Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

From Zufikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto

Saeed Shafqat

ROUTLEDGE

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN FROM ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO TO BENAZIR BHUTTO

SAEED SHAFQAT

To the memory of my parents

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The subject matter of this research has been the constraints and limitations of the successor civilian regimes in the post military hegemonic political system. How has the military helped or hampered the prospects of democracy and development in Pakistan? How has the military influenced the conduct and behavior of political leaders, political parties and parliamentary democracy? How have the civilian leaders responded to the policies of the military regimes? This study attempts to assess and evaluate the impact of military rule on the society, economy and political system of Pakistan. The origins of this study date back to my doctoral research, during 1980's, at the Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. As a doctoral candidate I benefitted enormously from exchange of views with Professor Francine Frankel, Professor Fredrick Frey, Professor Eugene Donald Smith. I am grateful to Professor Frankel and Frey for incisive remarks and valuable theoretical insights. Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstien was a constant source of inspiration and encouragement.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent decades some very interesting and insightful literature has appeared on the study of civil-military relations in the developing countries and also the "newly emerging democracies,"[1] Between 1973–1996, some forty countries made transition from authoritarian or military regimes to civilian regimes. It helped sharpen our focus on "transition" from authoritarian regimes to democratic order. In the process we got some useful conceptual and theoretical framework analyzing the changing nature of civil-military relations in the developing countries. This literature has also drawn our attention to difficulties as regime change occurred from military to civilian rule.[2] Thus raising the pertinent question how transitions from military to civilian rule take place? Why some transitions lead to democratic consolidation while others falter, fumble and revive "nostalgia" about military rule?

Military continues to be a potent political actor in the developing countries, despite trends towards democracy and civilian rule. The causes of military's intervention have been well theorized and documented.[3] A number of excellent case studies have appeared on the developmental and modernizing role of the military in developing countries.[4] In these studies, military emerges as an institution which is better organized, modern in outlook and orientation, professionally sound, more competent than the civilian politicians and motivated to promote economic development. More so, in

[1] See for example, Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy". *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer, 1990. pp 143–164. Helga A. Welsh "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe." *Comparative Politics*. Vol 26, No. 4, July 1994. pp 379–394. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave". *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 2, No. 2 Spring 1991. pp 12–34. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," *Foreign Policy;* No. 87, Summer 1992. pp 25–46. Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations". *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 6, No. 4, October 1995. pp 9–17.

[2] Juan J. Linz, *op.cit.,* pp 154–157. Larry Diamond *op.cit*., pp 25–28. Henri J. Barkey "Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition*." Armed Forces and Society*; Vol 16, No. 2, Winter 1990. pp 169–192. Guilmero O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

[3] For an early classic study See S. E. Finer, The Man on Horsebank, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977); Samuel Decalo, *Coup and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Henry Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes, Case Studies in Political Development* (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968); Gavin Kennedy*, The Military in the Third World* (London: Duckworth, 1976).

[4] Henry Bienen, "Armed Forces and National Modernization - Continuing the Debate," *Comparative Politics*, vol 16, No. 1, October 1983. pp 1–16. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Frederick M. Numan, *The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations*, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976.

societies where literacy rates and economic development were low, the military rule was projected as giving order, stability, modernity and brightening prospects of economic growth and development.[5] Modernization theorists made laudatory analysis of military's developmental role, particularly with reference to Latin America and also produced the myth that the higher the rate of professionalism in the militaries of the developing countries, the lower the chances of their intervention.[6] Fact of the matter was the more modern and professional the military became in developing countries, its intervention in politics also increased.

South Asian militaries remained under studied in this modernization literature. Yet whatever studies appeared they focused on the developmental role of military in these societies.[7] However, the analysis began to shift from modernization and intervention as scholars started analyzing the impact of military regimes on their society, economy and polity. This also brought to the fore difficulties that confronted civilian-successors in a "post-military state."[8]

The focus began to shift from modernizing role of military to its coercive capacity and the dynamics of authoritarian rule, with the publication of O'Donnell's path breaking work Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. His principal argument was that social and economic modernization would promote political pluralism, which in turn led to authoritarianism.[9] According to O'Donnell, in bureaucratic-authoritarian systems the higher governmental positions were occupied by individuals from armed forces, bureaucracy and private firms. Individuals in these institutions developed a highly complex network of bureaucratic organizations and pursued policies of political repression and economic exclusion, resultantly, politically active segments of society and industrial labor were excluded from processes of political and economic decision making. This in turn led to depoliticization of popular sector. Political and social problems were viewed by the decision-makers as "technical" in nature. This promoted and strengthened interaction among the decision-makers in the higher echelons. Consequently, changes in society occurred that promoted deepening of dependent capitalism and extensive industrialization. O'Donnell's characterization of bureaucratic-authoritarianism provided an insightful analysis of governing elites, their interactions with various social classes and the nature of 'dependent capitalism' in Latin American countries,

[5] Samuel O. Huntington, *Political Order, op.cit.,* pp 238–250. H. Daadler, The Role of Military in Emerging Countries. *The Hague Montana*, 1962. pp 18–24. Gavin Kennedy, The Military in the Third World, *New York, Praeger*, 1974, Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development,* Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1966. pp 172–187.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order, op.cit.,* pp. 190–240.

[7] Raymond A. Moore, *Nation building and the Pakistan Army 1947–1969*, Lahore, Aziz Publishers, 1979.

[8] Gerald A. Heeger, "Politics in the Post-military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience," *World Politics*, Vol XXIV, No. 2, January 1977. pp 242–262.

[9] Guilmero O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics," *Politics of Modernization Series* No. 9 (Berkeley: Institute of Internal Studies, University of California, 1973).

particularly in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.[10] O'Donnell's concept of bureaucratic-authoritarianism is instructive although of limited value for making an analysis of Pakistani experience.

First, compared to countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Pakistan had a relatively low level of economic development. At the time of independence, industry was almost non-existent, and the level of urbanization was low.[11] Pakistan was, and basically continues to be, an agrarian economy. Second, in terms of class structure, the feudal classes enjoyed power, privilege, and prestige in the political system, whereas the financial-industrial groups were weak, and the aspiring middle classes were in their formative phase. Concerned with elevating the level of economic development, the military-bureaucratic elites opted to promote and facilitate the emergence of financial-industrial groups. The military-bureaucratic elites believed that they (who perceived themselves as uniquely qualified modernizers) had to promote a "capitalist spirit" and to encourage the formation of financial-industrial groups before they could form any coalition. Thus emerged a patron-client relationship between the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups.[12] This relationship enhanced the power of the elites to impose various types of economic controls. It also provided the financial-industrial groups with an opportunity to expand without any pressure from competition. Third, the military-bureaucratic elites provided a vital link between the financial-industrial groups and international business, through a series of state sponsored economic policies the position of the financial-industrial groups was consolidated.

As noted above O'Donnell's, bureaucratic-authoritarianism model provided a penetrating analysis of coalition formation among the military, the bureaucracy, technocracies and international business in the Latin American countries. In this sense, gave an understanding of the nature of the military's rule and its relationship to "dependent capitalism."[13] As opposed to this in Pakistan's case, it was not economic but

[10] Guilmero O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State" *Latin American Research Review*, 13, (1978), pp. 3–38. For some other trend setting literature indicating change in researchers approach to the study of military See David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Nicole Ball, "The Military in Politics: Who Benefits and How," *World Development,* Vol 9, No. 6 (June 1981), pp. 569–582; Karen L. Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (1978), pp. 39–50; Miles D. Wolpin, "Socio-political Radicalism and Military Professionalism in the Third World," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 15, No. 12, January 1983, pp. 203–216.

[11] B. M. Bhatia*, Pakistan's Economic Development – 1948–78: The Failure of a Strategy* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 28–34. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.

[12] Agnus Maddison, *Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan since the Moghuls*, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1971, pp 139–140.

[13] O'Donnells. Reflections ... *op.cit.*, p. 6. also see Roman Kilkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," in *Roman Kilkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski* (eds.), *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 231–251.

strategic considerations that determined military-bureaucratic elites attitude towards the international security system and led to an alliance with the United States in the 1950's and later in the 1980's.

The purpose of this study is to explain why Pakistan has continued to oscillate between military-hegemonic rule and democratic propensities. It would explore and analyze why democratic processes and institutions have not gained ground in Pakistan and military's hegemony has continued to prevail. In this context the study would aim to project two alternate but competing models of political development in Pakistan. It would be argued that the constraints and limitations of democratic process and successor civilian regimes in Pakistan could best be understood by analyzing the dynamics of military-hegemony and dominant party political systems in Pakistan. The proponents and beneficiaries of two types of political system have hampered but could strengthen and consolidate democratic development in Pakistan.

Since its inception, Pakistan, like other developing countries, has been struggling to establish a viable political system. Pakistan's search for a viable political system produced two contradictory tendencies of political development. In the first, the primary objective was to curb participatory politics and to subordinate the political parties and other autonomous interest groups to military hegemony. This was best reflected in the military-hegemonic political system (1958–1969 and 1977–1985). In the second instance, the primary concern was to subordinate the military-bureaucratic elites to civilian-led party dominance, and to build an alternative to military rule. This was reflected in the party-dominant political system (1971–1977 and 1985–1996). The post 1985 period varied in form but was similar in substance. In either case, establishing control over the state and societal forces emerged as the sustained objective of Pakistan's political development. This tendency persisted as various contenders in the political arena failed to develop any minimal consensus on the nature and direction of the political system. The post 1985-period, saw the revival of dominant party system, where the successor civilian regimes began to establish the dominance of party in power by first controlling and then dispensing resources of the state to the elected members of the assemblies and their cronies.

Before we analyze how military-hegemonic and dominant party systems have functioned in Pakistan, let me briefly define what variables like political leaders, elites, classes, groups mean in this study and how the interplay and inter-relationship among these various forces has helped or hampered the functioning of one or the other type of political system.

Groups in This Study

Bureaucratic-Military Elites

Bureaucratic-military elites constitute the epitome of power structure in Pakistan. They enjoy power, privilege, prestige and status. These elites also monopolize control over governmental resources—both of coercion and patronage. C. Wright Mills has pointed out that in America, "power elites" is lodged in the "institutional landscape" of the country. According to him, "the institution makes the man, since it determines who shall wield power."[14] This dictum has relevance for Pakistan, where the military and the bureaucracy are the principal institutions. These elites are relatively small, cohesive, share similar political attitudes, and enjoy institutional bases of power.

Political Leadership

In this study, political leadership is defined behaviorally as an art in acquiring followership, maintaining leader—leader relations (i.e., how various political leaders relate to each other on specific policy issues), and exercising policy choices to create and build political institutions.[15] In examining politics in Pakistan, the concept of political leadership can be operationalized with greater precision as compared to that of political elite. The concept of political elite involves some degree of consensus, cohesion, similarity of beliefs and social origins. In Pakistan, political leadership is singularly non-cohesive, non-consensual, and non-institutionalized, despite similarities of social origins, beliefs, values and, to a certain degree, style.

Socioeconomic Classes

Class analysis shall be used to focus on the emergence of modern economic classes. In a Weberain sense, class refers to any group of people found in a similar class situation.[16] Modernization forces (education, urbanization, industrialization) had differential impact on the rural and urban classes. In rural Pakistan, family background, descent, and ownership of land have traditionally been the determinants of status. On the basis of changing production relations (as they emerged under the impact of modernization) and their impact on the status, at least three classes can be identified in the rural areas of Pakistan.

Feudal Class

The feudal class is not a homogeneous entity. This class has vertical and horizontal cleavages. Vertically, the feudals are divided by rival factions. These factions can cut along personal, tribal or caste-like rivalries. Horizontally, regional cleavages divide them, despite inter-marriages, in some cases. Feudal power should not be confused

[14] C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 18–20.

[15] Daniel Katz, "Patterns of Leadership," in *Jeannue M. Knuston* (ed.), *Handbook of Political Psychology*, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Co., 1975, pp. 203–233.

[16] H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: *Essays in Sociology*; New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 181–182.

with ownership of large land-holdings. It is a set of relationships in which those who own land exercise tremendous control over those who cultivate their lands, irrespective of the size of the land-holdings. This relationship is generally regarded as unequal and oppressive.

Middle Farmer Class

This class is the product and perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the "Green Revolution." The middle farmer class has increased agricultural productivity, but had little impact in changing the socioeconomic relations in the rural area. In class situations, the middle farmers identify themselves with the feudals; they pursue similar economic goals and manifest a similar socio-political outlook.

Peasants, Tenants/Sharecroppers

These, in general, can be described as the rural proletariat who constitute 70 percent of Pakistan's rural population. Small and poor peasants do own some land, but in order to sustain themselves, must cultivate the land of bigger landlords. The tenant/sharecroppers are those who do not own any land but cultivate land for the landlord. The most notable aspect is that the tenant/sharecropper is completely dependent on the landlord for his livelihood. Ejection by the land-owner means unemployment, not for one person, but the family he supports. Given this vulnerability, the tenant/sharecroppers tend to be submissive and comply to the landlords' will rather than rebel.

The Urban Middle Class

The urban middle class can be divided into the following categories:

1. Urban professionals (i.e., teachers, students, doctors, engineers, lawyers and journalists). This class is a product of modern education. Given their diverse professional experience, the urban professionals are not a unified group. They are ideologically divided; nevertheless, they are the most dynamic segment of Pakistani society. These have been persistent in pursuing their social, economic and political goals. During 1971–1977 ascendancy of this class was visible in the political system of Pakistan.

2. Petty merchants, traders, small scale manufacturers and private agri-businessmen constitute the backbone of free market economy. They are entrepreneurs and strongly believe in the right to own private property. Therefore, these classes are the strongest defenders of the principle of market economy. They do not have the status and prestige that the intelligentsia and professionals have.

Industrial Labor

This class has emerged under the impact of modernization. It along with the rural peasantry, has been aroused in Pakistan in 1970s. It is highly politicized, participant, and the least organized.

Financial-Industrial groups

At the time of independence, contemporary financial-industrial groups were at the stage of petty merchants and trading classes. These classes made significant financial contributions to the movement for Pakistan.[17]

As Pakistan emerged, they became the primary beneficiaries of the government's industrialization efforts. However, it was under the patronage and policies of military hegemonic political system that these "old" petty merchant-trader classes were transformed into "new" financial-industrial groups.

Religious Groups

Religious groups have proliferated in Pakistan in the past two decades. Some of these groups are exclusively devoted to the study of Islam and its preaching, others have their own political agenda for converting Pakistan into their own particular brand of an "Islamic State." Broadly, Ulema derive their strength not only from their followers but also their religious institutions (Such as pre-independence Deoband, Nadva etc which developed their extensions in post-independence Pakistan). Maulana Maududi and his Jamaat-i-Islami grew outside these religious schools. Religious groups are a potent force in Pakistani politics and enjoy power and influence quite disproportionate to the actual size.

Let us briefly analyze the interplay and inter-relationship of political leaders, military-bureaucratic elites, financial-industrial groups, trader-merchant classes etc. and how they have affected the development and functioning of military-hegemonic and dominant party political system. Ironically both military-hegemonic and dominant party systems have promoted authoritarian traits, undermined democratic norms, obliterated democratic processes and produced adherents and beneficiaries of both types of system. However, there are differences of form, style and substance, how the two systems function. It would be pertinent question to ask why Pakistan continues to oscillate between military-hegemonic and dominant party political system? Is there any causal relationship between the two? Are they mutually exclusive? Could one clearly delineate, the characteristics of one from the other? Could one postulate a reconciliation between the two systems? Let us examine how the two systems have evolved in Pakistan and what are the dynamics of their relationship.

Military Hegemonic Political System

[17] Hanna Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Business: Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship and Partial Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 21, No. 1, October 1972, pp. 1– 32.

A military hegemonic political system is characterized by the hegemony of the military in the political system. In the military hegemonic political system, the primary focus is: What impact does the military have on the society? In such a system the military has a monopoly of control over strategic policy issues and decision making institutions in the country. It can manipulate and steer the behavior of political leaders and interest groups in a chosen direction. In the social and cultural sense the public also shows greater trust and confidence in the military as compared to political parties. This lends legitimacy to military's hegemony.

Military hegemony is a product of internal and external factors. The propelling dynamics are internal. External factors, such as the international strategic environment (e.g., the strategic alliance with the United States in the 1950's and later in the 1980's helped the military to consolidate its position in the country's politics), and security threats (e.g., the fear of India), contributed to the military's hegemony in Pakistan. Internally, in heterogeneous societies like Pakistan or Nigeria, the military gives a semblance of cohesion and emerges as a symbol of nation-building.[18] It appears to be the only force capable of creating political order and of promoting economic development. In such societies, the military is a potential hegemon. It skillfully uses its organizational superiority and coercive capacity to restrict, suppress and abort the growth and development of autonomous groups and political parties (in Pakistan various martial law regulations have been used to achieve this goal). This is not to suggest that political leaders and political parties were less responsible for the failure of the party system, but to emphasize that the military's hegemony added to the malfunctioning of participatory politics, development of democratic norms, attitudes and institutions.

A military hegemonic political system functions through: (1) political control (i.e., continued reliance on executive decrees or ordinance), (2) political exclusion, and (3) building strategic alliances. Its primary thrust is to deactivate (those who were previously active) the political leaders and restrict the participation of aspiring classes. The military-bureaucratic elites pursue inclusionary policies to the extent of promoting the financial-industrial groups and insuring the continued preponderance of the feudal classes in the rural structure. The policies are exclusionary only to the extent of restricting the political participation of the aspiring urban middle classes and politicized industrial labor. Since the financial industrial groups are relatively less developed and the level of economic development is also low (compared to the bureaucratic-authoritarian systems), their link with the "world capitalist system" is also weak. The military-bureaucratic elites may seek military alliance with an outside power and obtain military aid and, in the process, deeply entrench themselves in the political system. Huntington's early influential work misleadingly equated military professionalism with being non-political. He also created the myth that military aid promoted

[18] Raymond Moore, *op.cit*., p. 19

professionalism.[19] In fact, Pakistan's case would show that military aid not only politicized the military but also enhanced the hegemonic position of the military.

Such a system may have some semblance of political stability. However, stability hinges on the hegemony of the military in the political system. The erosion of the military's hegemony creates a crisis of political participation and promotes political instability. In Pakistan, "political order" and "political stability" were achieved by establishing the hegemony of relatively strong institutions, like the military and bureaucracy.[20] Consequently, the weak political structures (like political parties, interest groups and parliaments) become still weaker and more fragmented. It is not the "absence of effective political institutions" alone, but the military-bureaucratic elites' perceptions and beliefs that the political process and political parties are chaotic and non-legitimate that prompt hegemony. Under the military hegemonic conditions, political parties and interest groups do not develop; they stagnate and fragment. These conditions produce anti-system movements.

Since the military-bureaucratic elites monopolize power, authority, and sources of economic patronage, the political leaders have limited choices: (1) to collaborate with the regime at the elite level and seek access to governmental patronage (as non-governmental associational activity is severely limited); (2) to build a coalition of like-minded political leaders and political parties and seek concessions from the regime within the framework of the military hegemonic system; and (3) to pursue a strategy of regime confrontation, mobilize the masses and build a broad coalition of groups and classes that are adversely affected by the regime's policies, thereby creating conditions which weaken the military's hegemony.[21] In Pakistan regime change has frequently occurred as a result of the third strategy, although between 1985–88 interregnum, the second strategy was also employed by the political leaders.

The military-bureaucratic elites seek a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the political leaders, which produces elite manipulation and intensified factionalism. On the other hand, to regulate societal behavior, the military-bureaucratic elites devise laws that severely restrict the growth of various groups. Unable to operate within the system, the excluded groups (i.e., urban professionals, industrial labor and occasionally a segment of feudals) become politicized and anti-regime. A politics of protest and demonstration reflects the weakening of hegemonic control. It is not the increase in political participation alone, but rather escalation of agitational politics that in turn evokes authoritarian response from the regime. Since processes and institutions, that could promote negotiations leading to bargain, compromise and accommodation within

[19] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 192–196.
[20] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order, op.cit.*, pp. 250–255.
[21] Richard Falk, "Militarization and Human Rights in the Third World," in *Absjorn Eide and Marek Thee* (eds.), *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, London, Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 216– 217.

the system are weak. Reluctantly, these conditions bring about the degeneration of the military hegemonic political system.

A review of the politics in Pakistan under the military hegemonic political system would show that politics becomes a pervasive phenomenon, with protests and demonstrations emerging as the expression of political discontent.[22] While military-bureaucratic institutions decay, politics intensifies in the already segmented society. Class and ethnic cleavages sharpen, and antagonism against the military-bureaucratic elites increases. Since associational group activity is discouraged and political parties are not allowed to develop, no institutionalized channels are available through which political discontent may be manifested.

Excluded from the political system, the political leaders increasingly rely on mass urban protests. They tend to incorporate demands that would have mass appeal or would cut across more than one group. Under such conditions, leadership becomes a crucial factor.[23] Those political leaders who reveal a capacity for mobilizing the masses and pursue a policy of regime confrontation are more likely to be successful in leading a mass movement. In Pakistan during 1969–71, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman were two such leaders, who adopted this strategy. In 1983 Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and in 1986 Benazir Bhutto pursued similar methods of mass mobilization and more recently Qazi Husain Ahmed of Jammat-i-Islami has pursued this approach of regime confrontation and mass mobilization against the civilian regime of Benazir Bhutto. Such a strategy of regime confrontation and mass mobilization may produce a crisis of regime legitimacy and may cause breakdown of the military hegemonic system or even dominant party system. However, alternative institutions to replace the system do not develop in that they require more time.

Because more energy is spent in mobilizing and demobilizing the masses, institution-building—i.e., party building, resolution of conflict within the parliament through negotiations and bargaining, tolerance of dissent, do not occur they remain a low priority.[24] Consequently, even after the regime breakdown, the coercive instruments of control, which evolved under the military hegemonic system, remain the only viable mechanism to ensure political stability and political order.

Dominant Party Political System

The origins of second model that of dominant party system could be traced from the formative years of an independent Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan (prime minister 1947–

[22] Gerald A. Heeger, *The Politics of Underdevelopment*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974, p. 8.

[23] In conditions of socioeconomic distress, the mobilizational role of political leaders has been emphasized by Dankwort A. Rustow, *A World of Nations*, Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1967. Heeger, Reflections, *op.cit*., pp. 258–259.

[24] For some useful theoretical insights on this point See Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, April 1990. pp. 359–377.

1951) ventured to establish Muslim League as the dominant party. The succeeding leadership of the Muslim League desired the same but neither had the political will nor capability to perpetuate dominant party system, they were effectively challenged and pre-empted by the bureaucratic-military elites from attaining their desired goal.

This latent tendency of dominant party system was managed and suppressed under the military-hegemonic system, as and when the military-hegemony system has shown signs of decay or weakness (1967–71, and 1983–85) it has reappeared. This happened during the 1971–1977 period and has continued to persist since the restoration of democratic process in 1985. During the first mentioned period (1971–1977) the preoccupation of political leadership and the aspiring urban middle classes was how to contain the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups and to establish the dominance of elected political leadership and civilian political institutions. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who emerged as perhaps the most dynamic political leader in this period, aspired to create a "dominant party" political system, somewhat similar to the Indian party system, in which the Indian National Congress Party under Nehru had acquired a dominant position.[25] This was to be a political system in which political parties were to be the main instruments of representation, but the general direction was that the ruling party would have a dominant position in the political system. The Indian National Congress had acquired dominance through the democratic process of regularized elections. In the case of Pakistan, this direction was constrained by the very nature of the military-hegemonic political system. Nevertheless, the dominant party system did facilitate the entry of groups and classes hitherto unrepresented in the political system.[26] In the post 1985 period as Pakistan made a transition towards a possible democratic alternative, the civilian political leaders revealed a preference for reviving the dominant party system. After the 1988 elections the PPP as a ruling party ventured to reestablish the dominant party model. Since 1990 both IJI, PML(N) and PDA, (including PPP) as ruling parties and coalitions have shown a tendency not only to establish dominant party system, but also to expand the hegemony of the elected political officials.

To reduce reliance on military-bureaucratic institutions, attempts were made to institute socioeconomic reforms and to create new institutions. The second model (1971–1977) was short, innovative, and controversial, and its residual effects continued to persist. It provided an alternative to the military-hegemonic system. It was an alternative that ran counter to the military-bureaucratic elites' vision of Pakistan. It was Pakistan's experiment with political democracy.[27] In a sense, it was a system of transitional democracy in which authoritarian tendencies continued to persist, discouraging the

[25] Rajani Kothari, *Politics in India*, Boston, Little and Brown, 1970, pp. 1–25.

[26] Robert LaPorte, Jr., *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 107–108.

[27] Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State*, London, Zed Press, 1983, p. 11.

formation of groups and constraining the development of opposition parties. It revealed that collapse of the military hegemonic political system does not necessarily entail the emergence of political leadership, broadening of political participation and consolidation of democratic processes and institutions. In the post 1985 phase of redemocratization, Pakistan continued to suffer from similar disabilities and predicaments of the successor civilian regimes. Despite greater political liberalization, most political parties, especially when in power, show propensity for dominant party system as a possible alternative to the military-hegemonic system.

To identify some of the obstacles and to analyze the difficulties that the successor civilian regimes were confronted with in the post military hegemonic system, we propose to explore three sets of interrelated propositions.

First, to what extent does the civilian dominance involve corresponding changes in the nature of the structure of the economy? In Pakistan between 1971 and 1977, the political participation of aspiring urban middle classes expanded, compared to earlier periods, and concerted efforts were made to establish the supremacy of elected political leadership in the political system. This initiated a process of resistance and change among the military-bureaucratic elites, the financial-industrial groups, and a segment of the feudal classes, who dominated the economy and were, therefore, reluctant to support the process of building civilian democratic institutions. On the other hand, Bhutto and the PPP socialists, who attempted to establish the ascendancy of civilian control, also sought changes in the economic structure.[28] Creating civilian institutions meant changing the nature of the economic structure and dismantling the hegemonic position of the military in the political system. To what extent did Bhutto succeed in instituting changes in the economic structure of the country to establish the dominance of the PPP?

Huntington and others have postulated that in developing countries, because political institutions were weak, the military tended to intervene in politics.[29] Making a case study of Pakistan, I present my second hypothesis —that it was the relative strength of the military that prompted its intervention into politics, and not merely the weakness of the political institutions. I maintain that Huntington generally attributed the ills of society to weak political institutions (including the military's intervention into politics) but he chose to ignore those ills that may stem from institutions being too strong.[30]

The military established its hegemony in the political system and thereby undermined not only the process of political participation but also caused the erosion of democratic

[28] Shahid Javed Bruki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971–1977*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, pp. 114–118.
[29] Huntington, Political Order ..., *op.cit.*, pp. 196–198, Eric A. Nordlinger, *op.cit.*, pp. 12–23.
[30] For some persuasive criticism on this point See, Gabriel Ben Dor, "Institutionalization and Political Development: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 17, No. 13, July 1975, pp. 109–112.

norms and processes. The concept of hegemony of the stronger over the weaker explicitly stated that the weak would become weaker and perhaps more fragmented. Under hegemonic control, no autonomous or potentially autonomous class, group or political structure was allowed to function, so the weak party system remained weak.

Withdrawal of the military from politics, voluntarily or otherwise, is not a sufficient condition for the development of a party system or participatory democracy. Even if it withdrew in some cases, it did not give up its supervisory role and the potential of its hegemony lingered on.[31] Focussing on the Pakistani experience, this study would show why even the collapse of a military hegemonic political system could not guarantee end of its hegemony. In fact, the hegemonic tendency persisted and constrained the process of party development. The continuity and deeply-entrenched nature of military-bureaucratic elites promoted suspicions about the very nature of participatory politics and political parties and interest groups. Ambiguity about civilian institutions as viable alternatives to military hegemonic systems continued. Pakistan's experimentation with redemocratization since 1985 clearly demonstrated this.[32]

The second period (1985–1996) of redemocratization revived the propensities toward the dominant party system. It must be reiterated that regime change occurred in Pakistan because of decline in military's hegemony, regime confrontation and mass-arousal posture of political parties. Constrained and conditioned by the military-hegemonic political system, the political parties have continued to reveal preference for the dominant party system. These conditionalities have put enormous responsibility on elites and political leaders, to expand areas of negotiation, identify issues of agreements and disagreements, then negotiate and bargain, minimize potential of conflict and build consensus in a manner that the interests of larger number of political contestants and economic competitors are protected. However, so far the political leaders have failed to develop consensus to restrict military political role, while their actions and conduct has continued to solidify trend toward dominant party system.[33]

Regime change from military-hegemonic to possible democratic entails changes at all levels—local, regional and national. Even decision makers and decision making procedures at various levels also change, and yet authoritarian structures remain intact, as the case of Pakistan reveals, although in a number of other countries regime change

[31] Rustow, *op.cit*., pp 188–189; Heeger, "Politics in the Post-Military ... *op.cit.,* pp. 244–260. Huntington, Political Order*..., op.cit*., pp. 195–198. Henry J. Barkey, *op.cit*., pp. 189–195. Claude E. Welch Jr., "Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes or Some Random, Events," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol 18, No. 3, Spring 1992. pp. 323–342.

[32] See for example, Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan's Cautions Democratic Course," *Current History*, March, 1992. pp. 169–192. Hassan Askari Rizvi, "The Civilization of Military Role in Pakistan." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1986. pp. 1067–1081.

[33] For a detailed analysis on this point see, Saeed Shafqat, "Is Consolidation of Democracy Possible in Pakistan," in Saeed Shafqat (ed.), *Contemporary Issues in Pakistan Studies*, Lahore, Gautum Press, pp 217–239.

has resulted in readjustment of existing institutions.[34] It is equally important to recognize that anticipating or conceding its hegemonic position the military certainly attempts to disengage from political scene, but the degree of its disengagement is closely linked with the ability of political parties and their leadership to develop consensus on developing civilian participatory institutions. The preference for dominant party system has hampered consensus building between the ruling party and opposition political parties.

It has promoted tendencies of confrontation, violence and polarization in the political process and society. The longer the civilian political leadership takes to build a consensus on the type of political system, the easier it becomes for the military to retain its hegemony. Under such conditions, the Pakistani case amply demonstrates that the military elites began to indulge in political manipulation and undercut the political process and development of civilian institutions.

Why certain types of authoritarian regimes have facilitated transitions to democracy, while others have restricted the process? There are two sets of arguments in the recent literature on the subject. One set of argument emphasized that success or failure of transition was dependant on the structure and culture of the society.[35] Therefore, the type of authoritarian regime was a reflection of culture and structures of the state. The other school argued that in the success or failure of a transition, the crucial factor was leadership. How the leaders and elites managed the transition phase determined the path in either case of democratization. The initial transition to democracy was anti-authoritarian, but not necessarily pro-democratic. Such a transition created an environment of political liberalism, encouraged associational activity, challenged the declining authoritarian institutions, but also relied on the same authoritarian institutions. Occasionally the political leaders adopted authoritarian means to make transition towards a democratic set up. Thus the phases of transition of democracy vacillated between authoritarian and democratic dispositions. The regime type was important to recognize, not because of structures of authoritarian regimes but because of choices that the political actors exercised—usage of ideology, capacity to build coalition of interest groups, economic policies and performance could give longevity to the regime. In general the authoritarian regimes were coercive and centralizing, while the succeeding civilian regimes attempted to break away from this but found themselves trapped.

In periods of transformation from military-hegemonic to dominant party system the 'constitutional choices' that leaders exercise have wider implications for the successor civilian regimes. These "choices" have a lasting effect on setting countries on a particular

[34] Helga Welsh, *op.cit*., pp. 380–386. For a perceptive analysis on this point see, Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective,' *Comparative Politics*, Vol 26, No. 3, April 1994. pp. 355–375.

[35] For some very useful insights and theoretical discussion on this point See, Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy For the Long Haul." *Journal of Democracy*, vol 7, No. 2, April 1986. pp. 3–13.

path of democratization. The 1973 constitution clearly tilted the balance of political power in favor of elected public officials, expanded and concentrated the executive power of the prime-minister, and to a considerable degree settled the issue of quantum of autonomy. It put Pakistan on the path of dominant party system. The 1985 restoration of democracy accompanied by the Eighth Amendment not only gave legitimacy to various martial law orders, and clauses of Islamization but also enhanced the powers of president vis-a-vis the Prime Minister. The outcome of this balancing act in the constitution has been that since the re-democratization in 1988, the political parties and political leaders have accelerated their attempts to establish dominance of the elected political leadership but without sufficiently creating processes and institutions for such a dominance. Both the ruling party and the opposition parties, while holding power have shown a strong tendency to resurrect dominant party system. These hegemonic intentions of political leaders have become pronounced and crucial, whenever the issue of appointments of top position in the armed forces, higher judiciary, ambassadorial postings and civil bureaucracy have arisen.

Thus the dominant party system demands not only dominance of the ruling party over opposition political parties, but also attempted to impose the supremacy of elected officials and representative institutions over the non-elected offices and non-institutions. This tension between the adherents of two systems have prompted combative relations between the proponents of military-hegemonic and dominant party system.

This study would analyze the alternating cycles of Pakistan's political development. How have these effected patterns of civil-military relations in Pakistan? It would be argued that over the years the military-bureaucratic elites through various policies of inclusion and exclusion have created a coalition of interests that not only supported but advocated the perpetuation of military-hegemonic system. Similarly, political parties, despite fragmentation, and weak institutional infrastructure have continued to retain adherents and advocates who express pro-democracy sentiments but in reality continue to reveal preference for dominant party system as an alternative to military hegemony. The dominant party system has thus demonstrated a preference for the civilian political leadership, parliamentary institutions and possible restoration of democratic processes and representative institutions. However, political leaders conduct and behavior has not been supportive for growth and development of democratic institutions. Consequently, democratic development in Pakistan has been arrested both by the functioning of military-hegemonic systems and also the constraints of political leaders to consolidate dominant party system rather than work for the creation, construction and consolidation of federal, parliamentary and democratic structures. Therefore, tendencies of military's hegemony and party dominance both have contributed towards the arrested development of democratic norms, attitudes and institutions. Consequently, disharmony and tension between democratic dispensations and

autocratic reality continues to be the most pronounced characteristic of Pakistan's political development.

My basic effort could be to delineate the similarities and differences how the military-hegemonic and dominant party system have been functioning in Pakistan and in the process impacted the patterns of civil-military relations.

Second chapter provides a brief over view of pre-military hegemonic period and analyzes how inter-relationships among bureaucracy, military and political parties facilitated the development of military-hegemonic system. This chapter not only defines the parameters of military-hegemony, but also explains the dynamics and functioning of such a system.

Third chapter provides a brief over view of what caused the decline of military-hegemonic system and how this led to the ascendency of political parties, particularly the emergence of the PPP.

Fourth chapter provides insight on the patterns of conflict that could emerge in a post-military-hegemonic system. For conceptual clarity and analytical precision these conflicts are described on three levels, personal, ideological and regional. It has been argued that decline of military-hegemonic system proportionately raises the intensity of conflict.

Fifth chapter provides an analysis of the development of dominant party system, but also draws attention towards the reformist nature of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's leadership. The imperative of rule and reform are projected as not only effecting civil-military relations, but also reshaping the formation of new coalition groups, which in turn introduce changes in the economic structure and set the overtones of redefining the civil-military relations.

Sixth chapter provides an analysis of instruments and policies that were devised by the political leadership and the ruling party to establish the supremacy of the political leadership and representative institutions on the military. It also explains why advocates of dominant party system failed to subordinate the military and discomfort among the military elites led to resurgence of military-hegemonic system.

Seventh chapter ventures to analyze the resurgence of military's hegemony under General Zia-ul-Haq. It also delineates the difference between earlier military regimes and this one. It focuses on policies and condition of interest group that military was able to construct, consolidate and expand the support base for a military-hegemonic system. An analysis is also provided as to what were the causes that forced military regime to disengage from politics and facilitate restoration of democratic process.

Eighth chapter not only provides an analysis of constraints and limitation of successor civilian regime in the post-military hegemonic system but also ventures to construct how post-military system becomes divided, polarized, and faction ridden. Civilian political leadership of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both emerged under military's tutelage, one confronting the military regime, while the other grew under its patronage, both attempted to establish dominant party system but in the process failed to develop a framework for ruling party—opposition relationship. Consequently democratic norms and representative institution have remained weak while military remains a potential hegemon.

2

MILITARY, BUREAUCRACY, AND PARTY POLITICS

Pre-Military-Hegemonic Period

This chapter will provide brief overview of developments between 1947 and 1969. Broadly speaking it will respond to two set of questions. First, what accounts for the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites and the decline of party politics in the pre-military hegemonic phase (1947–58) of Pakistan's political development? Second, how did the military establish its hegemony and what was the impact of its political and economic policies (1958–1969) on Pakistani state and society?

Three arguments are pertinent to this central question. First, the bureaucratic-military elites monopolized the positions of power. Second, the bureaucracy's anti-politics attitude. Third, since 1951 bureaucratic intervention was intentional, slow, gradual and systematic. The dominance of the bureaucratic-military elites was the result of their monopolization of key governmental offices. This prevented creation of political organizations. In Pakistan's case it was not only bureaucracy's organizational superiority, but it was the bureaucratic monopolization of key governmental offices that led to their ascendancy in the political system.

Organization of political parties was prevented through executive decrees and martial law regulations. Promotion of factionalism within the political parties made them irrelevant to the political process. Monopolization of governmental positions was their primary strategy. In his case study of India, Myron Weiner has succinctly pointed out that in some developing countries the major problem is "scarcity of resources";[36] the question of who controls, allocates and distributes these resources, determines the shape of the political system or the lack of it. The Indian political leaders, after independence, established their supremacy over the political institutions by taking control of the key governmental positions for distributing and allocating the resources among the competing groups and thereby consolidating the party system, while the Pakistani bureaucratic elites preempted the divided political leaders and then with the support of military elites exacerbated their divisiveness in order to maintain their supremacy.

The following pages will provide an overview of how some of the factors facilitated the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites during the pre-military hegemonic phase

[36] Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 1–11, 216–260.

(1947–58) of Pakistan's political development, and how these elites came to dominate the structure of economic and political decision-making during this phase.

Pakistan was born a fragile nation-state. It was burdened with ideological and ethnic cleavages and administrative chaos. The nationalist movement that culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 1947, although populist in character, cohered singularly around the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1947). Determination, single-mindedness of purpose, and faith in democratic constitutionalism, have generally been recognized as some of the attributes of Jinnah leadership.[37] Stanley Wolpert has summed up Jinnah's role in the making of Pakistan: "Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.... Jinnah virtually conjectured the country into statehood by his indomitable will."[38]

Jinnah's vehicle for the creation of Pakistan was the Muslim League. Formed in 1906 for the articulation of Muslim interests in British India, Jinnah transformed her into a mass nationalist movement between 1937 and 1947. Such movements are simplistic and spontaneous in their objective; frequently, their leaders establish a direct relationship with the people. Under Jinnah, the league acquired these characteristics. Pakistan, therefore, was born out of a mass movement, but without a well-organised political party. Motivated to make Pakistan a reality, Jinnah and the League leadership could not concentrate on the task of building a political administrative structure for the new state.[39]

Few states are born with so many drawbacks to political development as Pakistan. These included"

1. Regional diversity.
2. Limited bureaucracy.
3. Fear of India and rapid growth of Pakistan military.
4. Adoption of 1935 Act and Viceregal system.

[37] Considerable literature exists on Jinnah and his leadership. Some of the more recent studies are: Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "The Consolidation of Leadership in the Last Phase of the Politics of All India Muslim League," Asian Profile (Hong Kong), Vol., No. 2 (October 1973); Khalid B. Sayeed, "Political Leadership and Institution Building Under Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto," in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, Wriggins (eds.), *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 241–270; Sharif A1 Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981). Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of Pakistan Movement,* Lahore: Progressive Publishers.

[38] Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), preface.

[39] For an interesting and insight analysis. See. Sikandar Hayat, *op.cit*., pp. Ayesha Jalal, *op.cit*., pp. 174–207, 241–293.

Areas constituting Pakistan were educationally backward, socially conservative, predominantly rural, and politically inexperienced part of British India.[40] The physical separation of East and West Pakistan by 1500 miles further complicated the historical and political development of these areas.

Being culturally and linguistically heterogeneous (see table 2.1) it was not until 1849 that the British unified West Pakistan. British policy in this area was influenced by "imperial geo-strategic considerations because Punjab was an important recruitment base for British Indian army.[41]

Table 2.1 Frequency of Common Languages Spoken as Mother Tongue in Pakistan (Percentage of population)

	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Pakistan	
League	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
Bengali	98.16	98.42	0.02	0.02	56.40	55.48
Punjabi	0.02	0.02	67.08	66.39	28.55	29.02
Pushtu	-	0.01	8.16	8.47	3.48	3.70
Sindhi	0.01	0.01	12.85	12.59	5.47	5.51
Urdu	0.64	0.61	7.05	7.57	3.57	3.65
English	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02
Baluchi	-	-	3.04	2.49	1.29	1.09

Given these considerations, the British were reluctant to disrupt the existing social order, which resulted in the formation of an Indirect rule. Indirect rule primarily meant rule through advice, persuasion and occasional but brutal use of force.[42] The Indian Civil Services (ICS) or the Indian Political Service (IPS) performed the advisory functions. John Lawrence's model of patronage of loyal feudals in Punjab, the Sandeman or Sardari system for promotion of the Sardars (tribal chiefs) in NWFP and Baluchistan were variations of indirect rule. Tribal Riwaj (custom) was not disrupted, and, if need be, force was provided to uphold the authority of the chief.[43] Between 1850 and 1937 tribal resistance was checked by the British rule by force and by promotion of loyal tribal chiefs. Consequently, West Pakistan was exposed to participatory politics very late. Punjab was the only province that acquired some political experience under British rule. Even so, its political leadership was dominated by Hindu, Sikh and Muslim landlords and their nuclear unionist party.[44]

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[40] David A. Low, *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, London: MacMillan, 1991. pp. 3–9.

[41] Terence Creagh Coen, The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule, London: Chatto and Windus, 1971. pp. 179.

[42] Coen, *op.cit*., p. 16.

[43] Coen, *op.cit*., pp. 158–159.

[44] Craig Baxter, "Union or Partition: Some Aspects of Politics in the Punjab, 1936–1945," in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, W. Howard Wriggins (eds.), Pakistan: The Long View (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977). For a

East Bengal, on the other hand, was linguistically and culturally homogeneous and had been exposed to British educational and political institutions in the early 19th century. By the early 20th Century Bengal was the hotbed of radical politics.[45] East Bengalis politics was dominated by lawyers, small landlords, and to some extent, local religious leaders.

The existing heterogeneity of Pakistan was made complex by yet another factor. The creation of Pakistan was followed by the exodus of an estimated 14 million people. Six million Hindus comprising of landowners, businessmen and urban professional migrated to India from the areas that constituted Pakistan. The 8 million Muslim migrants were mostly those who hoped to be compensated, with economic benefits, for their sacrifices. The League leadership was now faced with an unanticipated problem of rehabilitation.[46] Thus, the problem of administering the new state rather than party-building became the immediate priority.

Emergence of Pakistan divided the military and the British Indian Civil Services between the two countries, with Muslim officers being out-numbered due to their early apprehensions about the Western education. At the time of independence, the Pakistani bureaucratic elites consisted of 157 officers, drawn from the Indian Civil Services (ICS) and the Indian Political Service (IPS). One hundred and forty six were available for domestic service: sixty were British officers; only eighty Muslim Officers were available. Most had little experience and were in junior positions.[47] In the formative phase, the British Officers played a key role in the development of the bureaucratic elites.

Like bureaucracy, Pakistan army had four lieutenant colonels, 42 majors, and 114 captains at the time of independence. The first Commander-in-Chief 'General Ayub' Khan, was promoted to the rank of general from lieutenant colonel in less than 4 years. The Indian threat, due to the early contact with India over Kashmir (1948), resulted in the expansion of the Pakistan army. Consequently, between 1948 and 1959, 60 percent of Pakistan's total budget was spent on defence.[48] Administrative and security problems, therefore, placed the bureaucratic-military elites at the core of Pakistan's power structure.

Predominantly feudalistic, the Muslim League leadership lacked urban professionals. To accommodate the muhajir leadership, the size of assemblies membership was raised

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refreshing analysis on the Unionist Party Politics See, Ian Talbot, "The Unionist Party and Public Policies, 1937–1947." in D. A. Low (Ed.), *op.cit*., pp. 86–105.

[45] Paul Brass, Radical Politics in South Asia.

[46] Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971–1977*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980) pp. 15–16.

[47] Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph La Palmonbara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 236– 67.

[48] Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, Lahore; Progressive Publishers, 1974 pp. 37, 54.

to 79.[49] Thus Pakistan, at the time of independence, had inherited a highly unrepresentative form of government. While the West Pakistani leadership was deprived of true professionals, the East Bengal inherited leaders who were predominantly professional politicians.[50]

Indian Act of 1935 and Indian independence Act of 1947 were two legal instruments that India and Pakistan inherited. The former provided for a "controlled parliamentary form of government," the latter gave India and Pakistan the dominion status.

Under the 1935 Act the real power remained with the Viceroy, who ruled with a powerful bureaucracy that was free from parliamentary limitations. The executive supremacy was perpetuated over the legislature. Being the founding father, Quaid-i-Azam chose to become the Governor General to create the administrative structure of the new state. Prime Minister was over-shadowed by the focal authority of the Governor General. Consequently, parliamentary politics remained peripheral. Indeed, Sayeed has asserted that Jinnah perpetuated the viceregal tradition of political rule in Pakistan and that Liaquat Ali Khan continued it.[51] Hamza Alvi, however, has pointed out that being sick, Jinnah would not actively participate in the decision-making process. Bureaucracy, therefore, used his name to make a number of constitutional amendments. For example, Section 92-A was asserted into the 1935 Act in July 1948 (at a time when Jinnah was ill) in the name of the Governor General.[52] This empowered the Governor General to suspend constitutional machinery in a province and direct the governor to assume the responsibilities of the provincial government. Subsequently, this section was used by the bureaucratic elites to dismiss the provincial governments. Between 1947 and 1954, nine provincial governments were dismissed.[53] Jinnah's death shifted the focus of power to the Prime Minister's office.

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[49] Rafiq Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947–1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976). p. 66.

[50] Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.) pp. 15–20.

[51] Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Misslin Co., 1967.), pp. 62–65.

[52] Hamza Alavi, "The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan," International Socialist Journal, Vol. 3, No. 14.(March–April, 1966), pp. 173–174. Alavi Says, "Inevitably the officers on whom he [Jinnah] had come to rely were virtually free to deal with the business of government. Extra ordinary powers had been vested in the Governor General which greatly strengthened their hands."

[53] Sequence of dismissals was:

1947	Dr. Khan Sahib of the N.W.F.P.
1948	Ayub Khuro of Sindh
1949	Khuda Bux of Sindh
1950	Khan of Momdot of the Punjab
1951	Khuro of Sindh
1953	Mumtaz Khan Daultana of the Punjab
1954	Pirzada Abdul Sattar of Sindh
1954	Fazlul Haq of East Pakistan
1954	Malik Feroze Khan Noon of the Punjab

Before his assassination in 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan tried to resolve the issues of constitution-making, refugee rehabilitation, economic development, reorganization of defence, and defining relations with India. Three trends emerged that accelerated the ascendancy of bureaucratic-military elites under Liaquat. First, Pakistan Finance Minister (1947–51) Ghulam Mohammad, formerly a member of Indian Audit and Account Services, initiated economic policies that enhanced the bureaucratic powers. Second, the Army's organizational problems and the perceived threat from India gave salience to the military elites. In 1951, the Rawalpindi conspiracy was unearthed. The conspiring officers were tried and imprisoned, and the incident raised the specter of the army's intervention in political realm.[54] Third, Jinnah's death resulted in the formation of factionalism within provincial Muslim League leaders. Initially personal, it led to a need for defining the center-province relations. In short, the provincial leaders found the viceregal approach of the center too overpowering, and the opposition parties also demanded a greater share of power for the provinces.[55]

The Liaquat government came out with two responses to deal with the opposition and to discipline factions within the league. First, by calling the opposition parties "the traitors," it equated the opposition to the Muslim League government with that of opposition to the state of Pakistan. This response was to promote anti-democratic tendencies and intolerance of opposition in later years. Second, the Liaquat government sought to discipline the factional leaders by passing the first act (The Public Representative Office Disqualifications Act of 1949) designed to punish political leaders for corrupt practices, willful administration and abuse of power and position. Increased reliance on such control mechanisms enhanced the bureaucratic elite's powers and inhibited both the development of Muslim League into a well-organized political party and the development of political parties in general.

Liaquat's death resulted in the conversion of the office of the Governor General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention. The chief ministers were dismissed despite their party's majority in the provincial assembly. From 1951 to 1958, Pakistan had only two Governors-General and one Commander-in-Chief while seven Prime Ministers tumbled one after the other.[56] Bureaucratic intervention, preemption and dissension among the political leaders made a sham of the parliament and the cabinet government.

[54] Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (1951), allegedly eleven military officers and three left oriented civilians were arrested in a plot to overthrow Liaquat's government. One Major General and one Air Commander, their trial was held Camera. For details see, Hasan Askari Rizvi, op.cit., pp. 82–84.

[55] Syed Noor Ahmed, Martial Law Sey Martial Law Taak (Lahore, Malik Deen Mohammad, 1970), (Urdu) pp. 374–381.

[56] The following Prime Ministers served during 1951–58: Khawaja Nazimuddin, October 1951– April 1953; Mohammad Ali Bogra, April 1953–October 1954, October 1954–August 1955; Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, August 1955–September 1956; H. S. Suhrawardy, October 1957–December 1957; Feroze Khan Noon December 1957–October 1958.

Table 2.2
Statement Showing Category wise, Disposal of Land Up to June 1974 in Kotri Barrage, Hyderabad

Category	Allocation	Disposal	Balance
Peasants Haris	674.076	331,173	160,553
Mohagedera		132,350	
M. S. Scheme	294,313	294,313	
Auction	129,070	129,070	
Long Term Lease Within Prohibited Areas	23,000	18,784	4,216
Cooperative Farming Societies of Peasants	29,321	29,117	204
East Pakistan Settlers	3,848	3,848	
Godhra Refugees	926	926	
Settlers from Northern Districts	108,561	108,561	
Tribesmen of Frontier Region	5,471	5,471	
Faouji Sugar Mill	2,207	2,207	
Defense Force	100,000	100,000	
Gallantry Awards	3,000	3,000	
Open Jail	2,000	1,975	25
Canals, Roads, Drains		43,000	43,000
Forest Department	60,000	60,000	
Mandi Town, Villages, etc.	38,000	38,000	
Agriculture and Husbandry Departments	12,100	15,607	
Affected Persons of Kharo Trust	20,000		20,000
Retired and Retiring Civil Gov.t Servants and Recommendations of the Governor/President	1,716	1,716	
Total	14,777,62	12,860,71	195,196
Minus excess disposal at Sr. 19		3,507	
Net Available	**191,689**		

Source: Nazir A. Moghul, "The Elite Groups and Aspects of Confrontation Within Pakistan" *Asian Profile* Vol. 5, No. 3, June 1977, p. 206.

The facade of "parliamentary politics" persisted but in reality the focus of power had shuttled to the bureaucratic and military institutions.[57]

Bureaucratic Elites and Economic Decision-Making

Having established effective dominance and control in economic decision-making, the bureaucratic elites entered the political arena in the post 1951 period. In the economic sector they facilitated the emergence of the financial-industrial groups. At the time of independence, Pakistan had a small merchant trading class (Memons, Bohras, Ismailis), that had emigrated from India. Though they had tremendous entrepreneurial skills, they did not have large surplus capital and industrial management experience. Additionally, due to uncertainty in the political environment, they were unwilling to make major investments without assurances from the government. The bureaucrats found this a fortuitous opportunity to expand their role in developing a bureaucratic

[57] Robert A. Laporte, Jr., *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan* (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1975.) pp. 48–49.

political system. Ghulam Mohammad, who served as Finance Minister (1947–51), and as Governor General from 1951–55, was a bureaucrat instrumental in initiating a number of economic policies and in building economic institutions that defined the parameters of the patron-client relationships between the bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups. His first industrial policy (April 1948) placed under the public sector only three groups of industries: arms and ammunition, generation of hydro electric power and the manufacture and operation of railways, telephone and wireless equipment. All other avenues were left open to the private sector. To facilitate the transformation of the trader-merchant classes into industrial groups, the private sector was provided such incentives as tariff protection and tax holidays. Establishment of institutions like Industrial Corporation (1949) and Pakistan Industrial Development, for granting loans on industrial projects (1950), bureaucratic elites acquired the control of key positions in the policy-making process. According to a well-informed observer of Pakistan's economic scene, the first chairman of (PIDC), Ghulam Faruque, effectively neutralized the opposition through a combination of ability and ruthlessness.[58] Under his chairmanship the PIDC played a major role in the industrialization and transformation of the merchant-trader classes into financial-industrial groups.[59]

Why did the bureaucratic elites come to dominate this process? One explanation is that the bureaucratic control, intervention and guidance were accepted and considered workable by the business communities. In addition, the society generally accepted bureaucratic elites' superiority.

Bureaucratic Elites and Political Decision-Making

How did the bureaucratic elites expand and consolidate their political power? Cabinet instability and the weakening of party politics were as much a function of the bureaucratic intervention and preemption as of the "praetorian conditions," and as the failure of political leaders to organize party politics.

[58] Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 81–83.

[59] Papanek *op.cit*., p. 95.

Table 2.3
Background of Industrial Families Business

Industrial	Community	Family Origin/Area	Settled	Headquarters pre-1947
Adamjee	Memon	Kathiwar/Jetpur	Karachi	Calcutta
Dawood	Memon	Kathiwaar/Bantwa	Karachi	Bombay
Saigol	Punjabi Sheikh	W. P unjab/Chakwal	Lahore	Calcutta
Valika	Dawoodi/Bohra	Bombay	Karachi	Bombay
Colony	Punjabi Sheikh Chinioti	W.Punjab/Chiniot	Lahore	Lahore
Fancy	Khoja Ismaili	Kathiwar	Karachi	E. Africa
Bawany	Memon	Kathiwar/Jetpur	Karachi	Rangoon
Crescent	Punjabi Sheikh Chinioti	W.Punjab/Chiniot	Lyallpur	Delhi
Beco	Punjabi	E. Punjab	Lahore	Batala
WazirAli	None, Syeds	W. Punjab/Lahore	Lahore	Lahore
Amin	Punjabi Sheikh	W. Punjab	Karachi	Calcutta
Nishat	Punjabi Chinioti	W. Punjab/Chiniot	Lyallpur	—
Hoti	Pathan Landlord	Charsadah	Charsadah	Mardan
Fateh	Marwari	Gujrat	Karachi	—
Isphahani	None	Iranian	Karachi	Calcutta
Karim	Bohras	Bombay	Karachi	—
Habib	Khoja Isnasheri	Bombay	Karachi	Bombay
Hyesons	None	Madras	Karachi	Madras

Sources: Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, (Lahore: South Asian Institute, Punjab University Press, 1974), p. 15; H. Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 21 (October 1972), p. 21.

Lawrence Ziring has suggested that most of the important political decisions after Liaquat's death were conceived and executed by the "Punjabi bureaucratic elite"[60] the core of which were two men: Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhary Mohammad Ali (a member of the Indian Audit Accounts Service and later Finance Minister and Prime Minister of Pakistan). Punjabi bureaucrats dominated the process of political decision-making during this period. A number of scholars have noted that rivalry between Chaudhary Mohammad Ali and Ghulam Mohammad suggests that the latter was more skillful in building a coalition of senior civil and military officers.[61] Thus a small number of bureaucratic-military elites made some of the most important political decisions that were to influence the future course of political development in Pakistan.

[60] Lawrence Ziring, "*The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan: East Pakistan and the Central Government*,"(New York: Columbia University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis), pp. 116–118.

[61] Hamza Alavi, "Class and State," in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship—the Political Economy of Praetorian* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 40–93, p. 80.

Some of the significant political decisions that the bureaucratic-military elites made were:

1. Dismissal of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din as Prime Minister of Pakistan.

2. Appointment of Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister.

3. Dismissal of Fazl-ul-Haq as the chief minister of East Pakistan and subsequently imposition of governor's rule in the province.

4. Dismissal of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

5. Creation of "One Unit" by amalgamating the four provinces of West Pakistan.

After Liaquat's death, Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza dominated the national political scene. They particularly excluded and alienated the East Bengali leadership. During their reign, the office of the Prime Minister and parliamentary politics were trivialized by frequent invocation of Section 92-A. Prime Ministers were appointed and dismissed at will by the Governor General. An American Advisor to several of Pakistan's prime ministers from 1955 to 1957, commenting on the political styles of Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza, remarked:

> Each in his own way, represented the viceregal system under new conditions without foreign principal. Each scorned politics, except his own ruthless kind, which neither acknowledged under that name. Each was possessive of executive ascendancy, regarded with repugnance the very idea of parliamentary experiments in Pakistan, and professed to prefer presidential government on the American model, though without having any insight into the political character of American presidency. Each fancied himself a strong man.[62]

Under Ghulam Mohammad, the bureaucratic elites established a paternalistic relationship with the politicians, and thus aborted the process of party politics. The Bengali language crisis (1952), the food crisis (1952–53), the Ahmedia issue (1953), the growing class antagonism in rural areas of West Pakistan and increased demands for provincial autonomy by East Bengal were exacerbated because these were perceived by the bureaucratic elites as threatening the continuities of the viceregal order and as weakening the center's control. Asserting that the weak Nazim-ud-Din's government had failed to manage the crisis, the Governor General dismissed the cabinet government in 1953, despite Prime Minister's party having a majority in the National Assembly.

[62] Charles Burton Marshall, "Reflections on a Revolution in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs, XXXVII*, (1959), p. 250.

This was not only a death blow to the democratic ideal but also the advent of bureaucratic intervention in the name of governor's rule in Pakistani politics. Setting aside all parliamentary rules, Mohammad Ali Bogra, then Pakistan's ambassador to US, was appointed the Prime Minister who had no support base in the Muslim League. The League leaders showed complete acquiescence in the governor's will, with 9 of the 11 members of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din's cabinet joining the Prime Minister's cabinet.[63] The parliamentary process and party politics had become irrelevant in Pakistan. Today it is widely accepted that the bureaucratic option the Governor General exercised in resolving the socio-political crisis of Pakistan was solidly backed by the military elites.[64] The Ahmedia riots and the subsequent imposition of martial law in the Punjab brought the military elites into the political arena. The support of the military elites was solicited to ensure the continuity of the viceregal system. The 1953 crisis laid the foundations for an institutional collaboration between bureaucratic and military elites. In addition, the sense of insecurity combined with the Kashmir dispute brought the military into the political arena almost from the inception of Pakistan. A militarily strong Pakistan was an enough imperative to encourage the military elites to participate in the political arena. The Kashmir War (1948) and subsequent cease-fire (1949) reinforced the notion that military elites would not stay out of Pakistani politics for long. A number of disgruntled senior military officers were dissatisfied with Liaquat's handling of the Kashmir cease fire, Liaquat's conciliatory decision to appoint the first Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army was highly colored by political considerations.[65] The appointment of General Ayub Khan in 1950 was widely criticized as his career was marked by administrative experience in staff appointments rather than in field commands. Ayub was quick to establish his loyalty to the civilian leadership with his uncovering of the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" involving a general to overthrow Liaquat's government. Until recently, a number of scholars regarded the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" as an isolated event. However, Major General Sher Ali has alleged in his autobiography that Ayub used the conspiracy case to promote a coterie of like-minded generals in the Army and thereby successfully create a core of generals who were willing to act under his command.[66] In addition, it brought Ayub closer to the bureaucratic elites such as Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza. Having forged an alliance with the bureaucratic elites the military elites pressed forward, with their efforts to equip the Army with modern weapons.

[63] Sayeed *op.cit*., pp. 71–72.
[64] Khalid Bin Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan," in Jacques Van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays (The Haque: Mouton, 1968), p. 289. Also see Qudrat ullah Shahab, *Shahab Nama* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 1987–1988) (Urdu), pp. 632–639.
[65] *Interviews*.
[66] Major General (Retired), Sher Ali Khan Patudi. *The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan*. Lahore: Wajidalis, 1978), pp. 134–135, 143–150.

Between 1951 and 1953, the military elites pursued a two-pronged strategy: forging an alliance with the bureaucratic elites and cultivating relations with the United States by impressing upon the US government Pakistan's need for military aid. General Fazal Muqeem recorded, "It is not known when the government of Pakistan decided to ask for military aid from the United State. Field marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan was however, definitely thinking along these lines in August 1951."[67] He speculated that consultation between the governments must have begun sometime in 1952. Although Khawaja Nazim-ud-din, the Prime Minister, and Chaudhary Zafar Ullah, the Foreign Minister, did not approve of an alliance with the United States, preferring instead closer ties with Great Britain, the bureaucratic military elites did not pay much attention to their preferences.

By middle of 1952, the army elites were exploring the prospects of forging an alliance with the US almost independently.[68] In October 1953 Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army paid an informal visit to the United States, apparently on personal initiative and without any formal approval from cabinet government.[69] The US military contacts were exploited by Pakistan to procure military aid. On February 25, 1954, the US president announced military aid for Pakistan, and on May 19, 1954, the US and Pakistan signed a mutual defence assistance agreement which provided military equipment and training assistance to the armed forces of Pakistan. In the minds of the military, they had not only procured military aid but also won a "dependable friend" for Pakistan.

It is in the context of these internal and external political developments that three decisions must be examined and analyzed. The elections of 1954 were not only a disaster for Muslim League but the results were also distasteful to the bureaucratic-military elites. The change in East Bengal was a challenge to their rule. The elites became alarmed and refused to concede to any of the provincial representative demands.[70] The alliance with the US had given them a sense of confidence. Ten days after the agreement, the central government dismissed the popularly elected government of Fazal-ul-Haq, the Chief Minister of Bengal, alleging that he had made statements that were prejudicial to Pakistan's integrity. The Governor General's action impressed upon political leaders that his powers had to be restricted if participatory politics in any form was to grow in Pakistan. For about five months, the politicians in the national and provincial assemblies attempted to limit the powers of the Governor General, but with little effect. On October 24, 1954, the Governor General made his final move, dissolving the National Assembly of Pakistan.[71] The dominance of the bureaucratic elites was well established and the regimes in Pakistan were from then on

[67] Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of Pakistan Army. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 153.
[68] *Ibid*., *op.cit*., p. 154–155.
[69] Mohammad Ahmed*, My Chief* (Lahore: Longmans, G..1960), pp. 74–75.
[70] Jahan, *op.cit*., pp. 45–48.
[71] *Dawn*, Karachi, October 25, 1954.

clearly military-supported. Still the parliamentary facade was retained even as participatory politics were delegitimized. The political leaders continued to head the cabinet government, but the real power was monopolized by the bureaucratic-military elites who emerged as the primary operators of the centralized system. They equated the demands for provincial autonomy, particularly those coming from East Bengal, with secession. They believed that such demands either were sponsored by India or would encourage India to attack Pakistan.[72]

It seems that the bureaucratic-military elites exaggerated the 1953 food crisis to create a political environment which would portray the US as a friend that was willing to bail out Pakistan.

The next step of the elites was the decision to unify the four provinces of West Pakistan into one unit. A unified West Pakistan was equated with a strong center and with centralized political control. Sayeed has attributed the authorship of the "One Unit Scheme" to Punjabi political leaders, while Von Vorys claimed that General Ayub Khan himself was the author of the scheme.[73] The scheme envisaged consolidating the four provinces in a single unit and name it West Pakistan.[74] The plan established the bureaucratic-military elites dominance. The small provinces saw it as a Punjabi conspiracy designed to perpetuate their dominance over the small provinces.[75] But it was more than that: undoubtedly, the Punjabis constituted the largest component of the bureaucratic-military elites, but theirs was an institutional dominance, not merely an ethnic or regional one. The bureaucratic elites, irrespective of their origins, were in general agreement on building a strong center and imposing their dominance.[76] The politicians, on the other hand, did little to develop any consensus among themselves on the nature or direction of political system.

The reign of Iskandar Mirza as the governor General (1955–1958) signified bureaucratic manipulation at its peak. In the words of Marshal "Mirza understood the routines of administration, the negative business of maintaining order and the techniques of divide and rule. Politics as a business of producing consensus was beyond him—something

[72] Qudrat ullah Shahab, who served as Secretary to Governor General Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan sheds light on the thinking, interaction and decision making styles of Pakistani rulers, pp. 640–660, 665–698.

[73] K. B. Syed, *op.cit*., pp. 76–78.

[74] Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); pp. 68–78.

[75] Commenting on One Unit Scheme Shahab offers a different interpretation "Administratively it was a workable and judicious decision. However, it was not appropriately managed. It was conceived in 1950 when Governor Ghulam Muhammad through an executive order appointed Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani as provincial governor and Dr. Khan Sahib as chief minister but the real work for the scheme was initiated when Muslim League was defeated in East Pakistan. Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, Pir Manki Sharif, G. M. Sayeed, Sh. Abdul Majeed and Sardar Samad Achakzai approved it. pp 674– 675.

[76] N. A. Faruki, informed me in an interview that a number of Senior Civil Servants from NWFP and Sindh were supportive of the One Unit Scheme.

fearful and strange."[77] The making and breaking of the cabinet became a normal part of Pakistani politics. This not only discredited the political leaders, but also undermined the party system. While the bureaucratic elites expanded and consolidated their powers, the making and breaking of cabinet governments discredited the political leaders and political parties.

The Pakistani case reveals that the ascendancy of bureaucratic elites and the decline of political parties was the result of the success of bureaucratic-military elites in preempting their control of key governmental positions. During the Mirza years, the office of the Governor General and later the President's office epitomized bureaucratic control, manipulation, and preemption of the political leaders. The cabinet instability discredited the political leaders, and parliamentary politics in general. By fomenting cabinet instability, bureaucratic elites enhanced their power and impressed upon the public that the political leaders were incapable of providing a viable government.

Being autocratic and authoritarian Mirza fully supported the elites' dominance of the nature and direction of the political system. His Republican party was a tool to make and break the cabinet governments and influence party politics in West Pakistan. These political leaders who joined or formed an alliance with the Republican party were duly rewarded and the party thus became a vehicle of patronage for the feudal classes.[78] These maneuvers intensified the factional struggle within the Muslim League and the League acquired a revivalist spirit. Mirza systematically began to promote individuals who were known for being anti-democratic and for their opposition to the Pakistan Movement. As Ziring has pungently noted "Mirza chose men who had supported the bureaucratic elite and had a basic antipathy for the Muslim League which still claimed dominant influence in the Province". Dr. Khan Sahib had never supported the Pakistan Movement and had "definite authoritarian" traits.[79]

By 1956 the League leaders began to mobilize the masses in West Pakistan. Nishtar made vigorous efforts to build the organizational base of the League and to mobilize the masses by arranging public meetings.[80] The mobilization effort of the Muslim League combining with cabinet instability made the political situation look extremely grim. Confronted with the crisis of its very existence, the League struggled hard to organize itself. The impact of the League efforts alarmed the military. In East Bengal, the economic discontent developed into a smuggling menace, and the Bengal political leaders intensified their demand for provincial autonomy. Before the electoral process

[77] Marshall, *op.cit*., p. 251.

[78] Qudrat ullah Shahab provides a graphic description of principal architects of Republican Party. He describes Iskandar Mirza, Dr. Khan Sahib, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani as the key players in its creation, pp. 675–676.

[79] According to Ziring, Republican Party had, "no philosophy or credibility and had been conceived merely to serve the interests of the landlord or feudal classes in the country.," Ziring, *op.cit*., p. 81.

[80] For a detailed discussion of Muslim League's organizational efforts, see, Sayeed Noor Ahmed, *op.cit*., pp. 511–516.

could acquire any legitimacy, the military elites decided to establish their hegemony by delegitimizing participatory politics and the political parties. The bureaucratic-military elites and the political parties had reached an impasse. The level of bitterness between the two can be understood from the text of Mirza's proclamation of martial law:

> The mentality of political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable government. The same group of people who have brought Pakistan to the verge of ruination will rig the elections (so that they) will be contested mainly on personal, regional and sectarian bases. However much the administration may try, I am convinced that elections will neither be free nor fair; they will not solve our difficulties.[81]

Let us turn to the second question and explore the impact of the military regime on clan formation, economic development and the process of building political institutions and dispute the contention that the military in Pakistan during 1958–1969 contributed to political institutionalization.[82] A distinction must be made between the hegemonic and participatory processes of political institutionalization. In Pakistan, unlike the third world countries, the middle classes were excluded by the military from participation in the political process. The military regimes' policies deepened the cleavages among different classes, groups and regions.[83] A number of studies suggest that between 1958 and 1969 the military regime in Pakistan took concrete steps to promote political institutions.[84] This was done mainly through a three-pronged strategy: (1) Basic Democratic schemes. (2) the constitution of 1962 and (3) the Revival of convention Muslim League. However, the efforts at political institutionalization headed by the military regime were half-baked and generated momentum which further destabilized the political system.

