples of this sub-continent, they must face realities and facts as they are".

Elections were approaching and Quaid-e-Azam was on a whirlwind tour of India, addressing scores of meetings a week. Everywhere he addressed Muslims, he explained to them that the coming elections would decide the fate of 100 million Muslims for all time to come. If the Muslim League won, Pakistan would be established, but if it lost, Muslims would be slaves of Hindus forever. The Frontier was a difficult province, as the Red Shirts, who were pro-Congress and anti-League and anti-Pakistan, were very powerful in that province. Addressing a conference convened by the Frontier League on 24th November at Peshawar, he said he was visiting the Frontier after nine years. But he could see a visible change; the brave Pathans had realized what was at stake for the Muslims. He said, "Elections are the beginning of the end. If the Muslims decide to stand for Pakistan in the coming elections, half the battle will have been won. If we fail in the first phase of our war, we shall be finished. This is the first step. This is your trial. If you stand firm and resolute, we shall, with God's help, establish Pakistan".

On 25th December 1945, he was celebrating his seventieth birthday in Bombay. The Memon Merchants, Chamber of Commerce celebrated the event by holding a tea party in his honor. The speech he delivered on this occasion in reply to the address presented to him showed that seventy years had not aged him. The mission to which he was wedded, of saving Muslims of India from bondage, had kept him young, in spite of his seventy years. He thundered, "If the Hindus do not join us in our struggle for freedom, then the Muslims of this country and the Muslim League will march alone to their goal of Pakistan and freedom."

By the end of December elections to the Central Legislature were held, and the results showed that the Muslim League, fighting on the basis of Pakistan, had won every Muslim seat, securing about 87 percent of the Muslim votes cast in Muslim constituencies. Out of a total of 102 seats, the Muslim League captured 30, as against 57 by the Congress. The Quaid declared Muslims all over India would celebrate 11th January 1946 as their "Victory Day" by offering prayers in mosques for the success God had been pleased to confer on the Muslim Nation.

On 11th January, when Muslims were celebrating Victory Day, the Parliamentary Delegation was in India, having arrived in that country on the 5th. The delegation, consisting of ten members, was led by Professor Robert Richards. The Secretary of State

for India had written letters to the Quaid and to the President of the Congress that the purpose of the delegation was only to make personal contacts with all leaders; that the members of the delegation were visiting India in their individual capacity; they were not authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Labour Government. When the Quaid met the delegation, he outlined to them the history of the struggle for Pakistan and why it had now become an article of faith with every Muslim. He left them in no doubt that if the principle of Pakistan and of parity to the Muslim League with all other parties was not accepted, the Muslim League would not enter the interim Government. The delegation, having met many leaders, left India after a stay of about a month.

When the newly elected Central Legislative Assembly met on 28th January 1946, the Viceroy delivered an inaugural address in which he said he was determined to form, in consultation with principal political parties, a new Executive Council consisting of important leaders, and thereafter he would give his attention to setting up of a constitution-making body. On the same day, the Quaid released a statement to the Press, "There is no reason, whatsoever, now, to talk of any arrangement to set up an interim Government ... Muslim India has made it clear beyond any doubt that the only solution of India's political problems is the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan ... Muslim League will not agree to any Central Government being set up as even an interim arrangement ... We can never agree to one constitution-making body being set-up for British India". He appealed in conclusion, that His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy must "face realities and facts and proceed to make a clear declaration with regard to the major issue of Pakistan without further delay".

In retaliation Sardar Vallabhai Patel, 'the strong man of the Congress', retorted. "The ship has reached the shore ... The freedom of India is near at hand".

In the middle of February, there was trouble in the Indian Navy. Ratings of the Naval School at Colaba near Pasta Lane in Bombay, in protest against "racial discrimination" and hardships regarding their food and pay had gone on hunger-strike. Both Muslim and Hindu ratings had joined and made this uprising possible, as their national honor had been deeply wounded by the insulting remarks of their English Commander. Their non-violent movement soon got out of control, and the trouble spread to naval units at Calcutta, Karachi and Madras. Bombay citizens rushed to the help of the mutineers marooned in the barracks and threw over the camp walls food and fruits. After five anxious days, settlement was arrived at between the dissatisfied men of the Indian Navy and the appropriate authorities. But sympathies manifested by the civilian population continued unabated in spite of this settlement, and unruly mobs took the law in their own hands, parading the streets of Bombay, indulging in arson and loot. In the Police firing that followed in order to restore law and order, about two hundred were killed, and a dusk to dawn curfew was imposed.

Quaid-e-Azam had organized the Muslim League so well that its popularity was at its highest. Muslims were united under the banner of the League and the Provincial Parliamentary Boards proceeded to issue tickets for the elections to the provincial assemblies. The Congress charge against the League that it did not represent all the Muslims, and that parties like the Ahrars, the Nationalists, and Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind represented a substantial portion of the Muslim population, had to be disproved. The Quaid was fully conscious of the gravity of the situation, and he faced the general elections with confidence, sure that the message of Pakistan had been responded to enthusiastically by the Muslims and that they would overwhelmingly vote for Muslim League candidates.

The Quaid had set up an Election Committee of seven to help Muslim League candidates for all the thirty-five Muslim seats in the Sindh Assembly, appointing me as its Honorary Secretary. Yusuf A. Haroon was its Chairman and, among its members, were Dr. A.H. Siddiqui and Hassanali Abdul Rahman, a former Vice-Chancellor of Sindh University. The Quaid gave a large sum of money for the Muslim League election campaign to me in cash as Honorary Secretary of the Committee and explained to the members of the Committee that Sindh was a crucial province in the struggle for Pakistan and that all the thirty-five seats should be won by League candidates, so that a League ministry could be formed in that province. He soon left Sindh and was on his way to see for himself the election work of other committees in other provinces. About four weeks before the day of polling, he came to Karachi and asked me in confidence to apprise him of the true situation. When he learnt that we may lose five seats and win only thirty seats, he was disturbed, as the total number of seats in the Sindh Assembly was sixty. One could see worry and anxiety writ large over his face. He wanted to know which five seats could not be won and why. I informed him that lack of adequate finances was the main hurdle; that the Hindus of Sindh controlled motor transport and petrol stations; and that it was feared that unless we stored petrol at appropriate places to be supplied to League candidates, as also motor transport, things would go adversely for our candidates on polling day. He asked me how much more money would be required. On being told we would need one hundred thousand rupees more, he said the money he had was not his personal money, but belonged to the nation. He wanted to see every rupee spent brought "sixteen annas of results". He said he was not bargaining, but I should accept fifty thousand more and assure him that we would then win all thirty-five seats. He was assured by me everything possible would be done and, God willing, all seats would be won. When he learnt that one of the five seats in doubt was that of G. M. Sayed, he arched his eyebrows and looked penetratingly at me. "This is a crucial election. I want the League to win all the Muslim seats. Particularly, we cannot afford to lose Sayed's seat. Why do you think we will not win in that constituency?" I explained that Sayed was a very powerful individual in his district, Dadu; a Pir with a large following of Murids. As against him, we had put up Kazi Mohammad Akbar, who was from Hyderabad District, and Sayed's camp was taking advantage of this and explaining to the voters that Kazi Akbar was an outsider. Once again the Quaid said he

attached the greatest importance to. Sayed's seat and that we must see that Kazi Akbar won at all costs. He said we must flood his constituency with literature, with workers, organize meetings, give him all help in transport and petrol. He asked me to shift my headquarters from Karachi to Hyderabad in order to be near Sayed's constituency. On his part, he assured me he would send many Muslim leaders of All-India fame and student volunteers from Aligarh. Once again he insisted that everything possible should be done to see we won in Sayed's constituency. As I was leaving the room, after having wished him good-bye, he called me back and told me to sit in a chair near him. "You must remember one thing", he said abruptly, although the elections are crucial, yet you should see to it that we do not resort to dishonest methods to win the elections. For instance, in Sayed's constituency, you should fully help our candidate Akbar, and see that he wins. But I do not want you to bribe the voters. That I will never forgive. I do not want you to give a single rupee to any voter and to buy votes. That is being dishonest. I prefer defeat to dishonesty".

This, indeed, was the hallmark of his greatness. He believed only moral means could justify such a noble end as the establishment of Pakistan.

Under his instructions, many Muslim leaders came to Hyderabad, and public meetings were arranged for them in Sayed's constituency. One hundred student volunteers came from Aligarh and, braving difficulties and hardships, they spread themselves all over Sayed's constituency. As it was mostly a hilly tract, Aligarh boys went on their mission to far-flung villages on camel back, with gram and dates as their only rations for ten days. They did excellent work. Among their leaders was A. T. M. Mustafa, who some years after partition became Pakistan's Education Minister. Transport had been engaged in advance at exorbitant prices, due to Hindu influence in the province, and petrol was secretly stored at convenient places in different districts of Sindh.

There was one seat for the Muslim women of Sindh. The Muslim League won this seat without a contest, as no nomination was filed against the Muslim League nominee, Mrs. J. G. Allana. The League captured all the thirty-five seats, including that of G. M. Sayed. Sindh had one labor seat, which could be contested by a voter in the labor constituency, irrespective of the community to which he belonged. This seat had been held since 1937 by a very important labor leader, Naraindas Anandji Bechar. The League put up Kazi Mohammad Mujtaba for the labor seat against Naraindas Bechar. There was a swing in the labor constituency in favor of the League, and as a consequence Mujtaba won and Bechar, the sitting member, was defeated. Thus the Muslim League secured thirty-six seats in a House of sixty in Sindh, ensuring a full-fledged League Ministry in that province.

The election results in the Punjab presented that province with a difficult situation. The League had won seventy-nine out of a total of eighty-six Muslim seats; the Congress had won fifty-one; Unionists ten; Independents ten; Panthic Akali Sikhs twenty-two.

The Muslim League Party, as the biggest individual party, should have been automatically asked by the Governor to form the ministry. This was not done, and it encouraged the Congress to initiate moves that undoubtedly amounted to an intrigue against the League Party. The Congress came to terms with the Akali Sikhs, and this combination placed before the League certain terms, which the latter in no conscience could accept. Among the Congress-Akali conditions was that Congress would have the liberty of nominating a Muslim to the Provincial Cabinet from its quota, and that the question of Pakistan should be kept out of the reach of the Punjab Assembly. The Quaid took a stiff attitude and advised the Punjab leaders to turn down these humiliating conditions. The Muslim Unionists stood on the sidelines during these negotiations, but they had been secretly assured by the Congress and the Akalis that, after having proved to the Governor that the League could not have a stable majority in the House, they would throw in their lot with the Unionists. This intrigue succeeded and the Governor of the Punjab called upon Khizr Hayat Khan, leader of the Unionist Party of ten, to form the ministry. All the parties except the Muslim League, gave their support to Khizr and a Unionist Ministry became the Government of the Punjab.

In the Frontier Province, Muslim League won seventeen Muslim seats as against nineteen by the Congress. There were two Muslim seats won by independent Muslims, and the Akali Sikh Party secured one seat. From among the general seats, Congress had won eleven seats, thus giving it a total strength of thirty. The Congress Party, under Dr. Khan Sahib, was called upon to form the Government.

The Muslim League won thirty-four out of forty Muslim seats in Bihar; fifty-five out of sixty-six in the United Provinces; thirty out of thirty in Bombay; thirteen out of fourteen in the Central Provinces; four out of four in Orissa; thirty-one out of thirty-four in Assam; twenty-nine out of twenty-nine in Madras. On the whole on an All-India basis, the Muslim League had captured 440 out of a total of 495 Muslim seats, giving it victory in approximately 90 percent of Muslim constituencies.

Total strength of Bengal Assembly was 250, and the Muslim League had captured in that province 113 out of 119 Muslim seats. It was thus not a party with an absolute majority in the House. H. S. Suhrawardy, leader of the Muslim League Party, was asked by the Governor of Bengal to form the Government. Suhrawardy approached Congress leaders to form a coalition ministry in Bengal, but the Congress placed before Suhrawardy conditions which he could never agree to. Negotiations between Suhrawardy and Congress failed, upon which he enlisted the support of independent members of the House, which enabled him to form a Muslim League Ministry in Bengal.

The general elections had proved that Muslims of India were overwhelmingly pro-League, in other words they backed the demand for Pakistan. None the less, the composition of Provincial Assemblies was such that out of five Muslim majority

provinces, the Muslim League was able to form ministries in only two provinces, Bengal and Sindh. This, however, did not deter Jinnah from demanding Pakistan as the only permanent solution for all the political troubles of India. He had the faith of a votary, and the courage of a crusader in a cause.

In the meantime Lord Wavell was tabulating election results in New Delhi and preparing plans in his mind to initiate a fresh, approach to resolve the political deadlock. He communicated his views in writing to the Secretary of State for India, which covered the entire field of Constitutional Reforms.. The British Cabinet gave careful consideration to the Viceroy's proposals and modified them in the light of past experience. Ultimately, the Cabinet decided to send out to India a Cabinet Mission to negotiate a settlement with Indian political leaders and parties on the spot The Viceroy agreed with the proposal and on 19th February Lord Pethick Lawrence and Prime Minister Attlee announced in Parliament that a Cabinet Mission consisting of Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps, A. V. Alexander, all three Cabinet Ministers, would be soon going to India to resolve the deadlock and to evolve a new formula for the constitutional advancement of India. These announcements were debated in the House of Commons on 15th March, when Prime Minister Attlee explained the full import of the Cabinet Mission's visit to India. During the course of his observations Attlee assured the minorities, "We are mindful of the rights of the minorities and the minorities should be able to live free from fear". However, at the same time he warned the minorities, "We cannot allow a minority to place their veto on the advance of the majority"

The reference was clearly to the Muslims of India. The Quaid-e-Azam, in a press statement released on the 17th, referring to the stand taken by Attlee regarding minorities, called it "rope-walking" on the part of the British Prime Minister. He said, "I want to reiterate that Muslims of India are not a minority, but a nation, and self-determination is their birthright". The Quaid expressed his views against a single constitution-making body. He concluded his statement, "It seems that he was speaking to a larger audience with many voices but so far as we are concerned our position remains definite that we stand for a division of India and the establishment of Pakistan and that Pakistan is the only solution of India's constitutional problem. It will lead to happiness, prosperity and security to the two sovereign states and all the inhabitants of this sub-continent."

Congress leaders welcomed the appointment of the Cabinet Mission, as they felt assured Attlee's speech in the House of Commons gave indication that the British would come to a settlement with the Congress, either with or without the consent of the Muslim League.

There was obvious jubilation among the Hindus of India and in the ranks of the Congress. The Quaid, assured of the support of the Muslim nation in his demand for Pakistan, was firm and determined.

"We will never surrender," he mused.

NO ROOM FOR COMPROMISE

When two nations live side by side under a common Government, a common flag – one rich and powerful, the other poor, weak and backward, with no prospect whatsoever of reaching a stage of development equal to that of the other under the status quo, then the unity of that country is continuously in jeopardy. For, only a silken thread binds them together in an artificial unity, while every single urge of life would wish to break the bonds that corrode the flesh of the weaker nation. In the absence of long-term security, the latter is compelled to launch a relentless struggle in the hope of ultimate victory, even though the period of uncertainty may entail untold suffering. Muslims were convinced Hindu India was determined to set up a permanent Hindu majority Government, even if it meant political liquidation of Muslims, who constituted about one-third of the population of India. Under such conditions, a major political clash between the two was inevitable. The demand of the Muslim Nation for its own recognition was voiced in different ways at different periods of our history during the last one hundred years. During this period there arose Muslim leaders who, subconsciously at first, but purposefully later on, channelized the direction of events to a goal that led them to be recognized as a separate nation, entitled to have its own separate homeland. Sajjad Zaheer, a leftist, has thus summed up the evolution of Muslim politics. "The progress of the Muslims and the Muslim League, from separate electorates and separate representation, to autonomy and residuary powers for Muslim provinces and then to self-determination and Pakis an is not to be regarded as the growth of reaction and communalism, but as the growing expression of the various stages of national, democratic and anti-imperialist urge of the developing Muslim nationalities of India".²⁰⁹ The scarcely audible rumblings of decades of discontent found a mighty voice in the demand for Pakistan, and Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was its mouthpiece. Under his leadership, the All-India Muslim League had launched the struggle for independence and Pakistan. Jinnah was merely its President, and not the League Party itself, a party which claimed the political allegiance of millions of Muslims. However, history must admit that the Muslim League succeeded in becoming the instrument for Muslim salvation because of the Quaid-e-Azam. Throughout, the history of Muslim India, no one individual had wielded so much power as he did. Yet, this absolute power did not corrupt or spoil him. He remained unaffected by success and power in the mid-forties, when he was at the height of his power. If any one individual could speak on behalf of one hundred million Muslims, it was the Quaid alone who could make that claim. And the Cabinet Mission that was to visit India was fully aware of the reality of the situation.

²⁰⁹ *A Case for Congress-League Unity*, by Sajjad Zaheer, p. 8, 1944: Peoples Publishing House, Bombay.

The Quaid told Fraser Wighton, the Special Representative of Reuter, in an interview in Bombay on 31st March 1946, when the latter called on him to elicit his views on the Cabinet Mission's visit to India, "We shall be very glad to meet them ... We are quite willing to settle details. But on the question of Pakistan, there is no room for compromise". When Dowald Edwards, representative of the British Broadcasting Corporation, met the Quaid in Delhi on 3rd April for the same purpose and asked him how it would be possible to maintain communications between a Pakistan divided into two parts, the Quaid said, "When you travel from Britain to other parts of the British Commonwealth, you pass through foreign territory – the Suez Canal, for instance. It is all done by amicable arrangement. We travel from the Muslim areas of the North-East to the Muslim areas of the North-West across this so-called 'Hindu Corridor' without any difficulty today. Why should that arrangement not continue?" The Quaid was told by Edwards that doubts were being expressed on the economic strength of a free and independent Pakistan. The Quaid said, "Economically Pakistan would be a powerful state. Even Congress Party experts had a shock when they investigated the matter ... Pakistan has wonderful economic opportunities". How right he was, only time was to prove after partition, leaving no doubt about its prosperity.

In the meantime, members of the Cabinet Mission reached India on 24th March 1946, and on the following day, Lord Pethick-Lawrence called a press conference in which he made a statement conciliatory to the Muslims. It will be recalled the Quaid had protested when Lord Pethick-Lawrence, as Secretary of State for India, had said in England that the Muslim minority cannot be allowed to hold a veto on constitutional advance in India. In reference to the protest by the Quaid, the Secretary of State said in the press conference he had been misunderstood, "it would not be right to regard the Muslim League as merely a minority political party they are in fact majority representatives of the great Muslim community". At the same time Sir Stafford Cripps assured Indians the Mission had an open mind and they had come "with no scheme, either on paper or in our hands". For the first few days, the Mission held consultations with the Viceroy, the provincial Governors and members of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and later on they interviewed representatives of the Chamber of Princes. Provincial Chief Ministers and leading personalities in India's public life on behalf of the Congress. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad met the Mission on 3rd April and made it clear the Congress stood for undisputed independence for a united India, and the future constitution must be drawn up by one Constituent Assembly. He explained to the Mission that according to him, Pakistan demanded by the League was harmful to Muslims themselves. Gandhi saw the Mission and made it clear he was before them in his personal capacity, and that the Congress point of view had been expressed by Maulana Azad. He also spoke against Pakistan and the two-nation theory. In order to keep the political unity of India, he suggested Jinnah be asked to form the Government of India and he could choose his own Cabinet in the Centre, provided he agreed India should not be divided into Pakistan and Hindustan.

On the following day, the Quaid had a lengthy discussion with the Mission in Delhi. The members asked him for clarification of the scheme for Pakistan and why he thought it was best in the interest of all concerned. The Quaid replied the unity of India was only a myth and not a reality. No Government had held a unified control over the sub-continent; that India was many States, which had been welded together into one entity only by the British in their own political and administrative interests. He quoted the example of Europe, where in spite of a common religion, common culture, there were various States, much smaller than Pakistan would be. And after all, an ocean divided Muslims from Hindus in religion, tradition and culture. Unity was merely artificial and imposed upon India externally. He asked how could they expect a hundred million Muslims to live under one Government, where 250 million Hindus would hold everything in their hands? The Secretary of State did not seem to agree with the basic principles on which the Quaid based his demand for Pakistan, but suggested the Mission would ordinarily see how best power can be transferred in India and to whom, as the British had decided to leave India in Indian hands. He made it clear in case the League and Congress would not come to a common understanding on the problem of transfer of power, the British would have to reluctantly make their own decision.

Later on, the Mission interviewed Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Hamam Singh on behalf of the Akali Sikhs, and they expressed their apprehensions as a community, both in a united and bifurcated India. They demanded the creation of a third State, Sikhistan. Baldev Singh, at that time a Sikh Minister in the Punjab, differed from the Sikh deputation, and suggested that the Sikhs, who were preponderantly concentrated in the Punjab, should be given adequate weightage in that province. Dr. Ambedkar, representing the Scheduled Castes, opposed the idea of a Constitution-body, as it would be dominated by Caste Hindus, which would be detrimental to the interests of Scheduled Caste Hindus. Dr. Ambedkar further demanded separate electorates for his community. Other Scheduled Caste leaders, Jagjivan Ram, Radhanath Das and Prithvi Singh Azad, opposed the demand for Pakistan and said their community would be happy if their interests and rights were statutorily guaranteed in the constitution; but in order to create a sense of security in them, they must get adequate weightage in the centre and in the provincial legislatures. The Hindu Mahasabha leaders Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and Bhopatkar vehemently opposed the demand for Pakistan and insisted on independence and unity of India. Two Liberal leaders, M. R. Jayakar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru were interviewed by the Mission and they also opposed the Partition of India. Their approach to India's solution was on the basis of a united India, with an interim Government having confidence of all political parties immediately installed. They, however, agreed that the Muslim League should not be ignored in arriving at any final decision.

Apprehensive that the Cabinet Mission may be stampeded into a decision that may go against the demand for Pakistan, the Mission having been subject to terrific pressure by all the anti-League forces, the Quaid made a spectacular move. He decided to call a

convention of all Muslim members of the Central and Provincial Assemblies that had been returned, on the League ticket. Over four hundred of them responded to his invitation and the historic convention started its deliberations on 9th April in Delhi. Quaid-e-Azam presided over this gathering which was a massive demonstration of the might of the Muslim League. Jinnah gave to the participants his views on the current political situation and explained how the mission was being assailed on all sides by those who were opposed to the demand for Pakistan. H. S. Suhrawardy moved a resolution which dealt at length with the differences between Hindus and Muslims over the last few centuries. The resolution, in unambiguous terms, said Muslims would never accept any constitution based on the concept of a United India; it demanded there should be two Constitution-making bodies, one for Pakistan and another for Hindustan. However, if a Constitution was sought to be imposed, contrary to the Muslim League point of view, one hundred million Muslims would resist such a move with all the force at their command for their national survival. This was followed by speeches by outstanding leaders from all provinces, manifesting the solidarity of the Muslims of India on the demand for Pakistan. Assurances were given by all the speakers that the Muslims of their respective provinces would willingly and unquestioningly follow the lead given by the Quaid-e-Azam for the achievement of Pakistan. All the four hundred delegates signed a solemn pledge expressing their faith in Pakistan as the only salvation for the Muslims of India and expressing their firm resolve to unshirkingly undergo all suffering that the struggle for Pakistan may entail.

On the 11th, the concluding day of the Convention, Quaid-e-Azam made a speech of great historic importance. He said it was true the Muslims were fighting for their religion, But that was not all. They were also fighting for the preservation of their social and economic life. But he asked, "Without political power, how can you defend your faith and your economic life?" He was happy solemn declaration had been made by the Convention, "While we hope for the best, we are prepared for the worst". Addressing representatives of Muslim minority provinces, he said he was from Bombay, also a minority province. As to the safeguards of Muslims of minority provinces, he said. "The most effective safeguard is the establishment of Pakistan. The present Constitution has safeguards also; but are paper safeguards any good?" He said in Akhand Hindustan, Hindus would change the constitution and the existing safeguards would be nullified. However, he warned, "If our minorities are ill-treated, Pakistan cannot remain a passive spectator". He praised the Muslims for the courage they had shown in responding to the call for Pakistan, "We Muslims have got everything— rains, intelligence, capacity and courage— virtues that nations must possess ... We have lost the fullness of our noble character". Explaining what he meant by character, he said it was, "Highest sense of honor and the highest sense of integrity— conviction—incorruptibility, readiness at any time to efface oneself for the collective good of the nation". Turning to women delegates at the convention, he said, "No nation can achieve anything, unless its women go side by side with men—even to the battlefield". He concluded by saying Britain can

only delay Pakistan, but no power on earth can deny Pakistan. "Let us, therefore, rise at the conclusion of this historic convention, full of hope, full of courage full of faith. *Insha Allah*, we shall win".

It was surprising that the resolution adopted by the convention and the speeches made therein, particularly by the Quaid, invoked the displeasure of the Congress and Hindus. The anti-Muslim press carried on a virulent tirade against Jinnah and his League. But he was undaunted – "full of hope, courage and faith".

Five days later, the Mission once again invited Jinnah for another round of talks. He was told the Cabinet Mission appreciated his views, but they were helpless, so long as Congress remained opposed to Pakistan, and they saw little chance of Congress accepting the demand put forward by the Muslim League. The Secretary for State suggested alternatives, as a compromise, which, although not conceding Pakistan in *toto*, provided for an Indian Union, with two equal partners. The Quaid regretted his inability to accept the idea of an Indian union or any compromise formula. No paper guarantees or equality on paper could be effective. He gave a stern warning to the Mission that any weakness on their part would encourage the Congress to become more insatiable in their demands than ever before. Commenting on the talks of Quaid-e-Azam with the Cabinet Mission, V. P. Menon writes, "Jinnah was entirely immovable in his demand for Pakistan."²¹⁰ The Cabinet Mission said they would have further talks with the Congress to see if a *via media* could be found, so as to satisfy both the Muslim League and the Congress.

On the 17th. the Mission once again interviewed Maulana Azad on behalf of the Congress. They conveyed to him the gist of their talks with Jinnah and hoped the Congress would not negate their efforts by refusing to concede the principle of Pakistan. But Azad, the mouthpiece of the Hindu Congress, strongly opposed the division of India into two parts. He suggested two lists of Central subjects, one compulsory, and another optional. Under the former would be defence and foreign affairs, the remaining subjects would be optional. This meant it would be for each province to come to its own terms with the Centre, and all provinces may not concede to the centre the same subjects. In any case, Muslim majority provinces may adopt a common policy in this regard, thus bringing into being, virtually speaking, two Centres for Pakistan and Hindustan, and over and above, there would be a Super-Centre. In the end, Azad sought refuge in the excuse that he must consult the Working Committee of the Congress, and the talks were adjourned to a later date.

Sir Stafford Cripps, one of the members of the Cabinet Mission, was a personal friend of Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Cripps saw both of them and tried to persuade them to accept some compromise formula. But the two remained adamant in their opposition to

²¹⁰ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 252.

Pakistan, or to any form of Government, which would make Pakistan a future possibility. Long hours of persuasion and talk had wearied the minds of the members of the mission and they went to the cool heights of Kashmir, in order to deliberate among themselves and to rest their tired nerves. In that calm and quiet atmosphere, they hatched a plan which they thought would be acceptable to the Congress and the League. The plan envisaged an interim Government at the Centre, which would set up an All-India Commission from among the elected legislators. The terms of reference of such a Commission were to be to prepare a list of constitutional guarantees for the protection of minorities and to determine whether there should be two States, or one, after the British leave India, The results of the deliberations of the Commission should be completed within thirty days, all decisions being by a certain specified minimum percentage of votes. In case of no agreement being arrived at, the question of one or two States would be decided by a plebiscite. The Muslim legislators from the Punjab, Bengal, Sindh and the Frontier would meet separately and decide whether their respective provinces would wish to be part of United India, and if seventy-five percent representatives of a province voted for exclusion, that province would be excluded from the Indian Union. This plan was, however, rejected both by the Quaid and by the Congress, when it was placed before them by the Cabinet Mission after its return from Kashmir.

In a last bid to get the League and the Congress to come to an agreement, the Cabinet Mission sent identical letters on 27th April to the two organizations asking each of them to send four representatives to a Conference, which was to take place in Simla from 5th to 12th May. The letter also contained a broad outline of what the Cabinet Mission had in mind as a possible formula. Quaid-e-Azam replied he had several reservations on the suggestions made and that he would seek further clarification in the Conference itself. The League decided to send its four nominees to the Conference—Quaid-e-Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan and Sardar Abdur Rub Nishtar. The Congress also made some reservations In their letter of reply, and appointed Azad, Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Abdul Ghaffar Khan to represent it at the Conference.

When the Conference met at Simla on 5th May, it was asked to consider the three-tier plan of the Cabinet Mission, which had been sent to the League and the Congress in advance. This plan was devised to appease the League in their demand for Pakistan, and at the same time to placate the Congress by not conceding the substance of Pakistan. Briefly speaking, the scheme was that there would be the first tier of a union of British India and Indian States, in charge of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. The last tier would be composed of Provinces and States. The former were to be divided into two, one consisting of predominantly Muslim provinces and the other Hindu majority provinces. The provincial Governments would have powers to deal with all other subjects, and their legislatures could exercise the freedom to form groups with other provinces, as also to opt for or secede from a group. Pyarelal in his biography of Gandhi, calls this three-tier plan of the Mission the "Ambiguous Middle".

