

# Pakistan Under the Military Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq

Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter

with contributions by  
Robert LaPorte, Jr., and Kamal Azfar



Reproduced by  
**Sani H. Panhwar**

# Pakistan Under the Military Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq

Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter

with contributions by

Robert LaPorte, Jr., and Kamal Azfar

Reproduced by  
Sani H. Panhwar

## Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments .. .. .	1
About the Authors .. .. .	2
Abbreviations .. .. .	3
1 Zia's Eleven Years, Shahid Javed Burki .. .. .	4
2 Restructuring the Pakistan Political System, Craig Baxter .. ..	27
3 Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan, Kamal Azfar .. .. .	45
4 Pakistan's Economy Under Zia, Shahid Javed Burki .. .. .	78
5 Administrative Restructuring During the Zia Period, Robert LaPorte, Jr.	102
6 Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena, Craig Baxter	120
Zia's Eleven Years: A Chronology of Important Events, Shahid Javed Burki	135
Biographical Sketches of Important Personalities During the Zia Period, Robert LaPorte, Jr. .. .. .	158
The Zia Period: A Bibliography, Craig Baxter .. .. .	167

## Preface and Acknowledgments

This volume brings together six chapters on various aspects of the rule of General (later President) Muhammad Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan. The two authors of this preface met Zia a number of times and, as will be clearly shown in the chapters written by each, came away with markedly different impressions of the man and his regime. We agree fully, however, that Zia was a gracious host and an engaging interlocutor, one who stated his views and opinions on a wide range of topics without hesitation and with candor.

We believe the strength of the book is that it reflects differing views of the Zia period in Pakistan's history. Although we have read and commented on each other's chapters and on those written by the two contributors to the volume, Kamal Azfar and Robert LaPorte, Jr., we have not attempted to dissuade each other or the contributors from the views we each hold or the conclusions we have reached. This work, then, is not intended to be committed to a single point of view but rather is intended to present several points of view.

The book is also meant to assist others who may want to assess Zia's role in the history of Pakistan and in the cast of those military persons who have assumed control of states in modern history. To this end, we have appended chronological, biographic, and bibliographic material that we hope will serve as a starting place.

All four of the contributors join in thanking those who have assisted in the preparation of the manuscript, especially Susan McEachern, Amos Zubrow, and Diana Luykx of Westview Press and our copy editor, Diane Hess. Our families have tolerated the long periods of our attention to typewriters and word processors along with the frustrations that such attention often brings; we appreciate their tolerance and understanding.

Finally, it should be noted, as one always does, that any errors in this volume are those of the writers. In addition, let it be known that the views expressed by Shahid Javed Burki are his own and are not necessarily those of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development by whom he is employed. Those of us in the academic and legal world require no such disclaimers.

Shahid Javed Burki Craig Baxter

## About the Authors

Shahid Javed Burki, former economic adviser to Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce, taught at Harvard University and since 1974 has been with the World Bank, most recently as director, China Department. He holds degrees in economics (Christ Church, Oxford University, Rhodes Scholar) and public administration (John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, Mason Fellow). His books on Pakistan include *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (1986), *Pakistan's Development Priorities: Choices for the Future* (1984) (with Robert LaPorte, Jr.), and *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977* (1980).

Craig Baxter is professor of politics and history at Juniata College, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He has written extensively on South Asia, including editing and contributing to *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (1985). He is also the author of *Bangladesh: A New Nation* (1984). He is a retired Foreign Service officer whose assignments included tours in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Robert LaPorte, Jr., is professor of public administration at The Pennsylvania State University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University and joined the faculty at Penn State in 1966. His books on Pakistan include *Public Enterprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development* (1989) (with Muntazar Bashir Ahmed), *Pakistan's Development Priorities: Choices for the Future* (with Shahid Javed Burki), and *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan* (1975).

Kamal Azfar is a barrister specializing in constitutional law in Karachi. In addition to being called to the bar from the Inns of Court, he studied at Government College, Lahore, and at Oxford. During the period of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he served as a minister in the Sindh government and as a senator. He was a special assistant to the caretaker prime minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. He has written *Pakistan: Political and Constitutional Dilemmas* (1987).

## Abbreviations

ADC	Agricultural Development Corporation
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CCI	Council of Common Interests
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator COAS Chief of Army Staff
COP	Combined Opposition Parties
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
C & W	Communications and works
DMG	District Management Group
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross national product
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance)
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JUI	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam
JUP	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
MQM	Muhajir Quami Mahaz (Refugee National Movement)
NAP	National Awami Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PIDC	Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	People's Party of Pakistan
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SARC	South Asian Regional Cooperation
SITE	Sindhi Industrial and Trading Estate
UAE	United Arab Emirates
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
V-AID	Village Agricultural and Industrial Development
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority

## Zia's Eleven Years Shahid Javed Burki

"I do not regret the death of Zia," said Benazir Bhutto.<sup>1</sup> Bhutto is the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was deposed by General Zia ul-Haq in July 1977. After forcing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from office, Zia had him arrested in September 1977 on the charge that he had ordered the murder of a political opponent. Bhutto was tried by the Lahore High Court, convicted, sentenced to death, and allowed by General Zia ul-Haq to be executed in Rawalpindi on April 4, 1979, after the Supreme Court upheld the verdict. Zia himself was killed in a plane crash near the central Punjab city of Bahawalpur on August 17, 1988. The cause of the crash was investigated by the civilian and military intelligence services of Pakistan and by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The investigators quickly reached the conclusion that the plane crash was not the result of mechanical failure, nor was it caused by pilot error. It was clearly an act of sabotage. Although a number of theories were advanced, the governments of Pakistan and the United States have not released any official finding. The motives for Zia's assassination remain shrouded in mystery.

A great deal was said and written about President Zia ul-Haq at the time of his death. The *Times* of London called Zia's demise "a bad death for the West."<sup>2</sup> The United States secretary of state, George Shultz, called his trip to Islamabad to attend Zia's funeral "a journey in sorrow." Zia was "a defender of Pakistan's freedom and independence and a steadfast champion of the Afghan cause," said Shultz.<sup>3</sup>

"The passing of Zia the dictator will not be regretted: Zia the sometimes confused human being will be recalled with affection. Zia the soldier has a decent place in the momentous recent history of the region. He did more than most to save it from Russia. That is not a bad epitaph," stated an article in *The Economist*.<sup>4</sup> Not all analysts agreed with this assessment. According to one, "The direct result of his autocratic rule was the development of serious divisiveness among the ethnic groups of Pakistan. His government also allowed the development of a criminal network of exiled Afghan drug and arms merchants, in collusion with Pakistani military officers and civil servants."<sup>5</sup> In a statement issued by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the political organization

---

<sup>1</sup> *The Economist*, August 20, 1988, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *The Times*, London, August 18, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> *The Washington Post*, August 20, 1988.

<sup>4</sup> *The Economist*, August 20, 1988.

<sup>5</sup> Amita A. Pandya, "President Zia's Rule," *The Washington Post*, September 7, 1988.

headed by Benazir Bhutto, Zia's contribution to rolling back the Soviet advance toward South Asia was recognized, but not much else was found in his record that was worthy of praise. "Internationally, Zia may be remembered as the man who stood up to the Soviets after they entered Afghanistan," the statement said. "But in Pakistan, he will be remembered as the man who illegally seized power, and after eleven and one half years of repressive rule, left behind nothing: debt and mortgages, hunger and unemployment, exploitation and discrimination, drugs and corruption."<sup>6</sup> Zia was not fond of calling himself a democrat, but he did not like the label of dictator either. He certainly did not picture himself as a ruthless leader, totally oblivious of human rights. A London *Times* editorial had this to say about the dead president: "Since coming to power, General Zia has carried out some harsh measures of repression against his opponents, most notably the execution of Mr. Bhutto himself. But his predecessor had at least as much blood on his hands as General Zia accumulated – probably more. Government in Pakistan is not for the tender-hearted."<sup>7</sup>

There are some who even dispute Zia's pride in his humble social origins. "Zia is himself the son of a mullah. It is reported by people in his village that he was ashamed of his origins and would not visit his father's home in his uniform, nor would he generally visit by day, preferring to go at night when he was not detectable."<sup>8</sup>

Who was Zia ul-Haq? Why was he chosen by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to head the army when a number of generals senior to Zia could have been given the job? Why did Zia suddenly turn on Bhutto? Having professed to no political ambition in the early days of martial law and having repeatedly promised elections, why did Zia stay in power for more than eleven years? Why after making a commitment to sustain the Constitution of 1973 did he tamper with it to such an extent that the political structure he erected did not resemble the one adopted by consensus in 1973? After introducing a new political order, why did he dismantle it himself by dismissing Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo on May 29, 1988, at the time when Junejo seemed in a position to challenge successfully Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party at the polls? After all, Junejo had been handpicked by Zia to head the civilian government, whose appointees were inducted into office in March 1985, and his success in office would have demonstrated to a large number of skeptical observers that power could be effectively shared between the military and political groups. What is Zia's legacy to Pakistan? Did he leave Pakistan economically and politically healthier after eleven years of rule, or did he set back Pakistan's economic and political development by concentrating a great deal of power in his own hands?

---

<sup>6</sup> *The Washington Post*, August 20, 1988.

<sup>7</sup> *The Times*, London, August 18, 1988.

<sup>8</sup> Antonio R. Gualtieri, *Conscience and Coercion: Ahmadi Muslims and Orthodoxy in Pakistan*, (Montreal, Canada: Guernica, 1989), p. 36.



Zia has been dead for more than two years, and political power passed into the hands of the PPP, but not as completely as expected by Nusrat Bhutto, the widow of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and their daughter Benazir Bhutto. Although, as predicted by most political observers, power passed to the Bhuttos and the PPP the moment Zia left the political scene and democracy was restored in the country, the Bhuttos' return was greeted by the people of Pakistan with less than total enthusiasm. In the election of November 1988, the people gave a split political mandate, making the PPP the largest party in the national legislature but denying it an absolute majority. Punjab, the largest of Pakistan's four provinces, returned Mian Nawaz Sharif to his position as chief minister. Nawaz, a young industrialist from Lahore, had been handpicked by Zia in 1985 and appointed Punjab's chief minister. Nawaz not only led the *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI), a coalition of several political parties formed after Zia's death to challenge the PPP, to victory in the provincial elections of 1988 but also survived a number of attempts by the PPP to topple him from power. In November 1989, the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) in the National Assembly, with the active support of the IJI, introduced a motion of no-confidence against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, which she survived by a narrow margin of only twelve votes. But the victory was short-lived. Her ministry was dismissed in August 1990, and after the ensuing election, her rival, Nawaz Sharif, emerged as prime minister.

Pakistan's political picture remains cloudy even after Zia, and as discussed in Chapter 4, Pakistan's economy now faces a critical situation. Are Pakistan's present difficult political and economic circumstances to be attributed to Zia's eleven years of stern rule? It is perhaps too early to answer these questions but not too soon to begin the process of finding some clues.

### Who Was Zia?

Zia ul-Haq was born in Jullundur on August 12, 1924, in a lower-middle-class Arain family. The Arains were small peasant-proprietors favored by the British for their hard work, frugality, and sense of discipline. When the British opened new lands in Punjab they brought in the Arains to cultivate the land around the cities established in the irrigated "colonies." Many Arain families flourished as urbanization increased the value of their land, and they put this new wealth to good use. According to a Pakistani anthropologist, the Arain "has little of the elegance and polish of the traditional feudal landlords of the Punjab, Noons and Tiwanas, of Rajput origin. Afternoon tea parties, partridge shoots, or polo are not associated with Arains. Nor does he waste his energies on dancing girls, or drunken evenings listening to poetry, or numerous marriages, a pastime of the landed gentry through which they alienated their lands."<sup>9</sup> Instead, the Arain families put their money into education and reaped quick rewards. Soon they

---

<sup>9</sup> Akbar S. Ahmad, *Pakistan Society: Islam Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 159.

were to dominate the legal profession among the urban Muslims of Punjab, and a number of them used law as a springboard to politics. Mian Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz, a prominent and influential politician of Punjab in the 1920s, was an Arain as was Mian Iftikharuddin, who was to play an important role in turning the Muslim community of urban Punjab toward favoring an independent Pakistan. Some Arains went into the civil service. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, the senior most civil servant to opt for service in Pakistan, was an Arain from Jullundur. Ali went on to become Pakistan's second finance minister (1951-56) and its fourth prime minister (1956-57).

Zia came from a more modest background than the prominent Arain families of Lahore. His father was an employee of the British government, a junior official who was barely able to scrape together enough resources to send his son to Delhi's well-known St. Stephen's College. After graduating from St. Stephen's in 1944, Zia joined the British Indian army, received training in an army school in India, and was commissioned into the Indian cavalry in 1945. The army was an unusual career for an Arain youngster; the British had not regarded the community as one of India's "martial races"<sup>10</sup> and had not encouraged its members to join the armed forces. But World War II broke the old class barriers for the British Indian army and opened recruitment for all Indian communities, "martial" or otherwise. Zia did not go to Sandhurst, where the military officers who later were to occupy senior positions in the Pakistan army had been trained. The war needed new recruits quickly, so Zia underwent a short period of training at a military academy, the Mhow Officers Training School in India and served in several overseas operational areas in Southeast Asia.

The partition of British India left Zia's native Jullundur on the Indian side of the border. The family was uprooted and had to leave behind its meager assets to migrate to Pakistan. "I will tell you what Islam and Pakistan means to me," Zia said to an international conference on Islam in Islamabad in 1983. "It is a vision of my mother struggling on tired, with all her worldly possessions in her hands, when she crossed the border into Pakistan."<sup>11</sup> Unlike thousands of other Punjabi Muslim families that were uprooted by the partition, Zia's parents did not settle in the Pakistani part of Punjab. Instead they went to Peshawar, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where the government allotted them a small house in compensation for the property they had left behind in India.

Zia never forgot his humble origins or the value system to which the industrious Arain community subscribed with great passion. His family was also very religious, believing in the type of Islam in which followers were to seek communion with God only with the help of the Koran and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. There was no need for

<sup>10</sup> The term "martial races" was coined by Lord Roberts of Kandahar who reorganized the British Indian Army. See Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), pp. 341-61.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Akbar S. Ahmad, *Pakistan Society*, p. 160.

intermediaries - no need for clerics, *pirs* (religious leaders), saints, or ancestors. This brand of Islam was different from the one that was popular in many parts of Pakistan, including the province of Sindh from which came Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

"My faith in God and his teachings was strong enough to be able to resist adopting the lifestyle common among the officers of the British Indian cavalry and the Pakistan armour corps," Zia once told me. "Drinking, gambling, dancing, and music were the way the officers spent their free time. I said prayers, instead. Initially, I was treated with some amusement – sometimes with contempt – but my seniors and my peers decided to leave me alone after some time."<sup>12</sup>

### **Why Did Bhutto Choose Zia to Head the Army?**

Fearful of the army, Bhutto had taken several steps to distance the officers in uniform from the country's politics. The Constitution of 1973 had classified any attempt to overthrow the legally constituted government as treason, with those involved in it subject to capital punishment. In 1972, Bhutto had engineered a coup against the senior officers of the armed forces who had been responsible for bringing him to power. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan were removed from office. The armed forces high command was reorganized, and the then President Bhutto assumed the office of commander-in-chief. He was to be assisted by a four-star officer who headed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the day-to-day administration of the three services – the army, navy, and airforce – was entrusted to the relevant chiefs of staff. Under the new setup, General Tikka Khan was appointed the chief of army staff (COAS) for a four-year term. When Tikka Khan's term was over in March 1976, Bhutto passed over half a dozen generals and picked Lieutenant General Zia ul-Haq to be the next COAS. Zia at that time was commanding a corps stationed in Multan in southern Punjab. He was a relatively unknown figure, marked by his professionalism and lack of interest in politics. He also had the reputation of serving his superiors with unquestioning loyalty, an attribute that was reportedly confirmed by General Sahabzada Yaqub Ali Khan. Sahabzada was close to Bhutto and in 1976 was Pakistan's ambassador to the United States; he was consulted by Prime Minister Bhutto when the search was on to replace General Tikka Khan. The fact that Zia was an Arain and, therefore, not from one of the

---

<sup>12</sup> I met Zia fifteen times during the 1977-88 period. My first meeting was in March 1978 when, along with Parvez Hasan, another Pakistani economist in the World Bank, I was invited by General Zia to advise him and his officials on the policies the martial law government should follow to revive the country's economy. What followed was an association that lasted right up to the time of his death. In a meeting in November 1987, he invited me to write his political biography, but in my last session with him on July 28, 1988, at Islamabad's Aiwane Sadr (President's House) he asked me to put the project on hold. "I have given this project a great deal of thought but I have come to the conclusion that political biographies written while their subject is still in office have short shelf lives. Look at Ayub Khan's *Friends Not Masters* written in 1967 when he was still president. Not many people read it now. It appears that I am going to be around for a while," he said with a smile. "When I do leave office and you are still interested in doing a book on me we should get together again. In the meantime, I am putting some notes together, not too many—and I will share those with you when the time is ripe."

"martial races" must have also appealed to Bhutto. According to Bhutto's reckoning, an Arain was unlikely to form deep alliances with the Pathans or the Rajputs, two communities well represented in the armed forces. The prime minister was also aware that Zia, a devout Muslim, did not have many close associates among his peers in the cavalry. Such a man could not possibly pose any political threat to a popular and charismatic leader such as Bhutto. Zia did not seem to possess the attributes of a man who could galvanize his fellow officers to move against a populist regime; he seemed safe to lead the army. Bhutto did not, of course, recognize that the very characteristics in Zia that appealed to him would, in time, come to the general's aid and be deployed effectively against the prime minister.

Bhutto was a man of two worlds. He was a landed aristocrat and as such was comfortable in the company of large landlords who, had dominated Pakistani politics for decades. Yet, he had developed a remarkable degree of empathy for the underprivileged in Pakistan's society. "Perhaps I have embedded myself too deep, in the hearts of the poor of this land for others to comprehend the phenomenon," Bhutto wrote in 1978 from his death cell in Rawalpindi's jail. "It may sound a rotten cliché if I say that I am a household word in every home and under every roof that leaks in rain. I belong to the sweat and sorrow of this land. I have an eternal bond with the people which armies cannot break."<sup>13</sup> But the army was able to break Bhutto; if the army could not sever the bond that Bhutto had forged with the poor of the land, then at least it was able to weaken the hold that he had exercised over Pakistan's political elite.

The army that General Zia ul-Haq was called upon to head in the spring of 1976 drew its officer corps from a social group that was different from that which provided the officers of General Ayub Khan's generation. According to a military historian, "the outstanding characteristic of those who have joined the Pakistan Army in the past ten to fifteen years is that they are the most purely 'Pakistani' of all. They are more representative of the wider society in class origin, they have been least subjected to foreign professional influences."<sup>14</sup> The Sandhurst-trained officers who took command of the Pakistani army after independence came from the "martial races" of North Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province. Military service was in their tradition; most of them belonged to the families that had been made economically comfortable and socially prominent by long service to the British raj. Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, Pakistan's first two soldier-politicians, belonged to this social class. Zia was different, as were a significant number of officers who entered the army in the closing years of World War II and the early years of nationhood. They were mostly from middle-and lower-middle-class families, and a large number of them came from the small towns and villages of Central Punjab. They joined the army not because of family tradition but in search of jobs that were scarce in a country that was struggling to become

---

<sup>13</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated?* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p. 25.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984), p. 70.

economically viable. This was Zia's generation and the generation that he put into position of command during his eleven years as the chief of army staff. Their value system was different from that of the gentlemen-officers of the days of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. And Bhutto, although he was a populist, was also an aristocrat with little knowledge of the middle class. Zia's feet were firmly planted in Pakistan's middle class.<sup>15</sup>

The free-wheeling ways of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party had deeply alienated the members of the middle class. They regarded the PPP government un-Islamic and anti-middle class, unmindful and disrespectful of the "ideology of Pakistan." The Islamic middle class believed that Pakistan was created to provide Islam a secure place in South Asia, not to turn it into a haven for socialism. Although Bhutto and his family were surprised at the ferocity of the agitation that was launched against the PPP government following the general elections of February 1977,<sup>16</sup> Zia and his fellow army officers came to understand and appreciate the reasons behind the anger displayed by those who came out into the streets. When a number of Zia's senior officers refused to use bullets to restore the authority of Bhutto's government, Zia knew that he could not sustain Bhutto in office by the use of force. He decided to move against the prime minister, but with some reluctance because he had not comprehended the full meaning of Bhutto's conduct in office. "I said to him 'Sir' – I still called him that 'Sir, why have you done all these things, you whom I respected so, you who had so much, and he only said that I should wait and he would be cleared. It was very disappointing."<sup>17</sup> Bhutto, of course, was not able to clear his name and was hanged for what Zia and his colleagues considered to be crimes against the social values held so dear by the middle class, the *shuraafa* (the respectable citizens), of Pakistan.<sup>18</sup>

### What Were the Reasons for Zia's Political Longevity?

The events of spring 1977—the sudden burst of middle-class anger against the administration of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—caught Zia and the armed forces by surprise.

---

<sup>15</sup> I have developed this theme at some length in Part IV of the second edition of my book, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1988). I shared with General Zia the gist of my analysis in my meeting with him.

<sup>16</sup> See, for instance, Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), pp. 70-74.

<sup>17</sup> *The Times, London*, September 8, 1977.

<sup>18</sup> Zia read my book, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, with some interest. In a conversation with me in July 1980, soon after the book was published, he had this to say about Mr. Bhutto, "Although the prime minister selected me to be the chief of the army staff over several people who were senior to me, I did not know him before I took up my new position. Even after becoming COAS, I did not become a close associate. We spoke different languages. I often had difficulty understanding him, in comprehending the nuances in his statements. He talked about people—often about those who were his friends and on occasion about those he considered his enemies. It was only after I came to occupy this office and had the opportunity to read what the prime minister had written in his own hand about these people that I began to comprehend the full import of these discussions." This conversation took place on August 4, 1980, in the office Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had once occupied.

They knew of the middle class's disaffection with Bhutto but did not expect that it would result in an exceptionally spirited, violent, and bloody campaign against the government. Unlike his military predecessors who had clearer visions about the future when they led the army into politics, Zia was unprepared to govern when he assumed control. General Ayub Khan, when he put Pakistan under martial law, had prepared himself for five years previous to taking control and had a program that had been worked out in great military detail.<sup>19</sup> His successor, General Yahya Khan, was an important member of the group of officers Ayub Khan had pressed into service soon after imposing martial law. Yahya Khan understood the working of the government and would not have ventured into politics had his predecessor's administration not collapsed under unrelenting pressure from political parties. But the collapse of the edifice Ayub Khan had built took more than a year to occur. Yahya Khan, therefore, had the time to analyze the grievances that had provoked rebellion by the parties of the opposition. After asking Ayub Khan to leave office, Yahya Khan began to implement a simple program. In Yahya Khan's mind, Ayub Khan's experiment, with a limited form of democracy and with putting economic growth before political development had been thoroughly discredited, and the system had to be changed completely. At a speed that was breathtaking even for Pakistan's chaotic political history, Yahya Khan set about to pull down all the political and economic structures that Ayub Khan had built during the ten and a half years he had remained in office. Although he worked out his plan "hand in glove with the politicians," the final program of political reform implemented by him was designed by a group—an inner cabinet of sorts—that included only one civilian, a professor of political science from Dhaka in East Pakistan.<sup>20</sup> In the process he destroyed the country that he had inherited.

Zia had neither the inclination to develop a political program of his own nor the time to prepare one when he decided to bring the military back into politics. The anti-Bhutto movement which started in March 1977, had reached climactic proportions within less than three months, and by June it was clear that Bhutto would have to make significant concessions to the opposition or risk military takeover. His concessions came too late; the final meeting with the opposition was held on July 4, 1977, when General Zia and his military colleagues had already launched their Operation Fairplay. The prime minister was taken to Murree, a hill station 50 km northeast of Rawalpindi, and Zia, assuming the title of chief martial law administrator (CMLA), ordered new elections to be held within a period of ninety days.

---

<sup>19</sup> For Ayub Khan's plan for political development, prepared by him in 1954 while he was passing through London enroute to the United States, see his political autobiography, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 48-56 and Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986), Appendix I, pp., 265-270.

<sup>20</sup> G.W. Choudhury was a member of this inner cabinet. For a description of the way Yahya Khan put together his program of political change see Choudhury's book, *The Last Days of Pakistan*, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1974) from which these quotations are taken—p. 81.

Zia began hesitantly and uncomfortably; his confusion of early days led to the depressing joke that the initials of chief martial law Administrator really stood for "cancel my last announcement." He cancelled his order to hold elections within ninety days of the launching of Operation Fairplay; he broke his promise to Bhutto that he could return to political campaigning well before the elections were held and his promise not to tamper with the constitutional and political systems that had been adopted in 1973. It took Zia eight and a half years to hold elections and to establish some form of civilian rule in Pakistan. Three years after appointing Muhammad Khan Junejo as prime minister under the Constitution of 1973, which he had significantly amended by issuing a presidential proclamation, Zia sent Junejo home—on May 29, 1988. "By the time I asked Mr. Junejo to leave office, a number of very serious difficulties had developed between the two of us. There was perhaps only one thing on which he and I agreed: that the system I had introduced in the spring of 1985 was not workable. Two men could not be in command simultaneously. This holds as much for politics as it does for the military. In May, it was clear to both Mr. Junejo and myself that only one person had to be in charge. That person could be called the president or the prime minister," Zia said to me the last time we met.<sup>21</sup> In the dramatic announcement that resulted in Junejo's dismissal and the dissolution of national and provincial assemblies that had been elected in the spring of 1985, President Zia once again promised elections within ninety days, as required even under the amended constitution. "I toyed with the idea of holding elections within one hundred days in order not to draw a parallel with my promise of July 1977," he said to me.<sup>22</sup> I came away from this meeting with the strong feeling that the promise to hold elections within ninety days would not be kept and that Zia would use some quasi-constitutional device to reestablish a presidential form of government.

For a man who, at the time of his death, was described as the "key player on the Indian sub-continent,"<sup>23</sup> Zia had begun very hesitantly. What caused this transformation? What made it possible for Zia to change from a man who did not seem to know his own mind most of the time to one "who was at the center of one of the most historically important events of recent decades: the withdrawal, under pressure, of a Soviet occupation army from Afghanistan?"<sup>24</sup> There were at least five reasons for this metamorphosis, for Zia's ability to surprise even himself by remaining in power—absolute power—for more than eleven years. The first was the slow realization on Zia's part that the middle-and lower-middle classes in Pakistan feared the return of the brand of politics the Pakistan People's Party had practiced during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's prime ministership. This realization dawned on him slowly, but once it did he was determined not to let down what he considered to be his main constituency. The second reason for Zia's political longevity was sound economic management by a group of technocrats who made it

---

<sup>21</sup> From my "conversation notes" of the meeting with President Zia ul-Haq on July 28, 1988.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Robert Graham, "Zia: Key Player on the Indian Sub-Continent," *Financial Times*, August 19, 1988.

<sup>24</sup> Michael Getler, "After Zia: What Next in Pakistan" *The Washington Post*, Outlook Section, August 21, 1988.

possible for Pakistan to recover from a deep recession induced by the policies of the PPP government. Zia's economic managers returned to the model of economic development the bureaucracy had put in place bit by bit from 1947, the year Pakistan was born, to 1971, the year Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power. This model, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, was good for crisis management, and in July 1977 Pakistan's economy was clearly faced with a deep economic crisis. The model worked, and during Zia's eleven years the economy was able to sustain one of the healthiest rates of GNP growth among the countries of the third world. The third reason Zia remained in power was the extraordinary canniness Zia displayed in keeping the loyalty of senior officers of the armed forces. The fourth reason was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 coupled with Zia's decision to challenge a superpower known for its resoluteness. This decision turned Pakistan into a "frontline state" and brought Zia not only arms and equipment for his armed forces but concessional capital for the country's economy. It also won him a place of respect among senior world leaders. Finally, Zia was helped by a number of rather fortuitous circumstances. Even his opponents seemed to help him at times. The 1979 hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines plane by *al-Zulfikar*, an underground organization formed by the sons of executed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to avenge their father's death, reminded people of the strong-arm tactics employed by the militant wing of the PPP to suppress opposition during the Bhutto period. The statement by Indira Gandhi in the summer of 1983 that India sympathized with the pro-democracy movement launched by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in the province of Sindh prevented the movement from spreading to Punjab. Punjab, always suspicious of India's designs on Pakistan, read a sinister meaning in the Indian prime minister's speech to her parliament and rallied around Zia.<sup>25</sup> Zia was an extraordinarily lucky politician for more than eleven years, but luck finally ran out for him on August 17, 1988, when his military aircraft exploded in mid-air.

Each of the five factors contributing to Zia's long term as Pakistan's leader need a word of explanation.