Military Hegemony

Military hegemony has emerged as the most dominant and durable characteristic of Pakistan's political system. Hegemony was achieved through four processes: (1) promotion of the "corporate interests" of the military (2) political exclusion i.e. exclusion

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[81] For full text, see *Dawn*, Karachi, October 8, 1958.

[82] Karl Von Voreys, *op.cit.,* pp. Samuel P. Huntington, *op.cit.,* pp. 250–255.

[83] Tariq Ali, *Pakistan Military Rule or People's Power* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), pp. 87–100, 116–130; Hamza Alvi, "Class and State," in Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 44–65.

[84] R. A. Moore, "The Army as a Vehicle of Social Change in Pakistan," The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October 1976); Samuel P. Huntington, *op.cit.*, pp. 250–255; Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958–1969,* Syracuse University Press, 1971). Samuel P. Huntington; Henry Bienen (ed.), The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. (xiii-xxi); H. Z. Schiffrin, Military and State in Modern Asia (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1976); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of new Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

of political leaders, political parties and the urban middle classes (3) political control, i.e., control of the press and labor; and (4) political inclusion, i.e., co-optation and consolidation of bureaucratic elites, financial industrial groups and the feudal classes. In the hegemony that emerged under General Ayub, political institutionalization remained an illusion, while the military hegemony became the reality of Pakistan's politics. The military regime, however, played a crucial role in the realignment of classes, groups and elites in Pakistan. It also succeeded in reinforcing its strategic alliance with the United States and in sustaining economic development of ensuring a constant flow of economic aid.[85] Since the military rule severely limited the organization and growth of autonomous groups or political parties, spontaneous protests developed into a mass movement.[86] A loosely organized coalition of diverse interests emerged which lacked ideological unity and well-defined goals other than seeking the removal of military rule.

The military regimes served to consolidate the feudal classes. What must be analyzed is how the military regime coopted and provided patronage to feudal classes, embarked on a policy of rural penetration, acquired control over key public and semi-public enterprises and expanded the military's role in the industrial sector.

The military elites who took over under General Ayub had neither the training nor the capacity to introduce any radical transformation in the society or the political system. Most of the officers either had origins in the feudal classes or were the descendants of government servants. Most hailed from families that were loyal to the British or were apolitical.[87] The military elites were a relatively small and cohesive group. By 1958 Pakistan had one general, five lieutenant generals and twenty major generals. Of these, eleven were Sandhurst graduates, and most of the rest had graduated from Dehra Dun military academy in British India.[88] The military established its hegemony by appointing more than 272 military officers to oversee and administer civilian departments and agencies.[89] Ayub Khan pursued his corporate interests through following policies.

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[85] Hamza Alvi and Amir Khurso, *Pakistan and the Burden of U.S. Aid* (Karachi: Syed and Syed, 1965), pp. 23–24.

[86] K. B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 163–156. Rounaq Jehan, *op.cit.,* pp. 67–89, 179–204; Rehman Sobhan, "East Pakistan's Revolt against Ayub: Old Resentments and New Needs," The Round Table (July 1969), pp. 302–307. Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971–77* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 61.

[87] There is a general paucity of data on the recruitment pattern of the officer cadre of the armed forces. For some interesting cadres analysis see, Hamza Alvi, "Army and Bureaucracy," pp. 149–181, 158–159; K.B. Sayeed in Jacques van Doorn (ed.), *op.cit*., pp. 276–297, 279–280. For some recent studies on the same theme, See Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. also Clive Dewey, "The Rural Roots of Pakistani Militarism." in D.A. Low (ed.) *op.cit*., pp. 255–283.

[88] Hassan Askari Rizvi, *op.cit*., p. 37.

[89] Shahid Javed Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Re-evaluation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1969, pp. 239–254, 267.

1. Promotions among the top brass.
2. Cooption of feudal classes and rural penetration.
3. Expansion of military's role in industrial projects.
4. Monopolization of key public and semi-public enterprises.

Between October 1958 and March 1959 the military elites began to accelerate promotions among the senior officer corps. In 1959 Ayub himself assumed the rank of Field Marshal and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In the Air Force and Navy, eight such top level promotions were made.[90]

The military recognized the feudals as the legitimate power-holders in rural Pakistan. In order to build a reformist image, however, Ayub in 1959 had imposed a ceiling on land ownership. Some of the big landholdings were broken up.[91] As Ayub wrote, "50 percent of the available land in the Punjab, a little less than 50 percent in the North West Frontier and over 50 percent in the Sindh was in the possession of a few thousand absentee landowners."[92]

Table 2.2 shows the highly sleeved pattern of land distribution and clearly indicates that the Land Reforms of 1959 did not challenge the supremacy of the feudal classes in the rural areas. The overall impact of the land reform, indeed, was inconsequential.[93] The total number of persons who benefitted from this reform was above 0.2 million, most of whom were tenants. The land reforms did not bring about change in the rural power structure, nor any significant redistribution of the land ownership pattern. The members of the Land Reform Commission were mostly bureaucratic elites who had strong ties with the feudal classes and were not interested in rocking the rural power structure. Similarly the powerful land owners were also quick to lend support to the military regime.

In addition to co-optation of the feudal classes, Ayub's regime also systematized the military's penetration of the rural structure of Pakistan. The process was initiated as early as 1952, when a welfare directorate was formed at the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi.[94] The directorate introduced five schemes to acquire land for defence personnel in the Indo-Pakistan border areas. The Army bought these lands from the government, reclaimed and developed them, and then distributed them among the Jawan (soldiers) and officers. According to these schemes, land was allotted

[90] *Dawn*, Karachi, October 30–31, 1958.
[91] *Report of Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan* (Lahore, 1959).
[92] Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 87.
[93] Mahmood Hasan Khan, *Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 161–166.
[94] Fazal Muqueem Khan, *op.cit.,* pp. 161–166.

according to rank in parcels ranging from 25 acres to 250 acres.[95] To implement these schemes, over 300,000 acres were earmarked in Sindh along with the Indo-Pakistan border. In addition, 2000 acres were earmarked for gallantry awards, for which officers could be awarded up to fifty acres, and other ranks upto sixteen acres. The declared purpose of awarding lands on the border was to create a defense reserve line of retired Officers and Jawans. There were, however, instances of malfeasance whereby some officers exchanged border land for land in the interior. In addition, some of the cultivatable land arising out of the completion of Ghulam Mohammad Barrage was distributed among civil servants and selected members of the feudal classes[96] (see Table 2.2).

The impact of the rural penetration can best be analyzed in the broad context of social prestige that is attached to land ownership in West Pakistani society. The feudal families of Punjab and NWFP were able to place one of their family members in the military or bureaucracy. This influenced the power and status of the feudal rural class and correspondingly the bureaucratic military elites enhanced their social prestige through their feudal connection. The ownership ceiling was greatly influenced by the considerations. In the rural sector, the primary beneficiaries of the regime's policies were the middle class farmers and the feudal classes.[97]

In 1961, the Agricultural Development Bank was created to provide loans to the rural farmers to buy tractors, quality seeds and to install tube-wells.[98] The second five year plan (1960–65) encouraged private investment in agricultural development and modern technology. The "Green Revolution," as this plan was referred to, increased agricultural productivity in West Pakistan. However, scholars disagree on the distributive effects of the Green Revolution. Burki contends that it led to the emergence of the rural middle class. Others like Hamza Alvi, Falcon and Stein dispute it and note that, "in agriculture the large farmers benefitted from the introduction of new technologies and the subsidies on inputs and their political power usually defeated attempt to tax their rising income."[99] Gotsch and Brown point out that the distributive effect of the Green

[95] Major-General and rank above 240 acres, Brigadiers and Colonels 150 acres, Lieutenant Colonels 124 acres, Lieutenants to Majors 100 acres, Junior Commissioned officers 64 acres, Non-commissioned officers and other ranks 32 acres.

[96] Nazir A. Mughal, "The Elite Groups and Aspects of Confrontation within Pakistan," *Asian Profile*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (June 1977), pp. 266.

[97] Hamza Alvi, "The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan," in R. Stevens, H. Alavi and P. Bertocci (eds.), *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1976).

[98] Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1961–62* (Rawalpindi: Economic Advisor to the Government of Pakistan, 1962), pp. 127–128 also See, *The Second Five Year Plan 1960–1965*, Karachi Planning Commission, I960, pp. 1–4.

[99] Shahid Javed Burki, "The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Explanation," in R. Stevens, H. Alavi and P. Bertocci (eds.), *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1976), pp. 290–316; Walter P. Falcon and Joseph J. Stem, "Pakistan's Development: An Introductory Perspective," in Walter P. Falcon and Gustav G. Papanek, *Development Policy II—The Pakistan Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 1–7.

Revolution was overwhelmingly in favor of the larger farmers since (a) tubewells were lumpy inputs requiring significant capital investment (b) percentage of cash crops on large farms unconstrained by subsistence requirements was much larger (c) fertilizer was in short supply and obtaining adequate supplies was often a matter of exercising social influence.[100]

The negative effects of these policies were that they sharpened the economic disparities between East and West Pakistan and the economic inequities in the rural areas became acute.

The military also created a place for itself in the industrial section by creating the Fauji Foundation (1953) for the welfare of former servicemen and their families. It initiated three industrial ventures: a textile mill, a cereals mill and a sugar mill.[101] Under the military regime, the foundation expanded into operation so that by 1970 it had total assets of 152 million rupees and by 1982 it had become "the largest welfare industrial complex in Pakistan." It had total assets of more than 2060 million rupees with twenty nine industrial projects operating.[102] The Second Five Year Plan (1960–65) spelled out how the military regime envisaged the projection and promotion of its corporate interests. Important relationships between civilian and military uses of manpower should be carefully explored by the National Manpower Council as the armed forces men are national assets to be conserved after discharge and fully utilized in the civilian work of development. It may also be considered whether a specific proportion of military manpower can be rotated on an actual basis through periods of service and into civilian life in order to upsurge the quality of labor force and at the same time preserve a desirable age within the military establishments.[103] Two points can be drawn from this statement. First, the regime believed that the military possessed important organizational skills. Second, it aimed to install the military personnel in defense related industry in the public sector. By 1970, the Fauji Foundation had created a sizeable industrial establishment.

The military became a ladder of respectable jobs in the society. Various private firms and limited companies offered them directorship to avail of their influence and controls in their dealings with the government.[104] Through such policies, the military regime constrained the social mobility of the urban professionals, who began to perceive the military as an obstacle to their advancement.

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[100] Carl Grotsch and Gilbert Brown, "Prices, Taxes and Subsidies in Pakistan Agriculture, 1960– 1976" (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 387, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1980), p. 23.

[101] Fazal Muqueem *op.cit.,* p. 235.

[102] Fauji Foundation (Rawalpindi: A Foundation Publication, 1976, 1983.)

[103] *The Second Five Year Plan, 1960–65* (Karachi: Planning Commission, 1960), p. 375.

[104] (1) Pakistan Oil and Gas Corporation (2) Pakistan Press Trust (3) West PakistanIndustrial Development Corporation (4) West Pakistan Agricultural Corporation (5) Small Industries Corporation (6) Karachi Development Authority (7) National Shipping Corporation (8) Karachi Port Trust (9) Pakistan International Airlines (10) National Oils (11) Burma Shell (12) Sui Northern (13) Gandhara Industries.

The military regime was quick to redefine their relationships with the bureaucracy. The new regime set up a number of screening committees between January and April 1959 to scrutinize and dismiss corrupt civil servants. As many as 1,662 civil servants belonging to central and provincial services were either dismissed, demoted or retired on the recommendations of these committees. By 1968 the regime had changed its relationship with the bureaucracy from one that was supported by the military to one that was controlled by the military. In the popular perception, the bureaucratic elites were corrupt, inefficient and arrogant.[105] The new regime held the CSP responsible for creating political chaos in the country. As one general commented: "We are convinced that the CSP must share the blame of political mischief which brought Pakistan to the edge of total disaster."[106] The military elites aimed at winning over and consolidating those civil servants who shared their policy goals. However, they did consider restricting the power and privileges of the CSP. For this purpose, a Pay and Service Commission was appointed in August 1959.[107] The appointment of A. R. Cornelius, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan known for his critical views of the CSP as Chairman of the Commission left no doubt that the military regime aimed to reduce the powers of the CSP. In response, the CSP attempted to reorient itself and align with the military. Being a small and cohesive group, this realignment was quickly achieved. Although the Commission presented its recommendations in 1962, the report was not made public until 1969, and the recommendations were never implemented.[108] The CSP also responded to the military challenge with mixed tactics of appeasement and resistance. For example, in 1960, the CSP allowed the entry of five military officers to the civil services. Between 1960 and 1963, fourteen officers from the Armed Forces joined the ranks of CSP, eight of whom had close connections with top military elites. Through such processes, a partnership grew between the military and bureaucratic elites in which the latter accepted the role of a junior partner.

Under Ayub Khan the military-bureaucratic elites moved with new vigor to exclude political leaders and parties from the political arena. According to one observer: "The imposition of Martial Law brought a whole series of repressive measures abolishing all civil liberties, censoring the press, and imposing extraordinary penalties for criminal acts. Special military courts were established and were authorized to pass any sentence, except death, transportations, or imprisonment exceeding one year or whipping exceeding fifteen stripes."[109]

The military regime revived old ordinances and introduced new acts to ensure their political control, including the following:

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[105] Nazim, Babus, *Brahmans and Bureaucrats* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1973), pp. 11–
[106] Cited in Shahid Javed Burki, *Twenty Years, op.cit.*, p. 246.
[107] *Dawn*, Karachi For details see, 1 September 1959.
[108] For a discussion on Pay and Service Commission Report of 1962, see Nazim, *op.cit.*, pp. 23.
[109] Karl Von Vorys, *op.cit.*, p. 189.

1. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code;
2. Public and Representative Officer (Disqualification) Act of 1949 (PARODA).
3. Security of Pakistan Act of 1952.
4. East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance of 1958.
5. Public Offices (Disqualification) Order of 1959 (PODO).
6. Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order of 1959 (EBDO).
7. Punjab Public Order Ordinance of 1960.
8. Take-over of Progressive Papers of 1959, later, Press and Public Ordinance of 1963.
9. Political Organizations (Prohibition of unregulated activities) Ordinance of 1962.
10. Defence of Pakistan Ordinance of 1965.

Section 144 has been frequently used by various regimes in Pakistan to control political activity and suppress anti-state activities. Under British Rule, it was designed to allow a District Magistrate to prohibit large gatherings and carrying of arms during times of civil disobedience. With a broad frame reference, it has even been invoked to prohibit tenants from removing grain from the threshing floor before the landlord received his share.[110] Under the military regime it was a major instrument of political repression and political control. The security of Pakistan Act (1952), the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance (1955), and the Defense of Pakistan Rules (1965) also were frequently used for purely political purposes. The military regime institutionalized the process of political repression by enforcing martial law orders, ordinances and decrees and by infringing upon the role of judiciary. In March 1959, it introduced the Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, (PODO) whose terms were similar to nose of PARODA.[111] Feldman had aptly remarked that, "PARODA had its origins in politics. It was used as a political weapon and it succumbed to political considerations."[112] Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had devised this innovative instrument to discipline the leaders of the Muslim League. In subsequent years, the Governor General used PARODA to remove undesirable political leaders from public office.

By invoking PODO, the military regime sought to silence political leaders. General Ayub Khan, who pronounced as his goal the introduction of a political system that would "suit the genius" of Pakistani people, was keen to eliminate as many political activists as possible. To achieve this objective, on August 7, 1959, the Electoral Bodies

[110] Stanley A. Kochanek, "Groups, Political Stability and Development." Unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Contemporary Pakistan, Columbia University, October 25–27, 1984.
[111] PODO—Public Offices (Disqualification) order 21 March 1959. *Gazette of Pakistan* (Extraordinary).
[112] Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan, 1962–1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

(Disqualification) Order (EBDO) was issued.[113] With this order more than 6,000 persons who held public offices or positions were debarred from participatory politics. The order had a forgiveness clause; if the person against whom the inquiry was being conducted chose to retire from public life voluntarily, the inquiry would not proceed against him. In both sides of Pakistan, the politically aware classes were effectively excluded from the political arena. Simultaneously, General Ayub Khan moved to consolidate his hold over his primary constituencies, the armed forces by assuming the rank of Field Marshal and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

Basic Democracies and Rural Works Program

Having coopted the bureaucratic elites and a segment of the feudal classes, and after excluding political leaders and parties from the political arena, Ayub Khan announced the Basic Democracies Scheme in November 1959, citing the following rationale:

First, this type of democracy will not be forced upon the people from above. Instead, it will work from below, gradually going to the top. Second, the people will not have to go far from their neighborhood to elect their representatives. The third factor which is of considerable significance is that the council which will be formed will be free from the curse of party intrigues, political pressures and the tub-thumping politicians that characterized the assemblies in our country in the past.[114]

The argument that democracy would not work under Indian conditions (illiteracy, class, caste, regional cleavages) is an old one as far as the Muslim view of India is concerned. Ayub Khan merely revived it.[115]

The Basic Democracies (BD) that Ayub proposed were expected to give a sense of political participation in managing local affairs, to mobilize the people for development roles in rural areas, to narrow the gap between the elites and masses, and above all to provide legitimacy for Ayub's role. In the end, the Basic Democracies never gained popular legitimacy, nor were they able to generate legitimacy for the regime. The urban middle classes, in particular the urban professionals, despised the Basic Democracies, which they viewed as antidemocratic in nature and content.[116] The alienation and exclusion of the East Pakistani urban middle classes were severe.

[113] *Dawn*, Karachi 8 August 1959. The ordinance was used to disqualify politicians from participating in politics for a period of eight years.

[114] Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. II (Karachi: Feroz Sons, n.d.), pp. 24– 25.

[115] Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan" Middle East Journal, Vol. XII, (1959), pp. 339–406. Rounaq Jahan, *op.cit*., pp. 117–121. *The Basic Democracies Order, 1959* (Karachi: Manager Pakistan Press, 1959) Lawrence Ziring, "*The Administration of Basic Democracies*," in Gutherie S. Birkhead (ed.), Administrative Problems in Pakistan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966); Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 103–104.

[116] Rounaq Jahan, *op.cit*., pp. 120–125.

The scheme could not develop grass-roots support because it was premised on extending the regime's control without political participation. The scheme politicized the society and enhanced the power of the bureaucratic elites and the feudals. Gunnar Myrdal aptly remarked: "The effect of the new system has been to associate local landowners with the official machinery of the government."[117]

The politically aware sectors saw the scheme as an administrative device to perpetuate the regime. Ayub desired a legislature that would "consist of men of high character and wisdom belonging to no party."[118] It also sharpened regional differences. The average East Pakistan B.D member was more literate and less wealthy than those from West Pakistan.[119]

The launching of the Rural Works Program in 1962 further enhanced the power and prestige of the bureaucracy, lending it greater control over government funds and their disbursement. The bureaucratic elites emerged as the primary beneficiaries of the twin programs of Basic Democracies and Rural Works Program. The military regime expected to achieve similar results by excluding the political leaders and the urban middle classes and by directing their focus on rural areas. But the scheme did not achieve desired results because the Bengalis were not only politically more aware but also highly politicized.[120] In addition, the plan failed to capture the imagination of the rural classes in East Pakistan. The system increased centralization, but did not provide an alternative to the political parties which it had aimed to eliminate. The party system had fragmented to such an extent that there were more political parties in the post-Ayub period than in pre-Ayub period. In some cases they revolved around a few notable leaders; in other cases they were in formative phases and weak in organization.
In May 1963 Ayub abandoned his own B.D system and reluctantly decided to head the Convention Muslim League ML(C). He did not make any effort to make Muslim League(C) into a popularly supported organization on the plea that the Muslim League was instrumental in the creation of Pakistan, then an organization base was not really imperative.

The military hegemony alienated East Pakistan since the East Pakistani elites were inadequately represented in the military-bureaucratic ranks. The Basic Democracies barely gave them a modicum of political participation. The military regime not only failed to develop any viable political institutions, but it also hampered the growth of political parties. The collapse of the hegemonic system also brought the collapse of the

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[117] Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), p. 333.
[118] Cited in Huntington, Political Order ... *op.cit.,* p. 243.
[119] For details see, Rounaq Jahan, *op.cit*., pp. 122–126.
[120] For details see, Rounaq Jahan, *op.cit*., pp. 122–126; Talukdar Manirruz Zaman, Group Interests and Political *Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), pp. 84–86. Yusuf Hamid, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy, 1974–1977* (Lahore: Afro Asian Publications, 1980).

Pakistani state. The regime made two important contributions in the economic domain: it stabilized the financial-industrial groups and created viable economic institutions.

Financial-Industrial Groups and Economic Institutions

In the early phase of Pakistan's history, the trader-merchant class was associated with economic policy-making institutions. It reflected the Quaid's belief that in an independent Pakistan, private enterprise and industrial development should be encouraged by the government.

At the time of independence Pakistan inherited a small but cohesive trader-merchant class and two trading families from Punjab (the Saigols and the Chiniotis).[121] Its members were dynamic and skillful entrepreneurs. This class was made up of small, close-knit, clannish, caste-like communities (see Table 2.4). The institution that represented the interests of the trader-merchants was the 600-members Pakistani Chamber of Commerce.

In the pre-military hegemonic period, the regimes in Pakistan had encouraged the participation of the trader-merchant class in the economic policy-making process. However this class could not organize itself effectively and thus its impact on economic policy-making remained marginal. Still, business organization proliferated and, according to one estimate, in 1958 there were 250 business organizations. Almost every major city had a chamber of commerce, but there was no coordination among them. The military found the large number of business organization cumbersome and therefore, under the Central Ministry of Commerce, an office of the Director of Trade Organization was created in 1958 which in 1961 abolished all the competing organization. The Director was given wide powers to form the new organization. He could modify and amend any resolution adopted by any business organization. Previously, the Chamber of Commerce elected the management of pubic or semi-public institution. Under the new law, the chamber could only nominate its members to these bodies and the director retained the power to regulate membership.[122] This centralization established bureaucratic control in the economic policy arena. Instead of creating an atmosphere in which business could expand under free-market principles, the military would reinforce a patron-client relationship with the trader-merchant class.[123]

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[121] For an excellent discussion on the role of minority Muslim trading communities, see Hanna Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Business: Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship and Partial Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.21, No. 1 (October 1972), pp. 1–32; Sergey Levin, "The Upper Bourgeoisie from the Muslim Commercial Community of Memons in Pakistan, 1947 to 1971," Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 40 (Marchl974), pp. 231–243. G.F. Papanek, op.cit., pp. 85–86, 111–116. 1948–1949 Year Book of Pakistan, Mumtaz Ahmed, Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan. Karachi: National Institute of Public Administration, 1974), pp. 141, 146.

[122] Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Ordinance No. XLV of 1961, *The Gazette of Pakistan* (Extraordinary), Karachi, December, 1961.

[123] Angus Maddison, *op.cit*. p. 139.

Table 2.4
Financial/Economic Institutions

Institution	Year Formed	Peak Year	Declared Objectives/Functions
PIDC*	1950	1959–69	To encourage industry where private enterprise was shy.
PIFC** Renamed IDBP	1949–61	1961	Long term loans to medium and small-scale industries.
PICIC***	1969		Provide long-term loans, credit, and foreign exchange to FGC's 40% of capital share held by U.S., U.K., Canada, Japan, W. Germany; 60% by Pakistani private investors.
ADFC & ABP merged to ADBP	1952, 1957	1961	Provide credit vash for agriculture, cottage industry, livestock, fisheries, forestry, etc.
* Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC)			
**Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP).			
***Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC).			
****Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan.			

In addition to bureaucratic patronage, another factor that facilitated the transformation of the trader-merchant class into financial-industrial groups was the vacuum created by the migrating Hindu trader-merchant class. The opportunity was skillfully exploited by the Muslim trader-merchants. This class had the initial advantage of experience.[124] By 1960–61, a small segment of trader-merchants dominated the trade and commerce of Pakistan. The peasantry was weakly organized and thus found it difficult to dislodge the feudals. Moreover, the bureaucracy was confronted with the problem of restoring law and order in the urban and rural areas. The regimes in the pre-military hegemonic period had given priority to the development of the industrial sector. Since most of the trader-merchants had settled in West Pakistan, this area became the prime beneficiary of industrialization.

Economic Institutions

The Ayub regime was instrumental in developing economic institutions. According to a well-informed observer of Pakistan's economic scene, Ayub "was deeply concerned with economic development and threw his weight on planning."[125] Ayub's role in fostering economic institutions and planning activities can be traced to 1953–54. By procuring US economic aid, the military elites under Ayub enhanced their position in the country's politics, developed a strategic link with the US, and were able to obtain US expertise for developing economic institutions. The US Military Assistance Group (US MAG) and the other economic group, the Harvard Advisory Group (HAG), played a dominant role in the planning and expanding of the economic institutions.

[124] Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan* (Moscow: "Nauka" Publishing House, 1964), pp. 137–142.

[125] Edward S. Mason, One of the HAG directors, foreword in Said Hassan, Pakistan: *The Story Behind Its Economic Development* (New York: Vantage Press, 1971), p. vii. Alavi and Khusro, op.cit., pp. 14–16.

Planning Commission

Planning Commission was the pivot of economic planning, development and growth in Pakistan. In 1954, the government of Pakistan, the Ford Foundation, and Harvard University signed an agreement stating that the university, with funding from the Ford Foundation, "would recruit and guide a group of experts who would assist Pakistan's Planning Commission ... to prepare the first comprehensive plan for long range economic and social development."[126] The HAG was to assist the Planning Commission in three ways:

1. Organizing and developing a long-term development plan;
2. Recommending and analyzing major economic policy questions;
3. Training professionals in various sectors of national planning.

The HAG was instrumental in shaping the intellectual and ideological orientation of the Commission. The Commission not only provided the guidelines for a capitalist road to development but also served as a vital bridge between the military and business interests. A Ford Foundation report published in 1965 could claim with satisfaction that the commission had "attained competence in its role originally conceived as a technical body."[127] Furthermore, the report praised the efforts of the military regime in encouraging private enterprise:

> Pakistan has evolved an enterprise system combined with a government formulated framework of policies and planning. Eighty percent of its output is privately produced while the government has protected, stimulated, financed and guided its agriculture and industry. It has relied heavily on private initiative in economic growth.

Under the military regime, the Planning Commission was made part of the Presidential Secretariat This further enhanced its power and prestige. In 1965, according to Mason, "The Planning Commission occupied a central position in the negotiations for foreign assistance and in directing its use."[128]

Ayub also streamlined the existing economic institutions. In 1959 the Credit Enquiry Commission was created to examine financial institutions. Upon its recommendations, most of the financial-economic institutions were renamed, reorganized and reformed to constitute new ones."[129] These institutions were given new priority and goals (see Table

[126] *Design for Pakistan: A Report on Assistance to the Pakistan Planning Commission by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1965), pp. 2, 16–17, 28–32.
[127] *Ibid*, p. 27, 34.
[128] Mason, *op.cit*., p. vii.
[129] *Economic Survey of Pakistan*, 1961–62, p. 34. also pp. 35–38.

2.5). Their underlying goal was to centralize and effectively control the economic decision-making process.

Table 2.5
Prior Occupation of Muslims Who Were Private Industrialists in 1959 (%)

	Previous Primary Occupation*	Previous Secondary Occupation**		Father's Occupation	
S. Antecedent Characteristics	**Industry**	**Industrial Investment*** **	**Industrial Investment**	**Industrial Investment**	**Industry**
1. Industrial, pre-1947	17	16	4	30	6
2. Small Industry Handicrafts	18	6	23	7	16
3. Traders-Import, Export	17	41	30	25	11
4. Traders-Internal Government	28	22	39	24	36
5. Employees (professional, other)	18	10	4	12	20
6. Agriculture	3	6	negligible	1	11
Total	**101**	**101**	**100**	**99**	**100**
Notes: Total differ from 100% because of rounding.					
*Excludes those who immigrated from the Near East in the last century.					
** Primary and secondary are determined according to the proportion of income received.					
***Proportion of total industry controlled by each catagory					

Economic Institutions and the Financial-Industrial Groups:
Three financial-economic institutions and their politics played central role in facilitating the financial-industrial groups.

PIDC
The PIDC was instrumental in transforming the trader-merchant class into financial-industrial groups. The corporation was bifurcated in January 1962 between East and West Pakistan. The corporation declared objective was ... to promote enterprises which private industrialists were unable or unwilling to undertake. Its policies were to supplement, not to displace private enterprise Every effort is needed to attract private capital into PIDC projects, and where private enterprise is not forthcoming at the outset, to transfer the complete projects to private ownership when the conditions for such transfer are fulfilled.[130] Clearly, the primary purpose of the corporation to create a class of private entrepreneurs under governmental patronage and the PIDC succeeded in performing that task. Between 1950 and 1962, the PIDC completed 55 industrial projects; of course, 33 were located in West Pakistan and 22 in East Pakistan.[131] In addition, between 1962 and 1969 another 25 projects were built by the West Pakistan PIDC. On completion, most of these industries were transferred to the financial-industrial groups through a process the PIDC called disinvestment.

[130] *Ibid*., p. 36.
[131] *Ibid*., pp. 32–38.

According to one study, 47 percent of the private industrialists in 1959 reported the occupation of their fathers as traders (Table 2.8)[132] Amjad has pointed out that ten major "industrial houses" emerged as beneficiaries of the PIDC's disinvestment policy (Table 2.6). There was close collaboration between the PIDC and these industrial houses, the members of which were represented on the board of directors of the PIDC. Interestingly, the PIDC not only transferred industries to the private sector, but also refrained from setting up those enterprises in which the private sector was not active. By 1960 Pakistan had achieved rapid industrialization and had one of the brightest growth rates in the world. Two major industries, cotton textiles and jute, were dominated by a handful of the industrial houses. Amjad has estimated that five houses controlled about 80 percent of the jute industries and ten houses controlled about 50 percent of the cotton textile production.[133]

[132] Rashid Amjad, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1974), pp. 18–20.
[133] *Ibid*., pp. 35–36.

Table 2.6
PIDC's Total Amount Disinvestment in Favor of Industrial Houses (Until June 1962)

Group/Companies	Amount	Percentage of Each Group	Percentage of Total Disinvestment by PIDC (in Millions of Rupees)
Amin Group			
Amin Jute Mills	20.00		
Total	20.00	7.00	50.00
Adamjee Group			
D.D.T. Factory Nowshera	3.02		
Adamjee Industries	30.00		
Adamjee Chemical Works			
Adamjee High Grade Board			
Paper Mills, Nowshera			
Adamjee Jute Mills	75.00		
Total	108.02	37.90	27.20
Bawany Group			
Latif Bawany Jute Mills	7.50		
Total	7.50	2.60	1.90
Dawood Group			
Kernaphully Paper Mills	65.90		
Total	65.90	23.10	16.60
Fancy Group			
Karachi Gas Company	15.00		
Peoples Jute Mills Ltd.	20.00		
Total	35.00	12.30	8.80
Isphani Group			
Chittagong Jute Mfg.	12.50		
Total	12.50	4.40	3.10
Nishat Group			
Nishat Jute Mills Ltd.	4.08		
Total	4.08	1.40	1.00
Saigol Group			
Jauharabad Sugar Mills	10.85		
Total	10.85	3.80	27.00
Karim Group			
Karem Jute Mills	7.50		
Total	7.50	2.60	1.90
Hoti Group			
Charsadah Sugar Mills	13.80		
Total	13.80	4.80	35.00
Grand Total	**285.15**	**100.00**	**71.70**

Source: Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power of Pakistan (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1974), p. 19.

Table 2.7
Distribution of PICIC Loans by Size (to July 31,1969)

Size of Loan	Amount*	Percentage
Under 0.5 million Rupees	597,11	3
0.5 million-1.0 million Rupees	101,224	6
1.0 million-2.5 million Rupees	359,198	20
Over 2.5 million Rupees	1,271,066	71
Total	1,791,199	100
Note: * Millions of Rupees		

Table 2.7
Distribution of PICIC Loans by size (to July 31, 1969)

	*		East Pakistan		Pakisran	
Loan Size	No. Cases	Amount	No. Cases	Amount*	No. Cases	Amount*
To 0.5	1,365.00	145,739.00	1,658.00	215,245.00	3,107.00	360,984.00
0.5-1.0	158.00	109,545.00	189.00	139,093.00	347.00	248,638.00
1.4+	156.00	604,700.00	186.00	589,868.00	372.00	1,194,568.00
Total	1,673.00	859,984.00	2,033.00	944,203.00	3,706.00	1,804,190.00
Source: Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power of Pakistan (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1974), pp. 35-37.						
Note: * Millions of Rupees.						

IDBP and PICIC

Both the PICIC and the IDBP played key roles in promoting the expansion of the financial-industrial groups and in facilitating their linkage with international capital. They provided opportunities for these groups to procure loans for expanding their investments, and also established their hold in the bank structure of the country. The foreign aid received was funnelled through the PICIC to the financial-industrial groups. PICIC could lend up to 1.5 million rupees in West Pakistan and up to one million rupees in East Pakistan for the installation of new industries. There were no upper limits. The breakdown of the PICIC loan size, as shown in Table 3.11, indicates that almost 71 percent of the loans sanctioned were in amounts greater than 2.5 million rupees. The PICIC promoted class consolidation by concentrating wealth in the hands of the few industrial houses. Amjad has noted that 70 percent of the loans sanctioned by the PICIC went to only 11 industrial houses (see Table 2.7).[134] He concluded that there was a definite relationship between borrowed capital and industrial expansion in Pakistan. The correlation between borrowed capital and industrial expansion clearly

[134] *Ibid*., pp. 39–40.

indicates that the PICIC served as a vital link between the financial-industrial groups and international capital.

The third important financial institution, the IDBP, provided only 20 percent of its total loans to the financial industrial groups. Its primary purpose was to provide credit facilities to the modicum and small industrial units in the private sector. Yet, the breakdown of IDBP loans (Table 2.8) suggests that a major portion of loans (almost 66%) were of over one million rupees and these went to a small portion (about 9.2%) of the total borrowers. One study concluded that the bank encouraged the formation of small, indigenous financial class in Pakistan.[135]

Conclusion

Through these financial-industrial institutions, the military regime under Ayub was able to consolidate the financial-industrial groups. The phenomenal economic growth, the development of economic institutions and the concentration of economic wealth that occurred during the military regime was a function of its ability to procure foreign aid. For example US grants and credentials to Pakistan declined from $380 million to $282 million in 1968. Since the regime had made little effort to develop political institutions that would give the urban middle classes and the urban proletariat a sense of political participation, the crisis of unequal economic growth and the resultant slowing down of economic development produced a crisis of political participation.

Ayub Khan's ability to procure foreign aid weakened after 1963 when Pakistan began to pursue a more independent foreign policy. To what degree Ayub encouraged and guided such a shift in policy continues to be debated, but the change did create two groups within the Ayub cabinet. The Foreign Ministry under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto asserted that Pakistan should pursue closer relation with China, identify itself with third World causes in international politics, seek settlement with India on Kashmir and tailor foreign aid negotiations to meet guidelines provided by the Foreign Ministry. The Planning Commission, under the direction of Mohammad Shoaib, the Finance Minister, asserted that economic growth and development in Pakistan had occurred because the military regime was able to procure foreign aid by pursuing a pro-western foreign policy. The conflict between the foreign ministry and the planning commission reached its peak during the September 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Said Hassan, a former Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, reported that President Mohammad Ayub Khan had believed that pursuing an independent foreign policy would not result in the stoppage of US aid, and that in such an eventuality, Pakistan would be able to secure aid from alternative sources.[136] But termination of aid from the United States in 1965, combined with the war with India and a bad harvest year, had all adversely

[135] Said Hasan, *op.cit*., p. 127.
[136] *Ibid*., pp. 128–129.

affected the economy. Although later in 1966 the US restored aid to Pakistan, the damage had been done. The economy was unable to recover.

The politics of protest reached a turning point in January 1968. President Ayub Khan suffered a near-fatal stroke, which shook the foundations of the regime. It became clear that the regime had failed to develop any mechanism for succession of power. In April 1968, the chief economist revealed that 80 percent of Pakistan's economic wealth was concentrated in the hands of twenty two families.[137] After this declaration the economic policies of the regime came under severe criticism from the disenfranchised classes, political leaders and political parties. The protest ultimately developed into a mass movement and Ayub was forced to resign. However, the military hegemonic system he created remained in place. The decline of the system brought about the collapse of the Pakistani state.

[137] Cited in Rashid Amjad, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

3

BREAKDOWN OF THE MILITARY-HEGEMONIC SYSTEM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

Ayub's legacy was mixed as uneven economic development widened the gulf between the rich and the poor. In 1968, twenty-two families owned 68 percent of the industries and 87 percent of the banking and insurance assets in the country. According to one estimate, in March 1969 Ayub Khan and his family's assets were somewhere between ten and twenty million dollars (U.S.).[138] Unequal growth led to regional disparities in income. In East Pakistan, income per capita rose from Rs. 269 in 1959–60 to Rs. 291.5 in 1969–70, while West Pakistan's per capita income rose from Rs. 355 to Rs. 473.4 for the same period. East Pakistan's per capita economic growth rate rose from 0.6 percent during 1954–60 to 2.6 percent during 1959–65, while during the same period West Pakistan's growth rate rose from 0.9 percent to 4.4 percent.[139]

Centralization, authoritarianism and corruption produced a crisis of legitimacy for the regime. Ayub had sought legitimacy for the military-hegemonic system through economic development, the Basic Democracies and the 1962 constitution, but the politically active segments of the society remained hostile to the exclusionary nature of the political process. The "political institutions" that Ayub created did not accommodate the aspirations of the urban middle classes, the industrial labor class and the rural peasantry. Most of the political parties and political leaders that Ayub displaced did not accept the legitimacy of the new institutions.
The military constituted a critical element of the hegemonic system. The coalition of the bureaucracy and the financial-industrial groups that Ayub

created could function only so long as he was able to muster the military's support. However, in March 1968 Ayub's illness shook the very foundations of the hegemonic system, for it revealed that the military elites had little if any faith in the system's ability to survive.[140] The military elites saw themselves as the rightful successors to Ayub, and they were determined to maintain their hegemony. More than one account suggests that General A. M. Yahya Khan, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, set aside

[138] Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962–1969* (London: Oxford University Press, pp. 287, 287.
[139] Rounaq, Jahan*, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 80–81.
[140] Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto: 1971–1977* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 40. Also, G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 28–30.

the provisions of the 1962 constitution and assumed effective control of the administration during Ayub's illness.[141]

The succession issue has confounded political leaders and military-bureaucratic elites in Pakistan. In the absence of rules of succession, conflict at the elite level becomes endemic. The military elites jockeyed for power while political leaders and other discontented groups resorted to mass mobilization. These acts exacerbated tensions and accelerated Ayub Khan's downfall. In addition to his deteriorating health, the highly centralized and authoritarian nature of his rule, uneven economic growth; exclusion of the urban middle classes; industrial labor, and peasantry from the political process; and the accumulation of wealth by Ayub's family combined to hasten his fall from power.[142] Two exogenous factors—the Tashkent declaration and the decline in American aid—were equally important factors in the decline of the Ayub regime.

Ayub's Fall and the Emergence of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

What were the circumstances that led to Ayub's downfall? How was the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) able to generate a political crisis? The PPP not only played a major role in bringing about Ayub's downfall, but also emerged as the primary beneficiary. There is considerable literature explaining the factors that led to Ayub's fall. Through a strategy of regime confrontation and mobilization of the masses, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto percipitated the crisis.[143] Because the hegemonic system had been premised on demobilization of the masses, exclusion of urban professionals, authoritarianism and political control, the political leaders and urban groups spent a maximum amount of energy on mass mobilization. Political institutionalization remained a low priority. In Pakistan, indeed, mass urban protests remain an important indicator of political change—more important than political innovation or institution building at the governmental level.[144]

The crisis of succession ushered into the political arena individuals, groups and classes who had previously been denied access. These new comers included urban professionals (university/college instructors, lawyers, engineers, doctors and journalists), industrial laborers, petty government employees (office clerks, postal workers, school-teachers, patwaris, peons) and rural peasantry (tenants, landless

[141] Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics 1958–1982* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), pp. 14–15. For an in-depth study of events, circumstances that shed light on the role of Yahya Khan, also Altaf Gauhar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler.* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1993). pp. 413–415, 470–480.

[142] For an excellent discussion of socioeconomic causes of Ayub's fall, see Shahid Javed Burki, "Social and Economic Determinants of Political Violence: A Case Study of Punjab," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 25 (1971). pp. 465–80.

[143] Various explanations have appeared on the circumstances that led to Ayub's downfall. See Wayne Wilcox, "Pakistan in 1969: Once Again at the Starting Point," *Asian Survey*, X (February 1970), p. 73; Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Carrison State," *Asian Survey* 9, No. II, (November 1969). Also see Altaf Gauhar, *op. cit.*, pp. 433–483.

[144] Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 139–143.

cultivators, etc.). The mobilization of these new groups contributed to Ayub's fall from power, but left the military-hegemonic system in place.

The antecedents of the anti-Ayub movement can be traced to the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the subsequent Tashkent Declaration. In West Pakistan the declaration was perceived as a surrender to India, and it evoked a spontaneous student protest.[145] In June 1966 Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Z. A. Bhutto) resigned—or rather was forced to resign—from Ayub's government. Bhutto himself claimed, and other writings also suggest, that Tashkent marked the parting of ways between Bhutto and Ayub.[146] It was following the declaration that Bhutto began to capture the imagination of students and other groups in West Pakistan as a nationalist committed to fighting a thousand-year war against India.[147]

After resigning from Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto pondered his political future for more than a year.[148] A number of urban professionals and student leaders, particularly from Punjab, approached Bhutto and encouraged him to form a new political party.[149] On November 30, 1967, he announced the formation of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The party's first convention was held at the residence of Dr. Mubasher Hassan, an engineer from Lahore. It was a very modest beginning. The convention was a congregation of urban professionals, student leaders and a few personal friends of Bhutto from the land-owning class. In ideological terms, the convention brought together a disparate mix of self-declared Marxists, and Islamic socialists.[150] The national press virtually ignored the event.[151]

The program and ideological position of the new party were stated in a series of papers entitled "Foundation and Policy."[152] The principal authors of the foundation document were Bhutto, J. A. Rahim, Dr. Hassan and the publisher Mohammad Haneef Ramey. The document proposed a socialist pattern of development for Pakistan and called for the nationalization of banking, insurance and heavy industries. It proposed labor,

[145] For details on protesting groups, see *Dawn*, Karachi, January 14, 1966; the daily *Imroze*, Lahore, January 25, 1966.

[146] For Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's account, see *Let the People Judge* (Lahore; Pakistan Peoples Party, 1969), pp. 41–42. Also see S. M. Zafar, *Through the Crisis* (Lahore, Book Center, 1970); Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980). p. 75.

[147] Bhutto's strongly anti-India speech in the United Nation's denouncing Indian aggression in 1965 September war had deep impact on public consciousness. Pakistani press gave wide coverage to the speech.

[148] Taseer, *op.cit*., pp. 77–79.

[149] See Fateh Mohammad Malik's preface in Mohammad Haneef Ramey (ed.), Islami Soshalizm (Lahore: Al-Bayan, no date) (Urdu).

[150] Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and Two," in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins (eds.), *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 70–116. Taseer, *op.cit*., pp. 91–100. For further details and analysis, See Anwar H. Syed.

[151] The Pakistani national press virtually ignored the event. *The Pakistan Times*, November, 30, 1967, for example, gave a two-inch story.

[152] Foundation and Policy Documents of Pakistan People's Party (Lahore, November 1967).

education and health reforms and promised to eliminate "feudalism" and "landlordism." The foundation papers strongly argued that socialism was not antithetical to Pakistan's cultural and religious values. (Although the term "Islamic socialism" was not used in the foundation document, immediately after the convention the PPP leadership began to propound the congruity between Islam and socialism).[153] The four basic principles of the party were stated in a catchy slogan:

> Islam is our faith;
> Democracy is our polity;
> Socialism is our economy;
> All power to the people.

PPP: Three Phases of Development

The emergence and development of the PPP can be divided into three phases.[154] The first two phases show a clear correlation between Ayub's downfall and the PPP's growth.

1. Formative phase: November 1967–September 1968;
2. Regime confrontation and rise of popular support: September–March 1969;
3. Mass mobilization: Bhutto's Political Style March 1969–December 1971.

The Formative Phase

During the formative phase, Bhutto addressed small meetings and attempted to persuade social elites to join his party. He did not meet with much success in this endeavor, largely because of his party's declared socialist program and its relative dominance by urban professionals. During this period Bhutto consistently focused his speeches on nationalist themes (anti-India, anti-Tashkent). By June 1968 he began to address socioeconomic issues such as rising prices and bureaucratic corruption, and he then launched a frontal attack on the regime's policies.[155]

In September 1968, while addressing the second convention of the PPP at Hyderabad, Bhutto embarked on a policy of confrontation and defiance. He publicly charged Ayub Khan with corruption, demanding, "Mr. President, let us know what you possessed before your presidency and what I did not possess before my ministership, what you have acquired during the presidency and what I have lost during the ministership. I have no lust for wealth, I have held portfolios of industries, oil, fuel and foreign affairs

[153] J. A. Rahim opposed the inclusion of term Islamic Socialism in the Foundation papers. However, immediately afterwards Bhutto and other PPP stalwarts popularized its usage.

[154] Various explanations exist on the emergence and development of the PPP. For a detailed discussion see Philp Jones, "*Pakistan People's Party*," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University, 1977. Also see Tassaduq Hussain, *Pakistan Pipalz Party* (Lahore: South Asian Institute, 1974).

[155] Hussain, *op.cit*., pp. 40–42.

for quite a long period. Had I desired to loot the nation, Mr. President, I would have acquired nearly the same amount of wealth as you have, if not more."[156]

In his speech Bhutto not only disassociated himself from Ayub, his onetime benefactor, but also claimed to have a clean record. Bhutto insisted that his differences with Ayub were not personal, but were instead matters of policy. He attacked bureaucratic corruption and emphasized his role as architect of Pakistan's independent foreign policy.[157]

The Hyderabad speech played a catalytic role in the protests that eventually culminated in Ayub's downfall. Between September 21 and November 12, 1968, Bhutto addressed fifteen public meetings.[158] Addressing party workers at Peshawar, Bhutto explained why drastic tactics were needed.

Upon Bhutto's return from Peshawar on November 7, he was stopped at the Polytechnic College near Rawalpindi by a group of students who asked him to address them.[159] As the police attempted to disperse the gathering, one of the students was killed, thereby sparking what has been called as the "November Movement."[160] This movement of street protest was spearheaded by the students, but later other groups (including urban professionals, industrial labor and opposition leaders) that were affected by the regime's exclusionary policies also joined. The protest lasted until March 1969, during which time 239 persons were killed (see Table 3.1).

[156] *Let the People Judge, op.cit*., pp. 13–16.
[157] *Ibid*. pp 16–18.
[158] Z. A. Bhutto, *Awakening the People: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1966–1969* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, no date). Calculated from the speeches reproduced in the text, pp. 199–244.
[159] Abdul Rashid Sheikh, President of the Government College, Rawalpindi Students Union joined Bhutto near Taxila and later organized protest.
[160] Muneer Ahmed, see chapter "The November Mass Movement in Pakistan," in *Political Sociology: Perspective on Pakistan* (Lahore: Punjab Adbi Markaz, 1974), pp. 1–56.

Table 3.1
Pattern of Violence During Anti-Government Protests, November 1968 to March 1969

	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Total
Killed by police shooting	41a	88b	129
Killed by violence	2c	103d	105
Officials killed by mob	_	5e	5
Total	43	196	239

Source: Muneer Ahmad, Political Sociology: Perspectives on Pakistan (Lahore: Punjab Adbi Markaz, 1978), p. 14.

Notes:
a. Mainly students and laborers from Rawalpindi, Karachi, and Lahore who were defying the government's ban on public meetings.
b. Primarily students in Dacca defying the government ban and curfew.
c. Shot by state guards of influential persons.
d. Local government elected officials closely identified with the unpopular regime, mainly from the subdivision of Jamalpur Parbatipur.

On November 12, 1969, Bhutto, Wali Khan and ten other political leaders were arrested under the Defence of Pakistan Rules.[161] Bhutto was charged with inciting student unrest and, later for demanding the breakup of the "one unit" model of West Pakistan. These arrests had two major effects on Pakistan's politics:

1. They provided the PPP leadership with an opportunity to mobilize the masses, to expand the party's organization, and to keep public attention on Bhutto's trial.

2. They encouraged such notable personalities as the former chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Asghar Khan; former Justice Murshid Hussain, the judge of the High Court of East Pakistan, and one of Ayub's former associates, Lieutenant General Azam Khan, to enter the political arena.

Of the above mentioned three, Asghar Khan attracted the most public attention. Within a week after Bhutto's arrest, Asghar became politically speculated that he might join the PPP, although he did not.[162] Despite his military background, Asghar Khan maintained a strongly anti-Ayub posture. He declared, "The rejection of Ayub Khan is utter and

[161] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, November 13, 1968.
[162] Tassaduq Hussain, *op.cit*., pp. 50–53.

complete. In his person President Ayub Khan rightly or wrongly symbolizes in the eyes of the people all that is evil in society."[163]

Bhutto's arrest opened the floodgates for increased political demands from urban professionals, industrial labor, petty government employees, and the rural peasantry.[164] Urban professionals, the most politically aware segment of Pakistani society, had been especially and adversely affected by the regime's authoritarianism. Thus various professional associations of doctors, engineers, university and college teachers, journalists, and petty government servants were quick to present their demands. The demands of the industrial labor followed. Broadly, these demands can be divided into two categories: (1) political demands to restore democracy, lift the state of emergency, and end military-bureaucratic rule; and (2) economic demands for wage and salary increases and improved service conditions (see Table 3.2).

[163] *Dawn*, Karachi, November, 16, 1968.

[164] For details of these demand groups: see Daily *Nawa-i-Waqat*, Lahore, November 20, 1968 through January 20, 1969.

Table 3.2
Demand Groups and Their Demands

Demand Groups	Associations/Organizations	Demand
Doctors	WPHSA, CMB	Class I status, better salaries, housing advancement, and confirmation of service after 1 year
Engineers	W. Pakistan Engineers, Asstt. Engineer Students Welfare Association	Class I status, engineering department to be headed by engineers, not by Civil Service. Chairman to be an engineer.
School teachers	PTU, PTFU	Provincialization of education, better service and retirement benefits, dignity for teachers.
Subordinate government	Office clerks, postmen, peons, patwaris, phone operators, etc.	Better salaries, housing, and medical conditions. Free education for children.
Political parties	Democratic Action Committee	Dissolution of One Unit; provincial autonomy, restore democracy, accept student demands.
Student	NSF, Unions of the Colleges	Repeal University Ordinance, reduce tuition fees, revive Punjab University's students' union, release political prisoners.
Lawyers	Various national and district Bar Councils	Judicial appointments from legal profession, end emergency, restore democracy, release political prisoners, repeal University Ordinance.
Journalists		Free press, better wages, associate journalists with management of news organizations.
University	PUASA, WPLA, WPCTA	Class I status, better salaries, housing, etc., and opportunities for advancement.
Industrial labor		Repeal anti-union laws, wage increase, better housing nationalize major industries.

Source: Based on newspaper reports from November 1968 to March 1969, in *Dawn,* Karachi, *The Pakistan Times,* Lahore, *Imroze* , Lahore, *Weekly Nusrat* , Lahore.

Abbreviations:
NSF National Students Federation
PTUF Punjab Teachers United Front
WPLA West Pakistan Lecturers Association
WPCTA West Pakistan College Teachers Association
PUASA Punjab University Academic Staff Association
WPHSA West Pakistan Health Service Association
CMB Central Medical Body
PTU Punjab Teachers Union

The PPP leadership sympathized with these demands, and encouraged party workers to bring these groups into the party fold. This was accomplished by socialist Sheikh Rashid, radicals like Miraj Mohammad Khan, and the Islamic 6 socialist Mohammad Haneef Ramey. Through these early initiatives radicals and socialists were able to consolidate their hold on the party organization.[165] During this phase, factionalism was low because most of the feudal leaders of the party had been arrested along with Bhutto. The PPP thus emerged as the primary beneficiary of the protest movement. Most of the other opposition political parties were indecisive about mass mobilization against President Ayub, while the PPP persisted in its drive toward mass mobilization.
Party Media and the Image Makers During the period of Bhutto's arrest and imprisonment (from November 1968–February 1969) many of the PPP's top leaders made strenuous efforts to keep the public's attention trained on Bhutto's trial and on the socialist content of the party's program. PPP central committee member Mohammad Haneef Ramey, owner of the newsweekly Nusrat, and an ardent proponent of Islamic socialism, built a personality cult around Bhutto.[166] Through Nusrat, Ramey launched a campaign to project Bhutto as a defiant nationalist, champion of the poor, and as the only leader who had the courage to challenge dictatorial rule. Ramey and other urban professionals who contributed to the newsweekly conveyed the impression that Bhutto and the PPP's socialist program were inseparable, and that Bhutto had been jailed because he was fighting for their rights.[167] In 1967 Nusrat had a circulation of less than 2,000 readers and was limited to the major urban centers. With the expansion of the PPP, its readership increased both in the rural and urban centers. By 1969, Nusrat had an estimated circulation of 60,000 and was available in the remote villages of West Pakistan.[168]

After Bhutto's arrest, Ramey wrote in one of his editorials:

> Wherever party officers do not exist or party leaders have not reached, people should create PPP offices and later seek approval from regional offices. The most important task is to spread PPP's program, enroll the maximum number of men and women as members of the party. For a party like PPP, which stands for Islam, democracy, economic and social justice, it should not be difficult to raise its membership into millions. This must be done, as it is imperative for the forthcoming elections. Increase in membership will promote solidarity among the people and will help us in changing the system.[169]

[165] Philp Jones, *op.cit*., pp. 461–65.
[166] See issues of weekly *Nusrat*, Lahore, during the months December 1968 and January 1969 for Bhutto's trial coverage.
[167] *Nusrat*, Lahore, December 15, 1968, reported nation-wide protests supporting Bhutto and demanding his release.
[168] Estimates provided by Ali Jaffar Zaidi, formerly assistant editor of weekly *Nusrat*.
[169] See weekly, *Nusrat*, Lahore, December 29, 1968.

Ramey's words clearly reveal the nature of the PPP leadership's difficulties. The party remained vague about its program and ideology. That the leadership was more concerned with increasing its membership, then with developing a well-planned organizational structure. Unlike other Marxist parties, it did not set any preconditions on membership.

At this stage the party was primarily concerned with expanding its base and preserving party unity."[170] As noted earlier, the PPP had had no leader of national stature other than Bhutto.[171] After Bhutto's arrest, however, several PPP leaders acquired national stature and played important roles in creating coalitions with other political leaders whom they invited to join the PPP. J. A. Rahim, a declared socialist, is credited with helping to draft the PPP's Foundation Documents.[172] As secretary general of the party, he sought to broaden the PPP leadership coalition, and he is widely recognized as having persuaded M. A. Qasuri, a prominent lawyer from Lahore and an important leader of the National Awami Party, to join the PPP.

Sheikh Rashid, president of the Punjab PPP and a socialist known for his association with peasant causes, launched a major organizational effort to recruit socialist elements into the PPP's leadership hierarchy.[173] In Karachi, Miraj Mohammad Khan, a lawyer and influential student leader, made an effort to expand the party base. Miraj, a Marxist, has been generally regarded within the party as a radical.

Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto entered public life after Bhutto's arrest, thereby setting a new trend in Pakistani politics. As Bhutto's wife she evoked considerable public sympathy and thereby kept the masses mobilized. In the protest marches she attended, students, housewives, and working women from urban middle and lower classes participated. Previously, Pakistani women had rarely participated in political protest. Women developed into an important PPP constituency. During this phase, the PPP leadership succeeded in preserving party unity, keeping public attention trained on Bhutto, and expanding the party's organizational structure, albeit in a rather disorderly fashion. Under pressure from the PPP, and other opposition parties, President Ayub Khan was forced to withdraw the state of emergency in February 1969.[174]

[170] Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan" in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque eds.), *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975). pp. 295–296; Sayeed "How Radical is the People's Party ..., *op.cit*., 89–91.
[171] Although later nationally recognized leaders began to join the PPP; for details see Philp Jones, *op.cit*., p. 469.
[172] Taseer, op.cit., p. 89; Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The enigma of Political Development* (Boulder: Review Press 1980), pp. 120–121.
[173] *Nusrat*, Lahore, January 26, 1969.
[174] *Dawn*, Karachi, February 12, 1969.

Mass Mobilization: Bhutto's Political Style

Bhutto was a very talented and effective communicator. He spoke the people's language, by calling upon common cultural symbols. He was thereby able to develop a true rapport with the people.

On February 14, 1969, Bhutto was released from jail. This event marked the beginning of a new and critical phase in the PPP's development. After his release, Bhutto was a new leader: bold, confident, and confrontational. During the weeks between his release and President Ayub's resignation on March 25, 1969, Bhutto launched a major mobilization effort. He was vociferous in his attacks on the regime and he relentlessly demanded President Ayub's resignation. He introduced a new political style in Pakistan political a style marked by mass demonstrations and radical slogans, banners and symbols.[175] He not only criticized the regime, but also attacked the opponents of his party and its program. Bhutto's political showmanship infuriated his opponents, but the crowds loved it. A brief description of the PPP processions will give the reader a taste of Bhutto's political style.

Bhutto launched his public contact movement with a massive public meeting at Karachi.[176] From the back of a truck Bhutto led the procession dancing and singing with the crowd. To rouse the people further, Bhutto would clap his hands together as if he were handcuffed and then snap them free to show that the chains had been broken; then he would clap his hands above his head in Maoist style. The crowds shouted and clapped with him. Bhutto repeated this performance in Rawalpindi, Multan, Lahore and Peshawar. Thousands of people participated in the processions and meetings.

But even as Bhutto and the PPP rode the crest of popularity, the first signs of factionalism in the party leadership began to appear. These factional tensions developed not over substantive issues, but rather over who would stand with Bhutto on the truck or who would sit with other party leaders on the podium. This tension was not insignificant, for these processions and meetings provided PPP leaders with an opportunity to seek access to party Chairman and to gain public recognition.[177] However, given Bhutto's popularity and the strong anti-Ayub sentiment at the popular level, factionalism within the PPP remained a less salient factor at this stage of the party's development.

To thwart Bhutto's mass mobilization effort, President Ayub Khan invited the opposition parties, a coalition called Democratic Action Committee (DAC), to a Round Table Conference (RTC). Ayub's program of reapproachment had begun in early

[175] For detailed description of Bhutto's public processions, types of slogans and news reporting *Nusrat*, Lahore, March 23, 1969.
[176] *Nusrat*, Lahore, March 23, 1969.
[177] *Ibid*., April 27, 1969. Particularly issues between December 8, 1968 and January 26, 1969.

February 1969 when Ayub agreed to the following DAC demands: (1) Ayub would not contest the presidential election; (2) he would release Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, president of the Awami League; (3) he would restore parliamentary democracy; and (4) elections would be based on adult franchise. However, Ayub was unwilling to concede to the dissolution of the One Unit system in West Pakistan and the removal of the parity principle. Ayub believed that these issues had been settled in the 1950s and he also equated the breakup of One Unit with regional separation.[178]

Ayub's decision to call the RTC indicated that he was losing the support of the military. The chiefs of the army, air force and navy and their aides had joint and separate meetings with Ayub. The most crucial meeting took place in mid-February, when the three chiefs (General Yahya, Air Marshal Nur Khan and Vice-Admiral Ahsan) told Ayub to work for "a political settlement" and not to rely on military forces to suppress the revolutionary movement.

For Ayub, the advice to seek a political solution to the social upheaval was perhaps the biggest shock. He had been the unchallenged chief of the armed forces for the last eighteen years (1950–68).[179] Thus, Ayub sought dialogue with the political parties without sufficient support the military elites. Several interpretations have been drawn to explain why the military elites withdrew their support from Ayub. Professor G. W. Choudhary suggests that Bhutto and Lieutenant General S. M. G. Peerzada conspired to overthrow Ayub because both had lost power during Ayub's rule.[180] Former air force marshal Asghar Khan suggests that during Ayub's illness, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, General A. M. Yahya Khan, had developed his own political ambitions. Still another view is that after the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, a number of generals had become disillusioned with Ayub and were reluctant to stand beside him.[181] Whatever the merits of these hypothesis, the fact remains that at the popular level anti-Ayub sentiment was very strong and enough individuals, groups and political parties had been mobilized to successfully oppose him.

The military elites, fast, realized that if they were to perpetuate the military's hegemony, Ayub would have to go. But Ayub's political system had failed to develop a proper structure for a peaceful succession. Instead, Ayub transferred power the way he had assumed it—through irregular succession. Ayub's downfall unleashed a contradictory political process. The military elites were confronted with a paradox: How could they maintain their hegemony while also restoring participatory politics? Burdened with Ayub's failure, General Yahya Khan imposed martial law on March 25, 1969. As Yahya assumed power, the *Economist* recorded: "President Ayub Khan's last

[178] G. W. Chaudhury, *op.cit*., pp. 35–39. Herbert Feldman, *The End and the Beginning of Pakistan 1969–71* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 57–52.
[179] G. W. Chaudhury), *op.cit.,* p. 35. Also Altai Gauhar *op.cit*., conveys similar view p. 46.
[180] G. W. Choudhry, op.cit., p. 93.
[181] Asghar Khan, *op.cit*., pp. 14–15.

service to his country may have been his least perceptive one. Certainly Pakistan needed a return to order; but there was little solid evidence that what it needed was a return to military rule. This West Pakistani decision may turn out to have been very unwise."[182] This observation proved to be prophetic for Yahya Khan's rule antagonized rebellious East Pakistan and further polarized West.

General Yahya Khan and the Military Elites

Conscious of the widened discontent and the unresolved demands of various groups and political parties, Yahya's priority was to restore law and order. But unlike the 1958 martial law order, Yahya's decree was perceived by the various groups and classes as an attempt to abort a "people's revolution."[183] General Yahya Khan and his associates were aware that they had two choices. To use force to crush the populist movement, or to buy time, ensure the military's credibility as the supreme enforcer of law and order and thereby perpetuate military hegemony through political settlement. Given the high degree of politicization at the mass level, Yahya choose the second option. In his first address to the nation, he declared:

> I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government. It is my firm belief that a sound, clean and honest administration is a prerequisite for a safe and constructive life and for the smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise. It will be the task of these elected representatives to give the country a constitution and find a solution for all other political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people.[184]

General Yahya's intent was to delegate power to the elected representatives, but his immediate priorities were to consolidate his personal power and to restore political order.[185] The Military Council and the system of administration that emerged under General Yahya placed into top decision-making positions twelve officers above the rank of brigadier from the three services (army, air force, navy). Four officers were from Punjab, four were migrants, three were from the Frontier Province, and one was from East Pakistan.[186] Despite their diverse ethnic origins, these military elites strongly believed that the bureaucratic elites had acquired too much power under President Ayub. Some felt that bureaucratic inefficiency was a major factor in Ayub's downfall.[187] Since popular sentiment was also running against the bureaucracy, the military leader

[182] *The Economist*, London, March 29, 1969.
[183] Herbert Feldman, *op.cit*., pp. 10–14.
[184] *Dawn*, Karachi, March 27, 1969. 18
[185] Lawrence Ziring, "Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political Underdevelopment under General Yahya Khan, 1969–71," in W. Howard Wriggins (ed.) *Pakistan in Transition* (Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 1975), pp. 198–228.
[186] *Ibid*., pp. 199–200.
[187] Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973). p. 25.

found it easy to adopt measures that would reduce bureaucratic power. Through a martial law order, 303 civil servants were removed from service.[188] A number of top executive bureaucratic positions in the private and public sectors were quickly assumed by the generals. Having established a consensus to maintain the military's hegemony, Yahya moved to keep the generals in good humor. He made large-scale promotion at the senior level, particularly in the army. It is alleged that on many occasions standard selection rules were violated.[189]

Having consolidated his personal power, General Yahya Khan moved gradually and cautiously to remove potential irritants within the Military Council. General Yahya had personal and policy differences with the chief of the air force, Air Marshal Nur Khan, who wished to perpetuate military rule.[190] Among the junta members he had a relatively progressive outlook on issues confronting the country. Nur Khan suggested that the regime adopt a reformist attitude and he is credited with initiating labor and educational reforms under the Yahya regime. However, he was considered too "progressive" for the status quo-oriented generals. By August 1969, Yahya had succeeded in luring Nur Khan West Pakistan, where he was appointed governor. Removed from the center Nur Khan lapsed into oblivion. Having removed his personal irritant, Yahya Khan established effective control over the military elites.

On November 28, 1969, Yahya announced plans to hold the country's first general elections. In March 1970, he issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which provided the rules according to which elections would be held. Yahya's November 28th speech and the LFO released social forces for which the Yahya regime was unprepared. Indeed, these two documents raised more questions than solutions.

Yahya announced several decisions in his November 28th speech. In response to popular demand, he proclaimed the dissolution of the One Unit structure, reviving instead the four provinces of West Pakistan.[191] Yahya's decision was based on tremendous political pressure from the political leaders of the smaller provinces (Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan) where leaders like Haider Baksh Jatoi, Wali Khan and Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo had emerged as symbols of resistance to Ayub's centralization. This decision apparently was also popular with the military elites, as it made available to the generals more administrative positions.

[188] *Dawn*, Karachi, December 2, 8, 1969.

[189] Fazal Muqeem Khan, *op.cit.*, pp. 150–151.

[190] For a detailed discussion on antagonism between General Yahya Khan and Air Marshal Nur Khan, see Fazal Muqeem Khan, *op.cit.,* pp. 20–21; Chaudhury, *op.cit.,* pp. 50–51, and 86.

[191] For text of Yahya's speech see *Dawn*, Karachi, November 29, 1969. For discussion of the issue, see Feldman *op.cit.,* pp. 51–64. The PPP position was stated by Haneef Ramey, who saw "one unit" as an obstacle to democratization and socialism. Hence must be dissolved. See *Nusrat*, March 23, 1969.

The elections were to be held on the basis of one man, one vote; the principle of parity which had evolved in the 1950s was set aside. The parity principle had held that irrespective of population size, the two provinces of Pakistan (East and West) would have equal representation in the country's National Assembly. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, leader of the Awami League, had opposed the idea of parity and demanded representation on the basis of one man one vote, which would give Bengalis a clear majority in the national assembly. Yahya's decision was well-received in East Pakistan, but it raised skepticism in West Pakistan. Yahya also promised maximum provincial autonomy, but left the issue of relations between the center and provinces vague and undefined, as Mujib preferred. Clearly Yahya was eager to appease Mujib.

There is no evidence to suggest that Yahya or any other member of the military elite seriously evaluated the implications of these decisions. In West Pakistan, the Islam Passand (literally, "Islam-loving") parties and the migrant community in Karachi (those who migrated from India after partition in 1947) were particularly distressed by these decisions. The primary complaint of the Islam Passand parties was that Yahya's speech did not impose any checks on the PPP's socialist ideology and the Awami League's six points. Similarly, the dissolution of One Unit created an identity crisis for the migrant community, which feared that their interests would not be protected in the Sindh Province; they subsequently demanded the separation of Karachi from Sindh. With these considerations the Islam Passand Parties and the migrant community made strenuous efforts to influence the shape of the LFO.[192] The two found an able proponent in General Sher Ali.

The Legal Framework Order was announced on March 31, 1970. It asserted that all political parties participating in elections must agree to operate under the following principles:

1. Preservation of Pakistan's Islamic ideology.

2. Establishment of a democratic constitution that would ensure periodic elections on the basis of population and guarantee fundamental rights and independence of the judiciary.

3. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and solidarity of Pakistan.

4. Elimination through statuary provisions of the disparity among different regions.

5. A promise of "maximum autonomy" for the provinces.

[192] For a detailed description on these issues See, Feldman, *op.cit*., pp. 55–61 Chaudhry, pp. 82– 83. Also, see General Sher Khan Patudi, *The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan* (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1978). pp. 244–245, 310–315.

In addition, the LFO stipulated that the National Assembly would prepare a constitution within 120 days and that the president would have the power to "authenticate" the constitution.