On the 6th, the President of the Congress commenting on the plan, said in a letter to the Mission that the Congress were rather mystified at the plan, and disturbed at its vagueness. Such an arrangement, the letter said, did not exist in any country, and emphasis was laid that, "It is not open to the Conference to entertain any suggestions for a division of India". The Council of the Muslim League, meeting on the same day, resolved "In as much as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission plan", therefore, the Muslim League was "willing to cooperate with the constitution-making machinery proposed ... by the Mission". The resolution expressed the hope that this "would ultimately result in the establishment of a completely sovereign Pakistan".

On receipt of these two contrary reactions, the Cabinet Mission found itself in a difficult predicament. The Secretary of State on behalf of the Mission wrote a letter to Quaid-e-Azam, President of the League, and the President of the Congress, giving the following "suggested points of agreement" between the Congress and the League.

1. An All-India Union Government and Legislature empowered to deal with Foreign Affairs Defence and Communications, with powers to raise finances for these subjects.
2. Provinces to exercise all other powers.
3. Provinces may form groups, and they could determine provincial subjects which they desire to take in common.
4. The Groups may set up their own executive and legislatures.
5. The Union Legislature to consist of equal representation from Muslim and Hindu majority provinces.
6. Union Government shall be constituted in the same proportion as the Legislature.
7. By a majority vote in a Legislature, the terms of the Constitution could be reconsidered after 10 years, and at 10-yearly intervals thereafter.
8. The Constitution-making machinery was to be formed, and an elaborate procedure was drawn up for this purpose.

On receipt of the "Suggested points of agreement", the Quaid wrote a letter to the Secretary of State protesting that there was a fundamental departure from their original stand. The Secretary of State sent a vague reply and requested the Quaid to attend the

Conference on the 9th. The Congress President also expressed his disapproval in a letter to the Secretary of State and suggested that "The dispute concerning the Constituent Assembly between the Congress and the League be referred to an independent tribunal".

When the Conference met on the 9th, Jawaharlal Nehru suggested the Congress and the League nominate one representative each to discuss the points of difference, with an umpire mutually agreed upon, to finally arbitrate in case of disagreement. The Quaid said he would like to discuss that proposal with Nehru, and the Conference was adjourned to the 11th. But the Jinnah-Nehru meeting proved unsuccessful, and when the Conference met on the 11th, Quaid-e-Azam put before the Mission in writing demands of the Muslim League, which were considered to be the irreducible minimum. The covering letter said they were being sent "by way of an offer". The demands were:—

1. Bengal, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, Assam and Baluchistan should be grouped together as one group and would deal with all subjects, except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. The last three subjects to be dealt with by the two constitution-making bodies, one of the above provinces and the other of the remaining provinces.
2. The Constitution-making body for the above group of provinces would frame a constitution for those provinces, residuary sovereign powers resting in. the provinces.
3. Number of representatives from each of the six provinces to be in proportion to their population.
4. Every province would have the right, after the Constitution is framed of the Pakistan Federal Government, to opt out, provided a referendum, in that province so decides the issue.
5. Whether there should be a Legislature for the Union or not should be left to the Constitution-making body.
6. Parity of representation in the executive of the Union, and in its Legislature, if any.
7. Unless majority of representatives of Muslim and Hindu groups vote, decisions on no major point concerning communal problems shall be deemed to be effective and operative.

8. All controversial matters not to be taken up by the Union, except by a three-fourths majority.
9. In constitution of provinces and groups, fundamental rights and safeguards in regard to religion, culture etc. will be provided for.
10. Right of cession of a province shall be operative after ten years, provided a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly so decides.

The above League formula was countered by the Congress by contrary demands which were put forth in a letter from its President to the Mission. The Congress memorandum insisted on one constitution-making body, emphatically repudiating the suggestion of including the Frontier Province in the Pakistan Group, "As the elections (in that province) show, that it is not in favor of that proposal."

The Congress, while conceding very little, wanted to nullify the demand for Pakistan; rejection by the Quaid of the Congress formula was a foregone conclusion. The result was when the Conference reassembled on the 12th, it could continue only for a short while. The League had reached the point of no return in their demand for Pakistan, and in the words of the Quaid, Muslims were not prepared to walk into the "spider's web," which the Congress was weaving to entrap them. Having reached the blind-alley of an unsuccessful conclusion, the curtain was rung down on the Conference. To the Quaid, Pakistan was a fundamental necessity, and he believed there should be "No compromise on principles".

The Cabinet Mission issued a press statement on the 15th, which was virtually an apology for their failure. Although in one part of the statement, the Mission expressed their understanding and support for Pakistan, "We are greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims, lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule", yet in another passage they negated the Muslim demand for Pakistan. In conclusion the statement said the Mission hoped that an independent India would remain friendly to the British peoples. "But ... whatever the choice may be, we look forward with you to your ever increasing prosperity among the great nations of the world, and to a future even, more glorious than your past".

The Quaid thought fit to inform the public about the role of the Muslim League at the Conference and what had prompted it to take a definite stand on Pakistan. He issued a statement on the 23rd from Simla in which he gave "A background of the discussions ... till the Conference was declared concluded and its breakdown, announced". Giving an outline of the formula of the Mission, he commented upon it in detail. He went on to explain the justification of the offer made at the Conference by the League, "The core of our offer ... was ... that six Muslim Provinces should be grouped together as Pakistan Group". Referring to the final statement issued by the Cabinet Mission, the Quaid said,

"I regret that the Mission should have negated the Muslim demand for the establishment of a complete sovereign State of Pakistan, which, we still hold, is the only solution of the constitutional problems of India" Referring to certain passages in the statement issued by the Mission, he said they were included "simply to appease and placate the Congress". The Quaid then went on to comment on the operative part of the Mission's statement, which he found to be unsatisfactory from the Muslim point of view, and, therefore, unacceptable by them. In the end he said he was convening a meeting of the Council and of the Working Committee of the League, to take a decision on the proposals of the Mission as issued in their final statement from Simla.

The Council of the Muslim League met on 6th June and in his introductory address the Quaid said, "You have got to decide momentous issues now facing you". He gave a resume of the Conference at Simla and said that the League Council had "all the material before you" and their decisions would be "of far reaching importance and consequence". He said the Working Committee had taken no decision on this issue, as they did not wish to "anticipate your verdict or your decision ... every member is free and he is not tied down or fettered by any step that we have taken". Raising his voice, he said, "Let me tell you that Muslims will not rest content until we have established full, complete and Sovereign Pakistan ... Six years ago, the position of the Muslims was such that they would have been wiped off". If Hindus wanted freedom of India, the quickest way was to accept Pakistan, "Either you agree, or we shall have it in spite of you". Turning his attention to the Congress, he said, "The Hindu is arrogant, tyrannical and oppressive. But I think all this will sober down. If it does not, then we shall have to do something to make it sober down".

After important leaders had expressed their views, the Council adopted a resolution, protesting against those provisions in the Mission's plan, which cast doubts at the feasibility of a full, independent and sovereign Pakistan. However, in view of its indirect acceptance "by implication" of Pakistan in the proposed scheme, the Council decided that the Muslim League would work in the constitution-making body, reserving its right of withdrawal, if subsequent developments so warranted. The resolution in the end authorized Quaid-e-Azam, its President, to negotiate with the Viceroy as the sole accredited representative of the League in all matters, including arrangements for the contemplated interim Government at the Centre. Two days later, Quaid-e-Azam conveyed to the Viceroy the decision of the Muslim League, reminding him the Viceroy had assured the Quaid that there would be five League, five Congress, one Sikh and one Indian-Christian or European nominee in the Central Government, with important portfolios evenly divided between the League and the Congress.

Maulana Azad, commenting on events of this period, writes in his book, "The Acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by both Congress and Muslim League was a glorious event in the history of the freedom movement in India".²¹¹

Maulana Azad, the Congress President, was not well, and in his place the Viceroy called Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru for discussions at the Viceregal House on the 12th. Nehru refused to accept the Viceroy's formula for the interim Government, and he communicated a summary of the conversation to Azad. Congress attitude seemed to stiffen against the suggestions of the Viceroy, as they appeared to them to be more satisfactory to the League point of view. It may be interesting to recall here that Maulana Azad in his book *India Wins Freedom*, published posthumously, writes, "He (Lord Wavell) genuinely believed that there could be no better solution of the Indian problem than that outlined in the Cabinet Mission plan ... Since the Cabinet Mission Plan was largely based on the scheme I had formulated in my statement of 15th April (1946), I naturally agreed with him".²¹² Yet, at the time the Viceroy's plan was made known to Azad through Nehru, he wrote to the Viceroy that the Congress Working Committee would not accept his suggestion.

Fearing the repetition of a political checkmate, as the League and Congress held diametrically opposite views on the fundamentals of an agreed solution, the Viceroy wrote on the 16th to Jinnah and Azad that he proposed to appoint an Executive Council of Fourteen, specifically named, six from the Congress, including a Scheduled Caste Congressite, five from the Muslim League, one Sikh, one Indian Christian, and one Parsi. The Muslim nominees were M. A. Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nawab Mohammad Ismail, Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin and Sardar Abdur Rab Nish tar. The Viceroy hoped the League and Congress would accept this formula, "We are sure we can rely on you and your Working Committee to look to the wider issues and to the urgent needs of the country as a whole, and to consider this proposal in a spirit of accommodation". The letter hinted in case either party stood out the Viceroy would proceed with the formation of the interim Government.

As soon as the proposed names of Muslims became known, provincial jealousies raised the head to strike the first discordant note. Dr. Khan Saheb, Chief Minister of the Frontier, and his brother, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, brought pressure on their Congress colleagues to oppose the inclusion of Sardar Nishtar, who was from the Frontier and one of the trusted lieutenants of Quaid-e-Azam. But the Quaid was made of sterner stuff than the Khan Brothers imagined, and he was not a man to let down a friend, who was loyal to the League.

²¹¹ *India Wins Freedom*, by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, p. 151, 1959: Orient Longmans, Bombay.

²¹² *Ibid.* p. 173.

The Quaid replied on the 19th, asking the Viceroy if the proposals were final or whether they were subject to change and modification, and he also sought some other clarification. The Viceroy promptly furnished the necessary explanations. It seemed as if the Quaid would by far and large accept the Viceroy's proposals. The Congress Working Committee, meeting in Delhi on 25th June, by a resolution rejected the proposals, as "Congressmen can never give up the national character of the Congress or accept an artificial and unjust parity, or agree to the veto of a communal group". Azad sent a copy of the resolution to the Viceroy, and in his covering letter protested against the non-inclusion of a Muslim-Congressman from the Congress quota. After the Congress stand had become known, the Working Committee of the Muslim League resolved to join the Interim Government, in accordance with the statement of the Viceroy dated 16th June. The interpretation of Quaid-e-Azam was that if the Congress rejected the proposals and the League accepted them, or vice versa, the Viceroy would go ahead and form the interim Government without including representatives of that party that decided to stand out. But the interpretation of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission was different from that of Quaid-e-Azam.

Everyone could now see that the protracted, negotiations carried on for about three months by the Cabinet Mission did not materialize in a League-Congress understanding, or in the formation of an interim Government. As members of the Mission were in the process of preparing to leave India, some non-official members of the Viceroy's Executive Council resigned, necessitating the formation of a caretaker Government, consisting of all officials, at the Centre. Towards the end of June the Cabinet Mission left for England, their task far from fulfilled.

It had, however, not been a complete failure. It was clear to Indians that the Labour Party meant to give up political power in India and that the acceptance of the demand for Pakistan would be an integral part of any future settlement of the Indian problem. In the meantime the League and the Congress were getting ready to put their party machinery into full gear for elections to the Constituent Assembly, which appeared to be round the corner.

When the Annual Session of the Congress met in Bombay on 6th July, Jawaharlal Nehru took over as President from Maulana Azad and, commenting on the resolution adopted, Nehru said the Congress was not committing itself to any long term or short-term aspect of any plan, but merely agreeing to enter the proposed Constituent Assembly. Jinnah retorted in a press statement it was clear from Nehru's speech at the A.I.C.C. that the Congress had repudiated "the basic form upon which the long-term scheme rests", and hoped in the ensuing debate in the British Parliament due note would be taken that the Congress had not "accepted the long-term scheme". The Dawn supported the stand taken by the Quaid and editorially wrote that if the Congress persisted in its attitude, as indicated by Nehru, then it was utterly futile to keep up the farce of a Constituent Assembly.

The India debate commenced in the British Parliament on the 18th, and Lord Pethick-Lawrence said both Congress and League "having agreed to the statement of May 16th and the Constituent Assembly elected in accordance with that statement, they cannot, of course, go outside the terms of what has been agreed". The debate, however, revealed that the British Government was not taking a stand in full accord with the League point of view. Its necessary sequence was when the Council of the League met in Bombay on the 27th. Quaid-e-Azam, addressing the gathering, said, "The Cabinet Mission have played into the hands of the Congress The Congress has done the greatest harm to the peoples of India by its petty-fogging and haggling attitude ... The Congress is full of spite towards the Muslims". He said the Congress was "talking through its hat, when they talk of turning the Constituent Assembly into a sovereign body". He termed Nehru's statement as childish. He regretted in the debate in British Parliament, Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps had tried to create the impression that the Congress had accepted the long-term proposal, which was quite contrary to facts. The Quaid said in the proposed Constituent Assembly, the Congress would have a majority, and the Congress believed it was "committed to nothing, and they were going to the Constituent Assembly to achieve their objective according to their sweet will". In that case, he said, a new situation faces the League and the Council must decide on its future line of action. On his part, he had come to the conclusion, "I feel we have exhausted all reasons. It is no use looking to any other source for help or assistance. There is no tribunal to which we can go. The only tribunal is the Muslim Nation". He said the League took part in the discussions with the Cabinet Mission in a spirit of give and take, "But the Congress stood there like a mule. It has no other consideration except the one, namely, how to down the Muslim League". This attitude of the Congress proved "That the only solution of India's problem is Pakistan". He was bitter in his criticism of the way Cripps had explained the negotiations in the House of Commons, "Cripps debased his legal talents and put his dishonest interpretation", and he referred to Cripps as "That ingenious juggler of words". He ended his speech with a scathing criticism of the part Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Cripps had played. "When representatives of His Majesty's Government go back on their own words within ten days and dishonor themselves and the Government they represent and the nation to whom they belong, what confidence can we have in these people?"

Thereafter, the Council adopted a resolution deploring that the Cabinet Mission had gone back on the assurances given by it to the President of the League, and, therefore, it was decided to revoke the previous acceptance by the League to enter the Constituent Assembly. By another resolution, the Council authorized the Working Committee to chalk out plans for "Direct Action", and called upon those who owed allegiance to the League to renounce titles bestowed on them by the British Government. The Quaid applauded the decision of the Council. "This day, we bid good-bye to constitutional methods ... Today, we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it. The decision to reject the proposals and to launch 'Direct Action' has not been taken in haste

... We mean it; and believe every word of it. We do not believe in equivocation". He said the League was "moved by a decision not to allow the situation to develop into bloodshed and civil war". He regretted both the Congress and the British had shown bad faith to the Muslims, "We have learnt a bitter lesson—the bitterest I think so far. Now there is no room left for compromise. Let us march on. If you seek peace, we do not want war. But, if you want war. we will accept it unhesitatingly".

The Working Committee of the League, meeting on the following day, decided that Muslims all over India should observe 16th August 1946 as "Direct Action Day", by holding meetings, where the inevitability of Pakistan would be explained as also the resolution adopted by the Council of the Muslim League.

In the elections to the Constituent Assembly that took place towards the end of July, the Muslim League won 73 out of 78 seats allotted to Muslims, i.e. ninety-four percent, while the Congress lost in elections to nine constituencies contested by it. During the course of the elections, the Viceroy, certain that the Muslim League would win an overwhelming majority of Muslim seats, wrote to the Quaid and to Nehru, the Congress President, that after the elections he would reshuffle his Government, and appoint an interim Government of 14 members, five of whom would be nominated by the League and six by the Congress, which should include one representative of the Scheduled Castes, and that the Viceroy would nominate three to represent other minority communities. The letter said the League and Congress would have an equitable share of the important portfolios. In the end, the Viceroy requested the two Presidents to let him have their replies very soon. Nehru gave an evasive reply, saying he could not commit the Congress without consulting the Working Committee and demanded that Indian independence should be guaranteed before the Congress could accept any plan.

Quaid-e-Azam wrote to the Viceroy on the 31st that the latest move of the Viceroy was a departure from the principle of parity between the League and Congress and that this had been done to appease and placate the Congress. He was emphatic in his opinion that the League Working Committee would reject the Viceroy's offer as being detrimental to the interests of the Muslims of India. The Viceroy replied on 2nd August that his offer was the same as the one accepted by the Working Committee of the League. Further, in view of the stand of the League, as indicated in the Quaid's letter of 31st July, he had asked the Congress to make proposals to form an interim Government. Menon writes, "It was apprehended that if Jinnah made a call for 'Direct Action', there would be a ready and immediate response. If the ministries went out in Bengal and Sindh and there was a Muslim mass movement, the Government might lose control of East Bengal and of much of the countryside in Sindh, and serious communal rioting might occur in the more populous towns of the Punjab and the United Provinces."²¹³ In spite of the situation being as indicated by Menon, it was strange that the Viceroy,

²¹³ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 290.

under instructions from His Majesty's Government, was in a hurry to by-pass the League and to accommodate the Congress. There broke out serious communal riots, resulting in a countrywide communal tension, which was aggravated by labor unrest all over the country.

On 8th August, the Working Committee of the Congress met at Wardha and passed a resolution regretting the attitude of the League and it said that the Congress "have emphasized the Sovereign character of the Constituent Assembly". After saying this, strange as it may seem, the resolution expressed the hope "That the Muslim League and all others concerned in the wider interests of the nation, as well as of their own will join in this great task". Asked to express his views on the Congress resolution, the Quaid said, "The situation remains as it was and we are where we were". Nehru followed up the Working Committee decision by writing to the Viceroy to invite the President of the Congress to form a provisional Government at the Centre and the Congress President would thereafter seek the cooperation of the League. The Viceroy obliged the Congress, eager to form the Government, by issuing a communiqué on these lines, and Nehru wrote to the Quaid to extend to him his cooperation in this task. The Quaid spurned the offer of joining the interim Government on these terms, "If this means that the Viceroy has commissioned you to form the Executive Council of the Governor-General ... it is not possible for me to accept such a position". But he wrote he would be willing to discuss with Nehru the Hindu-Muslim problem. The meeting did take place between the two, but Nehru acting according to the set and customary plan of the Congress, it failed to resolve the political deadlock.

The sixteenth of August was observed as "Direct Action Day" by the Muslims of India. Processions were taken out in all important towns; public meetings were held; resolutions were passed dwelling upon the stand of the League. Governments of Bengal and Sindh declared the day as a public holiday, and Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal, came out with a challenging statement in which he said if the Congress were to be inducted into office by the Viceroy at the Centre, he would declare Bengal to be completely independent with a parallel Government in his province, "We will see that no revenue is received by such Central Government from Bengal and we will consider ourselves as a separate State, having no connection with the Centre". The Hindu communalists of Bengal, backed by the Congressites, resorted to violence in the streets of Calcutta, and in the communal rioting that followed about 5,000 were killed and over 20,000 received injuries; and these are conservative estimates of human suffering that the riots involved in Calcutta alone.

The loss of life and destruction of property was so great that these riots came to be known as the "Great Calcutta Killing". Describing the street-scenes on the day of Calcutta rioting, Jan Stephens writes, "A visit to the police morgue necessitated use of a respirator; unremoved rotting cadavers were stacked to the ceiling ... During a three-hours' jeep-tour of the city with a pair of British N.C.O's of the military police, this

writer reckoned (as they did) that we had seen more horrors than most modern soldiers ever do on the battle field".²¹⁴ The Quaid issued a press statement, "The Viceroy, Mr. Gandhi and the Congress cannot be absolved of their main responsibility in creating the Calcutta situation". He said the Hindus had turned arrogant and they believed that Hindu Raj had been established, and therefore, they insult and taunt and persecute Muslims. Commenting on the Congress Government that was expected to take office at the Centre, the Quaid said, "I have no hope of this Government giving the Mussalmans a fair deal". He expressed his disapproval of the Viceroy asking Nehru to form the Government, "I see no hope of the League going into the interim Government and the Constituent Assembly, for it will be nothing but abject surrender and humiliation for us". Reverting to Pakistan, he said, "There is no alternative, except the outright establishment of Pakistan, which means freedom both for Hindus and Muslims ... That is the quickest way to India's real freedom ... The Congress is unfortunately blind". In the end he revealed he had been receiving threats by telephone and through the post. But, he was not afraid. What is the life of one individual, when a homeland for 100 million Muslims of India was the goal?

Nehru wrote to the Viceroy on 22nd August that the Congress was anxious to form a combination with the Muslim League, but at the same time the Congress would not agree to be dictated by Jinnah. On the 24th, the Viceroy gazetted the appointment of an interim Government, headed by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. This Council of the Governor-General consisted, among others, of Congressites, one Sikh, one Parsi, one Indian Christian. The interim Government was expected to take oath of office on 2nd September. The same evening the Viceroy broadcast a talk from All-India Radio in which he said five seats had been kept open for the Muslim League, yet the latter had refused to send names of its nominees to the Viceroy. The Viceroy could not wait indefinitely for the League to enter the Interim Government, and he was, therefore, proceeding with its formation. The broadcast informed Indians that for the first time in its history, the British Government had agreed the War Member would be an Indian. He concluded by appealing to the public and the press to give their cooperation, "Never were tolerance and soberness in thought and action more necessary".

Quaid-e-Azam reacted sharply, and said in a press statement that the Viceroy "has struck a severe blow to the Muslim League and Muslim India. But I am sure that the Muslims of India will bear this with fortitude and courage ... If the Viceroy's appeal is really sincere and if he is in earnest, he should translate it into concrete proposals by his deeds and actions".

A few days after his radio broadcast, Lord Wavell visited riot-stricken Calcutta, where he met, among others, Khwaja Nazimuddin, who discussed with the Viceroy his personal views on how best to make it possible for the Muslim League to enter the

²¹⁴ *Pakistan: Old Country/New Nation*, by Ian Stephens, p. 128, 1946: Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.

Interim Government. The Viceroy, on his return to Delhi, took up suggestions made by Nazimuddin with Gandhi and Nehru. The formula, which the Viceroy placed before the Congress leaders, made it clear that the grouping of provinces, as stated in the statement of May 16th, had to be accepted as an integral part of the understanding between the Viceroy and the Congress. Lord Wavell made it clear he did not want to create conditions in India that would lead to a civil war between Hindus and Muslims; the transfer of power in India from British to Indian hands, he maintained, should be peaceful and should not result in violence. The Congress Working Committee by a resolution expressed surprise at the change in the Viceroy's attitude, as was evident from his talks with Gandhi and Nehru and the letters he had written to them. The Viceroy, however, maintained his ground and said he did not look upon the question from the narrow angle of a lawyer, but with the eyes of comprehension of a practical man. His Majesty's Government instructed the Viceroy to induct the new members into office, and this was done on the appointed day, 2nd September 1946. Coincidentally with assumption of office by the Interim Government there broke out violent Hindu-Muslim riots in Ahmadabad and Bombay, resulting in loss of many human lives and destruction of property. Gandhi commented, "We are not yet in the midst of a civil war; but we are nearing it".

Five days after the swearing-in ceremony, Nehru broadcast from All-India Radio that the Government wanted to find mutually acceptable solutions to all problems, and hoped other parties would work in the Constituent Assembly to forge a constitution of a free and independent India. Asked to comment on Nehru's broadcast, the Quaid said Nehru was merely indulging in platitudes without meaning to satisfy Muslim aspirations, "He has made no definite proposals to me. You cannot butter parsnips with words; I have been stabbed, and kind words will not stop the bleeding".

The Viceroy invited the Quaid on behalf of the League for talks on the constitutional deadlock on 16th September in Delhi. The Quaid said to the Viceroy they believed the 16th May Plan had been mutilated beyond recognition, and this had made it impossible for the Muslim League to cooperate. He deplored the Viceroy had installed at the Centre a one-party Government. Ten days later, they met again, after Jinnah had consulted his colleagues. The Quaid insisted the Viceroy should agree that a convention be established for all communal controversies to be decided by a majority vote of both the communities, as he feared representatives of other minorities would always vote with the Congress. The Viceroy suggested a meeting between the Quaid and Nehru to see if the two could come to an agreement on essentials. But when Lord Wavell held discussions, separately, with Gandhi and Nehru, he found the two particularly unyielding on the question of the right of the Congress to include a Nationalist Muslim in the Interim Government. The Viceroy informed the Quaid he had failed to get agreement from Gandhi and Nehru, but he urged it was in the best interests of all concerned that the Muslim League should agree to join the Central Government and also to work in the Constituent Assembly. The Quaid replied he would call a meeting of

the Working Committee, place before them a report of his negotiations with the Viceroy, and then abide by its decision.

In an interview with Henley of the Kemsley newspaper group of England, the Quaid said, "I am sorrier than the Viceroy about his failure to secure a coalition Government". But he explained it was not the League that was to be blamed for this failure. Regarding the offer of the Viceroy to the League, he said, "It is so vague, except that the Muslim League will have five seats. Nothing else is clearly stated". He was not bargaining for seats, he said; to him it was important that a certain irreducible minimum agreement must be arrived at on basic principles. Explaining the reasons why he decided not to accept the plan and to join the Constituent Assembly, Sir George Dunbar writes, "The Moslem League withdrew entirely from the scheme, in which Jinnah saw dangerous ambiguity".²¹⁵

The situation all over the country was fast deteriorating, and communal riots of magnitudes never witnessed before were the order of the day. Thousands of human lives were being lost every week, and material loss due to arson and looting was reaching astronomical figures. Going into the statistics of losses in these riots, Ian Stephens writes, "These two events, the Calcutta Killing, and the setting up of Mr. Nehru's first Government, professedly in implementation of the British Cabinet Mission's Plan, in fact flict in which the estimated death-toll, about 500,000 signaled the start of a sixteen months' Civil War; a conpeople, was roughly comparable to that of the entire British Commonwealth during the six years of the Second World War".²¹⁶

At this stage, the Nawab of Bhopal, who was greatly respected by all leaders and political parties, brought Jinnah and Gandhi together to evolve an acceptable formula. Mainly due to the efforts of the Nawab of Bhopal the two leaders agreed, "The Congress does not challenge and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative organization of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such, and in accordance with democratic principles, they alone have today an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that any restriction, or limitation should be put upon the Congress to choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives". But when Gandhi communicated this formula, to which he had agreed, to Nehru and the Congress, the latter refused to accept it. Gandhi had to go back on his plighted word.

In the second week of October, the Quaid saw Lord Wavell again. In this interview he informed the Viceroy if the Congress claimed the right to include a Nationalist Muslim in their quota, the League reserved the right to include a representative of the

²¹⁵ *India and the Passing of Empire*, by Sir George Dunbar, p. 204. 1951: Nicolson & Watson, London.

²¹⁶ *Pakistan: New Country/Old Nation*, by Ian Stephens, pp. 129-30, 1964: Penguin.

Scheduled Castes in their share of representation in the interim Government. On the 13th the Quaid communicated in a letter to Lord Wavell the decision of the Working Committee on the entry of the League into the Interim Government. The letter said although the League had serious objections, yet "In the interests of Mussalmans and other communities, it will be fatal to leave the entire field of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress". On the following day Quaid-e-Azam communicated to the Viceroy in a letter that the five Muslim League nominees in the Interim Government would be (1) Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, (2) I. I. Chundrigar, (3) Abdur Rab Nishtar, (4) Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and the fifth would be Jogendra Nath Mandal, who was a member of the Scheduled Castes and a minister in the Muslim League Ministry in Bengal. In the Interim Government, as then constituted, there already existed two vacancies, and in order to accommodate the five League nominees, the following three tendered their resignation: (1) Sarat Chandra Bose. (2) Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, (3) Syed Ali Zaheer.

The Quaid had all along insisted that, in case Muslim League representatives joined the Central Government, there should be equitable distribution of portfolios between the League and Congress nominees. There ensued a protracted discussion between the Viceroy and the Quaid, and the Viceroy and Nehru, on this point. It took them twelve days to come to an agreed solution. On the 25th Lord Wavell wrote to the Quaid, "The portfolios that I can offer the Muslim League in the Interim Government are the following:—Finance, Commerce, Posts and Air, Health, and Legislative". On the same day, the Quaid replied to the Viceroy, "I am sorry I cannot say that it is an equitable distribution ... I am sending you below the names of the nominees of the Muslim League, showing how those portfolios should be distributed among them:—

Finance	Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan
Commerce	Mr. I. I. Chundrigar
Posts & Air	Mr. A. R. Nishtar
Health	Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan
Legislative	Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal"

During all these months, from the time the Cabinet Mission came to India to the day the League nominees entered the Interim Government at the Centre, having succeeded in preventing the Congress from getting all they wanted, the brunt of the battle on behalf of Muslim India had been borne by one man, Jinnah, who was now past seventy. His aged but willing shoulders carried the burden with zest and vigor, which could be the envy of men much younger than him in years. Paying glowing tribute to him for his work at this crucial period of our history, the Aga Khan writes, "The Quaid-e-Azam's brilliant and epoch-making career, so untimely ended, reached its summit in these momentous years of 1946 and 1947. Now he belongs to history; and his memory, I am certain, is imperishable. Of all the statesmen that I have known in my life—Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Churchill, Curzon, Mussolini, Mahatma Gandhi—Jinnah is the most

remarkable. None of those men in my view outshone him in strength of character, and that almost uncanny combination of pre-science and resolution which is statecraft".²¹⁷

²¹⁷ *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, by the Aga Khan, p. 292, 1954: Cassell & Co. Ltd., London.