### *Safeguarding Middle Class Social Values*

It was only after assuming power that Zia gained firsthand knowledge of the Bhutto administration's record of intimidation of the opposition. Bhutto left an extraordinary account of actions taken at his behest—some of the instructions given on dealing with his opponents were recorded in his own hand—and these were made public by the Zia

---

<sup>25</sup> The progress of the pro-democracy movement launched by the MRD is described in detail in the Chronology. After having gained ground in Sindh, the movement was about to spread in Punjab when Indira Gandhi gave her statement in Lok Sabha, India's parliament.



government in a White Paper published in the summer of 1978.<sup>26</sup> A deeply religious man, Zia was determined not to subject the middle classes to the same kind of treatment at the hands of Pakistan's future rulers. A return to Islam was his answer, and this also served a political purpose. The vehemence with which Bhutto, had been attacked in the movement that dislodged him was motivated in part by the belief that Bhutto had little love for Islam. By stating Islamization as one of the main objectives of his government, Zia was able not only to allay the fears of Pakistan's *shuraafa* but also to neutralize the Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan's polity. The Jama'at-i-Islami (Party of Islam) supported Zia in the period 1977-79 and accepted his decision to postpone the elections that he had promised. The fact that the Jama'at at that time was led by Mian Tufail Muhammad—also an Arain from Jullundur and with a social and economic background very similar to Zia's—was obviously of help to the general.<sup>27</sup> This was the only occasion when the Jama'at was to side with the government—in fact, with any government in Pakistan's forty-year history. Later, when Qazi Hasan Ahmad replaced Mian Tufail Ahmad as the party's *amir* (leader), the Jama'at joined hands with the Pakistan People's Party in the opposition's campaign against General Zia.

"There is no doubt that he believed passionately in Islam, whether or not it was a political tool for him. Even his greatest detractors called him a pious man, and his humility has been described as such that he could convey two handshakes and an embrace in a single glance," wrote a foreign observer who knew him well.<sup>28</sup> This attitude won him a very large number of followers and admirers among Pakistan's middle and lower-middle classes. Their support was never very vocal but it was always there and it helped him when the opposition on three occasions attempted to launch street agitation against him. The first occasion was in 1981 when the agitation was launched by the MRD, a conglomerate of nine political parties united by the common purpose of removing Zia from office. The agitation quickly petered out. In 1983, the MRD tried to force Zia's hand once again but found it difficult to sustain the movement. The third protest was in the summer of 1985 when Benazir Bhutto challenged the Zia-Junejo government by calling a public meeting in Lahore to demonstrate the people's unhappiness with the slowness of the pace toward the restoration of full democracy. Bhutto was incarcerated briefly and the movement failed to take hold. On these three occasions the reluctance on the part of the middle and lower-middle classes to give full support to the opposition was of immeasurable help to Zia.

---

<sup>26</sup> Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, (Islamabad, July 1978). This 1,449-page document was prepared by a group of officials appointed by the martial law government to enquire into the allegations leveled by the opposition parties against Bhutto's government.

<sup>27</sup> In an interview published in a Karachi magazine in April 1987, Mian Tufail Mohammad denied that he was related to General Zia ul-Haq. This "was first said by Mr. Bhutto when he was in jail. On that basis, some U.S. writers have even mentioned it in their books that Zia ul-haq is my nephew. It is totally wrong." Sadiq Jafri, "Personality Interview: Mian Tufail Mohammad," Herald, (Karachi, April 1987), p. 156.

<sup>28</sup> Christina Lamb, "A Man Strong for Islam," Financial Times, August 19, 1988.

Zia never tested his popularity with the middle classes but he knew it was there and this gave him confidence. This popularity manifested itself at the time of his death when nearly a million people materialized in Islamabad to attend his funeral. As a Pakistani journalist put it, "there is a tremendous sense of shock. This shows the hidden political support that man had developed. We always believed that this man had developed political support and if he had formed a political party, he had a good chance to win an election."<sup>29</sup> This support brought the IJI under Nawaz Sharif to power in Punjab after the elections of November 1988 and was visible once again on the occasion of the first anniversary of Zia's death when a very large crowd gathered at the King Faisal Mosque in Islamabad to pay him homage.<sup>30</sup> It has culminated in the election of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister.

### *Economic Development Record with Few Parallels in the Third World*

President Zia openly admitted to little knowledge of or interest in economic management. In this and many other respects his approach was completely different from that of President Ayub Khan, whose principal objective during his administration was to accelerate economic growth. Ayub Khan justified military intervention in Pakistan's political affairs on the grounds that the politicians were squandering the country's economic potential. Ayub moved quickly on the economic front after assuming office. A new planning commission was organized under his chairmanship. "I appointed Said Hasan as the deputy chairman and told him to quickly formulate a five year development plan. The Planning Commission was given a great deal of freedom and a lot of resources to accomplish this task," Ayub Khan told me in a discussion at his Islamabad residence in the summer of 1974.<sup>31</sup> Zia did not have similar interests and ambitions; he left economic management initially to a team of technocrats that included some civil servants (Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Aftab Kazi, and Vaseem Jaffrey among them) and some industrialists (Habibullah Khan and Mustafa Gokal). Ultimately, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was entrusted with the task of managing the economy as chairman of the Planning Commission and minister in charge of the departments of finance, economic development and commerce. In 1985, when Khan was elected chairman of the Senate, the upper house of the legislature constituted under the amended Constitution of 1973, Mahbub ul-Haq was appointed to guide the economy with powers equal to those wielded by his predecessor.

Although Zia left strategic economic planning and day-to-day management of the economy to a trusted lieutenant, he fully recognized that economic tranquility was critical for his survival. "I agree with the analysis in your Bhutto book," he said to me in the summer of 1980. "I agree that Ayub Khan would have lasted longer had the

<sup>29</sup> Fazal Qureshi, chief editor of Pakistan Press International as quoted by Stuart Auerbach, "Bustling Karachi Calm During Zia Funeral," *The Washington Post*, August 21, 1988.

<sup>30</sup> Salamat Ali, "Bhutto Is Stymied by Zia's Political Legacy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 7, 1989.

<sup>31</sup> From my "conversation notes" of the meeting with President Ayub Khan on August 11, 1974.

economy not taken a beating following the 1965 war with India and that the agitation against Bhutto would not have been expressed with such vehemence if some of the important groups in our society had not felt economically so insecure. My instructions to Ishaq Sahib are quite clear. I really don't care what he does as long as the economy continues to function smoothly and the poor and the lower middle classes continue to see some hope for themselves."<sup>32</sup> Zia allowed the same amount of freedom to maneuver to Mahbub ul-Haq, Ishaq Khan's successor, but Zia was troubled when Haq's 1988 budget caused a great deal of unhappiness among the traders and small industrialists. The budget had sought to bring these people onto the books of the tax authority.

Within the broad mandate provided by President Zia ul-Haq, Ishaq performed superbly. Ishaq Khan had taken control of an economy that had been buffeted by the deep structural reforms undertaken during the Bhutto years. The temptation must have been great for Ishaq to dismantle all that Bhutto had done—to denationalize the industries taken over by the government in 1972; to cut down the size of the government, both in the areas of development and non-development; to reduce political interference in economic decision making; to reinstitute medium-term planning that had been abandoned by the Bhutto administration; to reestablish the administrative structure that had produced people such as Ishaq and that Bhutto had abolished. Instead, Ghulam Ishaq Khan moved with deliberate caution. His first priority was to reinstitutionalize economic policy making; his second, to curb public-sector investments and expenditures. These objectives were achieved by reactivating the forums that had been assembled during the period of Ayub Khan to maintain at acceptable levels the quality of government development expenditure. The National Economic Council, a body with ministerial representation from both central and provincial governments; the Economic Coordination Committee, chaired by the minister of finance with senior civil servants from all economic ministries represented on it; the Central Development Working Party headed by the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, all became functional again and helped to restore people's confidence in an orderly process of decision-making in economic affairs. The scrutiny brought to bear on investment decisions by these bodies also helped to reduce the rate of increase in public-sector expenditures. At the same time the Planning Commission, under Vaseem Jaffrey, was asked to start work on the Fifth Five Year-Plan (1978-83).

Pakistan's relations with most donor agencies had suffered during the Bhutto period, in part because of the unhappiness of some of these agencies with the quality of economic management and in part because of the aggressively neutral foreign policy pursued by Prime Minister Bhutto. The World Bank's program had been cut down in size and the United States Agency for International Development (US AID) was maintaining only a token presence in the country. The Bhutto administration dealt with the situation created by the drastic reduction in official flows by short term borrowing from the

---

<sup>32</sup> From my "conversation notes" of the meeting with President Zia ul-Haq on July 23, 1984, at Rawalpindi.

governments of the Middle East and also from the international financial markets. Ishaq Khan, by reestablishing relations with Pakistan's traditional official donors, reduced government borrowings from the financial markets and brought about a significant increase in official capital flows to the country.

The new administration surprised the business community by refusing to place the nationalized industrial units on the auction bloc. Instead, Ishaq Khan preferred to concentrate on improving the performance of these units. This position irritated some members of the business community; Habibullah Khan and Mustafa Gokal departed from the government and left Ishaq Khan in charge of all important economic departments. The government was not intimidated by these departures; its firm handling of economic matters eventually won the respect of the business and industrial communities and private investment began to pick up significantly.

Ishaq Khan's firm but conservative management of the economy yielded impressive dividends for the government. Between 1977-78 and 1985-86, the size of the GNP increased by 76 percent and income per capita increased by 34 percent. The economy also benefited from the large inflow of remittances sent by Pakistani workers who had migrated to the Middle East in the late 1970s. From 1975 to 1985, Pakistan received a total of \$25 billion in remittances from the workers in the Middle East, a good proportion of which went to the poorer segments of the society. The impact on Pakistan's absolute poor was dramatic and, although the government could hardly take credit for this fortuitous event, it contributed to the political tranquility that Zia ul-Haq desired and provided him with the time and freedom for reengineering Pakistan's political structure.

### *Handling of the Armed Forces*

The silent support of the lower-middle and middle classes and good performance by the economy provided General Zia ul-Haq with the environment in which he could consolidate his power and in which he could begin to formulate his political agenda. But ultimately it was the loyalty of the senior officers of the armed forces that made it possible for him to hold the reins of power for over eleven years. In keeping the corps of military officers loyal to him, Zia learned from the experience of one of his military predecessors, General Ayub Khan, and his own strategy also changed over time.

Ayub Khan, after assuming political power, had left military matters to General Muhammad Musa. Musa was not one of the "Sandhurst boys"; he had been recruited to the junior ranks of the army during the early 1940s, had seen action during World War II and slowly gained in rank after Pakistan became independent. But he never gained the respect of his peers, whose social background was quite different from his own. His peers, having been trained at Sandhurst, were proud of all the pomp and swagger that went with the "King's commission." It was under General Musa that Pakistan went to

war with India in 1965. His performance did not win him respect<sup>33</sup> and it was in part to assuage the senior army command that President Ayub Khan decided to retire Musa and appoint General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, who became commander-in-chief in September 1966. It is possible to argue that had Ayub Khan chosen a person of Musa's background he may not have had to surrender power to the military in March 1969.

Yahya Khan, cast in the Sandhurst mold, had been, a trusted lieutenant of Ayub Khan's for many years, helping with the staff work that led to the military takeover in October 1958, and he had chaired the commission that recommended moving the capital from Karachi to Islamabad.<sup>34</sup> Yahya Khan was also fond of wine, women, song, and army mess life. Ayub did not expect Yahya, thus occupied, to take a lively interest in politics. Satisfied that Yahya Khan was unlikely to meddle in politics, Ayub Khan left military affairs to be managed by his commander-in-chief, a level of delegation much greater than was allowed to General Musa. At the same time, Ayub Khan busied himself with restoring people's confidence in his leadership, which been severely shattered by his willingness to conclude a peace treaty with India soon after the war in September 1965. Yahya did not quite live up to his reputation for lack of interest in politics; when the time came to show support for his mentor, he displayed only contempt for politicians, but not for politics. Ayub Khan, now a politician in Yahya Khan's eyes, was summarily dismissed from office and Pakistan went back under martial law with Yahya Khan as the chief martial law administrator.

There were two lessons to be drawn from the relationship between Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Zia ul-Haq understood these lessons with exceptional clarity: First, a military president should not leave military matters in the hands of another officer no matter how loyal and trusted a colleague he may be. Second, senior military commanders should be made to accept the principle of job rotation and fixed-period assignments. In keeping with the first lesson, Zia never relinquished the job of chief of army staff to which he had been appointed in March 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He surprised everybody, even his military associates, by staying on as COAS even after martial law was lifted and Muhammad Khan Junejo was appointed prime minister. Junejo assumed the portfolio of Defense and as such made Zia, the COAS, answerable to him. At the same time, Junejo was responsible to Zia, the president of the republic and under the Constitution of 1985 much more than a constitutional figurehead. There was a built-in scope of conflict in this situation; at best it was a clumsy arrangement that could not work for long and contributed to Junejo's dismissal on May 29, 1988.

---

<sup>33</sup> General Musa tried to vindicate his performance in his book, *My Version: Indian Pakistan War, 1965*, (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983).

<sup>34</sup> For Yahya Khan's contribution during the Ayub era, see Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, pp. 43, 70, 73, 96.

The other lesson—that rotation and fixed appointments for senior officers were necessary in order to prevent them from putting down roots in Pakistan's fertile political ground—was followed scrupulously. There was an irony in this because Zia's own term as COAS was extended three times—in 1980, 1984, and 1988. It was only in June 1988 that he announced in a press conference his intention to retire from the army in the spring of 1990. To help him manage the army, Zia in 1978 created the position of deputy chief of army staff and appointed Lt. General Iqbal Khan to fill it. In April 1980, he redefined the deputy's job, designated it as vice chief of army staff, and appointed General Muhammad Sawar Khan to a four-year term. General Sawar was succeeded by General Khalid Mahmood Arif in March 1984 who, in turn, gave way to General Mirza Aslam Beg in March 1987. Of these three, the first and third were seasoned professional soldiers. K. M. Arif was a close Zia associate and served as his adviser from 1977 to 1984. Sawar was from the Potahar plateau of North Punjab, which had been a traditional recruitment area for the British and Pakistan armies. Arif was a refugee from East Punjab who had migrated to Pakistan after independence. Aslam Beg was from the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh; This strategy of "moving geography" paid off; none of the incumbents put into command by Zia had the time to develop strong group loyalty within the senior ranks of the armed forces.

Zia used the army intelligence rather than the formal structure of the armed forces to fight the war in Afghanistan. This was an extraordinarily shrewd move in the sense that a direct involvement by the armed forces in the war effort would have given them independence and confidence. Zia justified this arrangement on the pretext that Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan had to remain covert; any overt action by the armed forces would have been dangerous for the country. There were several types of dividends from the involvement in Afghanistan but they did not go directly to the army. For instance, millions of dollars worth of arms and equipment that flowed to the Afghan *mujahiddin* (rebels) were channeled by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that, during most of the time that Zia was the president, was commanded by a loyal associate, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. If some of the arms and equipment were siphoned off for use in Pakistan, the siphoning was done by the ISI. The armed forces, therefore, came to look to the ISI for provisions. General Akhtar was a Pathan refugee from East Punjab. Like Zia, he was born in Jullundur. In 1988, Akhtar was taken out of the ISI and appointed chief of joint staff. General Akhtar was in the plane that carried him and Zia to their deaths in August 1988.

With time, Zia gathered more experience in dealing with the armed forces. When he took over from Bhutto, he had acted on behalf of a group of senior officers, and it is widely believed that most of the early important decisions—postponement of elections, prosecution of Bhutto and his execution, the decision to invite the Pakistan National Alliance to send representatives to the first of the several cabinets Zia used to govern Pakistan—were made in consultation with other senior officers. Lt. Generals Faiz Ali Chisti, Fazle Haq, Muhammad Rahimuddin, Ghulam Gilani Khan, and Jahan Dad Khan

were all important in advising and guiding Zia in the early period. Some of them were members of the military council that had been set up following the proclamation of martial law in July 1977. Over time, Zia dispersed this group: Fazle Haq, Muhammad Rahimuddin, Gilani Khan, and Jahan Dad Khan were appointed provincial governors and Chisti resigned. Once they were out of active army service, Zia was no longer answerable to his peer group. From 1979 on, he was clearly the undisputed leader of the armed forces with positions of command now held by officers many years his junior in service.

### *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*

The Soviet decision to move troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 provided Zia ul-Haq with an opportunity he was quick to grasp. He saw the geo-political significance of the Soviet action with greater clarity than any other world leader and decided that it was in his interest and in the interest of Pakistan to help the Afghans resist the communization of their country. It was a brave position to take, for he could not have anticipated that he would be able to draw the Americans, the Chinese, and many Arabs to his side to the extent he did. It was even more courageous to spurn the initial U.S. offer of assistance to Pakistan, made by President Jimmy Carter in 1980, as "peanuts." The new Reagan administration was willing to offer more assistance, and in the summer of 1981 Pakistan concluded a six year aid package with the United States worth \$3.6 billion, nine times the size of Carter's original offer. In addition, the United States opened a pipeline through which sophisticated arms, including eventually the Stinger missile, flowed to the Afghan *mujahiddin*. It is estimated that the United States alone supplied over \$2 billion worth of weaponry to the Afghan resistance groups that operated out of Peshawar. Many more millions worth of arms and ammunition came from China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. For Pakistan this was a high-risk adventure, but it paid off. On April 15, 1988, Afghanistan signed an agreement in Geneva with the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors. The Geneva accord stipulated that the Soviet Union would pull out of Afghanistan over an eight-month period ending on February 15, 1989. Half of the Soviet garrison was to leave Afghanistan by August 15, 1988. Both appointments were kept and Zia had achieved the impossible; he had engineered the first Soviet withdrawal from a country its troops had occupied.

Zia's and Pakistan's success in Afghanistan was great because a combination of Islam and tribal affinity was used to beat back the forces that had begun to bring about structural change in Afghanistan's primitive society. It was a combination that proved stronger than the promises made to the Afghans by the Soviets and their allies in Kabul. Pakistan's stand in Afghanistan strengthened Zia at home. It was a popular move with the, religious right, the Jama'at-i-Islami, which criticized Zia on a number of other counts but gave full support to his Afghan policy. The Jama'at had strong support among the *mujahiddin* groups, operating out of Peshawar, and the leader of one such group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was favored by Zia to succeed Najibullah (president of

the communist regime in Kabul) after the Soviet troops had completed their withdrawal.

The Afghan policy also had strong support among the senior officers of Pakistan's armed forces. Since 1980, armed forces Inter-Services Intelligence had been engaged in several ways in Afghanistan. It operated the pipeline that funneled arms and ammunition to the guerrillas operating in Afghanistan, and according to some reports, it also operated training camps for the freedom fighters. The air force patrolled the borders with F-16 aircraft and at times scored spectacular success as in July 1988 when they brought down two Soviet SU-21 war planes near the border with Afghanistan. The armed forces' involvement had begun in a highly Secret manner but, as it succeeded in its mission, the operation became less covert.

Although the Afghan war added strength to Zia ul-Haq's position in Pakistan and increased his stature abroad, it also created a number of difficulties at home. With each *mujahiddin* success, Moscow and its allies in Kabul increased their pressure on Pakistan. According to a report prepared by the United States Department of State, Afghan agents carried out 127 of the 187 terrorist incidents reported worldwide. These operations killed 234 people and wounded 1,200 people in Pakistan. About half of all the deaths and injuries attributable to state-sponsored terrorism in the world in 1987 occurred in Pakistan.<sup>35</sup> According to some accounts, Zia's death on August 17, 1988, may have been the result of a Soviet operation. "Many U.S. officials are troubled by the pattern of Soviet warnings to Zia before he died," wrote Lally Weymouth, an American journalist who had often traveled to Pakistan and who came to know Zia well. "In addition to the warning made to the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock, a similar statement was delivered to Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan during his recent visit to Moscow. And only the day before Zia died, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov attacked Zia."<sup>36</sup>

### *The Element of Luck*

And finally, luck remained on General Zia ul-Haq's side for more than twelve years. He did not expect to be picked to become chief of the army staff in 1976; he could not have imagined that a disunited opposition would be able to bring Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to his knees in the spring of 1977; he had not anticipated that he would be propelled suddenly into national prominence by some twists and turns in Pakistani politics. Even when he took risks and played high stakes, he continued to be on the winning side. The decision to let Bhutto hang was a momentous one; Bhutto's

---

<sup>35</sup> United States State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: August 1988). A number of newspaper stories appeared in the Western press using the report as a source. See for instance, Liodel Barber, "Kabul Tops U.S. State Terrorism List," *Financial Times*, August 23, 1988.

<sup>36</sup> Lally Weymouth, "Who Killed Pakistan's Zia: The Fears and the Theories," *The Washington Post*, Outlook Section, August 28, 1988.



popularity among the underprivileged segments of Pakistani society had not waned after his downfall. But in 1979, Pakistan had just begun an economic boom that, initiated by the flow of money from the Middle East, was sustained for nearly a decade. A very large number of people resented Bhutto's death but were too engaged in the dynamics unleashed by the boom in the Middle East to undertake any serious attack on the Zia regime. It took the opposition two years after Bhutto's execution to unite itself; the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was launched in February 1981. For a while the Zia government seemed in difficulty, but the hijacking by al-Zulfikar of a Pakistan International Airlines plane from Karachi first to Kabul and then to Damascus deflected people's attention. The hijackers killed a young army officer while the plane was in Kabul and threatened several more executions. Zia, succumbing to the hijackers' pressure, agreed to release more than fifty political prisoners and obtained the return of the plane from Syria. Two years later, the MRD launched another agitation, but this time a speech by Indira Gandhi in the Indian Parliament supporting the objectives of the opposition in Pakistan took the wind out of the MRD sails. The movement quickly collapsed. Indira Gandhi's death in 1984 left Zia the best known and most experienced government leader in South Asia.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Ronald Reagan's electoral triumph in Washington, the Gulf War, and Indira Gandhi's assassination were some of the events that made Zia the most respected leader of South Asia and propelled him to the center stage of world politics. Once there, he could look back to the situation in Pakistan with confidence.

### *Pakistan After Zia*

The two-year period after Zia's death in August 1988 has been about the most turbulent in Pakistan's history. Initially, a number of positive political developments occurred. The country was able that same year to make a constitutional transition in August, hold national and provincial elections in November, and install a civilian government in December. Benazir Bhutto, a young, Western-educated woman in her mid-thirties, became the prime minister of a country that seemed to have slipped into Islamic fundamentalism under Zia ul-Haq. Her party, the PPP, had failed to secure a majority in the National Assembly; that notwithstanding, she was quickly able to win a vote of confidence from the assembly. General Mirza Aslam Beg, appointed chief of army staff to succeed Zia, announced that the armed forces no longer had any political ambition of their own and were fully prepared to carry out the wishes of the civilian government. The judiciary, in particular the provincial high courts and the Supreme Court, decided a number of political cases and set the stage for the resumption of constitutional government.<sup>37</sup> There was an enormous amount of euphoria about these developments

---

<sup>37</sup> See Kamal Azfar's contribution to this volume for an analysis of the role played by the courts in the constitutional developments following President's Zia death.

both inside and outside Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto's electoral victory and assumption of power was seen as a sign of delayed political maturation of Pakistan. "Wednesday's general election in Pakistan will be remembered as one of the most significant moments in the country's 41 year history," wrote *The London Times* in an editorial. "It is one of those rare turning points when a dictatorship transforms peacefully into democracy. It compares with the elections of 1977 in India, 1983 in Argentina, 1987 in South Korea and, more recently, this October's plebiscite in Chile. On each occasion a popular mandate buried the pretensions of military or civilian dictators to exercise autocratic power and laid a foundation for democratic rule."<sup>38</sup> History's first verdict on Zia's eleven years in power was unequivocally unkind. His passing away from Pakistan's political scene was seen as a decidedly positive development, one that led to the democratization of the country and the return of a government responsible to the people.

The initial enthusiasm surrounding the return of democracy and ascendancy of Benazir Bhutto dissipated quickly. The PPP government spent most of its first year in power trying to dislodge Mian Nawaz Sharif from Punjab's chief ministership while protecting itself from being defeated in the National Assembly. Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province and one that seemed always prepared to sacrifice its interests to preserve Pakistan's integrity, developed an intensely parochial outlook and challenged the central government's authority in most areas: the setting up of the Punjab Bank, independent of central control, provided the province with the amount of economic autonomy that had not been envisaged in the Constitution of 1973. The minority communities in the province of Sindh became increasingly restive; almost ceaseless ethnic fighting in Karachi and Hyderabad not only claimed thousands of lives but brought the army back on the streets of the major cities of the province to maintain law and order. Urban civil unrest also inflicted a heavy economic blow to the provincial and national economies. Before Benazir Bhutto had finished her first year in office, she had lost the support of the *Muhajir Quami Mahaz* (MQM), the party that represented the refugees who had left India in 1947-51 and settled in the urban areas of Sindh. The MQM's support had been an important factor in Benazir Bhutto's initial parliamentary success. Without it she became exceedingly vulnerable to challenge by an increasingly confident but frustrated opposition.

Under Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan did well initially in conducting its foreign policy. She was received with warmth in Washington, London, and Paris. She gained readmission for Pakistan in the Commonwealth and managed to bring about a significant reduction in tension between India and Pakistan. Even these early successes began to turn sour, however. In spite of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the communist regime of President Najibullah in Kabul failed to fall and the number of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan continued to increase. Troubles in the state of Kashmir in

---

<sup>38</sup> *The Times*, "Return of the Bhuttos," November 18, 1988.

early 1990 revived fears of yet another war between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory.

These reverses significantly changed the public's perception about the success of democracy in Pakistan after the departure of Zia ul-Haq. "The West still misses a heartbeat every time Benazir, the world's youngest Prime Minister, re-adjusts her head scarf, and fears the return of the army at a time when democracy is winning across Europe," wrote an analyst in the *Financial Times*. "But democracy has been cheapened in the eyes of a people forced to witness the spectacle of elected representatives being bought and sold like cattle, a process the President (Ishaq Khan) likened only last week to stock exchange. Benazir is yet to look comfortable in her first job, and the clock is ticking away."<sup>39</sup>

It could be legitimately argued that the PPP government would have had an easier time in office if the military administration under General Zia ul-Haq had left Pakistan with robust institutions for managing its economy and polity. The PPP's indifferent performance could be treated as Zia's unfortunate legacy. Conversely, it could also be argued that Zia made it possible for Pakistan to move from an automatic system of government to the one in which democracy was given a role to play and that the lack of success of the democratic government that came after him cannot be laid at his door. It is still too early to tell which of these two explanations is the right one. It is not too early to speculate on his legacy.

### *Zia ul-Haq's Legacy*

More time must elapse before Zia's contribution to Pakistan's history can be fully assessed. At this point, it is possible to offer some preliminary views. Zia may have changed Pakistan in three ways.

His most important contribution may be the definition of a role for the military in Pakistan's politics. Of the three encroachments into Pakistan's political life by the armed forces, the one engineered by Zia lasted the longest. Zia's long rule established two "facts" in Pakistan's political development. First, that all future governments must not overlook the armed forces' power and influence in Pakistan. Democracy of the type practiced across the border in India was probably not for Pakistan, a fact some Western observers were prepared to recognize. "The West more generally should be sympathetic to Pakistan's efforts to strike a new internal political balance," advised Zbigniew Brzezinski in an article written a few days after Zia's death. "Filling the vacuum created not only by Zia's death but also by the decapitation of the country's military high command will not be easy. The Pakistanis should not be pressured by outsiders to move precipitously toward democracy, for that could actually intensify domestic

---

<sup>39</sup> Christina Lamb, "Benazir's Democracy," *Financial Times*, December 9, 1989.

tensions, given the deep-rooted ethnic and political hatreds inherent in Pakistan's domestic politics."<sup>40</sup> General Mirza Aslam Beg corroborated Brzezinski's view by making it clear that although he and his military colleagues did not have any political ambitions, it was legitimate for the armed forces to keep a watchful eye on the politicians.<sup>41</sup> Although the armed forces could not be counted out of politics, they could no longer govern without the explicit support of a cross section of Pakistan's political elite. These two facts—the need to factor the armed forces into any political equation and the need for the armed forces to recognize that it would be exceedingly difficult for them to go alone into politics—can be counted as Zia's contributions to Pakistan's political development. "The assumption of office of the President by the Chairman of the Senate, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, in keeping with the procedure laid down in the constitution, is a development that should be appreciated. This is possibly the first time in the history of the country that the letter and spirit of the constitution have been maintained and that the transfer of power has been effected smoothly and legally," editorialized *The Muslim* of Islamabad, a newspaper that was often very critical of Zia's political maneuverings.<sup>42</sup> That the baton passed from Zia, the chief of the army staff, to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of the Senate, was in part the result of the developments engineered by Zia ul-Haq.

Zia also moved Pakistan to the geo-political prominence desired by some of its early leaders—Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto included—but not achieved by them in spite of their strenuous efforts. Significant developments under Zia include Pakistan's role in Afghanistan; the presence of its troops and military advisors in more than a dozen countries of the Middle East; its active role in the politics of the Islamic World (Zia was responsible for getting Egypt readmitted into the Organization of Islamic Countries); and the critical role Pakistan played during the eight years of the Gulf War, including Zia's allowing U.S. ships to call at Karachi enroute to the Gulf. Zia was able to move Pakistan's foreign policy away from a total obsession with India and to reformulate it to provide the country with a role in a geo-political area that is critical for all major global powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and China. Some recent pronouncements by the policymakers in the United States notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will have the effect of displacing Pakistan from world notice and therefore from the niche it has carved for itself in world affairs. It was Zia—and not the Soviet presence—who brought Pakistan to its present stature.

Finally, it was during Zia's long martial law that Pakistan seemed to have graduated out of the ranks of poor countries and become a middle-income nation. A rate of growth of over 6 percent in its GNP sustained over a period of almost a decade profoundly

---

<sup>40</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Help Pakistan Stay on Course," *The Washington Post*, August 26, 1988.

<sup>41</sup> See for instance the statements made by General Aslam Beg in a wide ranging press conference held in Rawalpindi in October 1989. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, October 11, 1989.

<sup>42</sup> "Moment of Trial," *The Muslim*, Islamabad, August 19, 1988.

changed the structure of the economy. By leaving his technocrats alone to do their planning, he made that possible as well.