The LFO had numerous loopholes. The fifth clause was so vague that the phrase "maximum autonomy" could be given any meaning. For example, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman used the fifth clause of the LFO to his maximum advantage, while the LFO had a differential impact on the political process in East and West Pakistan. In the East, it legitimized Mujib's autonomy. He conducted his election campaign by demanding maximum autonomy, as promised in the LFO, and by denouncing West Pakistan for exploiting the East.[193] In West Pakistan the socialism of the PPP became the most controversial issue. Referring to the LFO, the Islam Passand parties insisted that the PPP's socialist ideology negated the ideology of Pakistan and thereby did not conform to the spirit and intent of the LFO. Thus, in West Pakistan the electoral campaign developed over religious, ideological and class issues.[194] Just one day before the issuance of the LFO, 113 Ulema (religious leaders) issued a fatwa (Decree) declaring that socialism is kufar (anti-religion).[195]

Table 3.3
Composition of PPP's Central Committee Leadership

Radicals	***Islamic Socialists***
Miraj Mohammad Khan	Haneef Ramey
J. A. Rahim	Khursheed Hassan Mir
Haq Nawaz Gandapur	Malik Mairaj Khalid
	Tahir Mohammad Khan
Socialists	***Feudals***
Sh. Mohammad Rashid	Makhdoom Talib-ul Maula
Dr. Mubashir Hassan	Ghulam Mustafa Khar
Mahmud Ali Kasuri	Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi
	Mumtaz Ali Bhutto

Source: This typology is based on the composition of the Pakistan People's party (PPP) Central Committee prior to 1972. The Committee had a total of 26 members and reflects their social origins and ideological orientation. Urban professionals numbered 17, zamindars 8 with one religious leader (i.e., Maulana Kausar Niazi).

[193] For a complete text, see *Dawn*, Karachi, April 1, 1969.
[194] For Mujib's conduct during the election campaign, see G. W. Chaudhury, *op.cit*., pp. 108–122. Also Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes—1970', *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (March 1971).
[195] *Imroze*, Lahore, March 31, 1969.

Ideological Debate Within the PPP

The PPP had mobilized the masses to its socialist program by promising a better socioeconomic future for the disadvantaged classes and groups.[196] The Islam Passand parties claim that socialist ideas were antithetical to Islam put tremendous pressure and strain on the PPP leadership at a time when the party was still debating whether to contest elections. The socialists and the radicals within the party claimed that the PPP was a revolutionary party and that it should develop cadres and prepare the masses for struggle to bring about a socialist revolution. The Islamic socialists within the party argued that in Pakistani society religion was a pervasive phenomena and that ignoring it would mean alienating the masses. They suggested that participation in the elections was necessary to combat the Islam Passand parties and to educate the masses. The Islam Passand Parties attacks on the socialist program of the PPP further strengthened the position of the Islamic socialists in the party. The socialists began to cluster around the position taken by the Islamic socialists, isolating such radicals as Miraj Mohammad Khan and J. A. Rahim within the party (see Table 3.3).

The ideological debate in the PPP was resolved in July 1970 at the Hala Convention where the party decided to participate in the elections. Why had the radicals lost this debate? The following are possible explanations:

1. The PPP resembled a protest movement in that it attracted a number of disenchanted groups and developed into an umbrella organization that accommodated multiple class interests. The radicals did not have a strong support base at either the popular or top leadership levels.

2. During Bhutto's arrest and imprisonment, the socialists and Islamic socialists were able to expand and consolidate their control over the various branches of the party, particularly in Punjab.[197] The radicals could not extend their influence beyond industrial labor in Karachi and Lyallpur. However, the radicals, greatest weakness appeared to be their inability to muster financial resources and their poor-organizational skills.

3. The party media, although small, were effectively dominated by the Islamic socialists and socialists of similar orientations. From March 1968 to March 1970, the weekly *Nusrat* was the only journal sympathetic to the PPP program. It performed two functions: it served as a forum for West Pakistani intellectuals to debate and refine the concept of Islamic

[196] For discussion on the PPP ideology, see Gerald A. Heeger, *op.cit*., pp. 298–299; Khalid B. Sayeed, *op.cit*., pp. 47–48; Anwar H. Sayeed *op.cit*., pp. 73–76.
[197] For details see, *Nusrat*, May 18, 1969 and July 20, 1969.

socialism,[198] and it served as an important vehicle for transmitting the PPP's message to the masses. After March 1970, however, several groups, in order to promote their own views, began to publish their own weekly journals.[199]

4. After Ayub's downfall, Bhutto changed his strategy from one of regime confrontation and mass mobilization to one of coalition formation. In early 1970 he began to cultivate the feudal classes in West Pakistan.

Bhutto's strategy of building coalitions with waderas, zamindars, khans and sardars proportionately increased the influence of the "feudals" in the party. However, the urban professionals still constituted the core of the party's socialists (mostly urban professionals) who wanted to participate in the elections did not oppose this coalition-building strategy, but the policy isolated the party radicals.[200] After due deliberation at the Hala Convention, the party announced that it would participate in the elections. The radicals agreed to stand by the party's decision, but decided that they would not take part in the elections. Later political developments were to indicate that the radicals had made a serious miscalculation in deciding not to participate in the elections. Their influence in the party hierarchy began to wane, and they were never again able to attain a similar position within the party.

Bhutto's failure to win over the established waderas, zamindars, khans and sardars is an important development that had a bearing on political realities once the PPP came to power. Several factors that shaped the ensuing power struggles included the following:

1. The established zamindars and others believed that Bhutto's public posture was too anti-status quo and anti-establishment. His emphasis on socialism and reformism was unpalatable to them.[201]

2. These groups were suspicious of the urban professionals' influence in the party hierarchy and found it difficult to accept their leadership, which was predominantly socialist.[202]

3. Although Bhutto himself hailed from a large landowning family in Sindh, a number of the established families in Punjab, Frontier province and Baluchistan regarded him as an upstart in the power game. (In Sindh he

[198] For the contributions of Pakistani intellectuals on the debate on Islami Socialism, see *Nusrat*, September 1966, and issues of December 1968.
[199] For example, weekly *Shahab*, Lahore, (Patron Maulana Kausar Niazi), *Dehqan*, Lahore, (Patron Sh. Rasheed Ahmed), *Alfath*, Karachi, (Meraj Mohammad Khan and other radicals).
[200] Henry Korson, (ed). Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974). pp. 6–29.
[201] Interview with several PPP leaders.
[202] *Ibid*.

had minimized this antagonism by forming coalitions with some of the established waderas.) It is interesting to note that in united Pakistan Bhutto was the only political leader from Sindh to gain national recognition.[203]

4. Most of the established "feudals" failed to recognize how much political awareness Bhutto's policies had created among the Pakistani masses. Because they believed that elections would be contested on the basis of traditional *biradri* (clan) alliances, and that ordinary village voters would be of little consequence, feudals were deeply shocked by the elections results.

After the Hala Convention, the PPP entered the political arena with new vigor. Bhutto continued with his strategy of coalition formation and mass mobilization.[204] As the election date drew nearer, hostility toward the regime increased, and attacks by Islam Passand Parties on PPP leaders became more intense. The PPP counter attacked with equal bitterness. On several occasions the supporters of the PPP and of the Islam Passand Parties clashed.[205] And as the election campaign intensified, the military elites also stepped up their activities.

Table 3.4
Results of the General Elections to the National Assembly of Pakistan 1970

Party	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Baluchistan	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	Total
Awami League	0	0	0	0	0	160	160
Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)	1	1	7	0	9	0	9
Pakistan Peoples Party	62	18	1	0	81	0	81
Council Muslim League	7	0	0	0	7	0	7
Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (Hazarvi)	0	0	6	1	7	0	7
Markazi Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan	4	3	0	0	7	0	7
National Awami Party	0	0	3	3	6	0	6
Jamat-e-Islami	1	2	1	0	4	0	4
Pakistan Muslim League (Convention)	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
Pakistan Democratic Party	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Independent	5	3	7	0	15	1	16
Total	82	27	25	4	138	162	300

Source: Adapted from Report on General Elections, Pakistan, 1970-71, Vol. 1 (Islamabad: Election Commission, Government of Pakistan, 1972), pp. 204-205.

The results of the December 1970 elections came as a surprise to everyone. The Awami League swept East Pakistan, capturing 167 National Assembly seats out of a total of 169.

[203] *Ibid*.
[204] Although Bhutto was recruited in Ayub's cabinet in 1958 as a representative of Sindh's feudals. While serving the Ayub and later Bhutto redefined his constituency.
[205] For reports of clashes, see *Dawn* for the months of March–April and September–November 1970.

In West Pakistan, the PPP emerged as the dominant party, gaining 81 of 138 seats. The Islam Passand and other right-wing parties were completely routed (see Table 3.4).

General Yahya and the military elites were shocked by the election results, having expected that in West Pakistan the Islam Passand parties and various Muslim League overwhelming victory. The party, with its ideological appeal, had emerged, in the words of an observer "a stranger in the Promised Land."[206] In the Provincial elections, too, the Awami League swept East Pakistan and the PPP maintained its dominant position in Punjab and Sindh; in Frontier and Baluchistan Province, however, the NAP and JUI emerged as the dominant parties (see Table 3.4).

Admiral Ahsan, the governor of East Pakistan, and G. W. Choudhary attempted to serve as honest brokers in promoting understanding between General Yahya and Mujib. Both men considerably influenced General Yahya's thinking and his attitude toward Mujib. Indeed, Choudhary implies that Yahya conferred with Mujib before making decisions on matters pertaining to elections and center-province relations.[207] Yahya had taken the following steps in order to placate the Bengalis (East Pakistan):

1. In August 1969 Yahya formed a civilian cabinet of nine ministers, four of whom were from Bengal.

2. Six Bengalis were appointed secretaries (the highest civil service position in Pakistan).

3. Under Yahya, a Bengali rose to the rank of general and was a member of the "inner core" of the military elite.

4. G. W. Choudhary, a Bengali who formulated the LFO, was appointed Yahya's constitutional advisor. The fact that these appointments were made in an election year clearly indicated Yahya's favorable attitude toward Mujib. To accommodate the Islam Passand Parties, he introduced the notion of "Islamic Ideology" in the LFO. General Yahya's partisanship encouraged other generals to develop strong link with political parties. For example, General Ghulam Umer openly sympathized with the Islam Passand Parties; the latter also maintained contacts with the Qayyum Muslim League, and General Peerzada had contacts with Bhutto and the PPP.

Conclusion

The paradox of the Pakistani military hegemonic system is that its breakdown and the subsequent changes of regimes occurred through the politics of mass mobilization,

[206] Gerald A. Heeger, *op.cit*., p. 291.
[207] G. W. Chaudhury, *op.cit*., pp. 90–93.

regime confrontation and mass movement. In most heterogeneous societies, the weakening of military hegemony sharpens the class and regional cleavages. Group conflict becomes endemic. Elections, if they are held, exacerbate rather than moderate conflict. Under pressure from the protesting classes and groups the military regimes at times allow limited political participation and sometimes agree to hold elections. However, their paradox remains how to manage the groups in conflict. Military regimes remain reluctant to transfer power if the election results are not to their liking.

The Yahya regime has been credited with holding the first general elections in Pakistan. However, it failed to transfer power to the elected representatives, which ultimately led to the country's disintegration. A number of observers provide interesting insights into the inadequacies of the Pakistani political leaders and military elites and into the way the management of post-election events provoked Indian intervention and led to the country's disintegration.[208]

In December 1971, the breakdown of the military hegemonic political system was accompanied by the collapse of the United Pakistani state. "New Pakistan" formerly West Pakistan was confronted with crises of succession, authority and legitimacy. The new Pakistan was confronted with combating the legacies of the military hegemonic system and of the LFO. The issues were how succession could take place and how it could be legitimized. The military elites were clearly divided. Yahya and his associates made a last-ditch effort to retain power. However, a "rebel" group of officers led by Lieutenant General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, chief of the Pakistan Air Force, persuaded the senior generals to transfer power to the civilian leaders.[209] They argued that the PPP was the majority party and Bhutto its popular leader, hence the PPP had a legitimate basis for claiming power. The military's withdrawal was sudden, not gradual, and it occurred under a most unusual set of circumstances: the partition of Pakistani state.

[208] For an interesting and detailed account of events personalities making contributions towards deepening the political crisis in 1971 and evoking India's involvement, See Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secessions: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992). pp. 91–153.

[209] This interpretation of events acquired credibility by the works of Burki *op.cit., Pakistani Under*... pp. 69–70, Fazal Muqueem *op.cit*., p. 209, Taseer, *op.cit*., pp. 129–130. In his recently published Memoires, General Gul Hasan has contested his involvement in transfer of power to Bhutto, instead he has argued that he set the "conditions" while accepting the responsibility of chief of staff of Pakistan army. For details see Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan: *Memoires of Lt. Gen. Gui Hassan Khan.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993) xi-xii, 346–350.

4

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN A POST-MILITARY HEGEMONIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

The breakdown of the military hegemonic system in 1971 correspondingly increased the potential of political conflicts in the post-military phase. The legacy of the military rule was a disruption of the existing patterns of political relationships among different elites, groups and classes. The successor civilian regime under Bhutto was confronted with the task of redefining the political roles, perceptions and expectations among the various contenders in the political arena. Heeger has perceptively pointed out that a post-military state is very much like a new state to the extent that both are "marginally institutionalized." Despite the number of its years of existence, such a state is a kind of, "nightmarish enigma, a victim of the logical extensions of a host of propositions about military regimes and their impact on society and social change."[210]

Pakistan under Bhutto (1971–77) followed the logical course of post-military rule. It was rife with political conflict. I will describe and analyze these patterns of conflict at three levels: personal, ideological, and regional.

What were the circumstances under which transition from the military to a party-dominant rule occurred? The transition took place under the most unusual of circumstances. Unlike the case in Turkey, where Kemal Attaturk designed a voluntary withdrawal of the military from politics, in Pakistan the military withdrew from politics not voluntarily, but rather after its humiliating surrender before the Indian army at Dacca.[211] In the post-World War II period, very few states have undergone such a "traumatic" experience as Pakistan, and in none has the withdrawal of the military from politics been accompanied by the partition of the state.[212]

As noted in the last chapter, the PPP had emerged as the dominant party in the 1970 elections in West Pakistan. However, power was transferred to Bhutto and his PPP, not in the wake of electoral success, but rather as a result of the military's defeat and the dismemberment of Pakistan. Lt. General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan had been instrumental in guiding the PPP to power. Both men envisioned some form of

[210] Gerald A. Heeger, "Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on The Pakistani Experience," World Politics, Vol. XXIX (Januaiy 1977), p. 262.

[211] For a text of the surrender documents see, D.K. Palit, The Lightning Campaign. The Indo-Pakistan War, 1971 (New Delhi, Thomson Press, 1972), pp 48–9.

[212] Ralph Braibanti, "The Research Potential of Pakistan's Development" in Lawrence Ziring, R. Braibanti, et al., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham, Duke University, 1977), pp. 438–440.

guardian role for the military in the political system.[213] However, neither an alliance nor a partnership grew up between the civilian leadership and the military generals; instead an uneasy but necessary transition took form. Although Bhutto had risen to power with the aid of the military, he was quick to emphasize that he was a duly elected leader.[214]

Even Bhutto's bitterest critics acknowledged that he assumed power under particularly adverse circumstances.[215] But they believe that he was instrumental in causing this political chaos and hold him responsible for the disintegration of the country.[216] The political, economic and administrative crises of 1971 evoked the memories of 1947, the year Pakistan had come into being. Bhutto was confronted with the formidable tasks of not merely replacing one type of regime with another, but constituting a collapsed nation-state. The situation demanded a leader with a sense of national purpose and self-confidence, and a hope in the future of Pakistan. Addressing the nation on 20 December 1971, Bhutto promised to build a "New Pakistan."

> We are facing the worst crisis in our country's life; a deadly crisis. We have to pick up the pieces, very small pieces, but we will have a new Pakistan, a prosperous and progressive Pakistan a Pakistan free from exploitation, a Pakistan for which the Muslims of the subcontinent sacrificed their lives and their honor in order to build this land. That Pakistan will come, it is bound to come. Every institution of Pakistan has either been destroyed or threatened and that is why we face this state today, we have to rebuild democratic institutions, we have to build confidence.[217]

The twin tasks of rebuilding democratic institutions and building confidence were not easy to accomplish in the post-military state. While making transition from military-hegemonic to democratic set-up the most difficult task is how to reorient the various leaders, elites, social groups, and classes toward the patterns of democratic reform, who for so long had been ruled by the military.

The military hegemonic system had placed constraints on the activities of Pakistan's political leaders, thus most of them were ill-equipped for the transition to a democratic political system. With the exception of Bhutto, most of the political leaders, particularly

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[213] Salman Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1980). pp. 148–149; Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975), pp. 115–116. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971–1977, New York: Martin's Press, 1980 p. 70

[214] Z. A. Bhutto, President of Pakistan: Speeches and Statements: December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972 (Karachi: The Department of Films and Publications Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 3.

[215] Weekly Zindgi, Lahore, 27 December–2 January 1972.

[216] G. W. Chaudhary, The Last Days of United Pakistan Bloomington, India: Indiana University Press, 1974. pp 146–156; Major General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan (Lahore, Wajidalis, 1978), pp. 310–311. For a defense of Bhutto's position, see Z. A. Bhutto: the Great Tragedy (Karachi, Vision Publications 1971, pp. 20–23.

[217] Z. A. Bhutto, Speeches and Statements: December 29, 1971–March 31, 1972, pp. 1–3.

the opposition leaders, had limited experience in government. Rebuilding democratic institutions and confidence meant developing some degree of mutual trust and consensus on the nature and direction of the political system. But the policies of regime confrontation under President Ayub Khan and the disintegration of the country under General Yahya Khan had considerably undermined the potential for nurturing mutual trust and consensus among the political leadership. LaPorte quite accurately observed that in early 1972, the terms "disillusionment, uncertainty, cynicism, and pessimism best described the Pakistani political condition."[218]

Although Bhutto had emerged as the dominant political leader, he assumed the presidency as a ruler limited by political constraints. His party had a majority of seats in the National Assembly (88 out of a total of 144), but controlled only two of the four provinces (Punjab and Sindh). The crisis had at least three dimensions: (1) A "crisis of identity."[219] The very basis of Pakistani nationhood was questioned, reviving the debate over "nationalities" or the relationship of various ethnic groups within the nation-state.[220] In the post-military hegemonic state, regional aspirations competed with national identity with new intensity. (2) A "crisis of legitimacy."[221] Although it had acquired the ideological veneer of the "United Pakistan" in 1947, "New Pakistan" of 1971 was born with an ideological cleavage which challenged the legitimacy of Bhutto's leadership. The Islam Passand political parties, particularly Jamaat-i-Islami, saw Bhutto as "*Kafir*" (non-believer), the PPP's leadership as immoral, and its socialist program as anti-religious. In the "New Pakistan," Jamaat-i-Islami sought with new intensity to transform Pakistan into its own ideological image. As was the case in 1950s, once again ideology and the role of religion in shaping the political system became central focus of national debate.[222] (3) A "crisis of participation."[223] The decay of the military hegemonic

[218] LaPorte *op.cit*., p. 100.

[219] "When a community finds that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physical or psychological definitions of its collective self are no longer acceptable under new historic conditions." Lucian W. Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in Leonard Binder, et al., *Crisis and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 110–111.

[220] Hafeez Malik, "Nationalism and the Quest for Ideology in Pakistan," in Ralph Braibanti, Lawrence Ziring, et al., *op.cit.,* pp. 296–300.

[221] "A breakdown in the constitutional structure and performance of government that arises out vof differences over the proper nature of authority for the system. A legitimacy crisis can thus take the form of a change in the fundamental structure or character of a government, a change in the source from which it claims to derive its ultimate authority, or a change in the ideals to professes to represent. Basic to legitimacy crisis is a change in the way in which governmental authority is conceived or itself acts." Lucian W. Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in Binder, et al., *op.cit.,* p. 136.

[222] Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkstone, Kent; Dawson, 1979), p. 89; also see, for example, Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. Berkeley (Los Angeles: University of California press, 1963). pp. 28–29, 34–37, 92–93; Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1957). pp. 230–232; Aziz Ahmed, "Islam and Democracy in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent," in Robert F. Spencer (ed), Religion and Contemporary Change in Asia (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1971), pp. 123–142; Sheila McDonough, "The Religious Legitimation Change among Modernists in Indo-Pakistan Islam," in Barndell L. Smith (ed), *Religion and Legitimization of Power in South Asia* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978). pp. 42–52.

system unleashed new social groups, classes and political leaders in the political arena, particularly in the urban professionals and industrialized labor groups which had been mobilized under the military-hegemonic system. Peasants, tenants, the lower-middle and petty government employees expected socioeconomic change. Financial-industrial groups, the bureaucratic military elites and a significant segment of the feudal classes, who were well entrenched in the power structure, were skeptical about the PPP's reformist intentions. In short, Bhutto inherited a conflict ridden and polarized Pakistan. Would he be able to build consensus and reconcile conflicting interests and ideals?

In the wake of these crises, the conflict that emerged in Pakistan followed three distinct patterns. In style and substance these conflict patterns can be described as personal, ideological and regional. I suggest that in the post-military hegemonic phase these conflict patterns were as much a function of Bhutto's political style and policies as of the political style and behavior of the political leaders who were his adversaries. Since most of these political leaders had their social origins in the feudal class, feudal culture became a dominant factor in Pakistan's politics.[224]

Before examining these patterns of conflict let me briefly identify the central characteristics of Pakistan's political system.

First, personalization of power has been the hallmark of Pakistan's political system. This process is pursued through personal rulership, centralization and concentration of power in the chief executive.[225] On becoming president, Bhutto inherited this tendency toward personalized rule from the military-hegemonic system.[226] As personalization of power was maintained, so was hostility toward it also perpetuated.

The second important feature of Pakistan's political system has been "perennial praetorianism," a condition that refers to the lack of mutual trust and absence of

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[223] According to Weiner, this occurs in such conditions "when those who seek power view the holders of power as being totally illegitimate, without any historical right, religious sanction, or moral qualities that entitle them to govern or even share in the process of government. A participation crisis can be defined as a conflict that occurs when the governing elite views the demands or behavior of individuals and groups seeking to participate in the political system as illegitimate." Myron Weiner, "Political participation: crisis of the political process," in Binder, et al., *op.cit.,* pp. 187–192.

[224] See for example, Saeed Shafqat, "Political Culture of Pakistan: A Case of Disharmony between Democratic Greed and Autocratic Reality." *South Asia Bulletin*, vol 10, No. 2. pp. 42–47.

[225] For a detailed description of this process see K.B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 10–15.

[226] K. B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York, Praeger, 1980), pp. 89–91; Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities and Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*; Vol. VII, No. 7 (July 1978), pp. 706–730; also see *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1980), p. 126.

consensus among political leaders.[227] In the wake of the 1970 general elections and Pakistan's disintegration, mutual suspicion and skepticism among political leaders further increased. Bhutto assumed power in a "constitutional vacuum" and in the absence of a commonly agreed political framework; this produced a political environment which was hostile to institutionalization of party politics.

The third important characteristic of Pakistan's political system can be called as the "personality factor." Whereas Bhutto had been generally recognized as the most popular elected leader of Pakistan, his antagonists despised his personal, political style and his reform ideology. Bhutto's antagonists saw him as politician Machiavellian.[228] They not only resisted his rule, but confronted him with unprecedented personal hostility.

The fourth point regarding the Pakistani system is that no established framework exists for a smooth transition of power. Whenever a framework was developed, the political actors failed to abide by the rules of the game. (Making or abrogating a constitution is not considered a very serious exercise in Pakistan. Three constitutions in 1956, 1962 and 1973, were made and abrogated the last one was held in absence and later drastically amended). Still, a consistent transition pattern can be identified: Each regime change is preceded by mass protests, demonstrations and destruction of public and private property, particularly in the urban areas. These events are followed by either military takeover or succession of leadership within the military. As noted earlier, power was transferred to Bhutto under unusual circumstances.

The fifth characteristic that marks Pakistani politics is that each succeeding regime has attempted to dismantle the political system created by the previous one. Whereas the military regimes have preferred the presidential system, the civilian regimes have functioned under the parliamentary system. Both have shown hegemonic tendencies and increased reliance on authoritarian structures (military, bureaucracy, police). Despite "crises," "system break-downs," and "disintegration of the state," authoritarian structures have endured. Consequently, authoritarianism has proportionately increased with each successive change of regime, irrespective of regime type.

Finally, differential regional development in Pakistan has placed greater constraints on the emergence, development and functioning of political leaders, in sharp contrast to the situation of the military-bureaucratic elites. As was the case under military rule, the activities of political parties and associational interest groups were constricted under Bhutto; therefore, politics grew not along associational but parochial lines.

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[227] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. pp. 192–196; for specific application of Huntington's concept, see William Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Fall, 1978.)

[228] Major General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan *op.cit*., p. 311; Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Written Statement in The Supreme Court of Pakistan (Peshawar, 1975), pp. 23–25; Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics: 1958–1982* (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1983), pp. 48–51.

The Politics of Personal Antagonism

At times, conflicts are based on images, on how individuals perceive themselves and others in certain situations. "Symbolic image," according to Boulding, "is of enormous importance in the understanding of human conflict, mainly because so many conflicts, both between persons and between groups and organizations, are about symbols. These symbolic elements are very difficult to handle in abstract form ... it is hard to reduce an insult to mathematical form, for the reduction has to be so great."[229]

Asghar Khan's conflict with Bhutto was intensely personal and cannot be reduced to any "mathematical form." Asghar Khan, who had excelled as a professional soldier, saw Bhutto as the cause of his damaged reputation as a political leader. Asghar Khan epitomized the politics of personal antagonism during the Bhutto era.

A Kashmiri by descent and resident of the Hazara district (NWFP) , Asghar Khan has been credited with building Pakistan Air Force into a modern organization. By reputation he was an able air force commander, and an honest and efficient administrator.[230] Despite these impressive credentials, however, Asghar Khan showed a lack of political skills and vision. He had an erratic political career. He founded the Justice Party but later merged it with the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). For a while he withdraw from politics, but later formed the Tehrik-e-Isteqlal Party. His primary support base were retired civilian and military officers, and he had considerable influence among the military elites. He did gain some support among urban professionals and business groups, but his mass appeal remained limited. He did not have a clear program of socioeconomic transformation, but in ideological orientation he was perceived as right of center.[231]

He was relentless in opposing Bhutto and saw in him nothing less than the personification of evil.[232] Within a week of Bhutto's assumption of the presidency, Asghar Khan launched a frontal attack on Bhutto. He questioned Bhutto's personal integrity and commitment to democracy. He declared, "I don't think he [President Bhutto] is sincere in his professions of democracy. I say this with full responsibility."[233] Furthermore, he alleged that Bhutto was responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan. He demanded the immediate restoration of democracy and vowed to remove the present government from power. In early 1972, when the PPP had hardly established its rule and Bhutto was struggling to consolidate his power Asghar Khan charged: "We are

[229] Kenneth E. Boulding. *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1962), pp. 96–97.
[230] Taseer *op.cit.,* p. 99; Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1974), pp. 199–200.
[231] Feldman *op.cit*., p. 30.
[232] Asghar Khan, *op.cit*., p. 74–75.
[233] *Dawn*, Karachi, January 12, 1972.

living in a virtual one party rule The outstanding feature is suppression."[234] On another occasion he declared that Pakistan is not a "*Jagir*" (estate) of one person, and he reiterated his intent to "remove" the present government.[235]

The sources of the mutual distrust between the two men can be traced to the period 1968–70. Asghar Khan had entered politics following Bhutto's crusade against President Ayub. Bhutto had invited Asghar Khan to join the PPP, but he declined.[236] During the 1970 election campaign, Bhutto ridiculed Asghar Khan and his style of politics. In fact, Bhutto initiated the distasteful tactic of name-calling and slandering in Pakistan's politics. Once Bhutto came to power, his opponents continued this practice, but with new venom and to Bhutto's discomfort. Asghar Khan saw Bhutto's public gimmickry as bad political ethics, but it had successfully undermined Asghar Khan's reputation in the public's eyes.

In the 1970 elections Asghar Khan contested the National Assembly seat from Rawalpindi whose constituency consisted predominantly of government employees associated with the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army. Given his reputation and influence in the services, it was expected that Asghar Khan would win overwhelmingly in the elections. However, a relatively unknown PPP lawyer, Khursheed Hasan Meer, also of Kashmiri descent, defeated Asghar Khan by a wide margin. [In Pakistan's society honor is based not only on one's status but also on one's reputation. Defeat at the hands of a relatively unknown PPP candidate meant humiliation and loss of honor for Asghar Khan, and this in turn made him bitter toward the PPP and its leadership, particularly Bhutto.] So deeply ingrained was Asghar Khan's antagonism toward Bhutto that even when Bhutto had succeeded in seeking a consensus on the 1973 constitution, Asghar Khan bitterly complained: "The present constituent assembly has no right to form a constitution."[237] Asghar Khan was persistent in attacking Bhutto. He called him a "dictator," a "fascist," an "Indian agent" and a "power hungry politician." In April 1973, while addressing a press conference, Asghar Khan called Bhutto a "sick man" who was "thoroughly evil" and "insane." He warned that if the ruling party adopted the "language of bullets" it should remember that a bullet could also turn toward Bhutto.[238] Another reason for Asghar Khan's hostility towards Bhutto was the latter's purges of the civil-military bureaucracies. There was a widely held belief among the PPP leaders that some senior military officers were encouraging Asghar Khan to confront Bhutto.[239] In addition, Bhutto's land reforms had limited land acquisition opportunities for the military bureaucratic elites. Many even

[234] *Outlook*, Karachi, January 26, 1972.
[235] *Ibid. op.cit.,* Asghar Khan said, "I would say that nothing right would get done unless the Bhutto government was forced to go."
[236] Taseer *op.cit*., p. 114; for Asghar Khan's explanation, see Asghar Khan *op.cit*., pp. 13–14.
[237] An interview with *Daily Nawa-i-Waqat*, Lahore, March 2, 1972.
[238] For details see, *Dawn*, Karachi, 21 April, 1973.
[239] Interviews, also see Rizvi, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

lost the lands they had acquired under previous regimes. There were instances of tenant occupation of the estates of some former generals. In Sindh, Asghar Khan's farm was occupied by his tenants. Asghar Khan charged that these occupations were deliberately encouraged by the Sindh government.[240]

Such occurrences exacerbated the personal hostilities and served as an impediment to democratization and the development of a party system. Asghar Khan's politics evoked repressive responses from the PPP regime. Asghar Khan charged that his public meetings were disrupted by PPP workers and that Bhutto encouraged such disruptions. It is hard to determine to what degree such disruptions were encouraged by Bhutto. However, Bhutto's opponents widely believed that he was responsible for promoting such violent tactics.[241] The White Papers released by the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq on the performance of the PPP rule not only implicate Bhutto, but also hold him responsible for unleashing state repression.[242]

Bhutto's attitude toward Asghar Khan was reciprocally contemptuous. Throughout his tenure Bhutto never referred to Asghar Khan or his party by name. Indeed, while Asghar Khan remained an "inveterate opponent" of Bhutto, Bhutto refused to recognize him publicly,[243] and the latter never jailed Asghar Khan. According to Asghar Khan:

> Bhutto's decision not to arrest me was probably influenced by his desire not to give me undue importance. Although throughout his five and a half years in power, the Tehrik-e-Isteqlal spearheaded the political movement against him and in the circumstances attracted considerable public response. He never mentioned my party or me in his press or public utterances. ... Bhutto may also have thought that my past association with the armed forces may influence them in my favor and I must therefore be carefully watched.[244]

In March 1977, when the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) launched a protest movement against the Bhutto regime for allegedly rigging the elections, Asghar Khan wrote an open letter to the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of Pakistan asking them to overthrow the government.[245] From Bhutto's installation in power until his fall, Asghar Khan continued his crusade against Bhutto with a missionary zeal.

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[240] Asghar Khan, *op.cit*., pp. 93–94.
[241] Asghar Khan, *op.cit.,* pp. 74–78; Wali Khan, op.cit., p. 26.
[242] *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime: Misuse of the Instruments of State Power*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1979.
[243] Asghar Khan *op.cit*., pp. 93, 145.
[244] *Ibid*. op.cit., p. 93.
[245] See appendix Asghar Khan's letter to the Chief of the Staff's of Army, Navy and Air Force. For an account of suspected United State's encouragement to Asghar Khan to pursue anti-Bhutto role see Shirin Tahir Khali, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 70–71; Taseer, *op.cit*., pp. 169–170.

This instance of personal and political antagonism revealed that the transition from military-hegemonic to democracy and pluralist rule was hazardous. Personal rivalry impeded not only the process of creating political order, but also of defining the "rules of the political game." The political environment remained hostile toward democratic consolidation and the building of political institutions.

The Politics of Ideological Conflict

Ideology has been variously defined with both positive and negative connotations.[246] Ideology refers to more than a doctrine; it is a set of ideas and beliefs which individuals and groups manifest through their actions. Conflicts over ideology can be a unifying factor for the contending parties when both parties pursue the same goal.

In a number of developing countries, ideology has been used by political leaders as a vehicle for political action. Pakistan's case has been no different, in that ideology served as a divisive force.

The second pattern of conflict that emerged as Bhutto assumed the presidency was ideological. The question of Islam's role in the political system of Pakistan has eluded bureaucratic-military elites and political leaders in Pakistan. The loss of East Pakistan reopened the controversy on the nature of transition of "Muslim state."[247] The debate can be analyzed by focusing on two competing views over the role of Islam in Pakistani politics: the Fundamentalist and the Progressive views. A third perspective, although interesting, is not relevant here for our purposes.[248]

As noted in the first chapter, most religious parties had opposed the creation of Pakistan. They believed that those who led the movement for an independent Pakistan were "secular," "western" and not "true Muslims." Maulana Abul ala Maudoodi (Maudoodi) and his party, Jamaat-i-Islami (Jamaat), were the most articulate proponents of the Fundamentalist view.[249] The Fundamentalists vigorously opposed the PPP's ideology of Islamic Socialism. On a number of occasions during 1968–1970, the supporters of the PPP and Jamaat got involved in violent confrontations.[250] The Jamaat saw Bhutto as an evil, morally corrupt "Kafir" (non-believer), who promoted the

[246] David E. Apter (ed.) *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), Introduction, pp. 15–43.

[247] Lawrence Ziring, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*; Vol. XXIV, No. 9 (September 1986), pp. 931–946. See also Schila Mcdonough, *op.cit.*, pp. 42–52.

[248] Traditionalists are those religious leaders who trace their antecedents from such schools of theology in the Indo-Pakistan sub continent as: Deoband, Nadva. For a discussion on third view See, Saeed Shafqat, *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy*; Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989. pp.87–112.

[249] For an excellent discussion on the origins and development of Jamaat-i-Islami. See Kalim Bahadur, The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action (New Delhi, Chetana Publications, 1977); Charles J. Adam, "The Ideology of Maulana Maudoodi" in D.E. Smith (ed.) *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 375–376; Binder, op.cit., p. 89.

[250] For a good discussion of this point, see K. B. Sayeed, "How Radical is the Pakistan People's Party?" *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 48 (September 1975), pp. 55–56.

supremacy of "the people" in an Islamic state. This was antithetical to their view of an Islamic state, and thus they vigorously opposed the PPP regime and its leadership.

An examination of the Fundamentalist view necessitates some understanding of the views of Maulana Maudoodi, who founded the Jamaat in 1941 with the support of 72 loyalists.[251] Jamaat was organized along the principles of a Leninist party, but it was not populace based. Members are carefully recruited and selected in a three-stage process: They begin as sympathizers (Hamdard), then become associates (Rafiq), and finally, members (Rukan)[252] Maulana Maudoodi claimed that since those who led the Pakistan movement were not "true Muslims," they were not qualified to rule an Islamic state. Maulana Maudoodi did not identify what qualifications a ruler in an Islamic state should have, but stated that "only a particular sort of individual can hold office under an Islamic government and these individuals cannot be brought into being through the ethic of democratic nationalism."[253]

According to Maulana Maudoodi, in an Islamic state sovereignty belonged to Allah (God) and no one else:[254] "no person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole can lay claim to sovereignty. God alone is the real sovereign, and others are merely his subjects."[255] Furthermore, Maulana Maudoodi maintained: "Individually and collectively human beings should waive all rights of legislation and all powers to give command to others. The right rests in Allah alone."[256]

"The Islamic State is not democratic, for democracy permits the laws to be changed by a mere majority. Majorities have been known to make foolish decisions Theocracy is perhaps a more apt term than democracy, but since the term usually implies rule by priests whereas the whole population will run the Islamic state in accordance with the Quran, theodemocracy might be a better term. In the Islamic state all administrative matters and other questions not settled by the Quran and Sunnah will be decided by a consensus of those of sound judgement and learning in the Sharia.[257]

In order to transform Pakistan from a Muslim state into an Islamic state, the Jamaat claimed that the use of persuasion, propaganda and even violence was justified. Binder has observed that, after the creation of Pakistan, the Jamaat attempted to sway the Muslim League leadership. It devised a two-pronged strategy: Through propaganda it

[251] Charles Adam, *op.cit*., p. 376.
[252] Bahadur, *op.cit,*. pp. 121–131.
[253] Cited in Leonard Binder, *op.cit*., p. 93.
[254] Abul-al-Maududi, "Political Theory of Islam," in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 254.
[255] A. A. Maududi, *Political Theory of Islam* (Rampur, (no date) pp. 29–30; *Islami Riasat* (in Urdu) (Lahore: Islami Publications, 1967), pp. 129–138.
[256] *Ibid., op.cit*., pp. 27–28.
[257] Cited in Binder *op.cit.,* p. 91.

sought penetration into military-bureaucratic circles. And through street protest, Islamization demands, and the persuasion of Muslim League leaders in the early fifties,

it attempted to create conditions for the transformation of Pakistan into an "Islamic state."[258]

Maulana Maudoodi's view of Pakistan as an Islamic state was the antithesis of the Progressive view envisioned by the country's founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had envisioned Pakistan as a democratic liberal state that provided social justice, freedom and equality to all its citizens. As early as 1946 Jinnah had stated that "the new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, color or creed."[259] On another occasion, when he served as president of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah delineated the difference between "citizenship" and "faith."

> You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state You will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.[260]

At no point did Jinnah ever think that Pakistan would be anything but a "modern state."[261] To Jinnah Islam was a civilization, a culture and a way of life. One finds countless references in his statements and speeches to the role of Islam in the development of the Pakistani state. He was categoric in stating that Pakistan will not be a "theocratic state" ruled by "priests."[262] Jinnah prescribed democracy, equality, social justice, tolerance and the brotherhood of man as Islamic ideals.[263] Jinnah's speech in Chittagong on March 26, 1948, gives a prime example of his views of Pakistani progressive ideal.[264]

In the late 1960s, the protest movement against President Ayub Khan raised new expectations about this progressive ideal. During this phase of Pakistan's turbulent history Bhutto emerged as a leading advocate for translating Jinnah's progressive ideals

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[258] *Ibid*., op.cit., pp. 98–104.
[259] *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan 1947–1948* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 27 (hereafter referred to as Speeches as Governor General).
[260] *Speeches as Governor General, op.cit*., p. 65.
[261] Aziz Ahmed *op.cit*., p. 124.
[262] *Speeches as Governor General, op.cit*., p. 124.
[263] Anwar Hussain Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 59.
[264] *Speeches as Governor General, op.cit.,* pp. 65, 98.

into reality.[265] Emphasizing the congruence between the Islam and socialism, Bhutto argued,

> Islam and the principles of socialism are not mutually repugnant. Islam preaches equality, and socialism is the modern technique for attaining it.... Pakistan cannot last without the supremacy of Islam. A socialist form of government does not rival that supremacy. On the contrary, socialism will make the whole population custodian of Islamic values.[266]

Bhutto's assumption of power in the "new" Pakistan demonstrated the ascendancy of modernist forces in the politics of the country, for many believed that Pakistan was at the threshold of achieving its long-sought progressive ideal. Bhutto spoke about the progressive ideal but his actual behavior and political style contributed little towards it. In the early months of his presidency Bhutto frequently referred to building "Quaid-i-Azam's Pakistan" as "one glorious state based on the principles of justice, equality and fraternity."[267]

In an interview with the *Spectator*; Bhutto clearly spelled out his view of the progressive ideal:

> My vision is that of a Pakistan whose social standards are comparable to those in parts of Europe. This means a war against illiteracy and ignorance. It means fighting prejudice and obscurantism. It involves the equality of men and women. It demands the mobilization of the people's collective energies. It dedicates the restoration to the human person, the citizen of Pakistan, the dignity which is his due. It requires a check on the growth of population, and easy access to education and medical care throughout the country. It contemplates better towns and cities and cleaner villages. It poses a hundred challenges. It is a long haul. We have braced ourselves for it.[268]

Like Jinnah, Bhutto saw Islam as a civilization, a culture and a way of life. According to the noted British historian Trevor-Roper, Bhutto saw Pakistan in the broad context of Islamic civilization. He believed that the decline of Islamic civilization was caused not by the "lack of spiritual strength," but by "spiritual obscurantism which barred the way

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[265] Bhutto outlined his views while presenting a defense of democratic rights before the Lahore High Court in February 1969. See Zulfikar Ali Buutto. Awakening the People: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1966–1969 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, no date), see in particular two articles, "Let the People Judge" and "Political Situation in Pakistan," pp. 40–60, Z.A. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy: Statements, Articles, Speeches 1970–1971* (Rawalpindi: Pakistani Publications, no date), pp. 4, 10, 24–30, 120–124.

[266] Z. A. Bhutto, *Political Situation in Pakistan,* People's Party's Political Series, No. 1 (Lahore: A1 Bayan, 1968), pp. 14–15.

[267] Z. A. Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements as President of Pakistan, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972*, pp. 24–25.

[268] Interview to British Newsweekly *Spectator*, reproduced in Z. A. Bhutto, *New Directions* (introduction by Trevor-Roper) (London: Namara Publications, 1980), p. 103.

to economic understanding."[269] Bhutto thought that an Islamic revival in the fundamentalist sense could not meet the challenges of the times, but that what was required involved "the strengthening of Islamic identity by modern science, modern technology, modern administration."[270]

Bhutto's frequent references to the progressive ideal, his policies of socioeconomic reform, and the preeminence of socialist-modernist leaders in the PPP were some of the factors that alarmed the Jamaat Fundamentalists who sensed that their power was being undermined. As noted in the last chapter, the Jamaat had limited success in the 1970 general elections. It held only three seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

The Fundamentalists also held Bhutto responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan.[271] As Bhutto and his PPP assumed power on December 20, 1971, the Jamiat-e-Tulba-Islam (Jamiat), a student wing of Jamaat-i-Islami, observed "Black Day" in Lahore. They burnt the effigies of Bhutto and Mao-Tse-Tung.[272] In addition to calling for the abolition of martial law, the Jamaat demanded enforcement of Islamic punishments in order to eradicate social evils.[273] A pro-Jamaat Urdu newsweekly, *Zindgi*, even demanded the removal of Ahmedia from senior positions of Pakistan's bureaucracy.[274]

The Jamaat fundamentalists genuinely believed that Bhutto's rule was causing the erosion of Islamic values in Pakistani society, and their belief eventually led to threats of violence. In early 1973, the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, Mian Tufail Mohammad, made an unprecedented appeal to the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, urging him to overthrow Bhutto's government because of its inherent moral corruption.[275] As Asaf Hussain has noted, it had become clear to the Jamaat-i-Islami that the more [Bhutto] "implemented socialism and justified his policies through economic and not religious legitimation the more it led to the secularization of the state."[276]

The progressive-fundamentalist conflict was not merely a conflict over two different conceptions of Pakistan; it had real political ramifications. In a way the PPP and the Jamaat were competing for similar constituencies. The Jamaat had its stronghold in urban centers like Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. It had support among a section of the urban professionals, the lower middle classes, and the trader-merchants. After 1972

[269] Trevor-Roper, *op.cit*., Introduction.
[270] *Ibid., op.cit.*
[271] Asghar Khan and Wali Khan also blamed Bhutto for the disintegration of Pakistan. See Asghar Khan *op.cit*., Wali Khan *op.cit*., pp. 14–15.
[272] The *Daily Imroze*, Lahore, 21 December 1971.
[273] The *Daily Imroze*, Lahore, December 22, 24, 1971.
[274] *Weekly Zindgi*, Lahore, December–January 3, 1972.
[275] Speech made by the Amir (chief) of the Jamaat-i-Islami, on February 18, 1973; see *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, February 23, 1973.
[276] Asaf Hussain, "From Nationhood to Umma: The Struggle of Islam in Pakistan," *Asian Thought and Society*, Vol. V. No. 13 (April 1980), p. 58.

it made tremendous efforts to penetrate the industrial labor sector. Some of the financial-industrial groups were ideologically inclined towards Jamaat, but it had no rural base, either in the peasantry or among the feudals. As noted earlier, the PPP not only had support in the urban centers and among urban professionals and industrial labor, but it also had nationwide popular support among the peasantry. In addition, both in the Punjab and particularly in the Sindh province, Bhutto was able to form an effective coalition with the feudal classes. However, it was in the urban centers that the ideological polarization between the PPP and the Jamaat persisted and consequently perpetuated ideological cleavages among the above-mentioned classes and groups.

Initially, Bhutto responded to the Jamaat challenge, with policies of appeasement and control. For example, while seeking a national consensus for the 1973 Constitution, Bhutto incorporated more Islamic clauses than had any previous Pakistani constitution. At other times, he resorted to coercive measures and control. For example, he suspended the publication of a number of pro-Jamaat newspapers and newsweeklies.[277]

In short, despite the disintegration of Pakistan, ideological conflict had emerged with new intensity, and this remained a major obstacle to the building of a national consensus regarding the nature and direction of Pakistan's political system.

The Politics of Regional Conflict

A third pattern of conflict that emerged was based on regional factors. As noted in the last chapter, in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) no single political party held a clear majority. In the National Assembly, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Qayyum) won seven seats, the National Awami Party (NAP) three seats, and Jamiat-ulma-e-Islam QUI) six seats, from a total of 25. In Baluchistan, of a total of four National Assembly Seats, the NAP had three, and the JUI won one. A coalition between the NAP and the JUI made them the dominant parties of NWFP and Baluchistan.

Before we discuss the regional and confrontationalist character of these two parties (particularly the NAP), a brief overview of each party's origins, ideology, and support base is in order.

The JUI-NAP Leadership

The antecedents of the JUI can be traced to the Deoband Ulema who constituted the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind.[278] These Ulema have also been described as nationalists, because they opposed British imperialism, collaborated with the Indian National Congress for the freedom of India, and opposed the Muslim League's struggle for an independent

[277] The publication of the weekly *Zindgi*, and the monthly *Urdu Digest*, two pro-Jamaat papers were suspended in October 1972.

[278] For Jamiat's view of Pakistan Movement see Naeem Asi, *Mufti Mahmud: Life and Service* (Urdu) (Sialkot, Muslim Academy, op.cit., pp. 45–52.

Pakistan.[279] After independence, the JUI Ulema played a more subdued role in Pakistan politics. They were also treated with skepticism by successive Pakistani regimes which emphatically underscored the anti-Pakistani role of the "Nationalist Ulema."

From 1956 to 1962 the JUI remained a strictly religious organization. However, in 1962 Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi launched a major effort to build a political support base for the party in the NWFP. In 1969, as the debate over Islamic socialism intensified in West Pakistan (i.e., Pakistan), the JUI split into factions. Maulana Ehtsham-ul-Haq Thanvi assumed the leadership of the Karachi-based conservative faction (later named the Jamiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan-Thanvi group or JUP [Thanvi]), while Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi assumed the leadership of the NWFP based populist faction.[280]

During the 1970 general elections, the JUI (Mufti-Hazarvi group) emerged as a populist-religious party, appealing to traditional Islamic sentiments. By extending effective control over the mosques, particularly in the NWFP, the JUI Ulema mixed populist rhetoric with Islamic principles. The JUI's declared program was to establish an Islamic constitution in accordance with the 22-point resolution of the 1951 Ulema.[281] It sought to end "the oppressive capitalist economic pattern and to establish Islamic Musaawat (equality) through a program of Islamic social welfare, free education, minimum wages and health care.[282] The rival JUP (Thanvi) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) accused the JUI Ulema of being socialists and un-Islamic. The JUI Ulema responded by attacking their accusers, calling them "stooges of imperialism."[283] The JUI leaders were particularly hostile to Maulana Maudoodi, calling him a "deceiver of the masses and agent of American imperialists."[284] "We are not socialists," explained Maulana Mufti Mahmud in a speech in Mardan, "and will not allow any ism except Islam to function in Pakistan." Nevertheless, he condemned those Ulema who had issued a fatwa against socialists as "agents of the capitalists." Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi later accused the Thanvi group of safeguarding the interests of the "22 families" who exploited Pakistan.[285] Although JUI leaders spoke in favor of provincial autonomy, they nevertheless criticized the NAP's support of "Pakhtunistan" as being contrary to national interests.[286]

[279] K. B. Sayeed *op.cit.,* p. 69.
[280] Craig Baxter. "Pakistan Votes—1970," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (March 1971), p. 206; also Naeem Asi op.cit., pp. 103–104.
[281] *Khyber Mail*, Peshawar, February 15, 1970.
[282] *Ibid*., March 17, 1970.
[283] *Ibid*., January 30, 1970.
[284] *Ibid*., July 4, 1970.
[285] *Ibid*., March 8, 1970.
[286] *Ibid*., September 5, 1970; also see Naeem Asi, *op.cit*., pp. 110–112.

Through its effective control over the mosques, its populist rhetoric, the prestige of its Ulema, and its extensive door-to-door campaigning, the JUI swept the backward but extremely religious districts of southern NWFP.[287]

The JUI won most of its seats in the more underdeveloped and deeply religious areas of the NWFP; leaders like Mufti Mahmud (in Dera Ismail Khan) and Ghaus Hazarvi (Hazara) won seats as a result of their religious prestige and local followings. In Baluchistan, the JUI was not very effective, because the NAP Sardars had greater control and influence over the tribes; religion remained a less potent factor, despite economic underdevelopment.

What prompted the JUI-NAP coalition, which was to have a deep impact on the regional and national politics of Pakistan? To address this question one needs to have some understanding about the emergence, growth and development of the NAP.

The antecedents of the NAP can be traced to the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) movement, which was launched by the "Frontier Ghandhi," Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, in 1925[288] The movement was also called the "Red Shirts" (members wore red shirts). It was primarily a Pakhtun nationalist movement, which meant the movement had main following in the Pakhtun areas of the province—the rural areas of the central districts. The movement remained weak in the north and south as well as urban centers of the province.[289] Ghaffar Khan struggled against British imperialism, and collaborated with the Indian National Congress. He opposed the Muslim League's demand for an independent Pakistan, considered Muslim League leaders to be "agents of the British" who represented only "feudal interests." Until 1946 the Red Shirts were an effective force in the above mentioned parts of the province. Its leadership consisted of small khans (landlords), who ideologically identified themselves with the Indian National Congress.[290]

Despite many claims that after independence Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan became reconciled to the creation of Pakistan, successive regimes in Pakistan alleged that he continued to work for the creation of an independent "Pakhtunistan" and that he sought help from Afghanistan for this purpose.[291] To dispel these charges of separatism, Ghaffar Khan formed the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1951. The leaders who joined with Ghaffar Khan were apparently disconcerted by the preemptive politics of the bureaucratic-military elites and by the disarray of the Muslim League leaders. Most of

[287] K. B. Sayeed, How Radical... *op.cit*., pp. 42–59.
[288] Ziring, The Engima ... *op.cit*., pp. 152–153; K. B. Sayeed, Political System ... *op.cit*., pp. 18– 19.
[289] For a perceptive analysis this point see, Erland Jansson, The Frontier Province: "Khudai Khidmatgars and The Muslim League" in D. A. Low (ed), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, London, MacMillan, 1991. *op.cit.,* pp. 194–217
[290] Terence Creagh Coen, *The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971). p. 195; Ziring, *The Engima ... op.cit*., p. 153.
[291] Ziring, *The Enigma ... op.cit*., p. 154.

the leaders who joined the NAP had factional following and in ideological orientation represented various shades of Marxism, socialism and provincialism. For some of these leaders, provincial autonomy meant a loose Pakistani federation; for others it meant a step toward secession. The key issue, however, was their dissatisfaction with the current state of center-province relations.

Among the founders of the NAP were such political stalwarts as Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din and Mian Mahmud Ali Qasuri of the Azad Pakistan Party from Punjab; G. M. Sayeed and Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi of the Sindhi Mahaz from Sindh; Abdul Samad Achakzai and Mohammad Hashim Ghilzai of the Wrore Pakhtun Baluchistan (spokesmen for Pathans of Baluchistan); and Shahzada Abdul Karim, Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and Usthman Gul of Baluchistan.[292] Later, a faction of the Awami League (East Bengal), led by Maulana Bashani and Mahmud-ul-Haq Usmani, also joined the NAP. Maulana Bashani was chosen as the President. The declared objects of the party were:

1. To break up the "one unit" of Pakistan and establish provincial autonomy.
2. To promote an egalitarian socioeconomic system.
3. To follow a non-aligned, independent foreign policy.

However, in 1958, before the NAP could take its program to the public and organize support, the military regime took over in Pakistan. All political parties were banned, and several political leaders were debarred from politics. As discontent grew against military rule, an attempt was made in 1967 to reactivate the NAP under the leadership of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Abdul Samad Achakzai in West Pakistan and Maulana Bhashani in East Pakistan. However the all-Pakistan character of the "autonomist" NAP did not last long. In 1968 the NAP split into two factions: NAP-Wali and NAP Bhashani. In the elections of 1970, three factors appear to have influenced the outcome of election results in the NWFP. Pakhtun nationalism, Islam and the traditional alliances in the non-Pakhtun areas. Wali Khan advocated Pakhtun nationalism and mobilized the support of the Pakhtun khans, but could not sweep the province.[293] As noted earlier, the JUI primarily relied on the Islamic factor, and through religious appeals and populist rhetoric it swept the southern districts of the province. Qayyum Khan and his Pakistan Muslim League (PML) relied primarily on traditional Muslim League support groups like the khans and the urban middle classes in Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun districts of Hazara.

Qayyum Khan and Wali Khan were traditional rivals whose conflicts were both personal and ideological. The rivalry between the two was an important factor that influenced Bhutto's attitude toward the NAP-JUI coalition. Qayyum Khan was chief minister of the NWFP from 1948 to 1954, and has been credited with the authoritarian

[292] Khan Abdul Wali Khan, *op.cit*., pp. 19–22.
[293] Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Politics in Pakista*. *op.cit*., pp. 123, 126.

nature of the pattern of economic development in the province. He was autocratic in dealing with Ghaffar Khan and brutally suppressed the Red Shirts during his rule.[294] Ideologically, Qayyum Khan was center of the right and he believed in a "strong center." As a leader of the Muslim League he had a national following and was respected as a nationalist.

During the 1970 elections campaign Wali Khan reminded his audiences about authoritarian and repressive rule of Qayyum Khan's ministry and promised that if elected to power he would hold ministry officials accountable for "the past misdeeds and injustices done to the Pakhtuns."[295] In the tradition of the founding fathers of the NAP, Wali Khan visualized a loose Pakistani federation with maximum provincial autonomy, and he professed a secular-socialist ideology.[296] He equated a "strong center" with Punjabi domination, and promised to protect regional languages and cultures.[297] He was consistent in his efforts to dispel notions of separatism, pleaded loyalty to Pakistan and even denounced the "Kabul brand" of "Pakhtunistan."[298]

Wali Khan took the 1970 elections as an opportunity to establish his credentials as a spokesman of Pakhtun nationalism and to dispel the belief that he was a secessionist. To promote Pakhtun nationalism, a number of Khudai Khidmatgar symbols (Red Caps, flags, etc.) were used by his supporters. Conscious of the fact that the NAP leadership was dominated by the Khans and "old guard" Khudai Khidmatgar workers, Wali Khan revived the "Pakhtun Zalme," a militant political organization, in order to attract Pakhtun youth.[299] The Pakhtun Zalme, in the spirit of Khudai Khidmatgar, were to be selfless in serving the people. They were to "gird up their loins for undertaking the reconstruction of their homeland," and they were to raise the political and Pakhtun consciousness of the masses.[300]

Wali Khan was persistent in transforming his image from that of a parochial separatist to a nationalist leader. His pledges of loyalty to Pakistan

not only forced him to compromise on demands for an independent "Pakhtunistan," but also caused the NAP split. Abdul Samad Achakzai, the NAP Pakhtun leader from Baluchistan, believed that the Pathan districts of Baluchistan should become part of "Pakhtunistan."[301] However, Wali Khan preferred to consolidate his alliance with Baluchistan NAP Sardars.

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[294] Anwar Mazdaki, *Vali Khan Ki Syasat* (Lahore: Tariq Publishers, *op.cit.*, p. 29.
[295] *Ibid*., pp. 27–29.
[296] For Wali Khan's views, See his statement, *Khyber Mail*, September 15, 1970.
[297] *Ibid*.
[298] *Ibid*., June 11, 1970.
[299] *Ibid*., August 5, 1970.
[300] *Ibid*., October 25, 1970.
[301] Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), pp. 190–191.

With these changes, Wali Khan began to concentrate on the NWFP. He advocated provincial autonomy, played on fears of Punjabi exploitation and mustered the support of such notable former civil-military officers as Ghulam Farooq Khan and Major General Ghulam Gilani. Through the support of these influential persons, Wali Khan enhanced his nationalist credentials.[302]

Between 1969 and 1971 the NAP under Wali Khan's leadership emerged as a party that asserted Pakhtun-Baluch identity. Its leadership base was comprised of Khans and Sardars. It professed a socialist-secular ideology, sought maximum provincial autonomy, and attempted to mobilize Pakhtun youth (although this last effort met with limited success). Wali Khan emerged as a serious rival of Qayyum Khan in provincial politics, and as a dynamic spokesman of Pakhtun identity and interests in Pakistan's politics. As Ghulam Farooq explained, "Wali Khan's cause is the restoration of the Pakhtuns in Pakistan to their traditional position of leadership, their rightful place of honor and dignity, as the foremost champions of the freedom of the country."[303] Wali Khan lauded the "Pakhtuns" as "defenders of Pakistan" in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.[304] By publicly recognizing the importance of the Pathans in the civil and armed services, Wali Khan attempted to earn their sympathy and respect.

Despite Wali Khan's pledges of loyalty, the military regime of Yahya Khan was not convinced that he had abandoned the separatist cause of an independent Pakhtunistan.[305] The regime was also concerned about Wali Khan's growing influence in the province and allegedly encouraged the Mazdor Kissan Party (MKP) a coalition of tenants and landless to challenge the NAP khans.[306] In late 1971 the Yahya regime banned the NAP and arrested its leadership on charges of promoting separatist activity. On assuming the office of the president and chief martial law administrator, Bhutto released Wali Khan and lifted the ban on the NAP.[307] Within weeks after his release, Wali Khan set out to devise the NAP's strategy. In January 1972, the NAP formed a coalition with the JUI which

would prove to be a formidable force during Bhutto years. It was a coalition that reflected the dominance of traditional Ulema and Sardars-Khans in the provinces of Baluchistan and NWFP. The coalition members had little in common, in terms of its goal and support base. However, they promoted themselves as the dominant force in the two provinces, very much like the PPP. Even though the PPP had a majority of seats in the National Assembly (88 of a total of 144), Wali Khan implied that the PPP was not truly national in character and had a regional support base only in Sindh and Punjab.

[302] *Khyber Mail,* March 8, 1970.
[303] *Khyber Mail, September 8, 1970.*
[304] *Ibid.*
[305] Rushbrook Williams, *Pakistan under Challenge* (London: Stacy International, 1975), p. 74.
[306] An allegation levelled by NAP against Mazdor-Kissan Party.
[307] *Speeches and Statements as President of Pakistan, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1971*, p. 14.

Throughout Bhutto's rule (1971–1977) Wali Khan consistently challenged the PPP and questioned Bhutto's credentials as an authentic national leader: "I do not consider Mr. Bhutto a national leader at all," Wali Khan declared. "At the most I can call him the chairman of the PPP with his representative character confined to the provinces of Punjab and Sindh."[308]

Given the PPP's majority in the National Assembly, Wali Khan conceded that the PPP had the right to form the central government.[309] But calculated and cautious support for Bhutto did not last long. A conflict ensued when Bhutto exercised his prerogative to make provincial appointments by selecting four party members as governors and martial law administrators of the four provinces. Because of its dominance in the two provinces, the NAP had expected these appointments to be made with its consent and consultation. The NAP leadership demanded the immediate removal of the NWFP-Baluchistan governors. The NAP Baluch Sardars saw the appointments as a personal affront and simply refused to accept the governors' authority. They saw Bhutto as a member of their own class who was striving to establish his personal hegemony or who at best was imposing the "dictatorship" of the PPP in the provinces where the NAP-JUI coalition predominated. Wali Khan was quick to warn that the PPP governors would not be tolerated in the NAPJUI dominated provinces.[310] He reasoned that if there were any external threat, military administrators would be appointed as governors and martial law administrators. In a similar tone the JUI leader Maulana Mufti Mahmud declared to "lift martial law" or "give power to the military" and asserted that the PPP could enforce martial law only in the Punjab and Sindh.[311] The NAP-JUI leaders made it clear that instead of the PPP governors they preferred military rule.

Most of the other opposition leaders joined Wali Khan and Mufti Mahmud in demanding the removal of martial law.[312] Responding to the NAP-JUI demands Bhutto argued:

> We have fought against two martial laws. Our victory is the victory of the people; we intend to complete and consolidate this victory. The powers of martial law have been used collectively and for the sole purpose of bringing about some basic reforms, essential and immediate. These reforms have been and are being introduced. Once this first phase of reforms is over and this will not take long the ground will be laid for the full flowering of democracy in which the

[308] Wali Khan, *op.cit*., p. 75.
[309] *Dawn*, Karachi, January 2, 1972. Wali Khan said, "Mr. Bhutto has a right to form the government as representative of the people at the center."
[310] *Dawn*, Karachi, January 5, 1972.
[311] *Ibid*., January 9, 1972.
[312] Mazdaki, *op.cit*., pp. 68–71.

> voice of the people can never be silenced again. When we renounce martial law it will be for all time to come.[313]

The issue here seems to be not so much the degree of reform but how reform would be decided and implemented. Wali Khan was clever not to criticize the reformist policies, arguing that martial law was not necessary to carry out the reform. Demanding the restoration of democracy, he suggested that the provincial legislatures should decide on the degree of reform.[314] Wali Khan was more concerned with limiting the powers of the central government and enhancing the powers of the provincial governments.

In sum this conflict betrayed the semi-feudal character of Pakistan's political leaders. The years between 1972 and 1975 were dominated by a power struggle between the nationally based groups led by Bhutto and the regionally entrenched groups and classes led by Wali Khan. This struggle promoted a political culture of violence and confrontation, defiance and coercion.

Wali Khan's Strategy of Regime Confrontation

Wali Khan's regime confrontation strategy had four components. First, as detailed above, he insisted that the PPP was regional in character, representing only half of Pakistan, while the other half was represented by the NAP-JUI. Second, he made vigorous efforts to dispel the notion that he was a separatist and that the NAP was regional in character. In January 1972, Wali Khan organized the NAP's national convention in Lahore, and by demanding the removal of martial law, presented himself as a leader struggling to restore democracy.[315] Third, Wali Khan launched a coalition-building effort with political leaders and parties who were willing to support his regime confrontational strategy. By February 1972 he was able to muster the support of two factions of the Muslim League party (Convention and Council), Jamaat-i-Islami and Asghar Khan.[316] By aligning the NAP with the conservative forces in the Punjab, Wali Khan demonstrated that he had the potential to challenge Bhutto and his regime at the national level. Finally, Wali Khan demanded that power be transferred to the NAP-JUI in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Wali Khan mobilized support in the provinces of Punjab and the NWFP by organizing public rallies.

As noted earlier, Bhutto's priority was to gain legitimacy through socioeconomic reform, and for this purpose he chose to continue martial law. Between January and March 1972 Bhutto announced a series of economic reform ordinances (discussed in the next chapter), which were resisted by opposition leaders who demanded that the legislature have control over reform policies and implementation.[317] Responding to this

[313] *Speeches and Statements as President of Pakistan, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972*, 60–61.
[314] Mazdaki, *op.cit.*, pp. 68–71.
[315] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, January 30, 1972.
[316] *Imroze*, Lahore, February 6, 9, 1972.
[317] Mazdaki, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

confrontationalist strategy, Bhutto began discussions with the NAP-JUI in March 1972 which centered on framing a constitution for the country. On March 6, 1972, Bhutto announced that the PPP, the NAP and JUI had agreed on a tripartite accord.[318] The accord provided for the removal of martial law by August, 1972, the appointment of the governors of the NWFP and Baluchistan in consultation with the NAP-JUI, the formation of NAP-JUI governments in the two provinces, and the adoption of an "interim constitution."[319] On April 21, 1972, the members of the National Assembly met and approved the "interim constitution." Thus, within four months after assuming power, Bhutto moved Pakistan from military-hegemonic rule to a participant political system.

The removal of martial law, however, did not mean unfettered parliamentary democracy. The interim constitution was a curious mix of presidential central rule and parliamentary governance in the provinces. The governors were appointed by the president and were answerable to him rather than the legislature. In the provinces, the ministries were answerable to the governors rather than the provincial legislature. The interim constitution clearly established the dominance of the centralized government over the provinces.[320]

Why did the NAP-JUI agree to such a centralized system? Three factors played important roles in this process the NAP-JUI leaders believed that this was merely an interim arrangement and that the country was passing through unusual times. Second, there was a genuine desire and some degree of consensus among the PPP and the NAP-JUI leaders to abolish martial law; the interim constitution was perceived as an acceptable alternative.[321] However, both the PPP and the NAP-JUI aimed to use the post-martial law situation to their advantage. Finally, the Government of India Act of 1935 provided a firm basis for forming consensus among the political leaders of Pakistan. It presented a good starting point for creating a more permanent constitutional system.

The NAP Governors were appointed in the NWFP and in Baluchistan in May 1972. The NAP-JUI formed the provincial governments, while the National Assembly began to work on formulating the permanent constitution. For this purpose a multi-party committee consisting of National Assembly members was formed.[322] Leaving the

[318] For full text of the Tripartite Accord, see *Dawn*, March 7, 1972; for NAP's view, see Mazdaki, *op.cit*., pp. 71–97.
[319] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, April 22, 1972.
[320] *The Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1972), pp. 11–15, 26–28.
[321] Burki *op.cit*., pp. 91–92; Mazdaki, *op.cit*., pp. 72–73.
[322] The committee that framed the Constitution comprised of the following members from all the parties in the parliament. Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Law Minister was Chairman, J.A. Rahim, Dr. Mubashir Hasan, Sh. Muhammad Rashid, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Rafi Raza, Yahya Bhukhtiar (all PPP), Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan PML(Q), Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil, Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, Ghulam Farooq (NAP), Sardar Shaukat Hayat PML (Council), Major

Assembly to deal with the constitution, Bhutto began to operationalize the interim constitution. Bhutto sought NAP-JUI cooperation, offering the coalition two cabinet posts; the NAP declined.[323]

Wali Khan's strategy was to confront the PPP central regime and to maximize autonomy at the provincial level. Unable to persuade the NAPJUI to join him, Bhutto approached Abdul Qayyum Khan (of PML-Q) and offered his party two cabinet posts in the central government. PML-Q was the largest single opposition party in the National Assembly and the leading opposition party in the NWFP provincial assembly. Qayyum Khan readily accepted the offer, for with the expectant installation of the NAP-JUI government in the NWFP, he found himself out maneuvered in provincial politics. Wali Khan, however, felt that by co-opting Qayyum Khan, an arch enemy of the NAP, Bhutto was placing a sword of damocles on the NAP-JUI ministries constraining their provincial governments. In fact, by enlisting Qayyum Khan's support, Bhutto achieved a double advantage. First, Qayyum Khan and the Muslim League had an effective support base both in the NWFP and in Baluchistan and thus could pose a challenge to the NAP-JUI provincial governments. Second, by this move Bhutto succeeded in neutralizing and absorbing the largest single opposition party in the National Assembly. It was in this environment of distrust and suspicion that the NAP-JUI provincial governments were installed in May 1972.

Having agreed to function under the interim constitution, the NAP-JUI attempted to counteract its strong centralizing features. Wali Khan, in a "Gandhian style," opted not to assume any governmental position, but remained instead the president of the NAP. He gained greater maneuverability by separating the party from the provincial government and maintaining effective control over the party's leadership. Any arrangement between the provincial or NAP-JUI ministries and the central government would fail without the approval and support of the NAP's central committee. In June 1972, for instance, Bhutto created a special ministry for streamlining and coordinating relations between the central government and the provinces. Under its auspices, the governors and chief ministers agreed to have regular consultations, to promote inter-provincial harmony, and to coordinate a policy of joint action despite differences in party positions. Within a week of this decision, however, Wali Khan stated, "My party and I are not bound by the governor's agreement."[324] Through such tactics Wali Khan hampered the development of a viable relationship between the provinces and the central authorities.

Bhutto also diverged from the "autonomist" approach of the opposition parties, led by Wali Khan and others, which held that the provinces must maintain power to protect

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General Jamal Dar Khan, Independent from FATA, Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani JUP, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad JI, Sardar Sher Baz Mazari Independent, Mufti Mahmood JUIP.

[323] See, LaPorte *op.cit*., pp. 104–105 also Mzdaki, *op.cit*., pp. 119–126.