PAKISTAN ZINDABAD

With the entry of Muslim League representatives into the Interim Government, establishment of Pakistan was bound to be a dominant issue in any future political settlement concerning India. At the time of the Round Table Conference, Pakistan was looked upon as a child of the youthful imagination of some overzealous students. Up to 1939, few took it seriously; but after "The Pakistan Resolution" of 23rd March 1940 attempts were made by the Congress to kill it by ridicule. A Government may stop a political movement by repressive measures; a political party or a people may smother the rising voice or popular demand by resorting to terror or mass killings; but Pakistan had by now become an article of faith of the political ideology of the Muslims of India. And no one can slit the throat of an ideal. The struggle and strivings of a century had brought the Muslims on the charted course of an ideology, which, subconscious for about a century, had now crystallized into the demand for Pakistan. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar wrote in this connection: "That Moslem politics should have run a parallel course and should never have merged in the Hindu current of politics is a strange fact of modern Indian History. In so segregating themselves the Muslims were influenced by some mysterious feeling, the source of which they could not define and guided by a hidden hand which they could not see but which was all the same directing them to keep apart from Hindus. This mysterious feeling and this hidden hand was no other than their pre-appointed destiny, symbolized by Pakistan, which, unknown to them, was working within them. Thus viewed, there is nothing new or nothing sudden in the idea of Pakistan. The only thing that has happened is that, what was indistinct appears now in full glow, and what was nameless has taken a name".²¹⁸

Almost simultaneously with the decision of the Muslim League to enter the interim Government, communal riots of an unprecedented magnitude broke out in many parts of India, particularly in Bihar, and in Noakhali and Tipperah in East Bengal, in which thousands of Muslims were mercilessly butchered. The timing and the organized manner in which these attacks on Muslims were launched would make one believe extremists among communal Hindus were not prepared to tolerate that Muslims should have an honorable place under the sun in India. In many parts of the country, the police was inadequate to cope with the situation, and the military had to be called in to restore the confidence of the people and to establish law and order. Quaid-e-Azam was constrained to issue a statement, "There is no limit to the false propaganda that is being carried on to throw the blame on the Muslim League and the Mussalmans for what is happening in various parts of India ... I know that the Mussalmans have suffered heavily and are suffering. But the tragedy of Bihar has eclipsed what are mere sparks elsewhere. I condemn brutality in any shape or form. But the Bihar tragedy has

²¹⁸ *Pakistan or Partition of India*, by B. R. Ambedkar, pp. 333-334: Thacker & Co. Ltd., Bombay.

no parallel or precedent in this record of cold-blooded butchery of the Muslim minority in various parts of the country committed by the majority Hindu community". He appealed to the Muslims not to sink low in the scales of civilization, morality and humanity but prove by their actions that they are brave, generous and trustworthy. In the end, he said, "Suffering of Muslims in the minority provinces and the terrific death roll and the butchery that has taken place will not go in vain. This sacrifice will, I am sure, establish our claim to Pakistan. Those who have died, been wounded, or suffered loss and destruction of property, may take some consolation that they have suffered and made their contribution for our freedom and the achievement of Pakistan".

Ian Stephens writes about the Bihar massacre, "Historians may reckon the Bihar calamity to have been decisive in its effects on the partition controversy. After, so huge a slaughter, which bore signs of such cold-blooded preparing, possibilities of getting India's Hindu and Muslim population to live together harmoniously under a single independent, post-British Government shrank towards zero ... Thus the Bihar calamity ... brought to the surface such profound ancient fears and hatreds, such vivid historical recollections of former strife, as to make Partition practically unavoidable."²¹⁹ Lt-Gen. Toker, on the basis of reports he received as C.-in-C., Eastern Command, writes, "Of all the terrible doings of 1946, this was the most shocking. Great mobs of Hindus turned suddenly, but with every preparation for the deed, upon the few Muslims who had lived, and whose forefathers had lived, in amity and trust, all their lives, among these very Hindu neighbors. It has never been ascertained who was the organizing brain of this well-laid, widely-planned plot of extirpation. All that we do know is that it went to a fixed plan and schedule. Had it not been so, such a large mob so fully armed with prepared weapons, would never have collected in the time and moved with such obvious fiendish intent from victim to victim. The number of Muslim dead, men, women, and children, in this short, savage killing was about 7,000 to 8,000. Women and their babies were cut up, butchered, with an obscene devilry."²²⁰ When Gandhi visited Bihar in order to help restore communal amity in that troubled province, he addressed a prayer meeting at Jehanabad in Gaya district on 26th March. Referring to his sermon at this prayer meeting, Pyarelal writes, "That very morning he (Gandhi) had been in a village where, near a mosque, someone — certainly not a Muslim—had felled on the previous night a stately coconut tree which was adorning what was a make-shift grave over the bones of the Muslims. killed during the disturbances". Gandhi angrily asked if the Hindus were surprised that Muslims were not prepared to return to their homes on the assurances of Hindus? Pyarelal continues, "He (Gandhi) confessed he was shaken in his belief in the plight word of the Bihari Hindus after what he had seen that morning".²²¹

²¹⁹ *Pakistan: Old Country/New Nation*, by Ian Stephens, pp. 136-137, 1964: Penguin Books, London.

²²⁰ *While Memory Serves*, by Lt-Gen. Toker.

²²¹ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, Vol. I, p. 672, by Pyarelal: Havjivan Publishing House, Ahmadabad.

Lord Wavell was anxious that both League and Congress should go on record to confirm that they had entered the Interim Government to implement the Cabinet Mission's statement of 16th May. He saw the Quaid in this connection, who informed the Viceroy that only the Council of the Muslim League could do so, provided they rescinded their previous resolution by which they had rejected the said proposals, and that the meeting of the Council could not be convened unless proper notice had been issued to the members. On 26th October, the reconstituted Interim Government took oath of office, Muslim League nominees being assigned the portfolios already agreed upon. Nehru was designated Vice-President of the Executive Council, and his behavior from the very first day was such as to make it clear to his League colleagues in the Government that he was the Prime Minister, a claim which was rightly repudiated by League representatives in the Interim Government. Liaquat Ali Khan made their position very clear in this regard, when he said in a press statement that the Interim Government "consisted of a Congress bloc and a Muslim bloc; each functioning under separate leadership".

It was decided by the Viceroy to summon the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly on 9th December, and the Congress members of the Government were insisting that Lord Wavell should issue invitations to the members forthwith. In order to clarify the position of the Muslim League, the Quaid wrote to the Viceroy on 17th November that as the Congress had not accepted the 16th May statement, it was futile for him to summon a meeting of the Council of the League to accept it. In this connection the Quaid quoted from a resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress and from the statements of Gandhi to prove his point. The letter went on to condemn the "ruthless massacre" of Muslims all over India at the hands of Hindus, particularly in Bihar; in this connection the Quaid strongly urged the Viceroy to give all his attention to restore peace and law and order in the country. The Quaid advised the Viceroy in unmistakable terms he should abandon sine die holding of the Constituent Assembly.

This letter was followed by a meeting between the Quaid and Lord Wavell, when the Quaid warned that to convene a Session of the Constituent Assembly would be a grave error, fraught with dangerous consequences. He gave a detailed account of the holocaust wrought by the Hindus in Bihar, where thousands of Muslims had been butchered. The Viceroy said the British wanted to leave India and it was, therefore, essential that Congress and the League came to terms on the question of transfer of power after they left. The Quaid replied the Muslims were not afraid of the consequences of British withdrawal from India and they would face all eventualities with grim determination; that the British could go that very minute after granting Pakistan.

However, much against the advice of Quaid-e-Azam, the Viceroy issued on 22nd November invitations for the Constituent Assembly meeting, a step which the Quaid regretted was "one more blunder of a very grave and serious character". To meet the

situation created by the Viceroy, Jinnah issued instructions to the Muslim League members of the Constituent Assembly to boycott its sittings. This roused the anger of Lord Wavell, who informed Liaquat Ali Khan that unless the League unequivocally accepted the 16th May statement, he could not see how he could allow League nominees to continue in the Interim Government. Liaquat Ali readily agreed to quit the Government, rather than accept the condition laid down by the Viceroy for the continued participation of Muslim League in the Interim Government. He further accused the British Government of not having the courage to force the Congress to accept the British Cabinet Mission Plan. The Muslims would be right in believing the British had thrown them to the tender mercy of wolves, who under the garb of Congressmen, were in no mood to show any mercy to the Muslims. It was clear to any student of current Indian political history, Liaquat Ali said, that if a lasting order was to be evolved, if an acceptable constitution was to be forged, the prerequisite was an understanding between the Congress and League. And that agreement was nowhere in sight due to the consistently anti-Muslim League stand of the Congress.

The Constituent Assembly had been called for the 9th of December, but in doing so the Viceroy seemed caught in the confines of a blind-alley.

To make things worse for him, Nehru, in the course of his speech at the Annual Session of the Congress in November at Meerut, said the Viceroy was "reversing the wheels of the car and this is leading to a critical situation." He declared the Congress representatives had twice thought of resigning from the Government, due to the unbearable attitude of League nominees, who looked upon themselves as the "King's Party". He said, "Our patience is fast reaching the limit". Nehru was followed by Sardar Patel, who said, "The Leaguers are trying to wage a war of nerves against the Congress ... The sword will be met with sword". After these fulminations by eminent Congress leaders at Meerut, the Quaid issued a statement clarifying the position of the League, and referring to the Congress fire-eater, Patel, he said "Sardar Patel is a strong man as they say and, therefore, he uses strong language. But words do not break bones ... All I can say is that he does not seem to realize that anyone who encourages this sort of thing is the greatest enemy of every community. Where has Sardar Patel got his sword? The Congress Ministries and those who are now sitting as members of the Executive Council will not be able to function, if they were not under the protection of British bayonets. He continued, the Interim Government was merely an Executive Council, as laid down by the Act of 1919; no more, no less, It was by no means "A Cabinet ... You cannot turn a horse into an elephant by calling it an elephant".

League and Congress representatives were ministers in the Central Government. But it was obvious they owed loyalty to different ideologies; they pulled in opposite directions.

At this stage Nehru made secret overtures to Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly in order to wean away their allegiance from the Muslim League. In a private letter to Gandhi, Nehru wrote, "Our general outlook at present is to approach privately some of the Muslim League leaders and try to induce them to come into the Constituent Assembly".²²² But Congress intrigues and the blandishments of Nehru failed to attract a single Muslim.

In order to have another round of tripartite talks between His Majesty's Government, Muslim League and Congress, the Secretary of State asked the Viceroy to persuade two representatives of each of the two parties to visit England, along with Sardar Baldev Singh, a Sikh leader, so that the vexed problem of the Punjab, where the Sikhs were concentrated, may also be efficiently tackled. The Viceroy conveyed the invitation to the five leaders on 26th November, and Liaquat Ali Khan replied he would give his decision after he had consulted Jinnah, who was at that time in Karachi. The Quaid insisted on knowing what correspondence had transpired between the Secretary of State and Nehru, before he could agree to go to London. Copies of letters exchanged were made available to him, and after studying them he expressed his inability to comply with the request. The Secretary of State, therefore, sent to the Quaid a personal telegram, as a consequence of which the Quaid agreed to proceed to London. On 2nd December the Quaid, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru, Lord Wavell and Baldev Singh reached London, and the Indian leaders were soon in conference with representatives of the British Cabinet to find a solution of the Indian problem. The discussions, however, once again resulted in failure. The British Government issued a statement on the 6th announcing that the talks had not resulted in an agreement between the two main political parties. The statement said, "The Cabinet Mission have throughout maintained the view that the decisions of the sections should, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote of the representatives in the sections. This view has been accepted by the League; but the Congress have put forward a different view ... On the? matter immediately in dispute, His Majesty's Government urge the Congress to accept the view of the Cabinet Mission, in order that the way may be open for the Muslim League to reconsider their attitude." The statement said in case of disagreement on interpretation of the May 16th Plan, the matter be referred to the Federal Government for decision. In conclusion, it was stated that the Constituent Assembly could not succeed, except on the basis of an agreed procedure, "should a constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented. His Majesty's Government could not, of course, contemplate—as the Congress have stated they would not contemplate – forcing such a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country".

Nehru did not conceal his chagrin at the statement issued by His Majesty's Government and left England a disappointed man. The Quaid and Liaquat Ali Khan stayed in

²²² Quoted in "*Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*". Vol. II. 1958 (by Pyarelal).

London for some time. In one of the speeches made in London during his stay, the Quaid said Pakistan was an article of faith with the Muslims. There was no alternative; any departure from the acceptance of Pakistan would result in a civil war in India. In an interview to the political correspondent of Reuters, the Quaid said on 5th December. "Our cause is a righteous one ... We cannot fail, therefore, in achieving our cherished goal – Pakistan". He said he had no doubt both Pakistan, and Hindustan would live as friendly States, "by virtue of contiguity and in the interest of the safety of the whole sub-continent of India". In a public meeting, he said, "I am glad the British people have awakened a bit. They awake only when there is something dangerous".

As scheduled, the Constituent Assembly met on the 9th. But it was like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, as the Muslim League was conspicuous by its absence. Representatives of the Muslims of India, a nation of one hundred million, having abstained from participation, proceedings of the Constituent Assembly became a mere mockery. The Quaid refused to walk into the Congress parlor and be trapped in the spider's web.

After partial discussion on what was euphemistically termed the "Objectives Resolution", moved by Nehru, the Constituent Assembly was adjourned to meet on 20th of January, 1947, in the hope that League representatives would attend by that date and take part in the debate on "The Objectives Resolution" of Nehru. To forestall this move, the Quaid called a meeting of the Working Committee for the 24th in Karachi. The Working Committee in this meeting adopted a resolution in which it took note of the fact that the 16th May Plan had been endorsed by His Majesty's Government. However, as the Congress, the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes had repudiated the 16th May statement, the resolution asked the British Government to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and to declare that the 16th May scheme had fallen through. The resolution emphasized that in the absence of representatives of the Muslim Nation, the Constituent Assembly was merely "a rump", a body quite different from what it was originally intended to be. In a Press Conference in Karachi the Quaid exposed the game of the Congress and Nehru's assertion that there was a Cabinet form of Government at the centre and that he was its Prime Minister, "The real truth is that if he (Nehru) can only come down to earth and think coolly and calmly, he must understand that he is neither the Prime Minister nor is it a Nehru Government. He is only a Member for the External Affairs and Commonwealth Department ... Pandit Nehru and the Congress expect the Muslim League nominees or the Muslim League to act according to their orders as a subservient body. That again is an impossible position for us to accept, We cannot take orders either from the Congress or from Nehru".

Nehru declined to be moved by the march of events and by the compelling force of logic of the situation. He kept his Constituent Assembly caravan on its merry march, deriving satisfaction from the fact that it rubber-stamped his "Objectives Resolution".

An empty victory, indeed, as his political adversaries were not there to challenge his leadership.

Lord Wavell, on the other hand, felt himself caught in a storm of misgivings. He summoned Nehru on the 1st of February, and confessed to him that, in his opinion, the Constituent Assembly without the Muslim League was an empty show. On the 5th, Congress and minority representatives in the Executive Council demanded that the Viceroy should call for the resignation of the Muslim League nominees in the Central Government. On the following day, the Viceroy conveyed to Liaquat Ali Khan the views of his colleagues in the Government. Having acquainted himself fully with the situation, Liaquat Ali wrote a letter to the Viceroy on the 7th that it was preposterous for his Congress colleagues to demand their resignation, as, according to the Muslim League, the Congress had not accepted the Cabinet Mission's statement of 16th May. He charged the Congress itself of having refused to abide by the terms of the 16th May statement, and it was, therefore, presumptuous on the part of the Congress to accuse the League. Commenting on Liaquat's letter to the Viceroy issued under advice from the Quaid, Menon writes, the "Viceroy was in sympathy with the Muslim League's contention and was himself of the view that the Congress had not in fact accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan."²²³

Nehru once again wrote to the Viceroy on 13th February to call for resignations of League nominees in the Government, knowing fully well it was an uncalled for stand to take. On the 15th, Sardar Patel said in a press interview the League must quit the Government, or change its Karachi resolution. The situation was too explosive for His Majesty's Government to handle by imposing their own decision, the communal situation in the country having deteriorated to an alarming degree.

His Majesty's Government was in a serious predicament, as the Cabinet Mission Plan had failed to secure the willing acceptance of the League and Congress, and the Constituent Assembly was only tilting at windmills in the absence of League representatives. To add to their troubles, the communal situation had deteriorated so badly that Menon, who was himself a top civil servant at that time, records, "In further communal disorders, it was doubtful if' the loyalty of the Army and Services could be relied upon".²²⁴ Compelling logic of the situation had been inexorably leading the British Cabinet to think in terms of declaring a set date for the definite transfer of power in India, so that the unwanted responsibility of making decisions in the absence of a League-Congress understanding may be avoided. A decision to this effect, it was felt, would make it incumbent upon the two main parties to adjust their attitudes and to think on more definite lines of assuming responsibility for the governance of Pakistan and Hindustan.

²²³ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 336.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

With this thinking as the source of future action, Prime Minister Attlee announced on 20th February, it was a matter of regret that there were wide differences between the two parties and this had reduced the representative character of the Constituent Assembly. "The present state of uncertainty", he said, "is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take necessary steps to effect the transfer of power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948". He further made it clear that towards that end, "Preparatory measures must be put in hand in advance". Referring to the Government of India Act of 1935, under which Governments were running in India, he said the 1935 Act would soon be obsolete and, therefore, "Legislation will be introduced in due course to give effect to the final transfer of power ... His Majesty's Government will negotiate agreements in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power with representatives of those to whom they propose to transfer power". The Prime Minister expressed, "On behalf of the people of this country, we express their goodwill and good wishes towards the people of India, as they go forward to this final stage in their achievement of self-government.

The concluding part of Attlee's statement paid high tribute to Lord Wavell, who had been made Viceroy of India as "a war time appointment", but "Lord Wavell had discharged this high office during this very difficult period with devotion and a high sense of duty". Lord Wavell was now to be relieved and "His Majesty had been pleased to approve, as successor to Lord Wavell, the appointment of Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten, who will be entrusted with the task of transferring to Indian hands responsibility for the Government of British India in a manner that will best assure the future happiness and prosperity of India. The change of office will take place during March. The House will be glad to know that His Majesty has been pleased to approve the conferment of an Earldom on Viscount Wavell".

Attlee's statement was the subject matter of a full-dress debate in the House of Commons for two days. Sir Stafford Cripps said His Majesty's Government could either strengthen its hold over India or to fix a definite date and warn Indian leaders that Britain was not prepared to retain power in India beyond the fixed date-line. The latter was a wise alternative and had been approved by the Cabinet. Winston Churchill, taking part in the debate, made scathing remarks against the Constituent Assembly, which had been elected "on an inadequate and unrepresentative franchise". It was dangerous, he maintained, to hand over power to such politicians, as had no representative character. Churchill warned, "In handing over the Government of India to these so-called political classes, we are handing over to men of straw of whom in a few years no trace will remain". How wrong Churchill proved to be! Winding up the debate, Attlee said, "The dangers of delay, the dangers of hanging on, were as great as the dangers of going forward".

On the following day Lord Wavell gave separate interviews to Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan. The latter, as Finance Minister, informed the Viceroy he could not justify spending of public money on a Constituent Assembly of a complexion contrary to the one contemplated by the Cabinet Mission. Liaquat had prior consultations with the Quaid on this subject, and the Muslim League was going to adopt a tough line in order to get the maximum advantage for the Muslims out of Attlee's statement on the transfer of power in India. Asked by the Press to comment on Attlee's announcement in Parliament, the Quaid said the Muslim League was determined and would not budge an inch from its demand – establishment of Pakistan.

As an aftermath of Britain's decision on the transfer of power in India, Khizr Hayat, foreseeing the shape of things to come in the Punjab, submitted his resignation as Chief Minister on 2nd March 1947. Sir Even Jenkins, Governor of the Punjab, advised the Viceroy to place that province under Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935. But Lord Wavell decided that the leader of the Muslim League Party, the Nawab of Mamdot, should be asked to form the ministry. The Hindus and Sikhs refused to cooperate or coalesce with the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and, consequently, the Punjab came to be governed by the Governor under Section 93.

While political power in the Punjab was artificially sought to be prevented by the machinations of the Congress, the Hindus and Sikhs from being transferred from the hands of the unrepresentative Unionist Party to the Muslim League, communal frenzy was whipped up by extremists among Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab. Rioting, loot and arson were let loose on the streets of Lahore, from where their specters spread their ugly shadows to Multan, Rawalpindi, Amritsar and later on into the countryside, resulting in an orgy of bloodshed and destruction of property. To add to the difficulties of the province, low paid Government employees, who had been clamoring unsuccessfully under the Unionist Ministry for better wages, had threatened to call a province-wide strike. Political passions, communal unrest, economic discontent rode the back of India like phantoms of destruction. The situation was further aggravated by an alarming food situation and inflation, bringing in their wake economic discontent of a serious magnitude. There was unrest among factory and office workers, who could not cope with the rising spiral of prices and stationary or stagnating incomes; peasantry, traditionally docile, was showing signs of waking up to strike for its just rights, long denied to them under the old order.

How hard Congress leaders at this time were trying to prevent Pakistan from coming into being is evident from a letter that Sardar Patel wrote on 4th March to Kanji Dwarkadas, one of his friends in Bombay, "If the League insists on Pakistan, the only alternative is the division of the Punjab and Bengal. They cannot have the Punjab as a whole or Bengal ... I do not think that the British Government will agree to division. In the end, they will see the wisdom of handing over the reins of Government to the strongest party. Even if they do not ... a strong Centre with the whole of India – except

Eastern Bengal and a part of the Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan—enjoying full autonomy under the Centre will be so powerful that the remaining portions will eventually come in."²²⁵

The Working Committee of the Congress, meeting on 5th March, took stock of the situation in the country and were convinced that with the transfer of power in India by June, 1948, Pakistan had become inevitable and inescapable. In one of its resolutions, the Working Committee, while condemning communal riots in the Punjab, called for the division of the Punjab and Bengal. On the same day, Nehru as President of the Congress, in a press statement justified the Congress stand on the division of the Punjab and Bengal as the only way to permanently tackle the communal problem in these two provinces, and said that division of Bengal and the Punjab would once for all separate Muslims from non-Muslims in the two provinces and put an end to communal riots there.

But a peep into the real intentions of the Congress is revealed by a personal letter that Sardar Patel wrote to a member of the Congress Working Committee, a portion from which has been quoted above. Nehru was, however, less emphatic against Pakistan, for, in a letter to Gandhi, he wrote, "About our proposal to divide the Punjab, this flows naturally from our previous decisions. These were negative previously, but now the time for a decision has come, and merely passing resolutions and giving expression to our views, means little. I feel convinced and so did most members of the Working Committee that we must press for this immediate division so that reality might be brought into the picture. Indeed, this is the only answer to partition as demanded by Jinnah". Years later, commenting on Nehru's stand on the division of the Punjab and Bengal, Penderal Moon, wrote it seemed as if a "Curse" weighed heavily on Nehru and his colleagues. In a mood of black despair, despondency and dejection Nehru and his friends acted "in such a way as to bring about exactly the opposite result to that which they intended. They passionately desired to preserve the Unity of India. They consistently acted so as to make its partition certain."²²⁶

Liaquat Ali Khan was presenting his first Budget as Finance Minister in March in the Central Assembly. Under proposals for new taxation, Liaquat had proposed a business profits tax of seventy-five percent on all incomes over rupees one hundred thousand. Hindu big business, which dictated Congress economic policies behind the scenes, was up in revolt against the proposed tax. It was made a communal issue, alleging it was designed to hit Hindu businessmen, few Muslims being in big business. Strangely, Nehru, who was known for his socialist leanings, lent his full support to those who were opposed to Liaquat's socialist budget. Nehru approached Lord Wavell, remonstrated against the increased business tax and requested the Viceroy to intervene

²²⁵ *Mahatma—Gandhi—The Last Phase*, Vol. II, p. 83, 1958, by Pyarelal.

²²⁶ *Divide and Quit*, by Penderal Moon.

and force the Finance Minister to withdraw it. The deadlock, however, continued until Lord Mountbatten resolved it towards the end of March, when a few days were left for the budget to be finally passed. Liaquat agreed to a compromise formula under which the incidence of tax was considerably reduced. Alan Campbell-Johnson writes Mountbatten had three hours' discussion with Nehru and two with Liaquat, whose budget "has put the Congress into the invidious position of being called upon to protect its big business supporters and of seeking relief for them apparently at the expense of its own progressive and equalitarian declaration".²²⁷ Commenting on Liaquat's Budget, Leonard Mosley writes, "Liaquat's budget had heavily soaked the millionaire backers of the Congress and showed up the hypocrisy of the Party's claim to be socialists".²²⁸

The issue of a United India versus Pakistan had divided the loyalty of Government servants, who were conspicuous in their thousands in public meetings addressed by Congress or League leaders. Impartiality of the administrative machinery, normally the backbone of stability and order, had been badly shaken, and Menon writes, "Even some members of the services, at least in the upper levels, had given up their traditional loyalty and impartiality and begun openly to take sides in the political controversy".²²⁹

Recalling the trend of Indian politics at this period, the Aga Khan writes, "That sense of spiritual unity and of continuity, which in my youth and long before had sustained British rule in India and had given its moral fiber and backbone as well as its outward manifestations of efficiency and thoroughness, was now finally sapped."²³⁰ To add to the difficulties of the British, the strength of the British officers in the civil administration was fast diminishing. They were not slow to read the writing on the wall; they realized the days of the British Indian Empire were numbered. Their main concern was to leave India, the only question was whether one wanted to leave immediately or after a short while. At this period of twilight of the British in India, there were less than 2,000 British officers in the Indian Civil Service. With this depleted strength, a nation of four hundred millions could no longer be kept in political subjugation. The chains of India's political slavery were in the process of snapping.

These were the conditions when Lord Mountbatten took over as Viceroy from Lord Wavell on 24th March 1947, charged with the task of handing over power in India by June 1948. On the occasion of his swearing-in ceremony, he said, "I am under no illusion of the difficulty of my task".

One of his first acts as Viceroy was to have free and frank discussions with Jinnah and Gandhi. As a first practical outcome of Mountbatten's efforts, the two leaders signed a joint appeal to Muslims and Hindus to stop communal riots that had blackened the

²²⁷ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 43, 1951: Robert Hale Ltd., London.

²²⁸ *The Last Days of the British Raj*, by Leonard Mosley.

²²⁹ *The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon, p. 348.

²³⁰ *The Memoirs of the Aga Khan*, p. 288.

pages of India's communal history. The joint appeal denounced substituting violence in place of political and constitutional agitation. Unfortunately, tempers were running so high that the appeal did not bring about the desired transformation.

Within a short time after assumption of office, Lord Mountbatten discovered it was impossible to keep intact Indian unity by the slender thread of a unitary form of Government and that such an arrangement, being artificial, would snap under the stress and strain of the realities of the situation. He, therefore, set about evolving an alternate plan according to which authority was to be handed over to the provinces or to a federation of provinces, provided it was to be willingly formed. However, the Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal would sit in two parts, Muslim section and non-Muslim section, and if both the sections agreed separately to divide their provinces into two, it would be accepted as the will of that province? If Bengal was to be partitioned, the Muslim district of Sylhet in Assam would be given the right to opt for Pakistan, if it so decided. In the North-West Frontier a referendum would be held to ascertain the views of the people of that province on the question of Partition. The Viceroy elaborated his new plan in a meeting of the provincial Governors. The Governors of the Punjab and Bengal expressed strong disapproval on the division of their provinces. But what concerned Lord Mountbatten most was how to bring about transfer of power with the willing consent of the League and the Congress, particularly as he had personally ascertained that Jinnah would never agree to any plan, which did not concede the division of India into two parts – Pakistan and Hindustan.

When Mountbatten called Sardar Patel for a discussion on 26th March, Campbell-Johnson reports, "His (Patel's) approach to the whole problem was clear and decisive. India must get rid of the Moslem League."²³¹ Yes, Patel, the strong man of the Congress, would like to get rid of the Muslim League; the strong men among communalist Hindus would wish death to all the one hundred million Muslims of India. Such was the mood of anti-League forces at the time; so powerful had that organization become under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam.

To counteract the Congress move for the partition of Bengal and the Punjab, Jinnah issued a press statement that it was "A sinister move actuated in spite and bitterness". He protested if the principle of splitting these two provinces was accepted, then all other provinces would have to be similarly dealt with. In the end, the Quaid insisted that the Defence Forces and stores should be equitably distributed between Pakistan and Hindustan, so that no semblance of any tie should remain between the two independent countries. Congress leaders like Babu Rajendra Prasad retorted that partition of Muslim majority provinces was inherent in the Lahore Resolution of 23rd March 1940, on which the claim for Pakistan was based. The Sikhs jumped into the fray and demanded a separate homeland, "Khalistan", in the Punjab. Muslims in the

²³¹ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Allan Campbell-Johnson, p. 46

United Provinces and Bombay retaliated by demanding certain areas in those provinces as Muslim homelands.