In sum, Zia changed Pakistan's politics, gave the country a prominence in international affairs, and encouraged his economic advisers to move Pakistan out of the ranks of poor nations. But as *The Muslim* wrote, "the outcome of the Zia ul-Haq interregnum will best be judged by an empirical appreciation in the times ahead when the results of this era become apparent. It would be appropriate to leave it to history to pass the filial verdict."<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

## **Restructuring the Pakistan Political System Craig Baxter**

Authoritarian rule, whether military or civilian, is not an unusual condition in Pakistan. Indeed, since its independence in 1947, representative government has been rare. Pakistan began its career with a system described as viceregal, based as it was on the Government of India Act of 1935. That act concentrated power in the hands of the viceroy while allowing provincial governments, a degree of controlled autonomy. After several failed attempts, Pakistan finally adopted a constitution in 1956 that provided for parliamentary government, but one allocated more powers to the president than would be the case in a pure Westminster form. This constitution, however, was never permitted to work; before elections to the parliament could be held, the military, led by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, took over the government in October 1958.

This began an almost uninterrupted period of military or military-dominated rule that culminated in the eleven-year domination by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Ayub ruled under martial law from 1958 to 1962 and with a presidential constitution from 1962 to 1969. Then followed another period of martial law under General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan that lasted until December 1971. Yahya's rule was distinguished by the holding of national direct elections in 1970, the first time such had been held in Pakistan's history. But mismanagement by Yahya and others following the poll led to the civil war that ended with the division of united Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh as a separate state.

The transfer of power from Yahya to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as Pakistani forces surrendered to India and Bangladesh seemed to usher in a period of parliamentary government. Although Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), had won a clear majority of the National Assembly seats in residual Pakistan in the 1970 voting, the PPP failed to win majorities in two provinces (Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)). A constitution adopted in 1973 called for a parliamentary system, but the pendulum swung very much toward an authoritarian role for the prime minister (the post Bhutto assumed with the enactment of the constitution) rather than a viceregal role for the now ceremonial president.

## The Bhutto Regime

Fears that may have been present when the 1973 constitution was accepted soon became reality as Bhutto assumed an increasingly authoritarian stance.<sup>44</sup> The dismissal of non-PPP governments in Balochistan and the NWFP were early indications that Bhutto's central government was not prepared to honor the carefully worked out rules of the game regarding the important question of provincial autonomy, critical especially for the smaller provinces who feared, justly or not, the domination of the Punjab with its approximately 60 percent majority of truncated Pakistan's population.<sup>45</sup> Although a Sindhi himself, Bhutto had his key power base in the Punjab.

The formation of the Federal Security Force as a body whose primary loyalty was to the prime minister heralded an increasing crackdown on political opposition figures. Many were arrested and, if widespread reports are correct, some were killed or tortured. Political parties, such as the National Awami Party (NAP), were banned, and leaders of these groups, including Khan Abdul Wali Khan of the NAP, were charged with treason. Bhutto himself would be implicated, and later under Zia, tried, convicted, and executed for the murder of the father of one political opponent. Describing the Bhutto period, I wrote that opposition under Bhutto had become equated with treason,<sup>46</sup> a point I would extend in describing the Zia period to say that opposition could also become equated with heresy.<sup>47</sup>

It is interesting that the final phase of Bhutto's first term as prime minister coincided with the emergency declared in India by Indira Gandhi in 1975. With the foreign press assigned to South Asia stationed primarily in New Delhi, the outside world was often aware of the actions in India while those in Pakistan were far less reported.

## The 1977 Election

In 1977, both Indira Gandhi in India and Bhutto in Pakistan decided to hold elections, each confident of victory at the time of the announcement. In India, Gandhi was soundly defeated by a hastily put together coalition. The Janata Party brought India its first period of non-Congress rule, ineffective though it was.

Bhutto, like Gandhi, thought that the disparate opposition would be unable to coalesce into a single group capable of seriously challenging him and his PPP. Also like Gandhi,

---

<sup>44</sup> The most thorough study of the Bhutto period is Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977*, second edition (London: Macmillan, 1988).

<sup>45</sup> See Craig Baxter, "Constitution Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 14:12 (December 1974).

<sup>46</sup> Craig Baxter, "Bhutto-Two Years On," *World Today*, 30:1 (January 1974).

<sup>47</sup> Craig Baxter, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia," *Journal of International Affairs*, 38(2) (Winter 1985).

he was wrong. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)-was pasted together and included almost all of the opposition parties ranging from the Islamic conservatives like the Jama'at-i-Islami, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), through the mainstream Muslim League to the leftist remnants of the NAP.

As these parties agreed on single candidates to oppose the PPP in almost all constituencies, it became clear to Bhutto and his associates that a strong challenge had been mounted. Public meetings of the PNA were widely attended, but those of the PPP seemed to lag behind, except for those addressed by Bhutto himself. As the PPP chose its candidates, it fell back on methods proven successful in the past, particularly in the Punjab where it chose candidates from the landed aristocracy, often those who had been defeated in the PPP sweep in the 1970 poll. At the same time, the PPP often discarded party loyalists who had served the party faithfully during the 1970-1977 period. At some point also, the PPP leadership, possibly including Bhutto himself although this is not certain, seems to have decided that some level of interference (i.e., "rigging") should take place, especially in the Punjab, to ensure a solid majority of seats in the National Assembly for the PPP.

When the results of the March 1977 election were announced, the solid majority was there, despite predictions that the PPP would likely win but with a narrow majority. The opposition immediately charged rigging and boycotted the provincial-level elections that were to follow the national election by a few days. Demonstrations against the Bhutto government began and continued into July, even as Bhutto went about forming a cabinet for his second administration as prime minister. During March, as protests by opposition leaders and demonstrations by their followers increased, Bhutto used the powers of government to combat them. Restrictions on the gathering of more than four persons were imposed and a state of emergency was declared. As the more conservative Islamic groups had charged him with being less than a strict Muslim, Bhutto in mid-April announced that the Islamic prohibition on the use of alcoholic beverages and on gambling would be enforced and added that his government would introduce shariat law (traditional Islamic law based on the Quran and the *hadith* (sayings) of the Prophet Muhammad) within six months. It is important to note that the first steps toward an Islamic state were taken by Bhutto, even if he had taken these steps in the face of adversity. (He had earlier shepherded through an amendment to the constitution that declared the dissident Ahmadiya sect to be non-Muslim.) At the same time, Bhutto offered a new election that would be "free and fair."

In an attempt to find a scapegoat for the declared emergency, Bhutto told the National Assembly on April 28 that a conspiracy had been hatched under American leadership to destabilize his government.<sup>48</sup> Foreign emissaries, notably from Saudi Arabia, were active in trying to find an acceptable compromise between the government and the

---

<sup>48</sup> *Viewpoint*, July 8, 1977 (in annual chronology).



opposition. There were consultations between the PPP and the PNA toward the same end. Bhutto offered a referendum on whether he should stay as prime minister. In the first few days of July, although differences remained, it appeared possible that an agreement between the PPP and the PNA could be reached that would lead to a new election.

### **Zia's Coup**

Although it seemed that the darkest days of confrontation between the PPP and the PNA were past and there was a glimmer of hope that the conflict could be resolved, the chief of the army staff, General Zia, probably encouraged by other senior military officers, seemed to have determined that the military should take control to ensure that a new "free and fair" election be held. After having met Bhutto at the American Independence Day celebration on July 4 (which Bhutto attended despite his earlier remarks about a United States-inspired conspiracy), Zia acted the next morning to take over the government and suspend the 1973 constitution. The constitution was "suspended," not abrogated. Zia announced that his action was a temporary step and that national and provincial elections would be held within ninety days. To end the demonstrations, martial law was declared throughout Pakistan (territorially limited martial law had been in effect under Bhutto).

Most observers took Zia at his word. The seemingly non-political general had been chosen by Bhutto to head the army over the heads of a number of more senior officers. This and the apparently cordial meeting at the United States Embassy the previous day even gave cause for rumors, later assumed to be unfounded, that the two were in cahoots as Bhutto felt a new election under possibly neutral military guidance would appear credible and that the PPP would win even if with a smaller majority.

Political parties were not banned. Bhutto himself was moved to Murree, a hill station near Islamabad, and was kept under a lenient house arrest. The parties went about the business of preparing for new elections. Candidates were nominated and candidate lists appeared in the press. It seemed that the ninety-day schedule would hold and the military would relinquish control to the victor in the poll.

### **Accountability**

Zia maintained throughout his time as chief martial law administrator and president that as chief of the army staff under Bhutto he was unaware of the "excesses" of the Bhutto regime. He claimed to have discovered these only after he assumed office.<sup>49</sup> He held that the previous government must be held accountable to the people for these excesses and that until the process of investigation was completed no elections could be

---

<sup>49</sup> See Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-1988," *Asian Survey*, 38:10 (October 1988), pp. 1087-1088.

held. The schedule was therefore changed and elections were postponed indefinitely. About a year later, on August 23, 1978, Zia announced that elections would be held in 1979, but these too were postponed. It was not until March 1985 that a poll would be held. The ninety days had stretched -into more than ninety months.

The process of accountability was generally approved by the PNA and others in the opposition. For example, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, now given amnesty from the treason trial Bhutto's government had ordered, declared as he reentered politics on January 6, 1978, that accountability was a prerequisite for free and fair elections.<sup>50</sup> Well might the PNA and other groups so state, as it was certain that any reports would be detrimental to Bhutto and the PPP.

Reports did appear and they were of no comfort to the dismissed government. These "white papers" covered such aspects as the operation of the 1977 elections. It was concluded that there was extensive rigging in many constituencies and that this had the active or passive sanction of the former prime minister. Other white papers covered matters concerning the Federal Security Force (which was disbanded) and freedom of the press, although Zia himself would soon impose restrictions on press and place many editors and writers under arrest.

### **Bhutto Arrested, Tried, Convicted, and Executed**

The Zia government struck at Bhutto personally when he was arrested on September 3, 1977, and charged him with complicity in murder in the case of an opposition member. In fact, the murder was bungled, as the alleged target, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, a member of the National Assembly elected in 1970 on the PPP ticket, survived and instead his father was killed. The charge maintained that Bhutto had authorized the murder attempt, a charge that carried the maximum penalty of death if proven.

Bhutto was convicted by the Lahore High Court on March 18, 1978, along with his co-defendants. They were sentenced to death. Zia stated that his government had no power to spare Bhutto from the sentence, apparently ignoring the powers of clemency and of pardon that were held by President Fazal Elahi Chaudhury. Those convicted appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which began hearings in May. Throughout the trial periods, both at Lahore and at Islamabad, Bhutto's wife Nusrat and daughter Benazir were frequently in judicial custody. On February 6, 1979, the Supreme Court upheld Bhutto's conviction by the Lahore High Court. The vote appeared to be slanted by province: The four Punjabi justices voted to uphold the conviction; the three from other provinces voted to strike it down.

---

<sup>50</sup> Foreign Broadcast Information Service, January 7, 1978.

Zia reacted quickly to control what might have become a difficult law and order problem. Colleges and schools were closed in Sindh and the NWFP. Earlier, in September 1978, Zia had replaced Chaudhury as president, ostensibly on the expiration of Chaudhury's five-year term as there was no National Assembly and Senate in existence to elect a new president. Zia ignored appeals from abroad from many governments, including the United States and Great Britain, to commute the death sentence. Bhutto was hanged in Rawalpindi on April 4, 1979. The protest demonstrations were not as widespread as had been anticipated, and Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto were released at the end of May, although they would be in custody at times while Zia remained in office.

### **Political Repression**

The initial martial law declaration did not, as we have noted, terminate all political activity, and the parties prepared for the elections expected to be held in September 1977. However, on March 1, 1978, Zia issued a martial law regulation that banned political activity, although the parties themselves were not banned. In the same month, there began a series of arrests of newspaper employees and the closing of newspapers, especially those associated with the PPP.

Nonetheless, Zia maintained that his plan was to hold free elections and he announced that this would be done during 1979. Several PNA parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League and the Jama'at-i-Islami permitted their members to join the cabinet. By doing so, these parties acted to secure a position from which they could campaign when the elections were held. At the same time, the PPP was excluded and suppressed to the extent possible. Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto continued to be occasionally held under house arrest or placed in jail, even though there were increasing reports that the health of Nusrat Bhutto was declining. It would take an international appeal to Zia before he would allow her to travel abroad to West Germany for treatment. Eventually, in January 1984, Benazir Bhutto was also permitted to travel abroad for medical treatment. Elections for local bodies were held in September 1979. These were held on a non-party basis and would be a prelude to the non-party poll held for national and provincial assemblies in 1985. Zia believed firmly that parties were divisive and could not be permitted under the unified system of Islam in which all Muslims were presumed to be in agreement. Nonetheless, many candidates who were elected were self-described *Awami Dost* (friend of the people) nominees. The term was clearly a designation for supporters of the PPP. The large number of so-designated PPP candidates elected created a fear that if the national and provincial elections scheduled for November 17 and 20, 1979, were held, supporters of the PPP would be elected in large numbers and possibly constitute a majority. It seems that this was the key reason why Zia chose to cancel the elections, rather than the stated concern over law and order issues.

The October 16 announcement of the cancellation brought with it further restrictions on political activity. Parties were banned, leading to the quaint phrase "the defunct such-and-such party" used often in the press. Earlier regulations requiring the registration of political parties were used to mandate more restrictive controls such as the provision of party accounts to the government. Parties of the PNA generally agreed to submit the required documents, and in September 1979 the government announced that forty registrations had been received, notwithstanding the inconsistency between non-party elections and party registration. Although the elections had been cancelled and the parties declared illegal, the registration requirements remained on the books, if in limbo, and were revived and then discarded by judicial action prior to the 1988 elections. The PPP refused to register, although Benazir Bhutto did submit a letter about the party's finances.<sup>51</sup>

On February 6, 1981, the PPP and several smaller parties who had not been or no longer were associated with the PNA formed a group named the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) that would work both for ending the martial law and for holding free elections in accordance with the suspended Constitution of 1973. It was evident that the PPP was the only party with any claim to a national following and that several parties were miniscule. When the MRD was faced in 1988 with the real prospect of free elections, it was unable to contest as a unified group because the PPP was not prepared to meet the unrealistic demands of the other constituents for the allocation of seats. Except for a few minor alliances and a PPP promise not to challenge the leaders of the smaller parties, the parties contested alone. The MRD did, nonetheless, present a focus for the opposition to Zia, even if it fell apart when its demands were about to be met in 1988.

Zia's intentions became clearer when he promulgated the Provisional Constitution Order of 1980, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. In an appeal of a case brought by Nusrat Bhutto against the proclamation of martial law, the Supreme Court ruled that the martial law regime was permitted to "perform all such acts and promulgate legislative measures, which fell within the scope of the law of necessity, including the power to amend the Constitution."<sup>52</sup> This ruling was taken by Zia's opponents as being supportive of martial law. The ruling was also seen as a setback by Zia and his associates because it implied power of the court to decide whether a measure was or was not within the "scope of the law of necessity." The order of 1980 foreclosed that possibility by excluding all martial law actions from the jurisdiction of the courts, decreeing itself and other such orders were valid "notwithstanding any judgement of any Court."<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> *Viewpoint*, August 10, 1980.

<sup>52</sup> Text in International Commission of Jurists, *Pakistan: Human Rights After Martial Law* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1987), p. 47.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

The Quetta (Balochistan) High Court, however, ruled that the 1980 order was beyond the power of the martial law regime. This resulted in the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981, which was hastily issued in lieu of a government appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Quetta High Court. The new order contained a provision that judges of the Supreme Court and of the high courts in the provinces would be required to take a new oath that would bind them "to act faithfully. in accordance with the Provisional Constitution Order of 1981 and to abide by it."<sup>54</sup> Although a number of judges refused to take the new oath and left their positions on the bench, many did agree to operate under the new rules. The result was the subordination of the court system to the martial law system. Writ jurisdiction was restored when martial law was lifted in 1985, and this permitted the courts to dismantle many of the Zia regime rules prior to the 1988 election.

Coupled with Zia's drive toward the Islamization of Pakistani society was a political move that created an appointive advisory body in February 1982. The Majlis-i-Shura, as it was termed, was modeled, so Zia said, on the classic Islamic pattern of notables serving as advisers to the ruler (the amir) of an Islamic state. The role of the advisers in Pakistan would be limited to consideration of proposals, including the budget, but would not be legislative in the sense that approval (and possible amendments to the proposals) would be binding on the government. Zia chose the membership of the national Majlis-i-Shura and of the similarly constituted provincial bodies. In some cases, the persons selected might well have been elected in free elections, but for many others the possibility of being chosen by the people was remote indeed.

Although the appointed Majlis-i-Shura was demonstrably unrepresentative, as it developed it did provide a forum for debate. The sharpest division was that between the proponents of Islamization and those whose views were somewhat more secular (fully secular would be a contradiction in terms within the body). Many members, perhaps even realizing that their own positions were at stake, pressed for elections. Before we turn to the decision by Zia to hold elections, we must look first at his steps toward Islamization.

### **Islamization**

The early steps toward an Islamic state in Pakistan were taken by Bhutto when he was in desperate straits after the 1977 elections just prior to the imposition of martial law. He instituted prohibition and declared an end to gambling and also promised that an Islamic state would soon be created. It seems evident, however, that Zia would have proceeded with his Islamization policy whether or not Bhutto had given him a head start. The religious nature of the state in Pakistan had been a matter of debate since the country's founding, and various devices had been used to assuage the demands of those

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

who favored strict Islamization in each of the constitutions Pakistan devised. Opponents of Islamization often used the words of the founder of the nation-state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in his speech to the Constituent Assembly to assert that Jinnah saw Pakistan as a, state in which Muslims could live under circumstances that would permit them to order their lives according to the Sunna but that the matter of religion was a personal one and the state had no role to play in enforcing Islamic behavior.<sup>55</sup> Even a judicial commission in 1953 found it impossible to define precisely what "proper" Islamic behavior was after listening to the variant ideas of a number of Islamic scholars.<sup>56</sup>

Zia, however, determined that an Islamic state as defined by him and his advisers was to be set up in Pakistan. It has been widely assumed that his advisers were drawn principally from the Jama'at-i-Islami and others who held similar views. There appears to be no question about Zia's personal piety to the extent of following the injunctions of Islam as he saw them. Thus, although many disagree, it seems that Zia was not using Islamization as a political gimmick. He firmly believed that it was the duty of the state to see that Islamic laws were enforced and not simply to create a favorable climate for those who wished to follow Islamic patterns of behavior. That an Islamic state was favored by all Muslim Pakistanis, or even a substantial majority, is questionable, but it took brave persons to oppose what was presented as the law of God.

Zia announced in 1978 that the legal system of Pakistan would be based on *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (the law of the Prophet). The ultimate step in a series of steps would be the proclamation that the shariah would be the basis of all law in Pakistan. This would mean that any law passed by Parliament or the provincial assemblies would be required to conform to the shariah; any laws that were found not to do so (i.e., were "repugnant") would be null and void and would have to be discarded or revised.

This presented two problems: Who would make the decision and what Islamic school of law would be followed? On the latter, Pakistan's Muslims were divided into the two major divisions of Islam: Sunni and Shi'a. The estimates of the number of Shi'a vary widely, with figures ranging from 10 percent to 25 percent of the Muslim population. The majority of the Shi'a belong to the Ithna Ashari division, which is the state religion in Iran; a minority belong to the Ismaili branch, headed by the Agha Khan. The Sunnis of Pakistan almost universally follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. The Shi'a follow the Jafariya school, which is unique to the Shi'a. There are several major differences between the two schools, as will be noted below.

In 1978 Zia decreed the establishment of special shariat courts to adjudicate cases brought under shariah law. These courts could, and do, try violations of Islamic law,

---

<sup>55</sup> See Jinnah's speech in the Constituent Assembly, August 11, 1947. Pertinent extract in Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 339.

<sup>56</sup> See Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1980), p. 45.

but they are not established principally to determine the validity of prior legislation. However, with the addition of a shariat bench as part of the Supreme Court, cases can be brought challenging the validity of laws.

In 1979, Islamic punishments were imposed for the commission of several crimes including drinking of alcoholic beverages, theft, prostitution, fornication, adultery, and bearing false witness. These crimes could be punished by flogging, amputation, or stoning to death according to the Islamic law applying to each case. These punishments were greeted with revulsion by many and were seen to be in violation of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights to which Pakistan is a party. There has been no instance of either amputation or stoning, although these punishments have been awarded by lower courts. There have, however, been many cases of flogging.

The rules of evidence in Islamic law are so stringent that cases that might result in a guilty decision in a regular court are often unprovable in a shariat court. Women's groups have been especially critical of many of the Islamic injunctions. For example, charges of rape most often cannot be supported. In some cases the woman, who appears under secular law to have been raped, instead finds herself guilty of fornication or adultery, a situation that at times is found to the satisfaction of the shariat judge when it is apparent that the woman is pregnant. Another aspect that has met with the angry opposition of women's groups is the 1984 ordinance concerning rules of evidence under which, in matters of financial dispute, the evidence of two women is equivalent to that of one man. Women are also angered by statements of Zia and others that women should stay at home and not work in public places, that women must not be involved in sports or drama when men might be in the audience, and that women must wear "Islamic dress" when in government offices or other public places. As far as sports are concerned, the government of Benazir Bhutto did permit Pakistani women to participate in the South Asian games in Islamabad in 1989, albeit clothed in a manner that could not but inhibit their athletic performance, but then yielded to criticism and sent only a men's team to the Commonwealth Games in 1990.

A critical line of defense for women, some of whom in urban areas are organized into the Women's Action Forum, has been the 1961 Family Law Ordinance decreed by Ayub Khan. Among other things, this ordinance provided that women would have the right to divorce, support, and inheritance, and it placed limitations on polygamy. Despite fears that this would be repealed, it was not. The family law ordinance might have been placed in jeopardy if Zia's last minute enactment of the shariat law (to be discussed shortly) had been upheld by the newly elected parliament.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> For a discussion of the opposition of women to Zia's policies, see Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shahid, *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Backward?* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987).

Zia also introduced several economic measures that accorded with Islamic law as he saw it. He directed steps be taken to provide Islamic banking facilities, that would avoid the Islamic injunction against the taking and paying of interest (although some interpreters believe that this applies to usury and not to interest as such). These measures saw the introduction of "profit and loss" loans and deposits in banks. He also introduced government collection of *zakat* (alms-giving), although this had been voluntary earlier, as it remains in some Muslim countries. *Zakat* would be collected at the rate of 2 percent of an individual's wealth and would be distributed to the needy by boards established for the purpose. It is widely believed that this system is not working well.<sup>58</sup> Also introduced was *ushr*, a form of agricultural tax. It is in these taxes that the differences between Sunni and Shi'a law are seen. Shi'a protested against the introduction of these taxes that comported with Sunni law and were successful in gaining modifications when the law is applied to Shi'a. *Zakat* as a compulsory requirement for Shi'a was withdrawn in 1981. Nonetheless, many Shi'a became concerned that the further development of Islamic law would follow a path that could be detrimental to them.

After the 1985 election, two members of the Jama'at-i-Islami introduced into the Senate a shariat bill that would require that all laws in Pakistan be in accordance with the Hanafi school of Islamic law, the school followed by the majority of the Sunni population. The bill would also mandate the addition of "recognized" (by whom it was not clear) *ulema* (Islamic scholars, although for many self-described *ulema* the term "scholar" is an exaggeration) to the shariat courts and would prohibit appeals from these courts to the regular courts. The ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) countered this with the ninth amendment bill to the constitution. This varied from the shariat bill in several ways. It reduced the power of the *ulema* and it also excluded financial and economic matters from the jurisdiction of the shariat courts. The amendment bill was passed by the Senate, but was never brought to a vote in the National Assembly. The Jama'at bill was not passed by the Senate. This is where matters stood when Zia suddenly dismissed the cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly in May 1988. One of his charges against the cabinet was that there had been no progress in parliament on making the shariah the basis of Pakistani law.

Zia's desire that this be done led him to what amounted to – although he, of course, did not know it – a parting shot. In June, he enacted by presidential ordinance a shariat law. This act was opposed by many. The constitution does provide that the president may legislate by ordinance when parliament is not in session, but it is widely understood that such ordinances are only to be issued in cases of emergency or great urgency. This was clearly not the case with the shariat ordinance. Ordinances must be confirmed by

---

<sup>58</sup> See Grace Clark, "Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr as a Welfare System," in Anita M. Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987).



the parliament within four months and, further, are not to be renewed.<sup>59</sup> The ordinance expired before the 1988 election, but a modified version was promulgated by the acting president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, when the four months expired, violating the spirit if not the letter of the constitution. The Benazir Bhutto parliament permitted the ordinance to expire. Zia's plan of a shariah-governed state has for the time being been frustrated, but the Islamic parties, abetted by the PML, still raise the issue on every occasion—and protested during Benazir Bhutto's term that it was improper for a Muslim state to be ruled by a woman.

### Provincialism

Pakistan has suffered more than most countries that became independent after World War II from difficulties in nation-building; the state has been unable to socialize the people into a willing acceptance that all are indeed Pakistanis. It is the only country in the newly independent world that has seen a part (the majority, in terms of population) separate violently to become an independent state, Bangladesh. The loss of Bangladesh was a major psychological shock to those who supported the two-nation theory that the Hindus and Muslims of the sub-continent were separate nations. The secession left residual Pakistan with a new group that had majority status, the Punjabis who comprise about 60 percent of the population.

Cries of Punjabi dominance had been common, especially in the unified province of West Pakistan (1955-1970) before the loss of Bangladesh. It seems to the residents of the three smaller provinces (Sindh, Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier Province) that the Punjabis have a greater share in the governance of the state than their population entitles them to. The fact that except for the military (a key exception, of course, given the history of military governments in Pakistan) this was not correct matters little. There is also the belief that the Punjab receives more than its due share of investment, although the major magnet for investment remains Karachi in Sindh and rural electrification has proceeded much farther in Sindh than in the Punjab.<sup>60</sup>

During the Bhutto period the greatest unhappiness was shown in Balochistan. Bhutto faced a continuing, low-level insurrection in that province and responded with the use of the military to attempt to put down the violence. Zia responded differently and expended funds for development. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cooled separatist aspirations in both Balochistan and the NWFP, the two provinces most affected by the three million Afghan refugees who entered Pakistan.

---

<sup>59</sup> This is intended to preclude the perpetuation of an ordinance through reissuance. For an interesting study of this device, see D. C. Wadhwa, *Re-promulgation of Ordinances: A Fraud on the Constitution of India* (Pune: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1983). The book deals with Bihar, but is applicable elsewhere.

<sup>60</sup> For data on the status of provinces, see "Special Report: Elections '88," *Herald* (Karachi) November 1988.

Discontent is long-standing in Sindh, but became much more violent during the Zia period. The mosaic is a complicated one in that province. The bulk of the Muslim refugees from north India who are speakers of Urdu settled in Sindh, generally in urban areas and often replacing Hindu merchants and professionals who had fled to India. Although more than forty years have passed since this influx, the refugees and their children still identify themselves and are identified as *muhajirs* (refugees) and form a separate community in the province. They are concentrated in Karachi, Hyderabad, and the smaller cities of Sindh. In addition, the economic opportunities in Sindh, primarily in Karachi, have drawn many Baloch, Punjabis, and Pathans from the NWFP to work in the commerce and industry of the city. On top of this, as new canal colonies were opened along the Indus River, plots were awarded to retiring civil and military officers who were most often Punjabis. It has been estimated that the speakers of Sindhi as a mother tongue in Sindh may now constitute slightly less than a majority.<sup>61</sup>

What is seen by Sindhis as a loss of opportunity has led some groups in the province to demand an end to free movement from other provinces to Sindh or even to push for Sindhi independence. These demands are sometimes expressed with violence which escalated in the late 1980s to the point that some said that Karachi had become another Beirut. Some of the violence was clearly related to an increased domestic drug problem, and this was often charged to the Pathans and especially to Afghan refugees who had worked their way from the NWFP and Balochistan to Karachi. Whether the sharp increase in violence can be attributed to a martial-law regime is open to question, but there is no doubt that the two events coincided. The return to a civilian and representative government, however, did not decrease the incidence of violence.

The solution to the problem of Sindh, and especially of Karachi, is not easy to find. It may be well to say that all Muslims are brothers and should live in peace, but when basic matters as language and employment are involved, such statements are simply pious hopes. Municipal facilities in Karachi and other cities are in a poor state, and opportunities for such services as education and health delivery require great improvement.<sup>62</sup> In November 1987, local elections were held and in Karachi and Hyderabad a new party for the refugees, the *Muhajir Quami Mahaz* (MQM), was swept into power. The MQM also won the majority of the national and provincial seats in these cities in the election of 1988. An agreement between the PPP and the MQM to share power in Sindh through a coalition fell apart in 1989. The issue thus remains one of the most difficult for Pakistan in its still incomplete task of nation-building.

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> See Arif Hasan, "A Decade of Urban Decay," *Herald* (Karachi), January 1990, pp. 125 ff.

## Elections (Sort of)

Pressure on Zia for elections in Pakistan continued. It came from the public at large, from the MRD, from many members of the Majlis-i-Shura, and from outside, especially from the United States, unhappy with Pakistan for a number of reasons including the lack of representative government. In 1984, Zia announced that elections would be held in 1985, and this time the schedule was kept.