[324] Cited in *The White Paper on Baluchistan* (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 13.

their own interests. Bhutto instead saw that such an arrangement would disproportionately favor the resource-rich and heavily populated Punjab, making the workings of the central government increasingly problematic, particularly as Bhutto was a non-Punjabi head of state.

Hailing from the province of Sindh and claiming national leadership, Bhutto was painfully aware of these realities and was keen to maintain central control. Wali Khan equated a viable central government with the domination of the Punjab, and therefore asserted that Bhutto represented the interests of Punjab and Sindh only and not those of the whole of Pakistan. Wali Khan's intransigent attitude toward the PPP regime revived the specter of the anti-national and separatist NAP. In addition, Wali Khan's frequent visits to Kabul in 1972 allowed the PPP regime to propagate through the government-controlled press, secessionist image of the NAP.[325] A series of policies initiated by the NAP-JUI provincial governments further exacerbated the tensions between the provinces and the central authorities.

At least four areas can be identified wherein the NAP-JUI provincial governments sought either to embarrass or confront the PPP regime.

The first involved laws pertaining to Islamization. Immediately after forming a government in the NWFP, Chief Minister Maulana Mufti Mahmud introduced two Islamization laws, establishing certain prohibitions in the provinces and requiring respect for a Ramadan ordinance.[326] The ordinance required that during the month of Ramadan (a Muslim holy month of fasting), opening hotels and restaurants and eating in public places would be considered punishable offenses. As noted earlier, the JUI had a strong support base in the backward but strongly religious districts of the southern NWFP, and the NAP government in Baluchistan was quick to adopt both of these laws. This put the PPP in an embarrassing position. In Punjab and Sindh, the Islam Passand parties and several militant groups criticized the "secular-socialist" character of the PPP and demanded adoption of similar Islamization laws.

The second issue that embarrassed the PPP was the NAP-JUI government's language policy. During the 1970 elections, the NAP had advocated linguistic nationalism and pledged to protect regional languages and cultures. However, once in power the provincial assemblies in the NWFP and Baluchistan adopted Urdu as the official language of the provinces.[327] By this move the NAP conveyed the impression that it had

[325] The government-controlled newspaper highlighted Wali Khan's frequent visits to Kabul as working toward Pakhtunistan. It also played upon the assembly of prominent NAP leaders in London. These meetings were labelled as the "London Plan" implying that the leaders were conspiring to break up Pakistan. See L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *op.cit.,* pp. 79–82.

[326] For a detailed discussion of Mufti Mahmood's *Islamization Policies and JUI-NAP rule*, see Ashfaq Hashmi, *Mufti Ka Daur-i-Hukumat* (Lahore: Hashmi Publications, 1974) (Urdu) pp. 16, 21, 36, 38–39; also see *Naeem Asi*, pp. 177–193.

[327] Ashfaq Hashmi, *op.cit.*, pp. 17–18.

abandoned its claims for recognizing four nationalities and had endeared itself instead to the migrant groups. In Sindh, however, the PPP government had aimed to adopt Sindhi as the provincial language. In July 1972 riots broke out between the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (migrant groups) and the Sindhis over the adoption of an official language for the province.[328] After considerable destruction of property and loss of human life, a bilingual language bill was adopted by the Sindh provincial assembly which protected the status of the two languages in the province.

The third issue that sharpened the contradictions between the PPP and the NAP-JUI was the latter's attempts to court the financial-industrial groups, in particular the Karachi-based groups that were adversely affected by the PPP's nationalization policies. Ghulam Farooq, Finance Minister of the NWFP, belonged to this group and had strong links with the financial-industrial families of Karachi and Punjab. He invited these group families to invest in the province and assured them that the provincial governments would not only provide tax holidays, but would also ensure industrial peace.[329] Through such overtures the NAP endeared itself to the financial industrial groups, and by so doing, further disconcerted the PPP regime.

Finally, the issues that shook the foundations of a precariously emerging democratic process in Pakistan were the oppositional attitude of the Baluchistan NAP leaders and the policy objectives of the Bhutto regime.

In post-1971 Baluchistan these NAP Sardars were appropriately described as a "triumvirate" consisting of Sardar Khair Baksh Marri, Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal, and Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo.[330] Marri and Mengal have been generally regarded as radical nationalists who advocated an "independent Baluchistan." Bizenjo has generally been considered a moderate who preferred that Baluchistan operate within the federation of Pakistan. In May 1972 Bizenjo was appointed governor of the province. In his letter of appointment, Bhutto specifically stated that Bizenjo was to act as a representative of the central government,[331] with Mengal as the chief minister. Khair Baksh Marri did not assume a governmental position.

The Bhutto regime's policy toward Baluchistan and the NAP government was conditioned by three factors:

1. The socioeconomic underdevelopment of the province.

[328] *Dawn*, Karachi, July 11, 1972. For a detailed discussion on the language controversy, also see Nazir A. Mughal, "The Elite Groups and Aspects of Confrontation within Pakistan," *Asian Profile*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (June 1977), pp. 268–271; *Pakistan Economist* (Karachi: August 1972), pp. 16– 25.

[329] Khan Abdul Wali Khan *op.cit.,* pp. 40–42.

[330] Seling Harrison*, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p. 41.

[331] President Bhutto was very specific about the terms and conditions of appointment. For full text of the letter, see *The White Paper on Baluchistan, op.cit*., pp. 9–11.

2. The absence of an administrative infrastructure.
3. The strategic significance of the province in the changing geopolitical environment around the Persian Gulf.

The NAP Baluch Sardars who rose to power, however, had different priorities. They were concerned with preserving their "tribal autonomy" and establishing their hegemony over other tribes. Since the NAP had a clear majority in the province, the Sardars were determined to maximize provincial autonomy. These considerations brought the NAP Sardars into direct conflict with the PPP regime.

Baluchistan has certain unique features. Territorially, it is the largest province and constitutes 40 percent of the total land area of Pakistan. In terms of population, however, it is the smallest province. According to the 1972 census Baluchistan had a population of only 2.4 million people, or approximately 3.7 percent of the country's total population.

Baluchistan is ethnically pluralistic. Indigenous Pathan tribes, such as the Kakars, Tarins and Shiranis, reside in the northern part of the province and constitute about 40 percent of the province's total population. The Pathans dominate the commercial trade in the Quetta division. The major Baluch tribes include the Mengals, Marris, Bugtis, Bizenjos, Zehris, Hasanis, and Raisanis. The main Brohi tribes are located in Sarawan and Jhalawan in the Kalat division. Together, the Baluchi and Brohi tribes dominate most of the central and western parts of the province. In addition, smaller tribes such as the Tajiks, Turkomans, and Hazaras are scattered throughout the province. In the southern part of Baluchistan are the smaller tribes, including the Jamotes, Lasis, and a number of non-Baluchi groups such as Punjabis, Sindhis and Gilgitis. Most of these groups practice farming in Kachi and Las Bela districts; others are settled in the towns.[332]

Baluchistan is well endowed with such natural resources as natural gas, oil, coal, marble, gold and some radioactive minerals. Prior to assuming power, the NAP Baluch Sardars had complained about the economic exploitation of Baluchistan by the "Punjabis," implying that the central government had pledged to redress the situation before they were voted into power.

Once in power the NAP provincial government moved to consolidate its hold over the province. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal, the chief minister, took a series of steps that heightened ethnic tensions and tribal rivalries and reinforced the suspicions of the central government.[333] One such measure was the repatriation of all non-Baluch technical and administrative personnel (i.e., police, teachers and engineers). This step

[332] See the special issue of the weekly *Shafaat*, February 16–March 3, 1978.

[333] For Mengal-Bizenjo's view, see *Shafaat*, February 16–March 3, 1978. For the PPP's National question, see Feroz Ahmed, et al., *Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question*, (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1975).

adversely affected the largest law enforcing agency, the Baluchistan Reserve Police (BRP), whose 2,600 non-Baluchi members were forced to leave.[334] The Mengal government was motivated by the desire to provide jobs for NAP supporters and educated Baluchs. This action was particularly resented in Punjab. In another decision the Mengal ministry created a civilian police force, the Baluchistan Dehi Mahafiz (BDM), and allegedly recruited 1100 NAP supporters to the force.

This even further alarmed the central government. Inayat Ullah Baluch observed: "This step was disturbing for the PPP government in Islamabad and in Punjab, where they had to provide jobs to these government servants or face unrest in their provinces."[335] On another occasion the Mengal-Bizenjo administration hampered the functioning of the Coastal Guard (a federal civil force that supervised the Baluchistan Coastline.) Such actions by the NAP government were perceived by the Bhutto regime as "tampering" with law enforcement agencies and defying the central authorities.[336]

The tribal nature of Baluch society and the NAP government surfaced between October and December 1972, when tribal wars erupted in the province.[337] The White Paper on Baluchistan has asserted that as the NAP Sardars assumed power in the province, some chiefs of the Jamote tribe told the central government that they feared reprisals because they had opposed the NAP during the 1970 elections.[338] In December 1972 tribal lashkars (bands) of the Marri, Mengal and Bizenjo tribes, supported by the newly created BDM, surrounded and besieged nearly 8,000 Jamote tribesmen. The Bizenjo-Mengal government, however, charged that the Interior Minister Qayyum Khan had encouraged the Jamote, Zehri, and Bugti tribes to revolt against the provincial government.[339] The central authorities were further dismayed when, during the same month, Marri tribesmen looted the farms in the Feeder area that belonged to non-Baluch settlers (most of these lands belonged to settlers from Punjab and Sindh and to senior civil and military officers).[340] Tribal warfare further intensified over the Baluchistan Mining Concessions (Acquisition) Bill of 1972, which proposed public ownership of mines in Baluchistan.[341]

The "Tribal wars" were barely settled when, in February 1973, the central government discovered arms in the Iraqi embassy, which it claimed were destined for Baluchistan.[342]

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[334] *The White Paper on Baluchistan*, p. 18.
[335] Baloch*, op.cit*., p. 204.
[336] Rushbrook Williams, *op.cit.,* pp. 86–88; See also *The White Paper on Baluchistan*, pp. 15– 16.
[337] Maleeha Lodi, "Bhutto, The Pakistan Peoples Party and Political Development in Pakistan: 1967–1977," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of London, 1981), pp. 336–339, Harrison, op.cit., p. 62. For the NAP's point of view, see Bizenjo's interview in *Shafaat*, March 3, 1978, pp. 51–52.
[338] *The White Paper on Baluchistan*, pp. 20–2121.
[339] *Ibid*., pp. 31–32.
[340] Lodi, *op.cit*., p. 337.
[341] *Baluchistan Provincial Assembly Debates*, 1972.
[342] Rushbrook Williams, *op.cit*., pp. 95–96. For NAP's interpretation, see Asi*, op.cit*., pp. 207– 212.

The Bhutto regime charged that the NAP government in Baluchistan was involved in a separatist plot. Bhutto dismissed the two NAP governors and the Mengal ministry in Baluchistan, even though the PPP regime had failed to provide convincing evidence that the NAP leadership was in any way involved with the Iraqi embassy's arms. To protest the central government's action, the NAP-JUI coalition in the NWFP also resigned a move for which Bhutto was completely unprepared. For almost a week, Bhutto tried, without success, to persuade Maulana Mufti Mahmud to stay on as chief minister.[343]

The defiance of the NAP Sardars in Baluchistan and the centralization efforts of the PPP regime clearly showed that the transition from the military hegemonic regime to a participant system was not easy. In effect, intra-tribal tensions were sharpened in the province, for while the NAP Sardars opposed the PPP, other tribes sought alliance with it. The conflict between the Baluchs and the non-Baluchs was also sharpened, thereby weakening the NAP Sardars' efforts to maximize provincial autonomy. And in the overall sense, the national versus regional tensions between the NAP regional leadership and the PPP national leadership were further intensified.

Once they were put out of power, the NAP Sardars launched an insurgency movement. Bhutto appointed Sardar Akbar Bugti governor of the province, and Bugti asked that federal troops be sent to restore law and order in the region.[344] The PPP regime rationalized this action by citing the tribal wars and the NAP Baluch Sardars' separatism. But the NAP charged that it was Bhutto's "reckless course" that had forced the military action. In an interview, Bizenjo stated:

> I had been struggling to avoid a confrontation and even gone to the extent of damaging my political image. Because I knew that a confrontation with Bhutto would ultimately mean the rule of the army. I was able to prevent such a confrontation for nearly one year but Mr. Bhutto has been on a reckless course.[345]

The dismissal of the NAP government and subsequent military action in Baluchistan compromised Bhutto's image as a democratic national leader and further intensified the politics of confrontation.

In the wake of these developments, Wali Khan devised a new strategy. He sought a coalition with the right wing parties of Punjab and Sindh and developed a national opposition, thereby moving the NAP from a regional-separatist party to an integrationist national party. His objective was not only to "isolate Mr. Bhutto," but to

[343] Asi, *op.cit*., pp. 192–193. K. B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan ... *op.cit*., pp. 129–130. *The White Paper on Baluchistan, op.cit*., pp. 20–21.
[344] See for example, Selig Harrison *op.cit*., p. 36.
[345] Cited in Harrison, pp. 56–57.

provide a national alternative to the PPP.[346] Thus emerged the United Democratic Front (UDF) in February 1973: a coalition of several parties, including the NAP, CML, JUI, JUP, PDP, JI, Khaksar, Tehrik-e-Isteqlal and some independent MNAs.

In a still more clever move, Wali Khan did not assume any office in the UDF. Instead, Pir Pagaro, one of the leading pirs (saints) and landlords from Sindh, was chosen as the party's president, while Mufti Mahmud became its secretary-general.[347] Most significantly, the coalition had the support of a segment of the powerful feudal class in the four provinces, the financial industrial groups, and the religious groups.

In order to demonstrate its newly won solidarity, and to show its strength by confronting the national regime, the UDF announced that a public meeting would be held at Rawalpindi on March 23, 1973.[348] The significance of this date lay in the fact that it was the Republic Day, and the PPP regime planned to celebrate the holiday with the usual parade and presidential review of the armed forces. Symbolically, it was a day to uphold national solidarity, but the UDF leaders were determined to hold its meeting to display its power publicly. The government-controlled press reported "Pakhtun Zalme" (militant armed supporters) of the NAP had been specially brought in from the NWFP to attend the meeting.[349] (Bringing supporters from different parts of the country for public meetings is a common-practice in Pakistan.) Before the UDF leaders could address the meeting, violent clashes broke out between PPP and UDF supporters. Nongovernment sources claimed that eighteen to fifty persons were killed in the incident, while government sources stated that seven persons were killed and seventy five injured. The UDF leaders charged that the PPP regime had disrupted their public meeting.[350]

Critics of Bhutto charged that through such strong-arm tactics the PPP regime had stifled the democratic process and established authoritarian rule. It was disconcerting to note that although Bhutto and the PPP leadership espoused an open, democratic political system, it had instituted a policy of authoritarianism that promoted its own primacy over that of the provinces.

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[346] Wali Khan, *op.cit.,* pp. 92–94.

[347] This was a very smart move on the part of Wali Khan, who stepped aside from the collisional national leadership and facilitated the emergence of Pir Pagaro as a national leader. Pagaro, one of the leading Pirs from Sindh, was in a position to challenge Bhutto's leadership and support base in Sindh.

[348] *Imroze*, Lahore, March 24, 1973. This incident was seen as the hallmark of the PPP suppression by the opposition parties. Pir Pagaro charged that the PPP government was responsible for disrupting the public meeting. Professor Abdul Ghafoor of Jamaat-i-Islami charged that the regime aimed to impose a dictatorship. Responding to these charges, the Interior Minister Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan stated that it was an effort to "over-throw the government." For a detailed account of the incident from NAP-JUI's view, see Hashmi, *op.cit*., pp. 174–175.

[349] *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, March 24, 1973.

[350] *Ibid*., March 25, 26, 1973, also See, for example, Ziring, *op.cit*., pp. 195–196, Rushbrook Williams, *op.cit*., pp. 96–99.

After the dismissal of the NAP-JUI governments and, in particular, the Rawalpindi incident, the rate of political violence increased. In response, the PPP regime increasingly invoked the emergency provisions of Section 144.

While Baluchistan was still in turmoil, the over throw of King Zahir Shah in Afghanistan in July 1973 and the emergence of Mohammad Daud as that country's new leader further aroused the Bhutto regime's anxiety. President Daud was perceived as an outspoken supporter of the "Greater Pakhtunistan movement" in Pakistan. This external development further hardened the PPP regime's attitude toward the NAP and, in particular, against the NAP Baluch Sardars.

In December 1973 the PPP regime experienced another setback in Baluchistan when Pakhtunkhawa leader Abdul Samad Achakzai was assassinated in Quetta. It was widely speculated that he was not only estranged from the NAP Baluch Sardars, but had also agreed to co-operate with the PPP in Baluchistan. Achakzai's loss came as a serious blow to Bhutto's plans for the province.

In January 1974, Nawab Akbar Bugti resigned from the governorship of the Baluchistan. Despite the military attempt to restore law and order, Bugti had failed to effectively control the insurgent tribes. Bhutto responded by appointing Khan of Kalat as governor of the province.

Bhutto began to map a strategy for undermining the UDF's support in Baluchistan. He opened up secret negotiations with the NAP Baluch Sardars and simultaneously adopted coercive measures, including the Anti-terrorist Act and further press controls.[351] By 1974 the UDF leaders had been completely out-maneuvered by Bhutto. Furthermore, an Islamic conference in February 1974 at Lahore, in which the leaders of many Muslim countries participated, enhanced Bhutto's prestige both within the country and internationally. Still, incidents of political violence continued to increase, as sporadic IRA-style bombings occurred in the NWFP and Baluchistan.[352]

Banned from holding public meetings, the UDF leaders adopted an innovative strategy. Maulana Mufti Mahmud, Mian Tufail Mohammad, and Asghar Khan wrote letters to the foreign embassies in Islamabad, pointing out the repressive policies of the regime. They also wrote letters to the army commanders in Baluchistan urging them to disobey Bhutto's orders.[353] These were clearly extra-constitutional measures that suggested that Pakistani political leaders, both in the government and outside the government, had little respect for the constitution. The NAP leader Wali Khan took it upon himself to launch a frontal attack on the coercive policies of the PPP, urging that repression had provoked violence. And yet, he also implied that the opposition was also ready to resort

[351] Herbert Feldman, "Pakistan in 1974," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 110–116.
[352] *Ibid*., p. 113.
[353] Asghar Khan, *op.cit*., pp. 115–116.

to political violence. In a frequently cited interview with the Karachi-based newsweekly Outlook in July 1974, Wali said:

> If you want to settle it bullet by bullet, you will find people who will match your bullet with their bullet. You can't stop it. If you have legitimate means of political agitation here, people will go to legitimate means. But if you stop all traditional and conventional methods of constitutional and legal agitation, people will pick up unconstitutional, illegal methods for furthering their political cause.[354]

After the publication of this interview the government suspended publication of *Outlook*. It was under these conditions that the power struggle between the PPP and the NAP reached a turning point. In February 1975, Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, a senior member of the NWFP provincial cabinet and a close associate of Bhutto, was assassinated while he was presiding over a student function at Peshawar University. Bhutto, who was on a state visit to the United States at the time, cut short his trip and returned to Pakistan. Addressing an emergency session of the National Assembly, Bhutto declared that all "necessary steps" would be taken to stop the politics of terrorism and secession.

Bhutto used the incident to unleash a series of coercive measures. The NAP was banned and its top leadership was arrested. Police raided university campuses to recover "foreign arms." Wali Khan's son and some other students were convicted for complicity in the Sherpao murder. Wali Khan was charged with conspiring against the state, and a special tribunal was set up to try him.[355] On February 12, 1975, the National Assembly passed the controversial Third Constitutional Amendment Bill. The bill provided for indefinite detention, without trial, of persons who were deemed to be "acting or attempting to act in a way prejudicial to the security of the state." Under this bill a legislature could also be arrested. Furthermore, the bill granted an indefinite continuation of the state of emergency.[356]

In November 1975, through the Fourth Constitutional Amendment, the High Courts were deprived of their right to grant bail to any person detained under the preventive detention laws. Through such measures, the opposition was forced into disarray and decline, and the supremacy of the executive was established over the representative institutions.

Conclusion

The pattern of regional conflict that emerged in post-1972 Pakistan should not be reduced to the personal conflict between Bhutto and Wali Khan. The tribal-feudal nature of the Pakistani political leadership, the preoccupation of the ruling elite with

[354] Cited in Ziring, *Pakistan: The Engima … op.cit.,* p. 158.
[355] *Dawn*, Karachi, 10 February, 1975.
[356] *Dawn*, Karachi, February 13, 1975.

disintegration, and the threat of the NAP's separatism were major factors that exacerbated the conflict. But the core issue was the redefinition of the relationship between the central government and the provinces, not merely in the constitutional sense, but in attitudinal terms. The national leadership led by Bhutto was concerned with developing a viable central institution that had primacy over the provincial governments, lending Wali Khan and the Baluch Sardars to believe that their autonomy was being usurped by the dominant party-PPP regime. Their defiance and confrontationist attitudes further exacerbated the conflict. Analyzing the sources of center-periphery conflict in developing countries, Heeger has incisively remarked:

> "Conflicts between center and periphery may not be so much a question of nationalism versus some form of separatism as a question of managing a highly segmented political system."[357]

The conflict between the central Pakistani government and the provinces was certainly a question of managing conflict in a segmented political system. But, contrary to Heeger's conclusion that centralizing elites are the principal causes of exacerbating the conflict, in the Pakistani case, the regional leader's attitudes were equally important factors worsening the conflict. As a consequence, Pakistan's political environment remained hostile to the process of democratic consolidation.

[357] Gerald A. Heeger, *The Politics of Under-development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 66–67.

5

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND RESISTANCE

In this chapter I shall analyze the process of socioeconomic reform and resistance that emerged in Pakistan under the civilian regime led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The focus shall be on (1) the reformist nature of Bhutto's political leadership, (2) the role of socialist factions within the PPP in formulating the policies of socioeconomic reform, and (3) the role of the resistance groups, classes, and elites in mitigating the impact of these reforms. To what degree, if any did the policies of socioeconomic reform lead to the growth of conflicts: public versus private sector, agriculture versus industry, and laissez-faire capitalism versus mixed economy? Furthermore, did the socioeconomic reform weaken the military hegemonic political system and create conditions for the development of an alternate political system?

Two important trends merit attention. First, the financial-industrial groups revealed a great capacity to resist Bhutto's reformism compared to any other group. These groups were reluctant, slow but persistent, in organizing resistance. Bhutto and the PPP socialist factions under-estimated the resistance capacity of the financial-industrial groups. Most scholarly studies have paid inadequate attention to this aspect of the financial-industrial groups during the Bhutto period. Second, compared to a military hegemonic regime, a civilian regime, despite tendencies of authoritarianism, provided greater scope and maneuverability to various groups to influence policy outcomes. This is demonstrated by the manner in which these financial-industrial groups were able to maintain their dominant position in the country's economy despite nationalization. These groups were not as weak as Bhutto had assumed.

It has been correctly pointed out that the groups and classes that Bhutto brought to power were not adequately represented in the political and economic power structure he inherited form the military regime.[358] Would he be able to integrate the new groups and classes without hurting the interest of the powerful elites, groups and classes? For Bhutto the task was not easy.

The coalition that Bhutto brought to power was composed of (1) the feudals, particularly those who were excluded under the military regime (2) the middle classes predominantly urban professionals, (3) industrial labor, (4) petty government employees, and (5) the peasantry. However, those who commanded positions of influence and leadership within the PPP, in terms of social class origins and group support, had their roots among the feudal classes of Punjab and Sindh, and the Urban

[358] Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan under Bhutto: 1971–1977* (London: The MacMillan Co., 1980), p. 71.

professionals. In the early phase of Bhutto's rule, i.e., from 1971 to 1973, the PPP feudals emerged as the dominant leaders at the provincial level, while at the center (national level), Urban professionals acquired positions of visible influence. For example, in the first Bhutto cabinet, of 10 ministers, six were urban professionals.[359] It is generally recognized by scholars that, compared to earlier cabinets under either civilian or military regimes, the central ministers of the Bhutto cabinet had greater autonomy and effective control over the bureaucracy.[360] This was particularly true in the early phase of the Bhutto period because (1) these ministers were a product of electoral politics, (2) some of them believed that the bureaucracy should be subordinate to the political leadership, and (3) some of them were committed to implementing the socialist goals of the party.

Thus the PPP brought to power a new set of individuals uninitiated into the existing power structure of Pakistan. These novices were keen to curb the power of the existing elites and aimed to redefine the relationship between the bureaucratic military elites and the financial-industrial groups. These new influential were the leaders of the socialist faction within the PPP, individuals like Dr. Mubashir Hasan, who became Minister of finance, Economic Affairs and Development, J. A. Rahim, Minister for Presidential Affairs, Culture, planning and Agrovilles, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, Minister for Social Welfare, Health and Family Planning, Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and Khursheed Hasan Meer, Minister for Establishment. Despite their ideological-cum-personal differences, these individuals (with the exception of Kasuri) were influential in steering the Pakistani economy in a socialist direction. They did not have any consensus on the nature and degree of socialism, nor did they exhibit any unison or coordination in the formulation of the socioeconomic reforms launched by Bhutto.[361] However, most of them encouraged Bhutto to honor the PPP's electoral promise of socioeconomic reform. The support of the PPP's socialist factions was crucial in helping Bhutto pursue reformist policies.

Bhutto was a unique leader in Pakistan's political history, not because of his charisma or the unusual circumstances (i.e the disintegration of Pakistan) that many believed he had caused, or, on the other hand, inherited, but because he campaigned and won election as a socialist. This had two consequences. On assuming power, Bhutto did move Pakistan in a "socialist direction" and attempted to honor his pledges of socioeconomic reform.[362]

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[359] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *President of Pakistan: Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1971– March 1972* (Karachi: Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1972), p. 18.
[360] Yusuf Hamid, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy, 1947–1977* (Lahore: Afro Asia Publications, 1980), pp. 112–113.
[361] Burki, op.cit., pp. 112–114.
[362] Gerald A. Heeger, "Socialism in Pakistan," in Helen Desfesses and Jacques (eds.), *Socialism in the Third World* (new York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 291–301: Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One Two," in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and Howard Wriggens (eds.), *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977), pp. 91–106.

The second notable aspect of the Bhutto period was that his rise to power marked the upsurge of the middle classes in the economic and political decision-making process. It had all the signs of a bourgeois revolution.[363] Given the popular mandate, Bhutto chose to restrict the role of the financial-industrial groups in the economic structure of Pakistan. His first priority was to redefine the pattern of relationship that existed between the bureaucracy and the financial-industrial groups. "Centralization of Power," Huntington
says, is "an essential pre-requisite for policy innovation and reform."[364] For Bhutto, "centralization of power" became a pre-condition of instituting reform. Therefore, rule and reform became intertwined as Bhutto moved to redirect and redefine the pattern of relationship between the bureaucracy and the financial-industrial groups. The coalition that Bhutto had brought to power (the PPP) was not only unfamiliar with the power structure but was also faction-ridden and very loosely organized. It has been argued and well-documented that Bhutto did not make a serious effort to streamline the party organization, but, instead, was content to keep the party under personal control.[365] His primary concern was to subordinate the military-bureaucratic elites under civilian leadership and to break the channels of personal and institutional access between the bureaucracy and the financial-industrial groups.[366] Thus, rule and reform became issues of primary concern for Bhutto and his associates. Invariably, Bhutto oscillated between rule and reform and found it difficult to maintain a balance between the two. This led some scholars to conclude that Bhutto was motivated by considerations of rule rather than reform.[367] Rule and reform are complementary processes. The reform that the PPP and Bhutto wanted to pursue had a popular mandate but did not have the approval or support of the financial-industrial groups, a segment of feudal class, and the military-bureaucratic and religious elites.

Before Bhutto could initiate reform, he was confronted with what Richard Neustad has termed a "classic problem" that the political leader has to face in any political system, namely: "How to be on top in fact, as well as in name."[368] This problem is of critical significance in the developing countries where in absence of well-defined rules of the political game or the traditional order in society demand that political leaders demonstrate that they are on top "in fact" and "in name." Bhutto demonstrated this by

[363] Robert A. LaPorte, Jr., *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. p. 116.
[364] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 366.
[365] For an excellent discussion on factionalism in the PPP, see Philip Jones, "Pakistan People's Party," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University, 1977 pp. 661–664: Anwar H. Syed, op.cit., pp. 91–100. For some fresh insights See, Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,* London: MacMillan, 1992. pp. 207–214.
[366] Stanley A. Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 272.
[367] Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 89; Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (London: Dawson, 1980), pp. 145–197.
[368] Richard E. Neustad, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), Preface.

purging the military bureaucratic elites, who were closely identified with the military regime. He also ordered the arrest of such leading industrialists as Ahmed Dawood, Valika, and General (retired) Habib Ullah of Gandhara Industries, the member of the "Lucky 22 families."[369] In the societal context of Pakistan, by such symbolic and real acts, Bhutto dishonored the honored or the privileged groups. To establish its authority, the new regime found itself reducing the power of the privileged groups and classes.[370]

To ensure regime stability, Bhutto needed to build authority and gain in the legitimacy he needed to honor his pledges of socioeconomic reform. His regime inherited a low degree of authority. The fundamental task was to build authority, both personal and institutional. In short, Bhutto was confronted with the task of creating a balance between regime-building and instituting socioeconomic reform. For him the paradox was how to find an acceptable mix of the two processes.

The civil war produced a breakdown of authority leading to the disintegration of Pakistan. Under conditions of administrative chaos, voluntary civilian compliance with authority was difficult to obtain. Various demand groups, which the PPP had either mobilized or helped to create, sought to pressure the new regime before it could consolidate its power, utilizing street protests or other forums available to them. These groups included professional organizations of teachers, engineers, journalists, doctors, etc., which had emerged anticipating the PPP's reformist intentions (similar to the Punjab Zimindar Association and the Association of Textile Owners). In addition, industrial labor, which was the new regime's principal support base, continued Gheraos (lockout of the employers by the employees).[371] The crisis of building authority was further deepened when, within weeks after the PPP assumed power, the country's police went on a nation-wide strike and prisoners revolted in most of the prisons in major cities.[372] Bhutto called the police strike a "mutiny."[373] The PPP cadres and the People's Guards (a militant wing of the PPP) were mobilized to enforce law and order. But in general, it was the cooperative response of the public that defused the crisis.[374] Bhutto and the PPP leaders now became skeptical about the military bureaucratic elites' allegiance to the new regime. It was in the wake of the police strike and the prisoners' revolt that Bhutto resolved to remove Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, acting Commander-in-Chief of the army since 1971, and Air Marshal A. Rahim Khan, plus six other senior Air Force officers. Bhutto claimed that this was done to root out the "Bonapartic influences" that had crept into Pakistan's socio-political life and to ensure that the "professional soldiers" did not turn into "professional politicians."[375] In an

[369] *Imroze*, Lahore, December 22, 1971. *op.cit*. p. 109.
[370] Burki, *op.cit*., pp. 98–104.
[371] *Imroze,* Lahore, January 1, 1972.
[372] *Ibid*., January 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, 1972.
[373] Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1972–March 31, 1972*, p. 172.
[374] *Imroze*, March 2, 1972.
[375] Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1972–March 31, 1972*, pp. 110–111.

interview with a Lahore news journal *Atish Fishan* in May 1980, General Gul Hasan revealed that during the police strike, both the army and air force declined to cooperate with their civilian regime, and he declined President Bhutto's request to send in troops to restore law and order.[376]

Lack of support from the military-bureaucratic elites at a time when the regime was confronted with a serious law and order situation may have prompted Bhutto to purge senior military and civilian officers. In addition to the military shake-up, on March 12, 1972 the Bhutto regime, through Martial Law Order Number 114, dismissed 1,300 civil servants. The purges were massive, arbitrary, and not only sent shock waves among the bureaucracy, but also evoked protests from the opposition political parties.[377] By April 1972, it appeared that, through purges and large-scale administrative personnel changes, Bhutto had effectively controlled and curbed the military and civilian bureaucracies.[378] Later events were to reveal that Bhutto was not satisfied with these changes and sought the creation of alternate authoritarian institutions.

To accomplish the goal of creating alternate authoritarian institutions, Bhutto first had to resolve two problems. The first was how to diminish the power of the military bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups. The former controlled the sources of patronage in a resource-scarce economy; the latter controlled the major source of industrial and financial wealth. Jointly, they regulated and dominated the economy of the country. The second problem was how to sustain a very broad coalition of contradictory class and group interests and also enforce some degree of economic reform.

Reform and Reformist Leadership

As noted in chapter 4, Bhutto inherited a crisis-ridden Pakistan. In addition to the crisis situation, the PPP-led reform became possible because of three other factors: (1) electoral competition, in that the PPP, as a product of electoral competition, was committed to honor the pledges it had made to its supporters, (2) the role of socialist factions within the PPP, and (3) the modernist and socially progressive outlook of Bhutto. Bhutto was a reformist political leader who ventured to re-orient and rebuild the socioeconomic structure of Pakistan by pursuing policies of gradual or incremental change. He orchestrated social change and redefined the priorities of social development and economic growth in Pakistan. The dynamics of Bhutto's reformist leadership will be analyzed within the context of the factors mentioned previously.

Bhutto's reformist policies have prompted considerable scholarly description and analysis of his political leadership. Despite differences of interpretation, most of these

[376] *Atishfishan*, Lahore, Vol. 8, No. 9 (May 1980), p. 19.
[377] *Imroze*, Lahore, March 13, 1972.
[378] *LaPorte*, op.cit., pp. 120–121.

have a common theme.[379] They cluster around Bhutto's personality, motives, and social class origins with a heavy emphasis on the motive factor, underscoring Bhutto's desire to dominate Pakistan's political system. In general these studies provide some interesting and useful insights into Bhutto's personality and how his feudal social class origins and western education influenced his political behavior and style. Based on their treatment of Bhutto's leadership, these studies can be divided into a three¬fold typology, as shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Characteristics of Political Behavior and Style	
Study	***Characteristics of Political Behavior and Style***
Ziring (1980)	*Feudal-* Authoritarian: motivated by personal aggrandizement. *Patrimonial:* patronage and reward to loyalists and punishment for adversaries. *Democrat-Despot:* a schizophrenic personality torn between his feudal background and western values.
K. B. Sayeed (1980)	
G. Heeger (1975)	
M. Lodi (1981)	
A. Syed (1977)	
P. Jones (1978)	
S. J. Burki (1981)	
S. Taseer (1980)	
S. Wolpert (1993)	

In the Ziring-Sayeed view, Bhutto's leadership was authoritarian, feudal and even fascist.[380] In these studies Bhutto emerges as a leader who was motivated by personal gain and self-aggrandizement, and who had little or no reformist intent. According to Ziring, Bhutto was "a typical Sindhi landlord," had a "suspicious mind" and ... relished being described as the Quaid-i-Awam" [leader of the people]. He was not only the key decision-maker, he insisted on being the only decision-maker in the country. His imperial style replicated his Sindhi landlord experience.[381] In similar terms, K. B. Sayeed has described Bhutto as a "Bonapartist" leader, who ... was primarily motivated by animus dominandi, that is, through the aggrandizement of his own power, he wanted to control every major class or interest by weakening its power base and by making it subservient to his will and policies. He nationalized a number of major industries with the purpose of setting up not socialism but a kind of state capitalism.[382]

[379] Burki, *op.cit*., pp. 81–84, 88–89: Sayeed, p. 91, Ziring, p. 126: Heeger, "Politics in Post-Military State, *op.cit.*, pp. 254–258; Philp Jones, *op.cit*., p. 624–627, 667: Syed, pp. 73–76, 110–116; Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980), pp. 12–14, 93– 94; Maleeha Lodi, "Bhutto, the Pakistan Peoples Party and Political Development in Pakistan, 1967– 1977," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1981, pp. 650–651. For some fresh reassessments basically along with the same themes, see Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse ... op.cit*., pp. 252–254. Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 1995. pp. 77–84. Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 003–26.

[380] Sayeed *op.cit*, p. 92; Ziring *op.cit*, pp.122, 145–146

[381] Ziring, *op.cit.,* p. 126 and pp. 146–148.

[382] Sayeed, *op.cit*., p. 91.

Heeger has described Bhutto's leadership as "patrimonial."[383] He was the first to use this concept to explain the substance and style of Bhutto's politics. By patrimonialism, Heeger implied personal rulership as opposed to rule through organizational means (i.e., the political party). He found Bhutto to be a patrimonial leader who indulged in distributing rewards and incentives to those who were loyal to him and punished his adversaries. Patronage was considered the key to building a support network.

Maleeha Lodi has further dwelt upon the concept of patrimonialism.[384] She has argued that the personalist approach suited Bhutto's political skills and temperament and that, given the weak political institutions and shifting alliances in Pakistani politics, he exploited the situation to his full advantage.

Bhutto's preference for personal rulership over organizational means (i.e., party rule) has been noted by such others as Taseer, Anwar Syed and Jones.[385] Although Anwar Syed and Philp Jones do not use the term patrimonial to describe Bhutto's political leadership and style, they do present Bhutto as a political craftsman, a real-politic practitioner who strove to develop support networks by rewarding those who showed allegiance to him and chastising those who opposed him. In these studies, Bhutto emerges as a leader who was attracted by power and his personal destiny. Salman Taseer, Shahid Javed Burki and Stanley Wolpert view Bhutto as a democrat despot, a political leader whose actions and political behavior were determined by his "feudal" class origins and western education and who oscillated between authoritarian and democratic tendencies because of these influences.

The two studies highlight the schizophrenic aspects of Bhutto's personality. Despite tremendous admiration for Bhutto and his politics, Salman Taseer found him "self-destructive and still enigmatic political personality." Shahid Javed Burki asserted that "Bhutto's personality" left a "peculiar imprint" on "the process of decision-making and the way decisions were implemented."[386] Bhutto was certainly a complex personality. His feudal social class origins and western education did influence his political style and behavior and he was conscious of this. In his well-cited interview with Oriana Fallaci, Bhutto stated:

> There are many conflicts in me. I am aware of that. I try to reconcile them, but I don't succeed and I remain this strange mixture of Asia and Europe.... My mind is Western and my soul Eastern.[387]

[383] Heeger *op.cit.,* p. 254.
[384] Lodi, *op.cit*., pp. 651–653.
[385] Taseer, *op.cit*., pp. 148–152: Anwar Syed, Ziring and Braibanti (eds.) *op.cit*., pp. 113–116: Jones, *op.cit*., pp. 666–667.
[386] Taseer, *op.cit*., p. 8: Burki *op.cit*, p. 7.
[387] Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History* (New York: Liverlight, 1976), p. 202.

All of these studies have considerable merit and provide a penetrating analysis of the authoritarian strains in Bhutto's personality. However, these studies do have some limitations. First, Sayeed and Ziring exaggerate the significance of the self-aggrandizement content of Bhutto's leadership in their studies obscuring the reformist content of Bhutto's leadership in their studies. Second, Burki and the aforementioned studies treat Bhutto as an independent variable, operating free from all constraints; even the patrimonial view considers Bhutto the sole dispenser of patronage and rewards and does not take full cognizance of the role of feudal and socialist factions within the PPP. The socialist factions were quite influential in the policy making process, particularly in the early phase of the PPP rule. They likewise do not deal with the fact that the feudal and socialist factions jockeyed for developing their own factional support base. Third, most of the above mentioned studies do not pay adequate attention to the fact the Bhutto was a product of electoral competition that was popularly supported, and he was committed to ushering in socioeconomic reform. Finally, these studies do not take into account the role of various resistance groups, analyzing the situation as if there were no resistance to Bhutto's policies, thereby confusing policy with outcome.

Bhutto as a Reformist Leader

This study differs from the other studies in arguing that it is rather simplistic to treat the entire reformist and modernist content of Bhutto's policies as if it were a function of his "schizophrenic personality," a mere "quest for power," or his preoccupation with "personal destiny," and that he showed an equally strong commitment to introducing progressive socioeconomic reform. Bhutto certainly sought autonomy, and at times gave the impression that he could act with a great degree of autonomy to achieve his goals. This authors' contention is that he had less autonomy than is generally attributed to him. Invariably, he responded to circumstances and pressures and functioned under political constraints. He ventured to combine real-politic with socioeconomic reform. In the process he may have failed to develop an ideal balance between rule and reform, but the fact that he persisted with reform in a modernizing society needs careful examination.

Reform must be seen in relation to the resistance it elicits. Reforms and reformist leadership do not occur in a vacuum; they have a social, economic and political context. It is this context that determines not only the nature and type of reformist leader, but also the degree of reform. This study also stresses that, to a considerable degree, reform entails coercion.[388]

The reformer (1) must possess political skills, (2) should be adept in methods, techniques, and the timing of introducing changes, and (3) should have a clear vision of

[388] Hirschman, *op.cit.,* pp. 262–263.

his priorities, choices, and the types of reform he intends to institute.[389] The reformer needs a higher order of political skills because invariably he is involved in a "multifront war." His enemies on one front may be his allies on another. Unlike the revolutionary who thrives on polarization, a reformer is confronted with having to satisfy both the radicals and the conservatives. He is burdened with reducing cleavages and building a consensus. In the process of reform-making, he may confront both and end up pleasing none.

The most critical task of the reformist leader is to devise policies of incremental change, not to usher in an abrupt and total change. A reformer is not oriented to the status quo but is a gradualist. He can adopt a "Fabian" approach, i.e., a policy of incremental change pursued through piecemeal reform. Through such an approach, the reformist leader conceals his aim. His policies are guided by an element of surprise whereby he keeps his adversaries guessing about his next move. The effectiveness of such a strategy depends on how skillful the reformist leader is in pursuing his policy goals. A reformer needs to maintain a balance between the degree of socioeconomic reform and the expansion of political participation. These goals are both difficult to achieve and strongly resisted by the conservatives and the privileged groups in the society.[390] Given the nature of a national crisis, the breakdown of the political order and disintegration of the state as previously discussed, Bhutto's political constraints were overwhelming and his options of pursuing reform were limited. Yet he adopted a Fabian approach to rebuild and reform the socioeconomic structure in Pakistan. In his speeches, statements, and writings he constantly reminded his supporters of the iniquitous nature of Pakistan's socioeconomic system.[391] Invariably, Bhutto's public pronouncements were loaded with rhetoric that was radical compared to the actual reformist policies that he made public or intended to institute. This had a contradictory impact on Pakistani society. At one end it roused the popular political consciousness; at the other, it caused fear and suspicion among the privileged groups and classes. More than the substance of his reformist policies, it was his egalitarian rhetoric that irritated the conservative elements (both within and outside his party), but gave a sense of confidence to the weaker segments of society and raised their level of expectations.[392] It was in such a political environment that Bhutto proceeded to introduce incremental change through piecemeal reform.

The distinguished characteristic of Bhutto's reformism was that it was a product of the politics of protest and electoral competition that merged in Pakistan between 1968 and 1970. With the electoral success of the PPP in 1970 in West Pakistan, the private sector

[389] Huntington, *op.cit.,* pp. 345–346.
[390] *Ibid*., p. 347.
[391] See, for example, Speeches and Statements of Bhutto from 1966–1969 and 1970–1971, compiled and entitled Politics of the People (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d., Vols. 2, 3).
[392] For a discussion on class contradictions, see Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.*), Pakistan, The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 8–11.

was visibly demoralized. The financial-industrial groups apparently lost their nerve and confidence in the economic future of the country. This trend was manifested by the decline in growth, savings, and investment rates. During the 1960's, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at a rate of almost 7 percent, but between 1969 and 1970 (which is generally regarded as the last normal year in terms of economic activity in United Pakistan) and between 1971 and 1972, the GDP grew at the paltry rate of 0.5 percent. From 1969 to 1970 the nation had saved 13.3 percent of its wealth. Those savings declined to 8.4 percent from 1971 to 1972. For the same period, investment rates in the private sector declined from 8.5 percent to 5.4 percent.[393]

Bhutto's public pronouncements were radical, showed strains of anti-capitalism and a preference for a socialist pattern of economic development. Bhutto and his associates showed a preference for a "mixed economy." The 1970 election manifesto of the PPP defined this to mean:

> the existence of a private sector alongside a nationalized sector. However, it is within the public sector that all the major sources of the production of wealth will be placed. The private sector will offer opportunities for individual initiative in the areas of production. Where small enterprise can be efficient, monopoly conditions will be abolished so that private enterprise will function according to the rules of competition.[394]

The PPP clearly sought a redirection of Pakistan's economy within the existing broad capitalist framework. Emphasis was on expanding the public sector, curbing monopoly conditions, and encouraging small enterprise. The individual and private initiatives were not to be discouraged, but redirected.

On assuming power as President and chief martial law administrator, he pointed out that reform was needed in almost every aspect of life in Pakistan. He asserted, "fundamentally it is the economic system that requires change and adjustment. We intend to put the social and economic system right."[395] In Bhutto's perception, this meant curbing the power of the financial-industrial groups, enhancing the public sector, and promoting welfare policies for the less privileged groups and classes in the society. To ensure the public good, Bhutto believed that the use of "state power" was justified. His adversaries felt that the "public good" was a facade and that, in reality, Bhutto aimed to impose his personal hegemony.[396] Perceptions aside, Bhutto had concrete views on the kind of mixed economy he envisaged for Pakistan. Addressing members of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce on April 1, 1973, Bhutto explicitly outlined the parameters of his socioeconomic reform.

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[393] Burki, *op.cit.*, p. 110.
[394] Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, 1970 (Lahore: Classic, 1970), p. 18.
[395] Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1972–March 31, 1972*, p. 10.
[396] Asghar Khan, *op.cit.*, pp. 53–56.

> The concept of mixed economy, aside from connoting an order wherein public and private sectors coexist, also signifies the deliberate use of state power for limiting the economic advantage of the more privileged classes in the interests of the people's welfare The activity of the public sector prevents the concentration of economic power in a few hands and protects the small and medium entrepreneurs from the clutches of giant enterprises and vested interests ... public and private sectors are two important instruments of socioeconomic development and they will have to function side-by-side for achieving a higher rate of economic growth and establishing a welfare state.[397]

He was quick to differentiate "welfare state" from "totalitarian state." "We do not believe in absolute state power manifesting itself in a totally nationalized, centralized and directed economy." Then he proceeded to explain how he intended to transform Pakistan into a "welfare state."

> One of the primary objectives of a modern state is to provide for the social welfare of its people. Our problem is not only to bring about a significant improvement in the level of living conditions of the people at large, but also to ensure progressive reduction in existing social and economic inequalities. It was once believed that adherence to the economic philosophy of "laissez-faire" would result in sustained economic growth as well as welfare, but ample experience indeed, the whole course of economic development-throughout the world in this age has proved beyond doubt that "laissez-faire" society can neither guarantee stable economic progress nor usher in a welfare state. Private enterprise is primarily propelled by consideration of profit maximization. Whether any welfare of the people results from it is a matter of chance. But planned state intervention bridges this gap between private profit and social welfare and ensures a reconciliation of objectives of private enterprise with the public interest.
>
> My government is committed to eliminating the concentration of economic power in order that no entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs should obtain control of strategic heights of the economy and use this dominant position against the public interest.[398]

This clearly illustrated Bhutto's belief that, in order to create the kind of "welfare state" and "mixed economy" he envisioned, (1) it was imperative to curb the "economic power" of the financial-industrial groups, and (2) the public sector was to help not only

[397] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, April 2, 1973–August 13, 1973,* pp. 2–3.
[398] *Ibid*., *op.cit*., p. 3.

to achieve this objective, but also to facilitate the growth of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs.

Evidently Bhutto propounded a developmental strategy that was radically different from the development policies of the earlier military regimes. The military regime under Field Marshal Ayub Khan had promoted the principle of "functional inequality" and had contended that for initial capitalist growth, capital formation and savings, social inequality was necessary.[399] For Bhutto, economic growth without social improvement was meaningless. Obviously, he sought a shift in the existing policies. Bhutto's development strategy had such multiple goals: the reduction of socioeconomic inequalities, generation of economic growth by expanding the public sector, and encouraging small entrepreneurs. There was one common theme in Ayub's and Bhutto's developmental policies; both used "state power" to reward and control various groups. The fundamental difference was that the regime under Ayub used state power to consolidate the financial-industrial groups and promoted the concentration of wealth, while the regime under Bhutto sought to use state power to curb the concentration of wealth, enhance the public sector, and promote small and medium-sized entrepreneurs.[400] To what degree did Bhutto make a genuine effort to achieve his stated goals? What kind of policies did he institute? What kind of obstacles was he confronted with? These questions will be analyzed in the following discussion.

To give meaning and substance to his vision of optimal "mixed economy" and to develop the contours of a welfare state, Bhutto began by redefining the relationship of the financial-industrial groups to the government in the national economy of Pakistan. From Bhutto's policy and public pronouncements, it appears he was convinced that without curbing the financial-industrial groups, redirecting Pakistan's economy would be impossible. In this belief, Bhutto was heavily influenced by the socialist factions within the PPP. In fact, it would have been impossible for Bhutto to initiate socioeconomic reform without the presence and active support of the PPP socialists. Dr. Mubashir Hasan, J. A. Rahim, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid were the leaders who became influential in the policy-making process as the PPP assumed power. These PPP socialists, despite their personal-cum-ideological differences, showed a preference for restricting the powers of the financial-industrial groups, attempted to break their connections with the bureaucratic-military elites, and ventured to consolidate the public sector. During the early phase of Bhutto's rule (1971–1973), these socialists dominated the ministries of finance, economic planning, production, establishment, and health and social welfare. Thus, the reformist policies that emerged during this period carried the imprint of these leaders.

Economic Power of the Financial-Industrial Groups

[399] Angus Maddison, *Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan since Moghuls* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1971), pp. 136–142.
[400] Burki, *op.cit.*, pp. 42–45, 109–112.

Concentration of economic wealth in the hands of a few groups or families is a common phenomenon in a number of developing countries. What is remarkable about Pakistan is that this concentration of wealth in the hands of a few occurred in the relatively short span of 15 to 20 years (see Table 2.6 in Chapter 2). In India the formation and development of such groups took 30 to 40 years. Given this relatively short span of time, the concentration of economic wealth in a few hands became highly visible. Within one generation the life style, consumption patterns, and behavior of these newly rich groups changed remarkably.[401] This evoked considerable public outcry in the late 1960s (Chapter 2).

In April 1968, Mahboob-ul-Haq, Chief Economist, Planning Commission of Pakistan, revealed in a speech that 22 families in Pakistan owned 87 percent of the banking and insurance companies and 66 percent of industry. Since this revelation, several attempts have been made to measure the level of concentration of ownership and control of industrial and financial assets in Pakistan (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Economic Power of the Financial-Industrial Groups in Pakistan

Study	Number of Groups or Industrial Houses	Assets & Industrial Manufacturing	Banking, Insurance
Haq	22	66%	87
White	43	53.10%	
Amjad	44	70%	80

Source: Lawrence J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 60-61; Rashid Amjad, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Lahore: South Asia Institute, 1974), pp. 22-23,34; Haq, cited in Amjad, p. 22.

[401] Burki, *op.cit.,* pp. 112–113.

Table 5.3 Loss of Assets by Industrial Houses in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)		
Industrial Groups or Houses	**Values of Net Assets (Rupees, Millions)**	**% of Total Manufacturing Assets Owned**
Isphani	88.4	100
Bawa	23.4	100
A. K. Khan*	50	100
Abbas Khaleeli	114.8	98
Maula Bux	58.9	68.1
Haji Dost	16.7	65.4
Karim	45.6	60
Adamjee	152.9	52.7
Dawood	182.4	46.3
Amins	61.8	45.2
Nishat	38.3	41.3
Bawany	67.8	37.1
Monnoo	25	35.7
Hafiz	52.7	30
Rahimtoola	5.1	27
Source: Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan (Lahore: South Asia Institute, 1974), p. 2.		
Note: * East Pakistan-based industrialists.		

Lawrence White, an American Economist, using the listings on the Karachi Stock Exchange in 1968, found that 43 financial-industrial groups or families owned 53 percent of the country's total assets in the manufacturing sector.[402] These groups controlled 98 percent of the 197 non-financial companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange in 1968. White noted that the top four financial-industrial groups or families, Dawood, Saigol,

[402] Lawrence J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 52.

Table 5.4 Comparison of Land Reform Orders of 1959 (Under Ayub) and 1972 (Under Bhutto)		
Criteria	**MLR 64**	**MLR 115**
Basis of holding	***Head of family***	***Individual***
Ceiling ownership	500 acres irrigated, 1,000 unirrigated land or 36,000 produce index units	150 acres irrigated or 300 acres unirrigated land or 12,000 product index units
Exemptions, exclusions, etc.	Studs, livestock, farms, orchards exempted. No specific provision for resumption of land acquired by government servants.	No exemptions. Placed a limit of 100 acres on lands acquired by government servants. The rest to be resumed.
	No provisions made for cancelation of border land allocated to military officers in exchange for inland areas.	Exchange of border land for inner land to be cancelled.
Redistribution and implementation	Compensation to be paid for the land resumed.	No compensation.
	Landlord had the choice to decide which part of land would be surrendered.	Same as MLR 64.
		No court was to take cognizance of an offense under MLR 115 except on complaint in writing made by order of or under authority from the Federal Land Commission.
	Implementation left to Revenue Department Beneficiaries to pay for allotted land on installment basis; price not to exceed Rs. 8 P.I.U.	To oversee the Revenue Department Federal Commission under chairmanship of a federal minister. Land to be distributed free.

Adamjee, and Amin, controlled 20 percent of the total assets. He concluded that, although concentration of wealth as high in Pakistan, it was not as high as Haq had claimed.[403] White also found that the role of foreign capital was relatively small in Pakistan; it accounted for 12 percent of the manufacturing assets listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange and 7.4 percent of all manufacturing in Pakistan.[404]

Rashid Amjad, a Pakistani Economist, using the listings on the Karachi Stock Exchange in 1970, found that 41 groups controlled 80 percent of private domestic assets of both non-financial and manufacturing assets.[405] If foreign companies and the government were included, the control declines to 50 percent of non-financial and 70 percent of all manufacturing assets. According to Amjad, the large-scale manufacturing sector was dominated by 44 industrial houses, which controlled 52 percent of all private domestic assets, and 37 percent of all assets if the government and foreign-owned companies were included.[406] Amjad gives a somewhat different ordering of the top seven industrial groups than does White.

According to Amjad's ordering, seven houses-Saigol, Habib, Dawood, Crescent (Bashir), Adamjee, Colony (Shaikh), and Valika-controlled 22.2 percent of the private assets.[407] In 1971, as Bhutto assumed power, the press reports suggested that the 22 richest families controlled 87 percent of Pakistan's insurance business, 80 percent of banking, and 66 percent of the country's industrial assets, and had large Swiss bank accounts.[408]

[403] *Ibid*., p. 59.
[404] *Ibid*., pp. 43–56.
[405] *Ibid*., p. 22.
[406] *Ibid*., p. 22.
[407] *Ibid*., p. 30.
[408] *Kessings Contemporary Archives*, February 5–12, 1972, op.cit., p. 25–52.

The civil war, weakening of the military-bureaucratic elites, and the loss of East Pakistan had demoralized the financial-industrial groups, but they still dominated the economy. Some of these groups were adversely affected by the loss of East Pakistan and lost substantial assets. Of the 44 financial-industrial groups, only 16 had assets in East Pakistan. Of these 16, only one, A. K. Khan, was East Pakistan-based, while all Isphani investment was in East Pakistan; the rest had their assets in both East and West Pakistan. The Isphani lost all their assets, while Dawood, Adamjee, Khalelli, Bawany, and Amins suffered most.[409]

These conditions have produced radical and non-radical scholarly interpretations as to how Bhutto may have proceeded to redefine the role of the financial-industrial groups in the national economy.[410] Radical interpretations underscore the "disarray of ruling classes" in Pakistan as Bhutto assumed power. Given this "disarray," these scholars argue that Bhutto could have proceeded to restructure the existing social-economic order. Non-radical interpretations note that in his reformist policies Bhutto went too far and too fast and antagonized the powerful groups. In my view, both the radical and non-radical interpretations underestimate the capacity and power of the resistance groups. The process of reform and resistance considerably influenced the formulation and outcomes of the policies. To comprehend the opportunities and constraints of reform in a transitional society like Pakistan, I shall attempt to bring into focus the interplay of forces that advocated reform and those that resisted it.

Nationalizations and Their Effects on the Financial-Industrial Groups

Analyzing the process and patterns of public policy in the United States, Lowi has insightfully remarked,

> Policies determine politics". A policy, according to Lowi, is defined ... in terms of its impact or expected impact on the society. In politics, expectations are determined by governmental output or policies. Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship.
>
> If power is defined as a share in the making of policy, or authoritative allocations, then the political relationship in question is a power, over time, a power structure.[411]

This is a useful framework for analyzing the policies of reform that emerged under Bhutto. Since his reform entailed a redistribution of power relationships, Bhutto's

[409] Amjad, *op.cit.*, p. 51.
[410] See Gardezi *op.cit.*, pp. 8–10; Burki *op.cit.,* pp. 16–20.
[411] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (July 1966), p. 688.

preoccupation was to identify what Lowi has termed "arenas of power" and then to institute policies that would redefine the patterns of relationship between the bureaucratic-military elites and the financial-industrial groups.[412] As noted earlier under the military hegemonic system, the sources of patronage and policy making (both in the public and private sectors) were controlled, if not monopolized, by the bureaucratic military elites. These groups were well entrenched in the power structure. Bhutto attempted to initiate "regulatory" and "redistributive policies"; the regulatory policies were to curb the financial-industrial groups, while the redistributive policies aimed at expansion of the public sector and development of the small manufacturing sector.

Bhutto attempted to institute social oversight through the governmental mechanism. Adopting a Fabian strategy, he acted skillfully to change the uses of and rewards associated with each of the four major factors of production in the economy: capital, labor, land, and foreign exchange. The scope and the rate of the institution of these changes did bring about a change in the character of national production and the distribution of rewards associated with that production. The formulation and implementation of these policies produced a contradictory process.

In January 1972, Bhutto announced the nationalization of 10 basic industries: iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, heavy electrical, motor vehicles, tractor plants, heavy and basic chemicals, cement, petrochemicals and gas and oil refineries. Nationalization affected 32 industrial units.[413] As a first step, the government took control of management, not ownership of these industries. Bhutto's rhetoric was high, but he also attempted to reassure the financial-industrial groups. He declared that the policy of nationalization was intended to put the people of Pakistan "in charge of their own industrial development. Following the "foot in the door" approach of the reformer, Bhutto asserted, "It is not the intention of the government to extend control over other categories of industries. We expect that, after these clear assurances, industries in other categories will maintain the norms of production and performance that government will prescribe."[414]

Rhetoric aside, the policies of nationalization and economic reform were adopted with some degree of caution, but not with sufficient coordination and consensus among the various influential factions within the PPP. These policies were incremental and evolved over a period of two years. In January 1972, the heavy industries were nationalized, in March, the insurance companies (including an American insurance company), in 1973, the Vegetable Ghee (oil) industry and the cotton trade were nationalized, and in January 1974, all the Pakistani banks were nationalized. No other foreign investment was nationalized. The nationalization of heavy industry was

[412] *Ibid*, pp. 689–690.
[413] Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1972–March 31, 1972*, pp. 33–34.
[414] *Ibid*., p. 34.

followed by an Economic Reform Order. The policy had three salient features. It aimed at (1) decentralization of wealth, by Implication including the financial-industrial groups, (2) reorganization of Industrial units, and (3) expansion and consolidation of the public sector.[415]

To achieve these objectives the primary policy instrument was the abolition of the "managing agency system." Dr. Mubashir Hassan, explaining the nationalization policy and the economic reforms order, said that the managing agencies:

> were one of the worst institutions of loot and plunder through which the cream of profit was skimmed by a handful of people who were able to control capital worth about Rs.50 to 60 crore with an investment of Rs.50,000 or so.[416]

The "managing agency" system was the principal pillar of accumulation of wealth in a few hands in Pakistan. In 1961, the Ayub regime considered abolishing it but, on the advice of the bureaucracy and pressure from the financial-industrial groups, abandoned the idea. The system has its origins in 19th-century British India. Its outstanding feature was that the trading firm in India would undertake the actual management of industrial enterprises that were owned by the Europeans. So when new companies were formed by the foreign or local capitalists, they handed over actual management of the companies to an existing managing agency.[417] These managing agents, if they saw a chance of establishing a new industry or a new line of trade, would draw up a project and form a "directorate" that would raise the necessary capital. The articles of association could give enormous power to the director. Under the system, capital formation was easy, risk were minimal, and profits high. The established firms preferred to take a managing agency rather than invest and promote a new enterprise. Through such mechanisms of "promotion, finance and administration, a vast agglomeration of miscellaneous and unrelated enterprises could be "controlled by a single firm."[418]

In Pakistan, the earlier civilian and military regimes provision of number of subsidies and protection for industrial development afforded the managing agents a golden opportunity for pooling the resources of the few and floating new companies in the stock exchange market. Thus, the entire control of joint stock companies rested in the hands of a few. The concentration of financial power gained momentum with industrial growth in the country because of the inherent tendency of the managing agency system to lead to concentration of power.

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[415] *Pakistan Economic Survey 1973–74* (Islamabad: Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 14.
[416] *The Pakistan Times*, January 20, 1972.
[417] *Pakistan Economist*, February 12, 1972, pp. 7–8.
[418] *Ibid*.

The abolition of the system struck at the very root's of power of the financial-industrial groups. J. A. Rahim, Dr. Mubashir Hasan, and the latter's small nucleus of left-oriented lawyers and economists were instrumental in formulating "the managing agency and election of directors trade 1972 order, "which ensured that the powers of the financial-industrial groups were effectively curbed."[419] This order affected 186 companies (158 companies of West Pakistan and 28 companies of East Pakistan, but mostly owned by the West Pakistan-based industrialists). Of these, 148 were managed by the managing agencies.[420]

For the management of nationalized industrial units, the regime replaced the Board of Directors and managing agents by appointing new managing directors. A Board of Industrial Management (BIM) was created under the chairmanship of the Federal Minister of Production, J. A. Rahim. By 1973 the industries taken over were regrouped and reorganized into 10 corporations.

1. State Heavy Engineering and Machine Tools Corporation (SGE and NTC);
2. Federal Chemical and Ceramics Corporation (FCC);
3. State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (SCCP);
4. State Electrical Corporation of Pakistan (SECP);
5. National Fertilizer Corporation of Pakistan (NFC);
6. National Design and Industrial Services Corporation (NDISC);
7. State Petroleum, Refining and Petrochemicals Corporation (SPRPC);
8. Pakistan Automobile Corporation (PAC);
9. Federal Light Engineering Corporation (FLEC);
10. Mineral Development Corporation (MDC).

Thus a foundation was laid for the development of a public sector. The PPP's policies of nationalization and economic reform, preceded by the loss of assets with the disintegration of Pakistan, further shook the confidence of the financial-industrial groups. Bhutto's nationalizations and economic reforms, although not apparently directed at any particular industrial house or family, adversely affected two groups, BECO and Rangoonwala, which lost almost their total assets. Saigol, Habib, Amin, and Fancy also suffered heavy losses.[421]

These nationalizations did loosen the pattern of concentration of wealth. According to Amjad, the control of assets of the large manufacturing sector dropped from 41.7 percent for the top 41 industrial houses to 31 percent for 39 industrial houses. The share

[419] Burki, op.cit, p. 114: Taseer *op.cit.*, p. 93.
[420] For details on companies and managing agents affected by the abolition order, see *Pakistan Economist*, March 18, 1972, pp. 32–36.
[421] Amjad., *op.cit*., p. 53.

of the top 10 industrial houses dropped from 24.8 percent to 18.2 percent. This suggested that the financial-industrial groups were weakened, not destroyed.[422]

The top 39 industrial houses continued to control 40 percent of the private assets and over 45 percent of the private domestic assets. The nationalizations also brought minor changes in the position of some of the industrial houses, as shown in Table 5.5. In the post-nationalization period, Dawood, Saigol, Crescent, Hoti and Adamjee emerged as the top five industrial houses.[423]

Evidently, Bhutto's naionalizations did not diminish the power of the financial-industrial groups in Pakistan's economy. However, the regime did make a beginning in guiding the public sector. As heavy industry was one sector in which the private sector was not well entrenched, the PPP regime could move swiftly to expand the public sector. By nationalizing heavy industry, Bhutto, in a way, did Jawahar Lai Nehru had done for India in the 1950's, i.e., laid the foundation for a strong public sector.[424]

The financial-industrial groups retained their dominance in Pakistan's economy because most of their assets were in the textile and sugar industries. The categories of industries that were nationalized constituted only 18 percent of the country's large-scale manufacturing and employed only 3.4 percent of the total labour force. Its contribution to exports was only 8.3 percent of the total. The relatively small size of this sector did not justify the rhetoric that accompanied nationalizations, nor could the private sector be blamed for the income inequalities. However, the important element was not the size of the sector but the fact that the regime's nationalization policies had not only struck at the very source of their power but had shaken their confidence. Later, the financial-industrial groups were quick to organize and make concerted efforts to resist Bhutto's reformation.

[422] Ibid., p. 56.
[423] *Ibid*., p. 53.
[424] For Nehru's role in developing the public sector in India, see Francine Frankel, *India's Political Economy 1947–1977* (Princeton University Press, 1978).

Table 5.5 West Pakistan Position of Industrial House Pre-Nationalism				
	Pre-Nationalization	Post-Nationalization		
House	Position	Net Assets	Net Assets	Position
Saigol	1	529.8	165.3	3
Habib	2	228	68.8(a)	11
Dawood	3	210.8	867.5(b)	1
Crescent	4	201.7	201.7	2
Adamjee	5	201.3	146.3	5
Colony (N)	6	189.7	95.8	6
Valika	7	183.5	62.2	12
Hoti	8	148.6	148.6	4
Amins	9	137.9	137.9	—
WazirAli	10	102.6	87.7	—
Fancy	11	192.4	—	—
Beco	12	101.4	—	—
Hussain	13	81.7	81.7	9
Colony (F)	14	89.9	19.8	—
Chandara	15	79.9	25.8	—
Hyesons	16	79.4	83.5©	8
Zafar-ul- Ahsan	17	77.2	22.1	—
Bawany	18	69.3	69.3	10
Premier	19	56.1	56.1	13
Nishat	20	54.1	54.3	14
Gul Ahmed	21	52.3	52.3	15
Arag	22	50.1	50.1	16
Rahimtoola	23	49.9	49.9	17
Noon	24	48.8	48.8	18
Shahnawaz	25	46	46	19
Monnoo	26	45	45	20

Notes:
a Includes non-manufacturing, banking, and insurance.
b Includes Dawod-Hercules (1971).
c Includes Hyesons Sugar Mills (1974).

If, on the one hand, Bhutto's effort was to redefine the regime's relationship with the financial-industrial groups, on the other, his problem was how to placate industrial labor, which was an important PPP constituency.

The readiness with which industrial labor had accepted the PPP's leadership indicated its ideological and organizational weakness. The successive regime in Pakistan have attempted to control labor through two methods, namely, state coercion and legislative ordinances. Bhutto added a third method i.e., providing material rewards. Besides governmental suppression, labor in Pakistan has been plagued with ethnic, religions

and ideological cleavages.[425] Under the Ayub regime through a presidential ordinance (1963), union activity was banned and labour's right to strike was suspended.

The Yahya regime was quick to recognize the grievances of labor and adopted a more sympathetic attitude toward labor. The Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO) of 1969, issued by the department of labor:

> [These] by and large first generation industrialists have failed to realize the contributions which a contented and well-motivated worker can make to productivity and profitability. They have looked upon trade unions as instruments of extortion rather than as institutions through which mutual give and take can lead to a peaceful resolution of conflict & possible higher productivity.[426]

The Yahya regime's sympathetic attitude toward labor and Bhutto's emphasis on Roti, Kapra, aur Makan (bread, clothing and shelter) emboldened labor, and they voted for the PPP in the 1970 elections. Thus, as Bhutto assumed power in 1971, labor was not only mobilized but intensely militant and expectant of favorable change. They believed their "Raj" (Rule) was in the offing, and Bhutto's rhetoric roused these expectations.

On assuming power, at one end of the spectrum, Bhutto found the financial-industrial groups skeptical about his reformist policies and, at the other end, labor impatient for change. The Gheraos (lock out of the employers by the employees) continued and, in some instances, physical violence against the mangers was reported.[427] Bhutto's problem was how to reconcile the interests of highly skeptical financial-industrial groups and highly politicized, militant, but weakly-organized industrial labor. As noted earlier, labor was an important component of the coalition that had brought Bhutto to power.[428]

It was under these circumstances that Bhutto announced his labor policy in February 1972. Given the high expectations and militancy of labor, Bhutto's policy statement was a combination of carrot and stick. While the policy provided a number of monetary and non-monetary rewards for labor, Bhutto was clearly concerned with introducing discipline to labor. He warned: "I want to make it clear that strength of the street will be met by the strength of the state." He advised labor to stop Gheraos and Jalaos (burning of property).