The Muslim League had strengthened its position with the Muslims in the Frontier, where Dr. Khan Saheb, the Chief Minister, had clapped hundreds of Muslim League leaders and workers in jail. But the brave Muslims of the Frontier, undeterred, kept up an unrelenting opposition to the Congress ministry in the Frontier. Mountbatten called Sir Olaf Caroe, the Governor, and Dr. Khan Saheb to Delhi for consultations, as a result of which the Frontier Government decided to release all political prisoners, not charged with acts of violence. The League detenus, however refused to accept their freedom, until the Congress ministry, which was unrepresentative of the peoples of the Frontier, had resigned. This compelled the Viceroy to personally visit the Frontier Province, as trouble had spread to the tribal areas, and the situation was explosive. Muslim League agitation, however, continued in full force in spite of the efforts of Mountbatten.

Lord Mountbatten was constantly in conference with Indian political leaders in order to find a way out so as to effect a peaceful and early transfer of power. In this connection he had a meeting with Quaid-e-Azam on 5th April. It was a long drawn out battle of disarming charm and persuasion of the Viceroy on the one hand, and the cold-blooded logic of the situation as expounded by the Quaid. Campbell-Johnson, recalling this interview, writes that Mountbatten's first reaction after Jinnah left, was "My God, he was cold. It took most of the interview to unfreeze him".²³² Quaid-e-Azam's reaction about the Viceroy was no less uncomplimentary. He is understood to have told his Secretary after his interview with Mountbatten. "The Viceroy does not understand."²³³ On the following evening the Viceroy invited the Quaid and his sister Miss Fatima Jinnah, to dinner at Viceregal Lodge. Campbell-Johnson writes about this dinner, the Quaid took pains to explain to Mountbatten about the justice of the Muslim case for Pakistan. The Quaid protested, "The Congress want to inherit everything, they would even accept Dominion Status to deprive me of Pakistan."²³⁴

Dismayed by the overall situation in the country, particularly in the Frontier, Lord Mountbatten sent on 2nd May his own plan to London, with Lord Ismay and George Abell as his emissaries, who handed over the Viceroy's note to Lord Listowel, who had succeeded Lord Pethick-Lawrence as Secretary of State for India. The Viceroy asked for its approval by 10th May, so that he could call a meeting of all leaders a week thereafter and endeavor to obtain their approval. But if no agreement was possible in that conference, His Majesty's Government would decide its own course of action on the question of transfer of power. While the Viceroy's emissaries were in London on this secret mission, Nehru and Krishna Memon, in response to the Viceroy's invitation, came to Simla on the 8th to stay as his guests at the Viceregal Lodge. V.P. Menon reports he

²³² *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 56.

²³³ *Jawaharlal Nehru*, by Frank Moraes, p. 332, 1956: The MacMillan Co., New York.

²³⁴ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, pp. 57 and 58.

had a talk there with Nehru, who "was not averse to the proposed transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status". It can thus be seen that Nehru, even at that stage of Indian politics, was prepared to give up complete independence, so long as establishment of Pakistan could be prevented. For, Menon writes, "I pointed out (to Nehru) that if the transfer of power took place on the basis of Dominion Status, it would enable the Congress to have at one and the same time a strong Central Government, which, of course, would have been the negation of Pakistan".²³⁵

Coincidentally, on that very day Lord Ismay returned from London with a final plan given to him by the British Cabinet to be handed over personally to Mountbatten. The Viceroy immediately issued invitations to Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh to meet him in Delhi on the morning of the 17th. Strange as it may seem, while he kept the contents of the Plan secret from the Quaid, Lord Mountbatten on the night of the 10th "Showed Nehru the plan «as he had received it from London".²³⁶ Nehru emphatically rejected the plan, saying the Congress would have nothing to do with it. The new plan brought by Lord Ismay envisaged breaking up India into several units; it rejected the idea of a United India, and gave option to successor States to unite with two or more sovereign States. There was also little hope of the Quaid accepting the scheme, as it stood, and at this stage V.P. Menon, one of the senior Indian Civil Servants and on the staff of the Viceroy, persuaded Mountbatten to accept a scheme devised by Menon as an alternative, as he believed, "My personal view was that it was better that the country should be divided, rather than it should gravitate towards civil war".²³⁷ Menon had prepared a draft known as "Heads of Agreement," consisting of eight parts, and Campbell-Johnson called it "A bold effort to get round the difficulty of the leaders refusing to take the full burden of unpopular decision."²³⁸ It envisaged Dominion Status as an interim arrangement, and power to be thereafter transferred to one or two successor sovereign States, which would be decided after "ascertaining the wishes of the people whether there should be a division of India or not. In case there were to be two States, the Governor-General would be common to both the States, but a commission would demarcate boundaries in case of partition. Under one of its Heads, the proposal sought the division of India's existing Armed Forces on the territorial basis of recruitment, to be placed under the full control of the respective Governments."

Lord Mountbatten again invited Quaid-e-Azam for discussions and threw a gentle threat that in case of refusal by the League to accept the plan, Britain would be compelled to transfer power to one Interim Government on the basis of Dominion Status. The Quaid remained firm in his demand for two independent and sovereign successor States, and Campbell-Johnson calls Quaid's reaction as being certainly shrewd, "The *ballon de essai* had gone up and down again, providing only the evidence

²³⁵ The quotations are from "The Transfer of Power in India", by V. P. Menon, pp. 359-360.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 361.

²³⁷ The quotations are from "The Transfer of Power in India", by V. P. Menon, pp. 359-360.

²³⁸ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p, 92.

that Jinnah has a very steady nerve. Mountbatten feels that Jinnah is well aware of his potency as a martyr butchered by the British on the Congress altar".²³⁹

Having ascertained the reactions of League and Congress leaders to the proposals sent by His Majesty's Government, Mountbatten left on the 18th for London, in order to personally discuss the Indian situation with the British Cabinet and to suggest fresh moves he thought best suited to resolve the deadlock. He took with him V.P. Menon, and Campbell-Johnson, commenting on Menon's accompanying the Viceroy, writes, "V.P. (Menon), after all his efforts at Simla, is now in the ascendant and enjoys Mountbatten's complete confidence".²⁴⁰ Many years after these events, Menon discloses in his book, "I was keeping Vallabhai Patel informed of the developments in Simla and he was delighted by the turn of events. He assured me that there would be no difficulty in the Congress accepting Dominion Status". And this gentleman, who kept the Congress leaders informed of inner developments, was going with the Viceroy to London as his adviser at a crucial and delicate stage of negotiations between His Majesty's Government on the one hand and the Congress on the other.

During his talks in London, Mountbatten kept the Quaid and Nehru informed through his emissaries in Delhi as to how the final plan was being evolved in those vital discussions.

It was at this time that Quaid-e-Azam, in an interview to *Reuters* correspondent on 22nd May, demanded it was vital that a "Corridor" across Hindustan be allowed to link what were going to be the two wings of Pakistan—East Pakistan and West Pakistan, and Campbell-Johnson wrote, "The technique of releasing it seems to have been copied from Stalin."²⁴¹ The demand for a "Corridor" brought forth sharp and caustic comments from the Congress and Hindu press. Nehru called it "a fantastic and absurd demand", and the *Hindustan Times* wrote, "If the existence of Pakistan is dependent on the 'Corridor', it (Pakistan) will never come into being". Raiendra Prasad said. "Jinnah's demand will not merit a moment's scrutiny." *Dawn*, the official daily of the Muslim League, commented in an editorial, "Cranks A", that the demand for a corridor was not a new one, "Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah has many times in the past raised that point which is so vital in the context of Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be real, solid and strong the creation of a corridor linking up its Eastern and Northern areas is an indispensable adjunct. Be that as it may, we have no doubt, however, that if Muslims can win Pakistan—as indeed they have already won it—they can just as well build a corridor somewhere for the linking up of the two segments of Pakistan".

In the meantime, the Viceroy completed his talks with His Majesty's Government and was on his way back to India, reaching Delhi on 31st May. Mountbatten requested the

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

²⁴⁰ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 94.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

League and the Congress to nominate three representatives each to meet him on 2nd June at the Viceroy's House in New Delhi, and at the same time he invited Sardar Baldev Singh to this conference, as representative of the Sikhs. Muslim League was represented by Quaid-e-Azam; Liaquat Ali Khan, and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar; the Congress by Nehru, Patel and Acharya Kirpalani, the Congress President. These seven were closeted with the Viceroy on that eventful day to take decisions which were to decide the fate of India. The Viceroy confessed it was an extremely difficult task to bring about unity of thought and action, when, on the one hand, Congress was opposed to Partition of India, although it agreed that Muslim majority areas cannot be forced against their will, and on the other hand, Jinnah wanted the division of India, but was not prepared for the division of the provinces. He informed the seven leaders what he was placing before them had not only the approval of His Majesty's Government but also of the opposition in Parliament, including Winston Churchill. The plan approved by His Majesty's Government accepted the principle of partition, details for which were to be found in consultation with the League and the Congress. Power would be transferred to two States with full and unfettered Dominion Status and with the right to secede from the Commonwealth. In view of recent developments in India, it was agreed to advance the date for the transfer of power from June 1948 to 15th August 1947. The wishes of the citizens of Calcutta were not to be ascertained whether they wanted to join Pakistan or not, but that it would be a city in Hindustan. The India Office would be abolished. Representatives of Muslim majority districts in Bengal and the Punjab Assemblies would decide for themselves whether they wish the constitution to be framed by the existing Constituent Assembly or by a new and separate Constituent Assembly; and Muslim and non-Muslim members of these Assemblies would sit separately and decide whether or not the province should be partitioned. The Sindh Assembly would take its own decision on this question. In the Frontier there would be a referendum to decide the issue, while the Governor-General would devise a plan for the same purpose for British Baluchistan. In case of partition being decided upon, there would be held a referendum, in the Sylhet district of Assam, whether it wanted to accede to Pakistan or to Hindustan. If it was agreed, in accordance with the procedure above laid, that there should be partition of India and also partition of Bengal and the Punjab, then a Boundary Commission would be set up to demarcate boundaries for this purpose, in order to determine the final geographical shape and extent of Pakistan and Hindustan. In so far as the Indian States were concerned, "The Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May 1946 remains unchanged". His Majesty's Government had decided, in deference to the desire for immediate transfer of power, to "anticipate the date of June 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting up of an independent Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier date." The plan had an Appendix, which named what were considered to be, in accordance with the Indian census of 1941, Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal. In the end the Viceroy said, although he trusted the word of the seven eminent leaders present, he would be glad to receive their final decisions by midnight, after they had consulted their Working Committees.

Quaid-e-Azam said he was hopeful of a favorable decision, but would not like to pre-determine the issue. In any case he would go to his "Masters, the People" and for this purpose he would have to consult the Council of the All-India Muslim League. Nehru agreed to communicate the views of the Congress by midnight.

Commenting on the adroit manner in which Quaid-e-Azam carried on negotiations at this period of history on behalf of the Muslims, the Aga Khan writes, "Meanwhile, 1947 was India's year of destiny ... Now Jinnah saw his chance and took it resolutely and unflinchingly. He announced his conditional acceptance of the British scheme. In that one decision, combining as it did sagacity, shrewdness, and unequalled political *flair*, he justified—I am convinced—my claim that he was the most remarkable of all the great statesmen that I have known. It put him on a level with Bismark."²⁴²

Mountbatten informed the leaders that he would record a world-wide broadcast from Delhi Station, to be relayed from Delhi, London and New York simultaneously, and requested Quaid-e-Azam and Nehru also to address the peoples of India, assuring their personal acceptance of the plan and that they would do their best to obtain its acceptance by their respective organizations. Both the leaders agreed to do so.

The Congress Working Committee met the same day and resolved to accept the plan, a letter to that effect was sent by the Congress President, Kirpalani, to the Viceroy. This acceptance had a proviso, "This is dependent on the acceptance of the proposals by the Muslim League and a clear understanding that no further claims will be put forward".

A meeting of the Working Committee of the League discussed the declaration of His Majesty's Government, as communicated to their representatives by the Viceroy. The Working Committee, after having discussed the scheme at great length, decided to name Karachi as the Capital of the State of Pakistan, indicating that the final acceptance of the Plan by the Council of the League was now only a matter of formality.

In an interview with the Viceroy that night, Quaid-e-Azam told the Viceroy that while his Working Committee were hopeful that the Council of the League would accept the plan, yet they could not speak on its behalf. He was, however, calling a meeting of the Council within a week and asked the Viceroy to await the decision of the Council. Mountbatten did not agree, as he was apprehensive that a week's delay may endanger full and final acceptance of the plan. As a compromise, the Viceroy suggested he would inform the leaders in the meeting which was to be held the next day that he was satisfied with the assurance Jinnah had given him, and that on this, the Quaid should move his head in token of his assent. Quaid-e-Azam agreed to this.

²⁴² *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, by the Aga Khan, pp. 298-299.

On 3rd June morning, the Viceroy was once again in conference with the seven leaders, informing them that Congress and the Sikhs had given their consent in writing, and that Jinnah had given a verbal assurance on behalf of the Muslim League. At this point of his talk with the leaders, the Viceroy turned towards Quaid-e-Azam, and Campbell-Johnson writes, "Jinnah confirmed this by the appropriate silence and nod of the head".²⁴³ At the conclusion of the Conference, Mountbatten announced that an official announcement of the acceptance of the plan would be made by him and by the two leaders, Jinnah and Nehru, that evening in a radio broadcast.

Mountbatten had communicated to the Secretary of State for India that he was satisfied with his talks with Indian leaders, and that the League and the Congress would accept the plan-Attlee lost no time in informing the House of Commons on 3rd June 1947 the contents of His Majesty's plan for the final transfer of power to India, and it is for this reason that it came to be known as "The 3rd June Plan". That same night Attlee spoke to his nation in a radio broadcast. "As the Indian leaders have finally failed to agree on the Cabinet Mission's Plan for a United India, partition becomes the inevitable alternative". These words were an indirect, but undying, tribute to the skilful manner in which Quaid-e-Azam had conducted all negotiations with the Congress and His Majesty's Government. Had he yielded, or compromised, or faltered, a United India would have been imposed on Muslims, sounding the death-knell of their demand for Pakistan.

The Delhi Station of All-India Radio was agog with excitement. There was Mountbatten to announce on behalf of His Majesty's Government what Churchill in his inimitable style had termed a few years earlier as the impending liquidation of the British Empire in India. Mountbatten spoke with poise and dignity, and millions that heard him all over India realized that the end of a long drawn-out struggle for independence was now in sight, as he declared in unequivocal terms that power would be definitely transferred by the British to two successor sovereign States. The Viceroy concluded his broadcast with the words, "I have faith in the future of India and I am proud to be with you all at this momentous time. May your decisions be wisely guided and may they be carried out in the peaceful and friendly spirit of the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal". Then followed Nehru, who in a solemn voice announced the Congress had accepted the Plan for India's independence, as set out in His Majesty's Plan announced by the Viceroy. Recalling India's struggle for freedom, now that freedom was near at hand, he said, "We are little men, serving great causes; but because the cause is great, something of that greatness fall upon us also". Nehru said he and his colleagues did not like that India be vivisected. But they had finally come to the conclusion that it was better to perform a surgical operation than to allow India to bleed continuously. Now it was Quaid-e-Azam, who was addressing the Muslim Nation. His first sentence on this historic occasion was, "I am glad that I am offered an opportunity to speak to you directly through this radio from Delhi". Regarding the Plan for the transfer of power to the

²⁴³ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 103.

peoples of India, he said they had to take momentous decisions and handle grave issues, "Therefore, we must galvanize and concentrate all our energy to see that the transfer of power is effected in a peaceful and orderly manner". In this, his finest hour, he was meek and humble, I pray to God that at this critical moment. He may guide us and enable us to discharge our responsibilities in a wise and statesmanlike manner". Referring to the Plan, he said it did not meet the point of view of the Muslim League in some important aspects, and he would, therefore, not say that he was satisfied with it. He had summoned a meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League on the 9th, and he would not, he said, wish to prejudge the issue. He then paid compliments to the Viceroy, who, "has battled against various forces very bravely and the impression he has left on my mind is that he was actuated by a high sense of fairness and impartiality". He did not forget to pay his tribute to those that had suffered and sacrificed in the struggle for Pakistan. "I cannot but express my appreciation of the sufferings and sacrifices made by all classes of Musalmans". He gave wholehearted credit for "the great part the women of the Frontier played in the fight for our civil liberties". He did not forget those who had died or suffered in the struggle for Pakistan, I deeply sympathies with all those who have suffered and those who died or whose properties were subjected to destruction". He finished reading the prepared text of his momentous address to the Muslim Nation on this historic occasion. He took the typed script in his hands; was silent for a few seconds; and, then, his voice sent through the ether to Muslims all over the sub-continent those two words which had been the rallying ground for Muslims for the last many years—two words that had been the symbol and slogan of their fight for freedom—words that had made them brave, suffering sacrifice, even death with a smile.

Quaid-e-Azam ended his memorable speech by saying, extemporaneously, "*Pakistan Zindabad*".

THE BIRTH OF A NATION

The day following the broadcast by the three leaders, Mountbatten addressed a press conference, in which the question put by Devdas Gandhi gave indication that his father, Gandhi, was not willing to accept partition, although the other Congress leaders had given their approval to it. The Viceroy invited Gandhi to the Viceregal House and the two had detailed discussions over the creation of Pakistan as a sovereign State. Thereafter, that evening Gandhi, in a chastened mood, told his prayer meeting, "The British Government is not responsible for partition. The Viceroy has no hand in it. In fact he is as opposed to division as Congress itself, but if both of us—Hindus and Muslims—cannot agree on anything else, then the Viceroy is left with no choice".

But the atmosphere in Delhi was surcharged with antagonism against Pakistan. Even at that late hour, a section of Hindus would have wished to strangulate Pakistan before it was born. Campbell-Johnson writes. "The Plan, now 48 hours old, has undoubtedly led to a detente throughout the country as a whole, but among the leaders in Delhi it had noticed no brotherly love. The situation here is still very tense, and is such that the most trivial incident could touch off a major crisis".²⁴⁴

Quaid-e-Azam convened a meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League to decide upon its attitude to the 3rd June Plan. The meeting of the Council was held on 9th June in the ball-room of the Imperial Hotel in Delhi. It was a fateful meeting, the last to be held by the Council in India in its life extending over forty years. Quaid-e-Azam presided over it, as he had done over almost all the meetings of the Council, for the last so many years. He was not only its President, but well and truly its friend, philosopher and guide. After the Quaid had introduced the subject at some length, and after some important members had explained the resolution of the Working Committee concerning the Plan, the Council took a decision endorsing the Working Committee resolution on the subject. It expressed satisfaction that the Cabinet Mission Plan had, after all, been abandoned. On the question of partition of Bengal and the Punjab, the resolution did not express a firm opinion in favor or against, but said it had to consider the 3rd June Plan for the transfer of power as a whole. The concluding part of the resolution gave full powers to Quaid-e-Azam to accept, as a compromise, the principles underlying the plan.

As the meeting was about to conclude, there were heard shouts and anti-League and anti-Jinnah slogans outside the hall. I was one of those that rushed out to see what it was all about. We soon learnt that some Khaksars, an organization headed by Inayatullah Mashraqui, had stormed the Imperial Hotel, armed with their *belchas* or

²⁴⁴ Mission with Mountbatten, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 113.

spades, a symbol of the Khaksars. They were trying to rush up the stairway, where they were challenged by the National Guards of the Muslim League. Fists, sticks and *belchas* were freely used, and the stairway and the lobbies were loud with slogans and counter-slogans, and clash of stick upon stick, of metal upon metal. Just then the police appeared on the scene, fired a few teargas shells, and instantly the intruding Khaksars, intent on mischief, turned tail and retreated from the Imperial Hotel, During all this period, Quaid-e-Azam sat on the dais, composed, unafraid. Campbell-Johnson wrote that day in his diary, "Jinnah behaved with great composure. Sidney Smith of the *Daily Express* saw him afterwards, and told me that Jinnah had no doubt but that the assault was an attempt on his life. The only previous attempt to assassinate him – in Bombay in 1943 – was made by a Khaksar"²⁴⁵

The Congress decided that Mountbatten should stay on in India, even after 15th August, as Governor-General, while Quaid-e-Azam wanted there should be three Governor-Generals – one for India, one for Pakistan and Lord Mountbatten as Supreme Arbitrator, who could intervene in case of dispute between Pakistan and India over distribution of assets between the two Dominions. His Majesty's Government was in no mood to accept Quaid's proposal.

With Pakistan now round the corner, Nehru and his Congress colleagues began to intrigue against the continuation in office by Muslim League nominees in the interim Government. In his private talks with the Viceroy, Quaid-e-Azam was very firm on this point, and threatened that the League would withdraw its acceptance of the 3rd June Plan, if Mountbatten yielded to Congress pressure on this question. The Viceroy, against the advice of the Congress members in the interim Government, and as a compromise, decided that all controversial issues should be left in abeyance for the transition period. But the Congress would not give up its intrigues. Now they brought Gandhi into the picture, who wrote to the Viceroy on 10th June, "The sooner you have a homogenous Ministry the better ... The attempt to please all parties is a fruitless and thankless task". The Quaid, single-handed fought all the machinations of Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and others. Once again, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy on 28th June, "You said that Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and League members were equally in the right with the Congress members and that possibly Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah was more so. I suggest that this is not humanly possible". Referring to the Viceroy's statement in one of his letters to Gandhi that the Quaid had made it clear the League would withdraw its approval of the 3rd June Plan in case Mountbatten agreed to the demand of the Congress and thus made it impossible for the transfer of power on 15th August, Gandhi wrote, "This was for me a startling statement.

You startled me again by telling me that if the partition had not been made during British occupation, the Hindus being the major party would have never allowed

²⁴⁵ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Allan Campbell-Johnson, p. 116.

partition and held the Muslims by force under subjection. I told you this was a great mistake".²⁴⁶ Gandhi went on to condemn partition of India as a mistake. It was obvious that while the Congress was maintaining acceptance of the 3rd June Plan on the surface, its guide, philosopher and saint was waging a last ditch battle to get the idea of Pakistan annulled.

Towards the end of June, Congress increased its pressure tactics to get the Muslim League out of the interim Government, and went to the extent of threatening the Viceroy with their resignations, in case he did not oblige them. At about the same time, the Muslim League decided that Quaid-e-Azam would be the first Governor-General of Pakistan. On this Mountbatten informed the Quaid that he was now free to reconstitute his interim Government. Quaid-e-Azam was not to be daunted and made it clear to Mountbatten it would be an affront to the League. He further objected to the Viceroy's move for reconstituting the interim Government on the ground that it would be *ultra vires* of the Government of India Act of 1935. The Viceroy sought legal advice from London on the constitutional objection raised by Quaid-e-Azam; the objection of the Quaid was upheld in London and Mountbatten was prevented from reconstituting his interim Government. Pyarelal writes, "It gave Lord Mountbatten some respite but left Congress High Command with their headache worse than ever."²⁴⁷

As soon as it was finally agreed that partition of India was to be effected by 15th August on the basis of the 3rd June Plan, His Majesty's Government was busy framing the Indian Independence Bill to be placed before British Parliament for approval. The Bill consisted of twenty clauses and three schedules, its draft being shown to the Muslim League and Congress leaders in advance.. Quaid-e-Azam after studying it gave his amendments and suggestions to the Viceroy, which along with those of the Congress, were sent to London by the Viceroy. The Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on 4th July, gave to the legislatures of the two Dominions complete independence, and these legislatures in fact, were to be the Constituent Assemblies of their respective Dominions. Until the Constituent Assembly of a Dominion made any constitutional provisions, the Government of India Act of 1935, as adapted and modified, would continue to govern each Dominion. The Bill was passed on 15th July; was adopted by the House of Lords on the 16th; and received Royal Assent on the 18th.

Towards the middle of June, Gandhi and Nehru appeared to have taken private consultations with Mountbatten on the question of accession by the State of Kashmir. According to Campbell-Johnson, "Nehru, himself descended from Kashmiri Brahmins, has been pressing to visit the State himself ... Gandhi's view was that he himself ought to prepare the way for Nehru."²⁴⁸ The Maharajah of Kashmir, however, emphatically declared he would not allow Gandhi or Nehru to visit Kashmir, and in the third week

²⁴⁶ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 290.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

²⁴⁸ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 120.

of June, Lord Mountbatten himself went on a visit to Kashmir to see the Maharaja. In the light of subsequent events, this visit proved to be of great significance. Campbell-Johnson would have us believe, "Mountbatten on these occasions urged him and his Prime Minister, Pandit Kak, not to make any declaration of independence, but to find out in one way or another the will of the people of Kashmir as soon as possible, and to announce their intention by 14th August to send representatives accordingly to one Constituent Assembly or the other."²⁴⁹ The people of Kashmir were never consulted, and, if one may anticipate events, its non-compliance was to result in untold sufferings for the peoples of Kashmir, making that State one of the world's trouble-spots.

Momentous decisions had to be taken on various important questions that were inevitably interlinked with the problem of partition. A Partition Committee was set up to tackle them, and it included Quaid-e-Azam and members of the interim Government as its members. The Partition Committee met for the first time on 27th June, under the Chairmanship of Mountbatten. At first it was suggested that the question of boundary demarcation be given to the United Nations; but this suggestion was opposed on the ground that it would entail long delays. Nehru suggested that, in accordance with Section 4 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, a Boundary Commission be set up to demarcate boundaries, taking into account contiguity of Muslim and non-Muslim areas with Pakistan or Hindustan, and in doing so the Commission should "take account of other factors". This proposal was accepted, according to Campbell-Johnson, "It (the Partition Committee) accepted with surprising speed and unanimity Jinnah's proposal that Sir Cyril Radcliffe should be invited to serve as Chairman of the Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions, with the casting vote on both".²⁵⁰ The League and Congress would each nominate two High Court Judges as their respective representatives on the two Boundary Commissions. Thus with two votes each for the League and the Congress on the two Commissions, the final decision came to be vested in the hands of Cyril Radcliffe, in case of disagreement. This was to result in great detriment to Muslim interests as the final reports of the Commissions were to prove.

The Muslim League nominated Justice Abu Saleh Mohammad Akram and Justice S.A. Rehman as their representatives on the Bengal Boundary Commission; and Justice Din Mohammad and Justice Mohammad Munir on the Punjab Commission.

Sir Cyril Radcliffe submitted the Report of the Punjab Commission to the Viceroy on 12th August, saying as there was no agreement among the members of the Commission, they "at the close of our discussions, assented to the conclusion that I must proceed to give my own decision. This I now proceed to do," Radcliffe then discusses rival claims over disputed territories and then adjudicated, "I have hesitated long over those not inconsiderable areas east of the Sutlej River and in the angle of the Bias and

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

Sutlej River in which Muslim majorities are found. But on the whole I have come to the conclusion that it would be in the interests of neither State to extend the territories of the West Punjab to strip on the far side of the Sutlej and that there are factors such as the disruption of railways, communications and water systems that ought in this instance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities". The report was appended with an annexure. By this report, now known as the Radcliffe Award, Pakistan lost the following districts and areas of the Punjab, which had Muslim majorities — Urdaspur District, Anjala Tehsil of Amritsar District, Hoshiarpur Tehsil, Dasuya Tehsil, Nakodar Tehsil, Jullundur Tehsil, Ferozpur Tehsil, Bira Tehsil, and a part of Kasur in Lahore District. All these were sacrificed by the Radcliffe Award on the considerations best known to the Chairman of the Boundary Commission, who, anticipating severe condemnation of his Award by Muslims, confessed in the last para of his report, "I am conscious too that the award cannot go far towards satisfying sentiments and aspirations deeply held on either side but directly in conflict as to their bearing on the placing of the boundary. If means are to be found to gratify to the full those sentiments and aspirations, I think that they must be found in political arrangements with which I am not concerned, and not in the decision of a boundary line drawn under the terms of reference of that Commission".

The course of future events was to demonstrate the mischief inherent in the division of the Punjab, as decided upon by Radcliffe. How absurd and unjust it would be to divide that province was shown by an Englishman, Penderel Moon, who appears to have had a foreboding in 1943 of the shape of things to come. For, he wrote "Yet if Pakistan is to be created, it seems absolutely necessary to include the Sikhs in it. To exclude them would mean drawing the boundary between Pakistan and the rest of India somewhere in the middle of the Punjab; and this seems impossible. Geographically, economically, racially and linguistically the central Punjab is one. Any boundary bisecting it in the middle would be wholly artificial; it would sunder a long and closely integrated society and cut across road, railway and canal system in an awkward, if not impossible manner. It might possibly serve as a dividing line between the units of a single Federated State, but not as the frontier between two independent National States".²⁵¹

In the same way, under the pretext of lack of unanimity, Radcliffe gave his award in the case of Bengal and Sylhet, submitting it to the Viceroy on 13th August. The Award included an annexure. It denied Muslims the important city of Calcutta, to which Muslims had a serious and genuine claim.

In the meantime, the Partition Council continued to meet and it agreed, as a compromise, that predominantly Muslim units of the Armed Forces would be transferred to Pakistan, and the non-Muslim units to Hindustan. It was, however, further agreed that the administration of the Armed Forces would be under the unified

²⁵¹ The Future of India, by Penderel Moon, 1943, p. 30: Pilot Press, London.

control of Field Marshal Auchinleck, until the process of division and distribution of army personnel, etc., was completed. A Joint Defence Council would be set up, consisting of the two Governors-General and the two Defence Ministers, and Auchinleck was to work under the control of the Defence Council as Supreme Commander; each of the two Dominions was to have its own Commander-in-Chief.