Zia had already decreed that Pakistan would return to a system of separate electorates under which the several religious communities would vote separately for members of the national and provincial assemblies. That is, Muslims would vote for Muslim members and the smaller communities would vote for their nominees. In the National Assembly, ten of the 217 directly-elected seats were set aside for the minorities: Christians and Hindus were allotted four seats each and Ahmadiyas and "others" one seat each ("others" included Parsis, Buddhists, and Sikhs). In addition, twenty indirectly elected seats were reserved for women, although women could run for the directly elected seats as well. The system of separate electorates had been demanded by Muslims in 1906 and were instated in India by the British under the Government of India Act of 1909. The election of 1970 was the first time joint electorates were used in Pakistan.

It should be noted that the Ahmadiyas were included among the non-Muslims, although adherents of the sect maintain that they are Muslims and follow Islamic rules. The sect, which honors the nineteenth-century religious leader Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and treats him as a prophet of Islam, has been subject to persecution and violence in independent Pakistan, most notably in riots in Lahore in 1953. As noted earlier, under Bhutto a constitutional amendment proclaimed them to be non-Muslims, and this led to their exclusion during the Zia period from the Muslim seats in legislative bodies.

Before the elections were held, Zia demanded a confirmation of his continued holding of the office of president (which he had assumed on the completion by Fazal Elahi Chaudhury of his five-year term in September 1978). His confirmation was accomplished through a referendum in November 1984, in which the people were asked to approve Zia's conduct of government and his path toward an Islamic state. The government announced that Zia had won an overwhelming vote of approval in a poll with high participation by the voters. The high level of participation was challenged by almost all observers. Nonetheless, Zia took the vote as reported by the government to mean that he had been "elected" to a five-year term as president.

The legislative elections would be held on a "non-party" basis. Zia's distrust of parties continued so each candidate ran as an independent. Although Zia was ambiguous on the question of permitting MRD members to run as candidates, they decided to boycott

the poll. It is clear, however, that some who were or had been members of MRD parties did contest, a point made more evident when several appeared again in the 1988 elections, but this time as candidates of the PPP and other opposition parties. Despite the boycott call, the participation in the February 1985, election was quite high by Pakistan standards, exceeding the turnout in the last comparable election, that of 1970.<sup>63</sup> With the lack of party identification, it was difficult to determine which party was the winner or loser, except to note that several members of Zia's cabinet were defeated.

Zia chose Muhammad Khan Junejo as prime minister, and he was sworn in on March 23, 1985. Junejo, from Sindh, had been a member of the West Pakistan cabinet in the 1960s. He was a minor political figure, but had a major qualification in that he was from Sindh. Zia, himself a Punjabi, was not to choose another Punjabi as prime minister and add further fuel to Sindhi complaints.

To tidy up legal matters, Zia also issued the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order. It was a misnomer, as the 1973 basic document had been so greatly altered during Zia's regime that in many ways the 1973 constitution was unrecognizable in the new document of 1985. The 1973 constitution had provided for a system in which the power was in the hands of the prime minister; the major change of 1985 placed the power primarily in the hands of the president.

Junejo promised that martial law would end by the close of 1985. Zia exacted a price for this. The Parliament was coerced into passing the eighth constitutional amendment bill. This bill, which might be called an "indemnity act" in other political systems, regularized all steps taken under martial law including the Revival of the Constitution Order and other basic changes. To a degree, such an act was necessary because martial law was unconstitutional under the 1973 constitution, and, if all acts were declared invalid, many trivial actions such as land transfers and even birth records could have been wiped out. But there were other actions that also stood, including the jail sentences given by military courts; the prisoners continued to languish in custody without benefit of a hearing in a regular court.

With the amendment bill passed, martial law ended at the end of 1985. There had already been a relaxation of many of the draconian aspects of martial law, and this leniency was extended. For example, the press became free, and public political meetings were not proscribed.

Political party activity soon resumed. Junejo revived the PML with himself as leader of the party. A snag occurred because he jumped the gun and announced the party revival before legislative action had been taken. One result of this was that the speaker, Syed

---

<sup>63</sup> See Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 113-115.

Fakhr Imam, called for an investigation, a call that cost him his speakership and led to his leadership of the opposition Independent Parliamentary Group.

Junejo as prime minister performed quite well in a difficult position. He challenged the president on a number of occasions. He questioned Zia's nominations regarding military promotion (submitted, in a reflection of the strange dual hierarchy, by Zia as chief of the army staff to Junejo as both defense and prime minister, who would then refer the file to Zia as president). He convened an all-party meeting on Afghanistan in 1988 while the Geneva discussions were going on, a session that was well attended, even by Benazir Bhutto as leader of the PPP. He ordered an investigation into a tragic explosion at an army ammunition depot near Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the report of which has not been released but is rumored to have been critical of the army. As we have seen, he stalled the constitutional amendment that would have instituted the shariah as the basis of Pakistani law; Junejo and most centrist politicians knew that the electoral record of Pakistan shows that candidates espousing Islamic law have done very poorly. In sum, he increasingly conducted himself as the head of government, duly elected under the rules that pertained.

Political activity was given another spur when Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in March 1986, to a triumphant welcome in the major cities as she toured Pakistan. Her demand was simple: immediate free and fair elections. Although the full thrust of the initial enthusiasm soon wore off, it was clear that the PPP was no longer to be ignored or suppressed, even though Bhutto was arrested briefly in August 1986, for trying to hold a mass meeting that was not authorized by the government. Benazir Bhutto also maintained that the PPP would not comply with the party registration law, a law that was eventually invalidated.

### **The Dismissal**

Although there were clear reasons for Zia to be unhappy with Junejo, Zia's dismissal of the cabinet and dissolution of the legislative bodies at the national and provincial levels at the end of May 1988, came as a surprise. It surely was a surprise for Junejo who had just returned to Islamabad from what had been reported as a very successful trip to East Asia. Zia put forward several reasons for his sudden action. He said the Junejo government was slow in enacting legislation on the shariah, it was corrupt, it had not managed the economy properly, and it had allowed the law-and-order situation to deteriorate. None of these seems to have been the real reason and none was put forward to me with emphasis in my last meeting with Zia in July 1988. Both Zia and his close associate, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, whom I met later the same evening, were more concerned with Junejo's assertion of his prime-ministerial role, especially with regard to the military.

Zia's action, which was later declared ultra vires of the constitution because neither Junejo or the provincial chief ministers had lost the confidence of the assemblies, set in motion a new set of events with the requirement of a new election within ninety days. Zia procrastinated on setting a date and eventually set November 17 as the date for the National Assembly poll, with the provincial voting three days later. This was almost six months after the dismissal of Junejo. Zia maintained that he was required only to set the date within ninety days, an apparent and deliberate misreading of the constitution he had tinkered with and ought to have known well. He said (correctly) that ninety days after dismissal date would have coincided with the Muslim month of mourning, Muharram, and (strangely) that the process of delimiting constituencies and the preparation of electoral rolls could not be completed in time. He blamed Junejo for the latter, although the processes are under the jurisdiction of the independent Election Commission.

Zia also declared that the new poll would be held under the non-party system. Local elections held in October 1987, had also been non-party, but the enforcement of the rules was so relaxed that candidates were clearly, if unofficially, identified as party candidates. As I saw at the time, the flags of the PPP and other parties were fully in evidence. This time, however, Zia's orders would be challenged in court. Although the decision came after his death, the Supreme Court held that under the constitutional right of assembly parties were permitted to identify themselves and, by extension, to use a common election symbol for their candidates. The Zia period rule on party registration was also voided by the court, thus permitting unregistered parties such as the PPP to contest.

On August 17, 1988, Zia and twenty-nine others were killed in an as yet unexplained crash of a C-130 near Bahawalpur. Among the others were General Akhtar and the U.S. Ambassador, Arnold Rafael.

### **Zia as Ruler**

It is impossible to speculate on what might have happened in the November election had Zia still been alive and had he given at least some indication of support for the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI-Islamic Democratic Alliance) that campaigned on the policies of Zia. That the IJI was able to deny the PPP a majority in the National Assembly and that it was able itself to win a narrow majority in the Punjab assembly is an indication that those voters who voted on the basis of programs other than *biradari* (brotherhood) were not entirely alienated from the Zia system. There remains support for his ideas in Pakistan as can be evidenced in the continued strength of the IJI as seen in the October 1990 elections and in the attendance at observances commemorating Zia's death.

On the other hand, his policies were rejected by a plurality of the country. The PPP, the champion of the anti-Zia forces, won a substantial plurality in the National Assembly and an overwhelming majority in Sindh. Thus, so far as the voters (at least, those who voted on policy issues) were concerned, there is a near stand-off with a slight edge going against Zia.

Zia's period in office did see the emergence of Pakistan as an important actor on the international scene, but this was by chance when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. There was, as the chapter on Pakistan's economy will detail, some progress made in the economy. There was, however, a serious shortage of facilities for education, health services, urban development, and other items in the social services agenda, a factor contributing to the Sindhi violence.

But, most importantly, there was an eleven-year hiatus in the political development of Pakistan. Few would support the actions of the last years of the Zulfikar Bhutto regime with its gross violations of human rights, but the Zia period did little to reverse this trend and it changed the 1973 parliamentary constitution so much as to destroy the philosophical, if not practiced, concept that the government of Pakistan belongs to the people of Pakistan. In this, Zia's regime must be seen as a step backward.

### **Aftermath**

At this writing, it is not yet clear that the steps backward are being made up, although only a portion of the blame can be assessed to the recently dismissed prime minister. Her administration accomplished little in the legislative area, but she was hobbled by the Zia system as she proceeded in accordance with the constitution she inherited, being hindered by her slim majority in the National Assembly and by a Senate in which the PPP presence was minimal. She was faced with a president who had power to overrule her wishes and who ultimately dismissed her government in August 1990. She had also to contend with a military that has been a major force in Pakistan and, although it disclaimed such a role at the time she was installed in office, has again seen itself as the arbiter and protector of the honor of Pakistan. And she was faced with the heritage of Zia displayed in the continuing challenges from the Punjab chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif and his IJI associates. This goes back to the question of nation-building. Zia contributed nothing to this process; the current contending politicians in the PPP, the IJI, the MQM, and other parties are also contributing nothing to the process and are instead contributing to the sharp regional, linguistic, and political differences in Pakistan.

The defeat of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP in the October 1990 poll will result in the installation of a new government more in tune with Ziaism (and perhaps Islamization) but it is unlikely to overcome the shortfalls in political development in Pakistan, shortfalls to which the Zia period contributed substantially.

## **Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan**

### **Kamal Azfar**

Constitutional experiments in Pakistan have taken a turbulent path. Since Pakistan's independence in 1947, the nation has persisted through five different republics. The Government of India Act of 1935, together with the Indian Independence Act of 1947, served as the first republic's constitution. The second republic began on March 23, 1956, with the Constitution of Pakistan of 1956. The second republic came to an end with the proclamation of martial law on October 7, 1958, which abrogated the 1956 constitution. The third republic and the 1962 constitution were tailor-made to Ayub Khan's requirements and fell along with him when martial law was imposed on March 25, 1969, by the Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Yahya's successor as chief martial law administrator and president, was the leader of the fourth republic and the author of the 1973 constitution. Martial law was declared once again by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the chief of army staff, on July 5, 1977, and was not lifted until 1985. The Revival of the Constitution Order of 1985 revived the 1973 constitution with some major amendments and marked the beginning of Pakistan's fifth republic.

From its birth, Pakistan has sought to reconcile an authoritarian political culture with a plural society. The superior courts always oscillated between extreme judicial activism and judicial restraint. The courts have played a legitimizing function, at times using the doctrine of state necessity to declare legal what was formerly illegal, and have often handed down decisions they later refused, for political reasons, to uphold. This chapter is a brief analysis of the political and constitutional vicissitudes that have so influenced Pakistan's history.

A disciplined army, a shaken bureaucracy, a timid judiciary, entrenched feudal interests, an emerging capitalist class, the fundamentalist ulema, warring political factions, and a tenacious dynasty have all played major roles in the high drama of formulating a constitution and building a nation. A network of minor groups and issues has impacted this process considerably and contributed to both divisiveness and cohesion. The army, Islam, the Urdu language, the Indus Valley, and a common market are some of the cohesive forces. Population pressures, unemployment, large neighbors, and ethnic conflicts and hostilities, have contributed to divisiveness.



## **The First Republic: The Government of India Act of 1935.**

During the first half of the twentieth century the British Parliament enacted a succession of laws that led to India's and Pakistan's eventual independence. The Government of India Act of 1919, which was based on the recommendations of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, introduced the first element of responsible government at the provincial level. In this system of dyarchy the ministers, appointed by the governor, would be answerable to the elected legislature in respect to the "transferred departments" (those defined as "nation-building," such as education, health, agriculture, and public works) but the powers under the "reserved subjects" (revenue, finance, and home affairs) were vested in the governors who were themselves appointed by the viceroy/governor general.

The Act of 1935 (the Act) contemplated the establishment of an all-India federation and the inclusion of the provinces and the Indian princely states in that federation. A council of ministers was to aid and advise the governor general of the federation in the exercise of his functions except for his discretionary powers. Ministers were to be appointed or dismissed by the governor general at his discretion. The Secretary of State for India, acting out of London's Whitehall, was empowered to issue specific instructions to the governor general. In the exercise of his powers, the governor general was under the control of the Secretary of State. The governor general had powers to assent or withhold assent to a bill. The governor general could assume emergency power if the government of the federation could not be carried on under the Act. The powers of the governors in the provinces were similar to those of the governor general. The Act of 1935 had three legislative lists: List I specified matters regarding which the federal legislature could make laws; List II enumerated the matters reserved for the provincial legislatures; and List III enumerated those matters in which the provinces and the federation had concurrent jurisdiction. Section 9 of the Government of India Act of 1935 elucidated the nature of the executive branch of the federation.

Theoretically, in matters left to ministerial discretion, the ministers had full power and authority, but as nominees of the governor, the ministers had little freedom to maneuver. There still remained a large sphere of action in which the governor general either did not consult the ministers or was not bound by their advice. In matters lying within that sphere, the governor general was responsible solely to the British government through the secretary of state, who was one of the members of the British cabinet, which was ultimately responsible to Parliament for the government of India. The Indian legislature was not a sovereign legislature; it was wholly incompetent to legislate on certain matters. Not only did the United Kingdom Parliament have full authority to legislate specifically for British India, but the laws made by that Parliament

could extend to British India. The India Independence Act of 1947 (the Act of 1947) was passed to guarantee sovereignty to the Indian and Pakistani legislatures.

The Act of 1947 contained all the elements necessary to support Pakistani independence achieved on August 14, 1947. It provided for a legislature with authority to legislate on all matters including the constitution without restrictions. The British Parliament ceased to have any authority to legislate for Pakistan, and no law made by the British Parliament could extend to Pakistan. The government of Pakistan would be responsible only to its own people and not to any outside authority. The British government would have no responsibility for the government of any part of the former British India. Paramountcy over the Indian princely states and any treaties with the states would lapse. Under Section 8 of the Act of 1947 the power of the legislature would be exercised by the Constituent Assembly of each dominion (India and Pakistan) until the framing of a constitution.

The government would proceed in accordance with the Act of 1935, subject to any change introduced by the Constituent Assembly. Under Section 9,<sup>64</sup> the governor general could pass an order making omissions, adaptations and modifications to the Act of 1935. Thus, the Act of 1935, subject to adaptation, became the provisional constitution of Pakistan until a constitution was framed.

The Constituent Assembly "made haste slowly." It was not until March 12, 1949, that the first Constituent Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution, its only lasting contribution. The Objectives Resolution is reproduced or referred to in all the subsequent constitutional instruments and may be regarded as the one uniting thread in the changing fabric of Pakistan's constitution.

According to the Objectives Resolution, sovereignty belongs to Almighty God whose authority has been delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people as a sacred trust. The state must exercise these delegated powers through the chosen representatives of the people. Democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice should be respected. The Muslims would be enabled to order their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and the Sunna, and the minorities would be free to practice their religions and develop their culture. The republic of Pakistan would consist of a federation where the units would be autonomous. Fundamental rights including equality before the law; social, economic, and political justice; and freedom, of

---

<sup>64</sup> "9(1) - There shall be a Council of Ministers, not exceeding ten in number, to aid and advise the Governor General in the exercise of his functions, except, in so far as he is by or under this Act required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. 9(2) - The Governor General in his discretion may preside at meetings of the Council of Minister. 9(3) - If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter [that] the Governor General is by or under this Act required to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgment, the decision of the Governor General in his discretion shall be final and the validity of anything done by the Governor General shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion, or ought or ought not to have exercised his individual judgment."

thought, expression, faith, worship, and association would be guaranteed. Independence of the judiciary would be safeguarded so that the people of Pakistan could prosper and attain their rightful and honorable place among the nations of the world and make their full contribution toward international peace and the happiness of humanity.

The members of the Constituent Assembly dragged their feet for seven long years. During this period the Constituent Assembly had lost much of its representative character as the once dominant Muslim League, which had controlled the Assembly, declined in power and popularity. On October 24, 1954, the governor general of Pakistan issued a proclamation which, in effect, was a vote of no confidence in parliamentary democracy.

Simultaneously with the proclamation various notifications were published regarding the restructuring of the government and the distribution of the portfolios among ten members of the governor general's council of ministers. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, was sworn in as the defense minister. This was contrary to the express provisions of the Act of 1935 which stated that only a member of the Constituent Assembly (as the Legislative Assembly had become) could be a minister.

The governor general could act in this peremptory manner because the Muslim League's influence in the Constituent Assembly had declined sharply. Forty-two of the seventy-eight members of the Constituent Assembly had come from East Bengal (renamed East Pakistan in 1955). And most of the forty-two members belonged to the Muslim League. But in the provincial elections to the East Bengal Assembly held in the spring of 1954, the Muslim League won only ten out of 237 Muslim seats. The Muslim League chief minister of East Bengal lost his seat to a medical student. Muslim assembly members from West Pakistan were not deeply loyal to the Muslim League as evidenced by their support for plans for the establishment of an officially sponsored Republican Party.

The proclamation also provided an entry for the involvement of the army in the political process. When General Ayub Khan became the defense minister at the end of 1954, the army entered politics. The army became the final arbiter of Pakistan politics following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly building was guarded by a strong police force, with the army in the background, and members of the Constituent Assembly were prevented from entering the premises.

The president of the Constituent Assembly then filed a writ petition in the Sindh Chief Court to challenge the validity of the dissolution. The section under which the writ petition was filed had been enacted by the Constituent Assembly but had not received the assent of the governor general. The first jurisdictional question to be decided by the

court was whether the pertinent section was valid legislation in the absence of the assent of the governor general, and the judgment rendered by the court was that the legislation was valid.<sup>65</sup>

The Sindh Court's judgment came up for appeal before the Federal Court of Pakistan in *Federation of Pakistan vs. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan*. In the leading judgment of the federal court written by Chief Justice Munir, references were made to democracy, democratic institutions, sovereignty, and independent dominions. The chief justice observed that the fundamental institution in modern democracy is the constitution, whether written or unwritten and it performs three functions: It expresses the consent by which people actually establish the state. It sets up a definite form of government. It defines the powers and the checks and balances which that government possesses.

Despite this high-sounding prelude, the federal court allowed the appeal on the technical grounds that the writ petition was not maintainable. The chief justice came to the conclusion that the assent of the governor general was necessary to all legislation including the pertinent section, which had not received assent. This section was not a validly enacted law and, therefore, the Sindh Chief Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writs. The Federal Court, however, did not inquire into the merits of the validity of the dissolution itself. The proclamation of October 27, 1954 dissolving the Constituent Assembly was thus left untouched.<sup>66</sup>

The Federal Court decision plunged the country into a legal vacuum, as many constitutional acts passed by the Constituent Assembly had not received the governor general's assent. The governor general attempted to validate retrospectively thirty-five constitutional acts which had been passed by the Constituent Assembly but had not received the assent of the governor general by Ordinance IX of 1935 promulgated on March 27, 1955. This Ordinance was struck down in the case of *Usif Patel vs. the Crown*.<sup>67</sup> The federal court held that only the Constituent Assembly could validate constitutional legislation under subsection (I) of Section 8 of the Act of 1947 and that the governor general could not exercise this power. The federal court then, in the appeal of the Sindh Chief Court case, had indirectly ruled that the governor general must validate the Constituent Assembly's acts; in the case of *Patel vs. Crown*, it reversed this position, in effect saying that only the Constituent Assembly could validate its own acts.

---

<sup>65</sup> The chief justice and his companion judges held that under the Act of 1947, the 'assent of the governor general was necessary in the case of the enactments of the federal legislature, but no corresponding provision necessitated assent in respect to the acts of the Constituent Assembly. In view of this clear intention that assent was not necessary for constitutional enactments, the chief justice held that under Section 10 of the Act of 1935, substituted by the Government of India Fifth Amendment Act of 1954, persons who were not members of the federal legislature were illegally appointed as ministers. The court also held the dissolution of the assembly to be illegal.

<sup>66</sup> The judgment is reported in full in *Pakistan Legal Decisions*, (Federal Court Section, 1955) p. 240.

<sup>67</sup> *Pakistan Legal Decisions* (Federal Court, 1955) p. 387.

In order to resolve this crisis, the governor general made a reference to the federal court under Section 213 of the Act of 1935.<sup>68</sup> The federal court now had to look into the merits of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the governor general's proclamation of October 24, 1954. The Act of 1947 did not prescribe any time limit within which the constitution was to be framed by the Constituent Assembly.

In overcoming the crisis, the federal court adopted the doctrine of state necessity advanced by the counsel for the government. According to the court, things which are otherwise not lawful can be made lawful through necessity. The continuance of the governing of Pakistan was manifestly necessary; therefore, the otherwise illegal act of the governor general in dissolving the Constituent Assembly must be accepted and a new Constituent Assembly must be created in accordance with the law relating to the election of a Constituent Assembly.

On the basis of the answers to the reference the governor general directed the setting up of a second Constituent Assembly that was to be indirectly elected by the newly elected provincial legislatures replacing the dissolved assembly. In adopting this procedure the court for the first time, but not the last in Pakistan's troubled constitutional history, referred to the doctrine of state necessity. Although the doctrine of state necessity is higher than the necessity of governments to stay in power, this is a distinction Pakistan's judges have found convenient to ignore.

### **The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic**

The new Constituent Assembly succeeded in framing the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which came into force on March 23, 1956, the anniversary of the Lahore resolution (sometimes referred to, incorrectly, as the Pakistan resolution) passed at the historic session of the-Muslim League at Lahore on March 23, 1940.

The constitution was divided into thirteen parts consisting of 234 articles. Pakistan was to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan consisting of two provinces, East Pakistan (formerly East Bengal) and West Pakistan (resulting from the merger of the provinces and former princely states in the western wing).<sup>69</sup>

The fundamental rights of the citizens were defined in Part II. Laws inconsistent with the fundamental rights articles would, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.<sup>70</sup> The

---

<sup>68</sup> Section 213 conferred an advisory jurisdiction on the Federal Court. In answering the Special Reference No. 1 of 1955 on May 16 (Pakistan Legal Decisions [Supreme Court, 1955] p. 435), Chief Justice Muhammad Munir stated that the country had come to the brink of a chasm and had only three choices: turn back, cross the gap by a legal bridge, or hurtle into the chasm.

<sup>69</sup> By this time the provinces of West Pakistan had been merged by the Establishment of West Pakistan Act of 1955.

<sup>70</sup> The fundamental rights articles guaranteed equality before law (Article 5), protection against retrospective punishment (Article 6), safeguards against arrest and detention (Article 7), freedom of speech (Article 8), freedom of assembly (Article 9), freedom of association (Article 10), freedom of movement and right to hold or dispose of

fundamental rights articles followed the pattern of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and were in fact borrowed almost verbatim from the constitution of India enacted in 1951. Citizens had the right to seek the enforcement of these rights by means of writs. Directive Principles of State Policy were contained in Part II.<sup>71</sup>

The Constitution of 1956 provided for power-sharing arrangements between the president and the prime minister. The president would be a Muslim, over forty years of age, elected by the members of the national and provincial assemblies for a period of five years (Articles 32 and 33). The president would not hold any other office of profit in Pakistan and would be subject to impeachment. Only members of the National Assembly were eligible to be in the cabinet which was headed by the prime minister and which would advise the president in the exercise of his functions. The prime minister would be selected by the president as the person most likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, but would hold office at the pleasure of the president. The executive authority of the federation would extend to matters concerning which the federation had power to make laws. The supreme command of the armed forces would vest in the president. All executive actions of the federal government would be taken in the name of the president.

The duties of the prime minister *vis-a-vis* the president were defined in Article 42. In effect the president had the power to select and dismiss the prime minister. In an assembly where there were no national political parties, and hence none with an overall majority in the parliament, the president was in a dominant position.

Parliament would consist of 300 members, half elected from each province. The president had the power to summon, prorogue and dissolve the parliament (Article 50) and to assent to bills passed by the parliament. In case the president withheld his assent the bill, would be presented again to the parliament and the president was bound to give his assent if the bill was passed by a two-thirds majority. Thus, the power of a presidential veto, which could only be overridden by a two-thirds majority, was cloaked in the power of assent. All money bills required the prior assent of the president. No tax could be levied except by an act of parliament (Article 60). The

---

property (Article 11), freedom of trade, business and profession (Article 12), safeguards for educational institutions (Article 13), non-discrimination in respect to access to public places (Article 14), protection of property right from acquisition without compensation (Article 15), prohibition of slavery and forced labor (Article 16), non-discrimination in public services after a period of fifteen years (Article 17), freedom of faith (Article 18), preservation of culture, script and language (Article 19), abolition of untouchability (Article 20), safe-guards against taxation for the purposes of any particular religion (Article 21).

<sup>71</sup> These included promotion of Muslim unity and international peace (Article 24), promotion of steps to enable Muslims to lead their lives individually and collectively in accordance with Holy Koran and Sunna (Article 25), discouragement of parochial and other prejudices (Article 26), protection of minorities (Article 27), social uplift (Article 28), promotion of social and economic well being of the people (Article 29), separation of judiciary from the executive (Article 30), provision of equal participation of people of various regions (Article 31). Unlike the fundamental rights, the directive principles were not enforceable by an individual against the state.

president had the power to issue ordinances when the National Assembly was not in session.

Power sharing arrangements similar to those between the president and prime minister were made between the governors and chief ministers in the provinces. The governor was appointed by the president. The chief minister was appointed by the governor from among members of the provincial assembly most likely to enjoy the confidence of the house. Each provincial assembly would have three hundred members and would be summoned, prorogued and dissolved by the governor. The governor had similar powers to veto and issue ordinances as the president. The financial procedure of the provinces followed that of the federation.

Relations between the federation and the provinces were defined in Part VI. The federation and the provinces had exclusive power to make laws on matters specified in the federal and provincial "lists" respectively, and both had legislative power in respect of the concurrent list. Powers not explicitly stated (residuary powers) were vested in the provinces. Provincial legislatures did not have the right to pass laws that might restrict interprovincial trade. The federal government had power to issue directives or delegate powers to the provinces.

Part VII dealt with the powers of the federal and provincial governments to hold property, enter into contracts, and initiate or defend law suits and legal proceedings. Part VIII dealt with elections to be held by an Election Commission within six months of the dissolution of an assembly. The question whether elections would be held by joint or separate electorates of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens was left to Parliament. Part IX established the judiciary with the Supreme Court at its apex. Under Article 170 the high courts were empowered to issue writs. Part X dealt with the Civil Service of Pakistan. No civil servant could be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority or without showing cause. The Public Service Commission at the federal and provincial levels would conduct examinations and supervise recruitment to the civil service. Part XI dealt with power to proclaim an emergency on account of war or internal disturbance. During an emergency Parliament could make laws on matters falling within the provincial sphere and the president could suspend the fundamental rights provisions. The president could also declare presidential rule in a province. Part XII dealt with general provisions and Part XIII with transitional provisions. An organization for Islamic research was to be set up; the president would appoint a body that would make recommendations to bring the laws into conformity with Islam.

The Constitution of 1956 represented a social contract between the representatives of the people of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. It successfully resolved four thorny issues: power sharing, the language question, representation in the Parliament, and the extent of provincial autonomy.

Ever since the assassination of Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan (from West Pakistan), on October 16, 1951, a convention had been established that the prime minister would be from East Pakistan. It was expected that under the Constitution of 1956 the prime minister would continue to be from East Pakistan. Indeed the only period of stability under the new constitution was the one-and-a-half year tenure as prime minister of Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy of East Pakistan's Awami League. The president, in whom power was concentrated, represented West Pakistan interest groups. The president changed as many as four prime ministers in the two and a half years of the short-lived Constitution of 1956, three of whom, departing from tradition, were from West Pakistan.

The language problem had proved intractable because of the failure of the government to gauge the depth of the demand for Bengali to be accepted as a state language. In March, 1948, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, speaking at a public meeting at the race course at Dhaka, had decreed that "Urdu and Urdu alone will be the State language of Pakistan" – an announcement that was received with stunned silence. The will of Jinnah succeeded, however, only in producing an uneasy and sullen acquiescence; and when in January 1952 Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin reiterated this viewpoint, it led to widespread unrest and the deaths of protesting students. When elections were held in East Bengal in the spring of 1954, the Muslim League was swept out of office principally because of the language problem. The Constitution of 1956 resolved this problem by providing that both Urdu and Bengali would be the national languages of Pakistan. This was a concession to East Pakistan. In return East Pakistan, despite its overall majority in the country, agreed to equal representation at the center: the so-called principle of parity. Each wing of Pakistan would hold an equal number of seats in Parliament.

The intractable problem was the allocation of powers between the center and the provinces. One of the main planks of the 21-Point manifesto of the United Front, which had swept the East Bengal election of 1954, had been that only defense, foreign affairs, and currency should be under federal jurisdiction. The United Front, once it entered the Constituent Assembly, settled for much less than this. Ultimately, important concessions were made by the addition to the provincial list of such matters as railways and industries, but the central government was kept sufficiently strong. One important result of the United Front's challenges was that residuary powers were given to the provinces.