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[425] Azfar A. Shaheed, "Role of the Government in the Development of Labor Movement," in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid eds), *Pakistan, The Roots of Dictatorship* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 271–277.
[426] Cited in Shaheed, *op.cit*., p. 279.
[427] Adams and Iqbal, *op.cit*., pp. 190–192.
[428] W. Eric Gustafson, "Economic Reforms under the Bhutto Regime," in J. Korson (ed.), *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 86.

This unruly and rowdy practice, negative in its purpose, anarchistic in its approach, nihilist in its results, has been endured regrettably by the government and the people for ever seven weeks. The object of this exercise in patience was to show the people, and indeed even the participants, that this simply is not the proper form of protest or ventilation of grievances. It is a self-destructive procedure It must stop It is in their interest and in the interest of the rest of the people to put an end to this lawlessness.[429]

The labor policy evolved gradually in three phases. The first phase was between February and May 1972 and provided for a number of statutory and monetary benefits. The second phase was between October and November of 1972 and improved upon the existing compensation and welfare provisions. The final phase came in 1975 when the Labor Law Ordinance (amendment) provided for a number of measures to check the proliferation of trade unions and gave protection to the office-holders of the trade unions against victimization. The salient features of the policy can be summarized as follows:[430]

1. Guaranteed labor's right to form associations for collective bargaining.

2. Recognized labor's fundamental right to strike. Encouraged labor and management to seek adjudication of disputes in the labor court.

3. Provided for the participation of workers in the management of industry.

4. Ensured material benefits. Raised the profit share for workers from 2 percent to 4 percent, and later to 5 percent. Payment of bonuses to labor was made compulsory. Provided compensation for injury, death. Streamlined pension rules and fixed a minimum wage scale. In addition, provided free medical treatment and education for the children of labor. Given the harsh treatment that labor had received in Pakistan, these labor reforms provided substantive statuary and material rewards. However, the policy did lead to serious implementation difficulties which were, in part, the product of Bhutto's political style and, in part, of the perceptions of labor, and the financial-industrial groups about the policy itself.

Bhutto's strategy was not only to ameliorate the conditions of industrial labor, but also to introduce discipline. It was manifested through a combination of coercion and material rewards. The labor policy evoked different responses from industrial labor and the financial-industrial groups.

[429] Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972*, p. 79.
[430] *Pakistan Economic Survey 1973–1974*, pp. 10–12.

The former's level of expectations was so high that they found the labor reforms insufficient and, to press for more concessions, resorted to violence. The latter not only found the labor policy pro-labor, but also believed that Bhutto was a rabble-rouser who was out to destroy the business groups. Although the financial-industrial groups were far from united in putting up a inherent resistance policy toward the PPP regime, they were, however, quick to reactivate the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (AMPTMA), an association of the textile mill owners.[431]

The policy choice reflected the reformer's problem: the financial-industrial groups perceived Bhutto as inimical to their interests, while labor's perception was that Bhutto had betrayed its cause. This was complicated by dissension within the various socialist factions of the PPP. It was under these circumstances that erupted the labor crisis of May–June 1972.[432] Other than these perceptions, what precisely caused labor's unrest is hard to determine. Bhutto's own love for radical rhetoric may have triggered the industrial unrest. Declaring May Day a national holiday, Bhutto exalted labor:

> Your government, which has come to power through your own votes, gives the highest importance to the well-being of the working class. The workers and peasants are the backbone of the nation; they are the foundation head of all power and all good The labor reforms have been introduced to allow the working class to get on its feet. It is a first step and if there are any shortcomings in the new labor laws which come to light during their application, they will be modified.[433]

This exaltation and the promise that the labor reforms could be "modified" may have prompted labor to launch a major Gherao campaign against the industrialists and managers. Perhaps believing that the regime desired to improve the conditions of the working class even further, labor launched a movement against the industrialists and industrial property, hoping to extract greater concessions from the regime. In Karachi, where more than 40 percent of Pakistan's textile industry is concentrated, militant labor's attacks on private property were so violent that they sent shock waves not only among the financial-industrial groups, but also among the various conservative groups who were represented by the Islam Passand Parties.[434] It even alarmed the feudals and moderate supporters of the PPP.

The militancy of labor, coupled with the resentment of the conservative elements in the society, evoked an authoritarian response from a regime that was professedly sympathetic towards labor. Given the organizational weaknesses, ideological and ethnic cleavages, and the tradition of pocket unions in the labor movement, the PPP regime

[431] *Pakistan Economist*, February 5, 1972, p. 24.
[432] *Ibid*., July 29,1972, see discussion on labor, pp. 10–13.
[433] Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, April 1, 1972–June 30, 1972*, p. 81.
[434] Sayeed *op.cit*., pp. 100–102.

came to believe that the financial-industrial groups and the Islam Passand Parties were encouraging labor unrest.[435] The PPP leadership was divided on how to deal with labor. Dr. Mubashir Hasan and Sheikh Mohammad Rashid urged labor to refrain from violence, but they vociferously attacked the financial-industrial groups for exacerbating tensions.[436] The radicals, like Miraj Mohammad Khan, whose primary support base was the Karachi industrial labor, sympathized with labor's agitation. Bhutto charged that communists were misleading labor and used force to quell labor unrest.[437] Such charges and the authoritarian approach estranged Miraj Mohammad Khan from Bhutto and the PPP, and he resigned from the post of Minister of State for Public Affairs (one he had held from May to October 1972). By October 1972, through welfare legislation and the use of "strength of the state," labor unrest was subdued. Although between 1973 and 1975 sporadic labor protests surfaced, in general, the material rewards ameliorated the condition of the labor. Wage and welfare increases did provide some relief to labor, but production did not increase, and investments in the private sector declined further. Besides the crisis of production and decline in private sector investment, the Bhutto regime was confronted with massive unemployment. According to official estimates, during 1972 and 1973 the labor force was increasing at a rate of 3 percent per year, about 600,000 people entering with the labor force each year. The unemployment rate stood at 13 percent. In the urban areas it was as high as 17.7 percent, whereas in the rural areas the ate may have disguised, as a large percentage of the population may have shown itself as ("self-employed").[438] To resolve the unemployment situation, Bhutto adopted a direct strategy. Two policy initiatives were taken. First, as noted earlier, the public sector was expanded. Second, and more significant, a "labor exchange" program was developed with Middle Easter countries, through which the surplus work force was encouraged to seek employment in these countries.[439] According to an official publication, the number of employees in the public sector industries increased from 40,817 in 1972–1973 to 57,827 in 1976–1977, an increase of 41 percent. Furthermore, to absorb the educated unemployed (which again was an important PPP constituency), two organizations, the National Development Volunteer Corps (NDVC) and the National Development Corporation (NDC), were created. These two organizations absorbed about 215,000 people.[440] However, the most effective employment policy was the "labor exchange" program. Burki has estimated that in 1978 about 600,000 Pakistani workers were in the Middle East contributing about $1 million

[435] *Imroze*, Lahore, October, 25, 1972.

[436] See, for example, the statements of the PPP leaders on the labor crisis appearing in *Imroze*, October 19–26, 1972.

[437] For Bhutto's statement See, *Imroze*, October 25, 1972.

[438] *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976–1977*, pp. 4–5.87.

[439] Shahid Javed Burki, "Employment Strategics for Economic Stability in Pakistan: New Initiatives," in Manzooruddin Ahmed (ed.), Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, Society (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977), p. 27.

[440] Pakistan Information and Broadcasting Division, Promises and Performance (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977), p. 27.

annually (currently over $2 billion annually) to the national exchequer.[441] These statistics show that unemployment pressure was reduced, but this contributed little to boosting industrial production. Nevertheless, foreign exchange earnings from these remittances showed an upward trend.

Labor Policy, Unrest, and the Financial-Industrial Groups

The financial-industrial groups, faced with the loss of assets, nationalization, pro-labor policy, labor unrest, and the regime's persistent radical rhetoric, gradually began to organize resistance. In February 1972, the APTMA was reactivated. Despite Bhutto's pleas for cooperation and repeated assurances of no further nationalizations, these groups remained skeptical.[442] Bhutto could not win their confidence. The sources of this creditability gap ... deep and mutual, and can be catalogued as follows:

1. The financial-industrial groups perceived Bhutto as a "rabble rouser" and "instigator of industrial unrest."

2. They believed that in the name of socioeconomic reform Bhutto was pampering labor and undermining the position of industrialists.

3. The financial-industrial groups also distrusted the presence and influence of the PPP socialists in the policy-making process of the regime.

4. Like some of the other privileged groups and classes, the financial-industrial groups found Bhutto's popularity and support among the masses of Pakistan irksome. Most of all they resented his anti-business rhetoric and populist slogans.

The financial-industrial groups distrusted Bhutto for his feudal social class origins who, besides drawing popular support, could extract support from this socioeconomic power base and challenge and curb their powers. In institutional terms, the financial-industrial groups showed greater confidence in the military bureaucratic elites and accepted them as patrons more readily than they accepted civilian political leaders, who invariably had feudal social class origins. What may have been a factor, however, was that Bhutto's ideas about and attitudes towards the financial-industrial groups were formulated during the Ayub years, when he was the minister of commerce and trade (1959–1961) and had seen firsthand how different industrial groups accumulated wealth in Pakistan through the military-bureaucratic patronage. In an interview with *Newsweek* in 1972, Bhutto said, "Our businessmen are not the real entrepreneurs who make the system of free enterprise work ... our entrepreneurs take no risks at all. He is terribly chicken-hearted and makes no real contribution." Explaining the system of permits, licenses, and

[441] Burki "Employment Strategics ..." *op.cit*., p. 193.
[442] *Pakistan Economist*, February 5, 1972, p. 26.

patronage, Bhutto went on: "here what our businessmen have done is that they have really put in state money and they have become the managers and owners."[443] Bhutto asserted that he did not want to deny a role to business, but insisted they be more forthright.

Such a perception about the financial-industrial groups was also shared and advocated by the socialist factions within the PPP. In addition, the Pakistani masses (given the politicization of the late 60s) had also come to believe that the financial-industrial groups were not only exploiters, but they had accumulated vast wealth through inappropriate means. These perceptions coupled with Bhutto's reformism, deepened the antagonism between Bhutto and the financial-industrial groups.

It was under conditions of mutual suspicion that, in May 1972, the PPP regime decided to radically devalue the Pakistani rupee by 130 percent.[444] The devaluation was long overdue, but a devaluation on such a large-scale was brought about under pressure from the IMF, which also persuaded the PPP regime to lift import restrictions on more than 300 commodities. This decision was not well received by the financial-industrial groups because it affected their investment opportunities and constrained their capacity to import machinery, particularly textile machinery.[445] The devaluation decision was one of the most far-reaching decisions of the Bhutto regime.[446]

This clearly suggested a shift in policy preference from import substitution to export expansion-particularly in the agricultural sector. It also indicated that the regime aimed to curb bureaucratic patronage and control and desired to create favorable conditions for the "feudals" who were an important component of the PPP-led coalition. The agricultural sector could direct surplus produce to export and from those earnings could invest in the mechanization of agriculture. Denied patronage, protection, and subsidies, the financial-industrial groups grew hostile towards the regime. The devaluation proved beneficial to the feudals and mediumsized landowners, but unfavorable for the financial-industrial groups particularly the textile industrialists.[447] Earlier, in March 1972, the regime had appointed a 23 member committee under the chairmanship of a Member of the National Assembly (MNA) to review the conditions of the textile production and cotton trade. The committee did not have any member from the APTMA or Karachi Cotton Association. The textile industrialists rightfully claimed that the committee was unrepresentative.[448] Between March and June 1972,

[443] Full text of interview is reproduced in Bhutto, *Speeches and Statements, October 1, 1972– December 31, 1972*, p. 196.
[444] Aijaz Ahmed, "Democracy and Dictatorship," in Gardezi and Rashid, et al., p. 101. Burki Pakistan Under ... *op.cit.,* p. 11, estimates devaluation of rupee by 57 percent.
[445] Adams and Iqbal, *op.cit*., pp. 187–188.
[446] S. M. Naseem, *Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 1981), pp. 300–301.
[447] Adams and Iqbal, *op.cit.,* p. 187; Burki *op.cit.,* pp. 155–156.
[448] *Pakistan Economist*, March 11, 1972, p. 1.

there was a serious debate among the PPP socialists, Bhutto, and the bureaucracy as to whether nationalize the textile industry.[449] In general, J. A. Rahim, Sh. Mohammad Rahid and Khursheed Hasan Meer favored the policy of nationalization; Dr. Mubashir Hasan emerged as the strongest advocate for nationalization of the textile industry. Among the bureaucrats, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Qamar-ul-Islam, and the Governor of the State Bank, Ghulam Ishaque Khan (President of Pakistan 1988–1993), advised Bhutto to go slowly with natioalizations. The latter publicly differed with Dr. Mubashir Hasan on a number of policy issues. Later in the year, the two PPP pragmatists, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Maulana Kausar Niazi (Minister for Education, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, and Information and Broadcasting, respectively) and also favored a slow pace in nationalization, advised Bhutto to proceed slowly.[450] Bhutto decided not to nationalize the textile industry. This suggests that Bhutto's Fabian strategy of gradualism was not merely a matter of preference alone, but that factionalism within the party was also an important contributor toward piecemeal reform.

The June 1972 budget also came as a shock to the financial-industrial groups. The budget (1) abolished the tax holiday scheme for industry, (2) made no compensation for industrial assets lost in East Pakistan or owing to nationalizations, and (3) abolished the distinction between registered and unregistered firms and treated assessment of income tax on partnership firms as one individual.[451] Besides these anti-business provisions, the budget had positive aspects: It was welfare-oriented proposed equitable allocation of resources to different provinces, and placed emphasis on the public sector.

Big business responded to the budget with non-cooperation; the trader-merchants and small business groups resorted to direct action. Finance Minister Dr. Mubashir Hasan declined to meet, or discuss the matter, with a delegation of the financial-industrial groups. Trader-merchants and small business groups saw the abolition of the distinction between registered and unregistered firms as a threat to their survival. The financial-industrial groups, led by the Pakistan Federation of Chairmen of Commerce and Industry (PFCCI), decided to issue a series of appeals to the government before embarking on a total strike. This had the desired effect. Bhutto personally intervened and withdrew the most unacceptable provision of the budget: The traditional distinction between registered and unregistered firms was retained. Encouraged by the favorable response from Bhutto on the budget, the financial-industrial groups gained confidence.

Between June and October of 1972, the financial-industrial roups launched a mobilization effort to influence the PPP's economic reformism. First, the APTMA

[449] Interview with a PPP leader.
[450] Burki *op.cit.*, pp. 115–116.
[451] Ministry of Finance, *An Economic Analysis of the Central Budget for 1971–1972*, Pinal (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1972).

launched a frontal attack in national newspapers on the PPP's rhetoric that followed its reforms. The APTMA charged that: "The sustained nihilist propaganda and preaching of class hatred seems to have official blessings as the T.V. and radio continue to portray employers as the sinners and the workers as innocent victims."[452]

It blamed the government for labor's undisciplined behavior and the decline in industrial production, and urged the government to enforce discipline. It issued appeals to the Chief Minister, Sindh, the Finance Minister, Minister of Commerce, Production and Information and Broadcasting, and the President to ensure industrial peace and stop "class hatred."[453] Second, in a memorandum to the President, the Karachi Chamber of Commerce urged the government to (1) allow liberal import of industrial raw materials instead of consumer goods, (2) increase tax holidays for industry, (3) provide compensation for the loss of assets in East Pakistan, and (4) lower interest rates from 6 to 4 percent. Bhutto responded by promising no further nationalizations if the industrialists promised to cooperate with the regime. To ensure industrial peace he used force against labor.[454]

Bhutto's positive response to the budget protests, promises of no further nationalizations and suppression of labor improved relations between the PPP regime and the financial-industrial groups. They appeared content to have survived the reformist policies of the PPP. This accommodative relationship with the financial-industrial groups did not last long. By mid-1973 the enforcement of a permanent constitution provided some viable basis for political stability. But an increase in international oil prices, heavy floods, crop failures, and shortage of consumer goods strained business government relations. The regime began to believe that the financial-industrial groups were causing unnecessary shortages of consumer goods and were taking advantage of the domestic and international crises that the regime was finding difficult to manage.[455] Apparently disappointed with the attitude of big-business, Bhutto decided to nationalize the Ghee (vegetable oil) industry, trade, cotton and rice during August and September of 1973.

These nationalizations had two effects. First, most of the Ghee industries nationalized were from Punjab (926 factories) and Sindh (14 factories), the primary support base of the PPP. Besides, these industries were owned by relatively medium-sized entrepreneurs, unlike the textile magnates. Second, it produced a credibility crisis between Bhutto and the financial-industrial groups. Big business lost faith in Bhutto.

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[452] *Pakistan Economist*, August 5, 1972, p. 4.

[453] During this period, Pakistan Television was showing such socially progressive dramas as "Khuda-ki-Basti," "Jazeera," "Alif-aur-Noon," which were perceived by big business as promoting "class hatred."

[454] As a gesture of accommodation Bhutto appointed Rafiq Saigol as Chairman of the Pakistan International Airlines also used force against labor.

[455] Burki, *op.cit*., pp. 116–117; the Pakistan Economic Survey 1973–74 blamed the owners of the vegetable ghee industry for creating artificial shortages, p. 44.

The parting of the ways between the two became irreversible when, in January 1974, Bhutto announced the nationalization of Pakistani banks.

The nationalization of the banks emerged as a corollary of the nationalization of industry and labor and employment policies. Despite problems of credibility with the financial-industrial groups and factional infighting within the PPP, Bhutto honored his commitment to move Pakistan in a socialist direction and expanded the role of public sector in Pakistan's economy. The regime described nationalization of the banks as "an important step towards breaking the concentration of wealth and economic power." The intent was to use it as a "means to distribute more equitably the fruits of development.[456] Credits and loans were to be made available to the medium-sized farmer and small entrepreneurs, with the hope of developing a small private sector.

Most of the 15 private commercial banks were either ownered or controlled by the financial-industrial groups. Of these, the nine leading banks controlled 90 percent of the total assets of all the private commercial banks; eight of these were controlled by the major industrial houses.[457] The three major banks in the country Habib, United and Muslim Commercial were controlled by three industrial groups, Habib, Saigol, and Adamjee. Before 1971, 84 percent of the investment in industry was financed by bank credit. With nationalization the regime could channel credit to the sectors of its choice and let the large industrial sector (in this case, the textile and sugar industries) languish for lack of money. In addition, the regime could freely use commercial credit for deficit financing.

Bhutto's regime did not make any systematic effort to facilitate the growth and expansion of the small and medium-sized industrialists, although in 1972 the State Bank of Pakistan had devised rules to provide credit and loans to small and medium-sized farmer, businessmen and industrialists. This, is some ways, did benefit the PPP urban-rural constituencies.

The nationalization of banks was used by the regime as a double-edged sword to expand the public sector and to regulate the private sector. Public investment in the industrial sector in 1971–72 was 7 percent of the total public investment; in 1976–77 it had reached 71 percent almost a 10-fold increase. During the same period, investments in the private sector declined from 93 percent to 29 percent (see Table 5.6).

The response of the financial-industrial groups to bank nationalization was one of dismay, withdrawal, and watchfulness. This response was not unanimous; some decided to wait for the regime to change, while others, such as the Saigol, Fancy and Haroon Groups, opened up joint ventures or businesses in the Middle East or the

[456] Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973–74, p. 65.
[457] Amjad, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

United State. Still other industrial families turned to real estate or returned to their "roots" in trade. In other words, the financial-industrial groups diversified their investments in areas which they thought were beyond the purview of nationalization. This led to the flight of the "capitalist" and the capital (precise figures are not available) and resulted in the decline of the private sector and of investments in the industrial sector.

Clearly, through nationalization policies, Bhutto succeeded in expanding the role of the public sector and restricting the opportunities for the growth of big business. His motive was not merely power and he made a concerted effort to institute socioeconomic reform, but underestimated the power of the resistance groups and failed to win their confidence. The most significant negative impact of these nationalizations was that, whereas they restricted growth opportunities for big business in Pakistan's economy, they provided them with new opportunities (by default) to initiate joint ventures with international business or to invest outside the country. This revealed the autonomy and power of the financial-industrial groups; they could choose to move out rather than yield to state power. These groups had developed linkages with international capital and, confronted with what they perceived to be a hostile regime, opted to invest outside.

Table 5.6 Private and Public Sector Industrial Investment (Millions of Rupees)

Year	*Private*	*Public*	*Total*	*Public Investment as %*
1971–1972	1,235	99	1,334	7
1972–1973	1,018	111	1,130	10
1973–1974	1,023	391	1,414	28
1974–1975	1,437	1,065	2,502	43
1975–1976	1,818	3,182	5,000	64
1976–1977	1,795	4,315	6,110	71

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-77 (Islamabad Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, 1977), p. 43.

An interesting, but probably unanticipated, consequence of bank nationalization was that it led to the monetization of the rural structure of Pakistan. According to an official publication, the credits and loans to farmers (the distinction between large, medium-sized and small landlords is not available) rose from 85 million rupees in 1971–1972 to 700 million rupees in 1976–77.[458] In some marginal but significant ways, even the peasantry benefitted. Between 1973 and 1977, the number of commercial banks branches increased from 2,942 to 6,275. Almost 60 percent of these branches were

[458] *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976–77*, pp. 190–192.

opened in rural areas.[459] This encouraged peasants to seek loans from the bank instead of the landlord or the money-lender, the traditional source of loans in the villages. Second, the villagers also learned to open bank accounts as the remittances from the workers in the Middle East began to flow to their families.[460] This inflow of money and the establishment of banks in rural areas began to disrupt the traditional social order, accelerating the transition to capitalism.

It is difficult to analyze the impact of nationalization policies on the small-scale sector. This sector did show dynamism in production and exports. (It seems that the expansion of this sector occurred, not by design, but probably by default). The primary industries in this sector were leather goods, footwear, sporting goods, carpets, textiles, and light engineering products.[461] Bhutto's regime did not make any systematic effort to favor this sector, except that it was instrumental in designing credit and loan policies for the small businessmen and industrialist in early 1972. Before the Bhutto regime, the role of this sector in the national economy was almost non-existent. What accounted for the dynamism of this sector?

A number of factors contributed to the development of this sector. First, Bhutto's preference for an egalitarian socioeconomic order and his bias against big businessmen and industrialists. Second, in its effort to curb the financial-industrial groups, the regime showed preference for relying on the market forces; this provided small business with an opportunity to take advantage of the market forces.[462] Big business, denied any protection or patronage, was unwilling to take risks or cooperate with the regime; this helped the small business groups to advance (e.g., leather goods, small textile industry). Finally, small enterprises did not need much capital or sophisticated technology, nor did they require a large labor force. Thus, Bhutto's efforts to restrict the financial-industrial groups, came as a blessing in disguise to the small sector (e.g., devaluation, budget, nationalization). Paradoxically, in this case the effect of Bhutto's socialism was capitalism, and private initiative grew rapidly under conducive market conditions.

Bhutto's policies provided conducive conditions for the growth of the small sector, yet he and his socialist associates failed to integrate the small industrialist/entrepreneur into their support base. They did not recognize either the economic importance of the small-scale textile producers or their potential political yield. Bhutto, in particular, was more concerned with reducing the power of financial-industrial groups rather than organizing these small-scale industrial entrepreneurial groups. In fact, little conscious effort was made to organize these interests. Had Bhutto paid adequate attention to party-building while pursuing socioeconomic reform, these groups could have been

[459] *Promises and Performance*, p. 82.
[460] *Ibid*., p. 80.
[461] Adams and Iqbal, *op.cit*., pp. 24–26, 205–206.
[462] *Ibid*., pp. 185–186.

developed into an important support base for the PPP. Bhutto sought to increase personal autonomy in the party rather than organize various interest groups within it. Thus an opportunity of potential political support of these small to medium sized business groups was squandered. Bhutto's 1976 nationalizations alarmed the small industrialists and entrepreneurs. They were to play an active role in protesting against his regime.

In short, nationalization of industries, banks and labor, and employment policies did define the parameters of a mixed economy. But the results were mixed. While the regime succeeded in making the public sector an integral part of Pakistan's economy, it failed to persuade the financial-industrial groups to accept these parameters of rewards to the relatively weak segments of the society, e.g., industrial labor, the uneducated unemployed, the small businessmen and small industrialist but it failed to institutionalize those interests into a political force. The nationalizations contributed little to generating economic growth, and the production crisis persisted because "inexperienced functionaries" and an "inefficient bureaucracy" could not run the nationalized industries.[463] But then, as Naqvi has remarked, "some inefficiency in the public sector has to be accepted as a price for securing more equity."[464] During Bhutto's rule, industrial production remained low and bureaucratization and inefficiency increased; nevertheless, a shift in the allocation of resources did occur.

Policies of Agrarian Reform

The agrarian structure is another area that Bhutto ventured to reform. The social and economic significance of agriculture in Pakistan's economy can be understood by the fact that 70 percent of its population lives in the villages. Agriculture and related industries are the mainstay of the country's economy. During 1972–1973, agriculture contributed 36 percent to the GDP, accounted for 40 percent of the country's total earnings, and employed 50 percent of the civilian labor force.[465] Statistics aside, at the core of agrarian relations in Pakistan are the highly skewed patterns of land ownership (see Chapter 2) and the feudal nature of the production relationship. This pattern of land ownership and feudalism had its origins in the land tenure laws the British created in India in the mid-19th century. With the enforcement of these laws emerged a process of dispossession of the peasantry and the concentration of land ownership, that is, the formation of a feudal class.[466]

Concentration of land in the hands of a few laid the basis for feudal production relations in the areas that constitute contemporary Pakistan. Ownership of land became

[463] Asaf Hussain *op.cit*., p. 109.

[464] Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Khawaja Sarmad, Pakistan's Economy through the Seventies (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1984), p. 49.

[465] *Pakistan Economic Survey*, 1972–1973.

[466] Naveed Hamid, "Dispossession and Differentiation of the Peasantry in the Punjab during Colonial Rule," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (October 1982), pp. 52–56.

a symbol of prestige, and a landlord's power and influence were to be measured in terms of how much land he owned. The land-owning classes became "awesome" and acquired elite status. Land became the source of power, privilege, prestige, and patronage.[467] After independence, the regimes that emerged in Pakistan were either dominated by the feudals or the feudal interests were well represented; hence, there was little incentive to change the pattern of land ownership inherited from the British Raj. Scholars working on the problems of agrarian reform in India and Pakistan have long recognized "concentration of land" and "tenurial laws" as the primary "obstacles" to any meaningful land reform.[468] Political leaders, parties, and regimes in South Asia have emphasized the need for agrarian reform, but steps taken to enforce land reform have been symbolic rather than substantive.[469] This is so because the feudals (particularly in Pakistan were not only well entrenched in the power structure (i.e., military and bureaucracy), but also commanded enormous social, economic, and political power over the peasantry, quite independent of state power. In Pakistan, both at the elite and popular levels, feudalism is equated with the landlord's tyranny, oppression, and exploitation of the tenants.[470] Since the feudal lord controls and regulates the Roozgar (means of livelihood) of the tenant, he exercises enormous social and political power. This dominance of the feudal lord in rural life has from time to time evoked the need for land reform. Herring has quite accurately summed up the rationale behind land reforms.

> The land reforms of contemporary South Asia generate powerful political symbolism announced as an attack on traditional rulers of society, an almost awesome class. In attacking such potentates, the government presents a dramatic confrontation, taking the role of the defence of the weak and powerless, the exploited and oppressed, against the most powerful class the peasantry experiences.[471]

Bhutto and the Promise of Land Reform

In Pakistan, Bhutto made skillful use of this "political symbolism" and raised the level of political consciousness among the rural peasantry. Through mass contact, Bhutto presented himself as the defender of the peasants' interests, a leader who was willing to fight "feudal oppression." He made direct appeals to the peasantry and promised agrarian reforms:

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[467] Ronald J. Herring, Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in South Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 87–90.

[468] Francine R. Frankel, "Compulsions and Social Change: Is Authoritarianism the Solution to India's Economic Development Problems," World Politics (1978), p. 226.

[469] Herring, *op.cit*., pp. 226–227.

[470] *Ibid*., pp. 95–96.

[471] *Ibid*., pp. 225–226.

> We cannot leave the fate of our peasantry entirely to the anarchy of private possession. There must be a bold and imaginative agrarian program aimed at reformation. The remaining vestiges of feudalism need to be removed.[472]
>
> The Pakistan peasantry believed in him and placed their confidence in him by overwhelmingly voting for Bhutto and his PPP in the 1970 elections.

The foundation papers of the party declared that the party stood for the "elimination of feudalism" and, in accordance with socialist principles, "would advance the interests of the peasantry. "Theoretically, the PPP had a program of rural transformation; it sought the elimination of feudalism, visualized the development of "cooperative farms:" and "agrovilles." The 1970 party manifesto declared.

> West Pakistani owners of large estates, the feudal lords, constitute a formidable obstacle to progress. Not only by virtue of their wealth, but on account of their hold over their tenants and the neighboring peasantry, they yield considerable power and are, even at present, a major political force The breaking-up of the large estates to destroy the power of the feudal land owners is a national necessity that will have to be carried out through practical measures.[473]

The program also envisaged the development of "cooperative farms." It argued that for an efficient utilization of the land, capital investment was needed, and improvements must be made over several holdings. This was to be achieved through voluntary effort. For example, the cooperative farms were to allocate labor, provide agricultural machinery, and regulate the supply of water for irrigation. The individual farmer would obtain seed and market his produce through the cooperative. In addition, the program called for "agrovilles," small towns linked functionally with the rural areas." These "new urban settlements ... [would] offer their inhabitants the maximum of amenities and participation in civic life."[474]

This blue-print for rural transformation was drafted by Bhutto, J. A. Rahim. Dr. Mubashir, and a few others. The program was too ambitious. The established groups and classes did not see it as more than an electoral ploy. It was quite evident that the PPP aimed to mobilize and incorporate those groups that were weak and dispossessed in the rural sectors. Did the PPP have the infrastructure to institute such a rural transformation? To reduce feudal power and improve the conditions of the peasantry, what kind of land reform did Bhutto propose?

[472] Bhutto, cited in Herring, p. 224.
[473] Pakistan People's Party Election Manifesto 1970, pp. 28–29.
[474] *Ibid*., pp. 30–31.

It has been observed that the land reforms of 1959 and 1972 had marginal effects on the agrarian structure of Pakistan.[475] I agree with the broad observation, but want to emphasize that there were some substantial differences between the two reforms which have not been given adequate attention (see Table 5.4).

First, Bhutto's reforms gave no compensation for the land confiscated by the government. Second, it imposed a ceiling under which government officials could not own more than 100 acres of land. Third, military officers were prohibited from exchanging border land granted to them for better land in the interior. These provisions reduced the niche that the military-bureaucratic elites had created for themselves and clearly curbed their power.

One can describe, analyze, and evaluate Bhutto's land reform policy as it evolved through the various stages of his rule (1971–1977). I will emphasize that, despite the persistence of hegemonic tendencies, the pluralist content of politics provided Bhutto with an opportunity to pursue an agrarian reform much bolder than that of Ayub's military regime. Bhutto attempted to synthesize ceiling and land tenure reforms in a step-by-step approach. He adopted a policy of incremental change to transform and, to some degree, restructure agriculture in Pakistan. As a reformist leader, Bhutto's task was to reconcile the interests of the feudals, the middle-sized farmer, and the tenants.[476] Accommodating the interests of one could hurt the other.

On the issue of land reform, Bhutto was evidently tom between his feudal class interests and his passion for improving the socioeconomic conditions of the rural population. This research argues that in the industrial sector, Bhutto curbed the financial-industrial groups and used coercion and economic rewards to control industrial labor. In the agricultural sector, he adopted a strategy of introducing reform in a manner that would benefit the feudals, middle-sized farmers, small peasants, and tenants. Despite loopholes in the land reform legislation and failures in implementation, I argue that Bhutto's reform provided a number of incentives to the agricultural sector for improvement, expansion, and growth that led to a shift in the economic development strategy from import substitution to an export orientation.

Bhutto's land reform policy emerged in three phases. The first began in March 1972.[477] Individual land ceilings were reduced to 300 acres of unirrigated land and 150 acres of irrigated land. Bedakhali (eviction) of tenants was declared illegal. Water rent and agricultural tax (both minimum) were to be paid by the landlord, not the tenant. Payment for seeds was also to be made by the landlord. These measures were modest, but Bhutto's rhetoric was radical. It must be pointed out that there is no correlation

[475] Naseem, p. 191.
[476] For a discussion of feudal vs. industrial class conflict, see Jamil, Rashid, "Economic Causes of Political Crisis in Pakistan: The Landlords vs. the Industrialists," The Developing Economies, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (June 1978), pp. 169–181.
[477] *Bhutto, Speeches and Statements*, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972, p. 98.

between fixing of land ceilings and feudalism. The ceilings merely imposed a limit on the ownership of land, while feudalism is a social system in which the feudal exercises social, economic and political control over the tenant.[478] The ceiling limit was progressive, but Bhutto clearly showed his "class interest" and deviated from the declared party goal of eliminating feudalism. In his policy announcement, Bhutto asserted that he stood for transforming the "feudal" landowner into a "humane, agricultural entrepreneur." At the same time, he appealed to the sensitivities of the popular conscience. Land reforms were to restore the dignity, self-respect, and honor" of the rural masses of Pakistan. In his characteristic rhetorical style, he dismissed the reforms of 1959 as a "subterfuge," a "facade" to fool the people in the name of reform." He alleged that these reforms (of 1959) were made "to buttress and pamper the landed aristocracy and fatten the favored few."[479] After these charges, one would have expected much more radical land reforms from him. Bhutto claimed that the reforms he envisaged

> would effectively break the inequitable concentrations of landed wealth, reduce income disparities, increase production, reduce unemployment, streamline the administration of land revenue and agricultural taxation, and truly lay the foundations of honor and mutual benefit between landowner and tenant.

Bhutto was reassuring to the feudals and exhorted them to change their attitude and outlook toward rural social relations. He proposed that:

> Enterprising and enlightened farmers should continue to live on the land and give agriculture the same sense of purpose it deserves We are as much against the ignorant and tyrannical landlord as we are against the robber barons of industry. We are as much for the creative and humane landowner as we are for a productive and conscientious owner of industry.[480]

Bhutto sought modernization of the agrarian structure, a goal that was also sought by the Ayub regime; the differences was that in agrarian relations, Bhutto aimed to "lay the foundations of honor and mutual benefit between the landowner and tenant." However, his personal political style fell far short of this declared aim. In May 1972 while explaining the thrust of his land reforms to Karachi businessmen and industrialists, Bhutto reiterated the same theme:

> The ceiling of land holdings is designed to break up the concentration of landed wealth while the revision of the 'batai system' in favor of the tenant is intended to relieve him of the burden of certain traditional changes. At the same time, we

[478] Herring, *op.cit*., pp. 85, 90–91.
[479] Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972, *op.cit*., p. 99.
[480] *Ibid*., pp. 99–100.

have tried to preserve the incentives for the continuation of agriculture as an attractive and profitable vocation for the enterprising and enlightened farmer.[481]

The twin task of liberating the tenant from the "burden of traditional charges" and producing an "enlightened farmer" was not easy. Of course, the land reforms were not implemented as envisioned. The main obstacles to any meaningful reform were the feudals and the revenue bureaucracy. Although Bhutto's reforms affected a much larger number of landlords (92,048 compared to only 763 under Ayub's reform);[482] and his ceiling was substantially lower than Ayub's, it was clear that Bhutto was constrained by the presence of feudals in his own party. In this sense, the very organization of the PPP inhibited reform. There was little consensus among the various factions of the party on what should be the proper agrarian policy. In his policy speech, Bhutto had acknowledge that "Landowners have been feverishly transferring land on an intensive scale and in a manner designed to defeat land reforms."[483] Later, the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission, Sheikh Mohammad Rasheed, also conceded that the feudals, both within the PPP and outside, exercised tremendous pressure to obstruct the formulation and implementation of an effective land reform policy.[484] In fact, since the 1970 election victory of the PPP, the feudals (both in the PPP and outside) had already begun the partitioning, distribution, and division of the land among family members and in the name of trusted tenants. Such practices moderated the impact of land reforms. On the other hand, the non-PPP feudals indulged in large-scale evictions of their tenants. (While the PPP feudals stayed in the party, they adopted an attitude of accommodation toward the tenants). The landlords would tell tenants to "go and work for Bhutto since they had voted him to power."[485] These evictions promoted Bhutto to declare eviction of tenants illegal. The evictions of tenants persisted during Bhutto's rule, but landlord vendetta was not the only cause. In its efforts to make agriculture "an attractive and profitable vocation" and to encourage the "enlightened farmer," the PPP regime developed favorable credit and loan policies that encouraged mechanization. This also caused tenant evictions. The tractor became the new status symbol; the feudals began to acquire tractors and the tenant became redundant and was forced off the land. According to one estimate, in 1974, 35,000 tractors were in use, an increase of 5000 in two years. Between 1973 and 1975, Pakistan imported 30,000 tractors.[486] The regime cited the increase in tractors as proof of its commitment to the agriculture sector. Bhutto, Sheikh Rashid, and the Planning Commission all equated mechanization with modernization of agriculture and presented this as evidence of the regime's support for the agricultural community. Despite radical rhetoric and claims of rehabilitating the

[481] Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, April 1, 1972–June 31, 1972, *op.cit*., p. 157.
[482] Naseem, *op.cit.,* p. 198.
[483] Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1971–March 31, 1972, *op.cit*., p. 101.
[484] Cited in Herring., *op.cit*., p. 111.
[485] *Imroze*, January 5, February 26–27, 1972.
[486] Ronald J. Herring and Charles R. Kennedy, Jr., "The Political Economy of Farm Mechanization Policy; Tractors in Pakistan," in Raymond F. Hopkins, Donald J. Puchala and Ross B. Talbot (eds.), Food, Politics and Agricultural Development. Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural Modernization (Boulder: Westview, 1979), pp. 213–215.

tenants and small peasants, the primary beneficiaries of this mechanization were the feudals and middle-sized farmers. In this sense, the effects of land reform were contradictory; the mass arousal of the peasantry and modernization of the agrarian sector both adversely affected the tenants and accelerated evictions.

According to one account, between 1973 and 1974 in Punjab, the number of tenants evicted rose from 1658 to 2709. During the same period in Sindh, It rose from 24 to 367. In Baluchistan in 1973, 36 tenant evictions were reported; this number rose to 349 in 1977.[487] These are only the reported incidents; in most cases eviction is not reported.

The Revenue Department bureaucracy was another impediment to the effective implementation of land reform. Although the Federal Land reform Commission was supposed to supervise the revenue bureaucracy, it had limited control and effect. The revenue bureaucracy is known for its power and corruption in the rural structure of Pakistan. At the village level, the Patwari (local revenue officer) is more an instrument of the feudal lord than of the state (because the feudal has power and wealth, while the Patwari is a petty government functionary; at times the feudal may have contacts with senior bureaucrats). The Zamindar-Patwari connection at the village level becomes awesome when one looks at the insecurities that confront the tenant and small peasant in rural life. Tenants and small peasants seek three basic securities: (1) security of life, (2) security of property, and (3) security of livelihood. Of these three securities, the most vital security of livelihood is almost non-existent because of the prevalent conditions in the rural areas[488] noted by one study.

1. The name of the tenant was not recorded in any register of the Patwari; thus, he could be evicted by the landlord without getting a share of the crop he had raised.

2. The landlord did not give a receipt for his share of the crops received and evicted the tenant for non-fulfillment of the contract.

3. Peasants were often evicted by force.

4. The landlord refused to accept his share of the crops, thus causing waste which the tenant could ill afford, and paving the way for his eviction.

This indicated that in the rural power structure the odds are heavily against the tenant or small peasant. Local officials would hardly implement any law that would undermine the power of the feudals. This clearly suggested that no land reforms could

[487] *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. IV (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, January 1979), p. 26.

[488] H. H. Kizilbash, "Local Government, Democracy, the Capital and Autocracy in the Villages," cited in Asaf Hussain (1979), p. 50.

be effectively implemented without severing the Zamindar-Patwari nexus at the village level. Evidently, Bhutto's land reform did not aim at that.

It is not clear whether Bhutto had full cognizance of the tenant's insecurity syndrome or fully anticipated the consequences of his agrarian reforms, but he showed determination in proposing measures that were expected to improve the socioeconomic condition of the medium-sized farmers, small peasants, and tenants. In yet another attempt, in November 1975, Bhutto announced a reform of tenure laws. This measure abolished the land revenue tax for all peasants with holdings under 25 acres and progressively increased the tax for those with greater holdings. According to one official estimate, 7.2 million medium-sized farmers and peasants in the country were to benefit from this measure (the breakdown of the beneficiaries, according to province, was Punjab, 5 million; Sindh, 0.7 million; NWFP, 1.7 million; Baluchistan, 0.3 million).[489] Through such gradual reformist measures, Bhutto demonstrated that he was committed to improving the conditions of small and medium-sized farmers and tenants. And, to a considerable degree, he succeeded in retaining their support.

Contradictory Goals: Radical Agrarian Reform and the Politics of Accommodation

The third phase of Bhutto's land reform emerged in December 1976, when the regime announced a "National Charter for Peasants."[490] It soon became evident that the third phase was designed with an eye to the elections. Bhutto announced the decision to hold general elections in January 1977. By 1975 Bhutto was seeking accommodation and reconciliation with such established power groups as the bureaucratic military elites, the financial-industrial groups, and, of course, the feudals. By 1974, Bhutto had apparently embarked on a policy of downgrading, relegating or removing the PPP socialists from positions of influence and policy-making roles in his government. By late 1974, socialist factional leaders such as Dr. Mubashir Hassan, J. A. Rahim, Khursheed Hassan Meer, and Haneef Ramey, had been disgraced, removed, or had resigned from the PPP. Among the socialists, Sheikh Mohammad Rashid was the only factional leader who survived Bhutto's purge of socialists, as he had a substantial following among the Punjab peasantry. Instead, Bhutto had come to rely on the bureaucracy again, and the nationalizations enhanced the power of the bureaucratic elites. Second, powerful and articulate representatives of the feudal classes like Malik Khuda Baksh Bucha and later Malik Hayat Mohammad Khan of Tamman were appointed advisors to Prime Minister Bhutto. Having embarked on a policy of elite accommodation, Bhutto persisted with radical rhetoric, the politics of mass arousal, and substantive reformism in the agrarian sector. The contradiction was too obvious; on the one hand, Bhutto was seeking accommodation with the feudals, and on the other, trying to placate the rural peasantry. It was in the wake of these top-level changes that the National Charter for Peasants was announced. According to the Charter, the government was to distribute all the

[489] Cited in Naseem.

[490] For full text of character, see *The Pakistan Times*, December 19, 1976.

cultivatable land the state possessed with less than subsistence holdings. According to official estimate, about 2 million acres of land were to be distributed among 100,000 peasant families.

In January 1977, just before calling for the general elections, Bhutto announced the second land ceiling. The land ceiling was reduced to 200 acres for unirrigated land and 100 acres for irrigated land. This move was clearly made with the elections in mind. It came as a surprise to the feudals and the opposition parties. It was estimated that 0.4 million acres would be distributed among 40,000 peasant families.[491]

How much land was actually redistributed will probably never be known with any degree of accuracy. According to official estimates, less than .5 percent of the total arable land was redistributed, and less than 10 percent of the country's landless tenants benefitted from these reforms (see Table 5.7).

It must be pointed out that there were strong regional differences in these reforms.

In the NWFP and Baluchistan, the redistributive effects were more pronounced. As noted in the preceding chapter, these two provinces were dominated by the NAP. Since the presence of the PPP was marginal in these provinces. To establish the effectiveness of the center, Bhutto pursued implementation of land reforms more vigorously in these provinces. In addition, a continued history of landlord/tenant conflict in the NWFP was skillfully exploited by Bhutto to embarrass the NAP "Khans." More land was resumed and distributed among the tenants in these two provinces. According to one estimate, in the NWFP about 12 percent of the total farm area was confiscated, and about three-quarters of it was distributed among the tenants. In Baluchistan, 10 percent of the total arable land was confiscated and 36 percent of the tenants benefitted.[492]

Before we assess the overall impact of Bhutto's land reforms, it would be useful to analyze two radical measures he adopted. First was the abolition of the Sardari System in Baluchistan. Second was the nationalization of agri-based industries. Both of these decisions came in 1976 at a time when Bhutto had apparently forged an effective alliance with the feudal classes and the bureaucratic military elites. The situation dictated that there was little need to disrupt the new elite accommodation he had reached. It seems that Bhutto was planning for the general elections and, despite post-1975 compromises and reconciliations with the established groups, desired to retain his radical reformist image with the rural segments of the society. Both these measure proved to be grave miscalculations, and Bhutto was to pay heavily for them.

[491] *Pakistan Economic Survey*, 1976–1977, p. 191.
[492] Herring, *op.cit*., pp. 113–114.

The system of Sardari (Abolition) Ordinance was introduced in April 1976.[493] This struck at the very foundations of "Sardars" (tribal chiefs) in Baluchistan. Sardars were disenfranchised of their judicial powers, not allowed to retain private jails or arrest anyone, could not take free labor or receive a tribute. Contravention of the ordinance was made a criminal offense. The Baluch "Sardars" took the ordinance as a personal affront and hostility intensified toward the regime. This also indicated that despite, coercion and patronage, Bhutto was unable to reduce the influence of the "Sardars," the most powerful class in the province. The tribesmen were too dependent on the Sardar and, unlike Punjab, Sindh and NWFP, there were hardly any small or middle-sized peasants that Bhutto could mobilize. The dominant Baluch Sardars were alienated from the PPP regime as Bhutto prepared for the elections.

The second radical and premature policy was the decision to nationalize the cotton, rice, and flour mills in July 1976.[494] There were 2,752 such mills (cotton ginning, 555; rice husking, 3,072; and flour, 125). The policy had reformist overtones and was aimed at expanding the public sector. Most accounts, sympathetic, and unsympathetic, seem to suggest that Bhutto was motivated by the prospect of winning the election and did not carefully examine the consequences the policy of nationalization agri-based industries might have. The consequences were to prove disastrous for the regime.

Ostensibly the policy had two objectives: first, to eliminate the Arthi (broker), or middle-man between the farmer and the market, and second, to consolidate the role of the public sector in the national economy. It is part of the political mythology in Pakistan that the Arthi squeezes profits from both the farmer and consumer. Bhutto played on this public perception, but found that the rewards were illusory. Arthis this were certainly despised by both the producers and the consumers, but had become an integral part of the market mechanism as it developed in Pakistan. The Arthis were not merely brokers, but in most cases performed the role of trader-merchants, acted as commission agents, and, in a number of cases, were small to medium-sized farmers or operated medium-sized industries. They also served as a vital link between the Mandi (market towns) and the urban centers. By their class origins, they were ideologically conservative groups and had links with Islam Passand Parties (i.e, JUI, JI, and JUP). These groups were to play an important role in the PNA-led protest movement against the Bhutto regime in the spring of 1977 and gave the protest religious overtones.

[493] Pakistan Economic Survey, p. 196.
[494] *Ibid*., p. 182.

?Table 5.7 Implementation of Land Reforms as of July 31,1977					
		Area Resumed	Area Disposed	Balance	Number of People Benefitted
MLR-115					
Punjab	357,865	240,490	117,375	35,351	
Sindh	311,155	117,137	194,018	5,431	
N.W.F.P.	257,521	132,002	125,519	10,809	
Baluchistan		391,788	197,842	193,946	9,222
Total	1,318,329	687,471	630,858	60,871	
MLR-64					
Punjab	508,940	81,653	427,287	88,800	
Sindh	292,802	123,722	427,287	12,067	
N.W.F.P.	240,406	240,406		24,314	
Baluchistan		52,848	52,848		2,900
Total	1,094,996	496,629	506,367	48,170	
MLR-117					
Baluchistan		523,816	260,760	265,056	17,476
By Federal Land Commission	521,458		52,458		
Grand Total		3,460,599	1,446,860	2,013,739	136,519
Sources: Federal Land Commission; S. M. Naseem, Underdevelopment, Poverty, and Inequality in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 1981), p. 197.					

The PPP regime simply did not have the managerial capacity to replace the Arthis. Burki has argued that agri-based industries were nationalized to reward the feudals because more than 4,000 officials with feudal connections were appointed to perform the functions of the Arthis.[495] The overall effect was increased bureaucratic control and corruption. The government functionaries were simply not motivated to perform brokerage functions. It bestowed a bad image on the regime and left the feudals and consumers dissatisfied.[496]

The private system may have been bad and despised, but to replace it with a corrupt and inefficient system proved disastrous for the regime and considerably tarnished Bhutto's reformist image. It alienated the trader-merchant groups, antagonized the financial-industrial groups, and failed to establish the dominance of the feudals in the rural market, if it was intended for that purpose.

Academic assessments of Bhutto's agrarian reform vary in their interpretations and conclusions. There is a general consensus among scholars that (a) the reforms had a

[495] Burki, Pakistan Under ... *op.cit.*, p. 160.
[496] Adams and Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 167.

marginal impact on the pattern of land ownership and did little to break the concentration of land holdings, and (b) the mechanization of the agricultural sector did occur, with the tractor emerging as the new symbol of status and of the modernization drive, particularly in Punjab, Sindh and parts of NWFP.[497] But the performance of the agricultural sector fluctuated because of internal factors (floods and crop failures) and external factors (depressed prices of cotton and rice in the world market). However, the assessments vary with regard to the degree of attitudinal change the land reforms may have brought about among the feudals, the level to which political consciousness among the rural masses may have been raised, and which groups may have benefitted and to what extent.

In Burki's assessment, the primary beneficiaries of Bhutto's land reform were not the more dynamic middle class farmers[498] but the large landlords. Furthermore, he has contended that the mechanization policies also favored the large landlords and displaced the tenants. According to S. M. Naseem, although both the 1959 and 1972 reforms had the goal of modernizing agriculture and ensuring security of tenure for the tenants, they both lacked the "political will" to achieve these goals. He concluded: "Land reforms which are not backed by the political will to undertake vigorous measures for their implementation do more harm than good to the tenants."[499]

According to Sayeed, although Bhutto's primary motive was to subordinate every class in the rural structure, his policies and political rhetoric still had two positive effects. First, although the peasants, tenants, and landless labor did not get what they expected, "they could find some satisfaction in the new benefits that were made available in the form of residential plots and the exemption of land revenue." Second, "Bhutto's great contribution was that he had aroused both a new hope and political consciousness among these classes that, given certain decisive policies on the part of the government, their lot could improve."[500] In a similar vein, Hamza Alvi, Gardezi, and others have also argued that although Bhutto's land reforms were a betrayal of the tenant and peasant classes, his political rhetoric did raise the level of political consciousness among the rural masses.[501]

By most accounts, it is evident that Bhutto's greatest contribution was that he succeeded in elevating the level of political consciousness of the rural masses. However, he made little or no effort to organize this political consciousness by encouraging peasant associations or by integrating the rural peasantry into the PPP fold in any systematic manner. He succeeded in generating political awareness, but failed to develop a self-sustaining industrial base for the rural peasantry.

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[497] Herring and Kennedy *op.cit*., p. 222.
[498] Burki, Pakistan Under ... *op.cit*., p. 158.
[499] Naseem, *op.cit*., p. 199.
[500] Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan ... *op.cit*., pp. 93–94.
[501] Gardezi Rashid, *op.cit*., pp. 88–89.

Despite ineffectual political rhetoric and loopholes in the implementation process, Bhutto's land reforms did provide some benefits to almost every rural class. The fedual classes were the principal beneficiaries (a number of families and groups in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP made the transition towards becoming agri-based industrialists). The policy also gave relief to the small and medium-sized farmers and the tenants. The nationalization of agri-based industries proved disastrous and reflected Bhutto's failure to organize trade merchant and small and medium sized agricultural entrepreneurs into the political process. It has been aptly observed that Bhutto's land reforms brought about an "Agrarian Bourgeois revolution" in Pakistan. Hearing has suggested that land reforms may be considered a part of the process of completing, invigorating, and facilitating the bourgeois society, economy and polity. Such functions, he concluded, were clear during the Bhutto regime generating powerful symbols, retaining the allegiance of the PPP left, attacking political opponents and regional satraps, attempting to cope with peasant discontent, stealing a march on other political parties that threatened to use same symbols in a counter-mobilization of the rural have-nots.[502]

Conclusion

Bhutto's policies of incremental change generated mixed results. These policies of incremental change created an environment for socioeconomic change, but did not produce conditions conducive to politics of bargaining, compromise and accommodation, in general, it can be stated that in the developing societies, policies of gradual transformation introduce a phase of transition, resistance to change, and uncertainty. Under the impact of Bhutto's socioeconomic reform, Pakistan underwent such an experience.

There is general consensus among scholars that Bhutto's policies did bring into the political arena the groups and classes hitherto unrepresented, but he could not institutionalize their role in the national polity. This was so because Bhutto sought accommodation with the established groups without sufficiently organizing the unrepresented groups. His policies did benefit the urban professionals, the medium-sized farmers, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, and the feudals. However, has policies alienated the financial-industrial groups, the trader-merchant groups, and a segment of the feudals (the "Khans and Sardars" in NWFP and Baluchistan), who resisted these polices. Bhutto failed to win their confidence. Confronted with this hostility, Bhutto found it difficult to synthesize the interests of established groups and the disadvantaged groups and classes. Nevertheless, through his policies of gradual reform, he did succeed in achieving some modicum of social justice.[503] The groups and classes that Bhutto mobilized did receive wage and welfare benefits and found some new employment opportunities, seen in the context of structural constraints and the

[502] Herring, *op.cit*., p. 123.

[503] Stainslow Welliocsz, "Some Remark on Pakistan's Economic System Before, During and After the Bhutto Period," in Manzooruddin Ahmed, p. 143.

relatively short span of six years, it seems that Bhutto succeeded in initiating a process of redistribution that apparently moved the pattern of income distribution toward grater equality, precise estimates of which are not available because of the paucity of data and formal analysis. Some studies, however, speculate that income inequalities may have increased because of the Middle East remittances (which certainly appears to be the case in post-1977 Pakistan).

Despite these modest achievements, industrial production stagnated, private investments declined, and the economic growth rate fluctuated. Industrial production stagnated for three reasons:

1. Nationalization of industries led to bureaucratization of industries, resulting in high inefficiency and low productivity.

2. By 1976, more than 70 percent of the public sector was committed to such heavy industries as steel, cement, fertilizer and defense-related industries. These industries had very large capital-labor ratios. According to one estimate, the Karachi Steel Mill required $100,000 for each job it created, whereas private, large-scale industry required $200,000 for each job. For small-scale enterprise, the capital-labor ratio was estimated to be only $500.[504]

3. To overcome the lack of private investment in the industrial sector, the government's preferred policy was to expand the agricultural sector and modest increase of small-scale industrial enterprises in the private sector.

In summary, it can be stated that, given the relatively short period of 5 years, Bhutto, despite personal and structural constraints, succeeded in ushering in some degree of socioeconomic change. He could not provide optimal solutions as a reformist leader. His policies of incremental change did initiate a process of attitudinal change. But such a change could not be sub-stained without organizing new mobilized groups.

One alternative Bhutto could have pursued was to build the organizational structure of the PPP, give it a sense of ideological coherence, and enforce factional stability. For personal or structural reasons, or a combination of the two, Bhutto gave low priority to party building.

Consideration of rule led Bhutto not only to continue relying on the bureaucratic-military elites, but in his efforts to increase personal autonomy, Bhutto created and reinforced authoritarian institutions. Regime-building and not party-building became Bhutto's primary preoccupation.

[504] Burki in Manzooruddin, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

In general, political parties in Pakistan have been dominated by leaders with feudal social origins. The PPP was an exception to the extent that in the formative phase of its development and early years of power, the urban professionals became a potent force in the decision-making process. However, by 1975 the feudal component had clearly established its dominance and that Bhutto was instrumental in bringing about this shift. Bhutto sought re-alignment with various feudal factions, both within and outside the PPP. This had a band-wagon effect; by 1976 feudals were joining the PPP in large numbers. This large influx of feudals further weakened the position of urban professionals in the PPP, who were either discouraged by this shift or were purged by Bhutto. In any case, the urban professionals showed lack of means and political will to resist this process. This added to the ideological chaos and organizational disabilities of the party. Simultaneously, Bhutto increased reliance on the bureaucratic military elites.

Having sought policies of elite accommodation, Bhutto did not change his radical rhetoric. Consequently, he retained popular support, but it remained mass-based, loosely organized, and dispersed. While the feudals and military bureaucratic elites, although adjusted to Bhutto's tactics, remained skeptical about his intentions.

Bhutto's major failure was his inability to co-opt the financial-industrial groups. He underestimated their strength and capacity for resistance. Excluded from the political and economic decision-making arenas, these groups not only remained hostile toward the Bhutto regime, but in the later years of his rule, encouraged and supported the opposition groups. The PPP increasingly became identified with feudal interests. With urban professionals weakened and the potential of small-medium business groups not politically realized, the PPP's reformism was perceived as pro-feudal and anti-big business. The financial-industrial groups remained hostile to the regime,. In addition, it was his precarious control over the military that, among other factors, limited Bhutto's choices of developing an effective alternative to the military hegemonic political system.

6

PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE MILITARY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND PUBLIC OPINION

The military had transferred power to Bhutto, but still the fundamental question remained: what should be the role of the military in the future political system of Pakistan? Would the political parties be able to develop consensus on how to restrict military's hold in politics?

The political parties, Urdu news media, military elites and general public gave mixed signals, These responses indicate lack of direction on how military should disengage from politics or civilian leadership may establish control over the military.

The Islam-Passand Political Parties, particularly Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), openly favored an active political role for the military. As early as 1972, Mian Tufail Mohammad, the chief of JI called upon the military to overthrow the Bhutto government because he believed it was morally corrupt and evil.[505] Those who believed that Pakistan is an ideological state postulate that a symbiotic relationship exists between the Pakistani state, Islam and the military.[506] Asaf Hussain, a proponent of this view, is so obsessed with the notion of Islamic factor that he fails to recognize the interventionist role of the military in Pakistan's politics. He has asserted that in the "Ideological State," the military "was a part of the political system, and as such, its take-over of the political arena could not be termed intervention as such."[507]

This assertion is erroneous and misleading. It does not take into account the Sandhurst, secular tradition of the Pakistan's armed forces. The training at the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) Kakul continues to develop professional expertise of the "would be officers" rather than simply infuse Islamic doctrines. Hussain also ignores that the military has its own corporate interests which must be protected. Various Pakistani civilian and military regimes have used Islam (some less, others more) to legitimize their rule, but the military in general has maintained its hegemony in politics as "saviors" of the state, claiming to promote national integration and intervening to avert disintegration.[508] In 1971, when the military failed as promoter of national integration,

[505] In March 1972, when General Tikka Khan was appointed Chief of Army Staff, Main Tufail Mohammad sent him a telegram urging him to overthrow Bhutto. Interview with a senior army officer.

[506] Asaf Hussain, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan* (Folkestone, Kent: Dawson, 1979), pp. 132–133.

[507] *Ibid*., p. 133.

[508] See, for example, General Ayub Khan's first broadcast to the nation on October 8, 1958, and General Yahya Khan's first broadcast on March 26, 1969. For text, see *Dawn*, October 9, 1958 and March 27, 1969.

the conservative social groups emerged as ardent sympathizers.[509] This shift, occurred as a consequence of Bhutto's radicalism during the election campaign of 1970, the PPP's victory and Islam Passand parties defeat in the elections and Bhutto's later efforts to bring the military under civilian control.

The National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI) were ambivalent about military's role in politics. As noted earlier, their demands for the removal of martial law suggested that they aimed to reduce the role of military in politics. The inability of the PPP and the NAP-JUI to gain consensus on the nature and direction of the political system produced conditions which increased the military's involvement in the political process, rather than reducing it.

Military officers were painfully aware of their loss of reputation. The public confidence in the armed forces of Pakistan was completely shaken. A feeling of dismay, depression and despondency was widely spread among the forces.[510]

Thus Pakistan military remained a potent political force and a potential intervener. This was so because in the post-military state, ethnic cleavages, ideological polarization and personal rivalries among the political leaders emerged with new intensity. In addition, the fear of India and further disintegration of the Pakistani state persisted. These conditions were hardly conducive for establishing civilian control over the military.

A cursory survey of Pakistan's Urdu newspapers reveals that the military's defeat struck the public with disbelief, shock and grief. It was the army generals and not the military as an institution that came under severe criticism. The Daily Nawa-i-Waqat commented: "The nation cannot believe that the army which was considered one of the best in the world can surrender in Dacca without putting any defense. Whatever has happened in Dacca is a defeat of a coterie of our rulers, it is a defeat of bureaucracy, but not of the army of the people."[511]

Another news daily editorial banner line ran "Now the Generals rule should end forever." The editorial was more in tune with the public sentiment and warned that Pakistan should not allow its military to get involved in politics. In the past 12 years it has been destroyed because of its involvement in politics. This must be stopped.[512]

The PPP-owned *Daily Mussawat* asked, "The people want to know what caused the defeat of Pakistan army in East Pakistan." Anticipating the transfer of power to the PPP, the editorial asserted "They [the people] want to create a new Pakistan in which they

[509] See for example, *Nawa-i-Waqat*, December 18, 1971, January 24, 25 and February 25, 27, 1972.
[510] Fazal Muqueem Khan, *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1972), p. 251.
[511] *Nawa-i-Waqat*, Lahore, December 18, 1971.
[512] *Imroze*, Lahore, December, 18, 1971.

have control over their destinies."[513] The political leaders were also more vocal in their criticism of the generals. This criticism and the PPP-initiated purges of the generals aroused distrust within the army and damaged the public reputation of the armed forces.[514]

Bhutto showed preference for subordinating the military to civilian control. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and disintegration of the country had left the military humiliated and weakened, and its ability to maintain hegemony had also declined. Bhutto recognized this and opted to pursue a selective purge of the senior military command. Within four months of assuming office of the president, he purged 43 senior officers from Army, Navy, and Air Force.[515] The fact that Bhutto was able to make such a purge indicated that the generals were divided, demoralized and paralyzed by the effects of war.

Purges in the air force and the navy were of minor significance because of their smaller size and secondary political role. Army was a different matter. However, in 1971 the total number of officers in the Pakistan army above the rank of brigadier was 120.[516] Thus retirement of 29 officers was a sizeable but not massive reduction. As a result of the 1971 crisis and the war with India, a number of these officers were discredited by the army and the public. It effectively shook the upper ranks in the army, and Bhutto was careful not to pursue a general purge. Bhutto's goal was to create professional but docile military establishment, with adequate fighting capabilities.[517]

The Pakistani experience revealed that the military withdrew from politics, not voluntarily, but under conditions of extreme distress or defeat.

Bhutto was the first Pakistani political leader who made a concerted effort to bring the military under civilian control. On one hand, his strategy was to impose checks on the political role of the military; on the other hand, domestic and external security considerations compelled him to increase defense expenditure. During his rule, (1972–1977) defense spending stood around 6% of the GNP or 47% of the annual budget (see Table 6.1).

This strategy of restricting the political role of the military and appeasing its budgetary needs produced contradictory effects. Bhutto became so occupied with imposing

[513] *Mussawat*, Lahore, December, 18, 1971.
[514] Interviews.
[515] From army (29) officers were purged; Generals 2, Lieutenant Generals 11, Major Generals 10, Brigadier 6, From Navy (7) Officers, Vice Admiral 1, Rear Admiral 4, Commodore 2, Air Force (7) Air Marshal 1, Air Vice Marshal 2, Air Commodore 3, Group Captain 1.
[516] Interview with a senior army officer.
[517] Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 73.

civilian control over the military that he failed to pay adequate attention to civilian political institutions(particularly political parties).[518]

To analyze civil-military relations, one can identify four mechanisms through which Bhutto attempted to control the military.

1. Imposing constitutional constraints on the public role of military.
2. Manipulation of geo-political factors.
3. Instituting changes in the command structure.
4. Creation of paramilitary force—Federal Security Force (FSF).

Table 6.1 GNP Gross Revenue Receipts and Defense Expenditures (in Millions of Rupees)

Expenditure as % of Year Rev. Receipts	GNP	Total Revenue Receipts	Amount	As GNP	Revenue Receipts
1968-1969	37,955	5,774	2,427	6.4	42.0
1969-1970	43,348	6,665	2,739	6.3	41.3
1970-1971	54,620	6,021	3,202	7.0	53.3
1971-1972	49,268	6,065	3,726	7.6	61.4
1972-1973	61,258	7,533	4,440	7.3	58.9
1973-1974	81,058	11,048	4,949	6.1	44.8
1974-1975	105,787	12,980	6,914	6.5	53.3
1976-1977	141,166	17,787	8,121	5.8	45.7

Source: Computed from Pakistan Survey, 1978-79 (Islamabad: Finance Division).
The elite circles and different factions jockeyed for power.

Constitutional Constraints

Having purged the generals whom Bhutto perceived as potential or real rivals, he opted to establish civilian control through constitutional means. Bhutto's strategy was to confine the role of the military to defense and security matters. The 1973 constitution clearly defined the functions of the military.[519] It was the first constitution of Pakistan that specifically spelled out the role of the military in the political system. The constitution declared that under the direction of the federal government, the military was required to, "defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so."[520] These are the

[518] Maleeha Lodi, "Bhutto*, the Pakistan People's Party and Political Development in Pakistan, 1967–1977*." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1981, p. 658.
[519] The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan on 10 April 1973 and authenticated by the President of the National Assembly on 12 April 1973, p. 117.
[520] *Ibid*., p. 117.

normal functions of the military, but by including such a clause Bhutto showed that he was determined to set limits on the political role of the military. Yet another clause was incorporated to ensure against a possible *coup d'état*. The Supreme Court had earlier held that General Yahya Khan had usurped power; therefore in the new constitution a "High Treason" clause was incorporated. It warned:

> Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to subvert the constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.[521]

In addition to these constitutional provisions Bhutto was persistent in highlighting the defense functions of the military under civilian supremacy. For example, in his public oath taking ceremony at Rawalpindi on April 21, 1972, he declared: "The armed forces are to defend the territorial integrity of the country, to defend the frontiers."[522] By purging the generals and by setting constitutional limits on the political role of the military, Bhutto succeeded in obtaining the support of the military high command. At the institutional level, however, the military remained skeptical about Bhutto's motives.

While Bhutto attempted to control the military through constitutional devices, he demonstrated a lack of respect for the constitution by his political actions and behavior. The opposition parties' confrontational attitude and the Bhutto regime's authoritarian response resulted in increased domestic political violence, frequent use of section 144, and continuation of the emergency and other repressive measures (see Chapter 4). These conditions produced skepticism among the military elites about Bhutto's commitment to uphold the constitution.

It must be recognized that respect for the constitution and civilian supremacy is a matter of socialization and educational training of the military which demands a degree of consensus among the civilian and military elite groups to show mutual respect for each other's spheres of interests.[523] The military hegemonic system is built on coercion and suppression of dissent, therefore both at the elite and popular levels. Consequently, in the post-military state, hegemonic tendencies not only persist, but political leadership also finds it difficult to promote acceptance of constitutional process. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition parties could resist adopting extra-constitutional methods to settle political differences because, under military hegemonic rule, their experience was limited to politics of confrontation and not compromise, accommodation and consensus. The Pakistani case shows that the civilian regime more than anything else attempted to use the constitution primarily as a means to eliminate the hegemonic position of the military and establish civilian control.

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[521] *Ibid*., p. 4.
[522] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *President of Pakistan: Speeches and Statement, April 1, 1972–June 30, 1972* (Karachi: The Department of Films and Publications, 1972), p. 51.
[523] Lodi, *op.cit*., pp. 650–651.

Manipulation of Geopolitical Factors

In the Pakistan case, one finds a direct correlation between the political salience of the military in the country's politics and the perceived external threat. In the post-military hegemonic period, Pakistan was faced with both external threat and internal dissension. With the military defeated and its top brass in disarray, these threats seemed larger than they really were. Since its inception, Pakistan has perceived India as a threat to its security. Three wars and Pakistan's eventual dismemberment as a consequence of the Indian invasion reinforced the belief among Pakistanis that India was out to destroy Pakistan. Bhutto inherited not only a disintegrated Pakistan, but 5,000 square miles of its territory were under Indian occupation, and 90,000 of its military and para-military forces were prisoners of war (POWs) in India.

These new geopolitical realities demanded: (1) improvement of relations with India to minimize the security threat, (2) recognition of Bangladesh, and (3) re-definition of the role of the military in domestic politics.