The transfer of power in accordance with the 3rd June Plan necessitated taking decisions on many important details—verdict of the provinces; legislation essential for the transitory period; division of armed forces and military equipment; allocation to the Dominions on an equitable basis of the assets and liabilities of United India; drawing up of boundaries in areas under dispute, so as to clearly demarcate the two States. And all this had to be done between the day the radio broadcast was made by the Quaid and other leaders and the final day for the transfer of power, 15th August 1947. Accordingly, the Bengal Legislative Assembly, meeting on 20th June, resolved by 126 votes to 90 to join a new Constituent Assembly. This was followed by a meeting of the M.L.As. from non-Muslim majority areas in which it was decided by 58 votes to 21 that Bengal be divided and that West Bengal representatives should collaborate with the existing Constituent Assembly. In a similar meeting of M.L.As. of Muslim majority areas a decision was taken by 106 votes to 35 that Bengal be divided into two and that East Bengal should coalesce with the new Constituent Assembly.)t was also decided in this meeting that the district of Sylhet in Assam, a Muslim majority area and contiguous with East Bengal, should be merged with the new province of East Bengal.

Due to the tense situation in the province, as a result of communal riots, the Punjab Assembly met under a heavy police guard and under strict security measures. It resolved by 91 votes to 77 that the Punjab should join the new Constituent Assembly. In a meeting held subsequently by the Muslim M.L.As., they decided by 69 votes to 27 that the Punjab should continue to remain intact and the proposal for the partition of that province into two parts be rejected. On the contrary, when the non-Muslim M.L.As. met, they decided by 50 votes to 22 that the Punjab be partitioned, and that East Punjab should join the existing Constituent Assembly. Supporters of both the points of view greeted the final but differing two decisions with acclamation in their respective meetings.

In Sindh, the Muslim League party had an absolute majority, and, therefore, when the Sindh Legislative Assembly met on 26th June, it resolved by 30 votes to 20 to join the new Constituent Assembly. Similarly, the Shahi Jirga and the non-official members of Quetta Municipality, being constituted as the appropriate body to take a decision in the case of Baluchistan, unanimously decided in a specially convened meeting of the two to join the new Constituent Assembly. This unanimity was made possible, due to the fact that non-Muslim members of the Quetta Municipality deliberately refrained from attending the meeting.

Differences of opinion at first manifested themselves between the League and Congress over the procedure to be adopted in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sylhet district in Assam. After protracted discussions, which were spent in considering various alternatives, it was finally agreed that voters in Muslim, General and Indian Christian constituencies from the district of Sylhet for the Assembly elections should constitute the electoral college to whom would be referred the question whether Sylhet wishes to join East Bengal or not. Under the inspiring leadership of the Quaid, Muslim leaders and workers both of Assam and other parts of India, worked round the clock, explaining to Muslim voters the importance of the outcome of the referendum. Muslims were at a disadvantage, as the number of Muslim voters on the electoral lists did not reflect the true proportion of the Muslim population in the district—54.27 percent voting strength as against a population of 60.7 percent. However, Muslims were able to assert their will through a verdict in favor of the stand taken by the Muslim League. The referendum showed that 239,619 voted for separation from Assam and to join East Bengal as against 184,041 votes in favor of the *status quo*.

It had been agreed that the wishes of the people of the North-West Frontier Province should be ascertained through a referendum in which all voters of the constituencies of the Provincial Assembly would determine whether the Frontier wanted to join the new Constituent Assembly or the Indian Union. Although there was a Congress Ministry in that Province under Dr. Khan Saheb, yet with tireless work over a long period of time Muslim masses of that province had veered round to the League ideology, and they had become among the most ardent supporters of Pakistan Movement and of the Quaid. Seeing which way the wind was blowing, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, with the full and solid backing of the Congress, protested against the procedure laid down and wrote to the Viceroy that the referendum should also give the voters the choice to determine whether they wanted an independent Pakhtunistan. Indications were not wanting that Afghanistan whole-heartedly supported the stand of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Quaid-e-Azam condemned the Khan Brothers and denounced the demand for an independent Pakhtunistan as being nothing else but "insidious and spurious". Lord Listowel, who was now Secretary of State for India, was constrained to give a stern admonishment to Afghanistan, as it was seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. Lord Listowel, while addressing the gathering of journalists in London, said, "Afghanistan has no right to interfere, as they are trying to interfere in the rights of the North-West Frontier Province. Pathans have been willing and contented to remain in the North-West Frontier Province for a long time. It will give rise to all sorts of difficulties if we allow any movement to break up the North-West Frontier Province".²⁵² Mountbatten said as there was no agreement between the Congress and League, over the proposal made by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, he would not agree to incorporate it as an issue for determination in the referendum.

²⁵² *Transfer of Power India*, by Menon, p. 389.

Gandhi championed the cause of Ghaffar Khan and told the Viceroy in a meeting with him on 6th June that Mountbatten should persuade Jinnah not to insist on a referendum in the Frontier, but to go there and explain to the people of the Frontier what Pakistan implied for them, "in the hope that you (Jinnah) will be able to woo them to become a Province of Pakistan, with perfect freedom to frame their own Provincial Constitution ... If you (Jinnah) felt disposed to adopt this suggestion, I could, I think, give you a positive assurance that the Khan Brothers and their followers would meet you as friends and give you an attentive hearing".²⁵³ Quaid-e-Azam agreed to this suggestion, but laid down a condition that "the Congress should undertake that they will not interfere with the people of the Frontier in any way whatsoever". Gandhi and the Congress did not agree to this, and Pyarelal writes, "For Congress to be party to such a proposal would have been tantamount to committing political suicide."²⁵⁴ Sardar Patel saw Gandhi in connection with this proposal, and after this meeting, Gandhi wrote to Nehru on the 7th, "He (Sardar Patel) is of the opinion that Badshah Khan's (Ghaffar Khan's) influence is on the wane. Badshah Khan has not left any such impression on me I also feel that Dr. Khan Saheb and his colleagues would be nowhere without the Badshah. He alone counts in so far as the Congress influence is concerned."²⁵⁵

On 18th June, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan met Quaid-e-Azam at the latter's residence and placed before him terms and conditions before the Frontier could agree to join Pakistan. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan adopted an attitude as if he alone represented that Province, and his terms were so absurd that Quaid-e-Azam had no alternative but to reject them. All attempts at preventing a referendum in the Frontier having failed, the Government administrative machinery went full steam ahead to make all arrangements ready to hold it in an orderly, impartial and peaceful manner.

After his meeting with the Quaid, Ghaffar Khan returned to Peshawar. He addressed a meeting at Bannu on 21st June, in which members of the Frontier Congress Committee, Congress Parliamentary Party, Khudai Khidmatgars, and Zalmi Pakhtoons (the Young Pathan League) participated. The meeting unanimously adopted a resolution, "That a free Pathan State of all Pakhtoons be established. The constitution of the State will be framed on the basis of Islamic conception of democracy, equality and social justice. The meeting appeals to all the Pathans to unite for the attainment of this cherished goal and not to submit to any non-Pakhtoon domination".²⁵⁶

Convinced that his point of view would be rejected by the people of the Frontier, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan called upon his party, the Khudai Khidmatgars and their supporters, to boycott the referendum. Brigadier J.B. Booth was appointed the Referendum Commissioner, and with British officers of the Indian Army to assist him,

²⁵³ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 266.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

he held a referendum which gave the Muslim League a convincing victory – 289,244 voted for joining the New Constituent Assembly and 2,874 voted against it.

Even after Pakistan came to be established, Dr. Khan Sahib's Congress ministry continued to be the Government of that province. But on 21st August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam in his capacity as Governor-General of Pakistan dismissed Dr. Khan's ministry. Ghaffar Khan continued his struggle for the establishment of Pakhtoonistan even after partition. In this connection, one month after his brother's ministry was dismissed, he called a meeting of the political organizations that supported him at Sardaryab. Ghaffar Khan once again demanded the creation of Pakhtoonistan at this meeting, which resolved that Pakhtoonistan would comprise the six settled districts of the N.W.F.P. and other contiguous Pathan areas that may desire to join it, "This State will enter into agreement on Defence, External Affairs and Communications with the Dominion of Pakistan". At the conclusion of the meeting, Ghaffar Khan declared, "I have been working for the establishment of Pakhtoonistan all my life – I stand for those principles today for which I stood in 1930. My path is therefore quite clear. I will not forsake it even if I stand alone in the world".²⁵⁷

Even before results of the referendum in Sylhet and in the Frontier were known, the Quaid was absolutely confident that the vote in both places would be overwhelmingly in favor of Pakistan. This is evident from an interview D.F. Karaka, an eminent Indian writer, had with Quaid-e-Azam in Delhi in June 1947. He told Karaka, "Congressmen had no real tolerance in them, and they had never learnt the art of living by the principle of give and take. "They say," he said to Karaka, "it is my pride that has made me fight for Pakistan. I have no self-pride of that sort. I go to the humblest and poorest people". Karaka informed him that he had met Maulana Azad, who was confident that the vote in Sylhet would be in favor of the Congress, but he was not so sure regarding the Frontier. The Quaid abruptly asked Karaka, "Which way would you vote if you were a Moslem?" That silenced Karaka, who proceeded to draw his own conclusion from the rhetorical question asked by the Quaid, "He (Quaid-e-Azam) shook his head and I could read his thought. The old Maulana (Azad) is well-meaning but stupid, he seemed to say. He did not say it of course."²⁵⁸

The results of the referendum both in the Frontier and in Sylhet showed the Quaid-e-Azam was right. Azad and the Congress on the other hand had proved to be victims of wishful thinking.

Having unfolded the 3rd June Plan to the League and Congress, Mountbatten convened a meeting of the State's Negotiating Committee, which was a sort of an Executive Committee of the Chamber of Princes. A lengthy debate followed in which conflicting

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

²⁵⁸ *Betrayal in India*, p. 28, 1950; Victor Gollancz Ltd., London.

views were expressed, some demanding that paramountcy should lapse before the date of the transfer of power to give a free hand to the States to take their own decisions, while others held a contrary view. Mountbatten was of the view that as paramountcy would in any case lapse, the States were free to negotiate on the basis of complete freedom. He also said it was for each State to decide for itself which Constituent Assembly it wanted to join. But Mountbatten said a broad outline of the Constitution would be available in Hindustan earlier than in Pakistan, as Hindustan had its Constituent Assembly already functioning. V. P. Menon writes Mountbatten further informed the Princes, "He believed that Jinnah had been working on 'heads of a constitution', but there would probably only be a guide and nothing concrete would have appeared before the lapse of paramountcy."²⁵⁹ In conclusion the Viceroy said he would not be willing to give any advice in his official capacity as to which Constituent Assembly any State should join, or whether such a step should be at all taken, none the less the Princes would be welcome to consult him in his personal capacity. One might as well ask what is the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee!

After the meeting, the Nawab of Bhopal, who was Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, submitted his resignation to the Viceroy in which he wrote, "Bhopal State 'would, as soon as paramountcy is withdrawn, be assuming an independent status".

The League and Congress were divided over the date of lapse of paramountcy and on the consequences that would arise on its coming to an end. On 13th June, Mountbatten invited leaders of the League and the Congress to a meeting to discuss this vexed question. Quaid-e-Azam, Liaquat Ali, and Sardar Nishtar represented the League. The Quaid said in his opinion the States had the right to say they would not join either of the two Constituent Assemblies, as such State would be sovereign and independent with the lapse of paramountcy. To compel States to do so, he said, was contrary to law and constitution, as also to what the Cabinet Mission had intended. Nehru, on the other hand, held a diametrically opposite view. The Viceroy distributed a draft for "The Standstill Agreement", consideration on which was deferred as each party wanted to study it. As a result of this conference, 'The States Department' was created to deal with problems connected with the States, divided into two sections for Pakistan and Hindustan. The Muslim League nominated Sardar Nishtar as their representative to control the States Department, while the Congress nominated Sardar Patel.

On 11th June, Travancore announced its decision to consider itself as an independent State, with full sovereign powers, and Hyderabad followed suit the following day. A week later, Quaid-e-Azam issued a statement saying it was the inherent right of every State to declare itself sovereign due to lapse of paramountcy, if it so desired. This was followed by a statement from the Chief Minister of Travancore that his State would appoint a Trade Commissioner in Pakistan.

²⁵⁹ *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 83. 1956: Orient Longmans Ltd., Bombay.

Towards the end of July, Quaid-e-Azam had detailed talks with the Maharajahs of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, as the boundaries of their States as also of Bikaner State were contiguous with those of Pakistan. Menon writes, "Jinnah, I was told, signed a blank sheet of paper and gave it to Maharajah Hanwant Singh (of Jodhpur) along with his own fountain pen, saying, You can fill in all your conditions". M Jodhpur was prepared to join Pakistan, but was dissuaded from doing so by the Maharajah of Jaisalmer, Maharajah Hanwant Singh asked the Quaid for time, so that he could go to his State, consult his friends and advisers, and then give a definite answer to the Quaid, very likely a favorable one, the next day. But the Maharajah's associates and friends were intractably hostile to joining Pakistan, and the whole affair leaked out. The Congress got wind of it and through Sardar Patel they deputed V.P. Menon to take the matter in his hands. Menon writes, "When he (Maharajah of Jodhpur) returned to Delhi after three days I was informed that, unless I handled the Maharajah quickly, the chances were that he might accede to Pakistan". Menon went to Hotel Imperial in Delhi, where the Maharajah was staying and told him Lord Mountbatten wanted to see him immediately. Mountbatten explained to the Maharajah that although legally he could accede to Pakistan, it would be contrary to the basis on which India was being divided, namely, on the basis of Muslim and Hindu areas. The Maharajah at first remonstrated and said he would not join India. Menon writes, "After a great deal of discussion, I gave him a letter conceding some of his demands. Thereafter he signed the Instruments of Accession. After a few minutes, Lord Mountbatten went out of the room and the Maharajah whipped out a revolver, leveled it at me and said: 'I refuse to accept your dictation' ... 'Don't indulge in juvenile theatricals', I admonished him".²⁶⁰ Jodhpur put his revolver back into his pocket, and placed his States in the pocket of Sardar Patel.

Similarly, the Nawab of Bhopal refused to sign the Instruments of Accession, saying he would wish to have a Standstill Agreement both with India and Pakistan. He was being advised by Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan, who was his Constitutional Adviser. Menon writes, "Lord Mountbatten's long-standing personal friendship with the Nawab played its part in the latter's decision to accede". All the Hinchhi Rulers of States, some after a certain amount of reluctance, signed the Instrument of Accession and joined India before 15th August.

The Nizam of Hyderabad continued to stay out and Lord Mountbatten visited that State in July 1947 and had to the Nizam two more months in which he was to convey his consent to join India.

The Maharajah of Kashmir was in two minds, and Lord Mountbatten visited that State in July 1947 and had detailed discussions regarding the future of Kashmir with its Maharajah, a personal friend of the Viceroy.

²⁶⁰ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, pp. 116-117.

The Nawab of Junagadh, most important of the States in Kathiawar, was a Muslim and he refused to sign the Instruments of Accession and the Standstill Agreement. The Nawab of Manavadar and the Sheikh of Mangrol did likewise. The Nawab of Junagadh was inclined to accede to Pakistan; the Congress was maneuvering to prevent it. However, the Nawab, supported by his Chief Minister, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who had succeeded K.B. Abdul Quadir, announced in a Government communiqué on 15th August that Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan. "After anxious consideration of careful balancing of all factors the Government of the State has decided to accede to Pakistan and hereby announces its decision to that effect". On 21st August, the Government of India wrote a letter to the High Commissioner of Pakistan in India protesting against the Nawab of Junagadh's decision, which had been taken without "consulting the views of the people with regard to accession".

The decision of the Nawab was not opposed by the people by holding any protest meetings or demonstrations; nor did it bring in its wake any communal disturbances. "But", Sarwar Hasan writes, "after that decision, a severe economic blockade was imposed by India on Junagadh, lines of communication were cut, and a campaign of terror was inaugurated. Indian troops surrounded the State".²⁶¹

In the middle of September, the Indian Cabinet sent V.P. Menon as their representative to Junagadh to persuade the Nawab to withdraw his accession to Pakistan. Menon could not meet the Nawab, who was lying ill in bed, and he had, therefore, discussion with Sir Bhutto, the Dewan of Junagadh. Menon threatened Sir Bhutto with grave consequences, if he did not hold a referendum in the State over the question of accession, as he insisted it was essential to ascertain the wishes of the people before such an important decision could be made. People, he said, were not to be taken like cattle to this or to that country, without giving them the choice to decide for themselves. Strange as it may seem, this very principle of taking a decision on such issues only in accordance with the wishes of the people was to be flagrantly violated by India herself in the case of Kashmir, Hyderabad and Goa. Menon, India's representative, then turned his attention to the Nawab of Manavadar and the Sheikh of Mangrol, who had also joined Pakistan by signing the necessary Instruments of Accession.

On 25th September, the State Ministry of India issued a communiqué saying India would take all steps to protect the States of Kathiawar. Simultaneously, India dispatched a brigade to plant India's military might in the heart of Kathiawar to intimidate Junagadh, Manavadar and Mangrol. The Government of Pakistan sent a telegram of protest on the same day to India, but the latter ignored it and embarked merrily on its military mission, which it sought to sugar-coat by euphemistically calling it "Police Action". The Indian Army, under Brig. Gurdial Singh, was supplemented by

²⁶¹ *Pakistan and The United Nations*, by K. Sarwar Hasan, p. 83.

the armed forces of Nawanagar, Bhavnagar and Porbandar, and all this military might was brought out to crush every semblance of resistance in Junagadh, Mangrol and Manavadar. Menon writes about this episode "Lord Mountbatten emphasized the danger of any precipitated action which might lead to a war between India and Pakistan. Such a war might be the end of Pakistan altogether, but it would also be the end of India for at least a generation to come. He was anxious that India should not lose her great international position by taking incorrect action".²⁶²

Not satisfied with military action, the Government of India conspired to convene a public meeting in Bombay on 25th September, where a provisional Government of Junagadh was set up, with Samaldas Gandhi as its President, "with all power, authority and jurisdiction heretofore vested in and exercised by the Nawab of Junagadh prior to 15th September 1947". An unconstitutional Government issued an illegal proclamation! Sir Chimanlal Setalvad wrote a letter to the Times of India on 3rd November, commenting on the provisional Government of Junagadh, "The so-called 'Provisional Government' of Junagadh was openly formed in Bombay, and for days it proclaimed its intention of marching to Junagadh to overthrow the Junagadh Government as by law established. The leaders of that 'Provisional Government' have openly raised a volunteer army and have captured several villages in Junagadh territory. Junagadh House in Rajkot was forcibly seized by the 'Provisional Government', and Rajkot State, which has acceded to India, and the Indian Government themselves, have remained passive spectators of all unfriendly and hostile acts against a state which has, together with the dominion to which it has acceded, had peace with India".

On 4th October 1947, a Government of India communiqué once again reiterated that the Government of India sincerely believed matters like accession should be decided by a plebiscite of the people themselves, and Indians considered such procedure to be democratic, peaceful and just. What a hollow platitude it sounds in the mouth of the Government of India, in view of its stand over the accession of Kashmir to India and Pakistan's insistence on a plebiscite in Kashmir.

On the 22nd, the Indian Army entered Manavadar and imposed a military occupation on that tiny State. This act of military aggression was repeated by India on 1st November in the case of Mangrol.

Finding odds heavily posed against him, the Nawab of Junagadh left his State by plane for Karachi towards the end of October and on 8th November Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto also left Junagadh for Karachi. All resistance having collapsed, Indian troops and representatives of the so-called Provisional Government, headed by Samaldas Gandhi and Dhebar, who later became President of the Congress, under a military convoy provided by Brig. Gurdial Singh, entered Junagadh and took over the administration of

²⁶² *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 138.

the State. The Indian flag began to flutter over Government buildings and the Nawab's palaces. The State infantry, cavalry and police forces were deprived of their weapons and disbanded; the treasury and Government stores were put under lock and seal; the Hindu militia of the so-called Provisional Government paraded the streets, arrogant, drunk with success; the Muslim population remained indoors, terrorized – apprehensive of the present, fearful of its future.

Quaid-e-Azam attached great importance to the dispute of Pakistan with India over these three States. It was not possible for Pakistan, which was struggling to establish itself, to go to war with India over her territories, which had been usurped by the latter. Only a legalistic and constitutional stand in regard to the reasonableness of Pakistan's stand could be taken. In consultation with Quaid-e-Azam, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, as Prime Minister of Pakistan, sent a strong telegram to the Government of India on 11th November protesting against its occupation of Junagadh, which due to its accession had become a part of Pakistan. Liaquat termed it as breach of international law. He demanded on behalf of Pakistan that Indian troops forthwith leave Junagadh territory and the Government of the State be returned to the Nawab, who was the rightful and constitutional ruler of the State. To this Nehru replied India was fully justified in what it had done, and India had merely gone to the aid of the people of Junagadh, "who were fighting for their elementary rights".

No one could be so gullible as to admit as correct India's action in regard to Junagadh, Manavadar and Mangrol. It was an uncalled for interference; a naked military aggression. The Government of Pakistan refused to accept that these three States had become part of India. Constitutionally speaking, they continued to be Pakistan territory. After the 3rd June Plan was announced, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a *firman* that he would neither send representatives of his State to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan nor to that of India. The Nizam contended that on 15th August, paramountcy having lapsed and in view of the special nature of his status by virtue of old treaties with the British, he would be constitutionally well within his rights to declare Hyderabad as an independent sovereign State. From the beginning of July, the Nizam sent frequently his representatives to Delhi to negotiate with the Government of India for special terms for his State, short of accession. The Nizam's representatives were always confronted with preposterous demands which amounted to unconditional accession to India, but he stoutly resisted these suggestions given by the Government of India in the language of veiled threats. Having weighed the issue carefully in his mind, the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten on 8th August that Hyderabad would neither accede to India nor to Pakistan. This roused the anger of the Government of India, where their "Strong Man", Sardar Patel, sat in ruthless grandeur, deciding the fate and destinies of Indian States. When Lord Mountbatten addressed the Indian Constituent Assembly on 15th August, he said during the course of his address that all the States had acceded to India, but that Hyderabad was still holding out. In view of inflammatory propaganda carried on against the Nizam by the Hindus and the Hindu

press. Mountbatten endeavored to pacify them by saying that the Government of India was optimistic of a satisfactory settlement of the problem. However, Menon writes, "Sardar (Patel) was adamant. He wrote to Lord Mountbatten saying that he saw no alternative but to insist on the Nizam's accession to the Dominion of India".²⁶³ In spite of the bullying and pressure tactics adopted by the Government of India, the Nizam was not deterred in the determination to keep Hyderabad an independent State, having friendly and cordial ties both with Pakistan and Hindustan. Lord Mountbatten wrote to the Nizam on 27th August that he should hold a referendum of his subjects whether they wished that Hyderabad should accede to India or not. The Nizam replied, "The problem and constitutional position of Hyderabad are such that the question of referendum does not arise".

Sardar Patel, who spoke on these matters in the name of the Government of India, was resolute in his determination to liquidate Hyderabad State and to merge it into the Indian Union. He was not to be bothered about legalistic and constitutional niceties, which the Nizam was raising. Once again the Nizam wrote to Mountbatten on 26th September that he would be letting loose a civil war in Hyderabad, if he declared that Hyderabad would accede to India. He, therefore, insisted he should be allowed to exercise his constitutional right to declare Hyderabad as an independent State. In the end he requested the Government of India to withdraw their troops from his territory. On the last issue, Menon, who was at the time Secretary in the States Ministry, writes, "Once or twice during the negotiations this point had been pressed by the Hyderabad delegation, but I had given a non-committal reply. The issue was again raised by the Nizam, but the Government of India decided to take no action pending the outcome of the negotiations".²⁶⁴

Having failed to browbeat the Nizam into complete accession, the Government of India endeavored to obtain at least "The substance of accession", as it would involve, Menon writes, "some loss of face for' the Government of India *vis a vis* other States, but that would be offset by Hyderabad being committed not to accede to Pakistan". The Muslim population of Hyderabad State was being subjected to severe Hindu persecution in an ever increasing manner with the passing of each day, due to infiltration of trained personnel with arms and ammunition into the State from across its borders contiguous with the provinces of Madras and Bombay. The situation that faced the Muslims was grave, and in order to protect their lives, honor and property, the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, under the leadership of Sayed Kasim Razvi, organized themselves for the purpose. This organization owed its origin mainly to the efforts of Bahadur Yar Jung, a great orator, whom Quaid-e-Azam held in high esteem. By October 1947, the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen had become a very popular and powerful force in expressing the views of the people and to protect their legitimate interests. The influence of Kasim Razvi began to increase

²⁶³ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 322.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 325.

rapidly, and he and his party came to be recognized as a force to be reckoned with in any decision that the Nizam may take regarding Hyderabad. It was quite obvious the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen was against accession to India and wanted Hyderabad to continue to be an independent State.

Towards the end of October, the Nizam sent a delegation on behalf of the State consisting of Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, Abdur Rahim and Pingle Reddy, to negotiate with the Government of India for a compromise formula, short of full accession to India. The delegation pleaded in case the Government of India was in no mood to oblige them by changing the agreement for accession, could they at least agree to make changes in the collateral letter? This simple request was also turned down, and according to Menon, Sardar Patel was of the view "That the only decent course for us (India) was to send back the new delegation by the very same plane by which it arrived".²⁶⁵ Lord Mountbatten asked the delegation to convey to the Nizam that, according to him, if the Nizam did not sign the agreement, "It was likely to be (for Hyderabad) a well-nigh irretrievable disaster". Continuing, Menon writes, "The Nizam had also sought Jinnah's advice on the negotiations that were going on with the Government of India".²⁶⁶

In the beginning of November 1947, Mir Laik Ali flew from Delhi to Lahore, in order to consult Quaid-e-Azam as to the attitude Hyderabad should take in view of India's unreasonableness. Laik Ali records in his book, "The Quaid had very definite views in regard to Hyderabad ... Not for a moment did he think it was necessary or advisable for Hyderabad to accede to Pakistan. He did not see why India should force Hyderabad into accession to India ... He fully appreciated how important and necessary it was for Hyderabad and India to establish good relations early, and strongly advised that not only a proper 'Standstill Agreement' should be concluded soon but every attempt should be made to work it smoothly. He felt that a year's period of the 'Standstill Agreement', if properly utilized by the two sides, ought to give opportunity to both to adjust matters in an amicable manner and dispel all mutual doubts and suspicions".²⁶⁷

Mir Laik Ali then asked the Quaid if in his opinion India would use armed force to compel Hyderabad to accede to India. The Quaid said he did not like making prophesies but thought that was most improbable. "Apart from the constitutional position under the Independence of India Act, he felt that world opinion would go very much against India if she ever went to the extent of armed intervention in the affairs of Hyderabad. He concluded by saying he would do everything in his power to help Hyderabad in building up honorable and lasting relations with India and securing a dignified political position for itself."²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 330.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 333.

²⁶⁷ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali, pp. 11-12, 1962: Pakistan Cooperative Book Society Ltd., Karachi.

²⁶⁸ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali. p. 13, 1962: Pakistan Cooperative Book Society Ltd., Karachi.

The delegation that had been sent to India returned to Hyderabad without a compromise formula in their briefcase, but with their ears ringing loud with many threats that Patel had inflicted on them. Thereafter Kasim Razvi visited Delhi, in the hope he would succeed where the delegation had failed. His mission to Delhi also ended in failure. Commenting on Razvi's efforts in Delhi, Menon writes, "I told him (Razvi) that so irresponsible an attitude would land him and the Nizam in disaster".²⁶⁹ It was clear from now on that Kasim Razvi and his Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen were marked targets in the eyes of the Government of India.

In the meantime depredations of Indians into Hyderabad State continued unabated; and looting and arson of Muslim property became the order of the day in those areas near the Indian border where Muslims were in a minority. The Nizam was compelled under the force of circumstances to sign an interim Standstill Agreement on 29th November with India, which was to be in force only for one year from that date. Under this Agreement, India appointed K. M. Munshi as its Agent-General in Hyderabad, and from that day onward the internal difficulties of the Government of Hyderabad increased a hundredfold, and the anti-Muslim campaign within the State developed into a general conflagration. With an inimical Agent-General implanted in the heart of the State, ably supported by a strong and well-equipped Indian Army within its territories, the Government of Hyderabad soon realized it was confronted with a dangerous situation. According to the terms of the agreement, the Nizam asked India to withdraw her troops forthwith. India asked for time to complete the evacuation of its troops, which were there as a powerful fifth column to choke the life out of the independent existence of the State. Hindus of the State were trying to strangulate the economic life of the State by many devious methods. The Nizam's Government issued a few ordinances under which Indian currency was declared to be no longer legal tender and a complete ban was imposed on the export of all precious metals. Some Government of India securities held by the State were transferred to Pakistan. The Indian Press, which had taken up a bellicose attitude against Hyderabad for some time past, intensified its hate campaign.

Patel was uncompromising in so far as integration, in other words, liquidation of Indian States was concerned. And yet he had agreed to sign a Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad, a departure from his policy of ruthlessness, which his friends had termed as "firmness". Karaka explains the reason why, "All the Sardar was concerned with was how to liquidate this theoretical concept of sovereignty (of the Nizam) as gracefully and peacefully as possible".²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 334.