The Constitution of 1956 was equally successful in appeasing the theocratic elements in defining the role of Islam, after painstaking efforts to synthesize the values of Western political systems within the Islamic framework. The constitution is one of the better examples of the self-deception and wishful thinking that helps bridge the gap between the Islamic tradition, which is intellectually accepted rather than deeply felt by the elite, and the aspiration for a parliamentary democracy. This gap was "resolved" by a clause



in the constitution stating that no law would be enacted which was repugnant to the Holy Quran and Sunna, but this clause was not enforceable.

Strong political parties are necessary to uphold any system of government. The failure of the constitution lay in the absence of the support of disciplined, grass roots, national parties as compared to the tightly knit, disciplined army waiting in the wings. The fundamental necessity for successful government is that the de jure government must be the de facto government. This end was not realized because of the lack of cohesion within the major parties and the lack of support from the general populace.

The failure to establish parliamentary supremacy must be attributed to the decline and fall of the Muslim League. The causes of the decline of the League were manifold. While the League conducted its vain and weakening struggle for supremacy in the country, power was slipping to other groups. From 1947 to 1954, the major battles of constitution making were fought within the parliamentary group belonging to the Muslim League; at times the Constituent Assembly, even with regard to procedure, was treated in a summary manner. Unfortunately, the League's parliamentary group did not capitalize on its monopoly of political power, which it enjoyed as the spearhead of the demand for a separate nation for Muslims. In the years after partition the League did not appear in a new role—unlike the Congress in India—that of a policy maker for the future of the country. It remained backward looking, wishing to cash in on popular patriotism and gratitude on the part of the electors for having achieved Pakistan. This point could be, and was, overstressed. The eventual failure of the Muslim League arose out of the political divisions in the country, the incapability of the League to bridge these divisions, and the League's lack of internal discipline and cohesion.

In a country like Pakistan, where East and West Pakistan were physically and linguistically miles apart, federation was the only possible solution. By 1958, the Muslim League (with one East Pakistani member) and the Republican Party (also with only one East Pakistani member) represented West Pakistan; the United Front and the Awami League represented East Pakistan. In the absence of a nationwide political organization, the period from 1956 to 1958 was one of great political instability. As many as four governments rose and fell and, while preparations were afoot for the first general election in the country, the army intervened – this time openly.

With the Proclamation of October 7, 1958, the president of Pakistan annulled the Constitution of 1956, dismissed the central and provincial cabinets and dissolved the national and provincial assemblies. Simultaneously, martial law was declared throughout the country and General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, was appointed the chief martial law administrator. Three days later, the president promulgated the Laws Continuance in Force Order, which had the general effect of validating the laws of and restoring the jurisdiction of the courts,

except for the jurisdiction to issue writs. On October 27, 1958, General Ayub Khan took over as president and sent Iskander Mirza, who had been president, into exile.

Once again the proclamation was tested in court. The question involved in the appeal filed by the state against Dosso<sup>72</sup> was whether writs issued by the High Court of Lahore had abated under Clause 7 of Article I of the Laws Continuance in Force Order promulgated by the president on October 10, 1958.

According to Chief Justice Munir, in judging the validity of laws at any given time, one of the basic doctrines is that of legal positivism on which the whole science of modern jurisprudence rests. If the constitution of a national legal order is destroyed by an abrupt political change not within the contemplation of the constitution, such a change, applying the doctrine of legal positivism, is equal to a revolution and its legal effect is the destruction of the existing constitution and the national legal order. From the juristic point of view, the method of revolution is wholly immaterial. If the attempt fails, the sponsors are tried for treason. If the revolution succeeds, then the person assuming power has successfully required the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, and -the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact and is judged by reference to its own success and not to the annulled constitution. Thus the essential condition of a legal order is efficacy.

### **The Third Republic, or the Ayub Khan Era**

The Constitution of Pakistan of 1962 was promulgated in June of that year by one man, President General Muhammad Ayub Khan; who claimed the mandate to enact the constitution on the basis of a referendum held on February 14, 1960. The referendum had elected Ayub as president for five years. The Constitution of 1962, divided into twelve parts, represented a radical departure from the parliamentary form of government.

Pakistan was defined as the Republic of Pakistan in keeping with the secular orientation of Ayub Khan. By the Constitution First Amendment Act of 1963, which came into force in January 1964, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to appease Islamic sentiments. The Constitution First Amendment Act of 1964 also reintroduced fundamental rights, which had been omitted at the time of promulgation. These rights were much the same as in the 1956 constitution. The directive principles of policy also followed those contained in the 1956 constitution, but were again not justiciable.

The executive power of the federation was concentrated in the president, who was to be indirectly elected by an electoral college consisting of eighty thousand Basic Democrats. These Basic Democrats were directly elected by eligible voters to perform local

---

<sup>72</sup> *State of Pakistan vs. Dosso*, Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court (1958) p. 533.

government duties, but had the additional function of serving as an electoral college for the presidency and for members of the national and provincial assemblies. The president was the supreme commander of the defense forces. The office of prime minister was abolished.

Parity between East and West Pakistan was preserved, but the size of the central legislature (now formally named the National Assembly) was reduced by half to one hundred fifty members (elected by the Basic Democrats serving as an electoral college), seventy-five from each wing of the country. The president had the power to summon, prorogue, or dissolve the National Assembly, which would serve for five years unless sooner dissolved by the president. The presidential veto was now further strengthened by an appeal to the electoral college in case of differences between the president and the National Assembly. Thus, the National Assembly could not be described as sovereign even in the legislative sphere as the president could appeal to the electoral college in which he implicitly enjoyed a majority because it had elected him. The president also had power to issue ordinances when the assembly was not in session and to issue a proclamation of emergency during which the fundamental rights articles could be suspended. Such an emergency was imposed during the September 1965 war. Thus, the brief twilight of fundamental rights lasted from January 1964 to the autumn of 1965.

The constitution limited the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to intergovernmental disputes. The court also enjoyed advisory jurisdiction on matters referred to it by the president. Under the 1956 constitution, the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in cases in which fundamental rights were invoked; this was now transferred to the provincial high courts.

Each province would have a governor appointed by the president and a legislature consisting of 155 members, later raised to 173 by the Eighth Amendment of 1967, including eight women and ten members who were technocrats or professionals. The governors had powers to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly. In case the governor withheld assent to a bill, again a concealed veto, this could be overridden by a vote of two-thirds of the total members of the assembly as compared with two-thirds of members present under the 1956 constitution. The governor could issue ordinances when the assembly was not in session. The executive authority of the province was vested in the governors assisted by a council of ministers appointed by and holding office at the pleasure of the governor.

Each province would have a high court. The constitution conferred power upon the high courts to declare any *ultra vires* act of government to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and to issue necessary directives.

The central legislature had power to make laws respecting matters enumerated in the Third Schedule and, in cases where national interest required, on matters not so

enumerated. Thus, the National Assembly could usurp the provincial law-making powers on the basis of a fiat that it involved an issue of national interest. The provincial assemblies had all the residuary powers concerning matters not listed in the Third Schedule.

Elections were to be conducted under the supervision and control of the Chief Election Commissioner appointed by the president and an Election Commission consisting of judges of the high courts appointed by the president. Each province would have forty thousand Basic Democrats to be elected by adult franchise. These persons would constitute the electoral college for members of the national and provincial assemblies and the president.

The advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was constituted to make recommendations to bring laws in conformity with the principles and concepts of Islam and to advise which laws were repugnant to the Quran and Sunna. A bill to amend the constitution required a two-thirds majority of the total National Assembly before it was presented for assent, but the president had the option to refer the bill to a referendum.

During the Ayub Khan era Pakistan enjoyed a certain degree of political stability and economic progress. The first elections under the constitution were on a non-party basis. However, political parties were revived in 1962 by the Political Parties Act of 1962. In the second elections, which were held in the winter of 1964-1965, the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) put up Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founder of the Pakistan, as their joint presidential candidate. The main demand of COP was that direct elections based on adult franchise should elect the country's chief executive and its legislature. The COP also called for restoration of the 1956 constitution to satisfy East Pakistani demands for a balance of power between a president and prime minister.

Although Ayub Khan won the elections, the results were disputed. After the 1965 war with India, the pervading sense of isolation and deprivation took deeper roots in East Pakistan. The East Pakistani demands for autonomy escalated in 1966 with the presentation of the Six-Point program of the Awami League (the province's principal political party) based on the two-economy theory of Bengali economists. This was the turning point from autonomy toward secession.

The Six-Point program demanded a new constitution of a confederal type instead of the restitution of the federalist constitution of 1956. In this new confederal arrangement of two autonomous states, the central government would be paramount in only two spheres defense and foreign affairs. Each state would levy its own taxes, control its foreign exchange, and print its own currency. The central government would derive its revenue from the states. It was a plan for autonomy bordering on secession. Thus, the social contract between East and West Pakistan, which was the essence of the 1956 constitution, came to an end.

Ayub Khan was stricken with serious heart trouble in 1968. Eventually another mass movement combining a mixture of class hatred in West Pakistan and regional discontents in East Pakistan succeeded in bringing down Ayub's regime during the winter of 1968 and 1969. The movement was spearheaded by the socialist Pakistan People's Party (PPP), headed by Ayub Khan's disaffected foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan and by the Awami League in East Pakistan, whose leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was then being tried for treason. On March 25, 1969, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, abrogated the Constitution of 1962 and imposed martial law again, after power was surrendered to him by Ayub.

The period between March 25, 1969, and the framing of the new constitution of Pakistan in 1973 was one of great turbulence. Yahya Khan followed the abrogation of constitution of 1962 by the dissolution of the province of West Pakistan in 1970 and restoration of the former provinces, namely Sindh, the Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan. He promulgated the Legal Framework Order in which the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan was replaced by the principle of representation according to population, conceding an absolute majority to East Pakistan in the national legislature. Yahya Khan's principal mistake was that he made his concession without securing an agreement with the Awami League on the degree of East Pakistan's autonomy in the future constitution.

In the election of 1970 the PPP, with its slogan of "food, clothing and shelter", emerged with a big majority in West Pakistan. The Awami League with its Six-Point manifesto emerged with an absolute majority in the National Assembly, winning all but two seats in East Pakistan. Since the Legal Framework Order provided that the constitution could be made by a simple majority, and there was no prior agreement on autonomy, the Awami League was in a position to dictate its terms and impose its Six-Points.- According to Mujibur Rahman, the Six-Points were now the property of the people, in other words, not negotiable.

This was unacceptable to the Yahya regime, which postponed the meeting of the National Assembly scheduled for March 1, 1971. This postponement in turn resulted in large scale disturbances in East Pakistan that culminated in civil war between East and West Pakistan, the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, and finally the dismemberment of Pakistan on December 16, 1971.

The verdict on the Yahya Khan regime was written by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Asma Jilani's case,<sup>73</sup> but only after Yahya Khan was disgraced and fell from power.

---

<sup>73</sup> *Miss Asma Jilani vs. Government of Punjab*, Pakistan Legal Decisions (1972) SC, p. 139.

Asma Jilani's case is of fundamental importance to Pakistan's jurisprudence because in that case the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in the case of *State vs. Dosso*.

The decision in Asma Jilani's case arose out of the judgment of a single judge of the Lahore High Court who dismissed under Article 98 of the constitution of 1962 the petition she had filed to question the validity of the detention of the father of the petitioner under Martial Law Regulation 78. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition on a preliminary objection that it lacked jurisdiction because of the ban contained in the jurisdiction of the Courts Removal of Doubts Order, 1969 (President's Order 31) promulgated by Yahya Khan as president and chief martial law administrator.

Justice Hamoodur Rahman, writing for the court, described the duty of the judge: to see that the law that he is called upon to administer is made by a person or authority legally competent to make the law and the law is capable of being enforced by the legal machinery, thus adding the test of legitimacy to that of efficacy. The court overruled the doctrine propounded in *State vs. Dosso* that efficacy is the sole criterion, in particular the theory that a successful coup is a revolution if it annuls the constitution and the annulment is effective. According to this doctrine, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Dosso's case, such a revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact, and thereafter its legality is judged not by reference to the annulled constitution but by reference to its success. If such a view were applied, the Order of 1969 and hence the detention could not be scrutinized by the superior courts.

The court came to the conclusion that the chief justice in the case of *State vs. Dosso* had acted on the assumption that Kelsen's views constituted a generally accepted doctrine of modern jurisprudence and had in any case misunderstood Kelsen's doctrine. The legal consequence of the judgment in Asma Jilani's case was that the only martial law that could be legitimized was one in temporary aid of civil power. The decision of Justice Hamoodur Rahman was endorsed by his companion judges of the Supreme Court.

Asma Jilani's case has ever since been the bright star in Pakistan's constitutional firmament. Bold though the decision in Asma Jilani's case was, it cannot be forgotten that the court declared Yahya Khan an usurper only after he was no longer in the saddle. The courts have yet to dismount a leader on horseback.

### **The Fourth Republic: Pakistan Under Bhutto**

The Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 is unique in many respects. This is the first constitution that was framed by representatives of the people who were directly elected in fair elections. It was passed unanimously. This was all the more impressive considering the deep ideological differences among the members of the assembly. The

religious parties wanted a constitution in which Islam would play a dominant role; the majority in the National Assembly consisted of parties that had a socialist and secular orientation. There was a major difference of opinion on the question of the rights of the provinces. The National Awami Party (NAP) and its allies, who were in the majority in the provincial assemblies of NWFP and Balochistan, stood for far greater autonomy for the provinces than did the PPP. Thus, the making of the constitution required major concessions on all sides.

The fact that a consensus was reached is the greatest merit of the Constitution of 1973, which represents a social contract between the various sections of Pakistan's plural society and contains the terms by which they are willing to live together. It is improbable that another such consensus could take shape between the various political parties on constitutional issues. The 1956 constitution was based on power sharing between the president and prime minister and between East and West Pakistan; the 1962 constitution was a constitution of a purely presidential type. The Constitution of 1973 was the first constitution in which the entire executive power was concentrated in the office of the prime minister.

The Constitution of 1973 was divided into twelve parts. Part I was the introductory part. It contained an article stating that Islam would be the state religion. Another article stated that elimination of exploitation would be the responsibility of the state, as would also the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." These two articles synthesize what may be called Islamic socialism. A new article was introduced defining high treason (Article 6). Article 6 provided that any person who abrogates or conspires to subvert the constitution by use of force would be guilty of high treason. Presumably the function of this article was to deter the imposition of martial law in the future.

Part II dealt with the fundamental rights and principles of policy.<sup>74</sup> Unfortunately, during the entire period after the constitution came into force, fundamental rights articles were suspended through a declaration of emergency.

Chapter II of Part II dealt with principles of policy, which were much the same as in the earlier constitution. As in the previous constitution these principles of policy were<sup>o</sup> not made justiciable.

---

<sup>74</sup> Fundamental rights under the 1973 constitution include security of persons (Article 9); safeguards as to arrest and detention (Article 10); prohibition of slavery and forced labor (Article 11); protection against retrospective punishment (Article 12); protection against double punishment (Article 13); dignity of man (Article 14); freedom of movement (Article 15); freedom of assembly (Article 16); freedom of association (Article 17); freedom of trade, business, and profession (Article 18); freedom of speech (Article 19); freedom to profess religion and safeguards for religious institutions (Articles 20 and 22); the right to compensation in case of acquisition of property by the government (Articles 23 and 24); non-discrimination regarding access to public places and in service (Articles 26 and 27); preservation of language, script, and culture (Article 28).

Chapter I of Part III dealt with the powers of the president. The president was to be a Muslim of not less than forty-five years of age; he could not hold any other office of profit; he was to hold office for a term of five years; he had the right to be kept informed by the prime minister on all matters of internal and foreign policy and on all legislative proposals the federal government intended to bring before Parliament. The president could issue ordinances when Parliament was not in session. He was bound to act on the advice of the prime minister, and his acts required the countersignature of the prime minister for validity. Thus, the president was a titular head of state with powers like those of a constitutional monarch.

Chapter II of the Part III dealt with the Parliament. Parliament was to consist of two houses to be known as the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly was to consist of two hundred members directly elected (Article 51) for a period of five years (Article 52). The National Assembly could be dissolved at the will of the prime minister.

The Senate was to consist of sixty three members, fourteen from each province elected by the provincial assemblies; five from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and two from the federal capital elected by the National Assembly. Senators had a tenure of four years, half of them retiring every two years. Thus, the Senate was a permanent body and was not subject to dissolution.

The bills relating to Part I of the Federal Legislative List originated in the National Assembly and were then sent to the Senate. A bill relating to Part II of the Federal Legislative List and the Concurrent List could originate in either house. Money bills could be passed by the National Assembly alone; unlike the U.S. Senate, Pakistan's Senate has no financial powers.

The President was bound to give assent to any bill and, if he failed to do so, he was deemed to have assented to the bill. Thus, the power of the head of state to withhold assent, which had created so many difficulties in the earlier constitutions and had acquired the nature of a veto in the 1962 constitution, was all but scrapped.

The financial procedure of the federal government provided for a federal consolidated fund and for an annual budget statement to be passed by the National Assembly, which alone could authorize expenditure, except for a four-month grace period during elections, when expenditure could be authorized through a presidential ordinance.

Chapter III of Part III dealt with the federal government. The prime minister was the chief executive of the federation. The prime minister would be elected by the majority of the National Assembly and would continue to hold office until his successor entered office. A resolution for a vote of no confidence against the prime minister would put forward the name of the successor. It also provided that for a period of ten years the



vote of dissident members of a political party would not be counted if the majority of the members of that party voted against the resolution. This provision was intended to enhance party discipline and to lessen the tendency toward factionalism seen earlier in Pakistan's history.

Part IV dealt with the provinces. Provincial governors appointed by the president were bound to act on the advice of the chief minister. The provincial assemblies of Balochistan, NWFP, the Punjab, and Sindh would consist of 40, 80, 240 and 100 members respectively, A provincial assembly would be dissolved by the governor on the advice of the chief minister. Provincial legislation would require assent of the governor who was deemed to have assented within seven days of presentation of the bill. The financial procedure of the provincial government was similar to the federal procedures. The chief minister was the executive head of the provincial administration. A vote of no confidence against the chief minister was subject to similar restrictions as in the case of the prime minister.

Part V dealt with the relations between the federation and the provinces. Parliament had exclusive power to make laws governing federal legislation. Both Parliament and the provincial assemblies had the power to make laws concerning matters in the Concurrent List.

The president could issue directives to the governors of provinces who, as the agents of the president, were bound to act according to these directions. The federal government could delegate the functions of broadcasting and telecasting to the provinces. The federal government could issue directions on matters falling within the jurisdiction of the provinces in case of any grave threat to peace or tranquility of the state.

Chapter III introduced a new institution known as the Council of Common Interests (CCI) consisting of the chief ministers of the provinces and an equal number of ministers of the federal government nominated by the prime minister. The council could formulate and regulate the policy in Part II of the Legislative List. In case of complaint of interference in water supply by any province, the CCI would look into the complaint. The proceeds of federal excise duties on natural gas and hydro-electric power were to be paid to the provinces in which these sources of power were situated.

Part VI dealt with finance, property, contracts, and services. The major innovation in this part of the constitution was the setting up of the National Finance Commission consisting of the federal and provincial finance ministers and other members to advise on distribution of revenues between the federation and the provinces.

Thus, the constitution gave more power to the smaller provinces, first, by providing for a Senate in which the provinces were equally represented; second, by providing for the Council of Common Interests, in which the provincial chief ministers were represented

regarding Part II of the Federal Legislative List; and third, by the creation of a National Finance Commission.

Part VII of the constitution dealt with the judiciary. The Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in matters of dispute between the governments or enforcement of fundamental rights articles. The Supreme Court had an advisory jurisdiction if the president considered it desirable to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court. Under Article 199, commonly known as the writ jurisdiction, the high courts had the power to direct a person performing the functions of the federal or provincial government or local authority to refrain from doing anything contrary to law or to do something required by law. The high courts could also declare that any action taken by such an official was without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

Part VIII of the constitution provided that elections would be held by an Election Commission presided by the Chief Election Commissioner. The function and duties of the Election Commission and the Chief Election Commissioner were almost the same as in the previous Constitution.

Part IX dealt with the place of Islam in the state. Under Article 227 all existing laws would be brought into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunna. This was a major concession to the Islamic parties. The Council of Islamic Ideology would be appointed by the president to identify laws repugnant to Islam and to make recommendations to bring the laws in accordance with Islam.

Part X dealt with emergency provisions. The president could issue a proclamation of emergency with the power to suspend fundamental rights during the emergency. This power could also be exercised in case of failure of constitutional machinery or in the case of a financial emergency. Soon after the constitution came into force, a proclamation of emergency was in fact issued and the fundamental rights articles remained suspended until these were revived following the 1985 elections.

Part XI prescribed that amendments to the constitution would require the vote of not less than two-thirds of the total of the National Assembly membership and a majority of the Senate membership. However, a bill that would have the effect of altering the territory of a province could not be passed unless it had the support of two-thirds of the membership of the provincial assembly.

Part XII dealt with miscellaneous, subjects such as services of Pakistan, tribal areas, and indemnity from legal proceedings against the president or prime minister. Urdu was declared the national language, but the provincial assemblies were given the power to approve the use of a provincial language in addition to the national language.

The Constitution of 1973 provided for a federal government of the purely parliamentary form with executive power concentrated in the prime minister. In order to allay the apprehensions about domination felt by the smaller provinces the constitution introduced two new institutions at the federal level: the Senate and the Council of Common Interests. A vain attempt was made to ensure civilian supremacy by treating any attempt to subvert the constitution as high treason.

The spirit of the constitution was subverted by the government itself, which crushed the opposition and dismissed the governments of NWFP and Balochistan. The *coup de grace* was the rigging of elections in March 1977. Once again, martial law came in the wake of countrywide agitation following the elections. On July 5, 1977, a proclamation of martial law was issued by the Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Martial law was acquiesced to by all political parties then in opposition, including, of course, the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance).

The martial law of 1977 was tested in the courts and resulted in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of *Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs. Chief of Army Staff*.<sup>75</sup> A petition was filed by Begum Nusrat Bhutto to challenge the detention of her husband, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and ten other leaders of the Pakistan People's Party who were arrested in the early hours of September 17, 1977, under Martial Law Order 12 of 1977. Relying mainly on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Asma Jilani, Yahya Bakhtiar, advocate for the petitioner, argued that the chief of staff of the Pakistan army had no authority under the 1973 constitution to impose martial law and as such Martial Law Order (MLO) 12 of 1977 was void. The declaration of martial law was an act of treason under Article 6 of the constitution and consequently the proclamation of July 5, 1977, and the Laws Continuance in Force Order of 1977, as well as MLO 12 were all issued without lawful authority.

Reliance was placed by the petitioner on the case of Asma Jilani, while the government relied on Dosso's case. The Supreme Court, however, declined to reverse the view taken in Asma Jilani's case and to revert to Dosso's case. It stated that the view taken in the Dosso case held the field for fourteen years until it was successfully brought under challenge and overruled in Asma Jilani's case. The court reiterated that Kelsen's theory had not been universally accepted. Kelsen had made some juristic propositions about the law, but not the administration of the law which is the daily concern of judges. The court observed that in fact Kelsen did not favor totalitarianism. Efficacy of a political change could not be the sole condition or criterion of legality. Thus, the consequences of a political change have to be judged not only by the application of Kelsen's theory but by consideration of the total circumstances: the sociological and moral factors, the

---

<sup>75</sup> See the Supreme Court's decision in *Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs. Chief of Army Staff*, in *Pakistan Legal Decisions* (Supreme Court, 1977) p. 639.

objective conditions, and the political situation. The Supreme Court therefore did not agree to resurrect Dosso in supersession of the view adopted in *Asma Jilani*.

The Supreme Court then referred to the fact that the election results of 1977, in which the PPP had obtained 157 out of the 200 seats of the National Assembly, were doubtful. The election results were not accepted by the other political forces in the country. The main demands of the opposition were resignation of the prime minister and fresh elections for the national and provincial assemblies. The situation was beyond the control of the civil administration. The Bhutto administration imposed local martial law in the cities of Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. Finally, Bhutto agreed in principle to hold fresh elections after his offer of referendum under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was rejected.

Talks were held between the Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan National Alliance, the opposition conglomerate, from June 3, 1977, until June 16, 1977, when it was announced that an accord had been reached; but the prime minister then left for a short tour of some friendly countries. Fresh efforts were made to break the deadlock upon his return, but these were inconclusive. On July 5, 1977, martial law was imposed.

The court came to the following conclusions: widespread rigging took place on March 7, 1977, which generated an agitation spreading from Karachi to the Khyber; the situation was beyond the control of the civilian administration; the disturbances resulted in heavy loss of life and property throughout the country; local intervention by the army did not control the agitation; economic, social, and educational activities were disrupted throughout the country; and the country was on the brink of civil war. The court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the declaration of martial law on July 5, 1977, was justified by state necessity and by the requirements and welfare of the people.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup> The decision of the Supreme Court is best summarized in the judgment of Chief Justice Anwarul Haq: That the 1973 Constitution still remains the supreme law of the land, subject to the condition that certain parts thereof have been held in abeyance on account of State necessity;

(ii) That the President of Pakistan and the Superior Courts continue to function under the Constitution. The mere fact that the Judges of the Superior Courts have taken a new oath after the Proclamation of Martial Law, does not in any manner derogate from this position, as the Courts had been originally established under the 1973 Constitution and have continued in their functions in spite of the Proclamation of Martial Law.

(iii) That the Chief Martial Law Administrator, having validly assumed power by means of an extra-Constitutional step, in the interest of the State and for the welfare of the people, is entitled to perform all such acts and promulgate all legislative measures which have been consistently recognized by judicial authorities as falling within the scope of the law of necessity namely:

- (a) All acts of legislative measures which are in accordance with, or could have been made under the 1973 Constitution, including the power to amend it;
- (b) All acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people;
- (c) All acts required to be done for the orderly running of the State; and
- (d) All such-measures as would establish or lead to the establishment of the declared objectives of the Proclamation of Martial Law, namely restoration of law and order, and normalcy in the country, and the earliest possible holding of free and fair elections for the purpose of restoration of democratic institutions under the 1973 Constitution;

Thus, the court once again exercised a legitimizing function, but it overstepped the principle of state necessity by conferring power upon the chief martial law administrator to amend the constitution. It was this power that led to the revival of a constitution with major amendments and the fifth republic.

### **The Fifth Republic and Judicial Activism**

Pakistan's longest period of martial law lasted over seven years, from July 5, 1977 to December 29, 1985. Having survived various challenges, principally the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, which reached its peak in August 1983, Zia got himself elected as president by a referendum held in December 1984. Taking a cue from Ayub Khan's actions in 1962, Zia held elections to the national and provincial assemblies on a non-party basis in early 1985. He also promulgated the Revival of the Constitution Order of 1985, which became the basis of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution and the charter for Pakistan's fifth republic.

The Eighth Amendment increased the powers of the president moving backward to the balance of power between the president and prime minister found in the Constitution of 1956. The Eighth Amendment permitted President General Zia ul-Haq to combine the office of chief of army staff and president contrary to the express provisions of all previous constitutions that the president could not hold any other office of profit. Among other key features of the Eighth Amendment were the president's power to dissolve the National Assembly, the power to nominate a prime minister, and the discretionary power to appoint all chiefs of staff of the armed forces. The amendment also indemnified all actions and ratified legislation introduced by Zia including those dealing with Islamization.

President Zia ul-Haq handpicked Muhammad Khan Junejo, a former cabinet minister, to be the prime minister, but Zia soon discovered that the prime minister had a will of his own. The main point of divergence was on the party system. The new prime minister revived the Muslim League, and other registered parties were allowed to function and participate in elections. The more stringent restrictions imposed on political parties by amendments made to the Political Parties Act of 1962 were not acceptable to the PPP and its allies in the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, which refused to comply with the registration process.

- 
- (iv) That these acts, Or any of them, may be performed or carried out by means of Presidential Orders, Ordinances, Martial Law Regulations, or Orders, as the occasion may require; and
- (v) That the Superior Courts continue to have the power of judicial review to judge the validity of any act or action of the Martial Law Authorities if challenged in the light of the principles underlying the law of necessity as stated above. Their powers under Article 199 of the Constitution thus remain available to their full extent, and may be exercised as heretofore, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Martial Law Regulation or Order, Presidential Order or Ordinance."

During 1985 Prime Minister Junejo enhanced his prestige and power. He was elected as the president of the All Pakistan Muslim League and also as the leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party. His popularity increased when he lifted the emergency and restored fundamental rights. The majority of members of the National Assembly joined the Muslim League, further strengthening the prime minister. Under the rules of business the prime minister was the final authority in day-to-day administration. The prime minister controlled the purse strings and enjoyed the patronage of appointing and transferring officials except for the chiefs of staffs of the armed forces, who were appointed by the president in his discretion. As time passed Zia felt increasingly isolated, and Junejo became more powerful.

By 1988 Zia and Junejo were on a collision course. A succession of events in the first half of 1988—the All Parties Conference on Afghanistan convened by the prime minister and attended among others by Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the PPP; explosion at the Ojhri munitions dump near Islamabad; and the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan—served to weaken Zia and strengthen Junejo. These events led Zia down a tragic path towards nemesis; he reached for the ultimate weapon. He dissolved the national and provincial assemblies on May 29, 1988. Zia dismissed Junejo at the same time. Thus, the power-sharing arrangements enshrined in the Revival of the Constitution Order and Eighth Amendment were not accepted by their own author.