Bhutto was one of the principal architects of a policy of confrontation with India in the 1960's. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war he spoke of resisting Indian aggression and fighting India for a thousand years. After the war he emerged as a symbol of national resistance and a war hero. Ironically, Bhutto was also perhaps the most articulate civilian leader in promoting military interests. He forcefully argued that "Pakistan's security and territorial integrity were more important than economic development."[524]

With such views on the defense and security needs of the country one would have expected a continuation of confrontation with India. But Bhutto was realistic enough to recognize the changing geopolitical realities and quickly moved to seek peace with India. In July 1972 he signed the Simla Agreement, secured the territory under Indian occupation, and initiated the return of the POWs.[525] He demonstrated that the peace process could be initiated without compromising the defense needs of the country.

Bhutto was cautious about recognizing Bangladesh, for internal and external reasons, and it was not until 1974 that Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. Internally, Bhutto was opposed by the Islam Passand Parties, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami, which alleged that he was responsible for the disintegration of the country and asserted that by recognition Bhutto aimed to legitimize his action.[526] Bhutto also faced opposition from the Punjab leadership of the PPP, which felt that recognition would endanger Pakistan's

[524] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 152.

[525] For comments and Indian point of view See Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), pp. 232–238. For text of Simla agreement, see *Dawn*, Karachi, July 3, 1972.

[526] JI was not alone in leveling these charges. Asghar Khan and later Wali Khan were to blame Bhutto for the disintegration of the country.

integrity.[527] The military also resisted recognition until all the POWs were returned. They were resentful of Bangladesh's threats of war crime trials.[528] External factors were equally important and caused Bhutto to go slow on recognition. For example, the Aid-Pakistan consortium was insisting that Pakistan should accept the debt liability of Bangladesh (about 35% of Pakistan's total debt liability-approximately $4,350 million) before any further economic assistance would be forthcoming to Pakistan. To resolve these issues, Bhutto sought a meeting with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, before extending recognition. These conditions helped Bhutto to, slowly and gradually, mobilize public opinion in favor of recognition of Bangladesh. Having ensured the return of POWs, Bhutto recognized Bangladesh in 1974.

Despite changed geo-political realities, redefining relations with the military was a complex issue. As noted earlier, in Pakistan the military had emerged as the symbol of national unity. This function of the military was seriously damaged with the emergence of Bangladesh. It must be recognized that, despite the breakup of Pakistani nation-state, the military was the strongest political institution in the country.

In the wake of breakup of Pakistan, questions were raised about the national character of the Pakistani military.[529] The Punjabi domination of the military, particularly the army, came under severe criticism. The Punjabi domination of army and emergence of militaristic tradition has a historical basis. After 1857, the British recruitment policies not only reinforced autocratic culture in rural Punjab but also provided respectability of military profession.

In the "new" Pakistan, Punjab emerged as the most populous province (58% of the total), followed by Sindh (21.6%), NWFP (16.7%), and Baluchistan (2.4%). In its ethnic composition, the Pakistan military (i.e., troops and officers) is predominantly Punjabi-Pathan; the former comprise above 68–70%, and the latter 20%,[530] while Mohajirs, Sindhis, Baluch, Kashmiri 10%. This uneven distribution is a result of two factors: (1) the British imperialist policy of containing Czarist Russia in the late 19th century, and (2) the notion of "martial races," a theory propounded by the British that certain races of India (e.g., Jats, Rajputs, Punjabi Mussalmans, and certain Pathan tribes) had better fighting qualities and more war like traditions than some of the other races (e.g., Bengali, Sindhi, or Madrasi). As a consequence of these policies, the districts of Jhelum, Rawalpindi, and Attock (i.e., the Pothwar region in Punjab and the districts of Kohat and Mardan in the NWFP) emerged as the primary recruitment bases.

While efforts were made in India to dilute the effects of the "theory of martial races," after independence little effort was made to change this historical discrepancy in

[527] Philp Jones, *op.cit*., p. 554.
[528] Kumar, *op.cit*., p. 264.
[529] Laporte, *op.cit*., pp. 114–115.
[530] Estimates provided by a senior army officer.

Pakistan. The argument was that since the Pakistani military was organized on the principle of voluntary recruitment, forcing communities against their will to join the military would not only violate the principle of voluntary recruitment but could also dilute the professional character of the armed forces.[531] It is worth noting that during late sixties and early seventies, some efforts were made by the army command to diversify the recruitment base of officers from martial areas to other areas and communities. Recruitment centers were created and upgraded in Sindh and Baluchistan. At the soldier level the response was encouraging but for the recruitment officers the response remained weak.[532] Demographic factors and the recruitment policy made the Pakistan military Punjabi-Pathan dominated. However, in terms of its outlook, establishment and symbolism, it has maintained a national character. The troops of the Pakistani army continue to be semi-literate peasants. It is predominantly an infantry army, well-disciplined and ideologically motivated.[533]

Social Class, Generational, and Regional Background of the Military Elites

It must be pointed out that prior to 1971, the ethnic factor was least salient; it was only after the emergence of Bangladesh that the ethnic factor became visible. Precise figures for each group's position in the officer corps are not available. According to two different estimates, the breakdown of the Pakistani military officer corps is shown in Table 6.2.

However, the upper echelons of the Pakistan army have show a tremendous capacity to maintain cohesiveness and suppress dissent or in subordination. For example, just before Bhutto's installation, three Brigadiers, Iqbal Mehdi Shah, Agha Javed Iqbal and F. B. Ali, were found to be involved in a plot to overthrow the Yahya regime. This was called the "Kharian conspiracy." The officers failed in their attempt and the brigadiers were court-martialled and released from the army.

Although definite data are not available on the social class, education, year of recruitment, socialization experience, and regional background of the Pakistani military elite, in recent years efforts have been made to classify them for analytical purposes.[534]

This estimate provides us with the broad composition of the Pakistan military officer corps, but does not provide insight into the complexity of inter-elite interactions. It may be noted that the ethnic issue has not emerged as a serious threat to the cohesion of the officer corps. During the post-1971, period the regional groupings (i.e., not necessarily based on language) did acquire salience among the elite circles, and different factions jockeyed for power.

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[531] Interview with a senior army officer.

[532] *Ibid*.

[533] Stephen P. Cohen, *op.cit*., p. 70.

[534] See for example, Asaf Hussain *op.cit*., p. 128. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 3–5. Cohen, *op.cit*., p. 40.

From 1950 to 1977, the Pakistani military elites underwent a cycle of generational-regional shifts. These shifts changed not only the political outlook of the officer corps, but also influenced their attitude toward the civilian political leadership and institutions. Although schooling and social class help us to understand the composition and outlook of the officer corps, one does find gaps. In a number of cases, officers had a similar social class and institutional training background, yet their political orientations and professional attitudes were completely different. In addition to generation, regional and above mentioned factors previously, another important factor was the selection and political orientation of the commander-in-chief of the army. Generational changes coincided with regional shifts and contributed to the selection of the commander-in-chief. This, in turn, shaped the political, professional attitudes and orientations of each successive generation of officers.

Between 1950–72, Pathan generals were the dominant military elites. With regard to recruitment, social class origins and schooling, these generals had different backgrounds. Although belonging to different generation, as Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (1950–1959), General A. M. Yahya Khan (1966–71) and General Gul Hasan (1971 December–March 1972) were influential in changing the course of politics in the country. General Gul Hasan's short tenure was transitory and led to regional-generational shift facilitating the ascendency of Pothwar Generals. The Pothwar General although from the "martial race," came from relatively humble social origins. Since Pothwar is a primary troop recruiting area these generals had strong support among the rank and file. A number of them had been Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCOs). This commission was given to aspiring and ambitious native soldiers in the British Indian Army. These officers were traditional in outlook, inclined to respect chain of command and civilian supremacy. General Tikka Khan, who was Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army from 1972 to 1976, came from this background.

Another prominent officer with similar social origins, but different regional-generational background, was General Mohammad Musa Khan (from Hazara tribe in Baluchistan). He had also risen from the ranks to become Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army from 1958–1966.[535] These two generals were the only commanders-in-chief of the Pakistan Army who did not initiate coups d'état to become President.

In 1976 the generation of Pathan-Pothwar generals was still visible and would have continued to dominate had Bhutto not decided to select a junior corps commander—superseding seven Lt. Generals, as Chief of Army Staff. Had Bhutto given due weightage to the principle of seniority and professionalism, a Pothwar general would had succeeded the outgoing chief. However since the principle of seniority was

[535] General Musa, *From Sawar to a General*, Karachi, EWP, 1984. pp. 1–23.

completely ignored thus General Zia-ul-Haq the junior most corps commander was appointed Chief of Army Staff. The officers of the World War II years were being replaced by officers commissioned in the post-war years. This third generation of officers came from the lower-middle class, some from "non-martial" backgrounds. Their English was weak and they joined military not as a profession but as government job. During the war years, a crash programme of granting "temporary commissions" was initiated by the British. They were called Emergency Commission Officers (ECO's) and were to be discharged from service after the war.[536]

Table 6.2 Approximate Ethnic Group Strength of the Pakistan Military Officer Corps

Ethnic Group	First Estimate (Percentage)	Second Estimate (Percentage)
Punjabis	70	68
Pathans	15	15
Muhajirs	10	10
Baluchis and Sindhis	5	7
Total	100	100
Source: Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkestone: Kent, 1979), p. 129.		
Note : Estimates are based on interviews with military officers. The second estimate of 7% includes Balochis, Sindhis and Kashmiris.		

Selection of General Zia-ul-Haq as Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army coincided with a third-generation regional shift in the elite structure of the Pakistan Army. The earlier generation of generals manifested modern-western political orientations. General Zia ul Haq hailed from a non-martial family background. His father was an Imam—a religious preacher in the British Army. As a child Zia-ul-Haq grew up in an environment where observing religious rituals and saying daily prayers were a way of life. His admirers and contemporaries have described him as a "devoutly religious person."[537] General Zia ul Haq did not take too long to reveal his religious political outlook. He was brisk in replacing the Quaid-i-Azam's motto of Pakistan army—Unity, Faith and Discipline with Faith, Piety and Holy War (Jihad). As noted earlier, the chief of Pakistan army has played a crucial role, not only in shaping the elite groupings but also in influencing the political orientations of the military elites. This suggests that in 1971, as Bhutto assumed power, the Pakistan military elites were undergoing a generational-regional shift. The

[536] Stephen Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 42–43.

[537] K. M. Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977–1988*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995. p. 120.

generals were faction-ridden, but maintained organizational unity. Bhutto was skillful in managing this shift. However, in 1976, he failed to comprehend the generational-regional change that was in the offing. While he chose the army chief, selection of corps commanders remained with the army chief.

Instituting Changes in Military Command Structure

Bhutto was shrewd enough to recognize the military elites were divided and struggling to adapt, and he was quick to take advantage of the situation. His objective was clear and simple—establish personal and civilian supremacy over the military. As noted earlier, having initiated the purges and constitutional controls, Bhutto set out to bring changes in the institutional structure of the military. He devised a two pronged strategy:

1. reform the command structure of the armed forces.
2. reduce reliance on the military for maintaining law and order by creating paramilitary forces.

As a first step, Bhutto opted to co-opt and promote the Pothwar generals. In March 1972, recognizing that the Sandhurst officers and General Yahya's associates had lost credibility in the army and that patronizing the Pothwar officers would secure a sizeable constituency for him, Bhutto chose to appoint General Tikka Khan Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army (who was initially by-passed although he was senior to General Gul Hassan). It may well have been that Bhutto found it difficult to persuade General Gul Hasan to go along with his (Bhutto's) proposed reform of the command structure of the armed forces.

Bhutto abolished what he termed the "anachronistic and obsolete" post of the commander-in-chief: all the services' chiefs (the army, navy and the air force) were given same rank and seniority.[538] Besides the strong support base of General Tikka Khan within the army, Bhutto was encouraged to promote the general as he was receptive to the civilian supremacy of the armed forces. At the same time, Bhutto had announced the retirement of six senior air force officers, and had appointed Air Marshal Zafar Choudhary Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force.

His second step was to fix the tenure of the chief of stafff for a term of four years, later reduced to three years. Third, Bhutto decided to shift the Naval headquarters from Karachi to Islamabad, ostensibly to promote coordination among the services, but also have a close watch-over the navy's top brass. These changes were cosmetic, but the fact that Bhutto was able to enforce them indicated that the military elites were weak and reluctantly accepted civilian supremacy.[539]

[538] Bhutto, *President of Pakistan: Speeches and Statements, December 20, 1972–March 31, 1972*, p. 110.
[539] Lodi, *op.cit.,* pp. 650–651.

Having appointed a team of dependable chiefs of the services, Bhutto gradually moved to placate various elite groups in the military. For instance, General Fazal Muqueem an East Punjabi was appointed Secretary Ministry of Defense. At the same time, Bhutto began to supervise closely the promotions, posting and transfers of the officers above the rank of brigadier. He was known to ask political associates, as well as adversaries, about the political affiliations of various senior officer. He withheld approval of promotion of officers related to his political opponents.[540] These decisions created a commotion among the senior officers corps, who perceived them as interference in the affairs of the military.

Nordlinger has hypothesized a correlation between civilian interference in the affairs of the military and *coup d'état*.[541] He points out that in Egypt in 1952, King Farouk was overthrown by the army because he interfered in the internal affairs of the army. Similarly, in 1964, Brazilian President Goulart was overthrown by the military as he attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of the military. Nordlinger's argument can be generalized and has relevance to Pakistani case. In March 1973, a group of army officers led by retired Brigadier F. B. Ali and Colonel Alim Afridi, attempted a coup against the Bhutto regime. The leaders aimed at not only overthrowing Bhutto, but also unseating senior commanders who were collaborating with Bhutto.[542]

The attempted *coup* failed because the conspiring officers had a very narrow base and their organization was weak. The ring leaders of the coup were tried according to the military law (with General Zia-ul-Haq as the Military Judge); the conspiring officers were given long term imprisonment. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's military is that only those *coups* have succeeded which were led by the chief of staff of the Pakistan army (1958, 1969, and 1977). All those attempts made by the junior officers failed (1951, 1971, 1973).

In general, the army under the command of General Tikka Khan, remained supportive of the Bhutto regime. However, despite these changes of the command structure, Bhutto's control of the military was precarious.

Still Bhutto felt confident, and went on to pursue civilian control of the military. In March 1976, the regime issued a "White Paper on Higher Defense Organization."[543] The White Paper upheld the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and declared

[540] Interviews.

[541] Nordlinger, *op.cit*., pp. 71–73.

[542] The March 1973 abortive coup was called the Attock Conspiracy case; for an academic assessment, see Lodi, *op.cit.,* pp. 649–651. For two intensely personal and opposing points of view, see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated* ... (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 103– 104, and Retired Air Marshal Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics, 1958–1982* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983), pp. 92–94.

[543] For full test of the White Paper on Defense Organization, see *Defense Journal*, Vol. H, Nos. 7– 8 (July-August 1976), pp. 16–22.

that the Prime Minister was the chief executive of the state and that the ultimate responsibility of national defense would rest with him. The White Paper attributed the defeat of the military in 1971 to poor defense planning and emphasized the need for civilian supremacy. It stated:

> The evolution of the national defense policy and its administration requires: (a) effective political control at the top, both to secure the proper integration of the various relevant elements and to provide competent political guidance to the nation's defense effort; and (b) a number of institutions and agencies at the base, to produce the necessary data and appreciations on which political decisions can be based, and to translate the overall policy when formulated into specific, mutually consistent plans for implementation by the armed services and other agencies concerned.[544]

The new scheme decentralized power into different offices and institutions. The chief of staff of the army was put incharge of planning and conducting ground operations, and the chiefs of the air and naval staffs were responsible for air and sea operations. The position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was created. The chairman was to be senior to the three chiefs. He was to plan and conduct joint operations of the three services. The secretary general for defense was placed in charge of administration, while the minister of state for defense was in charge of internal security and was to coordinate defense related matters with the JCSC and the armed forces headquarters.

The function of promotion and appointments was, however, not centralized under the Ministry of Defense, as is usual in most countries. The three service chiefs continued to be responsible for this function in their respective services. Bhutto thought that giving this function to the chairman of the JCSC would make him too powerful. And, he found the military too closely knit and closed for a civilian defense minister (the portfolio he himself had) to take on this task. However, the Defense Ministry had the right to veto a promotion. Bhutto used this veto power a few times and was met with resentment bordering on uproar. But the service chiefs remained a force in making appointments.[545]

Bhutto's obvious strategy was to insure that no individual or group within the armed forces acquired a dominant position. General Tikka Khan, the chief of army staff, was rewarded for his loyalty and was appointed minister of state for defense. General Mohammad Sharif was appointed as the first chairman of JCSC. Both he and Khan were from Pothwar. In March 1976, General Zia-ul-Haq, a junior corps commander was promoted to chief of army staff, superseding seven generals; two resigned in protest. General Zia-ul-Haq was from East Punjab and remained the Chief of Army Staff (1976–

[544] *Ibid*., p. 17.
[545] Interviews. *Although Burki, Pakistan Under … op.cit*., mentions an informal three-member committee, p. 103.

1988). With hindsight it appears Bhutto for three years observed Zia ul Haq and found him docile, having humble social origins and apparently not ambitious. Bhutto under estimated Zia ul Haq and chose him as army chief. Fearful of military, Bhutto chose a junior officer hoping he would be loyal to him. He belonged to Armour corps and served for many years in Multan. His promotion further reinforced the perception among the military elite that Bhutto was setting aside the principle of seniority and professional competence, and was promoting political loyalists to the top positions.[546]

These changes had three effects. First, they sharpened the "Punjabization" of the Pakistan Army at the elite level and may have caused a commotion among the senior Pathan officers. Second, the perception among the military elites that Bhutto was interfering in the professional matters of the army produced a status deprivation syndrome. The military elites were already aware of their tarnished reputation. Bhutto's attempts to establish civilian supremacy undermined the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of the military. Third, it appeared that Bhutto failed to comprehend the organizational principles of the military, particularly at the top level, where relations among, generals are of a political rather than a disciplinary nature.

By making out-of-line promotions, Bhutto threatened the "gerontologic arrangement" within the armed forces.[547] The military elites began to perceive him as a threat to the very institution of the military and its autonomy. This pattern made Bhutto's hold over the military precarious.

Federal Security Force (FSF): Its Functions and Bhutto's Motives

Had Bhutto confined himself to merely tinkering with the command structure, the military elites might have tolerated his reformism. But, confronted with problems of labor unrest, civil strife and regionalism, Bhutto was on more than one occasion forced to call upon the army to restore law and order.[548] To enhance personal power, reduce reliance on the military, and to diminish the military's monopoly of coercive power, Bhutto created paramilitary institutions like the Federal Security Force (FSF). It was an important step in a country where the military's hegemony had never before been challenged, and it was to have important ramifications for the pattern of civil-military relations under Bhutto's regime.

The creation of a paramilitary force, more than anything, produced a status deprivation syndrome among the military elite.

Nordlinger says that the military is provoked when its corporate interests are challenged while Welch reminds us that the military can also be provoked if the

[546] Lodi, *op.cit.,* p. 652.

[547] For some useful insights on this point see Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1959), p. 297.

[548] For example, industrial unrest in Karachi, October–November 1972, and early 1973 in Baluchistan.

legitimacy of civilian political institutions is weak.[549] I will argue that the military in Pakistan perceived the FSF as a potential rival institution—a threat to their autonomy and monopoly of coercive power. Furthermore, the opposition political parties also saw the FSF as a threat to their interests. They perceived it as an instrument of state repression and challenged its legitimacy. Thus the military and the opposition political parties, both, for their own reasons remained skeptical about the functions of the FSF. Consequently, the FSF emerged as a crucial factor influencing the pattern of civil-military relations under the Bhutto regime.

In creating the FSF, Bhutto was clearly motivated by power considerations. His strategy was to regulate the politics of street protest, reduce civilian dependence on the military, and if possible, create an autonomous paramilitary force. This was reflected in a confidential letter that Bhutto wrote to his chief security officer:

> We are living in times of trouble and chaos. In these extraordinary conditions the law and order situation is often threatened. The people come out on the streets on the least pretext. They violently defy established authority. Many of them have now become experts in the art of guerrilla tactics. Bloody clashes lead to more bloody clashes and the situation deteriorates so much that it becomes necessary to call upon the armed forces to intervene. Once the armed forces intervene they play the game according to their own rules. It is necessary for a civilian government to avoid seeking the assistance of the armed forces in dealing with its responsibilities (emphasis added).

He went on to argue that, since the Pakistani police force is "terribly inadequate and badly equipped," it has problems of low morale and discipline. In view of these conditions, Bhutto asserted:

> We must make provisions for a first class reserve force. This must be a really first class force, well educated, well trained and well equipped. It should have a good image and it should be really the final repository for serious agitations and serious breaches of law and order.[550]

Bhutto's diagnosis of the problem was correct. He was perceptive enough to see a correlation between political disorder and possible military intervention. Given the history of the military's hegemony in Pakistan's politics, Bhutto had a lingering fear of a military take over. This was reinforced by the fact that Bhutto hailed from Sindh, a province not adequately represented in the Pakistan military. He had a popular support base in the Punjab, but he was uncertain about support from the military elites. In this

[549] Nordlinger, *op.cit.,* p. 75, Welch Claude and Smith, *Military role and Rule*, Belmount: California University Press, 1976. *op.cit.,* p. 249.

[550] For complete text of letter, See Annexure 26 on page a-68 in *White Paper* on the performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. Ill (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979).

ethno-political milieu, Bhutto's strategy was not only to control the military but also to control and suppress the opposition forces, which developed overtones of regional confrontation in Baluchistan.

With these considerations, the FSF was assigned to assist the civil administration in maintaining law and order in institutions of "unlawful demonstration" or "serious breaches of law and order."[551] Even though the officer corps of the force was to be recruited from among the armed forces, civil armed force and the police, it did not satisfy the opposition parties or the military because, in reality, the FSF developed into an instrument of repression.

The opposition political parties opposed the FSF from its very inception. They believed that in creating such a force Bhutto's sole purpose was to subdue the opposition. They saw the FSF as an instrument of Bhutto's personal hegemony. Bhutto did little to change this perception. In fact, the FSF became a symbol of the regime's autocracy and authoritarian tendencies. This brought into question the very legitimacy of the FSF.

In 1973, during the debate of the FSF bill in the National Assembly, the members of the opposition charged that the government was creating a "private army" of its own, a "rival army," and aimed to deny the people their basic fundamental rights.[552]

During the debate, the opposition charged that the regime was gagging freedom of speech. Some members of the opposition pointed out that a number of political parties in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan had been disrupted by the FSF.[553] On more than one occasion (e.g. the Liaquat Bagh incident in 1973, the assault on a former federal minister and PPP leader J. A. Rahim in 1974), the FSF was believed to have been involved in acts of repression and coercion.[554] In November 1975, during a National Assembly debate, the PPP proposed the adoption of the Fourth Constitutional amendment, limiting dissent and extending executive control over the judiciary. The opposition fiercely protested the motion and adopted an unusual method of protest—one member called for the prayer, the rest of the opposition members joined in the prayer and then set down in the Assembly chambers. When the Speaker of the House had adjourned the proceedings, the FSF was called in and some of the opposition members were beaten and carried out of the Assembly. There was a fundamental difference of opinion between the regime and the opposition on the uses and functions of the FSF. The opposition believed that the FSF was meant to give Bhutto an autonomous base of coercive power, they did not like it. Two opposition stalwarts, Professor Abdul Ghafoor

[551] *The Gazette of Pakistan*, Extra, June 29, Islamabad, 1973, p. 667.
[552] National Assembly Debates, 1 June 1973. Main Mohmood Ali Qasuri, Prof. Adul Ghafoor, Adbul Hamid Jatoi critics of the F.S.F. Bill, pp. 411–16, 446–453.
[553] *Ibid., op.cit.,* pp. 447, 453.
[554] For the opposition's charges, see *Debates, op.cit*., pp. 436–444; also *White Paper*, Vol. III, pp. 107–117.

and M. A. Qasuri, even proposed that the FSF be placed under army control.[555] Thus the FSF was born with misgivings, and Bhutto could never win popular legitimacy for it. Had Bhutto used the FSF sparingly and with restraint, it might have gained some acceptability.

As noted in the beginning of this section, the military perceived the FSF as a potential rival. Lost of status loomed larger in their perception than any threat of inadequate budgetary support. Nordlinger's assertion that a large militia reduces the military's ability to insure adequate budgetary support, thereby leading to a sharp decline in the size of the military, was not the case in Bhutto's Pakistan. The total expenditure on the police and civil armed forces for the fiscal year 1976–77 amounted to Rs. 521.8 million (of this the, FSF's share was only Rs. 107.7 million) a figure significantly less than Rs. 8.1 billion defense budget for the same year (see Table 6.1). The size of Pakistan's military in Bhutto's reign rose from 300,000 to 400,000.

In 1977, the FSF had 20,000 servicemen. It had acquired a sophisticated communications network, possessed modern light weapons, and was visible not only in crowd control but also in VIP protection. Most of these functions had previously been monopolized by the military. Despite a large defense budget, it was the special status of the FSF that irked the military officer corps. According to Shirin Tahir Kheli, "there was a good deal of resentment against the special status it [FSF] enjoyed and the rapidity with which did had acquired this status."[556] In July 1977 when the military overthrow the Bhutto regime, one of its first acts was to disband the FSF.

In addition to their visible losses, there were instances where the military elites perceived that their privileges and autonomy were in jeopardy. For example, in November 1975, the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill was adopted by the National Assembly.[557] This enabled the regime to second any officer for service into civil armed forces of Pakistan. The previous practice had allowed only those officers who volunteered to join the civil armed forces to be seconded. Now the regime could transfer the army officers to the civil armed services.

In yet another reformist move in January 1977, Bhutto reduced the size of landholding to 100 acres of irrigated and 200 acres of non-irrigated land. This affected a large segment of officer corps. A precise figure is difficult to give. Under General Ayub Khan, a land grant scheme was introduced, according to this officers between the rank of colonel and general could be granted 150–240 acres of land. Bhutto's reform meant that officers would have to surrender part of their land. This was sufficient to cause

[555] Debates, 1 June 1973, *op.cit*., pp. 447–448.

[556] Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan. The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 69.

[557] The Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill was adopted by the Assembly on 7 November 1975. see Debates, 7 November 1975, p. 379.

disaffection among the senior officer corps with Bhutto's regime. The military elites saw this as another status depriving move.[558] There is no evidence to suggest whether Bhutto had carefully examined how this measure might affect the military elites.

By the mid-1970's, two trends were visible. First, the military was no longer an attractive career, as had been the case in the 1960's when, for both patriotic and economic reasons, a military career was considered attractive by the middle classes. The military lost of prestige after the 1971 war also dampened patriotic zeal. In the face of inflation and other economic challenges, even those who had economic motives in joining the military for social advancement became less attractive (precise figures are not available to support this assertion).

Second, the outflow of semi-skilled workers, peasants and other artisans to the Gulf States also caused concern among the military officers because they had to compete with Gulf countries, which were a more attractive alternative. By 1981, it was estimated that more than 1.2 million Pakistanis were serving in the Gulf region, sending back $ 2.25 billion annually to Pakistan—making this the largest foreign exchange earning category.[559] This boom came later, in the mid-1970's; the outflow of manpower was perceived by the military elites as undermining its institutional interests. To arrest this trend Junior Cadet Academy was initiated at Mangle in 1982. The scheme aimed at recruiting young high school students, who could be selected as potential army officers and after due selection sent to PMA (Kakul).

In the Pakistani case, my findings suggest that Nordlinger's argument is applicable to the extent that perceptions about military autonomy and rival paramilitary institutions influenced the military elite's attitude toward the civilian regime. His point about inadequacy of budgetary support for defense may be examined in a different light. That is, it may be the adequacy of defense budget and not necessarily inadequacy which encourages the military to intervene in politics.

Bhutto's Foreign Policy Goals and the Military

As noted earlier, Bhutto's strategy was to reduce the probability of the military's intervention in politics, and not to reduce the defense budget. Bhutto desired a politically docile but military well equipped, trained and professionally competent armed forces. Bhutto had two goals in maintaining a sizeable defense establishment. First, he believed that for an independent and active foreign policy a military strong Pakistan was a must. Second, through adequate defense expenditures, he thought he could appease the military. I will analyze how Bhutto's perception of Pakistan's security needs and foreign policy goals influenced the pattern of civil-military relations.

[558] Shirin Taher-Kheli, "Defense Planning in Pakistan," in Stepnaie G. Neuman (ed.), *Defense Planning in Less industrialized States* (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 212.
[559] Interviews.

Bhutto had concrete views on the kind of role Pakistan should play in the comity of nations. He identified these in terms of security needs, geo-political location, relations with great powers, historical ties with the Muslim world, and advocacy and support for Third World causes.[560]

Bhutto envisioned an independent foreign policy for Pakistan. I will focus on those issues and relations where Bhutto demonstrated what he meant by independent foreign policy. First, in a series of highly publicized foreign policy decisions, Bhutto recognized the Democratic People's Republic Korea (North Korea), German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. At the same time, he developed close relations with China, the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), Romania and North Korea. He was quick to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries. In addition, Pakistan's diplomatic corps were instructed to support a number of liberation movements in Africa. He was also outspoken in denouncing the military overthrow of Allende's government in Chile. Bhutto sought to play an influential role in the economic struggle of the Third World countries against the advanced industrial states.[561]

These foreign policy changes had an impact on the ideological consciousness of the people, gave popular legitimacy to the regime and reinforced Bhutto's radical-nationalist image. Thus Bhutto attempted to convey that, whereas the earlier military regimes in Pakistan had subordinated Pakistan's national interests to "imperialist interests," under the civilian regime, a change in the new direction was taking place.

Second, Bhutto carefully expanded and consolidated Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world. He was able to cultivate relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, and the Gulf States. In February 1974, Bhutto played an active role in organizing the Second Islamic Conference, in which 37 Muslim countries participated. (Bhutto was chosen as its first President and retained the position until his execution in April 1979.) This provided Bhutto with an opportunity to develop close personal relations with a number of leaders of the Muslim world. Speaking on the occasion, Bhutto linked the cause of Muslim countries with the Third World countries.

[I]t is inherent in our purpose that we promote solidarity of the Third World. This solidarity is based on human and not on ethnic factors. This solidarity reflects the similarity of the historic experiences of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

[560] For an interesting insight on Bhutto's perceptions for Pakistan's role in international systems, see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *New Directions* (London: Namara, 1977).
[561] For an excellent analysis see Aijaz Ahmed, "Democracy and Dictatorship," in Gardezi and Rashid, *op.cit*., p. 105.

It may well be that, in the cause of the Third World, and in humanity's struggle towards balanced world order, we, the Muslim's, are now being called upon to play a central role.[562]

It was this kind of thinking that influenced Bhutto's attitude toward the military. He believed Pakistan could pursue an active foreign policy if it had a sound defense establishment. It was with these considerations that Bhutto encouraged affinity among Muslim countries and was able to secure considerable monetary help from the rich oil producing countries and later for the defense needs of Pakistan. For example, with Libyan financial support, Bhutto established the Mirage fighter aircraft rebuilding plant, the Karachi Steel Mill with Soviet help, and the Indus Highway, Lowari Pass Tunnel, and the Nuclear Power Development Program to mention a few. He also expanded the existing defense-related exchange programs, particularly with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Increased number of officer corps from these countries received training in Pakistan's military and air force academies. The number of military "missions" in the Middle Eastern countries increased. (In 1982 Pakistan had 22 military missions in Arab States). Pakistan provided military advisors in number of countries from Morocco to Sudan, Libya and the Gulf States. According to one estimate, in 1984 Pakistan had as many as 30,000 troops in Saudi Arabia.[563]

Bhutto's emphasis on the unity of the Muslim world and the increase in the number of military missions in the Arab countries had two kinds of effects on the military. First, it reinforced the ideologically conservative trend among the military elite. Posts in the Arab countries were monetarily very lucrative and helped the officer crops enhance their material and social well being. Second, a foreign policy with an expanding defense establishment did not dampen the military elite's ambition to intervene in politics.

Third, the most important influence has been the changing nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations under Bhutto. Apparently Bhutto re-evaluated the nature of U.S-Pakistan relations as he assumed power in 1971. He explained this re-evaluation in terms of changes in objectives, conditions and geo-political realities.[564] His critics charged that this was another facet of Bhutto's opportunism.[565]

Let us briefly contrast Bhutto's perceptions of the United States before and after he assumed power. From 1967 to 1971, when Bhutto was out of power, he denounced Pakistan's membership of the U.S.-Pakistan CENTO and SEATO pacts.[566] He charged

[562] Bhutto, *New Directions, op.cit*., pp. 88–89.
[563] Interviews.
[564] Tahir-Kheli, *op.cit.,* pp. 54–55.
[565] Wali Khan, *op.cit*., pp. 48–49.
[566] See, for example, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1978), pp. 111–113.

that Pakistan's interests were subordinated to the interests of the United States. He asserted:

> We had been completely isolated from therest of the world. Pakistan's foreign policy had chained the people. We had to obey what the United States ordered us to do Our policies were those of SEATO and CENTO. The U.S. ambassador could keep Pakistan's policyin line with Washington's.[567]

This rhetoric can be attributed to Bhutto's penchant for the grandstand play. However, his anti-Americanism did help him in winning the 1970 elections.

Once in power, Bhutto found that changed geo-political realities demanded a continued alliance with the United States. Bhutto was forced to face this reality in view of Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, China-U.S. reapproachment, and the Pakistan military's need for the U.S. equipment. It is conceivable that the military itself was a potent factor in retaining an alliance with the United States. The Pakistani military had links with the Pentagon and the State Department which had developed and endured during different military regimes in Pakistan, and Bhutto was not prepared to disturb this linkage. In fact, the foreign policy goals he envisioned for the "new" Pakistan made it imperative to have sustained relations with the United States.[568]

Bhutto's strategy was to insure the flow of U.S. military equipment. He not only believed that U.S. had superior technology, but that such equipment was needed for Pakistan's security needs. The 1971 was had cost Pakistan about $ 200 million in military equipment. To replace this. Pakistan purchased equipment of $115 million worth of equipment from different sources. In addition, China provided Pakistan with military equipment worth $65 million.[569] In 1972, Pakistan spent almost one-third of its total government budget on defense.

Despite this, Bhutto was keen to get the U.S. arms embargo on Pakistan lifted. The United States had imposed the embargo on arms sale to Pakistan in 1965 after the Indo-Pakistan war. In 1973, Bhutto visited the United Sates and attempted to negotiate the lifting of the embargo, but found President Nixon overwhelmed with Watergate. Bhutto was able to win the support of Nixon Administration. In 1975, Bhutto again visited the United States, and this time the ban was lifted. Bhutto took pride in and credit for negotiating the lift on this ten-year arms embargo.

In 1976, Bhutto ran in trouble with the United States. The issue was the acquisition of a nuclear processing plant. In 1974, India had exploded a nuclear device. This revived Pakistan's insecurity syndrome. In response, Bhutto first sought guarantees from the

[567] Cited in Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan ... op.cit.*, p. 55.
[568] Thair-kheli, *op.cit*., pp. 54–55.
[569] *Ibid*., p. 57.

Western nuclear powers. Unable to secure such guarantees, he decided to go for the nuclear option.[570] Bhutto's primary considerations were not only the security threat from India; he hoped that Pakistan would be the first Muslim country to have a nuclear bomb. He thought it would give him great leverage in pursuing an active policy in the Muslim world and mobilized the support of the Muslim countries toward this end. It was in 1976 that Bhutto signed an agreement with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant. The U.S. government attempted to dissuade both France and Pakistan from making such a deal, but did not succeed.[571] After the nuclear deal, relations between the Bhutto regime and the United States deteriorated. President Carter's administration was publicly hostile to the Bhutto regime's insistence on pursuing a nuclear option. In July 1977 when, after wide spread protest, the Bhutto regime was overthrown by the military, there were speculation and reports of the United States having encouraged the military takeover.[572]

Conclusion

Bhutto's domestic and foreign policy goals had contradictory effects in influencing the pattern of civil-military relations. In Bhutto's last political statement, his principal argument was that his regime was overthrown by the generals, who were encouraged by the United States to restrain him from pursuing a nuclear weapons development program.[573] Bhutto also alleged that the opposition-led protest movement against his regime was financed by an outside power (implying the United States). These allegations were refuted by the military regime, which did not abandon the nuclear program. However, Bhutto's supporters continue to believe that U.S. involvement was a major factor in Bhutto's downfall and his execution.[574]

Domestically, the military elites felt status deprivation and threats to their autonomy, externally an activist foreign policy, identification with Third World, the Muslim connection and the nuclear option increased military's desire to intervene rather than accept civilian supremacy. The leadership of both, the PPP and opposition political parties squandered an opportunity of democratic development in Pakistan. On 5th July 1977 the military intervened to restore its hegemonic position.

Bhutto's plan to establish civilian control over the military by appeasing Pakistan's defense needs did not lead to acceptance of civilian supremacy: his tactics to control the military by imposing constitutional constraints, change of the command structure, and creation of the FSF also caused commotion among the military elite. Bhutto's excessive

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[570] *Ibid*., p. 58.
[571] *Ibid*., pp. 123–124.
[572] *Ibid., op.cit*., pp. 127–128; also Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan and India: Policies, Personalities and Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*; Vol. VIII, No. 7 (July 1978), pp. 717–725.
[573] Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated ... op.cit*., pp. 143–158.
[574] Sh. Rashid Senior Vice President of the PPP in an Interview stated "I believe that U.S threatened Mr. Bhutto" for full text of the interview see *Herald*, Karachi; Vol 18, No. 6, June 1987. pp 136–141.

zeal in disengaging the military from politics proved to be his most serious error. His strategics and tactics conveyed the impression that, more than just civilian control of the military, he wanted to establish personal hegemony. In a polity where military hegemony was the historical pattern, personal hegemony was feeble alternative. In a post-military hegemonic political system, the civilian successors can have a lingering fear of a possible military intervention. Given the history of the military's hegemony in Pakistan, Bhutto had reason to be concerned about the prospects of a coup, particularly after the 1973 abortive attempt. I have discussed various means that Bhutto employed to restrict the political role of the army. Bhutto found it difficult to develop consensus among other political parties in restricting the role of the military in politics. The FSF and its uses became a major cause of conflict between the PPP regime and opposition parties. Bhutto's inability to persuade the opposition political leadership or opposition political parties, reluctance to evolve consensus in restricting the role of military in politics became an impediment in establishing civilian control over the military.

7

MILITARY HEGEMONY: POLICIES AND LEGACIES

On assuming power General Zia ul Haq conveyed the image of political novice and a reluctant ruler, but in reality very cautiously and carefully consolidated personal power. In his opening speech, after the takeover he, extended two reasons for the military's intervention. Firstly, the country was on the threshold of a civil war. Secondly, Islam had not been effectively put into practice in Pakistani society. He revealed his ideological affinity with PNA protest movement, when he claimed:

> I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. This is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.[575]

Although Zia spoke of return to democracy and promised holding elections within 90 days, he insisted that the fears of a civil war and demand for an Islamic system necessitated military take over. General Zia ul Haq and his associates were aware that under the 1973 constitution the overthrow of an elected government was an "act of treason." Therefore the regime took refuge in Islam and sought public legitimacy through Islamization. One of the first steps of the Zia regime was to hold the constitution in "abeyance" and take government and opposition leaders into "protective custody."

What prompted the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army to overthrow an elected government Accounts vary and are intensely personal, subjective and some are apparently an effort to exonerate oneself. The accounts provided by military officers who were either involved in the planning of 1977 coup or were working with General Zia convey the impression that neither Bhutto was sincere nor the PNA leaders were inclined to reach an agreement. The military elites believed that PPP-PNA confrontation had produced a crisis of legitimacy for Bhutto regime. They also maintain that the differences between the two sides were irreconcilable.[576] These beliefs about Bhutto regime's legitimacy (or illegitimacy) provided the military with an opportunity to intervene and overthrow the government. Therefore, General Zia ul Haq had little

[575] For text of Zia's speech see, *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, July 6, 1977.

[576] Faiz Ali Chishti, *Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan,* Delhi, Tricolor Books, 1989. p. 64. K. M. Arif, Working with Zia, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1995. pp. 104–106. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Memoires of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Karachi, Oxford University, 1993, pp. 406–408. Brigadier Syed A. I. Trimizi, Profiles of Intelligence, Lahore, Trimizi, 1995, pp. 240–242.

choice except to overthrow the Bhutto government. However, Brig Trimizi hastens to add that foreign money was also used to destabilize the Bhutto government.

This provides insight into the perceptions of the military elites. The argument is weak on three counts. First, the chief of the army staff and his colleagues were fully informed about the negotiation process. As the civilian negotiators struggled to resolve their differences, the military elite began to develop ambitions for power. Second, between March–May 1977, when political opposition and protests were at their peak an atmosphere of distrust developed not only between the PPP and PNA but also between the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff.[577] Third, given this distrust, the Chief of the Army Staff and his close associates knew that if an accord between PPP-PNA was reached, the "treason clause" of the constitution would have serious implications for them. None of the accounts given by the army officers respond to this. The political leaders who were involved in the PPP-PNA negotiations convey the impression that the military intervened at a time when an accord for political settlement between the two sides had been reached. Professor Ghafoor Ahmed of Jamaat-i-Islami claims that Prime Minister Bhutto had virtually conceded to all the principal demands of the opposition, most importantly of holding fresh election;[578] Implying thereby that military intervention at such a late stage was unwarranted. Further research is needed to understand the 'circumstances' and the 'motives' of the coup makers. Here our concern is to explain and analyze a larger question: How was the military hegemonic political system resurrected and consolidated under the regime of General Zia ul Haq?

The group of army officers who came to dominate and control decision making in Pakistan shared a number of characteristics. Almost all of them obtained commission during 1945–1949. They had similar social class origins, educational background, combat experiences, attitude towards political process and ideological orientation. In the formative phase of their careers they were exposed to the experience of military action during the IInd World War and also saw liberation of India and Pakistan from a distance. Most of them went through military action as Majors and Colonels during the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. As Brigadiers during the 1971 war they experienced the humiliation of defeat: Most of them were promoted Major-Generals and Corps Commander during the mid 1970s.[579] They were conscious and sensitive about senior command's failures during 1971 war. They also believed that Bhutto was equally responsible for the breakup of the country and humiliation of the armed forces of Pakistan. Having reached the top echelons of Pakistan army, they espoused the middle

[577] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If Iam Assassinated*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979.
[578] Most of the political leaders have written their interpretation of events in Urdu. For example, See, Sardar Abdul Qayyyum Khan, *Muzzakraat Sey Marshal La Tek,* Lahore, Jang Publishers. 1987. pp. 85–88. Maulana Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line Kut Gai*, Lahore, Jang Publishers. Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, *Phir Marshal Law A'Gia*. Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1988. pp. 213–256. For a sympathetic view towards PPP and its position in negotiations See Azhar Sohail, Jamal Zia Kay Girran Saab, Lahore, Feroz Sons, 1988. pp. 27–32.
[579] Interviews.

class values and sought identification with the middle classes. They found the conduct and behavior of political leaders and parliamentarians unsatisfactory and were somewhat disillusioned by the unprincipled nature of politics in the country. These negative images and unsatisfactory political environment facilitated development of ambitions to replace the political structure and institute military control. In terms of ideological orientation these officers were generally conservative, social promiscuity and political liberalism was perceived by them as undermining the religious values, therefore they went along with Zia's ideological orientation and did not resist politics of Islamization. It must be reiterated that ideological unity among the senior military commanders is an important factor that helps them to maintain internal cohesion and effectively deal with those who are ideologically opposed to the regime.

The regime unfolded its strategy gradually and cautiously. General Zia ul Haq was much more vigorous and systematic in pursuing military's hegemony as compared to any previous military ruler in Pakistan. The regime assigned itself the twin tasks of deconstruction of the politico-economic structures that were built by the PPP regime and resurrection of the processes and institutions that would strengthen the military's hegemony. To achieve these objectives he ventured to evolve a new coalition of interest groups-comprising of religious groups, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami, landowning elite and Pirs from Sindh and Punjab, who were opposed to the PPP, trader-merchants, industrialists, selected members of the legal community and the judiciary.

The military regime's strategy under Zia can be divided into four phases. In the first phase, 1977–79, the regime's primary objective was to ensure demobilization of the PPP and seek cooperation of PNA leadership. In the second phase, 1979–83, the regime distanced itself from political parties in general, intensified coercion and began to expand corporate interests of the military. The effort was to create a 'partie military'— an aggregation of interests that would accept military's hegemony and advocate its interests. In the third phase, 1983–85, under increased pressure from opposition parties coalition, i.e., Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and the U.S., the regime conceded limited political participation and agreed to hold partyless elections in 1985. This phase of limited political participation paved the way for a fourth phase of ostensibly partyless parliamentary democracy but with a strong and interventionist presidency during 1985–88. For sustaining and expanding the coalition the regime used the following policy instruments:

1. Political control and political inclusion.
2. Political exclusion.
3. Islamization and Ideological "cleansing."
4. Promotion of corporate interests of the military.
5. Economic policies and strategic alliance with the United States

Political Control and Political Inclusion

The regime initiated a process of political inclusion and political control. As part of inclusionary process, it began to cultivate PNA leadership to support and become part of the regime. On the other end through various control measures, the regime made large scale arrests of the PPP workers and leaders.

Between July and September 1977, the regime conveyed the impression (and conducted itself in a manner) that it lacked effective control and sense of direction. The regime released Bhutto on July 8, and to its surprise found that despite the PNA movement he had not lost popular support.[580] It was evident that if elections were to be held Bhutto and his party would win again. Fearing his return to power a section of the press portrayed Bhutto as a criminal, who had engineered the murder of his political opponents.[581] Thereby creating a political and social environment in which those leaders who were hostile to Bhutto began to demand his trial and execution.

Through his autocratic style and behavior Bhutto had alienated many political leaders of the opposition. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Pir Pagaro, Musheer Pesh Imam, Sardar Sher Baz Mazari gave statements to this effect.[582] A section of the judiciary also joined the chorus, when on August 30, 1977, four former judges of the Supreme and High Courts of Pakistan, issued a joint statement demanding the trial of Bhutto for committing crimes against Pakistan.[583] Simultaneously, during this period General Zia ul Haq held private meetings with eminent lawyers and jurists like A. K. Brohi, Justice Hamood ur Rehman, Justice Qadeer Khan, who conveyed to him that martial law could be defended and that he should try to expose the "brutalities" of Bhutto regime. While political leaders like Mian Tufail Mohammad (JI), Chaudhry Zahur Ellahi (ML), a veteran Sindhi and former chief minister, Ayub Khoro, and Khan Abdul Wali Khan, in their private meetings urged Zia ul Haq not to hold elections, but initiate process of accountability on the misdeeds of Bhutto government. These leaders impressed upon General Zia ul Haq that Bhutto is "vindictive," "crooked" and could not be trusted. After these meetings General Zia ul Haq made up his mind in devising a strategy against the person of Bhutto. The political leaders main priority and attitude was that trial and accountability of Bhutto should take place first, elections could be held later.[584]

Given this environment of public and private hostility, the regime rearrested the former prime minister in September 1977 and the State of Pakistan reopened a case of murder

[580] On July 28, 1977 Bhutto along with other PNA leaders was released. On 8th August, he arrived from Multan to Lahore and was given a rousing reception by his supporters, for details, see *Daily Jang*, Lahore, 29 July, 9 August, 1977.
[581] See, *Nawa-i-Waqat*, Lahore 27 July, 6 August, 1977.
[582] See, *Daily Jang*, Lahore, 30 August, 1977, 31 August, 2 September.
[583] *Ibid*., 31 August 1977.
[584] For details of the meetings see, K. M. Arif, *op. cit.,* pp. 135–144.

against him.[585] (On 11th November 1974, this case was instituted against Bhutto by Ahmed Reza Kasuri, whose father was killed in the incident and he registered in the First Information Report (FIR) Bhutto as principal suspect of the murder). During the first year of his rule Zia chose a cabinet comprising of (15 to 20 persons) military elites, senior bureaucrats, lawyers, industrialists, technocrats and a segment of non-partisan feudals. The decision making was dominated by the military-bureaucratic elites. Court proceedings had already been initiated against Bhutto and by August 1978, General Zia was able to co-opt the PNA leadership. In his new cabinet out of 21 ministers, 13 were from the various components of the PNA. For the first time in its history Jamaat-i-Islami shared power. It was given the Ministries of Information and Broadcasting, Water and Power, and Production. The important cabinet portfolios were either held by Zia or his military men, the PNA leaders became part of the regime and its policies. Throughout the period of Bhutto's trial (August 1978–April 1979) these cabinet ministers remained part of the military regime. It was only after the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave a verdict against Bhutto that the PNA cabinet members decided to disassociate themselves from the military regime.[586] By co-opting the PNA leadership, General Zia was able to convey to the Pakistani public and the world that the PNA leaders ship was a silent partner in upholding the execution of Bhutto.

Between 1977–79 the regime of General Zia ul Haq skillfully cultivated the judiciary. The Chief Justices of the High Courts were made Provincial Governors. Those judges who were reluctant to pursue the goals of the military regime were either removed or allowed to seek pre-mature retirement.[587] The principal dilemma before the Higher Courts was whether to uphold military take over as constitutionally valid or invalid. To legitimize the extra-constitutional action of General Zia ul Haq, the Higher Courts of Pakistan relied on the "doctrine of necessity." The doctrine stated that the action of the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) was extra-constitutional, yet since it was taken as a necessity in the interest of the state, for the welfare of its people, the judicial authorities should accept it as valid. In its judgment the Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted validation of Zia's martial law on the condition that he would hold fair and free elections in the shortest possible time.[588]

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[585] On Sept. 3, 1977 Bhutto was arrested from his house and brought to Lahore under the supervision of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). He was charged for murder and conspiracy to murder. *Jang*, Lahore, 4 September, 1979.

[586] On March 19, 1978 the Lahore High Court full bench found Bhutto guilty of murder along with four others for killing Nawab Ahmed Raza Kasuri and gave death sentence to him on 25th March 1978. He filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging this decision. On August 14, 1978 some parties of PNA, joined Zia cabinet. In March 1979, Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision and sentenced Bhutto to death, he was executed on 4th April 1979.

[587] In September 1977 Yaqub Ali Khan, Chief Justice of Supreme Court was removed from office.

[588] For details see "*Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs Chief of Army Staff etc*." PLD, 1977 Supreme possible to validate the extra-constitutional action of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, not only for the reason that he stepped in to save the country at a time of grave national crisis and constitutional breakdown, but also because of the solemn pledge given by him that the period of constitutional deviation shall be of as short a duration as possible, and that during this period all his energies shall be directed towards creating conditions conducive to the holding of free

General Zia ul Haq interpreted it to mean that the Supreme Court had empowered him to amend the 1973 constitution. Therefore he established a system of military courts parallel to the existing civilian courts. Initially the military courts were to try offenders of martial law.[589] But, subsequently, the jurisdiction of military courts was expanded at the expense of Higher Courts. The regime made mass arrests of political opponents and dissidents. These political detinues sought justice through the courts, but the regime restricted the powers of the Civil and High Courts. Faced with military's hegemony the courts began to reassert themselves seeking the acquisition of their lost power and autonomy. They questioned the legitimacy of the military courts. The courts asserted that they had the power of judicial review to judge the validity of any action of the Martial Law Authorities. This was discomforting for the military regime.

To counter these moves, the CMLA responded by issuing the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) in March 1981.[590] The judges of the Supreme, High and Federal Shariat courts were required to take new oath of office to uphold the PCO. A few judges of the Supreme and High Courts resigned but by and large they complied with the order.[591] These measures marginalized the effectiveness of judiciary and helped the regime to include new sets of individuals and groups in the ruling coalition, thereby, consolidating military hegemony. The PCO had judicial and political implications. On the judicial side, the PCO terminated the right of the judiciary to review the constitutionality and legality of the politically important civil rights and restricted their powers to issue bail before arrest. The PCO also withdrew the court's right to insist on the holding of elections to the parliament.

On the political side the PCO provided for the formation of a Federal Council (Majlis-e-Shoora) to be nominated by the President. Invoking article 4 of the PCO on 11th January 1982, the President created a Federal Council consisting of 288 members.[592] With this action Zia ul Haq was able to induct a large number of individuals into positions of power and decision making whose names were recommended by Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, after careful scrutiny. Most of them were notables in their districts and were willing to serve under a non-representative system. The Federal Council was accountable to Zia alone; it had no representative character. This changed

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and fair elections, leading to the restoration of the democratic rule in accordance with the dictates of the constitution." (P 723)

[589] For this purpose through a Martial Law regulation No. 21, of 1977 a constitutional amendment was made and article 212-A was inserted in the 1973 constitution.

[590] Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981 promulgated on March 24, 1981.

[591] The following judges resigned Anwar ul Haq, chief justice, Durab Pattel, Fakharuddin G. Ibrahim, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain (Supreme Court), Zaki-uddin Paul, K. M. Samdani, Aftab Farrukh, Amer Raza A. Khan, Khawaja Habibullah, Khalil ur Rehman, Khurshid; (Punjab High Court) G. M. Shah, Abdul Hafeez Memon (Sindh High Court) Khuda Bukhsh Marri, chief justice, M. A. Rasheed (Baluchistan High Court).

[592] (PCO) On December 24, 1981, the President created a federal Majlis-e-Shoora comprising of 350 members.

the basis, style and recruitment process of political leadership. The Federal Council was assigned four primary tasks:

1. to accelerate the process of Islamization.
2. to create conditions and plans for Islamic democracy.
3. to advise government on national and international matters.
4. to assist government in over-coming the social and economic difficulties.

The PCO, not only altered the relationship between judiciary and military, but also redefined the basis of who were "politically relevant" and "politically powerful." Once the Federal Council was created, a number of new individuals became available to articulate the interests and policies of the military regime. These new set of individuals were socialized to work under military patronage. They were socially conservative, non-representative in character, and laid the foundations of a new style of political leadership.

The new groups lacked legitimacy and popular support base, as they were chosen by Zia and not by the electorate. Therefore this new leadership preferred display of their newly acquired power. Lacking legitimacy, these members were anxious to portray their symbols of power and authority by using government number plates on their vehicles, by carrying armed guards (preferably equipped with Klashenkofs) and by influence peddling in the district administration.

The creation of the Federal Council further weakened the structure of political parties. For gaining position of power, and access to government, the political parties became irrelevant. Those who worked with Federal Council also acquired experience in the functioning of the government. By interacting with the civil and military bureaucracies they not only gained experience, but were also able to appreciate their thinking and working, and provided an opportunity to advance their personal and group interests. A number of these individuals contested the 1985 elections.

Thus, during the period 1979–85 Zia created a political constituency, a set of individuals, who were to emerge as advocates and proponents of the 'partie military,' thereby consolidating the hegemony of the military in the political process. In 1985, when Zia allowed restricted elections and restored a system of guided parliamentary politics, a set of leadership had been groomed, trained and accepted, who would be willing to share power with the military and not demand transfer of power.

Political Exclusion

The regime devised legal and extra-legal means to exclude the PPP, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his family from the political process. In addition through various Ordinances and Laws, at times use of force, it sought the political exclusion of groups like students, labor, lawyers, women and also political parties that were unwilling to conform to

military rule. The regime made a conscious and effective use of terror as an instrument of political exclusion, I will briefly describe the policies that the regime initiated to create a psychological environment in which political opposition of the regime became extremely difficult.

The regime was adroit in targeting groups for political exclusion. It made large scale arrests of the PPP workers to demobilize and exclude the party from the political process. To ensure elimination of Bhutto, the regime leveled the charge that he had ordered the murder of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, a dissident PPP leader, (which caused the death of his father,) and initiated trial against Bhutto. Simultaneously, the regime sought and developed alliances with social and political groups that were opposed to Bhutto. Having eliminated Bhutto through the judicial process in April 1979, the regime proceeded to hold local bodies elections, on non-party basis in September 1979. The results of the local bodies elections did not turn out to be according to the desired goals of the regime, because a number of the PPP members or sympathizers emerged as successful candidates. The regime did not hesitate to cancel the election of a number of undesirable successful candidates.

Pressure was built around the Bhutto family, and Begum Nusrat Bhutto
and Benazir Bhutto were put under arrest for prolonged periods.[593] A large number of the PPP leaders and workers were forced to seek political asylum outside Pakistan. Despite the weakness of its organization, arrests of its top leadership, the party survived and continued to retain its popular support base. On a few occasions to counter regime coercion, a faction of the PPP leadership indulged in terrorist tactics.[594] But without much success. The Zia regime was skillful in managing the PPP. It was effective in controlling its leadership from launching any large scale protest movement. It was only in 1986 that under increased domestic and external pressure, particularly, from the U.S. that the PPP was allowed to demonstrate its popular support base.[595]

The industrial labor was coerced into submission. Union activities were banned and strikes in the industries were declared illegal. In 1978, the labor protest at Colony Textile Mills, Multan was suppressed through exemplary use of force. After that the industrial labor did not pose any serious threat for the regime.

During the 1977–83 period, the Zia regime acted in concert with religious right for ideological "cleansing" of the universities and colleges. Liberal, secular, student organizations and those having links with the PPP were targeted for political exclusion.

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[593] Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1988. pp. 148–214, also 218–220.

[594] Alzulfikar—a militant armed wing of the PPP was created by Mir Murtaza and Shah Nawaz Bhutto sons of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. It is alleged that the organization had connections with Indian Intelligence agency RAW and indulged in terrorist activities.

[595] See Rao Rashid, "Pakistan's winter politicians" *The Nation, Lahore*, July 8, 1992.

Zia regime did not restrain Islami Jamiat Tulba (IJT) from unleashing terror. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr an Iranian born U.S. based scholar has done extensive research on Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat and its politics during 1977–89. His research led him to conclude that (Jamiat) "collaborated closely with Zia regime in suppressing the PPP. It used government patronage to weaken the left on Pakistani campuses and served as a check on the urban activities of Al-Zulfiqar, the PPP clandestine organization."[596] The policy choice of Islamization advocated by the regime was used to its advantage by the IJT to advance its interests. At the University of Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and the Punjab University, Lahore the IJT was quick to establish its dominance by terrorizing student groups, University faculty and the administration.[597] The Punjab University which was the bastion of IJT power, welcomed martial law and distinguished itself by conferring an honorary degree of doctorate on General Zia ul Haq in 1978.[598] His meeting with the President of the Student Union, which was controlled by IJT was highly publicized. After this the IJT pursued ideological tirade with new vigor and zeal. The faculty members who did not agree to the awarding of the degree to the General, were transferred, harassed and their promotions were withheld. More than 100 students belonging to various secular, left-leaning student organizations were rusticated from the Punjab University.

At Karachi University the IJT resorted to violence.[599] At Quaid-i-Azam University socially liberal and secular minded students were brutally beaten several times by IJT members.[600] The faculty was systematically harassed by the religious right and the regime. Three members of the faculty were even jailed on charges of distributing "anti-state" literature.[601]

Initially, the academic community, through academic staff associations, resisted and condemned the strong arm tactics of the religious right and the government. However, under threats of physical harm, transfers and with holding of promotions, the academic community lost their nerve. They became apathetic, withdrawn and some even left their profession. Having subdued the students and faculty, the IJT designed its own agenda for student politics. The IJT promoted an entirely new 'cultural ethos for academic

[596] Seyyed Vali Raza Nasr, "Students, Islam and politics: Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba in Pakistan." *Middle East Journal*, Volume 46, No. 1, Winter 1992 (pp. 59–76) p. 67.

[597] Aamer Ahmed Khan, "The story of the Jamiat" *The Friday Times*, Lahore, April 23–29, 1992. pp. 5–7. The issue carries an interesting of student organization and their role in the politics of the country.

[598] Liaquat Baluch, (MNA, 1991–1993) then was president of the Punjab University Students Union. For interesting insight on Jamaat-i-Islami, its relations with Zia regime, see Mushahid Hussain, "Jamaat-i-Islami, and power structure" *The Nation*, Lahore, June 15, 1992.

[599] For insightful comments and analysis of Jamiat during this period. See interview Prof. Mehdi Hussain, *Friday Times,* 23–29 April 1992.

[600] As a faculty member at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in 1979, I personally witnessed the brutality with which Tayyab Yazdani Malik a student of Physics Department was beaten by the IJT students.

[601] Three members of the faculty at Quaid-i-Azam University were Tariq Ahsan, Lecturer at the Department of Pakistan Studies, Dr. Mohammad Saleem, Assistant Professor, Chemistry and Jamil Omar, Computer Science.

institutions,' segregating male and female students from all mixed extra-curricular activities.[602] Musical functions, dramas were disallowed, even inter-college, and inter-university debates were restricted. The topics that the IJT did not approve of could not be debated. Academic freedom and enlightenment, the very principles of higher education, were flouted.

After taming the students, the IJT student unions began to put pressure on the university administration, the Vice-Chancellor, Chairmen of the departments and other functionaries of the universities/colleges to promote and sustain their narrow sectional interests on the campuses.

No wonder the IJT emerged as the most feared student organization. The secular, liberal and left leaning student organizations had already been harassed and therefore ideologically divided and faction ridden. Under pressure from the religious right and the regime they were forced to assume a low profile and minimal existence.

By 1983, the IJT had become such a powerful force on campuses that it even began to challenge the military regime. The regime obviously could not tolerate these excesses. In addition, the regime found that patronage of IJT was no longer serving its purpose particularly the situation in Sindh demanded a change in its strategy. In the context of new realities the regime decided to cut the religious right to size and put a ban on the student unions in colleges and the universities. The IJT resisted but was coerced into submission. In the N.W.F.P. where IJT was relatively weak on campuses, Lt. General Fazal-e-Haq, Governor of the province, applied state power effectively,[603] thus signaling a shift in the regime's policy towards the IJT. Nevertheless, by then IJT had established its supremacy in the academic institutions of the country.

Thus by encouraging the religious right, Zia regime had effectively weakened the socially liberal, left leaning and secular minded student groups on the college, university campuses, thereby, strengthening the religious right quite disproportionate to its actual support base.

Women, who constitute almost 50 percent of the country's population, were another group which was targeted by the regime for political exclusion. Women were perceived by the regime as an important constituency of the PPP. Therefore, the effort was to confine them to household roles. In addition, through symbolic and legal means, attempts were made to project an inferior status of women in an Islamic polity. In 1979 Hudood and Zina Ordinance were initiated.[604] In 1984, a law was passed whereby evidence of two women was made equivalent to that of one man in certain legal

[602] Aamer Ahmed Khan, *op. cit.,* p. 7.
[603] Mushahid Hussain, *op. cit*,. June 15, 1992.
[604] For a comprehensive and critical review of the Ordinances see Charles H. Kennedy, March 1988. pp. 307–316.

situations.[605] In modern times this was perhaps a unique occasion, when the state itself initiated laws that took away the constitutional rights of women.

Discriminatory laws against women evoked criticism from educated urban women groups, who voiced their resentment on such laws and began to organize women and public opinion against such laws.[606] However, the regime remained firm in its attitude towards women and their role in the polity. General Zia ul Haq publicly stated that a woman could not hold the office of the Prime Minister. The Ansari Commission Report supported the same view. It went on to the extent of recommending that a woman should have her husband's permission to participate in legislature.

Islamization and Ideological "Cleansing"

General Zia ul Haq redirected the discourse of Pakistani politics by using Islamic metaphor with new vigor and with the object of Islamizing the polity, society and economy. He was emphatic and persistent in arguing that Pakistan is "an ideological state," where Islamic laws have not been operationalized.[607] The regime implied that the Bhutto regime was immoral and corrupted the society with social permissiveness and by propounding the ideology of "Islamic Socialism." Therefore ideological reorientation was a desirable goal. Ideology was considered "sacred" and had to be put into practice with missionary zeal. Since the mission to Islamize the society was "sacred," therefore persecution of the opponents and suppression of dissenting views was justified. The regime did not encourage any debate or build any consensus on Islamization, but implemented it through ordinances, martial law orders and executive action. Not all religious groups agreed with the regime's method and content of Islamization. Jamaat-e-Islami emerged as the most enthusiastic supporter and defender of Zia's Islamization—a partner in the pursuit of transforming Pakistan into "an ideological state."

This identity of views between Zia and Jamaat-i-Islami brought about a "spectacular change in Jamaat's fortunes."[608] As noted earlier, Jamaat leaders were included in Zia's cabinet. For the first time in the history of Pakistan the Jamaat found their dream coming true-that they would finally be able to demolish democratic-liberal basis of Pakistan and transform it into an "ideological Islamic State." It was in this spirit and

[605] The Qanoon-i-Shahadat Order, 1984.

[606] For a perceptive analysis on the emergence of Women's Movement See Fauzia Gardezi, "Islam, Feminism, and the Women's Movement in Pakistan: 1981–1991," *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1990. pp. 18–24.

[607] For a favorable and sympathetic commentary on Zia's efforts to Islamize Pakistani Society and polity see Zia-ul-Islam Ansari, Jamal Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq—Shaksiat Aur Karname, Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1990. pp. 23–30, 225–240. For a scholarly assessmentof Zia's Islamization policies and their impact on legal, political, social and economic institutions see Charles Kennedy, "Islamization and Legal Reforms in Pakistan, 1979–1989." Pacific Affairs, vol 63, No 1, spring 1990. pp. 62–77. For laudatory comments on Zia's Islamization also See, Muhammad Taqi Usmani, "The Islamization of Laws in Pakistan," *Shaheed-ul-Islam Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq*, London, Indus Thames Publishers, 1990. pp. 58–75.

[608] Godfrey H. Janson, *Militant Islam*, London, Pan Books, 1979. p. 153.

context that Jamaat opposed most of the rulers of Pakistan as "Muslims only in name." From Jamaat's perspective Zia was the first practicing Muslim 'ruler of Pakistan,' who approximated their precepts of 'Islamic model' and showed eagerness to transform the country into an "Ideological Islamic State."

Zia proceeded to reformulate the parameters of "Islamic system" by ridiculing the already declining liberal-democratic values and structures. He introduced far reaching normative and structural changes. The regime issued such value-reinforcing and symbolic Martial Law directives that during work hours people must say prayers. This produced a new office culture where a special break for prayer during office hours was allowed and continues to be a norm. It was instructed that on Fridays during prayer hours shops must be closed and that the call for prayer be announced on the radio and television. During the month of Ramadan it was obligatory for the Muslim population to observe Fast and say prayers. For criminal offences Islamic punishments (i.e., following the Arab code, amputation of wrists and ankles for theft, stoning to death for adultery and flogging for drinking alcohol) were announced and selectively enforced. Some criminals were publicly flogged.[609] The Islamic punishment symbolism had the desired effect, it demobilized the highly politicized masses, and enforced new norms of compliance.

At the structural level, in 1978, Shariah Benches were introduced to enforce laws according to Islamic jurisprudence, Ulema (religious leaders) and lawyers were appointed as members of these Benches. Their task was to ensure that no law repugnant to Quran and Sunnah was formulated. The Shariah Bench ordinance was silent on the status of the 1973 Constitution, Muslim personal law, and various aspects of taxation system. It did generate some controversy on these points. However, the Jamaat leader hailed it as a "landmark in the history of the country."[610]

To Islamize the economy on 10th February, 1979 (on Prophet Muhammad's birthday) the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was announced.[611] During the 1978–79 period, Professor Khursheed Ahmed emerged as the leading voice of Islamization of economy for Zia regime. Zakat fund was instituted with an initial capital of over two thousand million rupees. In addition Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates made generous contributions towards the fund. The Zakat Ordinance was expected to perform welfare functions for the state, by obtaining contribution from the wealthy to fulfill the needs of the poor and needy. The disbursement of Zakat fund led to the growth and expansion

[609] Saeed Shafqat, *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy*; Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1989, *op.cit*., p. 103.
[610] *Ibid*., cited in p. 103.
[611] Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. It is leviable on the total wealth of a person at the rate of 2.5 percent, whereas Usher is land tax, the produce of Barani land can be taxed at the rate of one tenth and irrigated land at the rate of 5 percent.

of Zakat Administrator and its functionaries. Interest free banking was introduced and was hailed as a major step towards developing a framework for Islamic economics.

To inculcate Islamic values among the youth Shariah Faculty (which, now is a full fledged International Islamic University, generously funded by Saudi Arabia) was founded at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Learning of Arabic was encouraged and Islamic Studies was made a compulsory subject at the high school and college level. To top it all, in 1984 Nizam-e-Salat campaign was launched. The regime appointed 100,000 prayer wardens for village and urban localities. During

the same year Qadiani Ordinance was introduced.[612] This Ordinance declared that if Ahmedis were to call themselves Muslims, it would be a punishable offence. They were also not to make a call for 'prayer' in their mosques. In 1985, the Ninth Amendment was passed by the Senate and Shariah Bill was introduced. Most of these Islamization measures were protected by Eighth Amendment, which radically altered the 1973 constitution.

These Islamization policies of Zia regime not only consolidated the position of religious groups, quite disproportionate to their actual strength on the ground, but the authority vested in the religious institution both in terms of value orientation and social control also increased. As envisioned, Islamization policies have not promoted ideological consensus. Islamization has given rise to growth of numerous religious groups and sectarian organizations. In May 1988 when Zia dismissed Junejo government, he revealed his frustration with the implementation of Islamization policies.[613] He announced another Shariat Ordinance. The Islamic laws and institutions that have emerged during Zia years have endured and naturally influence the course of Pakistani politics.