²⁷⁰ *Betrayal in India*, by D. F. Karaka, p. 162, 1950: Victor Gollancz, London.

Mir Laik Ali, who had been appointed President of the Executive Council by the Nizam, visited Delhi towards the end of January 1948 and had a series of talks with Sardar Patel in order to obtain assurances that the Government of India would not add to the difficulties of Hyderabad and that it would strictly abide by the interim agreement. Patel, in a hostile manner, admonished Mir Laik Ali that the internal situation within the State should be improved and Hindu life and property must be adequately protected. While these talks were going on, India was plunged in deep sorrow at the shocking news of the brutal assassination of Gandhi on the evening of 30th January 1948 at the hands of Nathuram Godse, while Gandhi was at his customary evening prayer gathering.

On 21st February, the States Ministry was busy with a meeting between themselves and the Home Ministers of Bombay and Madras to consider the Hyderabad situation. Munshi, the trouble-maker in Hyderabad, was present by special invitation. Describing the talks held at this conference, Menon writes, "The Premier of Bombay stated that some Socialists and Congressmen operating from the Bombay side of the border were using fire-arms ... The Premier of Madras described the difficulties created in his province by Communists who had entrenched themselves in the border districts of Andhra and Hyderabad and were indulging in hit-run tactics".²⁷¹ And yet, the Government of India was at pains to, have the world believe that the trouble in Hyderabad was of the making of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen.

Mir Laik Ali was summoned to Delhi once again on 2nd March, and Mountbatten insisted that he immediately impose a ban on the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen. Laik Ali replied, "It had precipitated itself into being because of the apprehensions of the Muslims in Hyderabad that their lives were in danger".²⁷² Mountbatten also advised Laik Ali to "arrange with the Government of Pakistan not to en-cash the securities advanced by Hyderabad during the currency of the Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad", and that if this could be done, then "A fresh chapter in the Indo-Hyderabad relations would open".²⁷³

From Delhi Laik Ali flew to Karachi, to discuss matters personally with Quaid-e-Azam; he needed sound constitutional, legal and political advice, and the Quaid was so much interested in developments in Hyderabad, a stronghold of Muslims in the South. On arrival in Karachi, Mir Laik Ali met some Cabinet Ministers, who he writes, were "not very encouraging when it came to the freezing of the Securities over a period of time". But when he explained to Quaid-e-Azam Hyderabad's difficulties with India over the Securities advanced to Pakistan, "He (Quaid-e-Azam) unhesitatingly said that anything that could be done to bring about a better understanding and build up a lasting and satisfactory relationship between India and Pakistan, he would be only too glad to

²⁷¹ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 342.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 344.

²⁷³ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali, pp. 153-154.

undertake. I pointed out to him. that the reactions of some of his ministers concerned were not the same and apparently the sale proceeds of the securities were urgently needed by Pakistan. In his typical calm and composed fashion, he waved his finger and said no consideration whatsoever would be allowed to jeopardize the interests of Hyderabad".²⁷⁴

This magnanimous gesture of Quaid-e-Azam surprised Mir Laik Ali, who records, "Imagine, a new country with even the elementary administrative organizations still in the making so greatly in need of finance even for its most immediate need, should have so readily and willingly agreed to make such a sacrifice to help Hyderabad. There, at Delhi everybody wanted to see the last of all that Hyderabad claimed to exist for and stood for!".²⁷⁵ On his return from Karachi to Hyderabad, Laik Ali was put under increasing pressure by the Government of India and harassed by the branch of the Indian Congress in Hyderabad State. But, actuated by a desire to steer the ship of State safe, he continued to run the affairs of Hyderabad in such a manner as to avoid giving any offence to the Hindus of the State or to the Government of India. But that State was not to be left to pursue an existence of tranquility and self-respect. In pursuance of their determination to subjugate Hyderabad, Menon, on behalf of the Government of India, wrote a letter on 23rd March to Mir Laik Ali, in which he made impossible and preposterous demands. The letter was delivered to Laik Ali personally by K.M. Munshi, and Menon writes, "Munshi told me later that Laik Ali at first appeared upset (though he was not unprepared for some such action on our part), but that his next reaction was to go off into heroics, declaring that the Nizam was willing to die a martyr and that he and lakhs of Muslims were willing to be killed".²⁷⁶

Mir Laik Ali, however, replied on 5th April that his Government was anxious to faithfully carry out all obligations arising from the Standstill Agreement. "Meantime", the letter continued, "the economic blockade of Hyderabad is being tightened every day ... Our latest reports are that troop concentrations are taking place in the Indian Union all around Hyderabad, and there have been instances of military personnel of the Union Government going about in our territory in mufti with concealed weapons. Nevertheless we want friendly settlement". The letter ended with a request that the Government of India should accept to submit to arbitration all outstanding disputes between the two Governments. On the 7th Sir Walter Monckton, one of the members of the Executive Council of the Nizam, saw Pandit Nehru in Delhi, who assured him that the Government of India had no intention of invading Hyderabad or of imposing an economic blockade of that State. But Sir Monckton was told that Kasim Razvi had made a speech in Hyderabad to which the Government of India took serious objection and that Razvi should be arrested and put in prison. On returning to Hyderabad, Monckton submitted a report on his talks with Nehru to the Nizam and his Council. Investigations

²⁷⁴ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali, p. 156.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

²⁷⁶ *The integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 348.

instituted revealed that the speech objected to was a mere invention of the Government of India and that Razvi had delivered no such speech at all, the whole affair was a mere concoction. Of this episode Menon writes, "Whether Razvi made that particular speech or not was not really material because he had made several other speeches which were even more objectionable".²⁷⁷

Munshi, India's Agent-General in Hyderabad State was active in his efforts to increase the difficulties ' that existed in an already explosive situation. He moved about the State, throwing his weight around as if he was there in his capacity as the conqueror of Hyderabad. On 10th May, the Government of India obtained Mountbatten's approval that Alan Campbell-Johnson, his Press Attaché, should visit the Nizam in Hyderabad with a personal letter from the Viceroy to the Nizam inviting him to come to Delhi and to sign an agreement of full and irrevocable accession to India. Campbell-Johnson writes about his visit that Mountbatten obtained an assurance from Nehru, "If the Nizam acceded, the Government of India would do all in its power to accord him full physical protection".²⁷⁸ Obviously, there was apprehension among the highest quarters in Delhi that the Nizam's life was in danger. Campbell-Johnson reached Hyderabad on 15th May, and he says he found the Nizam in a mood of aggressive fatalism. Mir Laik Ali complained to him there was an economic blockade of the State; that even the supply of chlorine for purifying Hyderabad water-supply had been withheld by India; buses ordered by the Government of Hyderabad for the city's transport had their spare parts removed, their upholstery ripped, and they were rotting on a wharf in Bombay. Summing up his impressions, Campbell-Johnson writes, "The Nizam is searching furtively and anxiously for an honorable settlement". But when he returned to Delhi and reported to Menon at the States Ministry, he records, "His (Menon's) general attitude to Hyderabad had hardened while I have been away, but at least I succeeded in getting him to reserve his judgment on the progress made until Zain's return tomorrow. V.P. (Menon) began speaking of Final Terms".²⁷⁹

Menon and Sardar Patel were soon in confesence and the former writes, "Sardar said that it was useless to waste any more time".²⁸⁰ On June 17th, Nehru told a press conference that India would not tolerate any protracted negotiations. There was no doubt now about India's military designs against Hyderabad; it was only a matter of time. On 21st June, Mountbatten left the shores of India, to be succeeded by Rajagopalachari as Governor-General of India.

Indian army personnel in Hyderabad were busy forging the first links in the chain of military events that resulted in the final conquest of that State. In the face of this imminent danger, Laik Ali wrote to the Government of India on 17th August that the

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

²⁷⁸ *Mission with Mountbatten*, p. 325.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

²⁸⁰ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 361.

Government of Hyderabad was taking the dispute with India to the United Nations. India protested that Hyderabad being a domestic issue, It was beyond the purview of the United Nations, and the Government of India refused travelling and other facilities to Hyderabad's delegation to the United Nations. However, the delegation flew to Karachi at the end of August, and under the leadership of Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung they were on their way to New York to plead Hyderabad's case in the United Nations.

The States Ministry was in close liaison with the Ministry of Defence in Delhi, and it was clear India was preparing to launch a military offensive against Hyderabad. As a result of these deliberations, "Our (India's) own military appreciation was that the Hyderabad forces would not be able to stand up to the vastly better equipped and trained Indian armed forces, and that the only problem was how to plan the campaign that resistances would collapse within the shortest possible time".²⁸¹ On 9th September, India committed naked and unabashed armed aggression when its troops marched into Hyderabad to conquer that State, much to the shock of Muslims in Pakistan in particular and to the world in general. Dr. Jose Arce, the delegate of Argentina to the Security Council said. "The march of the Indian troops towards the capital of Hyderabad reminds me of the march of Italian troops (of Mussolini) towards the Abyssinian capital". The conquering Indian army was commanded by Maj-Gen. J. N. Chaudhary, the offensive being termed by Indian Army Headquarters as "Operation Polo". Hyderabad defenses collapsed without much resistance and all opposition ceased, leaving over one thousand soldiers and civilians dead within a short period of time. The Hyderabad army laid down arms on the 17th, enabling India to complete its military occupation of the State. The same day Mir Laik Ali's Government submitted their resignation and they were put under house arrest, as also Kasim Razvi. Maj-Gen. Chaudhary was appointed Military Governor of Hyderabad State, and the Indian flag arrogantly proclaimed its suzerainty. "The attitude of the Hindus was naturally one of exultation".²⁸²

Justifying events in Hyderabad, the Government of India was at pains to assure the world that it was merely "a police action," to arrest the fast deteriorating internal situation in the State of Hyderabad. Karaka comments on this explanation of the Government of India, "It is unpleasant for an Indian to have to ask his Prime Minister why a Lieutenant-General, three Major-Generals and a whole armored Division had to be called out to effect a mere police action. A Police Commissioner and a handful of sepoy's armed with the familiar *lathis* were usually enough for police actions in the days of the British. The truth was—and let's face it—that our Government did not want to give the outside world the impression that India, a member of the United Nations, had had recourse to military action for the settlement of the Hyderabad dispute. Moreover, there was still an articulate section of Gandhian followers, believers of non-violence,

²⁸¹ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 375.

²⁸² *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 379.

who ought to be appeased. Had we said that we were taking Hyderabad by force of arms because we had no other alternative, it would have been an honest statement of facts".²⁸³

The story of Kashmir State since the day the 3rd June Plan was announced forms an important and vital chapter in understanding causes that gave rise to estrangement between the two Dominions, Pakistan and India, ever since their birth. Around the fourteenth century, Kashmir was being ruled by a Muslim dynasty, and towards the close of the sixteenth century Akbar launched a successful campaign and brought that part of the Sub-Continent into the political orbit of the Moghul Empire as one of its dependencies. The Moghuls left their mark on the beautiful valley of Kashmir, their summer resort, enhancing its natural scenic grandeur by their own contribution, notable and lingering landmarks of which are to be found in world-famous Shalimar and Nishat Gardens and in the Hari Parbat Fort. In the middle of the eighteenth century, with the weakening of the Central authority in Delhi consequent upon the decline of the Moghul Empire, Ahmed Shah Abdali established suzerainty of his dynasty over Kashmir. But the turn of the nineteenth century witnessed the rising power of Maharajah Ranjit Singh, the founder of a Sikh dynasty, who conquered Kashmir in 1819. Previous to the Sikh conquest of Kashmir, the neighboring valley of Jammu was being ruled by a Hindu Dogra ruler, who was a descendant of a Rajput warrior tribe. When the Sikh flag flew over Kashmir in token of being a Sikh dependency, the Dogra dynasty ruling over Jammu was in the doldrums, due to dynastic and internecine warfare, and Jammu fell an easy prize into the hunting-bag of the Sikh rulers of Kashmir. One of the Dogra Chiefs, Gulab Singh, entered the service of Ranjit Singh, and his valour, devotion, intelligence so pleased the Sikh Maharajah that he conferred upon Gulab Singh the hereditary title of "Rajah", and at the same time appointed him as the Rajah of Jammu.

With the death of Ranjit Singh started the beginning of the decadence and decline of the Sikh dynasty of Lahore, and towards the middle of the nineteenth century it stood in mortal fear of the rising power of the British in India. Gulab Singh took upon himself the task of acting as mediator between the Sikh Maharajah at Lahore and the crafty English. He proved wily and equal to the task, and due to his efforts it was agreed that the Lahore Durbar pay to the East India Company one crore rupees as indemnity, which Gulab Singh knew to be beyond the capacity of the Sikh ruler. The latter, due to his inability to pay the amount of indemnity, bartered instead his territories of Jammu and Kashmir. The British agreed to the bargain, but decided it would be too much strain on their military resources to look after such a far-flung dependency. Gulab Singh, finding his territory was included in what the Sikh dynasty offered the British, agreed to pay the latter an equal amount, if he was appointed as the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. This offer suited the British who, after giving Gulab Singh a remission of

²⁸³ *Betrayals in India*, by D. F. Karaka, pp. 165-166.

twenty-five lakh rupees for retaining under their own control the strategic areas of Lahoul and Kulu, handed over Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh. Accordingly, the Treaty of Amritsar was drawn up on 16th March 1846, which legalized this sordid transaction, and a predominantly Muslim territory came into the possession of a Hindu dynasty, defended in its title by the bayonets and bullets of the British. The first Article of the Treaty reads, "The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in independent possession to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body" all that the British obtained from the Lahore State under the Treaty of Amritsar except Lahoul. Fifty lakh rupees were to be paid on the spot and the remaining twenty five lakh before 1st October 1846. Under Article 10 of the Treaty, Gulab Singh acknowledged supremacy of the British Government, and in token thereof he undertook to present to the British annually, "One horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls".

With the advent of Gulab Singh on the scene commences the history of Jammu and Kashmir as an Indian State under the British. In 1925, on the death of Maharajah Partab Singh, who died without an heir, his nephew, Lt.-Gen. Maharajah Sir Hari Singh, ascended the Gadi of that State, and he was the ruler of Kashmir, when the 3rd June Plan became operative under which a decision could be taken whether Kashmir was to accede to Pakistan or to Hindustan. About Hari Singh, Lord Bird wood writes that he "remained in apparent indifference to the welfare of his people throughout the twenty-three years of his rule ... He inherited a system of taxation and land revenue which allowed the barest margin of subsistence to the Moslem Kashmiri".²⁸⁴ Kashmir would have had no contiguous boundaries with the Indian Union but for the unjust Radcliffe Award, which obligingly handed on a silver platter the missing link to India. To quote Menon, "As a result of the Radcliffe Award, the State had become connected by road with India".²⁸⁵

A few months after partition, Mir Laik Ali had flown from Delhi to Lahore, where Quaid-e-Azam was at the time. During the course of conversation between the two, the Quaid gave his views on the Radcliffe Award, which are recorded by Mir Laik Ali in his book, "He (Quaid-e-Azam) himself then gave me an account of the sorrowful events that had followed 'partition' and of the award the Radcliffe Award) in the matter of Punjab and Bengal, and how unjust he thought the award was".²⁸⁶

At the time of the transfer of power in India, Jammu and Kashmir had, according to the 1941 census, a Muslim population of 3,101,247 as against a non-Muslim population of 920,369. The Government of India, taking time by the forelock, maneuvered to alter this ratio of population, and we have it on the authority of Menon. "But the population ratio was affected to some extent after the partition, particularly in Jammu, as a result of

²⁸⁴ *Two Nations and Kashmir*, by Lord Bird wood, p. 31. 1956: Robert Hale Ltd., London.

²⁸⁵ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, p. 395.

²⁸⁶ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali, pp. 10-11.

migration to (of Muslims) and from Pakistan (of Hindus)".²⁸⁷ Although it was a Muslim majority State, yet its Hindu rulers had seen to it that the State police, army and Government servants were preponderantly Hindu, who were notorious for their anti-Muslim attitude. Compelled by sheer necessity, Muslims organized themselves politically, and as a result All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference came into being in 1932. Its strongest supporter and chief spokesman was Sheikh Abdullah, at one time a teacher in one of the State schools.

The Maharajah was dead set against any political parties that demanded rights for the people of his State. He was the State, and it was for the people to obey him, without questioning. Sheikh Abdullah was soon arrested after the Muslim Conference had made an impact on the Muslims of the State and was gaining in popularity. Martial Law was imposed and ruthless measures were adopted to crush the Muslims of the State. Years later, Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan, speaking on behalf of Pakistan in the Security Council in the debate over Kashmir, referring to this period of history of Kashmir, said, "They (the Kashmiris) were mowed down by the bullets of the State Dogra troops in their uprising ... but refused to turn back and received these bullets on their bared breasts."²⁸⁸

Later on Sheikh Abdullah broke away from the Muslim Conference and started a rival organization, All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. In the course of time, the Muslim Conference allied itself with the Muslim League, while the National Conference became a branch of the All-India Congress. Quaid-e-Azam visited Kashmir in 1943, and presided over the Annual Session of the Muslim Conference, in order to lend prestige to the Muslim Conference and to add to its popularity.

Hindu extremists visualized the shape of things to come in India in the middle of 1947, as also the fate of Kashmir with independence. After the 3rd June Plan, H. S. Sharma, leader of an extreme section of Hindu communalists, wrote to the Maharajah of Kashmir that they were prepared to rush men and arms to his State to crush the revolt of his people against him. The Maharajah wrote to Sharma, "Since you wrote, Mr. Nehru has come and gone. I am grateful to you for your offer to send volunteers to assist us in case a situation arose when such assistance will be necessary ... Should it arise I will keep your offer in view".²⁸⁹

Nehru, who had been served with a notice a few weeks earlier at Kohala, on the border of Kashmir State, not to enter the State, wrote on 4th July to the Maharajah, "What I am concerned with is not the past but the future and I want to consider this future in terms of friendly cooperation with you and with others concerned."²⁹⁰ At this same time, Gandhi and Nehru asked Mountbatten to compel the Maharajah to allow both of them

²⁸⁷ *The Integration of the Indian States*, p. 392.

²⁸⁸ *Security Council Official Records*, p. 65. 16-1-1948.

²⁸⁹ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 348.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

to visit Kashmir on a lecture tour. The Maharajah replied he could only do so, if he was prepared to agree to a similar request from Jinnah, in case he sent one. Mountbatten tried his best to persuade Gandhi and Nehru to abandon their proposed trip to Kashmir, but they could not be dissuaded, and once again Mountbatten wrote to the Maharajah in the beginning of July, "I have had talks with both Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru, who are both still anxious to visit Kashmir. I pointed out to them that any visit from a big Congress leader in which speeches were made could not fail to cause the League to send speakers of the order of Mr. Jinnah to counter their propaganda. This would, in effect, produce the electioneering atmosphere which you so rightly wish to avoid, since, as you pointed out to me, there has been no bloodshed up to date and only violent political speeches could now bring about this bloodshed".²⁹¹ The Maharajah replied on 8th July, "I would say that it would be advisable from all points of view for Mahatma Gandhi to cancel his projected visit to Kashmir this year ... A tiny spark, in spite of the best intentions in the world, may set alight a conflagration which it would be impossible to control".²⁹² Lord Mountbatten in a persuasive letter to Gandhi requested him to abandon the idea of going to Kashmir, "As I told you, the Maharajah was strongly opposed to any Muslim League leader coming to Kashmir, and I had asked Mr. Jinnah not to go or send anyone". Quaid-e-Azam realized the gravity of the situation and had agreed with Mountbatten's suggestion. But Nehru was in no mood to listen to logic, once he had made up his mind. On Nehru's advice Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy on the 16th, "I had a long talk with Panditji about Kashmir. He is finally of opinion that I should go in any case, not minding if Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah or his deputy goes after my visit". Nehru was determined to turn Kashmir into a battlefield, and the Maharajah had warned that the situation was explosive and would lead to unnecessary bloodshed. The weak Maharajah was stampeded into a compromise decision; he agreed that Gandhi may visit Kashmir, provided Nehru did not do so. Nehru was furious, and he wrote to Gandhi on 28th July, "I shall go ahead with my plans. As between visiting Kashmir when my people need me there and being Prime Minister, I prefer the former".²⁹³ It is not surprising that students of Kashmir dispute, who also knew Nehru personally, believe that India took an unyielding attitude on Kashmir, because to Nehru it was a problem involving a personal equation. Karaka, for instance, writes, "The whole issue of Kashmir is clouded by an emotional element, namely, that India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, has his ancestral roots in Kashmir. Therefore, Jawaharlal Nehru is unable to look upon the Kashmir issue dispassionately. Whatever strategic value Kashmir may or may not have, they are now so far committed in the instant that the honor of India is as much affected as were, originally, the personal feelings of Jawaharlal Nehru. Too much of the Indian taxpayers' money has gone into "operation Kashmir"; too many of our gallant young men

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 351-352.

²⁹³ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 354.

have paid with their lives. India, therefore, anxiously awaits the verdict of the people of Kashmir".²⁹⁴

Gandhi was on his way to Kashmir, and on reaching Srinagar he had detailed talks separately with the Maharajah and his Prime Minister on 1st August. On the 3rd, a deputation of Kashmiris asked Gandhi in Jammu, "India will be free on the 15th of August, what of Kashmir?" Gandhiji replied, "That will depend on the people of Kashmir". They all wanted to know whether Kashmir would join the Union or Pakistan. "That again," said Gandhiji. "should be decided by the will of the Kashmiris".²⁹⁵ About Gandhi's visit to Kashmir at this inadvisable time, Lord Birdwood writes although in his public pronouncements Gandhi was correct, yet, "It was the fact of his visit rather than the significance of what he said which was inevitably to confuse the situation".²⁹⁶ On his return from Kashmir, Gandhi wrote a letter on 6th August to Nehru, which he was to show to Sardar Patel, "Both (the Maharajah of Kashmir and his Prime Minister) admitted that with the lapse of British Paramountcy the true Paramountcy of the people of Kashmir would commence. However much they might wish to join the Union, they would have to make the choice in accordance with the wishes of the people".²⁹⁷ In the same letter, Gandhi proceeds to make a constitutional analysis about Kashmir State, "I studied the Amritsar Treaty, properly called 'Sale Deed'. I presume it lapses on 15th instant. To whom does the State revert? Does it not go to the people?"²⁹⁸

Subsequent events were to show it was the failure of the Maharajah of Kashmir, instigated as he was by the powers that ruled in Delhi, to ascertain the wishes of the people of his State over the question of its accession that converted peaceful Jammu and Kashmir into a plague-spot that continues to threaten world peace. Whenever a people are arbitrarily denied such an inalienable right, as were the people of Kashmir in this case, disaster and catastrophe become inevitable.

About two weeks after partition, Mountbatten was on a visit to Kashmir to discuss with the Maharajah the question of accession of Kashmir, and he told the Maharajah, "In view of the composition of the population, it was particularly important to ascertain the wishes of the people. But the Maharajah continued to be undecided. Menon, who was in the thick of India's."²⁹⁹ intrigues on the question of Kashmir, being Secretary of the States Ministry at that time, writes, "In fairness to Maharajah Hari Singh, it must be said that situated as he was, it was not easy for him to come to a decision ... But there was an obvious time of action which the Maharajah might have taken. He could have called a conference of representatives of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and discussed the

²⁹⁴ *Betrayal in India*, by D. F. Karaka, p. 179.

²⁹⁵ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 355.

²⁹⁶ *Two Nations and Kashmir*, by Lord Birdwood, p. 43.

²⁹⁷ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 357.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

²⁹⁹ *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, by Pyarelal, p. 394.

question with them."³⁰⁰ Hari Singh was a Maharajah and he believed he had the divine right to take all decisions on behalf of his people, whether they liked them or not.

The date for the transfer of power was in sight, and shortly before that day, Kashmir informed Pakistan and India it was ready to sign a Standstill Agreement with both the Dominions. India did not relish the idea of Kashmir signing an agreement with Pakistan and, therefore, the Government of India took no immediate decision, and Menon explains "We wanted time to examine its implications ... Coming to the composition of the population, the State had its own peculiar problems. Moreover, our hands were already full and, if truth be told, I for one had simply no time to think of Kashmir".³⁰¹ Sheikh Abdullah, addressing the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir on 5th November 1951, said India had refrained from signing the Standstill Agreement in 1947 as it considered such an agreement without the approval of the peoples' representatives would be invalid. And yet, it must be remembered, when two months later the Maharajah signed the Instruments of Accession with India, the Government of India accepted it readily, although it was done without obtaining the verdict of the people. Quaid-e-Azam, however, made an immediate decision, and Pakistan signed with the Maharajah the Standstill Agreement on its presentation. The hidden hand of India was, however, busy, and it was helped by the State's new Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan, who had pro-Indian sympathies. He was later on rewarded by India and made a judge of the Supreme Court and finally he retired as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India. Under India's instigation, Mahajan wrote a letter on 18th October 1947 to Quaid-e-Azam, in his capacity as Governor-General of Pakistan, accusing Pakistan of withholding certain supplies to Kashmir and blaming Pakistan for other violations of the Standstill Agreement. On the 20th, Quaid-e-Azam himself replied to the Government of Kashmir explaining the point of view of Pakistan, and repudiated all insinuations and allegations contained in the letter of protest. The Quaid took objection to the tone and temper of the communication, as he deemed it to be insulting and derogatory to the Government of Pakistan. The letter of the Government of Kashmir was a clear indication as to which way thought currents were flowing in the mind of the Maharajah.

By the end of October the Maharajah appeared to be leaning heavily towards India and The Times of London commented on 25th October 1947, "Indications are that the Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, has lately been much influenced by representations made by Mr. Gandhi who visited Kashmir three months ago and by other Congress leaders". It was obvious to the people of Pakistan that the unholy conspiracy between the Maharajah of Kashmir and the Government of India, headed by a Pandit from Kashmir, may result in that State surrendering to India.

³⁰⁰ *The Integration of the Indian States*, by V. P. Menon, pp. 394-395.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

Poonch was a principality of the State of Kashmir. While its Raja was a Hindu, its population was overwhelmingly Muslim. The Maharajah of Kashmir had made inroads on the constitutional rights of the Raja of Poonch, and imposed crippling restrictions on the people of Poonch, which the Poonchis resisted. Kashmir let loose a reign of terror and oppression, and the brave Poonchis fought for their inalienable rights. Kashmir troops marched in their thousands into Poonch, and most of them, being Muslims deserted and joined hands with the Poonchis. As a result, an "Azad Kashmir" Government was set up under Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim. The revolt against the tyrannical Maharajah of Kashmir and his Dogra troops, known for their anti-Muslim feelings, spread and soon the Azad Government had about 30,000 soldiers at its command. The Government of Kashmir was out to exterminate Muslims in the State and, with this end in view, from August 1947 started a systematic persecution of Muslims in the State. About 7,000 old muzzle-loader rifles were distributed by the State authorities among Hindus. Then came 15th August, which the Muslims of Kashmir were celebrating "Pakistan Day". Subsequently, the Statesman of Calcutta of 4th February 1948 carried a graphic account of atrocities perpetrated on Muslims, written by Richard Symonds, "Early in August (1947) as the partition of India drew near, there were many meetings and demonstrations in Poonch in favor of Kashmir joining Pakistan. Martial Law was introduced and meetings fired on". On the 26th, the State forces and the police killed hundreds of Muslims at Bagh in Poonch. From this day onwards, persecution of Muslims continued and thousands were butchered mercilessly.

On October 15th, the Maharajah of Kashmir sent a telegram to the Government of Pakistan protesting against infiltration of Pakistanis into Kashmir territory. The telegram went on to warn the Government of Pakistan that the Government of Kashmir "will have no option but to ask for assistance to withstand the aggression, and unfriendly actions of the Pakistan people along our border". It was clear to the authorities in Pakistan that under one pretext or the other, the Maharajah was preparing to seek active armed assistance from India. Quaid-e-Azam, who was taking keen personal interest in Kashmir affairs must have been perturbed at the ominous threat in the telegram. A reply was dispatched from Karachi in which the Government of Pakistan took a serious view of the Maharajah's threat but suggested a meeting between the representatives of the two Governments to jointly discuss the question. On the 18th, came another telegram from the Maharajah, ignoring the conciliatory gesture of the Government of Pakistan, but repeating he would call for assistance from outside to meet the situation.

It was obvious to the Quaid the Kashmir question had entered a serious phase, which Pakistan, could not view with complacency. He, as Governor-General, sent a strongly worded reply to Kashmir, which, inter alia, said "The threat to enlist outside assistance shows clearly that the real aim of your Government's policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Dominion, as a *coup d'état*, by securing the intervention and assistance of that Dominion. This policy is naturally creating deep resentment and grave

apprehension among your subjects, 85 percent of whom are Moslems. The proposal made by my Government for a meeting with your accredited representatives is now an urgent necessity...." ³⁰²This telegram repeated Pakistan's previous proposal for an impartial inquiry by duly nominated representatives of Pakistan and Kashmir. The Maharajah, however, continued to play his cards according to a set plan. "The rot continued and increased in tempo with the infiltration of members of the R.S.S.S., Akali Sikhs and the I.N.A. into Jammu Province throughout October. Finally it culminated with the massacre of two crowded convoys of Moslem evacuees who had been promised a safe conduct to Pakistan".³⁰³ The persecution and massacre of Muslims forced over 500,000 Muslims to flee Kashmir, to seek shelter in Azad Territory and to trek for security into the borders of Pakistan. Lord Birdwood continues, "It is hardly surprising that the Moslem Kashmiris accumulating in the western extremities of the State came to think of the fight as for nothing less than survival. The motives of the Kashmir State Government in prosecuting so disgraceful a campaign of persecution are not difficult to divine. A systematic modification of the population in favor of the non-Moslem elements would obviously achieve popular support for an extension of their own precarious term of office".³⁰⁴ The tales of merciless butchery that these Kashmiris brought with them eclipsed the terrors of Gengiz Khan and this incensed the minds of the volatile Muslim tribesmen.