A series of cataclysmic events now propelled Benazir Bhutto to power: the Ojhri Camp disaster in April 1988; the arbitrary dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies by General Zia in May 1988; the June 1988 judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan permitting unregistered parties like the PPP to contest elections; the July 1988 fixing of the date of November 16 for the elections; and the crash of the C-130 carrying Zia on August 17, 1988.

The years 1988 and 1989 were a period of intense judicial activism reflected in a series of judgments. The Superior Courts redeemed themselves in the eyes of the common citizens by their active role in restoring the basic right of the people to elect a party-based government of their own choice. The court held that restrictions on party-based elections introduced by Zia infringed on fundamental rights and negated the very concept of parliamentary democracy.<sup>77</sup> The court also upheld the decision of the Lahore High Court that the dissolution of the National Assembly by General Zia ul-Haq on May 29 1988 was unconstitutional.<sup>78</sup> Regarding the powers of judicial review, the Supreme Court opined that it had the power to review the sentences of the martial law authorities despite the indemnity and protection accorded to martial law sentencing by

<sup>77</sup> See the Court's judgment in *Benazir Bhutto vs. Federation of Pakistan*, in Pakistan Legal Decisions (Supreme Court Section, 1988) p. 416.

<sup>78</sup> See the Court's judgment in *The Federation of Pakistan vs. Saifullah Khan*, in Pakistan Legal Decisions (Supreme Court Section, 1988) p. 166.

the Article 270(A) introduced by the Eighth Amendment.<sup>79</sup> The court held that political parties and political alliances were entitled to distinctive symbols.<sup>80</sup> Eventually the peak of judicial activism was reached in January 1989 when the Balochistan High Court resurrected the dissolved Balochistan Assembly in the case of *Muhammad Anwar Durrani vs. Province of Baluchistan*.<sup>81</sup>

In the case of *Benazir Bhutto vs. Federation of Pakistan*, the Supreme Court held that when the impugned legislation by reference to its provisions violates fundamental rights of an individual or political parties or associations or unions, proceedings exist for the enforcement of those rights irrespective of whether any prejudicial order has been passed by the executive.

The constitution was seen as an instrument of an egalitarian welfare state. The court also chose the occasion to express its views on the fundamentals of parliamentary democracy.

Articles 3, 37 and 38 of the Constitution juxtapose to advance the cause of socio-economic principles and should be given a place of priority to mark the onward progress of democracy. These provisions become in an indirect sense enforceable by law and thus, bring about a phenomenal change in the idea of co-relation of fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy. If an egalitarian society is to be formed under the rule of law, then necessarily it has to be by legislative action in which case it would be harmonious and fruitful to make an effort to implement the socio-economical principles enunciated in the principles of policy, within the framework of the Fundamental Rights by enlarging the scope and meaning of liberties, while juridically defining them and testing the law on its anvil and also, if necessary, with the co-related provisions of the Objectives Resolution which is now a substantive part of the Constitution.

The liberties, in this context, if purposefully defined, will serve to guarantee genuine freedom; freedom not only from arbitrary restraint of authority, but also freedom from want, from poverty and destitution and from ignorance and illiteracy. This was the purpose of the role of the rule of law which was affirmed at Lagos in 1961 in the World Peace Through Law Conference.

Adequate levels of living are essential for full enjoyment of individual freedom and rights. What is the use of freedom of speech to under nourished people, of the freedom of press to an illiterate population? The rule of law must make for

---

<sup>79</sup> See *The Federation of Pakistan vs. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khan*, in Pakistan Legal Decisions (Supreme Court Section, 1988) p. 26).

<sup>80</sup> See *Benazir Bhutto vs. The Federation of Pakistan*.

<sup>81</sup> See *Muhammad Anwar Durani vs. Province of Balochistan*, in Pakistan Legal Decisions (Quetta Section, 1988) p. 25.

the establishing of social-economic and cultural conditions which promote men to live in dignity and to live with aspirations.<sup>82</sup>

On November 16, 1988, free and fair party-based elections were held in Pakistan in which the Pakistan People's Party emerged as the single largest party at the federal level but short of a simple majority. Benazir Bhutto was nominated as prime minister of Pakistan by Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. A few days later the acting president was elected as president of Pakistan for a term of five years.

### **Constitutional Dilemmas**

Four central dilemmas have confronted the constitution makers of Pakistan: first, the role of the army in the state; second, the nature and extent of federalism; third, the place of Islam in politics; and fourth, the nature of the executive office or balance of power between the president and the prime minister. Failure to resolve these issues is the source of the recurring constitutional crisis in Pakistan.

#### *The Army and the State*

All constitutional problems in Pakistan stem from the role of the army in the state. The growing strength of the army and the weakening of political parties has made the army the prime political force in the country. It can be said of Pakistan as it was of Bismarck's Prussia that it is a state within the army and not an army within the state. The struggle for power between the bureaucratic-military power elite and the feudal-political elite summarizes the history of the state. The outcome is that the feudal-political elite has agreed to a subservient role in the power-sharing arrangements.

The first constitutional crisis in the history of the country arose with the imposition of martial law in Lahore in March 1953 following disturbances arising out of a movement spearheaded by religious elements to declare the Ahmadiya sect a minority. This crisis eventually resulted in the dismissal of the provincial government, even though it enjoyed a majority in the assembly.

The second crisis arose at the time of dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin in April 1953, after the removal of the Punjab provincial government. Khawaja Nazimuddin as prime minister enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority in the Parliament. However, his ministry was dismissed under the order of Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat become governor general, who enjoyed the support of the army. Power had passed to the bureaucrat-military elite.

---

<sup>82</sup> *Benazir Bhutto vs. The Federation of Pakistan.*



A vain attempt by the new prime minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, to reduce the discretionary powers of the governor general resulted in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in October 1954. The army came out into the open at this time when its commander-in-chief was sworn in as defense minister in the civilian cabinet. Much later, Ayub Khan was to reveal in his autobiography that he began planning the coup of 1958 during 1954.

This dissolution resulted in the third constitutional crisis in the history of Pakistan. Maulvi Tamizuddin, the president (i.e., speaker) of the Constituent Assembly, filed a writ petition in the Sindh High Court that was granted and the dissolution of the assembly declared illegal. However, the federal government filed an appeal that was allowed, not on merit, but on the technical ground that the writ could not be issued because the governor general had not given his consent to the amendments to the Government of India Act of 1935, which permitted issuance of such writs. Lack of assent vitiated a number of constitutional acts. The edifice of government rested upon these invalidated enactments. A reference was made to the Federal Court to overcome this crisis and on its advice a newly-elected Constituent Assembly was convened. This Constituent Assembly produced the Constitution of 1956.

The fourth crisis arose in 1958 when the Constitution of 1956 was abrogated by the Proclamation of Martial Law throughout the country. Following the imposition of martial law, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the famous case of *Dosso vs. the State*, conferred legitimacy upon martial law relying upon some of the doctrines of the jurist Hans Kelsen. The efficacy of the new legal order, which was the basis of the doctrine, rested in fact on the Pakistan army.

The Proclamation of Martial Law in October 1958 led to the Constitution of 1962. The Constitution of 1962 was an imposition by mandate. Despite the constitution's preamble, at the very first political storm that followed its imposition, its author Ayub Khan having lost control of the Pakistan army, abdicated power to the commander-in-chief, General Yahya Khan. By the Proclamation of Martial Law issued by Yahya Khan, the Constitution of 1962 was abrogated. The province of West Pakistan was subsequently dissolved by the Dissolution of West Pakistan Order of 1969. The order restored the former Provinces of the Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province, and Balochistan.

General Yahya Khan held elections to a new constituent assembly under the Legal Framework Order of 1970. The Legal Framework Order did away with the principles of parity between East and West Pakistan and permitted a new constitution to be framed by a simple majority, a provision which proved fatal for Pakistan. In the ensuing elections at the end of 1970 one party from one province, the Awami League of East Pakistan, alone emerged with an absolute majority in the Assembly and was in the position to frame a new Constitution according to its six-point secessionist mandate.

The impasse led to civil war and eventually to the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

Following the dismemberment of Pakistan, the Constitution of 1973 was framed by consensus by the rump of the parliament elected in 1970, but on July 5, 1977, Pakistan was once again in the grip of martial law. This was the fifth crisis, but this time the constitution was kept in abeyance and not abrogated. The Supreme Court in Nusrat Bhutto's case, while declaring that martial law was transient and temporary, accepted it as a deviation but conferred on the chief martial law administrator the crucial authority to amend the Constitution.

Pakistan is a garrison state surrounded by three out of four of the world's biggest armies and is haunted by a history of wars with India. Pakistan has inherited weakly articulated political parties, and has an entrenched strong military-bureaucratic complex. These factors have contributed to a growing and ascendant role for the army. All the presidents of Pakistan, with the exception of Fazal Elahi Chaudhury and Ghulam Ishaq Khan, have served in the army. Thus, the greater the powers of the president, the greater the share of the army in the civilian state apparatus. The struggle for balance of power between the president and prime minister is in essence a question of the role of the army in the state, the president representing the army.

### *The Balance of Power Between the President and the Prime Minister*

Under Article 47 of the Constitution of 1973, the president could not hold any other office of profit. The key amendment to Article 47 permitted General Zia ul-Haq to combine the office of chief of the army staff and president. The National Assembly in legitimizing the amendment to Article 47 in effect elected the chief of the army staff as president of Pakistan. The assembly thus legitimized and converted into a de jure status a de facto convention of Pakistan's history that the chief of the army staff is to be the president of Pakistan. One reason that the elections were held on a non-party basis in 1985 was to permit this constitutional *coup d'état*.

Under the 1985 constitution (that is, the 1973 constitution as greatly modified by Zia ul-Haq) the president is far more powerful than was the figurehead of the 1973 constitution. He has the discretion to appoint the governors after consultation with the prime minister (Article 101 as amended); the power to promulgate ordinances when Parliament is not in session (Article 89); and the concurrent power to dissolve the National Assembly (Article 58). The shift in the balance of power from the prime minister to the president is reflected in the amendment to Article 90 which reads as follows:

90(1) The executive authority of the Federation shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him, either directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution.

The president is more powerful than under the 1973 constitution, but not quite as powerful as under the 1956 constitution, while the prime minister has more power than under the 1956 constitution but less than under the 1973 constitution. In practice prime ministers Muhammad Khan Junejo and Benazir Bhutto tried to exert greater influence; it remains to be seen whether the present prime minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, will follow the same path. Though he started as the mere nominee of the president in a non-party house, Junejo consolidated his position by forming the Muslim League, getting himself elected as leader of the party, and enacting amendments in the Political Parties Act, which penalizes floor crossing with loss of the seat. The day-to-day business of government is run by the prime minister. In refusing the president's nominee, Dr. Mahbub ul-Haq, and nominating a political associate, Mian Muhammad Yasin Wattoo, as finance minister in 1986, Prime Minister Junejo assumed control of economic policy. For three years there was an uneasy equilibrium between General Zia and Prime Minister Junejo, which came to an end with the dissolution of the assembly and dismissal of the prime minister in May 1988.

Benazir Bhutto was nominated as the prime minister on December 1, 1988, although her party was short of an absolute majority, as part of a system of checks and balances introduced by the Eighth Amendment. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, Economic Adviser V.A. Jaffrey, and the chiefs of staff continued in office as a legacy from the Zia era. These checks and balances were not acceptable to Benazir Bhutto. During the second half of 1989 two confrontations took place between the prime minister and the president the first relating to the army and the second to the judiciary. (It should be noted that the constitutional provision permitting the president to nominate a prime minister has expired; now the prime minister is elected by the National Assembly as was the case with Mian Nawaz Sharif following the October 1990 election.)

Article 243 as amended by the Eighth Amendment provides that the president, who is vested with supreme command of the armed forces, shall, subject to law, have the power to appoint in his discretion the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the chief of the army staff, the chief of the naval staff and the chief of the air staff. The words "in his discretion" were added by the Eighth Amendment. On August 5, 1989, the prime minister, taking the view that the power to retire all defense personnel was in her discretion, announced the retirement of Admiral Iftikhar Sirohey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Before the notification could be issued, the president issued a press statement that Admiral Sirohey would continue as the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee as the power of appointment vested in him also implied the power of retirement. There followed a war of words; eventually the prime minister

retreated and Admiral Sirohey continued as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Thus, the prime minister failed in her effort to gain total control over the armed forces.

The second confrontation occurred in November 1989 when a full bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan commenced a hearing of an appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of *M.D. Tahir vs. Federal Government*. In that case M.D. Tahir, an advocate of the Lahore High Court, had challenged the appointment of judges made by the acting president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, between August 17, 1988, and December 1, 1988. There was no prime minister during this period, and one of the contentions was that these appointments were invalid as they had been made without the advice of the prime minister. The Lahore High Court upheld the validity of the appointment as Article 193 of the constitution, which deals with the appointment of judges, states that the president shall make the appointments of judges of the superior courts in consultation with the chief justices of the appropriate courts. As such, the advice of the prime minister was not necessary. In appeal it was argued on behalf of the prime minister that in exercising his functions under Article 193, the president was bound to act on the advice of the prime minister. The court itself was split on what was basically a political question between the prime minister's people and president's people. The case became the focus of attention until the prime minister withdrew the appeal on December 10, 1989. In his annual address to Parliament on December 2, the president had criticized the performance of the government and indicated grounds on which the National Assembly could be dissolved—this may have prompted Benazir Bhutto's retreat. The prime minister had failed to obtain total control over the judiciary.

The net result of these ill-advised confrontations and disorderly retreats is that the power-sharing arrangement under the Eighth Amendment and its system of checks and balances remains intact. In Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Pakistan has a president who goes by the book and exercises restraint while preserving the compromise between the political and military elites, which is the essence of Pakistan's fifth republic.

### *Islam and Politics*

The role of Islam in the constitution and the state is yet another dilemma. The edifice of the constitution consisted of organs familiar to those found in modern secular states such as a national assembly, a senate, a president, a prime minister, a supreme court and high courts.

In earlier constitutions Islam and democracy were reconciled by a negative fiat that no law repugnant to the Quran and Sunna would be passed, but even this provision was not enforceable. Articles 227 to 230 of the Constitution of 1973 provided a positive direction for bringing laws into conformity with Islam. The constitution set up the Council of Islamic Ideology invested with the jurisdiction to advise the Parliament and

the provincial assemblies whether any existing law or a law proposed to be enacted was repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. On receiving a report of the council, the Parliament and provincial assemblies were required to enact laws in the light of the advice given by the report.

A further change was, however, made in 1983 during the martial law regime. A new chapter comprising Article 203-A to J was added to the constitution. Under this chapter the Federal Shariat Court was set up with power to strike down a law which was repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. Certain laws including the constitution's fiscal laws of procedures set out in Article 203-D were, however, excluded from the jurisdiction of the Shariat Court.

Zia's Islamization reached its peak with the Enforcement of Shariat Ordinance promulgated on June 15, 1988, a fortnight after the dissolution of the assemblies. Shariat was defined as the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunna. Supremacy of the shariah would be enforced as the supreme source of law in Pakistan and the basis for policy making by the state. The Shariat Ordinance laid the foundation of a new legal order leading to a totalitarian ideological state. The ordinance lapsed, however, after Zia's death as it was not ratified by the parliament constituted after the November elections. The rest of Zia's Islamization laws have survived him.

During Zia's lifetime there were incessant demands for the repeal of the Islamization legislation introduced by him, but these demands have abated. By imposing Islamic laws from above, Zia may have saved Pakistan from a fundamentalist revolution from below like the one that took place early in his tenure in neighboring Iran. Internally Zia's most lasting contribution could be resolving the issue of the role of Islam in the state. Nonetheless, the question is not dead; several of the parties supporting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wish to enact legislation incorporating the key elements of Zia's Shariat Ordinance.

### *The Problem of Federalism*

Federalism is the genesis of the concept of Pakistan both historically and literally. The word Pakistan is the acronym P for the Punjab, A for Afghania (NWFP), K for Kashmir, S for Sindh, and Tan for Balochistan. The originator of the word Pakistan, the Cambridge undergraduate Chaudhury Rahmat Ali, had conceived three Muslim states in the Indian subcontinent: the first was Pakistan (the Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan); the second was Osmanistan (the princely state of Hyderabad in the south of India) and third was Bangistan (the present country of Bangladesh and the present Indian states of West Bengal and Assam).

Historically the Pakistan idea emerged from the demand for an increase in the number of provinces with a Muslim majority and for greater autonomy for these provinces. The

most dramatic event was the partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon at the beginning of the century. The Muslim majority area of eastern Bengal including Assam was separated from the Hindu majority of western Bengal. The partition was annulled in the wake of Hindu revivalist agitation. The second event was the creation of the NWFP, the land of Pashtuns, adding to the number of Muslim majority provinces. During the 1920s the separation of province of Sindh from Bombay was the major Muslim demand. The famous Fourteen Points presented by Jinnah in 1929 included the demand for a separate province of Sindh and for upgrading NWFP and Balochistan to full provincial status. The Fourteen Points included the following key demands:

1. The form of the future constitution should be federal with residuary powers vested in the province. Central government to have control only of such matters of common interest as may be guaranteed by the constitution.
2. Uniform measures of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces.
3. Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary should not in any way effect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and Northwest Frontier Province.
4. Sindh should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.
5. Reforms should be introduced in the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan on the same footing as in other provinces.
6. No change should be made in the Constitution by the central legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the India Federation.

The consummation of this concept is the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which came to be known as the Pakistan resolution. By the Lahore Resolution the Muslim League demanded that in the future constitutional scheme only four subjects—defense, communication, finance, and foreign affairs—would be under federal jurisdiction in a constitutional federation where the federating units would be autonomous and sovereign. Needless to say, Jinnah was the arbiter if not the author of the Lahore Resolution.

The high noon of the federal ideal was reflected in the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, which provided for three groups of federations within an Indian confederation: the provinces that now comprise Pakistan in the northwest; the provinces of Bengal and Assam in the east; and the remaining provinces that had a Hindu majority. Each group would have the power to frame its own constitution. This scheme was accepted by the

Muslim League but was scuttled by the Congress. The rejection of the scheme by the Congress leadership led to direct action in August 1946, the Calcutta massacre of August 1946, the Punjab and Bihar killings in the 1946-47 winter of discontent, and eventually the June 3, 1947, plan in which separation of Pakistan as a nation-state was recognized.

Unfortunately, the federal principle was acknowledged more by its breach than its observance after the creation of Pakistan. The provincial governments were suspended, assemblies dissolved, and governor's rule imposed time and again. In fact this process started during Jinnah's lifetime in the provinces of Sindh and NWFP. The coup de grace was the merger of the separate provinces in the west wing of Pakistan into One Unit (the term often used to describe the province of West Pakistan) in 1955.

In the early years of Pakistan the meaning of federalism was less clear and more controversial than today. The terms of constitutional politics were fluid, ambiguous, and being redefined. Provinces were spoken of as "sovereign and autonomous" yet subordinate to the federal government, projecting the appealing imagery of a union of two gravitational centers of authority. The meaning of federalism was not fully grasped by supporters or opponents because it was undergoing redefinition during a process of accommodating the political divisions of the day. For fifteen years, from 1955 to 1970, the duration of the One Unit plan for West Pakistan, the anti-federalists held sway.

The anti-federalist theme of the Constitution of 1956 was reinforced in the Constitution of 1962, which retained legitimization of One Unit and concentrated more power in the office of the central presidential executive. The deep division between the federalists and anti-federalists was resolved by the Constitution of 1973.

The 1973 constitution reflects a historical compromise in its acceptance of a "mixed form" of government combining national and federalist elements. Yet the meaning of Pakistan federalism was by no means settled with coming into force of the constitution. Important questions like the place of ethnic groups as the *muhajirs* (refugees from India) of Sindh remained unresolved. The demand for greater autonomy had to be met. It is also a great mistake to suppose that the constitution would govern by itself. A constitution only defines the mode and the form; men and women carry out the business. The true construction of federalism will emerge with the experience of successive legislative bodies through a period of years and under the varied ascendancy of parties.

In creating a new form of federalism, the Pakistan Constitution of 1973 presumed the existence of but not the sovereignty of the provinces. The interests of the provinces, however, for better or worse, adequately or inadequately, are represented in the national political process through institutions such as the Council of Common Interests.

Indisputably, the provinces must enjoy a crucial role and increased responsibility in the administration.

### **Conclusion**

Pakistan came of age in the forty-second year of its existence with the army back in the barracks, the courts enforcing the constitution and upholding the rights of the people, freedom of the media, and the survival of a strong opposition. The country has been further tested with freely contested elections in 1988 and 1990, with governments selected by the people assuming power at the central and provincial levels.

The army has played a vital role in the restoration of democracy by abstaining from the spoils of office, despite the temptation to intervene when its top leadership was killed in the crash of August 17, 1988. Remarkable indeed was the army's continued support for the electoral process beyond the September 30, 1988 massacre in Hyderabad and the killings in Karachi that followed. In the process the army recovered much of its lost prestige and is in the process of rebuilding itself as a professional force whose prime duty is to defend Pakistan and its people. Still, there are lingering doubts that the army is prepared to eschew politics; many believe the dismissal of the government of Benazir Bhutto was instigated by the military.

The year 1989 showed that Pakistan has a democratic potential strong enough to overcome the vicious circle of feudal power, high illiteracy, tribal traditions, religious prejudices, cultural taboos and inhibitions, regional and ethnic factors, and a weak middle class. The year 1990 showed that, even though the reasons for the dismissal of Bhutto are questioned, the people of Pakistan have again been permitted to use the ballot box as a means to change the government. The question that remains to be answered is whether the ground is safe for a viable and enduring democratic system. Will democracy last or is this another false spring?

There is also a negative side to the balance sheet. Pakistan is a state but it has yet to become a nation. Regional and ethnic forces continue to threaten national unity.

The cohesive forces are in the last analysis stronger than the divisive forces. The success of national political parties in this year's elections confirmed the overriding impact of unifying forces over separatism. Pakistan is one economy based on the Indus Waters; its people by and large share a common faith; the national language Urdu is understood and spoken, from Khyber in the north to Karachi in the south; and it is in the interest of the provinces themselves that Pakistan should last. If something happens to Pakistan, its provinces will not survive in their present form.



## Pakistan's Economy Under Zia Shahid Javed Burki

General Zia ul-Haq's eleven years in power produced an impressive change in the Pakistani economy. The gross national product (GNP) doubled in real terms, increasing from Rs. 46 billion in 1977-78 to Rs. 86 billion in 1987-88, in 1959-60 rupees. This implies a rate of growth of nearly 7 percent a year, a very respectable performance by any standard. Based on the current rupee value, gross national product increased during the same period from Rs. 172 billion to Rs. 649 billion. In real terms again in 1959-60 rupees, income per capita increased from Rs. 631 to Rs. 856, a growth of 36 percent overall.<sup>83</sup> The much smaller percentage increase in income per capita relative to the increase in GNP was, of course, due to a large increase in population. When Zia ul-Haq proclaimed martial law on July 5, 1977, Pakistan had a population of 74.6 million people. When he died in an airplane crash on August 17, 1988, the country's population had crossed the 100 million mark and was estimated at 103.8 million. In other words, during Zia ul-Haq's eleven years in power, Pakistan added 29.2 million people to its population. What is of considerable significance is the fact that the much larger population that lived in Pakistan at the time of Zia's death was much better off in economic terms than was the population at the time he assumed political power. During the Zia period, Pakistan was able to rid itself in large measure of the worst forms of poverty. A vast majority of its people could better satisfy basic human needs for food, shelter and clothing than could the populations of other countries of South Asia.<sup>84</sup>

The structure of the economy also was transformed during the Zia period. In 1987-88, agriculture contributed slightly less than a quarter of the gross domestic product compared to nearly a third in 1976-77. The share of manufacturing increased from 16 percent to 20 percent. Agriculture and manufacturing contributed over 40 percent to the increase in gross domestic product; the rest came from, such sectors as transport, power, wholesale and retail trade, banking, and insurance. (See Table 1.) During the Zia period, the role of the external sector also increased significantly. In 1977, trade (exports combined with imports) was equivalent to 23.8 percent of the gross domestic product; by 1988, the ratio had increased to 29.1 percent. In 1987-88, judging by the structure of

<sup>83</sup> In 1988 Pakistan revised the base for national income accounting from 1959-60 to 1980-81. The methodology for estimating the sectoral composition of national income was also revised. However, the new methodology, using the constant factor cost of 1980-81, has not been used to rework the national income account time-series. For the old series from which these data are taken see Government of Pakistan, *Economic Survey, 1988-89* (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1988), Statistical Annex, pp. 23-35.

<sup>84</sup> I developed this theme in my chapter, "Poverty in Pakistan: Myth or Reality?" in T.N. Srinivisan and Pranab Bardhan (eds.), *Rural Poverty in South Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 69-88.

its economy, Pakistan had entered the ranks of middle-income countries. It was no longer a predominantly rural economy dependent mostly on agriculture. It had a large, diversified industrial sector; a vibrant urban economy, with economic assets no longer concentrated in one city (Karachi) but dispersed over several urban areas across the country; a large middle class, with impressive skills; a rapidly growing service sector of some sophistication; and growing economic links with the outside world.

The main purpose of this chapter is to answer the following question: Were the structural changes in Pakistan's economy the result of the leadership provided by General Zia ul-Haq? In answering this question it would be useful not only to examine the role played by General Zia as an economic manager but also to compare the performance of the economy during the Zia period with that of the period under Presidents Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, Pakistan's first "soldier-presidents." Also pertinent is an overview of the economy General Zia ul-Haq inherited from Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The next part of the chapter provides a description of the bureaucratic model of economic management that dominated economic decision making during much of Pakistan's history, including the eleven years dominated by Zia ul-Haq. Finally, the Zia years are examined with an overview of economic management under Zia, an analysis of the economic successes and failures of the Zia period, and a brief assessment of Zia's economic legacy.

### **Pakistan's Economy under Presidents Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan**

The performance of the Pakistani economy during the Zia period was not much different from that registered during the first military period in Pakistan's history, that of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, from 1958 to 1971 (see Table 2). The size of the gross national product nearly doubled in this period, increasing at the rate of 6.8 percent a year, a rate of growth unprecedented in the country's history. A number of significant developments occurred of which the following five deserve attention. First, the government instituted medium-term planning to prescribe an overall framework within which to make economic decisions. In the period before martial law an effort had been made to implement a five-year development plan, but the political leaders did not feel they had the mandate to institute the far-reaching structural reforms proposed in the draft that was presented to them by the planning board. These included land reforms, a profound change in the structure of civil administration, greater attention by the state to the development of social sectors, and a deliberate effort to use the public sector to provide East Pakistan with a larger share of resources. The First Five-Year Plan (1955-60) drafted by Zahid Hussain, a civil servant also responsible for a number of other innovative developments in the country's fledgling economy, was clearly before its time. It was adopted in October 1958, after General Ayub Khan had taken office, but by then it was largely inconsequential.

	1976-77	Percent of Total	1987-88	Percent of Total	Increase per Year
GDP at constant factor 1959-60					
Rs. million	42,401	100	86,166	100	6.7
Agriculture	14,004	33.0	21,124	24.5	3.8
Manufacturing	6,707	15.8	17,201	20	8.9
Mining and Quarrying	206	5.0	548	0.6	9.3
Construction	2,076	4.9	4,820	5.6	8.0
Electricity and Gas	1,143	2.7	2,927	3.4	8.9
Trade	5,875	13.9	12,836	14.9	7.3
Banking and Insurance	1,124	2.7	2,508	2.9	7.6
Ownerships and Dwellings	1,418	3.3	3,028	3.5	7.1
Public Administration & Defense	4,135	9.8	8,715	10.1	7.0
Services	3,060	7.2	6,137	7.1	6.5
Transport	2,653	6.3	6,322	7.3	8.2

**Source:** Computed from the data in Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1987-88 (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1988), Statistical Appendix, pp. 16-17.

Years	GNP Growth Rate (% per year)	Population Growth (% per year)	Income Growth (% per year)
1947-58	2.7	1.8	0.9
1958-71	6.8	2.8	4
1971-77	4.6	3.1	1.5
1977-88	6.9	3	3.9

Source: Computed from Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey, 1987-88 (Islamabad: Finance Division, 1988), Statistical Appendix, pp. 1 and 15, Tables 1.1 and 2.1.

Second, in adopting medium-term planning as the means for allocating government resources for development, the administration of Ayub Khan chose the objective of rapid growth over redistribution. "In emphasizing the need for a growth philosophy, we do not intend to imply that any rate of saving and any degree of income inequality is justified," wrote Mahbub ul-Haq, the principal architect of the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) launched with considerable fanfare on time on July 1, 1960. "(However), we have sought to stress in the plan the harm that can be done to economic growth because

of undue preoccupation with distributional policies or ideas of social justice during a stage of development when the real problem is the creation of 'surplus value.'<sup>85</sup> The second plan succeeded in its objectives; Pakistan's gross domestic product increased by a third during the 1960-65 period, from Rs. 19 billion to Rs. 25 billion in 1959-60 rupees. The implied rate of growth was 6.2 percent a year.