Promotion of Corporate Interests

All military regimes jealously guard their professional and institutional interests. Corporate interests of the military are expanded by increasing the number of senior positions, by expanding their role in the civilian sectors, by protecting defence budgets and by establishing military's hegemony in the economic and political decision-making

[612] The Qadiani Ordinance, 1984, clause 298-C reads, "Persons of Qadiani group, etc. calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith. Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadies' or by any other name) who directly or indirectly," poses himself as a Muslim or calls, or refers to his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine." The Ahmadies had filed a petition in supreme court against the Qadiani ordinance, 1984 in early 1993. On July 3, 1993 the supreme court of Pakistan gave majority verdict upholding the ordinance. There were five judges on the bench, Justice Shafi ur Rehman gave a descending note, while Justices, Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Mohammad Afzal Lone, Saleem Akhter, and Mohammad Khan, upheld the ordinance.

[613] For text of Zia speech removing Junejo government see, *The Nation*, Lahore, 30th May 1988.

process in the country. To advance, protect and consolidate its interests the military regime adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, it sought extensive penetration of the military in administration, industrial public sector and other para-economic institutions. It was no more a question of merely protecting the institutional interests of the military. It also meant an opportunity to advance personal careers and seek attractive jobs in the civilian sector. Secondly, the bureaucracy was encouraged to play the role of a junior partner. Thirdly, rule-making devices were sought to influence the working of an independent judiciary.

Compared to the previous military regimes, the involvement of military in administrating the country was quite extensive.[614] In July 1977, Corp commanders were appointed Zonal Martial Law Administrators, while Chief Justices of the high courts were made Governors of the provinces for a short while. Later Corp Commanders were also to hold the office of the Governor. It was only in 1980 that the office of Governor was separated from that of the corps commander. A number of serving generals were appointed to the posts of "Permanent Secretaries." According to one estimate, in 1980, as many as one fourth of the 35–40 top bureaucratic positions were held by the military officers.[615] A number of military officers were also appointed as additional secretaries and joint secretaries in various ministries. During the 1981–85 period, out of a total of 40–46 Ambassadorial positions, about 16 to 20 were held by the retired military (mostly army) officers. Prior to General Zia's regime, serving officers in such large numbers had never been appointed on top bureaucratic positions. In addition, in corporations such as PIA, WAPDA, PASSCO, NTRC the military officers continued to hold top positions. National Logistics Cell (NLC), which was created in 1976 under military command grew into a giant transport company, giving tough competition to private truckers and the Pakistan Railways. Fauji Foundation, which is considered the single largest employer of the retired Army personnel grew into a big economic conglomerate, as it made investments in industries, services, hospitals, real-estate etc. In short, under Zia regime, the military extensively expanded its role in the civilian sectors.

Bureaucracy, particularly, the elite cadre of civil service of Pakistan (CSP) remained skeptical and disconcerted during the Bhutto government. A large number of the CSP believed that the administrative reforms of 1973 merely aimed to tarnish the reputation and erode the power of their cadre.[616] Despite loss of reputation and power, the CSP were able to endure and recovered their lost power during the fag end of Bhutto's rule, but remained disconcerted. General Zia was aware of the CSP discontent. To co-opt them he moved quickly, and in order to give them a sense of confidence he reappointed a number of civil servants who were dismissed by the Bhutto regime. One of the ways Zia solidified relations with civilian bureaucracy was that after 5th July 1977 all federal

[614] Between 1977–79 over 400, officers beyond the rank of Major involved in various types of martial law duties. Saeed Shafqat, *op.cit.,* pp. 47–48.
[615] *Ibid*., p. 49.
[616] Interviews with senior CSP officers.

secretaries were made advisors to the CMLA, under the fancy title of "Council of Advisors." This was a morale booster for the civil servants who supported the military regime with a sense of confidence.

To look into the grievances and ameliorate the service conditions of the Civil Services of Pakistan, the regime instituted in February, 1978 a Civil Services Reform Commission under the Chairmanship of Justice Anwar ul Haq, Chief Justice of Pakistan.[617] The Commission recommended, inter-alia constitutional guarantees to the services, doing away with the lateral entry system, enhancing the powers of the Deputy Commissioner, proposed merger of Tribal Agencies Group (TAG) with District Management Group (DMG) and a separate status for it. The Commission also recommended the creation of the office of the Ombudsman and regularization of the local bodies elections. These recommendations were accepted, although certain other recommendations of the Commission were ignored by the regime. From 1980 onwards the regime ensured that 10 percent of the vacancies from Grade 17 to 22 in the Civil Services would be filled by the military officers.[618] With the help of such devices the regime skillfully co-opted the bureaucracy into a junior but respectable partner of the ruling coalition.

After his take over, Zia ul Haq brought the military at the core of decision making process in the country. In the formative years of the regime, the Chief of Army Staff/Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and Corp Commanders emerged as the real decision-makers. For a few initial months of the martial law, the chief justices of the high courts were made acting provincial governors, but the real power was with the Martial Law Administrators. By 1978, most of the judge governors were replaced by the military governors. It goes to Zia ul Haq's credit that as CMLA, he allowed discussion and deliberation among his colleagues.[619] Once a decision was made on critical issues, it was considered a decision by consensus. This process and style of decision making promoted a spirit of camaraderie, cohesion, a sense of loyalty, and solidified the unity of command. During the initial years of the regime, Zia would insist that important decisions were made in consultation with his military colleagues (Rufaqaa). Between 12 to 14 officers as corp commanders and personal staff officers (PSO) to the CMLA worked as the key decision makers. Thus Zia ul Haq made military the pivot of important decision making. No other military ruler so heavily relied or frequently consulted the corp commanders as Zia did.[620] In fact, he institutionalized consultation and decision making through Corp Commanders.

Zia ul Haq revealed considerable skill and pragmatism in managing his colleagues in the armed forces. General M. Sharif was to retire in March 1979 as CJCSC, he requested

[617] Report of the Civil Services Commission 1978–79, Rawalpindi, Government of Pakistan, 1979. pp. 189–195.
[618] See, *Estacode: Civil Establish Code*, Lahore, Pakistan Service Law Publication. 1992 (nd ed). pp. 164–170.
[619] Interviews with senior military officers. See also Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947–1986. Lahore. Progressive Publishers, 1986. p. 243.
[620] Interviews.

retirement and was allowed, while Zia ul Haq (who was also to retire in March 1979), extended his tenure and retained his position till his death in August 1988. He selectively gave extensions to a number of generals in the army.[621] However, he retired the Chiefs of Air Force and Navy as soon as they completed their tenure.

As a consequence of reorganization of higher defence in 1976, an additional post of four star general was created in the armed forces of Pakistan. To placate his colleagues, Zia ul Haq created the post of another full general. Until 1977, the armed forces of Pakistan had two posts of four star generals, the COAS and CJSC. Zia ul Haq created the post of a Deputy COAS. Within a year, he created the position of another Corp Commander. At least 12 positions were upgraded to the ranks of Brigadier, Major General and Lieutenant General: (such as corp of signals, ISPR etc.).[622] Thus through selective extensions, expansion and rotation, Zia ul Haq was able to keep control over the command structure of the military.

In placing and promoting corp commanders and divisional commanders Zia was careful that they served their tenure. He formalized the tenures of the senior commanders. In some cases, he preferred loyalty over professional qualifications. For example, he promoted and appointed General K. M. Arif, who did not have any command experience as Vice COAS. Similarly, General Akhter Abdul Rehman, who lacked command experience of a Corp Commander was made CJSC and served almost three terms as Chief of Inter Service's Intelligence (ISI) sustaining and coordinating the Afghan war. General Akhter Abdul Rehman was promoted as CJSC in March 1987.[623]

Zia moved very cautiously and perceptively to expand and consolidate his personal power. As a COAS he had free hand in choosing his own corps commanders and making important senior staff appointments. After the takeover Zia's primary concern was to decide which of the corps commanders would be willing to go along with him? Who were potential rivals? Who were like-minded and trustworthy and could be relied upon? Who could be trusted for relatively short time? Any military ruler would eliminate his potential threats sooner or later. Before Zia, Ayub had removed his potential rivals like General Habib ullah Khattak, General Azam Khan, Yahya Khan, displaced Air Marshal Nur Khan, Bhutto was quick in retiring Lt. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim, the two men most responsible for facilitating transfer of power to Bhutto.

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[621] For example, some Lieutenant Generals continued to serve for 7 to 10 years. These were Lt. Gen. Ghulam Gilani Khan 10 years, Lt. Gen. Fazal e Haq 7 years, Lt. Gen. S. M. Abbassi 6 years, Lt. Gen. Jehan Dad 7 years, Generals Mohammad Iqbal Khan and Sawar one year's Extension. Air Marshal Anwar Shamim was also given one year's extension.

[622] Interviews.

[623] The case of General Akhter Abdul Rehman is very interesting, he was senior to Lt. Gen. Chishti, but was made to serve under Chishti as G.O.C. Later he was promoted as Lieutenant General when he was appointed D.G., ISI,. Gen. K. M. Arif and Gen Rahimuddin were junior to him but became Generals, while he was superseded. However, he was promoted as General and made JCSC in 1987.

General Zia ul Haq managed his colleagues adroitly; Three Generals who were most responsible for executing the Operation Fair Play' and helping the installation of Zia, were given most important positions in the military council. For almost three years Lt. General Chishti was given a free hand to run the affairs of the Establishment division, and Lt. General Ghulam Hasan was made advisor on National Security. While Major General K. M. Arif was appointed Chief of Staff to the CMLA. In the initial years Lt. General Chishti gave the impression, that he was the man behind the COAS, and later revealed that he was responsible for executing the Operation Fair Play' (over throw of Bhutto regime) Zia, perpetuated this impression.[624] In the first few months he even behaved as if Chishti was the "boss," and for tough decisions he looked up to him. However, in March 1980, when General Chishti and Ghulam Hasan's tenure came to an end they were not given an extension. They were simply allowed to retire into oblivision.[625]

More interesting are the cases of Generals, Mohammad Iqbal Khan and Sawar Khan. Both were from Pothwar and were suspected of some allegiance to the former COAS, General Tikka Khan. The former was MLA Punjab and Corps Commander Lahore. In August/September 1977, when the Lahore High Court released Mr. Bhutto, and he was given verbal orders to arrest him, General Iqbal Khan hesitated to comply with these orders; Zia was furious, but did not act in haste. Instead of dismissing General Iqbal, he purchased loyalty through promotion. In 1978, Zia created the post of Deputy Chief of Army Staff (later changed the name to Vice Chief of Staff), removed Iqbal as Corps Commander and MLA, and promoted him as a four star general. Lt. General Sawar Khan, who was Corps Commander Peshawar and MLA N.W.F.P. was brought in as successor to General Iqbal. During Bhutto's trial in Lahore High Court, 1978–79, Lt. General Sawar Khan was Corps Commander Lahore and MLA Punjab. He also faltered but was not removed from his position, immediately.[626] It was in December 1979 that Lt. General Sawar Khan was promoted and replaced General Iqbal Khan as Vice Chief of Staff while General iqbal Khan was appointed CJSC. Thus, both men were removed from positions of command and were given staff appointments. (They duly completed their commands and were due for staff appointments). Both were given tenures as Vice Chief of Staff and CJSC and were retired in 1984. Once Zia ul Haq decided to remove any of his colleagues, his double handshake was firm and final.

In 1978, Zia began to create his own military team of provincial governors. Until 1980, Corps Commanders continued to be provincial governors, then the two offices were

[624] Interviews: Most Senior Officers believed Chishti was interested in bringing about the *Coup*. He was perceived as the hawk. For Chishti's own account See Chishti *op.cit.*, pp. 63–72.

[625] Although General Chishti claims that he did not seek extension from Zia, rather he disassociated himself from the government. Because Zia was "making dishonest decisions." *op.cit.*, p. 7.

[626] The then Deputy Commissioner Lahore in an interview told me that as District Magistrate he was given verbal orders by MLA Punjab to arrest Mr. Bhutto, but he refused to comply without written orders.

separated. Those who were appointed as provincial governors were personally known to Zia, were trustworthy, like-minded and in some cases had served with him. They were not as religious or ideological as Zia, but had a similar world view.[627] They shared Zia's domestic and international perception of Pakistan, and supported the regime's Afghan policy. These military men were cautious, shrewd, discrete on political matters, and possessed administrative skills. On provincial matters they enjoyed considerable autonomy, took independent decisions and sought presidential approval later. These military governors played a pivotal role in orchestrating the re-alignment of interest groups and political forces in their respective provinces. They were prudent decision makers and were quick to win the confidence and support of civilian bureaucracy in their provinces of governance.

Lt. General Fazal-e-Haq, who was commander 7 division (Major General) in July 77, was promoted to the rank of Lt. General and Corps Commander. He was appointed Governor N.W.F.P. in 1978 and stayed in that position until 1985. Fazal-e-Haq had close family ties with Zia; both had served together in the Guides Cavalry and Fazal-e-Haq was junior to Zia by a few years.[628] By his own admission, Fazal-e-Haq was sympathetic and favorably inclined towards the PNA movement against the Bhutto regime. He believed that Bhutto had rigged elections, and therefore should be removed.[629]

Fazal-e-Haq had good career as a commander and emerged as an efficient and strong administrator of the province. The Afghan war provided him with an opportunity to develop the transportation network in the province. His thrust was developmental. He built one of the finest road networks in the province, initiated housing schemes, expanded rural electrification and encouraged expansion of education. During his tenure, the N.W.F.P. government did its best to support, sustain and carry out the Afghan resistance policy of Zia ul Haq.

In the Punjab, Lt. General Ghulam Gilani Khan was appointed governor in 1980. He had been chief of ISI for almost a decade. General Gilani was a good task master, who provided patronage, reward and protection to his subordinate officers. He would assign a task and rely on their judgement and ability. As Director General ISI he was reputed to use secret funds judiciously and that experience helped him in the Punjab. Given his enormous intelligence experience, he was well versed with provincial politics, important political families and the business groups. He was an effective administrator, but unlike Nawab of Kalabagh, did not represent the feudal classes of the Punjab. He relied on bureaucracy and encouraged the cooptation of younger generation of Punjab's feudal families, trader-merchants and business groups in the political arena. By inducting young Mian Nawaz Sharif (prime minister 1990–93), as finance minister in

[627] Interviews.
[628] For details on his association with Zia, his political views and military outlook, see his interview in Mohammad Sham, *Nai Awazain*, Karachi, Mahmood Publication, 1990.
[629] *Ibid*.

the provincial cabinet in 1981, he redirected the thrust of social change and economic development in the Punjab.[630] This indicated that the military elites, particularly, General Gilani, chose to distance himself from the feudals in the Punjab but did not alienate them and adapted a pro-business policy, facilitating the expansion and consolidation of trader-merchant groups. General Gilani's singular most important contribution was, that he won the Punjab for General Zia ul Haq, skilfully maintained the law and order situation and redirected developmental thrust in the largest province of the country. Political stability in the Punjab was an important contributory factor giving longevity to Zia's military regime.

In Baluchistan Zia appointed General Rahim-ud-Din, another close associate as governor and martial law administrator (1978–84). These ties were further strengthened with the marriage of Zia's son Ijaz ul Haq to General Raimuddin's daughter. Rahim-ud-din, a *muhajir*, did not evoke allegations of Punjabi domination from the Baluch Sardars. Through a deliberate low key administrative style he was able to cultivate the Baluch Sardars. During the Afghan war, Quetta and Peshawar were important staging grounds for covert operations.

In Sindh, Zia appointed Lt. General S. M. Abbasi as governor and martial law administrator (1978–84). Lt. General Abbasi hailed from the Nawab family of Bahawalpur. Given his social origins and background, he was at ease with Sindhi culture and was quite effective in managing the province. However, Zia lost confidence in him, when he hesitated in applying brutal force during the MRD agitation in the province in 1983 and was removed from governorship in 1984.

This is to suggest that Zia was very careful in choosing his team for managing the provinces. The men chosen were loyal, trustworthy, had long associations with Zia, and served their tenures as efficient administrators. They played a crucial role in building the coalition of interest groups in the provinces that gave not only longevity to the military regime but also facilitated the re-alignment of social and political groups. In all the provinces the military governors were able to create a 'niche' of regime supporters. The provincial governors played a pivotal role in consolidating the new coalition of groups that Zia had encouraged to grow.

[630] Mian Nawaz Sharif's father was the founder of Ittefaq group of industries. At the time of independence Mian Sharif made a modest beginning by establishing iron and steel foundries in Lahore. By 1970 Ittefaq foundries had developed into a industry. In 1972, the PPP government nationalized iron and steel industries, Ittefaq foundries were also nationalized, while the Sharif family diversified interests and made some investment in the Gulf countries. In 1977, when General Zia came to power he restored the Ittefaq foundries to the Sharif family. Zia years changed the fortunes of the family. Installed into power in 1981, Mian Nawaz Sharif became Chief Minister of the Punjab in 1985, remained in that position until 1990 and rose to become the prime minister of Pakistan in 1990. In July 18, 1993, unable to resolve the political stalemate in the country, Nawaz Sharif had to resign as prime-minister of Pakistan.

Strategic Alliance with the U.S. and Economic Policies

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, provided Pakistan military an opportunity to reconstruct its professional image which had been considerably tarnished as a consequence of 1971 war and dismemberment of Pakistan. By itself Zia regime neither had the capability nor the means to sustain and support the Afghan resistance fighters. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also provided Zia ul Haq an opportunity to establish his credentials as an Islamist. He assigned himself the 'Sacred Mission' of defending and supporting the Afghan Muslim brethren who were caught in a situation of distress. Supporting Afghan Mujahideen was equated with fighting against the Soviet infidels and championing the cause of Muslim Ummah. Zia admirers proudly presented his formulation of Afghan policy as the most significant contribution of his era.[631] It solidified Islamic sentiments and led to rise of religious groups, ushering in of US economic and military aid and in turn, hegemony of military in domestic and foreign policy decision making in Pakistan. In 1981, when the Reagan administration agreed to support the Afghan Mujahideen and U.S. military assistance to Pakistan began to filter in, it helped the military to build its professional image. Without the collaboration of Zia regime, it would not have been possible for the U.S. to wage and sustain an ideological war against the Soviet Union. The planning and coordination of Afghan resistance movement was done in close collaboration with the U.S. intelligence agencies and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. While supporting, training and organizing the various Afghan guerilla bands, the ISI built its reputation and skills as a professional organization. In the process, the ISI enhanced its intelligence and surveillance capabilities.[632] The regime also availed this opportunity to embark on a program to modernize the armed forces of Pakistan. The regime was able to strike a deal with Reagan administration for the procurement of sophisticated F-16 fighter planes. It was also able to procure some artillery and armour equipment for the army.[633] Consequently the Afghan war and U.S. military aid did facilitate the modernization of the Pakistan military. This helped the military to bolster its professional image. Unfortunately, the successful conduct of Afghan resistance movement by the ISI also led to its politicization. It also developed ideological affinity and linkage with religious groups, particularly Jamaat-i-Islami. It began to believe that if it could manage Afghan resistance movement it could also manage the domestic opposition to the regime. For

[631] Zia-ul-Islam Ansari, *op.cit*., pp. 193–198. For an enthusiastic defence of Zia's Afghan Policy, See Ibn-ul-Hasan, "*Zia-ul-Haq—A Defence Planner*." pp. 89–112 and also G. W. Choudhry, "Shaheed Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and the Islamic Ummah" in *Shaheed-ul-Islam ... op.cit*., pp. 113– 123.

[632] Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, *The Silent Soldier; The man behind the Afghan Jehad*, Lahore, Jang Publishers. 1991, See particularly pp. 46–70. For a comprehensive and yet controversial analysis of CIA-ISI connection, see Symour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge" *The New York Post*, March 29, 1993, pp. 56–73. For an equally interesting and insightful analysis of CIA-ISI connection. See Lawrence Lifschultz, "Dangerous Liaison: The CIA-ISI connection" *News line*, November, 1989. pp. 49–54. He claimed that the Director of CIA, William Casey visited Pakistan during Zia years once or twice a year.

[633] Devidus Lohalekar *U.S. Arms to Pakistan: A Study in Alliance Relationship*. New Delhi, Shish Publishing House, 1991. See pp. 57–72.

managing domestic opposition Zia began to rely increasingly on ISI.[634] This led the military elite to believe that they understood politics and national interest better than the political leaders. They began to define who was the "enemy" of the state and who were its supporter. In the process, they blurred the distinction between government and state. Opposition and criticism of Zia's regime was equated with opposition to the state. This promoted military hegemony and also helped ISI to expand its autonomy. Thus under Zia and in later years, the ISI became assertive in defining how politics may be managed and controlled in Pakistan.

The military in Pakistan has generally been pro-business. Ayub regime in the 1960's built coalition and formulated policies that led to the emergence and consolidation of commercial-industrial groups. Military regime under Zia was no different. The economic policies of the regime evolved slowly; restructuring of the economy was not its priority. However, early on, the regime decided to sustain the nationalization policies of the Bhutto regime. It selectively denationalized some industries, but did not pursue large scale denationalization. It significantly lowered the relative rate of investment in the public sector in an apparent effort to "redress" the imbalance against the private sector as the Bhutto era was envisaged to have resulted in. Though the private sector was assured of no further nationalization, it remained skeptical as it feared the return of the Bhutto party. Thus, despite tax holidays, liberal rules for import of the machinery, the private sector did not grow or gain confidence to any significant extent.

In fact, during the Zia era, the factors that were most responsible for economic growth were largely external in nature, such as the U.S. aid of about 4 billion dollars over this period and annual workers' remittances of about 2 billion dollars mainly from the Middle East. How did the regime go about assuring the commercial-industrial groups? What kind of symbolic and substantive measures did it take to re-align the commercial-industrial groups and trader-merchant classes?

To restore the confidence of business groups, the regime re-embarked on a pro-business process. To indicate the regime's pro-business inclination, in his first cabinet Zia appointed Lt. General Habib ullah Khattak, a known industrialist and Mustafa Gokal, a Pakistani of Sindhi descent, but settled in England, whose family had interests in rice trade and shipping. These individuals were included in the cabinet as symbols to reassure the business groups and also to redirect the orientation of Pakistan's economy from public to private sector.[635] However, the person who became the pivot of economic decision making during 1977–85, was Ghulam Ishaq Khan (President of Pakistan August-May 1988–93). He was appointed Secretary General in chief, Finance, provincial coordination and planning (1977 July-August 1979). In that position he emerged as the

[634] Interviews.
[635] For details see, Shahid Javed Burki.

'Dean' of civil bureaucracy in Pakistan. He became an anchor for the higher echelons of Civil Services. They looked up to him and he provided patronage, guidance, direction and protected their institutional interests. As a civil servant Ghulam Ishaq Khan had a distinguished career and also enormous experience in administration and economic management. He advised the regime to go slow on denationalization of the public sector, but taking into cognizance the political imperatives of the regime he selectively denationalized some of the industries. In the Punjab, steel-re-rolling industry was denationalized which was dominated by the Ittefaq group.

This created an environment indicating that the regime would encourage privatization and show greater reliance on market forces.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan moved cautiously to revitalize institutions of economic decision-making. He built a team of civil servants to steer the economy; individuals who believed the public sector had been mismanaged and that the private sector needed favorable investment environment. He brought Vaseem Jaffery into planning commission, Aftab Ahmed Khan into the Finance Ministry, and A. G. N. Kazi continued as governor State Bank. In addition, he appointed Nawab Haider Naqvi a leading economist to head Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). The PIDE as an autonomous research organization encouraged academic and policy debate on privatization and Islamization of the economy.

This team made concerted efforts to establish a relationship of trust, respect, and understanding with the business groups. It reopened the channels of access between the government and the business groups. These channels of access were restricted during the Bhutto years. From time to time it gave incentives for tax holidays, duty free import of capital equipment and provided credit at low interest rates. However, this team of economic managers would not develop a privatization policy, nor was it able to attract any significant foreign investment.

The ruling coalition under General Zia ul Haq was able to change the relationship among the structural components not merely because of the coalitional mechanisms that it adopted, but largely due to external factors. Changes in international environment proved conducive for the economic policies and performance of the regime. During this period (1977–1985) growth rate was phenomenal and averaged around 6.5 percent per annum. However, it did not promote industrialization or economic development, because the regime did not have any clear vision for it. The economic performance of the regime can be analyzed by focusing on four factors. First, in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan emerged as a "front line state." In pursuance of their strategic interests the U.S. policy makers rediscovered an

ally in Pakistan and conveniently forgot that a month earlier, it was under the Zia regime that the U.S. embassy had been burnt in Islamabad.[636]

While assessing the performance of the regime, the Economist incisively commented, "An accident of history—Russia's blunder into Afghanistan changed the fortunes of the Zia regime. Almost overnight Pakistan became a bulwark against Soviet expansion, and General Zia ul Haq its sturdy leader."[637] By 1981, the U.S. agreed to provide 3.2 billion dollars in economic and military assistance for Pakistan. Consequently, the U.S. military and economic assistance increased Pakistan's dependence on the U.S. and internally strengthened the position of the military *viz a viz* other political groups and institutions. The second factor that contributed towards growth and economic stability during this period was the remittances of Pakistani workers in the Middle East. In 1984, out of a total of 2 million Pakistanis living abroad. 68 percent were working in the Middle East. The migrant workers came predominantly from Punjab (52 percent) N.W.F.P. (27 percent) and urban Sindh (18 percent), while a smaller percentage (3 percent) from Baluchistan.[638] These remittances rose from 577.4 million dollars in 1976–77 to 2885.80 million dollars in 1982–83, reaching to the tune of $2.5 to 3 billion in 1987.[639]

The beneficiaries of migration to the Middle East have been generally the lower classes. According to one estimate about 10 million, i.e., 11 percent of the total population have benefitted from the remittances from the Middle East. On an average the salaries of these low income households increased eight fold.[640] The impact of remittances on the income levels on groups and classes in various regions of Pakistan was not uniform. Rural Sindh was almost left out in this wave of remittance prosperity. As noted above, the largest number of migrant workers hailed from the Punjab. Consequently, the improvement in income levels rapidly changed the social complexion and value structure in the province. Changes in consumption patterns, life styles and rise in political conservatism was visible. The remittances or emigration of the labor to the Middle East undercut the support base of the PPP. This also partly explains why the MRD in 1983 was unable to mobilize the masses in the Punjab against Zia regime. It indicated that in Punjab an expansion of middle class was taking place and a new set of trader-merchant groups, through their linkages with military elite, were transforming into business groups and industrialists.[641]

The third factor that contributed towards economic growth was the fact that the economic policies of Zia regime were formulated in the broad framework of World

[636] On November 29, 1979, The U.S. embassy was burnt in Islamabad, while General Zia ul Haq was touring the Rawalpindi city on a bicycle.
[637] Economist.
[638] *Herald*, Karachi October, 1990. pp. 47–49.
[639] Saeed Shafqat, *op.cit.*, p. 55.
[640] *Herald, op.cit.,* p. 49.
[641] For an insightful and interesting analysis on this point see Emma Duncan*, Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey Through Pakistan*, London, Michael Joseph, 1989.

Bank/IMF guidelines.[642] These encouraged import liberalization, withdrawal of subsidies and devaluation of exchange rates. Thus the regime adopted economic policies to appease the industrial and

commercial groups. It opted for limited denationalization, liberal import/export policies, reduction or exemption from taxes. These policies facilitated the opening up of the country's market to foreign goods. Finally, an element of luck, and good climatic conditions during this period led to bumper agricultural crops. Agricultural groups thus remained contented.

Besides these positive aspects of economy during the Zia period, the negative effects were equally visible. The good times for industrial-commercial, trader-merchants groups and the newly rich among these classes during Zia regime resulted in deepening debt crises for Pakistan. The government's heavy borrowings, including short and medium term loans from international commercial banks and donor agencies, pushed up the external debt to the tune of over 16 billion dollars in 1988. Debt servicing rose to more than one-sixth of the value of exports of goods and services. Average interest carried by outstanding debt increased nearly two fold, from 2.3 to 5.8 percent a year.[643] By fall, 1988, foreign exchange reserves had shrunk so much that Pakistan could finance less than four weeks of imports. This prompted the down-grading of Pakistan's international credit rating and the drying up of new short term credits from foreign banks.

Response of Political Parties

Zia was skillful in building an effective coalition of political and business groups. However the regime's repressive policies did evoke a response from political parties and other disaffected groups. As early as 1978, cracks appeared in PNA, when some of its components (i.e., JI, ML and PDP) joined the Zia regime, while others stayed away. The regime off loaded the PNA cabinet members in 1979, and began to adopt increasingly repressive policies towards political parties, journalists, lawyers etc., through a number of executive orders.[644] In turn, the political parties began to rearrange alliances. The repressive policies of the regime intensified the demands for restoration of democracy, and disaffected political parties formed a coalition, Movement For the Restoration of Democracy(MRD).[645] Between 1981–83, the MRD devised a four-point agenda, demanding:

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[642] See Akmal Hussain, *Strategic Issues in Pakistan's Economic Policy*, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1988. pp. 386–391.

[643] Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan's Economy Under Zia" in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, *Pakistan Under the Military—Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

[644] In 1982, the Human Rights Commission reported that there were 6,000 political prisoners, with 1250 under death sentence in Punjab alone. During the year 192 political prisoners were flogged and sentenced by the military courts.

[645] The Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was formed in February 1980. The alliance was dominated by the PPP, but comprised of political parties that had diverse support base, ideology and orientation. The political

1. End of Martial Law
2. Restoration of 1973 Constitution
3. Elections to the parliament
4. Transfer of power to the elected representatives.

In 1983, the military-hegemonic regime was jolted by the MRD Movement, but the movement failed to bring about its collapse. The regime responded very skillfully to thwart the MRD protest movement. It insured that the movement did not gain momentum and mass support in the Punjab. However in Sindh, the MRD movement acquired the overtones of a popular upsurge against the regime. Here the movement was primarily rural in character but a large number of doctors, engineers, lawyers, students and party workers of various persuasions participated in the revolt against the regime. There were instances of burning government property, uprooting railway lines, bank robberies, and breaking canal waters, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi the leading PPP leader was arrested. There were reports that one of his son, took refuge in India. Confronted by breakdown of political order, the regime responded by unleashing terror, treating it as an Indian inspired regional movement.[646] Such an approach alienated the protesting social classes and groups in rural Sindh.

The Sindhi leaders of the movement and peasantry felt betrayed and abandoned by the Punjabi political leadership, which in their view failed to support their Sindhi counterparts in their hour of trial.[647] The MRD movement deepened the cleavage between the Punjab and Sindh, and within the MRD, it led to the politics of blame (i.e., Sindhis blaming Punjabis and vice-versa). Nevertheless the MRD movement sufficiently shook the regime.

Under increasing internal and external pressure the regime conceded holding of presidential referendum in 1984. Earlier through the Federal Council it had created a set of political leaders who were ready to accept the military's hegemony and were willing to share power.

Along with internal pressure, the external pressure also began to mount on the regime. A fall out effect of the MRD movement was that the Human Rights organizations began to highlight the repressive policies and brutalities of the regime. This in turn coincided with an external development that had a bearing on Zia regime. Until 1984 the Reagan

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parties that joined the coalition were (1) PPP (2) National Democratic Party (NDP) (3) Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) (4) Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (5) Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin—Qasim group) (6) Qaumi Mahaz Azadi (7) Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party (8) Jamiat-ulema-e-Islam—subsequently it split on the question of participation (9) Pakistan National Party (PNP) Awami Tehrik (formerly Sindh Awami Tehrik).

[646] K. M. Arif, *op.cit.*, pp. 218–220.

[647] I visited Sindh in 1989, and interviewed number of people from different walks of life, they conveyed this impression.

administration had almost ignored the human rights record of the Zia regime. However, in 1983 the U.S. Congress through a bipartisan vote created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The NED was assigned the task to explore ways and means to improve human rights conditions in countries with a poor record and to strengthen democratic processes and institutions at a global level.[648] In this context, the Congress began to impress upon the Reagan administration that U.S. economic and military assistance may not be given to countries whose human rights record was not satisfactory. Under pressure from the Congress the Reagan administration began to pressurize Zia regime to restore the democratic process. In 1984 Dean Hinton was appointed U.S. ambassador to Pakistan.

Dean Hinton had the image and reputation of a "democracy pusher."[649] Earlier as ambassador in El-Salvador he had encouraged and played a key role in the holding of elections in that country. In Pakistan, Dean Hinton was assigned the task of encouraging General Zia ul Haq for restoration of the democratic process. Thus faced with demands of restoration for democracy from the MRD movement and pressed by the U.S., Zia agreed to hold presidential referendum in December, 1984. The MRD boycotted it. Despite claims and counter claims of participation and voters turn out, the referendum was generally believed to be a farce and did not legitimize Zia's position.[650] In February 1985 the regime called for partyless elections. The MRD boycotted once again. However, this time the MRD misread the popular mood. The people of Pakistan participated in the elections. They showed preference for participation over confrontation and boycott as propounded by the MRD. The electoral process, howsoever, restricted, has its own dynamics. Once the national assembly became functional, a large number of most of the newly elected members began to demand lifting of martial law, restoration of civil liberties and restoration of 1973 constitution. Some of Zia's close associates lost in the elections. Nevertheless, elections gave a semblance of legitimacy to Zia rule. It is hard to describe the 1985 elections as "fair and free," because they were not held under the 1973 constitution as mandated by the Supreme Court.[651] Political parties were excluded from participation and a large number of political leaders were put under arrest and in detention. However, Zia regime was able to retain its supremacy by installing a civilian government. It also helped the regime to redefine the basis of power sharing.

1985 Partyless Elections: Mohammad Khan Junejo and Power Sharing

The 1985 partyless elections initiated a phase of guided democracy in Pakistan. Under military tutelage, restricted political participation was restored. For the parliament to

[648] For details on this point see Larry Diamond; "Promoting Democracy." *Foreign Policy*, No 87, Summer, 1992. pp. 25–46.

[649] For an interesting account on this, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. pp. 144–145.

[650] Interviews with Civil Servants.

[651] See *Begum Nusrat Bhutto Vs State, op.cit.*

become functional, Zia made it conditional that the actions, ordinances, orders that he had passed between 1977–85 as CMLA would not be reversed, nor would they be challenged under any court of law. On March 2, 1985 when Zia introduced the Revival of Constitution Order (RCO), out of the 280 articles of the 1973 Constitution, 67 articles were drastically changed or altered.[652] These changes were accepted and passed by the assembly and are referred to as the Eighth Amendment. As noted earlier, when Zia assumed power, the 1973 Constitution was held in abeyance. In 1981 he imposed the PCO, and with the introduction of RCO in 1985 the federal and parliamentary character of the 1973 constitution was fundamentally altered. This amendment also changed the basis of constitutional relationship between the President, Prime-Minister and the Parliament. Before this amendment in the 1973 constitution, the executive powers were concentrated in the office of the Prime-Minister. As a consequence of this amendment, office of the President became locus of power. Under article 43 of the 1973 constitution the President could not hold any office of profit. Zia obliterated this article by inserting article 41-(7), that allowed him to hold the office of the president as well as CO AS. This created a legal anomaly and built in tension between the office of the Prime-Minister and President. Since the Prime-Minister retained the portfolio of defence, the COAS was answerable to him. However, as prime-minister, he was answerable to the president. In addition the president had the discretionary powers to nominate the prime-minister, dismiss his cabinet and the parliament. Thus transition to democracy and functioning of the parliament were inherently constricted.

Military regimes are consistent in opposing, constraining and even aborting the political parties. The more these regimes restrict political parties, the more vocal the demand for restoration of the political parties becomes. The dynamics of electoral competition are such that it promotes the emergence of political parties. In the short run the military regime succeeded in weakening the political parties, but in the long run it failed to curb the growth of political parties.

As noted above, although the 1985 elections were held on non-party basis, yet as soon as the parliament met the need for a party led government became imperative. The military elite had carefully orchestrated the 1985 elections and were skillful in master-minding selective participation of candidates. According to Gallop of Pakistan Poll Survey 39 percent of those elected to National Assembly in 1985, began their political career after 1977.[653] This new set of political leaders were initiated and became politically active during 1977–84. They were the political beneficiaries of the regime and were willing to function under the military hegemony. The military regime had little difficulty in establishing patron-client relationship with the civilian leadership which had social origins in the landowning elites and commercial-industrial groups. From this perspective the military had put Pakistan on the road to democratic transition, without

[652] For details see Kamal Azfar.
[653] Ijaz Shafi Gilani.

political parties, yet as soon as parliament became functional, the military could not stop the revival of political parties. In our socio-political milieu, the 1985 partyless elections revived the primordial sentiments and loyalties (which were considerably weakened during 1970 elections.) The electorate got divided along the units of "Biradri," "Caste," Qoum" which resulted in the further fragmentation of not only community but also political parties.

Mohammad Khan Junejo, a follower of Pir Pagaro, and a Sindhi landlord of modest means was installed as the Prime Minister. Ironically, later he was accepted as the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League. Junejo was not a new-comer to the game of sharing power with the military. Like Bhutto he was also a product of Ayub's martial law. In 1962 he was elected to the West Pakistan assembly and remained a provincial minister from 1962–69. He had ample political and administrative experience. Given these credentials he had also been inducted in the Zia cabinet and served as a federal minister during 1978–79. Junejo was polite, unassuming, non-charismatic and little known to the public, but had sufficient experience of politics and government.[654] Zia thought he would be willing to comply and accept the military's hegemony. Junejo started on a cordial note; therefore members elected to the parliament on non-party basis were not restrained by the Zia regime to join the Muslim League. It was ordained that the Muslim League from the parliament was to grow into a 'partie military'— representating and advocating the interests of the military and specially the interests of those who it had brought to power. Therefore Zia's initial thrust was to see Muslim League evolve into a dominant parliamentary party. However, the majority of those who were elected to the national parliament had feudal social origins (157), while industrialists, trader-merchant (54), urban professionals (18) and religious groups (6), who were sympathetic towards Zia, were smaller in number. Thus, under Junejo's parliamentary leadership Muslim League emerged not as a mass based, ideologically coherent and organizationally well knit political party, but as a party primarily advancing the interests of feudal groups and in a limited way the interests of trader-merchant and industrial-commercial groups. Its policy instrument was patronage. Therefore the party remained fragile, faction-ridden and dependent upon the military regime for protecting the interests of these groups. Its leadership showed willingness to challenge the military's hegemony, yet it did not make any serious effort to develop Muslim League into an alternate source of power.

The ruling coalition that emerged under Mohammad Khan Junejo basically comprised of the feudals, while military, bureaucracy, and industrial-commercial groups were accepted as the dominant partners. A significant aspect of this coalition was that it inducted and brought to surface a new generation of land-owning groups from the Punjab and N.W.F.P. and from Sindh to a lesser degree. The generational change was

[654] See, Zia-ul-Islam Ansari, *op.cit*., pp. Ahmed Salim, *Tootatee Baanti Assemblian*, Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1991. *op.cit*., pp. 256–257.

most visible in the Punjab, (where younger Chattas, Gilanis, Makhdooms, Shujjat and Pervaiz Elahis etc. assumed positions of power, while in, N.W.F.P. Saifullahs acquired salience). This meant that the old guard was being replaced by the younger generation. This new breed of land owning elite (mostly in 30's and 40's) were relatively better educated as compared to their parents but in orientation and political out-look not much different from them. Their leadership style and political training was traditional as reflected in providing patronage to their support groups and not very enthusiastic about popular participation.[655] This new generation of political leaders not only accepted the political framework provided by the military but also became its primary instruments, defenders and exponents. It is interesting to note that while in the other three provinces and at the federal level the military elite facilitated the feudals or their representatives to assume the offices of the Prime Minister and Chief Minister, in the Punjab, the regime choose to install Mian Nawaz Sharif—a representative of new commercial-industrial groups (in the Punjab). Here remittances, good harvests, and relative political stability had brought changes in the social class structure and value orientation. Contradictions between the land owning groups and new emerging commercial-industrial interests sharpened in the Punjab. However the military arbitrated and sustained the ruling coalition. The conflict of interest between the feudals and business groups continued to persist. Nevertheless, the military, under General Zia ul Haq agreed to share power with the civilian leadership, but did not intend to transfer power to them.[656]

The military-civilian relationship had begun on a cordial note. However, soon tension began to grow between the president and the prime minister. The tension in relationship was not merely personal, but rooted in difference in outlook on internal and external policy matters.

Junejo appeared colorless and docile, but on a number of policy and personnel placement issues he took a firm position, and challenged in a subtle manner, the military's hegemony and Zia's supremacy I will briefly identify and analyze the personnel placement and policy differences that surfaced between the civilian leaders and military elites.

Initially the difference between the president and prime minister appeared on trivial matters of bureaucratic procedures and protocol, (i.e., whether the prime minister may be allowed to have a military secretary, use of the Falcon plane etc.) Zia claimed that by issuing Revival of Constitution Order (RCO) he had put Pakistan on the path to democracy, while Junejo was emphatic in claiming that his government had brought an end to martial law, restored civil liberties, revived political parties and ushered in democracy. He took position on matters which he thought were in the domain of the

[655] For detailed analysis on this point see Saeed Shafqat, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–59.
[656] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

prime minister. For example, in March 1985 Zia ul Haq appointed Major General Agha Naik Mohammad as Director Intelligence Bureau (IB).[657] It was for the first time in the history of IB that a serving general was appointed as the head. Zia was aiming to keep both the intelligence agencies ISI and IB under military control. In July 1986, Junejo after his successful visit to U.S., replaced the General as chief of IB without informing Zia and appointed a civilian Aslam Hayat as his successor. After his U.S. visit Junejo became assertive, bold and showed firmness in taking a number of decisions.[658]

During the year the prime minister successively removed Dr. Mahboobul-Haq, Dr. Asad and Dr. Attiya Inayat Ullah from their cabinet positions. All three were Zia appointees and protégés.[659] Junejo appointed Yasin Watto, a former PPP leader and minister as finance minister. Zia tolerated these personnel and policy changes. However, when the prime minister began to assert on the placing and promotion of army officers, Zia and the military felt that he was going too far. The prime minister had refused to allow extensions of tenure to General K. M. Arif and General Rahimuddin, close associates of Zia. He had also played a key role in the selection of Mirza Aslam Beg as vice COAS.

This perceived civilian interference in the affairs of military and divergence of views on how to deal with Afghanistan issue led to parting of ways between Zia and Junejo.

In November 1987, Junejo unceremoniously removed Lt. General Sahibzada Yaqoob as foreign minister (1982–87), a Zia protege. In his place he appointed Zain Noorani as minister of state for foreign affairs. He appointed Lt. General Majeed Malik, the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee of the parliament to head the Federal Anti Corruption Committee. The committee was assigned the task of reviewing the corruption of the civil services and the armed forces and its subsequent investigations created quite a stir. The prime minister also spoke enthusiastically about reducing defence expenditure.

In March 1988, prime minister Junejo called an All Parties Conference on the Afghanistan issue. The political parties urged the prime minister to seek an end of war in Afghanistan. Benazir Bhutto demanded that she would participate in the conference only if president Zia ul Haq was not invited. This was accepted by the prime minister. The All Parties Conference supported the prime minister's efforts to pursue Geneva peace process on Afghanistan. Zia found this distasteful and instructed the prime minister not to be in haste in signing the Geneva accord.[660] However, the prime minister sent Zain Noorani, minister of state for foreign affairs, to sign the Geneva Accord,

[657] Muneer Ahmad, *Political Role of Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan* (Urdu), Lahore, Jehangir Book Depot, 1993.
[658] Interview with Dr. Basharat Jazbi, who was a close associate of General Ziaul-Haq and served as cabinet member and advisor from 1981–1985.
[659] Muneer Ahmad, *op.cit.*
[660] Basharat Jazbi, *op.cit*., also Zia ul Islam Ansari, *op. cit.,* pp. 95–96.

apparently without the consent of the president. Zia believed that it amounted to trivializing the sacrifices of the Afghan Mujahideen. His primary concern was that the Geneva accord did not ensure the installation of the government by Afghan Mujahideen. He felt that the Hizbe-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmat Yar was capable of capturing Kabul, with or without Russian withdrawal. At this stage Zia ul Haq was visibly distracted, frustrated and felt betrayed by America.[661] Ironically the Geneva Accord was signed on 14th April 1988, while on 10th April 1988, the Ojari camp disaster occurred. The camp was an ammunition dump, and had been used for the supply of arms to the Afghan freedom fighters since 1980. An explosion in the dump not only destroyed the ammunition, but also caused the death of over 100 persons and property damage worth millions of rupees. At the time of Geneva accord Zia's trust in America was so low that he believed, that Ojari camp explosion was "engineered by the Americans or their Afghan agents."[662] Zia had come to believe that the U.S. had reached an agreement with the Soviet Union and no longer needing Pakistan's support, it aimed to discredit the Pakistan military, which had successfully organized the Afghan resistance movement. Those who were close to Zia have pointed out that he felt betrayed, frustrated and dismayed by the attitude of the U.S. With the signing of Geneva Accord, Zia felt isolated and his Afghanistan policy was in a shambles. Zia and his military associates who had sustained and waged the Afghan war were completely left out in the Geneva Accord.

The tension between the president and prime minister aggravated on another policy matter. The prime-minister sought to sack generals who were responsible for negligence at the Ojari camp. The president argued that this would have a demoralizing effect on the military.[663] Zia felt that Junejo was getting too big for his shoes.

The prime minister who had gone to China and Korea in the second week of May 1988 on an official tour was expected to announce the sacking of generals involved in the Ojari camp incident on his return. It was also rumored that he would announce the removal of Zia from the position of COAS.[664] As the prime minister returned on 28th May 1988, Zia struck first. He dismissed the government of prime minister Junejo and the assemblies. Within a period of three years Zia had destroyed the very fragile democratic structure which he had created.

Conclusion

Zia was perhaps the most underestimated ruler of Pakistan. He portrayed two facets: one of private virtue, the other of a consummate political strategist. In interpersonal contact, he was polite, full of humility and portrayed the image of a God-fearing person.

[661] Zia ul Islam Ansari, *op.cit.,* pp. 96–97.

[662] For detailed description of events and personalities See Zia ul Islam Ansari *op.cit*., pp. 97– 104 also Muneer Ahmad *op.cit.*

[663] Jazbi, *op.cit.,* Muneer Ahmed, *op.cit.*

[664] *The Economist*, June 4, 1988, also see Zia ul Islam Ansari, *op cit*., p. 105.

Those who have worked with Zia and seen his growth from a 2nd Lieutenant to Chief of Staff of Pakistan Army, believed that Zia had a religious bent of mind.[665] These were private virtues; his political actions were different. He was shrewd, skillful and pragmatic in dealing with political leaders and showed a level of tolerance and respect for them. He was very skillful in managing military colleagues who differed with his personal preferences and policies. He was relentless in pursuing the political exclusion of "Bhutto family" and the PPP from Pakistani politics. Their exclusion became the cardinal principle of his political strategy. According to General K. M. Arif, return of PPP "to power was not acceptable to Zia."[666] Did he succeed in excluding or eliminating the "Bhuttos" and the PPP from Pakistani politics? Why he could not he promote politics of reconciliation?

He was vigorous and innovative in orchestrating a new ruling coalition of religious groups, trader-merchants, industrial group and the feudals. He was successful in consolidating these groups and classes. In the Military and bureaucracy he encouraged the advancement of like minded officers. At the institutional level he sought the inculcation of Islamic values among the younger officers. Thus Zia was able to create an alternate alignment of groups and classes which were socially conservative, politically opposed to the PPP and shared a variation of fundamentalist vision of Pakistan.[667] In the early 70's Bhutto had brought and built a coalition of political groups, who were socially liberal and politically progressive. Similarly Zia left a strong coalition of socially conservative and politically anti-PPP groups. This polarization of interest groups and, conflict of values has been a stumbling block in the growth and development of democratic process in Pakistan. Is it possible to minimize this polarization? What can be done to promote consensus among the divided rulers of Pakistan? How can the differences between the outlook, interests and vision of Bhutto and Zia supporters be reconciled? These questions merit attention. When Zia died in August 1988, two trends were dominant; first, the polity was polarized and divided, second, the military hegemony had become an unalterable fact of Pakistan's political system.

As a ruler Zia failed to promote politics of consensus building. He left Pakistan turbulent and rife with sectarian and ethnic tensions. Political parties were weak and divided. In such a divided polity the military was not merely the hegemon, but also the only institution that had grown, expanded and emerged as the arbitrator in defining power relations among various contending power groups. Having established its hegemony in the political system the military was poised to search for redefining its role in the post Zia era.

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[665] Zia ul Islam Ansari, *op.cit*., pp. 275–279, also see, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, "Zia the Soldier" in *Shaheed-ul-Islam Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, op. cit*., pp. 24–38.

[666] K. M. Arif, *op.cit*., p. 252.

[667] For a varying interpretation of interplay of ideology, corporate interest and legitimacy of Zia rule See, Mumtaz Ahmed, The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the Military and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan 1977–1985. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 1996. pp. 372–386.

8

STRUGGLE FOR PARTY DOMINANCE: BENAZIR BHUTTO VS. NAWAZ SHARIF

Zia-ul-Haq's military regime under increased political pressure from the opposition political parties and the Reagan administration, conceded to allow limited political participation. The military did not disengage from politics, it only encouraged controlled and guided political participation of those groups who were willing to operate under its hegemony. As noted in the last chapter, the 1985 elections provided a framework for sharing power with those groups whom the military had guided into political arena. It was, however, the accidental death of General Zia-ul-Haq on August 17, 1988 in a plane crash that put Pakistan on a path to redemocratization. After his death under General Mirza Mohammad Aslam Beg, the new COAS, the military embarked upon a two pronged strategy. First it opted to distance itself from explicit involvement in politics and decided to hold general elections in the country. Second, it chose to portray the professional dimensions and capabilities of the military. During the military-hegemonic period, the armed forces had expanded and modernized their training institutions, streamlined career planning and pursued its corporate interest with new vigor. It had invested heavily not only in the acquisition of sophisticated weapons (e.g., F-16's for the Air Force) but also in the training and education of its officer corps. Between 1980–1995, each year about 200 officers were sent for training abroad, almost 70 percent went to the U.S.[668] It strengthened and solidified institutional arrangements with Pentagon. Thus at the time of Zia's death, the military appeared professionally confident and determined to supervise the political process.

It broadened the base of electoral competition and encouraged the participation of those groups, leaders and political parties, which had hitherto been excluded. The military reassured the electorate that it was ready to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. From a distance it continued to guide the direction of electoral competition. The ISI, played a crucial role in unifying political forces that were opposed to the PPP. In addition to ISI, there were political parties and interest groups who were uncomfortable with the prospects of PPP's electoral victory and identified themselves with the ideological legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq. These conditions prompted the formation of Islamic Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI).

After General Zia-ul-Haq's death, Chairman of the Senate of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, became acting President heading a care taker government. Recognizing the crisis

[668] Mushahid Hussain, "Changing profile of the Pakistan Army." The Frontier Post, Lahore, February 13, 1993.

of legitimacy, he announced the holding of general elections in November 1988. The electoral process provided Benazir Bhutto an opportunity to demonstrate her political skills and also mobilize the PPP supporters. But it was apparent that, Bhutto and the PPP were least prepared for electoral contest. During Zia years she had roused expectation as a confrontational leader of a resistance movement and a crusader for the restoration of democracy; For her the challenge was to galvanize support base into electoral victory. Would she be able to make a transition to a parliamentary leader and a consensus builder? Would she be able to strengthen parliamentary democracy and party system? The announcement of holding of elections was well received by the leaders, political parties and the public, generating great enthusiasm and a spirit of competition. The number of contestants proportionately increasing in each constituency. In 1988 the average number of candidates contesting for a National Assembly seat was 6.4 as compared to 5.3 in 1985, 3.6 in 1977 and 5.3 in 1970.[669] However the voters turnout was low as compared to previous elections. It was 42 percent in 1988, 54 percent in 1985, and 63 percent in 1970. Clearly, the 1988 and 1970 elections were well contested. Three political parties were the principal winners. The PPP as the largest party in the National Assembly, but it was not a resounding victory, winning 38.52 percent of the total vote and securing 93 seats out of 207.[670] It did exceedingly well in Sindh, especially in the rural areas. The Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI) came in second, with 30.16 percent of the vote and 55 seats, and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) emerged was third with 13 seats, primarily from Karachi and Hyderabad. The IJI was routed in Sindh and marginalized in Baluchistan and emerged as the dominant force in the Punjab. It is widely believed that the military, the interim government, and the state controlled media were not neutral during the elections, and did whatever they could to prevent a PPP victory. The IJI also orchestrated a smear campaign against Benzair Bhutto, but she demonstrated considerable skill in managing various factional leaders and preserving party unity.[671] Thus the elections brought to the forefront the political and social groups that had been excluded from the political process for over a decade and paved the way for redemocratization.

The outcome of 1988 elections made it difficult to exclude Benazir Bhutto or prevent her, as the majority party leader, from forming the government, but the president delayed calling on her to do so. The military made it amply clear that it desired to share power and not transfer power.[672] Thus, only after behind the scene compromises did Benazir Bhutto assume the office of the prime minister on 2nd December 1988. She ushered into power a ruling coalition that was bound by structural constraints. It

[669] See for example, *Herald*, Karachi, October 1990 (special issue).

[670] Election Commission Report, Report on General Elections 1993. Islamabad, Election Commission of Pakistan, No date p (iv).

[671] During the election campaign the IJI leaders not only used slanderous language against Benazir Bhutto and Nusrat Bhutto, but also distributed handbills with obscene language and pictures of the Bhutto ladies.

[672] See Saeed Shafqat, "Transition to Democracy: The Experience of Pakistan." Paper presented for the Columbia University Conference, *Political Development and Democracy in Pakistan*. 25–26 September 1992, (mimeographed).

comprised of the political elites (a segment of landowning classes), the urban professional (lawyers, engineers, and doctors), middle farmers, women, and marginally industrial labor. Women appeared as an important component—five ministers (including the PM) in a rather large cabinet of 43.[673] This created an air of expectancy among her women supporters, while her detractors ridiculed a government so dominated by women.

On assuming power Benazir Bhutto was quick to concede that (on the Pakistani political scene she had not emerged as a "free agent") and had to make major compromises to form the government. She showed pragmatism and flexibility on accepting the office of the prime minister, giving the impression that she understood the bargaining, compromise and consensus building that politics entails. Appeasing the military, she agreed to let General Aslam Beg continue as chief of the army staff (COAS) and to give the military a direct role in the foreign policy by retaining Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan, as Foreign Minister who had been elected senator on the IJI ticket. She consented to remain nominal head of defence committee, not interfere in the internal affairs of the military, retain large budget for the armed forces, and let the military handle Afghan policy. She also agreed to support the candidacy of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as president, and said she would abide by the agreements that had been signed by the interim government with the IMF in an ill conceived manner. The military, had accepted Benazir Bhutto's installation into power with reluctance, and remained hostile toward her government. Given these constraints and limitations how skillful was she in managing the powerful groups in Pakistan's political structure? Did she reveal leadership qualities or was she reckless in provoking a conflict with the military that led to her downfall? Let us now analyze her performance by focusing on her management of relations with the military and with the provinces, particularly, Punjab, of foreign relations, conduct of her husband, and of the economy.

Relations with the Military

The military had agreed to the 1988 elections hoping that the PPP would not be able to sweep the polls. For 11 years under General Zia-ul-Haq, a generation of military officers had been indoctrinated against the PPP, which they believed was a security threat. They perceived Benazir Bhutto as anti-state, anti army, so there was a perception that a party has come to power, whose leadership had conspired against the military from exile and abroad.[674] Thus mutual distrust and hostility existed between Banazir Bhutto and military elites. Once the PPP emerged as a majority party, the military top brass began to define the parameters of sharing power with the PPP. In addition, the situation demanded an attitudinal change from the military elites if they were to accept the leadership of a woman in country where for most of its history the military had dominated politics.[675] Under the circumstances Benazir Bhutto's primary task was to

[673] *Jang*, Lahore, 23rd March, 1989.
[674] Interviews with senior officers of the Armed Forces.
[675] *Ibid*.

build a relationship of trust and confidence with the military, and the latter reluctantly made the first move in accepting her as the prime minister, thus showing interest in developing a relationship with the civilian leadership. Both sides approached each other with caution and suspicion.

Four Cases that Widened the Gulf

We will briefly examine four specific cases in which prime minister Benazir Bhutto's initiatives antagonized the military and widened the gulf between the civilian leadership and military elites. In February, 1989, the prime minister appointed a committee to review the role and relationship of Intelligence Agencies in a democratic establishment.[676] Based upon its findings of the committee she chose to control the working of the ISI; on more than one occasion, she had stated that the ISI was undermining her government.[677] Her distrust of the ISI had a historical bases, as it had hounded her during Zia years and just before elections played a key role in creating the IJI.[678] So her suspicions were well founded and she sought to bring the ISI under effective civilian control. In May 1989, against the advice of COAS she replaced its powerful ISI chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, and posted him as corps commander in Multan. Lieutenant General Hamid Gul was considered not only the creator of IJI, but also key strategist for Afghan war during Zia's years. With the shift in U.S. policy on Afghanistan and the prospects of a peaceful settlement, Hamid Gul had became an irritant for the U.S. policy makers,[679] and this helped Benazir Bhutto in her goal to replace him. But she showed little understanding of military organization when instead of appointing a serving officer to the post of Director General of ISI, she appointed retired Lieutenant General Shams ur Rehman Kallu. The military considered it as interference in the professional affairs of the military and believed that the prime minister was violating, her commitment not to do that.[680] Nevertheless, in a spirit of accommodation they complied with her orders.

Later in the year she picked up another case in which her government ran into conflict not only with the military but the president as well. The issue was constitutional; who had the authority, the president or prime minister to appoint the chief of the services and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJSC)? Admiral Sarohi, was

[676] The committee was headed by the Air Chief, and three members were M.A.K. Chaudry, S.K. Mahmud, Secretary interior and Air Commodore Muhammad Yamin. It was to examine the working of ISI, IB, ASF and the provincial special branches.

[677] Muneer Ahmed. "*Political Role of Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan*" (Urdu) Lahore, Jehangir Book Depot, 1993. pp. 108–123.

[678] Observations of a U.S. diplomat based in Pakistan.

[679] Interviews.

[680] I visited Hyderabad in January 1991 and met a number of officials and citizens who in one way or the other were affected be these events. The Sindhi side of the interpretation is perhaps best conveyed by Nur-ul-Huda Shah, a Sindhi writer in a short story "Pucca Qila," which she read before the Lahore audiences in December 1990. For an analysis of the event and circumstances surrounding it also See, Mushahid Hussain, "After Black Sunday." Benazir: Back to the Bunker. The Nation, Lahore, June 3, 1990.

appointed as CJSC in November, 1988, and was to retire in November, 1991, upon completion of his three year tenure. The president took the position that the constitution as amended under General Zia-ul-Haq in 1985, gave him the right under Article 243(C) to appoint "in his discretion, the chairman joint chiefs of staff committee" and three services chiefs. The prime minister asserted her authority by referring to the executive order that was passed by late prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970's, fixing the three year tenure term of services chiefs, but not of the JCSC. Relying on the executive order and the Army Act Benazir Bhutto claimed that she had the powers to retire the chairman JCSC, because the term of that office was not fixed. The president responded that constitution empowered him to appoint the chairman JCSC, and he had the authority to retire and not the prime minister. The argument acquired the overtones of a constitutional crises but in view of the Eighth Amendment, these powers were held by the president and prime minister had to retreat from her position. Nevertheless, her assertion annoyed and antagonized the president and the military, and both grew suspicious of Benazir Bhutto's intentions, reinforcing the perception among the military elite that the prime minister was deviating from her commitment not to interfere in military affairs. The Sarohi affair tarnished Benazir Bhutto's image as a leader, it indicated that she asserted her authority without sufficiently understanding the working and organization of the military or the Constitution.

It was expected that in future she would be more careful and cautious in dealing with the military but this proved illusory. The third case that widened the gulf between prime minister and the military was the Pucca Qila incident of 27th May 1990. Pucca Qila is an old settlement in Hyderabad city, whose inhabitants are predominantly from the Mohajir community. As to what really happened at Pucca Qila the perceptions are highly colored by ethnic factors.[681] From the Sindhis perspective, Mohajirs had unleashed terror on Sindhis, while the Mohajir's claim that the Sindhi government and police had terrorized unarmed Mohajir children and women. In any case, fighting killed at least 30 persons and caused a reaction in the city of Karachi where over 350 persons died.[682]

The point of contention between Benazir Bhutto government and the military was the manner and the timing of the government's operation. The Sindh government, under clearance from the federal government launched an operation to capture the terrorists who were hiding in the Pucca Qila. The timing was such that the COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg was on a tour abroad, the corps commander of Sindh was on a visit to border areas, while the general officer commanding (GOC) was also abroad. So the action was taken at a time when the military top brass was not available, embarrassed Benazir Bhutto Government as it showed lack of communication between the military and police. A senior police officer, who was involved in the operation told the author

[681] For a detailed report on the incident, See, *The Nation*, Lahore, 29th May, 1990.
[682] Interviews in Hyderabad.

that the provincial police had established that the area was a den of terrorists and with a cache of illegal weapons. He said that the operation was larger in scale than the police strength that was available in Hyderabad could handle, and pointed out with some degree of frustration that the police was not given a free hand to run it. The ISI got involved quickly and Army Ranges, who were deployed in the city provided protection to the culprits instead of supporting the police action.[683] Consequently the incident was now seen as an ethnic conflict, in which the provincial police, who were predominantly Sindhi were portrayed as massacring the Mohajirs. Later on, upon return from the foreign visit, General Beg, visited the affected areas of Hyderabad and was given a heros welcome, with slogans of "impose martial law, remove Benazir Bhutto."

At both the personal and institutional level the Pucca Qila incident marked the parting of the ways between the COAS and the prime minister, and between 27th May and 24th July 1990 the two did not meet.[684] It was now amply clear that the prime minister had failed to win the trust of the military and that she used little tact in dealing with it. Unfortunately, Benazir Bhutto did not stop there but moved on to fourth confrontation. Between April–June, each year the army's selection board meets to decide about the promotions, retirements and postings in the senior ranks. The armed forces of Pakistan jealously guard the proceedings, decisions and recommendations of the board in the 1970's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto caused an uproar when he attempted to influence the board's recommendations. Although, he was discrete and managed the event skillfully, it was not forgotten by the military elites.[685] In June 1990 prime Minister Benazir Bhutto also tried to influence the working of the army's selection board, seeking to extend the term of Lieutenant General Alam Jan Mehsud, corps commander in Lahore. The board did not agree-and upon completion of the corps commander's term, the COAS named Lieutenant General Ashraf Janjua to the post.[686]

This led the military top brass to conclude that Benazir Bhutto was not upholding her commitment to share power with the military and was interfering in their professional domain. Thus, at the corps commanders meeting in July 1990 the generals decided that they can no longer continue to accept the supremacy of the government and in the third week of July the COAS conveyed the corps commanders decision to the president.[687] The president had his own list of grievances and dissatisfactions with the PPP government and supported and encouraged by the military, he dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto on 6th August 1990 on charges of corruption, inefficiency

[683] For an interesting analysis of the events leading to the widening of gulf between Benazir Bhutto and the army and ultimately the dismissal of her government by the president, see Maleeha Lodhi's write up in the daily *Jang*. Lahore, 16th August, 1991.
[684] Interviews with senior military officers.
[685] Lt. General Ashraf Janjua was appointed corps commander Lahore.
[686] General Beg revealed that in talk at the Civil Services Academy, in January 1992.
[687] For details of the president's dismissal order see, *Dawn*, Karachi, 7th August, 1990.

and misconduct of power.[688] The foregoing suggests that Benazir Bhutto was not very effective and skillful in managing relations with the army, and that her poor comprehension of the military's working provided it with an opportunity to encourage her government's dismissal.

Center-Province Relations: The Case of Punjab

In the 1970 elections, the PPP under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the dominant party in Punjab and Sindh. As Punjab represents 60 percent of Pakistan's population, control over it enhances the stability of any government at the center. Thus in 1970, despite marginal success in the provinces of Baluchistan and the NWFP, the PPP, "came to be regarded as the largest party of Pakistan, and the Punjab was seen as its bastion of strength."[689] After the dismissal of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government in 1977 and his execution in 1979, the strategy of the Zia regime was to restrict the PPP's support base in Punjab. General Zia-ul-Haq was skillful in creating sympathizers and supporters in the Punjab, and through patronage of religious groups, traders, merchants and business groups he consolidated a coalition of interests who were opposed to the PPP.[690] The partyless 1985 elections further weakened the PPP's position. In May 1988, Zia dissolved the National Assembly but retained Nawaz Sharif as Chief Minister the Punjab—a symbol of the new realignment of socioeconomic groups that Zia had very carefully nurtured and encouraged in the province.[691] During the 1988 elections, the provincial governments retained power and a care-taker government was constituted at the center. The IJI party leadership under Nawaz Sharif was successful in ensuring that Punjab remained under IJI control, winning 108 seats out of a total of 240 seats, PPP came second with 94 and 32 independents. The PPP's bastion of power in Punjab was wrestled away from it, as it fumbled and could not win over enough independents to build a coalition. The IJI had plurality of votes, and with the support of a few independents, it was able to form the government in the province.

Thus, for the first time in Pakistan's electoral history, a party assumed power at the center which could not form a government in Punjab, leaving the new prime minister facing, in addition to a skeptical military, an adversarial party and leadership that like her, was young but, unlike her had been well entrenched in the power structure. The attitude of Nawaz Sharif as chief minister was certainly confrontational, but Benazir Bhutto also did little to promote a politics of accommodation and her inability to control or seek conciliation with the Punjabi leadership, further weakened her position. The

[688] For a very perceptive analysis on the Punjab and the PPP see, Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party and the Punjab" National Assembly elections 1988–90" *Asian Survey* Vol. XXXI, July 1991. (pp 581–597). p. 582.

[689] For growth and emergence of trader merchants classes and industrialists in Punjab see, Anita M. Weiss, Culture, *Class and Development in Pakistan; The Emergence of Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab*. Boulder, Westview, 1991. See chapter 4.

[690] For some interesting analysis on Nawaz Sharif and General Zia-ul-Haq relationship, see Shahid Burki, "Pakistan's Cautious Democratic Course." *Current History,* March, 1992, pp. 117– 122.

[691] In all the four provinces, provincial banks were created, there were demands for provincial TV set up that did not materialize.

military, the president, and the opposition parties took full advantage of this situation. Her inability to seek accommodation with Punjabi leadership further weakened Benazir Bhutto's position. Nawaz Sharif's demands for provincial autonomy led to the creation of provincial banks and an environment that proved conducive for raising the issues of provincial autonomy and greater decentralization.[692]

Benazir Bhutto and her party affiliates in Punjab failed to recognize that Nawaz Sharif had been well entrenched in Punjab politics since early 1980's, had acquired experience in the workings of the government and had developed contacts with military elite. Instead of evolving a harmonious working relationship with him and the socioeconomic groups that he represented, the PPP leadership in Punjab encouraged Benazir Bhutto to confront and destabilize the Nawaz Sharif government, and she began to encourage moves to undermine the parliamentary support of the provincial government. PPP stalwarts in the Punjab sought to dislodge the chief minister through non-parliamentary means and, thus started in Pakistan a politics of "no confidence motions" in which the PPP, tried to remove Nawaz Sharif by passing a vote of no confidence against him, while the IJI under his leadership attempted the same move against Benazir Bhutto in the National Assembly. Both failed, none was able to dislodge the other, but in the process center-province confrontation intensified, tarnishing Benazir Bhutto's image and weakening her government's ability to evolve meaningful relations with the provinces. These conditions made it easier for the president and the military to assert that Bhutto's regime was deficient in managing the affairs of the country and paved the way for the president to dismiss her government.

Conduct of Her Husband and Family

Benazir Bhutto was an exceptional woman leader, in the sense that she inherited leadership in the wake of her father's execution and was only 35 years, when she became the youngest prime minister in the world. She had been married for only a year. She was faced with a situation of reconciling family needs and demands of political career. For her child bearing age and rise to the office of the prime minister came together and after a year in office, when she gave birth to a baby, the joke in Islamabad was that after a year in office the only thing that Benazir Bhutto has done is given birth to a baby. In addition her husband Asif Zardari became a point of controversy; Zardari chose not to remain anonymous and apolitical husband. On foreign tours and official briefings he conducted himself in a manner that was neither approved by the bureaucratic-military elites nor by the public. Benazir Bhutto was embarrassed, when told that in some official briefings her husband's presence was not welcome.[693]

[692] Interviews.

[693] For some entertaining remarks and comments on Asif Zardari's role, see Christina Lamb, *Waiting for Allah*, New Delhi, Viking, 1991, p. 72; also see *The Economist*, which commented: "her polo playing businessman husband was widely seen as a source of potential influence for awarding of government favours." *The Economist*, London, August 11, 1990. p. 15.