The Government of India was busy inciting Hindus of Kashmir and intriguing through them to force the Maharajah to accede to India, against the obvious wishes of the overwhelmingly Muslim population of the State who wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. As a part of this conspiracy by India, V.P. Menon flew into Srinagar on 25th October, inducing the Maharajah to save himself and his dynasty by asking India to rush military aid to Kashmir. But, Menon demanded his pound of flesh—namely, that Kashmir should accede to India. The Maharajah, who had vacillated over this question for some time, was helped by his pro-Indian Prime Minister and other advisers to accept the offer. Menon, after hopeful talks in Kashmir, returned to Delhi only to fly back to Srinagar the following day. He came with prepared documents, and the weak and panic-stricken Maharajah was forced to sign on the dotted lines. The letter of accession dated 26th October 1947, signed by the Maharajah and addressed to Lord Mountbatten, said that Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan, but it had not acceded to either so far. The letter went on to record the Maharajah's negotiations with both the Dominions for a Standstill Agreement, "The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government". The Maharajah asked for military assistance from India, and in return for this anticipated help, the Maharajah wrote, "I attach the instruments of accession for acceptance by your Government". He asked for immediate

³⁰² *Danger in Kashmir*, by J. Korbd, pp. 68-69.

³⁰³ *Two Nations and Kashmir*, by Lord Birdwood, p. 51.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

assistance, "Mr. V.P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and will explain it to you".

Indian conspiracy had succeeded and there was jubilation in the Indian Capital on the return of Menon with the precious letter safe in his pocket.

India's stand on Kashmir was in glaring contrast to what it had maintained with regard to the question of Hyderabad State. Commenting on this aspect of Indo-Pakistan relations, K. Sarwar Hasan writes, "As a consequence of the transfer of power and in order that there should be no disturbance in the life of the State, the Maharajah entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. This agreement placed upon Pakistan, in respect to Kashmir, the same responsibility as were formerly borne by the Crown or the pre-partition Government of India. Hyderabad had entered a Standstill Agreement with India leading to India's claim ... that Hyderabad was under an obligation (a) to have no relations with any country other than India, and (b) to accede to India. *Pari passu*, because of the Standstill Agreement between Kashmir and Pakistan, Kashmir was (a) debarred from having any relations with any country other than Pakistan, and (b) under an obligation to accede to Pakistan. This would render Kashmir's accession to India invalid".³⁰⁵

On the 27th, Lord Mountbatten sent a cleverly worded letter of acceptance on behalf of the Government of India to the Maharajah of Kashmir. The latter consisted of two brief paras, the first of which was remarkably deceitful, as subsequent events were to prove. It said, "Your Highness' letter dated 26th October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr. V.P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Governments wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".³⁰⁶

The second para commenced with an ominous sentence, "Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian. Army to Kashmir, to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property, and honor of your people". It ended, "My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister".³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ *Pakistan and the United Nations*, by K. Sarwar Hasan, p. 93. 1960: Manhattan Publishing Co., New York.

³⁰⁶ *Two Nations and Kashmir*, by Lord Birdwood. p. 214.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

It is obvious from Mountbatten's letter to the Maharajah that the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". But India was to conveniently forget this solemn stipulation to satisfy her own selfish interests. Much has been written and said in condemnation of the duplicity and treachery of India over the episode of the so-called "accession" of Kashmir to India. Lord Birdwood writes, "I do not for a moment suggest that Lord Mountbatten had in mind any other development than the normal expectancy of the status quo to be followed by a plebiscite within a year. His previous attempt to persuade the Maharaja and his subsequent advocacy of an internationally controlled plebiscite are consistent with a perfectly unambiguous intention—for the people of Kashmir to settle the matter. It is far more probable that the opportunity for procrastination was quickly appreciated in Indian Government circles and has resulted in a play of words to screen intentions ever since".³⁰⁸

The news of Kashmir's accession to India came as a shock to Quaid-e-Azam, who was at that time in Lahore on an official visit. He was immediately in consultation with General Gracie in Rawalpindi, who was Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan's army. At Quaid-e-Azam's suggestion it was agreed that Lord Mountbatten and Nehru would come to Lahore on 28th October to discuss the Kashmir issue with the Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, when the Indian Cabinet met to ratify the decision, there was general opposition to the Lahore meeting. Strangely, it was given out after the Cabinet meeting that Nehru was ill and was not in a position to fly to Lahore, and so Lord Mountbatten reached Lahore alone on 1st November. On the previous day, in order to put the record right, the Government of Pakistan issued a statement, repudiating the fraudulent and arbitrary action of the Maharajah of Kashmir in signing the instruments of accession with India. Quaid-e-Azam suggested to Mountbatten that both the Governors-General should issue a joint appeal for cessation of hostilities on both sides within forty-eight hours. If this was not done, then the two Governors-General should take upon themselves the administration of Kashmir jointly and the two would then have the responsibility jointly to hold a plebiscite over the question of Kashmir's accession. Mountbatten sulked from this fair and just solution and played for time, saying he would have to consult his Cabinet.

Alan Campbell-Johnson records in his diary when Lord Mountbatten met Quaid-e-Azam, the latter accused the Government of India as being responsible for the dangerous situation that had arisen in Kashmir, and Mountbatten accused Pakistan in this connection, "Thus it went on until Jinnah could no longer conceal his anger at what he called Mountbatten's obtuseness".³⁰⁹ Campbell-Johnson continues, "Jinnah's mood was one of depression almost fatalism. He kept harping on the masochistic theme that India was out to destroy the nation of his making".³¹⁰

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

³⁰⁹ *Mission with Mountbatten*, p. 229.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

Summing up the impressions of the Quaid given to him by Mountbatten, Campbell-Johnson writes, "Jinnah is now wholly dedicated to the aims of his statecraft".³¹¹ As a weak defence, in order to nullify Quaid-e-Azam's proposal. Nehru in a broadcast from Delhi on 2nd November said, "We are prepared, when peace and law and order have been" established, to have a referendum in Kashmir under international auspices".

On 1st January 1948, India decided to refer the Kashmir question to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations. The debate opened in the Security Council on 15th January 1948, with Sir Gopalaswamy Ayyanger arguing the Indian case, while Pakistan's spokesman was Sir Zafarullah Khan, who presented Pakistan's case in a convincing and forceful manner in a speech that lasted over five hours. On the 20th, the Council decided to send out to Kashmir a three-man Commission. Josef Korbel records that this Commission was not sent out immediately, "And the United Nation documents do not offer an explanation, for this omission. Instantly the bitter wrangling broke out again, in an intensified form".³¹² The Commission, however, left for Karachi by plane on 5th July 1948, and when they reached Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam was in bad health, recuperating at Ziarat. His health went on deteriorating with alarming rapidity, and he could see that when Pakistan needed him so much to handle the Kashmir question and negotiate with United Nation's representatives in Pakistan, he, unfortunately, was lying in bed under his doctors' advice, a sick man.

Between 1948 and 1965, the Kashmir question has been often debated by the Security Council, Pakistan ably presenting an irrefutable case for an early and impartial plebiscite. Often Pakistan's representatives in their speeches have drawn the attention of world delegates in the General Assembly to the explosive Kashmir question. But India continues to be in illegal occupation of Kashmir, which is in fact a military occupation, using a fraudulent accession by an individual as the basis of its usurpation. The brave Kashmiri Muslims continue to groan under the heels of the Indian army, oppressed and persecuted by a Government, which is not prepared to concede to them their inalienable right of self-determination.

The Maharajah of Kashmir, whose anti-Muslim attitude was responsible for the misery and suffering of the citizens of his State, met his nemesis two years after he signed the instruments of accession with India. On 20th June 1949, he was forced to unceremoniously leave his State for Bombay, unwept and unsung. Lord Birdwood comments, "Having used the ruler conveniently to satisfy legal obligations, India lost interest in his fate. He may not have merited State mourning. But his departure does lend the legality of accession a somewhat artificial appearance".³¹³

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

³¹² *Danger in Kashmir*, by Josef Korbel, p. 104.

³¹³ *Two Nations and Kashmir*, by Lord Birdwood. p. 62.

The birth of Pakistan brought in its wake so many grave problems – problems which threatened the security and the very existence of Pakistan. Its enemies, who had not reconciled themselves with its coming into being, were busy conspiring to strangulate Pakistan at its birth. Fortunately for Pakistan, there was Quaid-e-Azam to steer the ship of Pakistan's destiny to safety and to security. The Quaid was not a man to be overpowered by dangers and obstacles that confronted him. A brave fighter, he was at his best when beset with difficulties. In spite of his years and his failing health, he was for Pakistan in its initial days a great source of strength, hope and inspiration.

TO GOD HE RETURNED

Nature had gifted him with a giant's strength in so far as his determination was concerned to accomplish tasks that he set before himself; but it had clothed that will in a frail body, unable to keep pace with the driving force of his restless mind. It was bitter to be afflicted with health unable to stand the rigors of a life that is the common lot of a leader championing a difficult political cause, and to be gifted with a tenaciousness that wanted to triumph over all obstacles to lead his people to their ultimate destiny.

His political activities and responsibilities had increased manifold during the last ten years of his life, when he was already in the afternoon of his old age. Despite the advice of his doctors, he did not spare himself, refusing to take rest or respite. Work, work and more work. He drained away the last reserves of his energy like a spendthrift child of nature, and he plunged himself deeper and deeper into the stormy ocean of political struggle to the utter neglect of his health.

Since the Pakistan Resolution of 23rd March 1940 at Lahore, he whipped his failing health to make it keep pace with his ever increasing work. With a scattered and disorganized following as his only strength, he decided from that year onward to translate the demand for Pakistan into a heroic chapter of human history. Incessant travelling, long and arduous hours of work, and worries—the only reward that a political leader receives during his days of struggle were taking a heavy toll; but he paid the price with a smile. His body that normally weighed around 112 lbs was rapidly losing weight, ounce by ounce, but he showed supreme indifference to such private matters as his personal health. That should not interfere with his responsibilities. His doctors were once again arguing and pleading with him to pay at least some attention to physical fitness. But they never succeeded in stopping the onward rush of the mighty ocean of his will that wanted to sweep away all obstacles standing as hindrances in the path of his people.

He was known to have had a serious setback in his health some time in 1941, and it was probably the beginning of the sickness that ultimately claimed his life. He could have got over it, if he had taken proper care; if he had kept regular hours; if he had given up exposing himself to wind and rain as he toured the sub-continent, almost uninterruptedly.

Alone, he grappled successfully with gigantic problems. enough to break the heart of a man of lesser mettle. He towered above his following. Like many heroes of history, however, he was at home with solitude. But once he was amidst his people, his radiating fire warmed their hearts from a distance. He knew he had a mission in life, and fate was transforming him into a man who had a rendezvous with destiny. How

could a person, leader of a hundred million people at a difficult period of their history, enjoy such commonplace luxuries as sleep, rest and leisure? The worries and cares of the day stood on the side-lines of his sub-consciousness; they did not completely melt in the warmth of a sound sleep. With the approach of dawn came fresh letters, fresh requests, new problems, and weighty decisions to be made. His was a soul that thirsted for service in a body that was worn out by overwork and ill-health. He kept up this feverish tempo of life for a number of years, in spite of his recurring bouts with ill-health that emaciated his body.

There was feverish activity in Delhi, as the dates for the inauguration of Pakistan and Hindustan as independent sovereign countries were drawing near. On 5th August 1947, Lord Mountbatten had a private meeting with Quaid-e-Azam, as the former had received frightening intelligence reports concerning conspiracies to assassinate the Quaid. Mountbatten, introduced a police officer from the Criminal Investigation Department from the Punjab, and Campbell-Johnson records, "This officer told of various statements made by instigators of disturbances arrested' after incidents. Their interrogations and intelligence from other sources implicated the Sikh leaders in a number of sabotage plans, including a plot to assassinate Jinnah during the State drive at the Independence celebrations in Karachi next week".³¹⁴ The Quaid, in spite of these lurking attempts on his life, remained unmoved and decided that the State drive on Independence Day would take place as scheduled, being a high-priority State function for that auspicious day.

Two days later, Quaid-e-Azam left Delhi and flew into Karachi, where he was born seventy-one years ago in order to assume his responsibilities as the first Governor-General of Pakistan. As he drove from the airport to the Governor-General's House, thousands thronged the streets, cheering him as the liberator of their nation, which had been suppressed and held in political bondage for so many long decades. Little did they realize his health was in bad shape now, when they needed him so much. He was at the highest point of his personal triumph; Pakistan, for which he had labored unceasingly for many years, had found its place on the map of the world and he was its Governor-General designate. Neither personal success nor victory of the cause that he symbolized had turned his head. Those of us that watched him that day saw humility in his eyes, not arrogance; a sense of overwhelming responsibility, not elation.

Two days later, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah gave a dinner at the Karachi Club in honor of the Quaid. As he sat on the sofa, before the dinner commenced, I could see fatigue writ large on his face. After the dinner he rose to make a suitable reply to the welcome speech of the host, "Yes, I am Karachi-born, and it was on the sands of Karachi that I played marbles in my boyhood. I was schooled at Karachi". In a reminiscent mood, he narrated landmarks of his early life – his stay in London, where he was called

³¹⁴ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p, 149. 1951.

to the Bar; his decision, to start practice in Bombay instead of Karachi; weeks and months of deep anxiety waiting for his first brief; then crowded years of political activity; and finally in Karachi as the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Towards the end of his speech, he paid a well-deserved tribute to his sister, "Miss Fatima Jinnah is a constant source of help and encouragement to me. In the days when I was expecting to be taken as prisoner by the British Government, it was my sister who encouraged me, and said hopeful things when revolution was staring me in the face. Her constant care is about my health".

On the 11th, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan met for the first time in Karachi, the atmosphere in the Assembly Hall surcharged with solemnity, and the proceedings commenced with a recitation from the Holy Quran. All of us in the galleries as well as members of the Constituent Assembly felt we were witnessing the first words being written on the first page of the history of a newly born independent country, Pakistan.

The very first enactment of the Constituent Assembly was to unanimously elect Mohammed Ali Jinnah as its President, the motion being carried with thunderous applause; and we in the galleries broke parliamentary practice and precedent by joining in the clapping, rising in our seats out of reverence for Quaid-e-Azam. A hushed silence descended in the Hall, as the Quaid rose to deliver his Presidential Address. After expressing his thanks, he said the Constituent Assembly had two main functions to perform, "The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future Constitution of Pakistan; and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan". Speaking about the revolution that had brought about Pakistan, he said, "It has been unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history of the world". He condemned bribery and corruption from which India had suffered, "That really is a poison. We must put it down with an iron hand ... Black marketing is another curse". He branded nepotism and jobbery as obnoxious evils, "This evil must be crushed relentlessly ... I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought, to bear upon me". Speaking of religious tolerance he said, "You are free; you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques, or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan". He solemnly pledged he would remain above prejudice or ill-will, partiality or favoritism. "I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fair play".

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan rose to move a resolution that the Constituent Assembly, in gratitude for his services to the nation and in order to make articulate the wishes of the people, confers upon Mohammed Ali Jinnah the title of "Quaid-e-Azam"—a title which the Muslims of India had lovingly bestowed on him during the anxious years before partition. In commending the resolution for acceptance, Liaquat Ali Khan called the Quaid "The Attaturk or Stalin of our State". The resolution was unanimously adopted. The Muslim League had adopted as its flag a green banner with a crescent in the centre. The Constituent Assembly decided in commemoration of the years of

struggle by their political organization, to adopt the same as the flag of Pakistan with only one modification—adding a white strip near the mast to denote the minorities of Pakistan.

Lord Mountbatten flew into Karachi from Delhi on the morning of 13th August to formally participate in the inauguration of the State of Pakistan and that was to be his last official duty as the Viceroy of British India. That night the Quaid entertained Lord Mountbatten to a State banquet. During the course of his speech, the Quaid proposed a toast for His Majesty the King. "This is one of the most momentous and unique occasions. Today, we are on the eve of complete transfer of power to the peoples of India, and there will emerge and establish two independent Sovereign Dominions of Pakistan and Hindustan on the appointed day, the 15th of August 1947 ... Such voluntary and absolute transfer of power and rule by one nation over others is unknown in the whole history of the world". The Quaid paid fulsome tribute to the role played by Lord Mountbatten, in the drama of the transfer of power to Pakistan and Hindustan, "As one who performed his task and duties magnificently". On Thursday, 14th August 1947 Quaid-e-Azam, accompanied by Miss Fatima Jinnah, drove in State to the Assembly Building for the official ceremonies, where Lord Mountbatten was to make the historic statement, with which would synchronise the birth of Pakistan. Lord and Lady Mountbatten followed after a little while. The compound of the Assembly building was jam-packed, so were the streets from where the State drive was to take place, hundreds of spectators sitting perilously in vantage positions all along the route, some dangling from roofs like bats from trees. The official ceremonies were impressive, in keeping with the historic occasion. After the ceremonies terminated, the Quaid and Mountbatten were sitting together in the coach, going back in State to the Governor-General's House. There had been so much talk among those that knew about an attempt that was expected to be made on the Quaid's life on this occasion. Quaid-e-Azam was fully aware of the grave risk involved, but he refused to be persuaded to abandon the State drive, which was an integral part of the official schedule. Slowly the procession proceeded, every second pregnant with anxiety. The coach was now inside the gates of the Governor-General's House; nothing untoward had happened on the way, and Campbell-Johnson records in his diary the Quaid said to Mountbatten, "Thank God I have brought you back alive".³¹⁵

To us Pakistanis, it was the day of our independence; to him, it was the moment of fulfillment. The destination had been reached; but the struggle was not yet over. The new State that emerged had to face many problems of gigantic magnitude, and the task of steering the ship of Pakistan's destiny to a safe harbor fell to his hands that were worn out with work. But under his inspired leadership the nation showed it had the will to rise with its head erect. Its determination to succeed proved greater than the overwhelming obstacles encountered, and its achievements came to be recognized as a

³¹⁵ *Mission with Mountbatten*, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, p. 156.

marvel in the art of nation-building. James A. Michener, a visitor to Pakistan in the early years, writes, "I have never seen so hard-working a Government as Pakistan's. It is literally licking itself up by its own intellectual boot-straps."³¹⁶

His Private Secretary, S. M. Yusuf, has given in an article in the *Dawn* intimate glimpses of the dedicated manner in which he discharged his duties as the first Governor-General of Pakistan in those difficult days. Yusuf writes, the Law Department of the Government of Pakistan did not have a sufficient number of trained draftsmen, and "The drafting of some of the bills and ordinances left a lot to be desired". The Quaid would not be content to agree in principle to a piece of legislation, he would carefully scan every line and word of the proposed legislation, as "He had a wholesome aversion to signing a document the full implications of which were not known to him". The Quaid, according to Yusuf, wanted the administration to be alert and "They should not expect me (Quaid-e-Azam) to come to their rescue, if they delay matters without adequate cause". Yusuf proceeds to record, "A Provincial Government once wanted the Quaid-e-Azam's assent to the promulgation of an ordinance a few days before its Legislature was due to meet. Assent was refused, for bypassing the Legislature was not to be countenanced". About his devotion to duty, Yusuf records "Sickness and failing health did not deter the Quaid-e-Azam from attending to his duty. He went on working to the very last and continued to deal with important State papers until his death". This is corroborated by Farukh Amin, also on his Secretariat staff, "The Quaid-e-Azam never rested a moment after he became Governor-General and he literally worked himself to death".

On 15th August 1947 was published the first issue of the Gazette of Pakistan, and Pakistan was now officially set on its course as an independent sovereign State. The Gazette said, "Whereas Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah has been appointed by His Majesty to be the Governor-General of Pakistan, the said appointment is hereby notified and it is proclaimed that the said Governor-General of Pakistan has this day assumed his office". It was ordered to accordingly notify the Governments of East Bengal, West Punjab, Sindh, the North-Western Frontier Province, Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan, and that "it be read at the troops in different garrisons and at all principal naval, military and air force stations", and that a copy of it be sent to all the Ministries of the Government of Pakistan. That same Gazette contained a further notification, "His Excellency the Governor-General has been pleased to appoint Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr. I. I. Chundrigar, Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal, Mr. Fazlur Rehman to be Ministers of the Government of Pakistan". Another notification on the same day said that the Governor-General had made "the following distribution of portfolios", and then followed allocation of portfolios to the seven Ministers.

³¹⁶ *The Voice of Asia*, by James A. Michener, p. 293: Bantam Books, New York.

It is doubtful if in the pages of world history any new nation had to face such difficulties as were faced by Pakistan at its birth. A whole Government had overnight descended into Karachi to administer the affairs of a country of seventy million people, without having so much as an adequate Secretariat Building. All the Ministries and Government departments had to make make-shift arrangements to house them in improvised barrack-type office accommodation. Often even such elementary necessities as chairs, tables, typewriters, stationery and writing material were lacking. To add to all this, the housing problem in Karachi became intensely acute. It was a city of about 250,000 people, and it had suddenly zoomed into world prominence as the Capital of the fifth largest State in the world, with people overflowing on the roads and pavements, with a roof of mats stuck to four poles hurriedly dug in the ground, wherever open space was available, in order to find shelter for themselves. James A. Michener, describing Karachi of those days, writes, "Pakistan is one of the thrilling nations of Asia. It is literally being born before your eyes. Karachi, once a sleepy, unimportant seaport of 200,000, exploded overnight into a national capital of 150,000.³¹⁷ But Michener admits "Karachi is one of the few cities in Asia that has ... enough dedicated young men to contract a new society."³¹⁸ That reflected the spirit of the whole nation, rather than that of Karachi alone. There was scarcity of drinking-water; sewerage and drainage pipes were choked. All this was a challenge to a new nation, and the Quaid, seventy-one, but a willing and devoted worker, shouldered the responsibility to lead Pakistan on the road to prosperity and progress.

It is a truism that complete success is more fatal to heroic inspiration than complete failure. His life's work had been accomplished, and he had been rewarded with the fullest measure of success, but it did not damp his enthusiasm and zeal for more work in the service of his people. His physical strength had been sapped by the demon of ill-health, but his irrepressible spirit raised its head high, braving the challenges that independence brought to his nation. He wanted to face them courageously, to grapple with them, and to find solutions for them. He was a dedicated man, and he dug the mine of his physical strength to the last ounce of that metal to serve his people. To Pakistan, his untiring dedication and devotion was its richest asset in those early years, when her very existence was a question mark of history.

Hindu intrigues were actively undermining the economic fabric of Pakistan even before it came into existence. Trade and industry in that part of India which became Pakistan was almost exclusively in the hands of Hindus. The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, for instance, wrote in its issue of 6th May 1947 that the Punjab National Bank had decided to transfer the registered office of the Company from Lahore to Delhi. Two more important banks and two premier insurance companies", the Civil and Military Gazette continued, "are contemplating to move out of the Punjab. The total capital

³¹⁷ *The Voice of Asia*, by James A. Michener, p. 312.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

under flight is estimated at Rs. 250 crores." The Gazette also reproduced the words of a Hindu banker, "After us the deluge. We are leaving Pakistan an economic desert". That epitomizes the wishful thinking of Hindus who began to migrate to India in their thousands after the establishment of Pakistan.

Partition brought in its wake brutal killings of Muslims all over Hindustan, particularly in East Punjab, Delhi, Calcutta, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Even Maulana Azad, an inveterate opponent of Pakistan, had to admit in his book that on the very next day, after independence the Indian cabinet received startling reports, "It was learnt that in the East Punjab, Hindu and Sikh mobs had attacked Muslim villages. They were burning houses and killing innocent men, women and children". Azad writes that East Punjab Ministers came rushing to Delhi and "We (the Government of India) asked them why they had not called upon the military. In despair they said that troops stationed in the Punjab were no longer reliable and not much help could be expected from them". Azad goes on to describe the condition of Muslims in Delhi, under the very nose of the Government of India, "Murder stalked the town (Delhi) ... Some Sikhs took a leading part in organizing these murderous attacks in Delhi". In Delhi, just as in East Punjab, the Indian Army refused to take orders to save innocent Muslims from being mercilessly butchered, and Azad laments, "The attitude of the Army now became a critical issue ... The majority of troops in Delhi were Hindus and Sikhs". Azad continues that, besides the city proper, suburbs like Karolbagh, Lodhi Colony, Subzi Mandi and Sadar Bazar were also engulfed by the flames of communal frenzy against Muslims. "In all these areas, life and property were no longer safe ... At one stage, the situation in these areas became so bad that no Muslim householder could go to sleep at night with the confidence that he would be alive next morning". Azad narrates he went with military officers to two Muslim areas, "I found the Muslims completely demoralized and suffering from a sense of utter helplessness". Several Magistrates were appointed to maintain law and order in Delhi. About them, Azad writes, "I regret to say that the selections were not always very happy and that some of these Magistrates failed in their duty". As a last resort, the Government of India decided to shift Muslims of Delhi to camps, protected by the military, and one such camp was in Purana Qila or the Fort of Delhi, "A large number of Muslims were assembled in the Fort and lived in these bastions throughout almost the whole of the winter."³¹⁹

As Lord Mountbatten flew from Karachi to Delhi on 14th August, he was accompanied, among other members of his staff, by Alan Campbell-Johnson, who records, "As we passed over the boundary area of the Punjab we could see several large fires, beacons of ill-omen dominating the landscape for miles around."³²⁰

³¹⁹ These quotations are taken from the book, "*India Wins Freedom*", by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, pp. 209 to 216.

³²⁰ *Mission with Mountbatten*, p. 156.

Two days after independence, Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru, the two Prime Ministers, were on their way to Ambala and Amritsar, and Frank Moraes writes, "Nehru was shocked by the 'terrible orgy' he witnessed. He rebuked the Sikhs roundly."³²¹ When Gandhi arrived in Delhi on 9th September, he went to see the plight of Muslims of that city, and Frank Moraes confesses that Gandhi "was horrified by the gory spectacle which the capital presented."³²² On the same night Nehru appealed in a radio broadcast to Indians, lost in a frenzied hate, "During these last few days in the Punjab and in Delhi, I have supped my fill of horror ... I go to the countryside and people with spikes and all sorts of destructive weapons, when they see me, shout "*Mahatma Gandhi Ki Jai*" I feel ashamed to hear these cries from these people, who might have committed murder, loot and arson, in the name of Mahatma Gandhi". That night Gandhi told his prayer meeting that when he was visiting a Muslim refugee camp in Delhi, an old Muslim with his wife, their clothes torn to tatters, rose to greet him. Gandhi saw both husband and wife had deep knife wounds on their hands and faces. Gandhi said, "I put my head down in shame, when I saw them".

These harrowing tales of the woes of Muslims in Delhi reached Karachi, which added unbearable spiritual sorrow to the physical burden of an already over-worked Governor-General. The women of Karachi rose to the occasion, and under the leadership of Miss Fatima Jinnah, they collected woolen blankets and warm clothes in thousands to be rushed by plane to the camps in Delhi, where Muslims were passing a life of utter destitution and humiliation. Even food was not available to the Muslims in these camps, so said reports that reached Karachi from Delhi. Once again the women of Karachi undertook to supply this want, and tons of cooked food was on its way to Delhi by plane every day.

The sufferings of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir increased after independence. In the beginning of September the Maharajah of Kashmir promulgated the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance, empowering State troops to shoot at sight those actually caught in indulging in lawlessness, and, strange as it may seem, even those who, in their opinion, were about to act in prejudicial manner. This was the signal for systematic extermination of Muslims in that State, and under the pretext of this Ordinance five battalions were rushed into Kashmir. The men of the armed forces indulged in an orgy of shooting, looting and terrorizing of Muslims, and they were soon reinforced by Hindu R.S.S. extremists and Sikhs, who poured into Kashmir from East Punjab to add to the misery of the panic-stricken Kashmiri Muslims. On 20th September the Pakistan Times of Lahore carried the news that several troops of the Indian Union were found mysteriously infiltrating into Kashmir territory, carrying tommy-guns, hand-grenades and other deadly weapons. Terrorized Muslims were evacuating Kashmir to seek refuge in Pakistan.

³²¹ *Jawaharlal Nehru*, by Frank Moraes, p. 341.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 342.

On 20th September, two special trains carrying Defence Department personnel and their families were attacked by Jathas of Sikhs between Ludhiana and Amritsar. When the trains reached Lahore, there were 295 dead bodies, including more than 50 children and 29 women. Two days later, a Sikh Jatha of 5,000, armed with guns and revolvers, indulged in wanton killing of Muslim refugees on their way to Pakistan in a train, near Khalsa College, about three miles West of Amritsar. The gruesome tally of the dead revealed that 2,000 refugees were killed and wounded. Between 19th and 22nd September six trains carrying Muslim refugees into Pakistan were attacked, and thousand of them were massacred and mutilated between Delhi and Lahore.