Third, the government of Ayub Khan successfully shifted the attention of the bureaucracy to the development of agriculture and to the promotion of rural development. The previous administrations had paid scant attention to the countryside. The focus on agriculture led to the green revolution in the late 1960s, which saw a quantum jump in the output of major crops. When Ayub Khan took office in 1958, wheat production was estimated at 3.9 million tons; when he left office in 1969, 7.3 million tons of wheat was harvested. This near doubling in the output of Pakistan's principal crop was equivalent to a rate of growth of 5.8 percent a year. The output of rice increased at an even greater rate, from 992,000 tons in the 1958-59 crop year to 2.4 million tons in 1969-70, a growth rate of 8.4 percent a year. The value of agricultural production during the time Ayub Khan held power increased by 49.3 percent, or 3.7 percent a year. Although considerably less than the rate of increase in the output of wheat and rice, this expansion in the total output of agriculture was very respectable compared to Pakistan's past performance as well as to the performance of other developing countries. The military governments of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan succeeded in reversing the fortunes of the agriculture sector; a region that had earned the reputation of being the granary of India during the first third of the twentieth century had a food deficit by the mid-1950s. By the early 1970s, Pakistan was once again approaching food self-sufficiency. During the first military period (1958-71), agriculture contributed 28 percent to the increment in gross domestic product.

Even though planners, on the grounds" of economic efficiency, would have liked to see Pakistan move toward the commercialization of agriculture, the Ayub Khan administration chose to adopt food self-sufficiency as one of its primary economic objectives. "It appears that the acceptance of the target of 'food self sufficiency' on political and social grounds led the [government] to ignore consideration of efficiency in the allocation of resources in the agricultural sector," wrote Mahbub ul-Haq.<sup>86</sup> (A large stock of surplus U.S. wheat had been committed to Pakistan by Washington—the country would import \$722 million worth of wheat and other food stuffs during this period.) "In this case, it would have made much greater sense to de-emphasize the production of food grains, to push vigorously the production of commercial crops which sometimes compete for the same agricultural land and irrigation water, and to stress other elements of the agricultural program such as fisheries and forestry."<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Mahbub ul-Haq, *The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 3.

<sup>86</sup> Mahbub ul-Haq, *The Strategy of Economic Planning*, p. 185.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 184.

Fourth, while it focused its attention on increasing the production of foodgrains, the military government under Ayub Khan also chose to emphasize social reconstruction of the countryside. This it did by adopting a number of measures, including land reforms and the development of a rural infrastructure. "Land reforms represented a vital link in the chain of measures that I proposed," wrote Ayub Khan in his autobiography. He wanted ceilings to be established on the ownership of land and protection to be given to the tenants who cultivated the land. This was to be done for political, social, and economic reasons. "We could not have a democratic system if a vast majority of people in the countryside were living as serfs," he said. "... the laws and institutions which govern the ownership and use of land have a direct effect on production and determine the social attitude of those engaged in agriculture."<sup>88</sup> In the early days of his administration, Ayub Khan's political philosophy clearly favored the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class in agriculture that would provide the sector the dynamism that large and parasitic landed aristocracy had failed to provide. It was not enough to provide the middle-sized, commercially oriented farmers with the means to acquire more land by establishing ceilings on the amount of area that could be possessed by large landlords. Ayub Khan believed that the state had also to intervene in other ways, including the expenditure of public resources to improve the rural infrastructure, in particular village-to-market roads, water, electricity, primary schools, and clinics. A large rural works program, financed by the counterpart funds that accrued from the sale of PL-480 wheat provided free by the United States, was launched first in East Pakistan in 1962 and then in West Pakistan in 1963.<sup>89</sup>

In determining these priorities, Ayub Khan essentially took his own counsel. He was clearly in command and made use of the civil bureaucracy to implement his decisions rather than to guide the economy independently. As we shall see later in this chapter, Zia ul-Haq adopted a much more arms-length approach toward economic management, leaving almost all of the decision making to the bureaucracy. Although economic gains during the eleven years of Zia ul-Haq were not dissimilar from those in the thirteen years of the first two military governments, the model of economic management that produced them was considerably different.

### **Zia's Economic Inheritance**

General Zia ul-Haq's assumption of political control on July 5, 1977, interrupted the process of structural transformation that was initiated by the administration of Prime

---

<sup>88</sup> Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 87-88.

<sup>89</sup> For a description of the social, economic, and distributive impact of the Rural Works Program in West Pakistan see Shahid Javed Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," *Public Policy*, 19, Winter 1971, pp. 167-206.

Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.<sup>90</sup> The Bhutto administration had sought to expand the economic role of the government by allowing it to ascend the "commanding heights" of the economy; that is by giving it a position of virtual monopoly in internal finance, by providing it a prominent role in the regulation of external commerce, and by allowing it to determine the direction of social change. This expanded government role was made possible by a series of actions taken between 1972 and 1974. Large industries, commercial banks, and insurance companies were nationalized. Public-sector trading corporations were created to handle the export of rice and cotton. Private schools and colleges were brought under government control. Public-sector enterprises were set up to manufacture a number of basic consumer goods including vegetable ghee (cooking oil), garments, and roti (bread). Although such a deep encroachment by the public sector into the economy had no precedent in Pakistan's history, it was based on an approach popular in the late 1940s and early 1950s in several academic circles in England and the United States when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was at Berkeley and Oxford. Along with other third-world intellectuals, Bhutto was obviously influenced by Fabian socialism. These ideas were tried by India in the 1950s and 1960s starting with their Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61).<sup>91</sup>

Nationalizations introduced serious inefficiencies into the economy. Many public-sector enterprises performed well below expectations and considerably less well compared to the private sector. There were other adverse consequences of this belated experiment in statism and socialism by Bhutto, and the experiment did not inspire confidence on the part of the donor community that, because of the country's continued dependence on foreign flows, had considerable influence on domestic economic decision making. Also, the swift turn toward a prominent economic role for the state was not especially appealing to the important economic interests in Pakistan who were the product of the capitalist approach followed by the earlier regimes, in particular those of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. These interests responded predictably. Private fixed investment fell precipitously in the first year of the Bhutto administration. The World Bank<sup>92</sup> estimated the decline at 29.8 percent. There was some improvement in later years – gross private investment increased at the rate of 6 percent a year between 1972-73 and 1975-76. If depreciation is allowed for in the fixed assets owned by the private sector, there was a

---

<sup>90</sup> For an indepth analysis of the performance of the economy during the Bhutto period, see Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

<sup>91</sup> India's political economy has received much greater academic attention than that of Pakistan. See, for instance, Pranab Bardhan, *The Political Economy of Development in India* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.); Francine R. Frankel, *India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University, 1978); Atul Kohli, *The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987). This type of research has attracted little attention in Pakistan. Exceptions are Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977*; Omar Noman, *The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-1985* (London: KPI, 1988); and Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

<sup>92</sup> The World Bank, *Pakistan Economic Developments and Fifth Plan Review* (Washington, D.C.: April, 1979), p. 4.

considerable amount of net disinvestment by private investors. Several large industrial families moved out of Pakistan. The Dawoods established a significant presence in Texas in the United States; the Saigols made investments in the Middle East; the Habibs looked to Europe for new opportunities. Even middle-sized industrialists sought sanctuaries outside Pakistan for their capital. There are no estimates of capital flight from Pakistan, but it reached significant proportions during the Bhutto period.

The rapid expansion in the public sector that occurred under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto not only discouraged new investing by private entrepreneurs but also brought about a sharp deterioration in the performance of the industrial enterprises that were taken over by the government in 1972. The civil service bureaucracy was demoralized by "reforms" introducing PPP authority into its ranks in 1973 and was not inclined to give its best to the state.<sup>93</sup> A number of nationalized industrial enterprises suffered losses and had to be sustained by increasing the amount of government subsidies.<sup>94</sup>

Bhutto's last year in office was an especially difficult one for the economy. Gross domestic product increased by only 1.4 percent for the first five years of his administration. Output of three sectors—industry, construction, trade, and transport—declined in real terms. It was only a large increase in indirect taxes and government subsidies by 12.2 percent that resulted in GDP growth at market prices by 2.2 percent, but even this growth was considerably less than the increase in population. Incomes of a very large number of people declined by significant amounts and contributed to the political agitation that brought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's fall from political power. The PPP in general and the Bhutto family in particular were taken by surprise at the intensity of the reaction unleashed by the 1977 National Assembly elections. "Swarms of young men on motor scooters were suddenly reported to be racing through Karachi leaving cinemas, banks, shops that sold alcohol and any houses flying the PPP flag burning in their wake," recalls Benazir Bhutto in her autobiography. "Death threats were issued to innumerable ... PPP ministers and parliamentarians, as were threats to kidnap their children from school. A nightmare was unfolding in Karachi."<sup>95</sup>

hi the Pakistan People's Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had developed an organization with a structure that put roots in thousands of communities across the country. This party structure was a new development for Pakistan, one with profound implications for the country's economic and political development. The political parties before the advent of the PPP had exercised control from the center, leaving local development in the hands of the civil servants. Under Bhutto the party officials in the communities—in city *mohallas* (wards) as well as in villages—were given the authority to direct the bureaucracy. In the period since independence, the civil service had become the agent

<sup>93</sup> See Robert LaPorte's contribution to this book for the way these "reforms" changed the bureaucratic structure.

<sup>94</sup> Robert LaPorte, Jr., and Muntazar Bashir Ahmed, *Public Enterprise in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1989).

<sup>95</sup> Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: A Political Autobiography* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), p. 74.

for bringing about economic change, relying mostly on its own understanding of what was needed for promoting human welfare. Working under the PPP, the civil servants had to reorient their thinking and to allow political objectives to be factored into their developmental work. Before Bhutto, the bureaucracy was able to design and implement a model of development that was considered to be universally applicable—as is further discussed later in this chapter. Now the local leaders wanted the civil servants to serve their micro-political interests, which might or might not conform to the larger goals of the central administration. This profound change occurred before the PPP as a political party had the time and the opportunity to develop its own network to which its constituents could have ready access. Consequently, the people lost in the bureaucracy a conduit they had used to convey their aspirations as well as their frustrations to the central authority. The civil service's role as an intermediary was not fully replaced by the PPP working as a channel of communication.

The displacement of the civil service structure by an underdeveloped political institution had other consequences as well. Pakistan's powerful bureaucracy, in particular the elitist Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), was not prepared to surrender readily the role it had carved for itself in the period after independence in 1947. Having been left alone for nearly a quarter century to look after the economic and social welfare of the hundreds of communities its officers were responsible for, it was not able to accept willingly the change that was being forced on it. This reluctance on the part of the CSP to accept political masters at the community level no doubt contributed to Bhutto's decision to dissolve the civil service in 1973.

The politicization of economic decision making at the local level arrested the momentum of development that had produced an impressive amount of economic change in rural Pakistan since the advent of the green revolution in Punjab in 1967. It also brought the large landlords back to political power—an ironic development under a socialist regime. Commercialization of agriculture in Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province in the 1960s had made middle farmers important players in the economies of the two provinces. Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracies had aided the process of commercialization and rewarded the middle farmers by giving them political recognition. The PPP, by enrolling large landlords and by disbanding the local councils that formed part of the Basic Democracies system, moved political power back to the landed aristocracy.

When Bhutto fell from power it was obvious that the direction his administration had taken could not be maintained. The economic nightmare that had brought people to the streets of Karachi and other major cities had to be brought to an end. The economic situation needed urgent attention, and the new soldier-politicians under Zia did what politicians had always done in Pakistan when faced with crises. They turned to the civil bureaucracy. The new managers, called in by General Zia ul-Haq to change the course of the economy, quickly dispensed with Bhutto's socialism and his style of economic



management. They and their predecessors had begun to develop the bureaucratic model of economic management in 1947, the year of Pakistan's birth. The model matured during Pakistan's first long military period (1958-71). Invited by Zia ul-Haq to return as economic decision makers, the civil servants reapplied this model and reverted Pakistan basically to the style of management that had been practiced in the 1960s under Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.

### **Bureaucratic Control Over Economic Policy Making**

The emergence of the state's non-interventionist economic policy was the consequence of poor political development, and, even after four decades of independence, the state's political apparatus remains underdeveloped. The process of political development suffered an early setback in Pakistan because the political party that led the movement for the creation of Pakistan was not well equipped to govern the new country. The task of creating an independent Muslim state for the Muslim population of British India was entrusted to the All India Muslim League at the annual session held in Lahore on March 23, 1940. The League's impressive performance in the provincial elections of 1946 reconfirmed that mandate. With the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the League's mission had been accomplished; with no new mandate available to it from the people, it simply collapsed under the weight of its several factions. In August 1947, after the successful campaign for the creation of Pakistan, the All India Muslim League was rechristened the All Pakistan Muslim League. With this change in name the League seems to have lost its mandate and its influence over the people of Pakistan. It can be argued that the League might have survived the creation of Pakistan had it gone quickly to the people to renew its legitimacy as a political organization. But the party's leaders had, at best, weak support in the regions that now constituted Pakistan. Instead of risking their political lives at the hands of the electorate, the governing elite decided to indulge in the politics of manipulation. Old governments fell and new ones were formed to accommodate the rapidly shifting sands of Pakistani politics. Into this situation of virtual chaos, the civil bureaucracy stepped forward and took firm control of the economy.

In managing the economy the civil servants developed an approach that, with some changes, persists to this day. This approach had four distinct features. In keeping with their training, the civil servants took no interest in long term planning. They dealt with the economy as they had handled law and order problems during the period of the British raj: crises were solved as they appeared; long-term solutions were only applied when, in the eyes of the civil servants, the crisis warranted such a handling. Applying this approach to economic management, the civil service scored a number of early successes. They were able to accommodate millions of refugees who had poured into urban Pakistan by quickly distributing to them the properties left by the emigrating

Hindus and Sikhs.<sup>96</sup> Within months of the unanticipated havoc that accompanied the partition of British India, Pakistan once again had a functioning urban economy. Similarly, the shock waves generated by the Indian decision in 1949 to stop trade with Pakistan were handled by the civil servants by reinstating the import controls and consumer rationing that they had used during the days of World War II. At the same time, private entrepreneurs—mostly traders who had profited from the commerce associated with British India's war effort—were invited to set up consumer industries in Karachi's Sindhi Industrial and Trading Estate (SITE).

In later years the bureaucracy scored a number of other successes. For instance in 1972, following the separation of Bangladesh, the ministries of finance and commerce, under the direction of senior civil servants, were able to find new export markets for the goods and commodities that had previously been sold in Pakistan's east wing. Again in 1972, under the political direction of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's administration, the civil bureaucracy was able quickly to bring under public control large segments of the industrial sector that had hitherto been privately owned. And following the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in December 1979, the civil servants, working as district officers, helped to resettle millions of refugees who poured into Pakistan. In other words, the civil servants responded quickly, and most effectively, whenever they were called upon to handle economic crises; they had little training and even less taste for working within the framework of medium- or long-term development plans. Pakistan's distributor problems could only be addressed by such planning; the fact that they were never addressed in advance is testimony to the power the civil servants wielded over economic management.

Decentralization was the second important feature of the model of economic management and control developed and practiced by the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan. This approach was also in keeping with the training of the bureaucracy. Most civil servants who wielded power in the economic arena and helped shape the country's economic history came from the Indian Civil Service (ICS) or the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the successor to the ICS in Pakistan. The members of these services had been trained to act on their own within the loose administrative framework the British had developed in India and that Pakistan adopted for its own use following independence. With poor communication of all kinds—poor roads and even poorer telecommunications—it made sense for the British government in Delhi and in the provincial headquarters to leave their trusted field representatives to their own devices. The field officers were required to perform three tasks—maintain law and order, handle crises of all kinds, and collect taxes to pay for government expenditure. "India was a poor country which could not afford luxuries and a district officer had to concentrate on

---

<sup>96</sup> For a full description of the economic crises Pakistan has faced in its forty years, how they were handled by the bureaucracy and what was the long-term impact of this handling on the economy, see Shahid Javed Burki, "Bureaucracy, Politicians and Economic Development," in William James and Suby Roy (eds) *Pakistan's Economic Development* (New York: Sage Publications, forthcoming).

essentials—public order, the swift administration of justice, the prompt payment of taxes moderately assessed, the maintenance of accurate land records which would prevent disputes. These had been the four first things."<sup>97</sup> There was little reason for the central authority to intervene in the work of the field officers. Deputy Commissioners who were put in charge of the districts constituted the centerpiece of this machinery. More often than not, this machinery worked smoothly, maintaining peace for the British raj and collecting resources to pay for its administration. The fact that the British administration in India paid for itself was the result of the enterprise and dedication of the civil service.

The needs of an independent Pakistan were necessarily different from those of a land under the colonial administration. The law and order-maintaining and revenue-generating administrative machine the British had created should have been quickly adapted to suit the circumstances of a self-governing developing country. For that to happen in Pakistan a strong political entity at the center was required to direct the powerful civil bureaucracy to apply itself in ways different from those it had used during colonial times. Such a political entity did not come into being for nearly a quarter century: not until 1971, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took command in Islamabad. In the meantime, the civil servants were left alone to reorient their approach toward governance. They recognized that the citizens expected the government to work for their economic and social improvement, not for keeping them on a tight administrative leash.

The civil service's belief in the efficacy of decentralized management was applied in two different ways to promote economic development. The civil service supported the creation of public development corporations, and it favored the grant of significant sums of money to local administrations for development purposes. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was the first such entity to be set up; its purpose was to establish industrial enterprises that required too large an investment of capital to be attractive to the private sector or that were considered risky undertakings by private entrepreneurs. The PIDC experiment was considered a success; in the 1960s, the government of Ayub Khan set up public-sector corporations to develop power and irrigation (Water and Power Development Authority, or WAPDA) and to promote investment in agriculture (Agricultural Development Corporation, or ADC).

At the same time a number of rural development programs were started by successive governments in Pakistan centered around the civil bureaucracy. The Village Agriculture and Industrial Development Program (V-AID) in the 1950s, the Rural Works Programme in East and West Pakistan in the 1960s, the Integrated Rural Development Programme (with service delivery centers, or markaz) in the 1970s, followed the same model: the local administrator, who was a member of either the Civil Service of

---

<sup>97</sup> Philip Mason, *The Men Who Ruled India* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), p. 317.

Pakistan or one of the provincial civil services, was given public funds to expend on development, which he did with some guidance from the village council that he nominated himself, as in the case of V-AID programs, or from the elected union and district councils over which he had considerable influence, as in the case of the Rural Works Programme.

The public corporation as a device for undertaking development had a mixed record in Pakistan, as in other developing countries. The developmental and distributive impact of rural development programs, however, if not negative was at best marginal. The West Pakistan Rural Works Programme, for instance, was captured by the landed aristocracy soon after its inception and made no contribution whatsoever to redistributing incomes or alleviating rural poverty.<sup>98</sup>

The third feature of the bureaucratic model was its adaptability to the whims and wishes of politicians in command. For instance, it was under political pressure that the civil bureaucracy accepted medium term economic planning as a way of setting development priorities. Ayub Khan was keen to promote economic growth and was persuaded by a number of foreign economic advisers to adopt medium-term economic planning as an important way to achieve this objective. Accordingly, a group of foreign and Pakistani economic experts were engaged to formulate a five-year development plan. The plan, the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65), was launched after Ayub Khan had been in office for less than two years. It was the first of the two development plans that were to succeed in meeting their overall goals. Growth rather than redistribution was the explicitly stated objective of the plan's program. "There exists a functional justification for inequality of income, if it raises production for all and not consumption for a few ... The road to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities," wrote Mahbub ul-Haq, then chief economist of the Planning Commission.<sup>99</sup> The second time a firm political hand took charge of economic decision making was when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president. He significantly altered the relationship between public and private sectors by nationalizing large-scale industries, commercial banks, and insurance companies, and by sharply increasing development expenditure by the public sector. A second wave of nationalizations followed in 1976, when the government took over most agro-industries. These measures were carried out in the name of socialism and for improving the economic well-being of Pakistan's poor citizenry. Instead, they contributed to worsening three of Pakistan's many distributor problems: income disparities increased in the cities; there was a widening in the economic gap between rural and urban areas; and incomes in Punjab and Sindh, Pakistan's prosperous provinces, increased much more rapidly than in the poor provinces of Northwest Frontier and Balochistan.

---

<sup>98</sup> For a discussion of the progress made by Pakistan in alleviating the worst forms of poverty see Shahid Javed Burki, "Poverty in Pakistan: Myth or Reality?" in T.N. Srinivisan and Parnab Bardhan (eds) *Poverty in South Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 69-88.

<sup>99</sup> Mahbub ul-Haq, *Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 1.

Zia ul-Haq's *coup d'état* in 1977 was the third occasion when Pakistan was in the control of a strong leader. With one difference, General Zia reintroduced the model of economic development that had been tried with some success by Ayub Khan in the early 1960s. The difference was that instead of taking personal command of the economy as Ayub Khan had done in the early years of his rule, Zia delegated all economic authority to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who began in the Zia administration as secretary general and went on to become the minister in charge of finance, planning, economic development and commerce. Ishaq, a civil servant, turned to his colleagues for help, and the civil service busied itself with correcting what in its judgment were the mistakes made by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia directed that medium-term planning, suspended during the Bhutto period, should be reinstated. This was done in 1978 and the Fifth Five Year-Plan was launched to cover the 1978-83 period. The plan's main objective was to bring the private sector back into partnership with the government to help with the country's economic growth. The private sector had been scared by Bhutto's policies of nationalization; it became active again within the framework of the fifth plan. The fifth plan was the second time that a five-year program of development succeeded in achieving most of its objectives.<sup>100</sup> Redistribution of national income in favor of the underprivileged segments of the population or toward the less developed regions of the country were not included among the plan's goals. The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88), also formulated during the Zia period, chose redistribution, poverty alleviation, and social justice as its principal objectives but these remained just that; little action was taken to achieve them.

The model of bureaucratic economic management practiced by Pakistan during most of its history helped to achieve rapid growth in gross domestic output. The civil servants were well equipped to handle crises and left to their own devices, as they were most of the time in Pakistan, they managed to handle successfully a number of problems. Had these problems remained unattended, they would have taken a heavy economic toll. Through efficient crisis management the civil service created an environment in which the economy could grow rapidly, but it eschewed long-term development planning. In that respect it differed from the military, which put greater store in planning, which is the reason why Generals Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haq instructed the civil-service-dominated Planning Commission to prepare five-year development plans.

By leaving the economy to the management of the civil bureaucracy for most of Pakistan's history, the politicians more or less ensured that the country's deep structural and distributor problems would remain unresolved. It is not that the civil servants were

---

<sup>100</sup> *The Second Five-Year Plan* (1960-65) succeeded in its objective of achieving a high rate of economic growth. The Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70) attempted to continue with the approach of the Second Plan, but its priorities had to be recast following the 1965 war with India. Following the war, defense expenditure was given precedence over expenditure on development. The Fourth Plan (1970-75) had to be abandoned following the emergence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh.

ill-disposed toward structural change or disinclined to deliver benefits of growth to the less-privileged sections of the society; it is only that the bureaucracy was neither well equipped nor trained to concern itself with the problem of distribution. Accordingly, all the major distributor and structural problems faced by Pakistan remained largely unattended because the instruments of redistribution deployed were not designed specifically to address these crises.

Finally, the civil servants were not able to mobilize domestic resources for development. Resource mobilization involves political engineering; interest groups have to be persuaded to yield a proportion of their income in return for rewards in the future. During most of its history Pakistan has been a quasi-democratic society in which the interests of powerful groups could not be ignored. Even under military leaders, hard economic decisions that would have resulted in hurting powerful interests were not taken. For instance, Ayub Khan was able to introduce only a minor redistribution of land under the land reforms of 1959; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while drafting the Constitution of 1973, had to exclude income from agricultural activities as a source for government revenues; and Zia ul-Haq was not prepared to strengthen the tax administration in the-fear that such a step would alienate the powerful commercial class. It is not surprising, therefore, that in managing development, the civil service turned to loans from foreign countries, which were available in large amounts most of the time. The most obvious consequence of this excessive reliance on foreign capital for financing development was the buildup in the burden of debt carried by the economy. By the time Zia left office, this burden had become uncomfortably large.

These features of the bureaucratic model of economic management—absence of long-term planning, decentralization, adaptability to leadership and inability to mobilize domestic resources—were very much in evidence during the Zia period. The civil servants once again showed their remarkable capacity to manage crises—for instance, they not only successfully settled millions of Afghan refugees that arrived in the country following the Soviet invasion but also organized the machinery to move more than 2 million tons of imported wheat from Karachi to the interior when Pakistan suffered a sharp decline in its grain output in 1978-79. While not in favor of medium-term planning, they formulated the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978-88) in order to provide substance to the military's wish for a more important role for the private sector. They used their network of field officers to implement a series of rural development programs launched during the Zia period. And they relied heavily on external resources for financing development.

### **Economic Management Under Zia**

Zia came to political power considerably less well equipped to deal with economic issues than Generals Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Ayub Khan had spent more than four years before assuming power worrying about Pakistan's deteriorating economic

situation. When he declared martial law in October 1958, he already had with him a blueprint for the structural changes that he wanted introduced in the management of the economy. Yahya Khan was a close associate of Ayub Khan's before and after the latter became Pakistan's paramount political leader. He had helped Ayub Khan reach decisions on a number of issues, including the transfer of the country's capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi-Islamabad. In March 1969, when Ayub Khan was asked to hand over power to the military, Yahya Khan, the new soldier-president, had a reasonable amount of working knowledge of the way the government and the economic systems worked. In July 1977, when Zia moved in to take command of Pakistan, he had had no experience of work outside the military. It was this lack of nonmilitary experience that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appeared to have found attractive about Zia ul-Haq. "The civilian government must not seem to be imposing their will on the military," Bhutto told Benazir to explain why he had chosen Zia to lead the army. "Zia may not be among the most senior officers, but the men in the army seem to like him."<sup>101</sup> In July 1977, a soldier's soldier was assuming political power and he turned to the civil servants and looked within the civilian bureaucracy to the man he knew the best, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, to manage the economy. But Ishaq Khan had to wait for a while before he became the country's "economic czar". He had to share power initially with a number of people appointed by Zia to his first team of advisers. Thus General (retired) Habibullah Khan was brought in to help restore the confidence of the private sector in the economy. He was an interesting choice to deliver that message. Habibullah was a rising star in the ranks of the army when Ayub Khan became president. Ayub Khan's son, Gauhar, was married to Habibullah Khan's daughter, and Ayub Khan seemed initially to have groomed Habibullah Khan as a successor. In 1959, Habibullah was appointed to a senior position in the general headquarters of the army but chose retirement when, in 1962, Ayub Khan chose General Muhammad Musa to head the armed forces. Upon leaving the army, Habibullah Khan invested his family's not inconsiderable wealth in industry. He first set up a cotton spinning mill in Kohat, a town in his native Northwest Frontier Province. Later, joining hands with Gauhar Ayub, his son-in-law, he purchased an automobile assembly plant from the General Motors. Gandhara Motors became one of the most successful privately owned industrial enterprises in Pakistan during the Ayub period leading to the widespread impression that it had been favored by the government in all manner of extra-legal ways. In January 1972, soon after becoming president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto chose Habibullah Khan and Gandhara Motors as the symbols of the type of economic order he was planning for Pakistan. Habibullah was arrested on several charges of corruption and paraded, handcuffed, on television. Gandhara Motors was one of the thirty-one large industries the new government nationalized in early 1972. It became the centerpiece of the Automobile Corporation of Pakistan, one of the several public-sector enterprises set up during the Bhutto period to manage large-scale industry.

---

<sup>101</sup> Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography*, p. 68.

By accepting a position as industry adviser in the first Zia "cabinet," Habibullah Khan became a symbol of state policy for the second time. His inclusion was supposed to demonstrate to the demoralized industrial entrepreneurs that the new military government planned to use the private sector as a driving force for the economy. Formerly under Bhutto the model directing the behavior of state enterprises and the workers employed by them was carried over from high socialism. The enterprise managers believed that although they might be chastised for poor decisions and losses, the state would absorb the deficits. Not only large state enterprises considered themselves immortal but also those that drew a large proportion of their initial capital from public-sector banks and development finance companies. For a vast majority of the workers employed by these firms, lifetime tenure was almost guaranteed by the labor legislation introduced by the Bhutto administration. The Zia government wished to reverse these tendencies and it turned to Habibullah Khan to begin the process of reform.

Another selection for an economic position in the first cabinet was Mustapha Gokal, and he was brought in to deliver another kind of message. The disinvestment of the private sector that had occurred during the Bhutto period had resulted not only in the flight of capital from Pakistan to the Western world but also in the relocation of a large number of industrial families away from Pakistan. The Zia government was anxious to attract the capital that had flown out of the country as well as to bring back the entrepreneurs who had left Pakistan. Gokal, brought in to help with this process, was a good candidate for this job. Gokal's family was Sindhi; his father had migrated to Baghdad, Iraq, and had founded a successful trading company there. Rice from Pakistan was one of the main commodities imported by the company. The elder Gokal was a victim of the socialist revolution in Iraq in 1958; he was arrested and executed by the socialist regime that overthrew and killed King Faisal. His three sons fled the country and relocated themselves in London and Geneva where they recreated their business. By the time Zia came to power, the Gokal brothers presided over a multi-million dollar empire, which included not only commerce in commodities but also shipping. Mustapha, the oldest of the three Gokal brothers, was persuaded by General Zia to return to Pakistan ahead of other Pakistani industrialists and traders who had created successful businesses in the West. Mustapha Gokal was assigned the portfolios of commerce and shipping in the first Zia cabinet.