Zardari developed the reputation of a swindler, who was using the office of the Prime Minister to make shady financial deals, indulged in selling permits, licences for industries and gave patronage to friends. On this reputation he came to be known as "Mr. Ten Percent" and this negative public perception of her husband,[694] considerably tarnished the image of Benazir Bhutto. Although, after dismissal of her government and three years of investigation none of the charges leveled against Asif Zardari were proved in the courts. Ironically, during the second term too, Zardari's reputation of a wheeler and dealer continued to persist. The chattering classes in the country continuously spoke about stories of his financial corruption. Zardari's conduct and reputation became an important contributory factor in not only downsizing Benzair Bhutto's performance as prime minister but also hastened the process of down fall of the PPP's government in the second term.

Managing of the Economy

On the economic front, Benazir Bhutto did not formulate a coherent policy. In principle, the PPP abandoned its socialist goals and resolved to pursue privatization, but reluctantly and without clarity of purpose.[695] A high powered committee was constituted under the chairmanship of Farooq Leghari (then a federal minister) that assigned to the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) the task of reinvigorating industrialization, facilitating decentralization and encouraging privatization. An ambitious expansion plan for the PIDC was announced under which it was to receive Rs. 12 billion over a five years period. The committee identified five sick units in the public sector, namely; Pak-Iran textile mills, Baluchistan, which suffered heavy losses (49 percent of its shares were held by the Iranian government); Dir Forest Industries Complex, which had taken 16 years to complete at the cost of Rs. 302.85 million, whereas the original cost was estimated at Rs. 63 million. The Shadakot textile mills, Sindh, Larkana Sugar Mills, Sindh, and Hamai Mills, Baluchistan. The losses of these units were estimated around Rs. 1.9 billion, while the total losses of the PIDC were estimated to the tune Rs. 2.5 billion. By infusing funds and reinvigorating the PIDC the PPP regime intended to prepare favorable conditions for the sale of sick units to the private sector.[696]

But the PPP government was slow to devise a systematic privatization policy. Unemployment, inflation and stagnation in the industrial enterprises particularly in the public sector demanded immediate attention and policy action, which the Benazir Bhutto government did not seem to be able to provide. Instead of formulating an economic policy, the government indulged in politics of patronage, providing jobs to the PPP supporters and sympathizers in the public sector; this irritated the bureaucracy

[694] See for example an assessment by Arif Nizami, "A Balance Sheet in the Deficit"; *The Nation*, Lahore, Dec. 2, 1989.

[695] For details see a news report by M Sabihuddin Ghauri on PIDC, *Dawn*, Karachi 20-1-1990.

[696] See, Robert B. Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, "U.S. Business Interest in Pakistani Raws." *Dawn*, Karachi 20.1.1990.

and increased inefficiency. The perception grew that the PPP regime neither had the will to streamline the public sector nor was serious in encouraging privatization. Thus the confidence of the industrialists, who were skeptical of Benazir Bhutto anyway, was weakened. While the government did not formulate a coherent privatization policy, it was able to attract foreign investment. In 1989 a number of multinational corporations began to open projects in oil exploration, textile, fruit preservation industries.[697] For example, Cargil (U.S) made an investment of 6.4 million dollars for a frozen concentrate juice plant, near Sargodha, scheduled to begin operations in the fall of 1990 and Pioneer Seed began construction of a hybrid seed plant, near Lahore, with a $15 million investment. Both of these projects were 100 percent U.S. equity involvements. Dawood/Hercules a Pak-American joint venture in fertilizer also expanded its operations by investing $325 million in the existing Urea fertilizers plant. And in oil exploration and drilling Occidental, Union Texas, AMOCO and Caltex made fresh investments or expanded their existing operations.

Managing of Foreign Relations

When Benazir Bhutto assumed the office of the prime minister, the general expectation was that foreign policy would show continuity, with no radical departure from the foreign policy framework of previous military regime. To appease the military, she had retained Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan as the foreign minister but soon she appointed Tanveer Ahmad Khan, as Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and operated through him.

On how to deal with regional issues of strategic significance, particularly relations with India, Afghanistan as well as developing new regional alliances, the differences between Benazir Bhutto's outlook and military's perception became sharper and more public. The military under Zia had begun to pursue an active role in foreign policy-making process, advocating that Pakistan should strive to explore a confederation—a loose economic, cultural, strategic cooperation—with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Bangla-Desh. The military elites also wanted Pakistan to vigorously support the uprising in Kashmir, internationalize the problem and seek its resolution, and they proposed that Pakistan should challenge India's role of a "regional police-man."[698] Benazir Bhutto, on the contrary visualized developing an association of democratic nations, instead of concentrating on security arrangements and strategic consensus.[699] In this context, her attitude was that India be seen as a democratic nation and relations between the two countries reviewed in that spirit. In December 1989 during prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan, she made overtures on improving relations with India, which were publicly criticized by the IJI leaders and opposed by the military.[700]

[697] See for example, *The Friday Times*, Lahore, October 5–11, 1989.
[698] Interviews.
[699] Speech at Harvard University, while visiting U.S. in June 1989.
[700] Countless statements were made during and after her visit by the IJI leaders.

Perceptions of civilian leaders and the military elite also diverged on how to resolve the problems in Afghanistan. The civilian government of prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo had signed the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan, and Benazir Bhutto favored continuing that policy. After the Accord, the American government began to concentrate on resolving the Afghan problem through political negotiations rather than military force and appointed an ambassador for Afghanistan affairs, with residence in Pakistan.[701] During the Afghan resistance movement, Gulbadeen Hikmat Yar and his Hizbe-Islami had been supported by the military regime in Pakistan, was perceived by U.S. policy makers as an "Islamic fundamentalist," and they were not too enthusiastic about his forming the government in Kabul. On this crucial question the perception of the civilian leaders and military elites diverged, the military believing that Benazir Bhutto did not fully comprehend Pakistan strategic interests.[702] By the time the prime minister was removed in August 1991, she had begun to shift from accepting military's hegemony and to operate with some degree of "autonomy" on foreign policy issues. She made concerted efforts to improve relations with the U.S. and even down played differences on nuclear issue. In other words, she had skillfully assumed the management and conduct of the nation's foreign policy.

From the foregoing it is clear that Benazir Bhutto's leadership on key issues was at times not very effective, persuasive or skillful. Although as a female leader she confronted enormous but by no means insurmountable odds, she showed a poor grasp of the workings of government, at times was slow in taking a decision, made little efforts to dispel the charges of corruption, and prematurely began to interfere in the affairs of the military. She persisted in establishing personal supremacy but without creating conditions that strengthened her party. Obviously, the attitude of opposition groups was also confrontational and they showed title interest in promoting politics of accommodation and consensus building.

The removal of Benazir Bhutto government paved the way for yet another elections in November 1990. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the opposition leader in the National Assembly was installed as interim prime minister, but subsequent hostile policies towards Benazir Bhutto and the PPP considerably tarnished the nonpartisan image of the interim government. Therefore, when the elections were held and the results were announced they immediately aroused suspicions of rigging. Whether the elections were rigged or not they demonstrated one point effectively: Punjab was no longer the bastion of the PPP. The Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) secured only 44 seats in the National Assembly, while IJI got 106 seats, out of a total of 207 seats. Both in the national and provincial assemblies the PDA secured fewer seats than expected.

[701] For an informative analysis on the role of military on Afghanistan and differences with Benazir Bhutto See, "A Coup in Mufti" *The Economist*, August 11, 1990. pp. 25–26.
[702] Interviews.

Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister: 1990–1993

In 1990 Nawaz Sharif assumed premiership as representative of business groups—particularly those who had interests in trade, commerce, steel-re-rolling, real estate and some agricultural farming. His close associates (e.g., Elahis of Gujrat, Ch. Nisar, Sh. Rashid, Saifullahs of NWFP now with PML(J) were initiated into politics under Zia-ul-Haq. During the Zia years this new breed of leaders built government connections, entered into interfamily marriages, expanded these links and grew as formidable business and political groups. These new leaders grew and gained strength as collaborators, sharing power with the military. They were not public advocates in the sense of espousing popular causes or sentiments, but represented, advocated and protected particular interests. The IJI ruling coalition that took power under Nawaz Sharif had been the primary beneficiary during Zia regime. This leadership was groomed in the process of power sharing, unlike Benazir Bhutto whose political orientation and outlook was suspect in the eyes of president and the military. Would Nawaz Sharif be able to strengthen parliamentary democracy and party system?

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had two distinct advantages. First, he had been associated with the Punjab government since 1981, as minister of finance and later as chief minister. Consequently, he was not only familiar with how the government worked but also had considerable goodwill among the senior echelons of civil and military bureaucracy. He took pride in identifying himself with General Zia-ul-Haq and has continued to defend his political legacy. Second, he was the first Pakistani prime minister whose social base was an urban Punjabi business family. He broke the monopoly of land owning groups (feudals) or former bureaucrats who had on previous occasions held the office of the prime minister. In popular perception, Nawaz Sharif was a protégé of the military regime, who was trained and groomed by them. On becoming prime minister Nawaz Sharif was quick to dispel this perception, projected his electoral credentials, underscored his popular support base and sought legitimacy as an elected leader. The president and the upper echelons of military and civil bureaucracy expected Nawaz Sharif to play the role of a docile leader and follow their dictates. Quite contrary to this expectation, Nawaz Sharif made concerted efforts to establish his credentials as an autonomous, independent and assertive leader.[703] While making decisions, he was firm, decisive and showed qualities of a risk-taker leader. For example, as prime minister one of his first act was to abolish the positions of Commissioner and Inspector General of Police for Islamabad. His rationale for the abolition of these posts was that for a small population of Islamabad (500,000) such senior positions were not needed. The president was quick to write to the prime

[703] For an assessment of prime minister Nawaz Sharif's policies and performance See, Lawrence Ziring, "*Dilemma and Challenge in Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan,*" in Charles Kennedy (ed) Pakistan 1992. Boulder, Westview, 1993. pp. 1–18.

minister that his action was unconstitutional and uncalled for—this led to mistrust between the president and prime minister.[704]

On the political front, Nawaz Sharif chose to pursue an agenda that was initiated by the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq—to contain and suppress the PPP and to establish the dominance of PML(N). His government pursued this vigorously by encouraging court cases against Benazir Bhutto, her husband Asif Zardari, and other PPP stalwarts. Most of these cases were instituted against the PPP leaders under the care taker government of prime minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. In Sindh, Nawaz Sharif skillfully expanded and consolidated partnership with Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), and ventured to built support base in rural Sindh. In the NWFP he was able to forge an alliance with Awami National Party (NAP). By building alliance with MQM and ANP, Nawaz Sharif succeeded in containing the PPP. His tilt towards ANP evoked disapproval from the Jamaat-i-Islami and eventually contributed toward the breakup of III. Ironically, Nawaz Sharif chose to built an alliance with MQM at a time when the military had decided not only to distance itself from the MQM but also embarked upon a policy to expose it fascist practices.[705] While forming an alliance with MQM was his timing right? Why the alliance has endured?

Nawaz Sharif's control over the military was precarious anyway. During the Gulf war, General Aslam Beg, the COAS took a position that was opposed to the policy of Nawaz Sharif government. His government supported the coalition building efforts of the United States against Iraq, while the COAS publicly supported Iraq—this embarrassed the government and the prime minister. Similarly, in June 1992 when the army under General Asif Nawaz Janjua started operation clean up in Sindh, it struck at the very roots of PML(N)-MQM alliance. Nawaz Sharif was eager to break loose from the tutelage of the military and to establish his credentials as a popularly elected leader. He had forged an alliance with ANP and MQM to demonstrate his autonomy, strengthen his credentials as a national leader, and establish the dominance of PML(N). He was vigorous in expanding his support base in urban Punjab, Sindh and NWFP but in the rural parts of the country the impact of his leadership reminded marginal. His government's strong arm tactics to contain the PPP intensified politics of confrontation.

On the economic front, Nawaz Sharif government was more swift and systematic in pursuing privatization. It stabilized the Privatization Commission, identified over 100 public enterprises for sale. Some of these were sold under allegations of 'crony capitalism' and without sufficient transparency. Like a shrewed businessman, Nawaz Sharif took a number of measures to decontrol and deregulate Pakistan's economy. The

[704] For some laudatory comments on the achievement of Nawaz Sharif government, See Mohammad Farooq Qureshi, *Nawaz Sharif Eik Hukmaran Eik Siyasatdan*," (Urdu) Lahore, Qaumi Publishers, 1995.

[705] In a series of articles Mushahid Hussain, Secretary Information PML(N) has asserted that the COAS Asif Nawaz Janjua launched operation in Sindh without consultation of PM or approval of the President, See for example, "Military coup's and the United States." *The Nation*, Lahore, July 16, 1995.

regime initiated a policy of currency reform and allowed citizens to open up foreign currency accounts. To encourage the business groups to bring consumer items in the country a little more freely, introduced "Green Channel" on the airports. His government sold Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB) to the private sector. The regime initiated grandiose projects like Motorway, Yellow Cab Scheme. While adapting these projects and schemes the normal procedures were set aside. This evoked criticism from the president who had managed Pakistan's economy and finance during Zia years. Ghulam Ishaq Khan had been known for his conservative views, caution and prudence in managing the economy. He warned that the rate and scale of privatization was too rapid and appropriate rules, regulations and procedures were being violated. The president showed skepticism about government's schemes and policies of privatization. At personal, political and economic levels the president and prime minister revealed difference of views publicly. In a span of a little over two years between (i.e., November 1990, and January 1993), the relations between the president and the prime minister moved from cordiality to hostility.

It is interesting to note that despite tenuous relations between the president and the prime minister and threats of mass mobilization by the PPP, Nawaz Sharif's government was stable its removal was not expected.[706] An unforeseen event—the sudden death of the General Asif Nawaz Janjua (COAS) in January 1993, intensified the conflict between the president and the prime minister on the selection of his successor. The president chose General Abdul Waheed, Corps Commander, Quetta, who was not the senior most for the appointment as COAS. The prime minister showed inclination toward General Ashraf Janjua, Corps Commander, Lahore who was bypassed. After the selection of COAS the relations between the president and the prime minister never acquired the same level of trust that had existed between the two previously. The simmering friction between the president and the prime minister now acquired the overtones of confrontation between the two.

This explains the centrality of military in Pakistani politics. It is of crucial significance for the civilian leadership, who is the chief of Pakistan Army? What is his orientation and attitude towards civilian leadership? Since redemocratization in 1988, there has been a struggle between the president and the prime minister as to who has the right to select and appoint the chiefs of the armed forces of Pakistan, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. As noted above the constitutional position on the issue is clear but both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif as prime ministers found it troublesome. Ideally, the prime minister and the president through mutual consultation need to develop consensus on the selection of chiefs. However, in reality, they have run into conflict on the selection of the individual. This reflects the weakness of the civilian leaders and proportionately raises the significance of the military. Therefore, once the chief of army staff is selected,

[706] For a perceptive and detailed analysis of fall of Nawaz Sharif government, See, Rasul B. Rais, "Benazir's Return to Power, 1992–1994" in Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul B. Rais (ed) Pakistan 1995. Boulder, Westview, 1995. (pp. 1–16) pp. 2–8.

he assumes the role of an ultimate arbitrator, sometimes broker, always potential intervener in the political process of the country. What role the COAS chooses to play depends on three factors his personal orientation, political circumstances and the corporate interests of the military.

From the foregoing analysis it is clear that Nawaz Sharif's leadership on key issues—i.e., coalition building with ANP and particularly MQM, privatization, and economic management, relations with the military and the president—was not very effective or skillful. He had the opportunity to develop a dialogue with the PPP and promote an environment of consensus building, instead he pursued the alternate strategies of expanding coalition with ANP and MQM. This provided the PPP and the like-minded leaders and groups to mobilize masses against the Nawaz Sharif government. Nawaz Sharif like Benazir Bhutto also ventured to establish dominant party rule and failed to strengthen parliamentary democracy and party system. Consequently, military's hegemony continued to persist, it only acquired a new form—presidential intervention.

Leader of the Opposition

Booted out of power Benazir Bhutto entered upon another phase of her political career, assuming the role of the opposition leader in the parliament. Here she demonstrated greater resilience, imagination and manipulative capacity to mobilize the masses. Between 1990–93, she adopted a three pronged strategy as leader of the opposition. First, she made efforts to mend relations with the army and by the end of 1992 she had developed a relationship of trust and accommodation with the military elites, no mean achievement. Second, she was consistent in targeting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Inside and outside the Parliament she left no opportunity to attack him, portraying the president as the principal architect of her government's downfall, and holding him responsible for weakening the democratic process in the country. She was skillful in creating a wedge between the president and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, particularly on the Eighth Amendment issue and the discretionary powers of the president. She continued to put pressure on the Ghulam Ishaq Khan until he was provoked into a confrontation with the government. Third, she aroused the masses against the president and the government and once she succeeded in weaning the president away from Nawaz Sharif government, she threatened to launch a long march of opposition. She persuaded the military to remain neutral, alleged that the government was corrupt, inefficient and had rigged the polls, and demanded fresh elections. More important, cultivated relations with opposition political parties and leaders opposed to PML(N) and Nawaz Sharif. Finally, between January and April 1993, Benazir Bhutto shrewdly exploited the differences between the president and prime minister on Eighth Amendment, both of whom sought her support on the issue. However, she proved much more skillful and exploited the opportunity to advance her interest, i.e., to deepen the crisis of legitimacy for the Nawaz Sharif government. During the few months, she had an opportunity to consolidate close personal contacts with a number of political leaders—Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (PDP), Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi

(NPP), Maulana Fazal ur Rehman JUI(F), Balakh Sher Mazari, Malik Qasim, Hamid Nasir Chattha, Manzoor Watto PML(J).

The president dismissed the Nawaz Sharif government in April 1993 on the same charges, he had earlier levelled on the Benazir Bhutto government in 1990. Nawaz Sharif challenged the decision of president in the Supreme Court, and Chief Justice Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, (who as one of the judges of the Supreme Court had upheld the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979), in an unprecedented decision demonstrating the independence of judiciary, issued a verdict with only one vote, against the order of the president and restored the government of Nawaz Sharif. The conflict between the president and the prime minister and threats of mass agitation from Benazir Bhutto and her allies created conditions that forced the government to agree to hold new elections.

Benazir Bhutto's Return to Power in 1993

Under the caretaker government of Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi, the elections held in October 1993 have been widely acclaimed as transparent and fair. The PPP emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly, winning 86 out of 202 seats, while PML(N) won 72 seats, PML(J) 6 and independents won 5. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif gave laudatory statements on the polls being fair and transparent, but within months Nawaz Sharif and PML(N) leaders went back on their earlier pronouncements and asserted that the election results were 'engineered.'

Resuming the prime ministership, Benazir Bhutto made appointments that showed much more experience and skill in retaining, building and sustaining not only the coalition government in Punjab but also relations with important national leaders and political parties, Nawabzada Nasrullah, became Chairman of the Kashmir Committee, Maulana Fazal ur Rehman, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Malik Qasim, Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Committee in the National Assembly. Furthermore, the PPP supported Malik Qasim as the leader of the House in the Senate. Balakh Sher Mazari's son was appointed minister in the Punjab cabinet, Mustafa Jatoi's son in the Sindh cabinet, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Nawabzada Nasrullah's son in the provincial cabinet. She pursued a two pronged strategy: First, ensuring that her coalition partners maintain the coalition and support the policies of her government or else stay silent, and second, she made overtures (initially) toward PML(N) and Nawaz Sharif for accommodation to develop a working relationship between the government and opposition.

However, she soon discovered that the PML(N) under Nawaz Sharif was determined to oppose her policies and not to enter a dialogue from a position of weakness. After about a year, Benazir Bhutto's government evolved a strategy to contain the role of PML(N) by instituting cases of misdemeanor, corruption and misconduct against party leaders. By December 1995, some 140 cases had been filed against Nawaz Sharif and his family in the courts, and Sheikh Rashid Ahmed a vocal PML(N) MNA from Rawalpindi was

put under detention. The regime was careful not to pursue a large-scale arrest of PML(N) leaders and workers, but instituted cases in the courts. The litigation process in Pakistan is tedious, complex and time consuming, and it does restrict the political mobilization capacity of the political leaders under trial. This was an ugly reality of Pakistani politics when Nawaz Sharif was in power, there were several cases instituted against Benazir Bhutto and her close associates. Benazir Bhutto was successful in keeping the coalition intact and the PML(N) opposition could not launch a protest movement to destabilize the PPP regime.

Military

Compared to her first government, Benazir Bhutto in her second term was prudent in dealing with the military, avoiding interference in army affairs. For example, the retirement of JCSC Chairman, General Shamim Ahmad was managed smoothly and efficiently, unlike the Sarohi affair. Similarly, the selection of chiefs of air staff, naval staff were made without causing any ripples. On 12th January 1996, General Jehangir Karamat took over the command of Pakistan Army upon the completion of term of General Abdul Waheed, the first time that the senior most general has become CO AS. His appointment was acclaimed by all shades of political parties and opinion builders in the country. In November 1994, when the military decided to wind up its "operation clean up" in Sindh, Benazir Bhutto was prompt in giving her approval. The military's withdrawal served her purposes because MQM had been demanding its withdrawal from Karachi, and now she could confront the MQM by saying that she has acceded to their demand. In return, the military encouraged the civilian government in Sindh to organize a para-military force. Under the command of Major General Mushtaq Malik (who has been posted elsewhere since October 1995), the army rangers emerged as an effective force challenging the supremacy of MQM in Karachi.

Benazir Bhutto also carefully protected the corporate interests of the military by vigorously campaigning to procure arms from different sources, but especially from the U.S. The Brown Amendment was trumpeted as victory for her government. Despite pressures from IMF, the World Bank, and her own government's public pronouncements on increasing funds for health, housing, education and population welfare, she resisted decrease in defence allocation, and in 1993–94 and 1994–95, defence expenditures stood at 26 percent of the entire budget. There were two reasons for this. First, India continues to build its arms arsenal and remains Pakistan's primary security concern. Second, there is a growing perception among Pakistani policy makers and intellectuals that the West is over playing the threat of "Islamic fundamentalism" from the Muslim countries, and that under this banner, it is promoting defence build ups in India and Israel to counter the threat. Given this perception, along with India's Kashmir policy, its nuclear stance, and persistence with a missile technology program, there is little likelihood that Pakistan would cut its defence expenditures. "Cold war" is likely to persist in South Asia, and the civilian regime in Pakistan is constrained—and has chosen—to pursue vigorously a security agenda defined by military.

From hostility and mistrust, during her second term, civil-military relations appeared to have been maturing with increasing trust, mutual tolerance and non-interference in each other's domains. The army is still a potent factor in Pakistani politics, and the longevity of any civilian government depends on sustaining its trust and confidence, while also managing relations with opposition political parties and the economic performance of the government.

The Karachi Factor

Karachi had become the sour point of Benazir Bhutto's government. It is country's largest city, an industrial and commercial center with a population of 10.2. million, 40$ of the industrial units are located here and the city generates 30 percent of Pakistan's revenue. Precise data on Karachi's ethic composition is not available, but it is estimated that 60 percent of the city's population is Mohajir, while Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis, (less than 7 percent) Baluchis, Kashmiris and Hazara's constitute the other 40 percent. Despite chaos, turmoil and violence, the city hosts an estimated half a million illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and some Arab countries.

In the October 1993 elections, the PPP emerged as the largest party in the Sindh Provincial Assembly, capturing 56 of the 99 seats, while the MQM gained 27 seats. But the MQM swept the polls in Karachi, winning 22 out of the 28 seats from the city's constituencies. Although the MQM has a substantial support base in other urban centers of Sindh—Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah, in Karachi it had a preponderant vote bank in the election. Whereas the support base of MQM is primarily urban and Karachi centric, the PPP's support base cuts across rural and urban Sindh, and without mustering support in rural Sindh or forming alliances, the MQM is not in a position to capture power at the provincial level. During the first PPP government, the MQM shared power in Sindh as a junior partner, but it was a tenuous and friction ridden coalition. The conflict in the province was a major contributing factor leading to the Benazir Bhutto government's dismissal in August 1990.

It is public knowledge now, that the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq encouraged the formation and development of the MQM to undermine the support base of the PPP in urban Sindh. Furthermore, between August 1990 and April 1993, through political manipulations and shady deals, the PPP was sidelined in Sindh politics. Both at the national and provincial level the PML(N) and, a MQM became coalition partners. In this coalition arrangement the MQM emerged as a dominant force; the two chief ministers during this period—Jam Sadiq Ali and Syed Muzaffar Shah— extended patronage and protection to the MQM. These policies fomented discontent in rural Sindh, where incidence of dacoity increased and emboldened the MQM, whose activists indulged in extortions from the businessmen and ordinary citizens. Deteriorating law and order situation in rural Sindh and allegations of extortions led to military operation in June

1992 which exposed the terrorist nature of the party and making public their torture cells. The operation ruptured the PML(N) MQM coalition and caused the split of MQM into two functions MQM(H) and MQM(A). At the core of conflict in Karachi between the PPP and MQM is; how to evolve a formula which would satisfy both for power sharing. Given MQM's overwhelming parliamentary support in Karachi, the party aims to monopolize the control of local resources of the city. The MQM asserts that it has electoral dominance in the city, therefore it should control the resources and destiny of Karachi.

Since Benazir Bhutto's return to power in 1993, the MQM has been waging an urban guerrilla war of increasing ferocity against her government. In 1995 on an average 10 to 20 persons died daily as a result of terrorist activity, and in the past two years over 6 thousand persons have died in terrorist related acts, including about 200 security services personnel. One may not agree with Benazir Bhutto, but she has been categoric and emphatic in saying that MQM is a terrorist organization that its leadership has been charged with criminal acts by earlier governments and that it must surrender weapons and accept judicial proceedings in the courts before any political dialogue may be initiated. Bhutto also insists that the MQM is not the sole spokesman of the entire mohajir community in Karachi and other urban centers of Sindh, but maintains that the organization represents only a segment of Mohajir community in central Karachi. Bhutto has been trying to draw a distinction between loyal opposition and the terrorist leadership of the MQM. She maintains that for the past ten years, whichever the government the MQM has opposed it; she claims its leaders are anti-state terrorist who are trying to blackmail the government and that the government must not succumb to their tactics.

The strategy to contain and suppress the MQM, particularly its hardcore has yielded some results. A large number of MQM activists have been arrested (while some have been eliminated in police encounters), leaders of opposition political parties (other than PML(N) have become a little apprehensive of openly supporting the MQM and the press is also questioning the validity of MQM's defiance of state authority. The PPP regime succeeded in exposing the terrorist character of the MQM to the Pakistani public, which is skeptical of the MQM claims to the contrary. But this confrontation between the PPP regime and the MQM has devastated civic live in Karachi. Whenever, Altaf Hussain, the MQM leader issues a strike call the response is overwhelming and the city of Karachi and other urban centers of Sindh come to grinding halt. These strikes have had crippling effect on social, cultural, commercial life in Karachi and on the economy of the country. Altaf Hussain alleges that the federal government and its intelligence agencies are committing atrocities in the Mohajir commencing and has launched a campaign to defame the government in international forums for violation of human rights.

This heavy death toll plus loss of an estimated 35 million rupees on a single strike day in Karachi had a crippling effect on the country's economy. Between May and September 1995 the city lost 60 billion rupees and the country an estimated 180 billion rupees. Clearly, the human and economic cost of PPP-MQM conflict in Karachi has been phenomenal and deepened the crisis of legitimacy of Bhutto's government.

Foreign Policy

During her second term, three issues dominated the foreign policy agenda— Kashmir, Afghanistan, and seeking removal of Pressler Amendment. On all three Benazir Bhutto's government achieved modest suecess, but under her leadership the government could not evolve coherent and clear set of goals for Pakistan's foreign policy in the post-cold war era. Let me briefly examine how her government formulated its position on these issues.

During her tenure as prime minister Benazir Bhutto visited about 35 countries.[707] According to an estimate these trips cost 5 billion rupees to the Pakistani exchequer. Extravagant spending for a poor country.[708] Ostensibly these extensive and expensive visits were made for two purposes: (a) to attract foreign investment in Pakistan (b) and to globalize the Kashmir issue by drawing the attention of international community toward Indian atrocities in Kashmir. On Kashmir, her government made concerted efforts but without sufficient homework to present Kashmir issue in various international forums and United Nations bodies. These efforts howsoever clumsy did embarrass India, raised the level of awareness about Kashmir, but won little support from the international community for Pakistani position. Thus the gulf between expectation and meaningful achievement on Kashmir widened.

Her visit to the United States in April–May 1996 year was of crucial significance. It aroused hope for the removal of Pressler Amendment and release of F-16 to Pakistan. Both of these issues are complex and entailed slow processes. Benazir Bhutto was able to win sympathy, support, goodwill and appreciation from the U.S administration. The visit created an environment in which U.S Pakistan showed signs of improvement. On both Pressler amendment and release of F-16, the PPP regime maintained that it had won moral victory and subsequently the Brown Amendment was hailed as a major achievement that smoothened the U.S Pakistan relations.[709] Her other visits did not bring about any meaningful change in the direction of Pakistan's foreign policy or on the perceptions of international forums.

On Afghanistan her government chose to operate under the UN sponsored peace plan initiative and also facilitated the emergence of Taliban —a movement dominated by

[707] Between October 1993 and April 1995 Benazir Bhutto made 25 foreign tours, while the other ten were taken during remaining period.
[708] Estimates provided by a senior official of the Ministry of Finance.
[709] *The Nation*, Lahore, various issues from 18th October to 30th October, 1995.

Pashtun Students who hailed from Afghanistan but had education and training in the religious schools in the towns close to Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The growth, expansion and rise of Taliban has been phenomenal—in less than four years of their emergence they have been able to capture Kabul.[710] Their political orientation and actions frustrated and proved embarrassing for Bhutto's government.

On the above stated issues Benazir Bhutto government was careful not to antagonize the military. She was loathe in formulating a clear and coherent foreign policy, but was vigorous and consistent in pursuing policy goals that the military considered important. Her primary thrust was on sustaining and strengthening a relationship of trust and confidence with the United States. She had an opportunity to rethink, redefine and redirect Pakistan's foreign policy goals in the light of post-cold war but remained glued to continuity, therefore a bold, imaginative foreign policy to constructively engage China, Iran, Central Asian States, and diffusing tensions with India could not be realized—cold war problems continue to linger and obliterate Pakistan's foreign policy goals.

Management of Pakistan's Economy

Upon re-election Benazir Bhutto chose to seek direct foreign investment in infrastructure projects; Energy, oil exploration, telecommunications, road construction and development of ports and airfields. Simultaneously, her government ventured to privatize the utilities and banking sector. Apparently, the government embarked upon a three pronged strategy to uplift Pakistan's economy. First, the regime opted for expanding direct foreign investment. Her government boasted of signing of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUS) of worth 22 billion dollars of investment in the above mentioned sectors (particularly energy) with foreign firms.[711] In 1994 the government announced a comprehensive power policy to encourage local and foreign investment in the energy sector together with plans to privatize the two utilities. The main characteristics of this package was internationally competitive terms and an attractive fiscal framework for investment in both thermal and hydel power generation.[712] The government also decided to withdraw completely from nonhydel power generation. Energy power consumption in Pakistan has been growing at 8 percent per annum, in 1995 it jumped to 12 percent. According to projected estimates annual capacity in Pakistan needs to be increased by almost 7,000 Mega Watt by 1998 so as to meet the current suppressed demand as well as future anticipated demand. Meeting this demand at current price meant an investment of $7 billion dollars at

[710] For an incisive and informative analysis on Talibans rise and possible involvement of Pakistan, see, Ahmed Rashid, "Road to Disaster," *The Herald*, November, 1996. pp 74–77 also see Ikram Sehgal, "Among the Taliban," *The Nation,* Lahore, November 19, 1996.

[711] For an informative report on investments in Pakistan, See, Ahmed Rashid, "Proceed with Caution." *Far Eastern Economic Review*; July 27, 1995. p. 74.

[712] For an informal analysis of power and energy policy See, Asad Amin, "The Fast Track to Power." *The Herald*, August 1996. pp. 118–120.

current prices. Had the foreign investment started to pour, by 1996 it would have reached to a level $4 billion dollars, however, during 1994–1995 an investment of only 0.5 billion was registered.[713] The ground work for some projects was started— for example, ICI put up a 500 million dollars chemical plant in Punjab, South Korea's Hyundai established 800 million dollars oil refinery, 2.6 billion dollars Ghazi Brotha hydro-electric power project was finalized with foreign investors. However, Consolidated Electronic Power Asia (CEPA)'s much publicized thermal power project at Keti Bendar, worth 7 billion dollars ran into serious difficulties.[714] All said and done Benazir Bhutto's government was able to attract an investment of about 1.5 billion dollars by 1996, but it fell far short of the promise and expectations that it had aroused. The MOUS could neither inspire the confidence of the industrialists or business groups nor of the public. Instead of promoting an investment friendly environment the MOUS led to erosion of government's credibility.

Second, Benazir Bhutto government decided to pursue privatization program with new vigor. The PPP regime appointed Naveed Qamar, a member of the Sindh Assembly as Chairman of the Privatization Commission, his feudal social origins, (despite foreign education), aroused skepticism among the business groups and industrialists. Naveed Qamar was skillful in allying their fears, however, a desired level of trust and understanding between the chairman of Privatization Commission and business-industrial groups could not develop. Nevertheless, the privatization program was continued through outright auctions, public offerings and strategic sales of 26 percent equity stakes to investors. Thereby allowing the government to keep a part stake and continue to earn dividend income from efficient and profitable enterprises. According to Privatization Commission between 1993–1995 28 public sector units were sold to the private sector.[715] The communication, utilities and financial sector had been dominated by the government, Bhutto government decided to accelerate the privatization of these sectors.

The Pakistan Tele-Communication Corporation (PTC) was partly divested in 1994 through a domestic and international offerings of share of vouchers totaling 12 percent of the company. By June 1996, the government was expected to conclude the final phase of privatization of PTC by transferring 26 percent of the equity to a strategic investor but that did not occur. Similarly little movement was made towards the privatization of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Pakistan Railways (PR). In the financial sector two commercial banks (United and Habib Bank), two Development Finance Institutions (including Bankers Equity) and an insurance company were to be sold to the privatesector. Key utilities such as Sui Northern Gas Company, Sui Northern Gas

[713] *The Friday Times*, June 13, 1996, *op.cit*.

[714] For some interesting details on this point, See Kaleem Omer, "WU's $7b coal fired Keti Bander Power Plant goes down the pit?" *The News*, Lahore, November 5, 1996.

[715] For two conflicting views and facts on privatization, See the interviews of Naveed Qamar and Senator Sartaj Aziz, Secretary General PML(N) *News Line*, Karachi, May 1996. pp. 58–59 and 65.

Pipelines, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Karachi Water and Sewerage Bank and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) units namely Kot Addu and Jamshoro were to be privatized—only Kot Addu's sale was finalized— while sale of most of the other projects ran into difficulty either on grounds of opportunism—crony capitalism or lack of information—insufficient transparency. Resultantly, the potential buyers withdrew their bids.

The entire privatization process has raised questions and been compromised by allegations of corruption and violation of rules. Both direct foreign investment and privatization in public perception were equated with large scale corruption at the government level.

Third, on structural adjustments the IMF since 1988 and more specifically 1993 has been insisting for reduction in budget deficit, broadening of tax base, reduction in defence expenditure, improvement of tax collection and imposition of agricultural tax. The two budgets of 1995 and 1996 reveal considerable gap between IMF demands and governments provision on key issues.[716] (See Table 8.1.)

The budgetary provision neither satisfied the IMF nor the Pakistani public, both budgets were followed by mini-budgets, which had a devastating effect on the economy. Two major problems were how to control inflation, which stood around 13 percent, although unofficial estimates point it to be at 20 percent, while the budgetary deficit has been between 5 percent to 5.7 percent of the GDP.[717] High inflation rates and increasing budgetary deficit continued to threaten the economic stability. In addition Bhutto government made little effort to control government spending; price hikes in utilities and charges of corruption and mismanagement added fuel to the fire.

Tax evasion is rampant in Pakistan, and the tax base is shockingly narrow. It is instructive to note that only 1 percent of the country's 130 million people pay income tax. The land owning groups who dominate the national and provincial parliaments, paid a partly sum of 2 million rupees in wealth tax during 1994–95.[718] They defy the imposition of agriculture tax, although agriculture accounts for 24 percent of the total GDP. The attitude of businessmen, traders and industrialists is no different. They continue to resist imposition of any taxes. There is no tax morality. Given increase in government spending and allegations of corruption, there is a growing belief among the small taxpaying population that the state hardly provides any services, while elected representatives and public officials continue to misappropriate public money—so why

[716] Government of Pakistan, Federal Budget in Brief 1995–96, Islamabad, Finance Division, 1995. pp 1–45. "TFT pre-budget report on the state of the economy: Features of Economy in 1995– 96." also see Mansoor Ijaz, "The IMF's recipe for disaster." *The Friday Times*, Lahore, Vol. VIII, June 13, 1996. pp. 6–7.

[717] For an informed and critical analysis on this point See, S. Akbar Zaidi, "Is Four Percent Sacrosanct." *The Herald*, June 1996. pp. 87–89.

[718] Estimates provided by the officials of Central Board of Revenue (CBR) government of Pakistan.

pay taxes? The 1994–95 budget revenue target was 260 billion rupees (8.35 billion dollars), twice it was revised downwards even than the government was able to raise only 225 billion rupees. The government has taken some steps to expand the tax collection department; but expansion of tax base would not be meaningful, unless efforts could be made to increase productivity.

As noted above, the PPP government was able to attract some foreign investment, the major failure of Bhutto government was its inability to win the support and confidence of business groups, traders and industrialists. They perceived the PPP regime and its policies as pro-feudal and anti-business. This basic distrust hampered the process of privatization, obliterated the developmental goals of the regime and widened the gulf between the government and the business groups. This perception was further deepened by the confrontational policies of the PML(N)— reinforcing the belief among the people that the two leading parties of the country were perpetuating polarization.

Table 8.1 IMF Targets

Budget Provision		
IMF Targets	**1995**	**1996**
Reduce budget deficit by 4% of GDP	Reduced to 5.7%	Initially agreed to 4%, revised to 5%
Cut all tariffs 25%	Cut tariffs by 5%	–
End exemptions to 15% sales tax	Exemptions remain	Exemptions remain
Impose agricultural tax	Non-landlords who control national and provincial assemblies reluctant to tax theory	–
Broaden tax base to include Bazar economy	Fixed annual tax of 1,000 rupees on small business	–
Raise electricity rates by 15%	Rates increased on 14.5% average	Rates increased over 20%
Cut defense	Defense budget increase spending by 15%	Defense spending raised by 7%
Limit government borrowing	Target 30 billion rupees	Target 37 billion rupees
Improve revenue collection	Trying to root out corruption at Central Board of Revenue (CBR)	–

Conclusion

The administrative and economic performance of Benazir Bhutto regime remained poor, inefficiency and mismanagement led to a crisis of legitimacy for the government. A running inflation rate, price hikes of utilities and consumer items and continuing stories of corruption, ignited discontent among various segments of the society. Retaining power requires establishing sufficient political support from various socioeconomic groups in the polity without such support governments fall, coalitions collapse and parliaments are dismissed. Political support is obtained by rewarding various groups and protecting their interests. Apparently the PPP regime became oblivious of this fact. The June 1996 budget imposed new taxes, including a general sales tax, and the various groups resorted to street protests and agitation. The Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Trade, The All Pakistan Clerks Association,

Pakistan Transporters Association, Opposition Political Parties and religious groups demanded that these levies be replaced with imposition of agricultural tax on land owners. Between June and October 1996 Qazi Hussain Ahmd Jamaat-i-Islami launched a massive campaign of protest, agitation, and demonstrations against Benazir Bhutto's government. He maintained that Bhutto government was corrupt and demanded that president must dismiss her cabinet and install an interim government. The Jamaat leader advocated that the corrupt officials and politicians must be held accountable. He even suggested that an interim government be installed for two to three years and that such a government's priority should be to institute a process of accountability, elections could be delayed for some time.

The PML(N) under Nawaz Sharif had been consistent in opposing the Bhutto government and its policies from the very beginning. Once Jamaat took the initiative, PML(N) also jumped on the bandwagon, when the budget was announced in June 1996, Nawaz Sharif called it anti-people and pro-landowners.[719] He also attacked the PPP regime on charges of corruption, mismanagement and demanded, that president should dismisss

the government; install a care-taker government, and call for holding fresh elections. Both the JI and PML(N) made concerted efforts to put extra parliamentary pressure on the president to invoke article 58–2(B) and remove Benazir Bhutto's government. The authoritarian response of government, economic mismanagement and extra-judicial killings in Karachi widened the gulf between president and PPP government. Taking note of these demands and protests the president began to caution the prime minister to take cognizance of allegations and charges of opposition parties, and directed her to improve management of economy and functioning of the government. Under growing opposition protests escalation in violence, Benazir Bhutto found it difficult to muster the support of the business and religious groups, although she was skillful in sustaining the PDA coalition. On September 20th Murtaza Bhutto (brother of Benazir Bhutto) was murdered in mysterious circumstances. The PPP regime attempted to implicate the president in conspiring to murder her brother,[720] this further widened the gulf and distrust between the president and the prime minister. It was in the context of these circumstances of personal distrust, allegations of corruption, and growing violence that the president dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto on November 5, 1996. President Farooq Leghari removed her government on charges of corruption, extra-judicial killings in Karachi, gross mismanagement of economy erosion of institutions

[719] For details of reports of Jamaat-PML(N)'s protests and sit-in against Benzair government, See *The Nation*, Lahore, October 26–29, 1996, and several issues between 25th June to July 20, 1996, also for a detailed analysis of Qazi Hussain Ahmed's movement against Benazir Bhutto's government See, Zaigham Khan, "The Jamaat Strikes Back," *The Herald*, November 1996. pp. 53– 56.

[720] On 4th October 1996, Benazir Bhutto while speaking in the National Assembly alleged that the President and GHQ were involved in the murder case, but on 8th October 1996, she retracted her statement.

and maladministration.[721] Benzair Bhutto's government fall came rather abruptly, which explains not only the fragility of democracy, but also the inability of civilian leaders to develop a working relationship on the nature and working of parliamentary democracy in the country.

It is instructive to note that in the past decade or so, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif— as leaders of their respective parties and prime ministers— had an opportunity to build organizational structure of the party and possibly democratize the process of leadership selection, instead both squandered an opportunity to stabilize procedures and practices of parliamentary democracy and party system. While in power both used party as an instrument for extending patronage and ventured to establish the dominant party model to strengthen personal rule, none facilitated the development of two party system and in the process both failed. Both contributed little in developing any consensual framework for government-opposition relationship; both allowed and encouraged political confrontation, polarization, intolerance and authoritarian style of governance. Resultantly, military hegemony in Pakistan's politics has continued to persist—presidential intervention has become only its new manifestation.

[721] For text of the presidential orders on dissolution of the National Assembly, See, *The Nation, Lahore*, November 6, 1996.

9

CONCLUSION

The subject of this research has been the limitations and constraints of a successor civilian regime in the post-military hegemonic political system. The paradox is that, on the one hand, a party dominance system emerges as a response to the military hegemonic system, while on the other hand, the functioning and development of the former is conditioned by the latter. The dynamics of this relationship are adversarial and competitive to the extent that each seeks control over the resources of the society. Both inhibit the growth and development of autonomous groups and political parties. Consequently, party-building, associational activity, and competitive party politics remain low priorities. Socialization of democratic norms and values remain weak, and authoritarian and hegemonic tendencies persist.

Pakistan's search for a viable political system has produced two developmental patterns. As noted in Chapter 2, the military hegemonic regime advanced the interests of the military-bureaucratic elites, consolidated the financial industrial groups, co-opted a segment of the feudal class, and led to laissez fair economic growth and development. At the same time, through political control and political exclusion, the regime promoted centralization and authoritarianism, excluded political leaders, restricted associational group activity, and suppressed the growth and development of political parties. Many observers have noted this anti-politics nature of the military regime, but the fact that the military regimes rewarded the already privileged groups in the society has not been given adequate attention. This research emphasizes that in Pakistan, while political order was maintained through military hegemony, unequal economic growth led to a concentration of wealth which, in turn, politicized the excluded groups and classes. In other words, the economic policies of the military regime promoted class inequalities. This, coupled with centralization, political suppression, and authoritarianism, evoked politics of regime confrontation. Differentiated economic growth did occur under military hegemonic systems and it promoted economic pluralism and economic development (industrialization, urbanization). It also increased the size of industrial labor. However, policies of political exclusion and control politicized the masses. Since under the military-hegemonic regime associational group activity is discouraged and functioning of political parties is restricted, political leaders excluded from the political system resort to coalition-building, mass mobilization, and confrontation. Also because interest group formation is discouraged and intermediate channels of conflict resolution are not allowed to develop, the regime is perceived as the symbol of social ills. Thus, mass protest movements emerge as a consequence of the exclusionary policies of the

military and as a response to the military hegemonic system. Such mass movements are loosely organized, broad-based, and focus on regime change.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP emerged as a response to the military hegemonic political system. By its very nature, origin, orientation, leadership composition, and group support, the PPP emerged as an anti-elite, anti-status quo party. Although the PPP's leadership came predominantly from the feudal class and urban professional groups, it was not represented in the existing elite structure and, therefore, did not have much of a stake in the existing system. Once in power, the socio-economic policies of the PPP showed a bias against existing elite groups. The party devised and employed Islamic Socialism as an ideology of protest and raised popular consciousness and expectations. Many observers have noted the radical character of the PPP-led mass movement in Pakistani politics. It needs to be recognized that mass movements which emerge in opposition to military regimes are in general socially progressive in nature and content. Coalitions, groups, and leaders which dominate such a movement seek not only redistribution of power, but dispersion of economic resources. These movements—anti-regime and anti-system—advocate nationalization of industries, land reforms and restoration of democracy. These are contradictory goals, but lead to mass politicization and raise the level of expectation. The PPP spearheaded this kind of movement.

Once in power, the PPP found itself confronted with making a transition from a mass movement to a parliamentary party. As the dominant party, the PPP and its leadership was expected to provide a role model by making the transition from a military hegemony to a parliamentary political party. Many observers of Third World politics have noted that mass mobilizational parties may have an ideological flavor, but are weak organizationally and find it difficult to make such a transition; the PPP was no exception.

The PPP was faction-ridden, loosely organized and composed of contradictory group support bases. Its task was further complicated by yet another legacy of the military regime. As noted in Chapter 4, weakening of the military hegemonic political system proportionately increases and intensifies societal cleavages (e.g., ideological, personal, regional, etc.) which were either suppressed, ignored or remained unresolved under the military regime. Thus, various forms of conflict emerged with new intensity, and newly mobilized groups pursue their goals with whatever means available.

In a post-military hegemonic system, politics are characterized by dissent, conflict and violence. Under such conditions, regime-building becomes a top priority and party-building remains a low priority. Bhutto and the PPP were preoccupied with regime-building. A successor civilian regime in a post-military hegemonic system has limited coercive capacity, and voluntary compliance is difficult to obtain (Bhutto created the FSF to increase personal autonomy and to expand the coercive capacity of his regime.) Consequently, the party in power focuses on regime-building which, in turn, leads to

centralization; potential and real threats of regionalism evoke authoritarian responses from the civilian regime very much like those of the military regime. Aware of the civilian regime's limited coercive capacity, the regional and oppositional groups do not hesitate to resort to violence to achieve their goals. This exacerbates conflict. Thus, despite transition from military to party rule, hegemonic tendencies persist, the democratic process remains fragile, and opposition parties and associational group activity are suppressed and restricted as the party in power seeks dominance.

Under the party dominance political system, considerations of rule and reform promote tendencies of centralization, authoritarianism and control. As previously noted, imperatives of rule encourage regime dominance in the name of party rule. However, in order to sustain the support of its followers, the PPP embarked on a policy of socio-economic reform. It must be emphasized that, as a non-elitest party, the PPP was keen to broaden the existing elite structure; the party did not pursue a total restructuring of the bureaucratic-military institutions. Bhutto merely sought subordination of these institutions and personal control over them. His and the PPP's primary thrust was to block the channels of access between the bureaucratic-military elites and the financial-industrial groups. For the PPP, rule and reform were two sides of the same coin.

Given that the PPP was loosely organized, faction-ridden, had a contradictory social class support base, and lacked ideological coherence, Bhutto chose to use the party as a vehicle for patronage. The party was to be an instrument of acquiring access to governmental resources to distribute rewards to its adherents; it was to destroy the bureaucratic-military elites' control of resources. In addition, a weakly organized party provided Bhutto with greater maneuverability in dealing with various factions. This enhanced Bhutto's personal power but inhibited the development of the PPP as a political party.

Bhutto's critics correctly attribute the failure of the PPP to authoritarian strains in Bhutto's personality. At no stage of the party's development did Bhutto allow or encourage elections within the party. He appointed leaders to party offices. Despite purging the socialists and the induction of feudals in larger numbers, Bhutto did not feel comfortable about holding party elections. This strategy of keeping a mass-based but loosely organized party to enhance personal power has been tried by many Third World leaders. It failed almost all of them. It failed Bhutto, too.

I have emphasized that, whereas in general the military hegemonic system inhibited the growth and development of the party system, in the case of the PPP, Bhutto's personal preferences were an important factor which hampered party-building. However, I want to underscore that Bhutto's was not so much a failure in party-building as it was his inability to develop some degree of consensus on the method and form of his reform. It was not the weak organization of the PPP that caused this; it was socio-economic reform, particularly efforts to break the linkage between the bureaucratic-military elites

and the financial-industrial groups, that Bhutto and the PPP failed to accomplish. Had Bhutto given priority to party-building, along with socio-economic reforms, he might have succeeded in providing an alternative to the military hegemonic system.

Under the military hegemonic political system, the functions of patronage and reward are not only monopolized by the bureaucratic-military elites, but are distributed by discreet and subtle mechanisms. But, under the party dominance system, patronage and distribution of rewards visibly benefit party supporters. This produces unrest in the opposition groups, and the bureaucratic-military elites perceive party patronage as fostering corruption. This damages the reputation of the party system and undermines its legitimacy.

The coalition that Bhutto brought to power did attempt to provide material rewards to the relatively weaker segments of society, such as industrial labor, peasants, and petty government employees. In this sense, the party dominance system raised the expectations of the masses and promoted the belief that if a relatively sympathetic regime came to power, it might improve their economic status. However, under the dominant party system little effort was made either to organize these groups or to encourage their involvement in the decision-making process, and they remained peripheral to the political process. Thus an opportunity to integrate these groups with the PPP and empower the public was lost.

The party dominance system produced contradictory results. On the one hand, the PPP pursued an economic policy of redistribution and brought to power a new coalition of groups. On the other hand, it continued to rely on coercion. To increase the civilian leadership's autonomy and to reduce dependence on the military, Bhutto regime expanded paramilitary institutions. It imposed restrictions on dissent. This resulted in increased centralization, authoritarianism and control. Interestingly, despite these tendencies, the regime retained wide acceptance because of its economic policies. The regime's legitimacy was not challenged by the urban professionals, industrial labor, the peasantry or the petty government employees. It was challenged by the financial-industrial groups, a segment of the feudal class, the trader-merchant classes, and religious groups. Bhutto's reformism had affected the powerful financial-industrial groups, and the regime's authoritarian policies had restricted the functioning of opposition parties. Therefore, in January 1977, as Bhutto announced elections, these anti-regime groups seized the opportunity to denounce the PPP's socioeconomic policies and social liberalism. As noted earlier, the military hegemonic regime evoked socially progressive protest movements in the late 1960's. This led to regime change. In the spring of 1977, the Bhutto regime's reformism and social liberalism, combined with its authoritarian tendencies, evoked an ideologically conservative protest movement whose leadership openly incited the military to overthrow the regime. The movement was led by a coalition of nine parties, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). It was a conglomeration of such rightist and religious groups as Jamaat-i-Islami (Mian Tufail

Mohammad), Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (Mufti Mahmud), Jamiat-ul-Ulema Pakistan (Maulana Noorani), Tehrik-Istaqlal (retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan), Pakistan Muslim League (PIR Pagaro), Pakistan Democratic Party (Nawabzada Nasar Ullah), Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (Sardar Abdul Qayyum), National Democratic party (Sher Baz Mazari), Khaksar Tehrik (Khan Mohammad Ashraf Khan).

From the outset, the PNA showed a determination to use the elections not as a legitimate means toward competitive politics and a peaceful succession of power, but as an opportunity to dislodge Bhutto from power. The PNA leadership was greatly distressed by Bhutto's autocratic and authoritarian rule and suggested on numerous occasions during the campaign that nothing short of Bhutto's removal from power would satisfy them. While Bhutto saw elections as a means to legitimize his rule, the PNA saw them as an opportunity to delegitimize Bhutto's rule. Prior to the elections it was widely believed that Bhutto's regime was well entrenched and would win the elections. In the 1977 National Assembly elections, the PPP won overwhelmingly; it won 155 of the 200 seats and received 58 percent of the votes, as opposed to 35 percent for the PNA. The only province where the PPP lost was N.W.F.P. The PNA was stunned by its defeat and charged that the elections had been rigged. After its defeat in the Provincial Assembly elections on March 11, 1977, the PNA decided to launch a protest movement against the "electoral fraud" of the PPP.

The immediate cause of the protest was the rigging charge, but deep down, Pakistan was polarized by Bhutto's reformism and authoritarian rule. The nationalizations, administrative reforms and changes that had emerged in the higher structure of the Pakistan Army had seriously hurt the powerful groups in the country. In other words, by the time Bhutto called for national elections, financial-industrial groups, the bureaucracy, the military, trader-merchant classes, and religious groups had become alienated by Bhutto's policies. Opposition leaders thought Bhutto's rule was authoritarian and coercive and feared that if he continued to rule, Pakistan would become a single-party dictatorship. Bhutto had not lost popularity or legitimacy but, when the PNA movement began, he was unable to counter it effectively. There were two reasons for this ineffectiveness. First, Bhutto had not given

proper attention to party-building; therefore, he was unable to mobilize his party. Second, he dealt with the PNA movement as a law and order problem, not as a political one. He had sufficient popular appeal (as post-1977 events were to show), and he could easily have mobilized the masses to counter the PNA. He was reluctant to do so because he was probably aware that if he mobilized the masses, he might not be able to control them. Therefore, Bhutto opted to use force that escalated this movement. The Arthis and trader-merchants who were adversely affected by the 1976 nationalizations emerged as the vanguard of the PNA movement supported by religious groups. The religious groups, particularly those belonging to Deeni Madrassa (religious schools), were distressed because Maulana Kausar Niazi, Minister for HAJ and Auqaf under

Bhutto, was making an effort to bring religious schools and Imams of Mosques under the control of Auqaf's department, and the religious groups resented this.

The PNA strategy was two-pronged: (1) to stage mass protests to create disorderly conditions to the extent that Bhutto was forced to call upon the military to aid the civilian regime, and (2) to incite the military to overthrow Bhutto's government. In April 1977, the PNA strategy paid off when Bhutto introduced partial martial law in three cities—Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. Once the military came in to support the civilian government, the PNA provoked military officers. For example, in Lahore the PNA raised slogans that "Dhaka Dee Khoti Lahore Aa Khalotee" (those who were defeated in Dacca now have come back to Lahore). To further injure their pride, the PNA supporters sent Churian (Bangles) to Officers and Jawans patrolling the streets under partial martial law. In the Pakistani culture, this amounted to challenging the fighting spirit and manhood of Officers and Jawans. Such tactics of cultural symbolism were adopted to cause disaffection in the army for supporting the civilian regime.

In addition, at the height of the protest movement in May 1977, retired Air marshal Asghar Khan wrote an open letter to the chiefs of the Pakistani Army, Navy and Air Force, asking them to disobey the "unlawful" command and to overthrow the government. He wrote:

> Bhutto has vitiated the constitution and is guilty of a grave crime against the people. It is your duty not to support his illegal regime Let it not be said that the Pakistan Armed Forces are a degenerate police force, fit for killing unarmed civilians.[722]

Air Marshal Asghar Khan's letter suggested that, despite widespread support for the PNA movement, the leaders were not sure if they would be able to dislodge Bhutto. After a brief but swift protest movement, Bhutto's regime was overthrown by the military in July 1977.

Writing from his cell, Bhutto alleged that the military and the PNA acted in concert to overthrow his government. He charged:

> Since February 1977, the PNA and the Chief Martial Law Administrator have been in league with each other. The agitation was a common affair. Jawans [soldiers] dressed in civilian clothes or muftis were sent to PNA demonstration to swell the crowds and incite public provocation.[723]

The White Papers published by the military regime refuted these allegations.

[722] Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics 1958–1982*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1983. pp. 116–118.
[723] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If Iam Assassinated*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979. p. 145.

The PNA protest movement of 1977 suggested that the party dominance system which emerged under Bhutto, although authoritarian in character, was not coercive enough to suppress the opposition groups. The party dominance system functioned as an extension of the military hegemonic political system in the sense that party rule also discouraged the formation of associational groups, ruling and opposition parties could not build consensus on workings of the parliamentary democracy, thus ruling party's control of the military remained precarious. Apparently the PPP and PNA leadership failed to develop any consensus on how to keep the military subordinate to civilian leadership. But deeper sources of tension were Bhutto's socioeconomic policies which had antagonized the powerful groups who preferred the revival of military hegemony rather than compromise on Bhutto's continuation in power. Thus military intervened in complex circumstances of "invitation" from opposition political leaders and ambitions of generals to resurrect military hegemonic political system with new zeal and orientation.

General Zia ul Haq constructed a military regime which was more coercive and ideological compared to that of Ayub Khan's. It explicitly used Islamic ideology and strengthened the role of religious groups in political arena, while the Ayub regime sought legitimacy not on ideological grounds, but on its developmental, modernist and professedly nation-building approach.

The first military regime treated the religious groups as non-political actors. Therefore it restricted their entry into political arena. The second military (Yahya Khan) regime encouraged the entry of religious groups into political arena. The third military regime not only sought legitimacy in Islamic ideology and Islamization but also legitimized the participation of religious groups in the political system. Thus, the protesting religious groups were galvanized into political supporters of the military regime and later proliferated as legitimate participants in the political process. Change from Bhutto's party dominant regime to Zia ul Haq's military hegemonic regime-making an ideological shift—from one direction and set of values to another—caused considerable anxiety, anguish and pain. The societal polarization developed the overtones of pro-military groups and loosely defined pro-democracy groups. The "Islamic socialist" and nationalist ideology of Bhutto's civilian regime emanated from process and results of electoral competition. The imposition of Zia ul Haq's variation of "Islamic ideology" originated from his consolidation of military rule. The military regime under Zia took upon itself to Islamize the society for which it had no mandate except that it used the PNA's demand of Nizam-e-Mustafa to impose Islamization. Yahya Khan and Zia ul Haq's military regimes brought ideology to the core of Pakistani politics, a task which religious political parties had failed to accomplish.

The PNA protest clearly indicated that the fragile consensus that political parties and political leadership constructed (manifested through promulgation of 1973 constitution)

had broken down, and that PNA and PPP leadership did enter into prolonged negotiations to restore confidence and rejuvenate the system. However, military's intervention and its expansion of power solidified the gulf between social and political forces during PNA-PPP confrontation. As soon as the military regime consolidated its hegemonic position, the socio-economic and political cleavages produced by PNA-PPP confrontation developed into a "bleeding wound." Pakistani society, economy and polity became divided, fragmented and violence ridden.

When Zia attempted to heal the "bleeding wound" by agreeing to hold partyless elections in 1985, the MRD political parties and political leaders found it to be too late and too little. The MRD boycotted these elections, although a significant number of individual political leaders from the MRD parties participated in the 1985 elections and subsequently became members of national and provincial assemblies. Elections considerably softened the polarization. However, consensus building still eluded the Pakistani ruling elites and leaders. By and large MRD leadership remained hostile and assemblies could neither acquire legitimacy nor built a minimum consensus among the political contestants and the military. Once parliament became functional, it developed in-house political parties and revived the prospects of political parties as principle pillars of a democratic order. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) under prime minister Muhammed Khan Junejo made moves to construct political hegemony as an alternative to military hegemony. As an important step in that direction, in 1986, it encouraged the re-entry of PPP in the political process. In a span of three years PML did emerge as a dominant party in the parliament. It devised a framework to establish political hegemony by providing political patronage and allocation of developmental funds/schemes to individual members of the ruling party. To counter PML's tactics of seeking dominance, the PPP responded by mobilizing its mass support. Restoration of democracy, resurgence of PPP, success of All Political Parties Conference and Geneva Peace accords on Afghanistan were perceived by Zia ul Haq as challenges not only to his rule but also serious policy irritants with the civilian partners. Given these differences in May 1988 he did away with the restricted parliamentary experience that he had initiated in the February 1985. Pakistan came back full circle once again. Zia ul Haq pushed for military hegemony with new vigor, zeal and a heavy dose of Islamization and enforcement of Shariat Laws, thus arresting the fragile process of transition to democracy. Zia's dissolution of assemblies and subsequent inability to develop any political framework for rule, clearly suggested that the military hegemonic system could not be sustained any longer! Yet again in Pakistani politics the political parties and their leadership failed to develop a coherent response to the hegemonial designs of the military. In August 1988 Zia's death in an air crash clearly indicated that there was no political institution in place and military's hegemony was a reality. Thus once again the onus fell on military to not only extricate its political role but also redesign a framework for re-democratization. Resultantly, the military elites under the new CO AS General Mirza Aslam Beg opted to distance themselves from politics and agreed to hold elections. The military conceded to hold elections on party basis,

broadened the base of electoral competition and encouraged the participation of those groups, individuals and political parties, which had hitherto been excluded. The military also reassured the electorate that it would share power with the elected representatives of the people. However from a distance it also continued to guide the direction of electoral competition. Through ISI the military was able to unify political forces that were opposed to the PPP, thus IJI was born. Military elites orchestrated re-democratization in a manner that on the one hand, they imposed checks on the newly installed PPP government. On the other hand, they did little to discourage IJI to confront the ruling party, particularly in the Punjab. Consequently military's hegemony in politics could not be reduced and it assumed the role of an arbitrator and a referee between the ruling PPP and the opposition IJI.

Ironically both transitions, i.e., in 1971 and 1985, from military hegemonic to civilian rule were burdened with divisiveness rather than consensus. Transitions that occur in the context of social and political cleavages and divisiveness are bound to be fragile, violence prone and inherently unstable. Thus Pakistan embarked on a path of re-democratization conflict ridden, divided, and tentative.

Despite agreement on the legitimacy of electoral contests for electing a government to power and its removal through elections, the Pakistani elites and political leaders have found it difficult to uphold the electoral mandate or abide by the rules and results of the electoral outcome. These disagreements among the political contenders—both in the government and in the opposition have deepened social, economic and political polarization. It has resulted in escalation of political, ethnic and sectarian violence. Confronted with violence and crisis of legitimacy of enforcement of government authority, the members of higher echelons of power in Pakistan —military, bureaucracy, business, religious elites, and political leaders have lost the power and credibility to influence the behavior and orientation of the socioeconomic groups below them. This is a major transformation, which has eroded the authority of those who rule and govern. Consequently the capacity of ruling elites to govern and rule has been severely limited. In addition over the years various policies of civilian and military regimes and forces of modernization have ushered in new groups in the political arena. Ironically, this has happened without any accepted and binding agreement among the political contenders, on how to govern and play the rules of politics. Political parties and their leadership have been found wanting on developing their intellectual and policy content. There is no debate on crucial issues: such as how to reform education, improve human skills, eliminate corruption, reduce deficit, control governmental expenditure, rationalize defence expenditure and reduce the burden of debt, etc.

Consequently the political parties have yet to develop their policy goals and organizational stability; they remain faction ridden and undemocratic. Political parties and their leadership do not focus on developing programmes and policies of economic development and good governance. Once in power they resort to rely on same

authoritarian structures of the state which they had defied while in the opposition. Instead of developing political parties as tools of governance and instruments of change and reform, they venture to make bureaucracy and paramilitary institutions as instruments of governance. Resultantly, democratic dispensation and tolerance of dissent remain weak in the civil society and authoritarian structures acquire stability The ruling party attempts to establish political hegemony by distributing patronage and rewards to its supporters and coalition partners, while the parties in opposition spend their energy in mobilizing groups against the government. Confrontation between government and opposition parties weakens democratic development. In turn, military hegemony lingers on and erosion of governmental authority escalates.

The breakdown of social and political order in Pakistan has occurred because of social and economic change, as well as the attitude and workings of the leaders—both in the government and opposition political parties. None of them have contributed towards either strengthening the democratic processes and institutions, nor have they made any meaningful contribution in improving institutions of governance. In fact, since the transition to democracy, the political parties and their leadership have used bureaucracy as a blatant instrument to expand their powers and in the process they have compromised the neutrality and efficiency of the bureaucracy. Through postings, transfers, interference in appointments at the lower cadres particularly in police and district administration, the political parties have disrupted the procedure of chain of command in the bureaucracy. They have violated the principle of merit, seniority and chain of authority. Consequently, in the past decade or so of transition to democracy, the political leadership of whichever party in (PPP or IJI or PML(N)) power have been using bureaucracy as an instrument to exercise personal power, consolidate personal gains, and undermine the rule of law. Resultantly an interlocking of politician and bureaucracy has become too visible, particularly at the district and policy making level. This has considerably tarnished the image of both political parties and the civil servants. It has also produced a crisis of legitimacy for the bureaucracy, its moral and legal authority to govern has come under attack. Political, ethnic, sectarian violence and erosion of authority and disfunctioning of institutions have become a way of life in Pakistan. Democracy and representative government have become equated with unlawful rule, violence, disorder and the ruling groups whether in power or in opposition, both seem equally responsible for the current malaise.

Political parties and religious groups have yet to accept elections and parliamentary democracy as legitimate instrument of transfer of power from one set of individuals and groups to another. They have yet to accept the outcome of electoral competition as legitimate source of governance. The party that looses elections does not play the role of a responsible opposition. It either challenges the very basis of electoral process or resorts to politics of agitation leading to demands of removal of the party in power. The party in power has also been less than accommodating and suppresses dissent, invariably establishing political hegemony which appears to be its sole goal. The

opposition is harassed and hounded. In situation of crisis, they either invite military to intervene, or look towards it for patronage or support, mediation or arbitration. This further enhances the significance and strength of the military. Consequently the military hegemony continues to persist. Unless military voluntarily decides to withdraw from politics and constructs an environment conducive for the functioning of democracy—democracy is unlikely to take root in the country. This demands a radical change in the attitude of military elites. They have to play the "king" to construct democracy, they have to descend from hegemonial rulership to democratic disposition. In a country where political parties have failed to construct democracy, Should military be expected to construct one?

The greatest weakness of political elites and political leaders is their inability to project democracy as a preferable alternative system of government. Most developing countries' experience reveals that once the process of redemocratization is initiated it leads to two processes: First, we see the disintegration of authoritarian regime and its structures, two, with disintegration, we see construction and creation of democratic structures and processes.[724] Ironically, in case of Pakistan neither of the two processes succeed as they should have made transition to democracy meaningful. Hence neither the opposition political parties and their leadership nor successor civilian regimes to the military-hegemonic rule have been able to

make any significant contribution. More than the culture and structure of Pakistani society, it is the political leadership that has failed to construct democracy as a preferable alternative model of government. Redemocratization has not brought a desirable value change from authoritarian to democratic norms among the leaders and their followers. As noted throughout this study, Pakistani political parties, their organization, styles, conduct and behavior of their leaders reveals that they remain undemocratic in their orientation and outlook. The press has became relatively free but not fully responsible. Political liberalization has gained ground, but unless democratic norms and practices gain legitimacy, uncertainty about the sustenance of democracy as a preferable alternative is likely to persist.

The dominant elites, political leaders, autonomous groups and institutions of governance in Pakistan are in disarray. There is a situation of moral outrage and crisis of legitimacy. They are losing capacity to rule and govern. Unless these ruling elites develop some degree of consensus on how to govern, the elite structure may fall apart and force a radically new realignment of social and political forces to reinvent democracy in Pakistan.

[724] For some perceptive theoretical insights on this point See, Samuel P. Huntington, "Armed Forces and Democracy: Reforming Civil-Military Relations." Journal of Democracy, Vol 6, No. 4, October 1995, pp. 9–17 and also by the same author, "Democracy for the Long Haul." Journal of Democracy, Vol 7, No. 2, April 1996. pp. 3–13.

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ABOUT THE BOOK AND AUTHOR

Taking an explicitly comparative theoretical approach, Saeed Shafqat presents a comprehensive exploration of civil-military relations in Pakistan. He begins by describing the history of military hegemony in this volatile South Asian country and then examines the breakdown of military control, assessing the rise of the Pakistan People's Party and the changing configuration of party-military relations.

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