Blood-curdling stories of slaughter, rape and looting of Muslims by Hindus incensed Muslims in Pakistan, and recriminations started in some parts of Pakistan against Hindus. It is difficult to say with any degree of precision what was the number of people killed on both sides of the border, but some responsible estimates place the figure around 200,000. A colossal and wanton destruction of precious human lives! And the trek of refugees to and from Pakistan had already commenced. Frank Moraes, commenting on the two-way movement of refugees, writes, "Not since the migration of the Israelites had history witnessed so mammoth a movement of the human race as started to cross the Punjab borders from late June (1947) until nearly a year later".³²³

Refugees were pouring into Pakistan from the Khokrapar border, and the Quaid wanted to be in Lahore to see arrangements that were being made for them in refugee camps, although his health was far from satisfactory. The choice that lay before him was between dereliction of duty to a cause that he had always held dearer than life and the loss of health that alone could sustain his life. He chose to listen to the voice of duty and to turn a deaf ear to the advice of his doctors. The individual in him had surrendered all its rights to the leader in him. So he was on the move from Karachi to Lahore in September 1947, about a month after his arrival in Karachi. Mir Laik Ali, who was Prime Minister of Hyderabad, flew into Lahore from Delhi to meet the Quaid. He writes he learnt that the Quaid's doctors had allowed only a few people to see him and had advised him not to work for more than one hour a day. Laik Ai was to see him from eleven to twelve in the morning, and his doctors agreed to this arrangement, on the express understanding that Quaid-e-Azam would do no other work on that day. The meeting between the two, where they discussed the grave issues of Hyderabad and Kashmir, lasted for three hours, putting him one hour behind his luncheon time of one o'clock. Laik Ali records, "Later, I learned that the strain of more than three hours of discussion with me had got him a fresh attack of weakness and a rise in temperature which lasted for several days."³²⁴ After a few days at Lahore, the Quaid returned to Karachi; once again he was in Lahore towards the end of October, after three anxious

³²³ *Jawaharlal Nehru*, by Frank Moraes, p. 337.

³²⁴ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali, p. 10, 1962. Pakistan Co-operative Book Society Ltd., Karachi.

weeks in Karachi. Achievement of Pakistan had meant for him only the end of one phase of his life and the beginning of another phase, equally important—of consolidating Pakistan and ensuring its stability. He was not going to desert his post at the period of crisis through which his nation was passing, and he did not spare himself.

There were clouds of despondency hovering over the skies of Pakistan, and he wanted to infuse cheer and hope to dispel any feeling of frustration and dejection. Addressing a mammoth rally at the University Stadium in Lahore on 30th October 1947, he said, "Some people might think that the June 3rd Plan was a mistake on the part of the Muslim League. I would like to tell them that the consequences of any other alternative would have been too disastrous to imagine ... Time and history will prove that. On the other hand, history will also record its verdict on those whose treachery and machinations let loose forces of disorder and disruption in this sub-continent causing the death of lakhs, enormous destruction of property and bringing about suffering and misery to many millions by uprooting them from their homes and hearths and all that was dear to them. The systematic massacre of defenseless and innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by the worst tyrants known to history. We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honor. We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours".

As he proceeded with his speech, his voice trembled with emotion, and for the first time he spoke of death in a public speech, "Along with this, keep up your morale. Do not be afraid of death. Our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honor of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a righteous cause ... Do your duty and have faith in God. There is no power on earth that can undo Pakistan. It has come to stay".

He had done what he could as the Head of State in the interests of the incoming refugees and, satisfied that they would receive all necessary attention, he returned to Karachi. The emotion of the occasion, aggravated by the sufferings of his people, had worn out not only his body, but also his spirit and soul. He was once again in bed, laid up with exhaustion and a mounting fever. In the meantime, pace of work of the Government of a country that had just emerged, starting its work from scratch, went on increasing from day to day. Files were pouring in, ministers and secretaries came to seek his advice, and peace and rest were impossible.

He oscillated between weeks of work and days of rest. He had promised the people of the Frontier Province he would visit Peshawar to personally express his gratitude to them for the wonderful work they had done in the referendum the previous year as a result of which the Frontier Province acceded to Pakistan. He would not let them down

and in order to fulfill a promise he had made, he proceeded in April 1948 to Peshawar, where a heavy programme awaited him. In his address to the students of Islamia College on 12th April, he said, "On this occasion the thought in my mind is the support and help that the movement for the achievement of Pakistan received from the student community, particularly of this province. I cannot help feeling that the unequivocal and unmistakable decision of the people of this Province to join Pakistan, which was given through the referendum held last year, was helped considerably by the contribution made by the students. I take particular pride in the fact that the people of this province have never and in no way lagged behind in the struggle for freedom and achievement of Pakistan".

The next day he drove to Risalpur, where he had to address the officers and men of the Royal Pakistan Air Force. India had held back military equipment that according to agreement at the time of partition, had to come to Pakistan, and our Air Force was without adequate aircraft and equipment. On that occasion, he said, "I know also that you are short of aircraft and equipment, but efforts are being made to procure the necessary equipment and orders for modern aircraft have also been placed. But aircraft and personnel in any numbers are of little use, unless there is a team spirit within the Air Force and strict sense of discipline prevails. I charge you to remember that only with discipline and self-reliance can the Royal Pakistan Air Force be worthy of Pakistan.

On 14th April, he called a meeting of Civil Officers at Government House in Peshawar. He met many of them, mixed freely with them, and in an informal talk to them he said, "The first thing that I want to tell you is this, that you should not be influenced by any political pressure, by any political party or individual politician. If you want to raise the prestige and greatness of Pakistan, you must not fall a victim to any pressure, but do your duty as servants to the people and the State, fearlessly and honestly. Service is the backbone of the State, Governments are formed, Governments are defeated, Prime Ministers come and go, Ministers come and go, but you stay on, and therefore there is a very great responsibility placed on your shoulders. You should have no hand in supporting this political party or that political party, this political leader or that political leader—this is not your business. Whichever Government is formed according to the constitution, and whoever happens to be the Prime Minister or Minister coming into power in the ordinary constitutional course, your duty is not only to serve that Government loyally and faithfully, but, at the same time, fearlessly maintaining your high reputation, your prestige, your honor and the integrity of your service. If you will start with that determination, you will make a great contribution to the building up of the Pakistan of our conception and our dream—a glorious State and one of the greatest nations in the world. While impressing this upon you on your side, I wish also to take the opportunity of impressing upon our leaders and politicians in the same way that if they ever try to interfere with you and bring political pressure to bear upon you, which leads to nothing but corruption, bribery and nepotism—which is a horrible disease and for which not only your province but others too, are suffering—if they try and interfere

with you in this way, I say, they are doing nothing but disservice to Pakistan ... May be some of you may fall victims for not satisfying the whims of Ministers. I hope it does not happen, but you may even be put to trouble not because you are doing anything wrong but because you are doing right".

A few days later, he addressed students of the Edwards College at Peshawar, where he recalled the day when he was "literally dismissed from this province in 1937". He recalled the days of defeat of the Muslim League in the Frontier, and then spoke of the change that had come over the province during the last two to three years.

He expressed his gratitude to the brave Pathans, who gave an overwhelming verdict in favor of Pakistan, want you to keep your heads up as citizens of a free and independent sovereign State. Praise your Government when it deserves. Criticize your Government fearlessly when it deserves. Certainly criticize fearlessly, when wrong is done. I welcome criticism By that method you will improve matters more quickly for the benefit of our own people".

While attending one of the open-air meetings held in Peshawar, the skies were overcast with foreboding and dark clouds. As the meeting proceeded, it began to drizzle. But thousands of people gathered there continued to keep their seats, undeterred by the heavy downpour. He was drenched to the bone, but he sat throughout the meeting, braving the inclement weather.

In June, exhausted and worn out, he left Karachi with its sticky and sultry heat, under his doctors advice, to rest at Quetta, where the climate was far better. However, he had ordered files to be sent to him, and thus he continued to work even though holidaying in Quetta.

Occasionally he accepted to attend public functions that were sought to be arranged by different sections of the citizens of Quetta, using these occasions to make his views known on important problems facing Pakistan at that time. While replying to a welcome address presented to him by the Quetta Parsi community, he said, "In the very nature of things it will take eighteen months to two years before the new constitution of Pakistan is ready... "

Continuing his reply to the address, he dwelt on the problems of minorities of Pakistan, "You know that it is the policy of my Government and myself that every member of every community irrespective of caste, color, creed or race shall be fully protected with regard to his life, property and honor and that there should be peace in Pakistan and law and order should be maintained at any cost".

The following day he addressed the officers of the Staff College, Quetta, and in an emphatic voice, he said, "One thing more. I am persuaded to say this because during

my talks with one or two high ranking officers I discovered that they did not know the implication of the Oath taken by the troops of Pakistan. Of course, an Oath is only a matter of form; what is more important is the true spirit and the heart. But it is an important form and I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed Oath to you 'I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the Constitution and the Dominion of Pakistan (mark the words Constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan) and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan Forces and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or sea and that I will observe and obey all commands of any officer set over me...' As I have said just now, the spirit is what really matters. I should like you to study the Constitution which is in force in Pakistan at present and understand its true constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the Constitution of the Dominion".

On the 15th, in reply to the Civil Address presented to him by the Quetta Municipality, he said it pained him to find the course of provincialism holding sway in every section of Pakistan, and he advised them to forget that they were Baluchis, Pathans, Sindhis, Punjabis, Bengalis but, to look upon themselves as Pakistanis first and last. Towards the end of his reply he said, "Representative Government and representative institutions are no doubt good and desirable, but when people want to reduce them merely to channels of personal aggrandizement, they not only lose their value but earn a bad name. Let us avoid that and it is possible only if, as I have said, we subject our actions to perpetual scrutiny and test them with the touchstone not for personal or sectional interest but of the good of the State".

He had accepted to perform the opening ceremony of the State Bank of Pakistan in Karachi on 1st July 1948, and the very first sentence of his speech on the opening of the State Bank explained his presence in spite of bad health, "The opening of the State Bank of Pakistan symbolizes the sovereignty of our State in the financial sphere ... As you have observed, Mr. Governor, in undivided India banking was kept a close preserve of non-Muslims and their migration from Western Pakistan has caused a good deal of dislocation in the economic life of our young State. In order that the wheels of commerce and industry should run smoothly, it is imperative that the vacuum caused by the exodus of non-Muslims should be filled without delay ... The abnormal rise in the cost of living has hit the poorer sections of society, including those with fixed incomes very hard indeed and is responsible to a great extent for the prevailing unrest in the country. The policy of the Pakistan Government is to stabilize prices at a level that would be fair to the producer, as well as to the consumer...."

We, who heard him on this occasion, realized Quaid-e-Azam was in bad health, his voice scarcely audible, pausing, coughing, as he proceeded with the text of his speech

He looked so pale and anemic, but within that emaciated body there burnt the dazzling flame of genius.

After five days' stay at Karachi, where he attended to some very important files, he went back to Quetta by air. Once again at Quetta requests began to pour in from various institutions, and demands were made from so many individuals and leaders, who were anxious to see him. He felt dejected that his health could not permit him to oblige them.

The Government of Hyderabad in the meantime was apprehensive that India may launch an armed attack on the State, and Mir Laik Ali was anxious to know what would be in that eventuality the attitude of the Government of Pakistan. He flew into Karachi, at much personal risk, "cutting across intercepting fighter planes", in order to see the Quaid in Quetta in this connection. The Quaid was in very bad health, and Laik Ali writes. "It was a little before eleven o'clock in the morning that I had reached Quetta. Every minute was hanging heavy on me. At one o'clock I was served with some luncheon. Most of the time I had spent with Miss Jinnah, hoping all along that the Quaid would soon recover enough to spare me a few minutes. Miss Jinnah kept frequently going into his room and returned disappointed each time that he was no better. Finally, she was able to convey to him that I was in Quetta and had been waiting for a long time in the other room. The Quaid, she told me, only with great difficulty, waved his fingers indicating that his agony was too great". Unable to see the Quaid, Laik Ali flew back to Karachi, where he met Liaquat Ali Khan, Zafarullah Khan and Ghulam Mohammad, I told them of the serious condition of health in which I found Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah at Quetta. They all looked surprised. All I could do was to impress upon them the seriousness and urgency of the situation. There was some talk of cabling to London for a specialist."³²⁵ Quaid-e-Azam's health was bad and his doctors were really worried. They decided to move him up to Ziarat, a few miles from Quetta, where it would be cooler than Quetta and decidedly more restful.

The Residency at Ziarat, where he stayed is a picturesque, old, double-storied building, standing like a watchful sentry on a rising hillock. It has spacious lawns and gardens, where the birds sing their morning hymns and their vespers, and the sweet-smelling junipers spray the breeze with their fragrance. A cluster of deep green fruit trees and rows upon rows of beds of flowers add to the scenic beauty of the place. Quaid-e-Azam, an ardent lover of flowers and greenery, must have fallen in love with its quiet and charm. Lt. Mazhar Ahmed, one of his A.D.Cs., describing Quaid-e-Azam's days at Ziarat wrote, "Here was neither the heat of Karachi nor the formality of the Governor-General's House. Here the Governor-General was just Quaid-e-Azam, and Quaid-e-Azam was just a man on a holiday. In the sitting room jokes were cracked, yams were spun, discussions were prolonged, and even the A.D.Cs. talked!"

³²⁵ *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, by Mir Laik Ali, p. 258, 1962.

According to Lt. Mazhar Ahmed, Quaid-e-Azam was in a happy mood during the first days of his stay in Ziarat. "He (Quaid-e-Azam) had a sharp sense of humor and was full of jokes and anecdotes for all occasion. At one time he was talking of his visit to the Jacko Hill in Simla and spoke of the monkeys that dwelt there. He had some peanuts in his pocket and threw a handful to a large number of monkeys at one place. He was surprised to see that no monkey moved; there was no mad rush amongst them. The mystery was soon solved when a big fat monkey moved down from a tree towards the peanuts and the monkeys gave way and stood in a line in silence, all the chirping having suddenly ceased. This fat monkey was their leader for whom they had exhibited so much discipline and respect. Even monkeys had discipline!

One day, while peaking to Lt. Ahmed, the Quaid expressed his horror at the massacre of Muslims, men, women and children, and the reign of terror let loose against them in India. The Quaid said to Lt. Ahmed, "It was nothing short of war. Undeclared war, but complete war on us ... I can understand them wanting to kill me; for to them then I was Pakistan. If I ceased to be, Pakistan would cease to be – but I cannot understand any one throwing poison in a well which was the only source of supply of water to a hospital where mercilessly butchered women and children were being nursed, It is not human. It is not even beastly".³²⁶

Farrukh Amin, also on the Quaid's staff at Ziarat, wrote in the *Dawn*, "Often in these days did I find him walking up and down his bedroom at dead of night".

It was obvious to those around him at Ziarat that his health was fast deteriorating and Lt. Ahmed writes, "Miss Fatima Jinnah who for years had been the Quaid's sole companion and who shared with the people of Pakistan their fanatical love for him, in these days of ill-health looked after the Quaid-e-Azam with an affection and devotion which only a sister is capable of. Often, she would go without sleep for nights on end, nursing him, humoring him, reading out to him, or just sitting by his side. Quaid-e-Azam's immense love for his sister was returned by her if anything with greater warmth. Her name for him in affection was Jinn, but he called her Fatima". Lt. Ahmed continues, "Towards the end though he continued to wear the clothes that he had, he stopped buying cloth manufactured in foreign countries. Home-made cloth, though coarse and hand-spun, found its way into his wardrobe. Miss Jinnah payed visits to Quetta handloom factories to give them encouragement".

S. M. Yusuf, his Private Secretary, who was close to him in those days, could discern the ravages that sickness was making on his health, but "sickness and failing health did not

³²⁶ The above extracts are reproduced from the *Dawn*, Karachi.

deter the Quaid-e-Azam from attending to his duty. He went on working to the very last and continued to deal with important State papers until his death".³²⁷

Saleh Mohammad was gardener at the Residency while Quaid-e-Azam stayed at Ziarat. Among his many chores was to take every morning into the bedroom of the Quaid a vase filled with flowers. Saleh Mohammad, describing Quaid's days at Ziarat, said to Yunus M. Saeed the Quaid liked carnations and roses most, but, "he never put them in his buttonhole". About his daily routine at Ziarat Saleh Mohammad said, "Every day a table and a chair was laid for him in the lawn and he used to work. It was only a few days before his departure that he stopped working". Saleh Mohammad said further, "The Quaid used to walk on the road that goes from the Residency to the swimming pool, the distance being about two furlongs. He used to walk slow and appreciate the juniper trees and wild flowers. After reaching the swimming pool he used to rest for some time and come back. Morning and evening, day after day, I went with him to the swimming pool and back to the Residency. There used to be a perpetual and unforgettable smile on his lips. I do not remember having seen him without this smile, not even during the worst days of his illness ... He was terribly weak during those days. But he was a brave man and even during the most hopeless days of his illness he did not lose hope". Then came the day Quaid-e-Azam was to leave for Quetta, "I went to him on the day he was to leave for Karachi". Saleh Mohammad relates, "To bid him good-bye, and to have a good look of him. When he looked at me he said, 'Saleh Mohammad, you will go with me up to Quetta and come back' ".

The condition of Quaid-e-Azam was getting worse every day, and Col. Illahi Bux, an eminent physician, was summoned to Ziarat towards the end of July. In spite of his physical disabilities, the Quaid's mind was active and alert, his spirit undamped and undaunted. He had won many battles in life; he faced his struggle against ill-health with confidence. For, as Farrukh Amin, who was on his personal staff at Ziarat, wrote in the Dawn they had seen the Quaid "so many times overcome the repeated illness by sheer will-power!" He had spent all his life treading the fiery path of struggle and defiance, and he did not want to end it in the ashes of defeat. He wanted to do so much, but he had so little time and strength left to do it. Nonetheless, he believed the candle should go on shedding its light until the dawn had taken over its task.

Col. Illahi Bux examined his patient, on whose health depended so much. The doctor decided advisable to get his blood and sputum examined. On the following day the necessary equipment arrived from Quetta, along with Dr. Siddiqui, the Civil Surgeon of Quetta, and Dr. Mahmood, the Clinical Pathologist. Samples of the Quaid's blood and sputum revealed on examination he was suffering from an infection of the lungs; it was thought he had been suffering from it for about two years. The Quaid showed considerable surprise, as he had never had any serious ailment, working as he did for

³²⁷ The above extracts are reproduced from the *Dawn*, Karachi.

the past thirty years for more than twelve hours a day. Yes, in spite of his doctor's warning, he must continue to work. He wanted to stand by his post as long as he could; for, he believed man can only struggle to the best of his light; what does it matter if the tongue of destiny is always dumb.

Under pressure from his doctors, he was ultimately forced to give up all work connected with his official duties as Governor-General. Disappointed, the Quaid kept himself away from his files, hoping he would be soon well to tackle the problems of Pakistan at its difficult period of history. No visitor was allowed to see him, but when M.A.H. Ispahani, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington, and one of the Lieutenants of the Quaid, came to the Residency at Ziarat, an exception was made in his case. He was to leave Pakistan within the next few days for Washington. Having talked with Quaid-e-Azam for about half an hour, Ispahani, realized that the great Leader, who had meant so much to the Muslims of this sub-continent, was in very bad health indeed. He could only hope and pray that the Quaid would recover. However, he said he would be only too willing to send immediately the best physicians and any medicine from the States that may be needed. With a heavy heart, Ispahani bade good-bye to Quaid-e-Azam.

In the meantime, at Dr. Illahi Bux's request, Dr. Riaz Ali Shah, Dr. Alam, the X-ray specialist, and Dr. Ghulam Muhammad, the Clinical Pathologist, arrived from Lahore, with the X-ray apparatus and equipment. Their examination and test confirmed the opinion and findings of Dr. Illahi Bux.

Towards the end of July, Liaquat Ali Khan arrived in Ziarat, accompanied by Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Secretary General of the Cabinet and he expressed his desire to see the Quaid. As soon as Quaid Azam was informed, he said the Prime Minister be brought into his room.

14th August 1948, when Pakistan was to celebrate its first anniversary of Independence, was drawing near and in spite of his doctor's advice to the contrary, he was working on the message he wanted to give to the nation on that occasion. He was busy at it, his failing health notwithstanding. The message, released on Independence day, said, "Remember, that the establishment of Pakistan is a fact of which there is no parallel in the history of the world ... I have full faith in my people ... Disappointed in their efforts by other means to strangle the new State at its very birth, our enemies yet hoped that economic man oeuvres would achieve the object they had at heart. With all the wealth of argument and detail, which malice could invent or ill-will devise they prophesied that Pakistan would be left bankrupt. And what the fuel and sword of the enemy could not achieve, would be brought about by the ruined finances of the State. But these prophets of evil have been thoroughly discredited. Our first budget was a surplus one; there is a favorable balance of trade, and a steady and an all-round improvement in the economic field".

A few days later doctors found his blood pressure. very low, and there was swelling on his feet. After a prolonged conference the doctors held that, in their opinion, the altitude of Ziarat was not good for him in that condition of health. The Quaid agreed with their suggestion, but wished to be shifted to Quetta after 14th August The doctors were, however, not prepared to wait until then, and so ultimately Quaid-e-Azam left Ziarat for Quetta on 13th August.

The car moved slowly to avoid jerks and bumps, taking four hours to reach Quetta. As soon as they reached the Residency in Quetta, the doctors examined him and found he had stood the journey well.

His health began to improve and Dr. Illahi Bux suggested he should start attending about an hour a day to his flies, in order to engage his active mind in some light work.

Eid-ul-Fitr was to fall that year on 27th August, and he was busy preparing his Eid day message to the Nation. In this message, he wrote, "It is only with united effort and faith in our destiny that we shall be able to translate the Pakistan of our dreams into reality ... For us the last Eid-ul-Fitr which followed soon after the birth of Pakistan was marred by the tragic happenings in East Punjab. The blood bath of last year and its aftermath—the mass migration of millions—presented a problem of unprecedented magnitude. To provide new moorings for this mass of drifting humanity strained our energies and resources to breaking point. The immensity of the task very nearly overwhelmed us and we could only just keep our heads above water. The brief span of 12 months was not sufficient to see all the Mohajreen settled in profitable employment in Pakistan. Considerable progress has been made in resettling them but a good many remain to be rehabilitated. We cannot rejoice till everyone of them has been put on his feet again. I am sanguine that by next Eid this formidable and intractable problem will have been solved and all the refugees absorbed to Pakistan's economy as useful members of society". Continuing his message, he wrote, "My Eid message to our brother Muslim States is one of friendship and goodwill. We are all passing through perilous times. The drama of power politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir should serve as an eye-opener to us. It is only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt in the counsels of the world. Let me, therefore, appeal to you—in whatever language you may put, when the essence of my advice is boiled down, it comes to this—that every Mussalman should serve Pakistan honestly, sincerely and selflessly".

These turned out to be his last recorded words.

By a resolution dated 20th January 1948, the Security Council had set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, commonly known as U.N.C.I.P., to make proposals for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir and to report on other ancillary matters. The members of the Commission were on a visit to Pakistan and India in the first week

of July 1948, discussing various possibilities with the two Governments. The situation in Kashmir was grave from Pakistan's point of view, as the Commander-in-Chief had earlier reported to the Government of Pakistan that the military build-up of India, started in February 1948, had reached alarming proportions, giving indication that India was feverishly preparing to soon launch a general offensive. The Commander-in-Chief recommended, "If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if the civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera".³²⁸ The Kashmir dispute was being discussed by the Security Council and the Government of Pakistan had to take important decisions. Quaid-e-Azam was in Ziarat and then he had been removed to Quetta and the Government wanted his guidance and advice on the – matter of Pakistan's stand *vis a vis* the question of Kashmir. The Quaid summoned Choudhari Mohammad Ali to Quetta on 9th September in this connection. Choudhari Mohammad Ali, recalling his talks with the Quaid on this occasion, said, "He was most eager and anxious that I inform him of the latest developments regarding Kashmir. I could see he was in a very bad state of health. He was experiencing difficulty in breathing and looked pale and exhausted. But, despite his age and sickness, his mind was as alert and clear as ever".³²⁹

In the first days of September, the doctors attending on the Quaid felt as if chances of his recovery were receding. To add to his difficulties, the altitude of Quetta was having an adverse effect on his health, as he was finding difficulty in breathing, making it necessary to frequently give him oxygen. Worry and despair weighed heavily on those around him, and they spent their time in anxious days and sleepless nights. His end was drawing near at a time when he knew there was so much he was expected to do for his nation. In spite of afflictions of ill-health, his mind continued to bear the burden of responsibilities of State. The problems confronting the new State were his unshakable pre-occupation, and often in his sleep he would "Pakistan". His subconscious self revealed the innermost mumble the words, "Kashmir", "Refugees", "Constitution", wishes of an anxious heart. In a desperate attempt to save his life, it was decided to remove him from the altitude of Quetta to the sea-level of Karachi. Discreetly, the news was conveyed to Quaid-e-Azam that it was essential to leave Quetta at once for Karachi. The Viking of the Governor-General was ordered to fly immediately to Quetta, and the doctors decided on 11th September they should leave for Karachi at two in the afternoon. As he was being taken on a stretcher into the cabin of the Viking, the pilot and the crew lined up to give him a salute. He raised his feeble and trembling hand with difficulty to return the salute.

³²⁸ Quoted in *Pakistan and The United Nations*, by K. Sarwar Hasan, p. 136, 1960": Manhattan Publishing Company, New York.

³²⁹ Choudhri Mohammad Ali to the Author.

He was laid comfortably in the seats that had been converted into an improvised bed in the front cabin, and with him sat Miss Fatima Jinnah, and the nurse, Sister Dunham. The pilot had warned the doctors he would have to fly at a high altitude for some time, and as soon as he had crossed the mountains of Baluchistan, he would fly at a comfortable altitude. Oxygen cylinder and gas mask were ready, and oxygen was given to him while flying at a high altitude.

After about two hours' flying, the Viking landed at Mauripur Airport; it was 4.15 in the afternoon. Here he had landed about a year ago, full of hope, full of confidence he would build Pakistan into a great nation. Thousands had thronged to welcome him, including Cabinet Ministers and members of the diplomatic corps. But that day, as instructed in advance, there was no one at the airport. Colonel Geoffrey Knowles, the Military Secretary of the Governor-General, was there to receive the party. The Quaid was carried on a stretcher to a military ambulance that had been kept ready to drive him to the Governor-General's House. Miss Fatima Jinnah and Sister Dunham sat with him in the ambulance, while other members of the party left in cars in advance, only a Cadillac car with the doctors and the Military Secretary was following the slow-moving ambulance.

After it had covered about four miles, the ambulance coughed, as if gasping for breath, and came to a sudden stop. Something had gone wrong with it. What could be done? The driver started fumbling with the engine; but, obstinately, it refused to move, in spite of his coaxing.

Usually there is a strong sea-breeze in Karachi, which keeps the temperature down and relieves the oppressiveness of a warm day. But that day there was no breeze, and the heat was unbearable. To add to his discomfort, scores of flies buzzed around his face, and his hands had lost their strength to raise themselves to ward them off. The party waited for another ambulance to come, every minute an eternity of agony. He could not be shifted to the Cadillac, as it was not big enough for the stretcher. And so they waited. Hoping.....

Nearby stood hundreds of huts of refugees, who went about their business, not knowing that their Quaid, who had given them the promised homeland, was in their midst lying helpless in an ambulance that could not proceed on its journey. Cars honked on their way; buses and trucks screamed to their destinations; and the Quaid lay immobilized in an ambulance that refused to move an inch. A precious life ebbed away, drop by drop, breath by breath.

They waited for over one hour, and no hour in their life could have been so long and painful. Then came another ambulance. He was carried on the stretcher to the newly arrived ambulance, and the party proceeded, reaching the Governor-General's House a little after six o'clock. He was gently put into his bed, almost two hours after he had landed at Mauripur Airport. Two hours from Quetta to Karachi, and two hours from Mauripur Airport to the Governor-General's House!

At about 9.30 PM., the Quaid showed signs of acute discomfort. His doctors were by his bedside, examining him. "At 9-50 Dr. Baksh leaned over and whispered, 'Sir we have given you an injection to strengthen you, and it will soon have its effect. God willing, you are going to live'. Quaid-e-Azam moved his head and spoke for the last time: he said faintly, "No, I am not".³³⁰

A few minutes later, while sleeping peacefully, he breathed his last.

An ominous silence descended in that room, where he lay.

The news of his death spread fast and wide. The huge iron-gates of the Governor-Generals House, where strict security measures prevent unauthorized entry, stood wide open. Men and women, old and young, started pouring in.

I was among the first to arrive. There was sorrow on every face; a tear in every eye. I dragged myself on heavy feet into the room, where the Quaid lay. Among the few in the room were Miss Fatima Jinnah, Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, Ikramullah, Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, Yusuf Haroon, M.A. Rangoonwalla, and A.M. Qureshi. I looked in the direction of the bed. In a language without words or voice that plain white sheet of cloth that covered his body told the sorry tale. I stood there speechless, tears racing down my eyes. I realized my nation, one year old, had been orphaned that day.

An old lady burst into the room, sobbing. She came and stood near us. She raised her hands in prayer. In a voice that mirrored the anguish of our Nation, she chanted the words of the Holy Quran—

إِنَّا لِلَّهِ وَإِنَّا إِلَيْهِ رَاجِعُونَ

"From God he came
To God he returned".

³³⁰ *Jinnah*, by Hector Bolitho, p. 225.

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