For several months after Zia's *coup d'état* against the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the civil bureaucracy had to share economic decision-making - authority with such outsiders as General Habibullah and Mustapha Gokal. This proved to be an unstable arrangement; Habibullah Khan and Mustapha Gokal wanted a complete return to the situation that had prevailed under Ayub Khan. They wanted denationalization of the enterprises taken over by the administration of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; they wished to see the state control removed from commerce, both internal and external, in commodities such as cotton and rice; they were in favor of returning to the



private sector the banks and other financial institutions nationalized by Bhutto. In sum, they wanted the state to climb down from the position it had taken on the commanding heights of the economy and resume its role as a facilitator for private initiative. The civil bureaucracy was not in a great hurry to dismantle the structure erected by the PPP under Bhutto.<sup>102</sup> However, it had to consolidate its control over the economic decision making process before it could successfully challenge Habibullah Khan and Mustapha Gokal. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as Zia's appointed economic authority and member of the civil service, made some important appointments to strengthen his hand. He brought Vaseem Jaffrey into the Planning Commission and Aftab Ahmad Khan into the Ministry of Finance. A.G.N. Kazi stayed on at the State Bank. Jaffrey, Khan, and Kazi were highly experienced and well-respected civil servants who were to remain in important economic decision-making positions throughout the Zia period. In May 1979, Zia dissolved his council of advisers and replaced it with a cabinet in which Ghulam Ishaq Khan was given the responsibility for all economic portfolios. Habibullah Khan and Mustapha Gokal were not included in the cabinet; both returned to their businesses, disappointed at having failed to persuade Zia to bring about major structural changes in the economy.

### **Economic Performance of the Zia Regime: Successes and Failures**

In the minds of Ghulam Ishaq Khan and his civil service associates, the loss of confidence in the health of the economy by two important groups—Pakistan's industrial class and Pakistan's external lenders—was by far the most important economic crisis faced by the country. With an extremely low domestic savings rate, Pakistan could not afford the disaffection of either the industrial entrepreneurial class or the lending community. Both groups had been important in providing the funds needed by the economy for investment. Accordingly, when General Zia ul-Haq persuaded the civil servants to return to planning, they made regaining the confidence of the entrepreneurial class their principal objective. The Fifth Five-Year Plan was formulated quickly; it was announced in June 1978, less than a year after political control had passed back to the armed forces. The plan was to cover the 1978-83 five-year period; its objectives were reminiscent of those of the Second Five-Year Plan, adopted by the government of Ayub Khan in 1960. "The broad objectives of the industrial strategy in the Fifth Plan are commendable," wrote the World Bank in 1979. "Perhaps the major factor in a sustained revival of private investment—and thus a major consideration in achieving a number of the major Plan goals for industry—is a revival of business

---

<sup>102</sup> I witnessed this debate firsthand in the spring of 1978 when, invited by the new government, I visited Pakistan with Parvez Hasan, another World Bank economist and coauthored a paper on the reform of the Pakistani economic structure. Before writing the paper we interviewed, among others, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Habibullah Khan, Mustapha Gokal, Aftab G.N. Kazi and Vaseem Jaffrey. We presented our conclusions to General Zia ul-Haq in a meeting held in Rawalpindi on March 20, 1978. The meeting was attended by Ishaq Khan and A.G.N. Kazi.

confidence. This is a complex issue, tied to the country's political stability and political future ..."<sup>103</sup>

As was the case with their predecessors in the administration of President Ayub Khan, the framers of the fifth plan did not plan to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth and income. Although the plan was conceived as a "comprehensive national effort to overcome economic difficulties and correct the insufficient spread and quality of social services,"<sup>104</sup> it did not suggest policies or provide an adequate amount of resources for the realization of this objective. This approach was in keeping with the model of bureaucratic management of the economy that was being practiced once again. Successful long-term planning must include the adoption of goals supported by a broad consensus among different segments and sectors of the society. Realization of these goals implies the adoption of redistributor policies that aim to move resources from the static to the more dynamic sectors of the economy, or from the more prosperous to the less prosperous segments of the population. As in earlier times, the civil service during the Zia period was ill equipped to define long-term economic and social objectives or to generate resources for achieving them. These responsibilities could only be handled by the decision makers who had the political mandate to be so concerned. Accordingly, in the Zia period, as in the period of General Ayub Khan, the government did not concern itself *directly* with redistributor policies.

In aggregate terms the economy performed well during the Zia period. This performance was all the more impressive in light of the inhospitable global economic environment faced by Pakistan and other developing countries during much of this period. The early years of the Zia period coincided with a severe recession in the global economy that left a deep impression on the economies of the third world. The recession affected third-world economies in three different ways: There was a marked deterioration in developing countries terms of trade with industrial countries. There was a significant reduction in developing countries' exports to industrial nations. And there was only a slight increase in the flow of concessional funds from industrial to developing countries. These adverse developments reduced the rate of growth of gross domestic product of most third-world countries. From 1980 to 1984, combined gross domestic product of developing countries increased at the rate of only 3.0 percent a year, a shade above the 2.3 percent increase in their combined population. Pakistan seems not to have been affected by the global economic downturn of the early 1980s, and its economy benefited from the sharp expansion in world trade that accompanied the recovery of the economies of industrial countries.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his party had made a strong political commitment at the time of the National Assembly elections in December 1970 to alleviate poverty and improve

---

<sup>103</sup> The World Bank, *Pakistan Economic Developments and Fifth Plan Review*, p. 50.

<sup>104</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Economic Survey 1977-78* (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 1978), p. 2.

income distribution. These promises were not fulfilled, and when Zia assumed power he had also to contend with this legacy of the Bhutto period. However, Zia reverted to the bureaucratic management of the economy, and the bureaucracy was not well equipped to handle this. If the worst forms of poverty were alleviated and if income distribution improved during the Zia period, it was not because of deliberate government policy. It was the consequence of the large amount of capital that came into Pakistan from the workers who had gone to the Middle East. (See Table 3 for the contribution made by the workers' remittances to capital flows into Pakistan.)

The Zia period also saw a significant improvement in economic welfare. Although data on income distribution are not available for this period, some secondary evidence suggests considerable benefits accruing to the less-privileged segments of the population. For instance, the wages of skilled workers in the large urban centers increased by 3 to 4 percent in real terms while those of unskilled workers may have increased by as much as 18 percent. There was also some narrowing of the wage differentials between different parts of the urban economy. Wages of the unskilled workers in Lahore in 1977 were 72 percent of those in Karachi. Ten years later, in 1987, wages in Lahore were 85 percent of the Karachi wages. This change represented a narrowing of differential equivalent to 13 percentage points between two major industrial centers of the country. Although in the absence of reliable household and expenditure data it may be premature to come to a judgment, it appears that income distribution during the Zia period may have improved significantly.

That economic change during the Zia period helped improve income distribution is a conclusion also supported by statistics on the consumption of some basic goods. For instance, per capita milk consumption in the ten-year period between 1977 and 1987 increased by 6 percent, from 117 kg per capita per year to 124 kg. Consumption of beef increased by 20 percent, from 5 to 6 kg per person in the population. Domestic availability of cloth per capita improved by over 5 percent during this ten year-period.

The bureaucracy's handling of Zia's wish to Islamize the economy can also be counted as a success. The most important change made in this respect was the introduction of *zakat* and *ushr*, two forms of wealth taxes that aimed to produce a better distribution of income. In promoting Islamization and thus falling in line with one of General Zia ul-Haq's major objectives, the civil service was running true to form. The bureaucratic model of economic management allowed civil servants to absorb the objectives of a powerful political authority whenever one emerged on the scene. In keeping with this approach, the civil bureaucracy had implemented rural development programs under Ayub Khan, and under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it had implemented the program of nationalization of industrial and financial assets. Under President Zia ul-Haq, the administration put together a program for Islamizing the economy.

Workers' Remittances, 1976/77 to 1989/90 (as percent of capital imports)			
Year	Remittances (\$ million)	Total Capital Imports (\$ million)	Remittances as Percent of Imports
1976/77	578	2325	24.9
1977/78	1156	2810	41.1
1978/79	1398	3676	38.0
1979/80	1748	4740	36.9
1980/81	2097	5409	38.8
1981/82	2225	5622	40.0
1982/83	2886	5357	53.9
1983/84	2737	5685	48.1
1984/85	2446	5906	41.4
1985/86	2596	5634	46.1
1986/87	2278	5380	42.3
1987/88	2013	6391	31.4
1988/89	1987	7034	28.2
1989/90	1999*	6801	29.4
*estimate			
<b>Source:</b> From data supplied by the State Bank of Pakistan, 1990.			

The Islamization program promoted by Zia but implemented by the civil bureaucracy had two important features. It incorporated a "profit and loss sharing" scheme in commercial banking to replace *riba* (usury), forbidden by Islam.<sup>105</sup> And it included the introduction of such Islamic taxes as *zakat* and *ushr*. The program did not, however, encompass land redistribution although "the Shari'ah courts have upheld previous land reform and nationalization measures under the governments of Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto, citing in their decisions Islamic teaching that all land belongs to God and that the right of private property is limited by the demands of social justice."<sup>106</sup>

The Islamization of the financial system was carried out not only for "eliminating that which is forbidden and establishing that which is enjoined by Islam."<sup>107</sup> To the government of President Zia ul-Haq, it was also clear that such a system by its very nature could bring about a better distribution of assets and income and thus address the

<sup>105</sup> Shahrukh Shafi Khan, *Profits and Loss Sharing: An Islamic Experience in Finance and Banking* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

<sup>106</sup> John Z. Espcisto, "Islam in Ideology and Politics in Pakistan," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Wienbr (eds) *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 121-139.

<sup>107</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Economic Survey 1984-85* (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance,, 1985), p. 52.

problem of persistent poverty. But the results were modest. A government report issued in 1985 estimated that the funds generated by *zakat* and *ushr* were providing Rs. 330 a year for every household that benefited (about \$34 at the rate of exchange prevailing at that time). About 2.71 million households, or 10 percent of the total, received this stipend.<sup>108</sup>

These positive indicators of economic performance, however, hide a number of negative developments that occurred during the Zia period. For instance, Pakistan's dependence on loans from foreign banks increased considerably while the already low rate of domestic savings declined even further. Pakistan ended the Zia period with public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt of over \$16 billion, equivalent to nearly one-half of its gross domestic product and two and one-half times the total value of exports. Reliance on short-term debt increased; in 1987, there were \$2.3 billion in outstanding short-term obligations. Debt servicing was more than one-sixth the value of exports of goods and services. The terms on which these loans were being secured deteriorated considerably: in 1970, average maturity of outstanding debt was 32 years; in 1987, this had declined to 28 years. The period of grace allowed by foreign creditors also decreased: from 12 to 8 years between 1970 and 1986. Average interest carried by outstanding debt increased nearly two-fold, from 2.3 to 5.8 percent a year.<sup>109</sup> In the fall of 1988, Pakistan's external reserves could finance less than one month's worth of imports.

This sharp increase in borrowing (on increasingly hard terms) compensated for the decline in the domestic savings rate. From 1973 to 1980, gross national savings in Pakistan averaged only 6.4 percent of the gross national product. The average for 1980-86 declined by 18 percent, to only 4.6 percent. Because gross domestic investment was maintained at 17.5 percent of the gross national income, the gap had to be met by capital flows from the outside.<sup>110</sup> The impressive performance of the economy, therefore, may have been obtained at a high, long-term cost. It was this feature of the economic situation that persuaded Finance Minister Mahbub ul-Haq to declare in his budget speech, delivered on TV in the absence of the national assembly on June 8, 1988, that he was dealing with a bankruptcy situation.

In spite of the significant increases in national and per capita incomes and in spite of the indication that the people in 1988 were generally better off than in 1977, there does not seem to have been a significant improvement in social development. Life expectancy at birth in 1986 was estimated at 52 years, 5 years less than in India and 16 years less than in China. Both India and China had a lower per capita income than Pakistan. The relatively low life expectancy was due to high mortality rates for infants and mothers

---

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>109</sup> The World Bank, *World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, Vol. II: Country Tables, 1989*, pp. 290-293.

<sup>110</sup> The World Bank, *World Development Report 1988* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 193.

during and after childbirth. In 1986, Pakistan lost 111 infants within the first year of birth out of every 1,000 that were born alive. Infant mortality rates in India and China were estimated at 86 and 34 per 1,000 respectively. In 1987, 600 mothers died for every 100,000 live births compared to 500 in India and only 44 in China. Educational statistics also point to a low level of social development. In 1986, only 44 percent of the children were attending primary school compared to 92 percent in India and 129 percent in China.<sup>111</sup> As in the area of health, educational statistics also point to the very low social status of women in Pakistan. Only 32 percent of the girls were attending schools in 1986 compared to 55 percent for boys (and the enrollment rate for boys had declined from 59 to 55 percent).<sup>112</sup>

This brief overview of economic performance during the Zia period perhaps points to two contradictory conclusions. Using the data and information provided above, it is possible to argue that during the 1977-88 period Pakistan produced an enviable economic record: its GNP and income per capita grew at rates significantly higher than the average for the developing world. It also appears that the benefits of this growth were distributed widely among the people. In fact, during the Zia period Pakistan may have finally graduated into the ranks of middle-income countries and may have succeeded in banishing the worst forms of poverty from its society. The country's economic structure at the time of Zia's death had more in common with middle-income countries than with poor nations.

The other conclusion that could be reached would suggest that the remarkable performance of the economy may have been secured at a high cost and may not be sustained over the long run. The ability to generate domestic savings to pay for only a third of the total investment has produced a debt that will have to be serviced at the cost of future domestic capital formation. Also, data implying that growth had an impressive impact on redistribution of income hide the low social status of Pakistani women.<sup>113</sup> The improvement in the situation of the poor and in income distribution may prove to be a temporary one, subject to a complete reversal in the not-too-distant future. Both conclusions point to the vulnerability of the present situation. Pakistan's economy fared well during the Zia period and large segments of the population benefitted from the developments that took place during this time. That notwithstanding, a number of structural weaknesses were not addressed, exacerbating the economy's vulnerability. These included excessive dependence on foreign loans, inability to put into place programs that would address the problems faced by the more underprivileged

---

<sup>111</sup> An enrollment rate of more than 100 percent implies that children who did not attend school while they were of "primary school going age" are now enrolled in primary schools.

<sup>112</sup> The World Bank, World Development Report 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), World Development Report Indicator.

<sup>113</sup> For an in-depth analysis of the economic and social status of Pakistani women see Ann Duncan et. al., *Women in Pakistan: An Economic and Social Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990).

segments of the society, and the willingness to allow widespread economic and social discrimination against women.

An attempt was made by Mahbub ul-Haq to break away from the bureaucratic model of management when he was reappointed finance minister in June 1988 after the dismissal of the Junejo government and the dissolution of the National Assembly. But Haq was a technocrat; he needed a political framework within which to institute his program of fiscal reform, which had a high redistributive content. Such a framework did not exist within the bureaucracy dominating economic policy making and the politicians were unable to make the necessary difficult decisions.

### **General Zia ul-Haq's Economic Legacy**

General Zia ul-Haq's personal influence on Pakistan's economic history was marginal at best. In that respect he was different from Pakistan's other major political figures, President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ayub Khan's legacy was a robust economy in which commercial agriculture became its most dynamic part; Prime Minister Bhutto significantly expanded the role of the state in economic management. Both influences continue to be felt to this day. Commercial agriculture remains the dominant influence on the Pakistan economy, and state ownership of industrial and financial assets continues to be an important feature of the economic landscape. Islamization of some parts of the economy is perhaps the only longterm legacy with which General Zia ul-Haq will remain associated.

That notwithstanding, it was during the period of General Zia ul-Haq that the bureaucratic model of economic management may have reached the stage beyond which it would not be able to extend itself. It seems doubtful whether Pakistan's economic problems can be handled any longer with the tools most often employed by the bureaucrats who were called upon to manage the economy: short-term crisis management and long term dependence on foreign loans. The economy is now faced with a number of critical shortages and bottlenecks—electric power outages and crowded roads and highways have begun to take a heavy economic toll. These obstacles will not be removed by short-term crisis management; they will need large amounts of capital investment that, to be made efficiently, will need long-term planning. Moreover, Pakistan may have finally run out of external sources from which to obtain an ever-increasing amount of capital flow. The country's external environment is likely to become less favorable over time in terms of its ability to obtain transfers of foreign resources. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan now makes Pakistan a less attractive candidate for aid from the United States. In fact a number of important U.S. congressmen have already indicated that they would like to move aid money from Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines to East Europe. Continuing economic difficulties in the Middle East already affect the amount of remittances being received by the country from its workers. In other words, Pakistan will need to rely

increasingly on its own resources. This is now greatly exacerbated by the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.

This recognition dawned upon the "caretaker" government sworn into office by General Zia ul-Haq following the dismissal of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo on May 29, 1988. Mahbub ul-Haq, the finance minister in the caretaker administration, proposed a significant restructuring of the government's financing and the country's fiscal structure in order to reduce Pakistan's dependence on external resources. The proposals met with a storm of protest from a number of powerful economic constituencies. Haq had clearly gone into the territory reserved for politicians. He did not have a political consensus to support his proposed measures; he was, after all, a caretaker finance minister. Most of Haq's proposals were not implemented.

Pakistan is also vulnerable on one additional count; its ability to sustain the progress it has made in alleviating the worst forms of poverty. It was the flow of remittances rather than the government's distributor policies that brought about an alleviation of poverty. But with remittances declining, population continuing to increase, and the government without a viable distributor program, the progress made by Pakistan in the 1975-85 decade could be reversed. That the poor and the not-so-poor may fear such an outcome may explain the impressive electoral performance of the Pakistan People's Party in the election of November 1988. The PPP triumphed in the economically more vulnerable areas of Sindh, North Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province.

Pakistan, therefore, stands at an important crossroads; the model of economic management that has brought it to a comfortable stage of development may no longer be able to sustain the former pace of growth and development. This model certainly does not have the capacity to sustain the improvements in income distribution that occurred over the last decade. With the country faced with a less hospitable external economic environment, Pakistan's new economic managers will have to call domestic resources into play to improve the welfare of the underprivileged sections of the society. There is no precedent in Pakistan's history of this type of redistribution having occurred successfully. It is not unknown for countries to slip backward from the ranks of middle-income countries and to experience a significant increase in the incidence of poverty. This reversal has occurred in Africa—for instance in Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria—and it may happen in Pakistan if a political solution cannot be found for its economic problems.



## Administrative Restructuring During the Zia Period

### Robert LaPorte, Jr.

General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq ruled Pakistan longer than any of his predecessors.<sup>114</sup> In the course of his eleven year, rule, the politics, economy, and society of Pakistan were transformed considerably. Demographic changes account for some of the alterations in the economy and society. Changes in the attitudes and expectations of Pakistanis toward government and the role it should play in the society and economy were also responsible in part. But Zia's role is undeniable.<sup>115</sup>

Unlike General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958-69), General Zia did not have a preformulated plan to change the political system of Pakistan when he took power. Rather, Zia's "plan" took the form of proclamations and public statements, subject to change, regarding problems confronting the country. His approach to government appeared to be *ad hoc*; he responded to issues rather than following a preconceived plan. The changes he undertook regarding the administrative system took the form of modifications of changes adopted during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto period (1971-77).

General Zia's decision-making style might best be described as problem avoidance. He tried to avoid the mistakes made by his predecessors. The way he dealt with the institution that brought him to power, the military, is a good example of his approach. Unlike General Ayub, who relinquished the position of commander-in-chief, Zia continued to hold the position of chief of staff of the Pakistani army. His instructions to key civil servants who participated in his regime were to avoid decisions, whenever possible, that would lead to confrontation that would undermine his support base. He was able to reverse decisions he had taken if the decision generated political confrontation that he considered would be threatening to his regime. When he imposed *zakat*, he exempted the Shi'a community after hearing complaints from prominent members of this community. This ability to remove his ego from the decision making process and reverse a decision was one of the reasons why he stayed in office as long as he did.

---

<sup>114</sup> He outlasted Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (October 27, 1958 - March 25, 1969) by about eight and one-half months. Some may argue that Zia shared power with Muhammad Khan Junejo from 1986 to 1988, and this argument has some basis in fact, but Zia amended the 1973 constitution to maintain control over the National Assembly and the prime minister.

<sup>115</sup> See: Craig Baxter (ed.), *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State*, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985; and Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-78," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 1988), pp. 108-110.

This chapter focuses on Zia's efforts to restructure the administrative system of Pakistan. Given the important role that government plays in Pakistan, the term "administrative system" in its broadest context includes the entire government apparatus, from policy making through implementation of government-sponsored programs, and includes institutions (ministries, departments, and public enterprises), levels of government (the center, provinces, divisions, districts, and local bodies), those employed by government departments and public enterprises, and those affected by government decisions and actions. To analyze the impact of the Zia regime on the administrative system, we will begin by examining Zia's frame of reference, namely the changes in the administrative system introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This period is important for understanding what Zia did, because the changes made by Bhutto were seen by Zia as abuses of state institutions and the misuse of power. For example, in the accountability process that Zia initiated after the July 1977 coup, Bhutto's reform of the civil service was interpreted as the mistreatment of state institutions. The analysis of Bhutto's changes in the administrative system will be followed by an examination of Zia's modifications and the administrative system that Zia left behind. Finally, we will discuss the implications of Zia's changes in the administrative system for successive governments in Pakistan.

### **Zia's Frame of Reference: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Restructuring of the Administrative System**

Bhutto's disdain and distrust of Pakistan's "steel frame" (its elite Civil Service of Pakistan, or CSP) was well known and long standing before he assumed power on December 20, 1971. From his days as minister of commerce under Ayub, Bhutto saw the Civil Service of Pakistan as a threat to his exercise of power. His experiences in dealing with CSP officers were very unsatisfactory.

#### ***Dismissal of Civil Servants***

Bhutto began to make changes in the civil service almost immediately after assuming power from General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan in December 1971. His first target was existing government personnel. According to Volume II of the *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, the Bhutto government summarily dismissed about two thousand civil servants on March 12, 1972.<sup>116</sup> This was not the first time that a new government in Pakistan dismissed civil servants—both Ayub and Yahya did so—but the number of civil officers dismissed was much larger under Bhutto.

---

<sup>116</sup> See Government of Pakistan, "Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions," in *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. II*, Rawalpindi, 1979, pp. 120-32. Bhutto used Martial Law Regulation 114, called the "Removal from Service (Special Provisions)" Regulation, to remove them. An additional one hundred senior civil servants were removed in October 1976. See *Ibid.*, pp. 139-43.

### *Changes in Policy and Decision-Making Processes*

The power of the civil service in its policy- and decision-making role, and autonomy were the second and third targets of the Bhutto government. He dismantled Ayub's economic development policy-planning and decision-making process (which had been vested in the federal Planning Commission that Ayub chaired) and replaced it with planning and decisions emanating directly from the office of the prime minister. In this regard, directives from the prime minister replaced resource-allocation decisions based on multi-year planning made by technocrats in the Planning Commission.

By personalizing the policy- and decision-making process (and removing civil servants and technocrats from the process), Bhutto politicized the process and made his own imprint on government activities. The high visibility that Bhutto achieved by the changes he made in the policy- and decision-making process was a two-edged sword. Following the advice of what some scholars have labeled the ultra-left wing of the Pakistan People's Party, (PPP), Bhutto suffered losses in political support such as the one which occurred after the nationalization of the vegetable oil industry in 1973.<sup>117</sup>

### *Reforms in the Civil Service*

The job security of the civil servants and the monopoly of the CSP regarding key government positions were Bhutto's fourth and fifth targets. Here, Bhutto played on the anti-CSP sentiment that had developed in the country.<sup>118</sup> Although the interim constitution adopted in 1972 continued the constitutional guarantees to civil servants that were contained in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, the 1973 constitution did not contain these guarantees. Instead of continuing past practices, the Bhutto government

---

<sup>117</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, p. 117. Burki states: "For a number of reasons, the nationalisation of the vegetable oil industry was an important development. Whereas the January [1973] takeover mainly hurt the 'twenty-two families'; a good proportion of the cooking oil industry was owned by small and middle-sized entrepreneurs. Some of these people had been active PPP supporters and many others belonged to social groups that were favourably disposed towards the party. The government's encroachment into this industry, therefore, was resented by its own constituency."

<sup>118</sup> An example of this sentiment is found in the following statement: "Apart from being unequal, authoritarian and unscientific and an instrument of colonial rule, the administrative system of Pakistan has doggedly defied the winds of change and in the process has earned a nation-wide disgust and dislike. It has blighted creative and professional talent everywhere and has vitiated the educational system. It has hindered the founding and flowering of democracy and people's sovereignty."

"Nazim", Babus, Brahmins, and Bureaucrats: A Critique of an Administrative System in Pakistan, Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1973, preface. Cited in Lawrence Ziring, "*Administrative Reforms*," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 12 (December 1984), p. 1087. "Nazim" is a pseudonym for Hassan Habib who served as principal of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College and the Academy for Administrative Training (the name Bhutto gave to the Civil Service Academy after he moved it from the Mall in Lahore to Walden outside Lahore). Habib was a member of the Provincial Civil Service (PCS) and was involved in the Bhutto reform effort.

reformed the civil service.<sup>119</sup> In an address to the nation, Bhutto announced the implementation of a series of reforms in civil service.<sup>120</sup> These included:

- (a) All the services and cadres will be merged into a unified grading structure with equality of opportunity for all who entered the service at any stage based on the required professional and specialized competence necessary for the job.
- (b) All "classes" among Government servants will be abolished and similarly replaced by a unified grading structure, a peon or equivalent at the bottom, a Secretary or Departmental Head at the top. The existing classification of the services into Class I to Class IV will no longer operate. The road to the top will be open to all on merit.
- (c) The use of "service" labels will be discontinued forthwith.
- (d) The Unified Structure will enable promotions to the highest posts throughout the range of public service for horizontal movements from one cadre to another including the movement of technical personnel to the cadre of general management. There will also be scope for out of turn promotion to exceptionally able officers.
- (e) The correct grading of each post will be determined by job evaluation.
- (f) There will be provision for entry into Government service for the talented individuals from the private sector in fields such as banking, insurance, industry and trade.

These changes were based on the work of the Administrative Reforms Committee appointed by Prime Minister Bhutto and chaired by Khurshid Hasan Meer,<sup>121</sup> minister without portfolio, and were incorporated in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1973.

---

<sup>119</sup> For a contemporary analysis of the Bhutto reforms, see Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Civil Bureaucracy—Twenty-Five Years of Power and Influence," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 12 (December 1974), pp. 1094-1103; and Lawrence Ziring, "Administrative Reforms," pp. 1086-1093. For an analysis of the Bhutto reforms in the context of other reform attempts in Pakistan, see Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Administrative Reform and the Evolution of the Administrative System of Pakistan," in Krishna K. Tummala (ed.), *Administrative Systems Abroad*, Washington, DC: University Press of America, Inc., 1982, pp. 127-157.

<sup>120</sup> "Prime Minister's Address to the Nation," August 1973, in Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Implementation of Administrative Reform, Rawalpindi, 1973.

<sup>121</sup> Meer himself was "anti-CSP." In a speech opening a meeting of the heads of public administration training institutions, he stated that generalist administrators (i.e. CSP officers) held "anti-people" attitudes and had become "anti-people rulers. . . Well all that must change. Because there has been a big change. The people have voted for revolutionary changes. They have rejected the old system and they want it to die giving birth to the new system. A socialist system. A people's system. . . The time and the people demand a revolution. Let us usher in peacefully and above all willingly. The sense of rulership must yield place to a new sense of service."

## *Expansion of the Role of Government*

A final change carried out by Bhutto expanded the bureaucracy and the role of the government in the economy. Through the nationalization of the domestic banking and insurance sector, shipping and many manufacturing firms, coupled with the government's entry into heavy industry with the construction of the Karachi steel mill (assisted by the Soviet Union), the role of government was increased substantially. The government now directly controlled financial markets, held an almost absolute monopoly in the energy sector, monopolized air and sea transport, produced durable goods, and influenced the price of almost all goods available in Pakistan through its regulatory powers or its participation in the economy.

The private firms that were nationalized became public enterprises. As a result of nationalization, two things happened. First, there was an exodus from the nationalized firms of personnel who either did not want to work in public firms or who were dismissed. Second, the public sector was expanded almost overnight by almost one hundred financial and manufacturing units. The positions vacated or added to the new public enterprises were filled by Bhutto appointees. Bhutto's appointments contributed, at least in the short run, to support for the PPP, but the loss of business talent may have contributed to the poor commercial performance that many of these public enterprises experienced in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>122</sup>

## *Conclusions*

In essence, Bhutto opened up the administrative system of Pakistan and broadened the recruitment base of the civil service. In the process, he was able to induct into the civil service individuals who had proven to be politically loyal to him<sup>123</sup> and to rid the civil services of individuals whom he suspected of being obstacles to his policies.

From an historical standpoint, the Bhutto reforms were the culmination of previous attempts to reform the bureaucracy that dated back to the early 1950s. In fact, Bhutto

---

Inaugural Speech by Mr. Khurshid Hasan Meer, Minister, Government of Pakistan, *Fourth Meeting of the Heads of Training Institutions Held at Quetta, July 22-25, 1972*, (Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, 1972), p. 33. Cited in Lawrence Ziring, p. 1086.

<sup>122</sup> See "Commercial Performance of Public Enterprises," Chapter 3, in Robert LaPorte, Jr. and Muntazar Bashir Ahmed, *Public Enterprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development*, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989.

<sup>123</sup> According to the White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, close to 5,500 appointments to the civil service were made under the lateral entry scheme. See "*Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions*," Vol. 2, p. 159.

cited the Egger Report<sup>124</sup> as the "first substantive criticism of the present structure. . .made by a foreign consultant. . ." in his speech before the nation.<sup>125</sup>

The changes in government decision making reflected Bhutto's desire to control and monopolize the decision-making process to ensure that the bureaucracy responded to his directives. Not all prominent civil servants were removed from office—one of the Most prominent who remained was Ghulam Ishaq Khan, now president of Pakistan. Bhutto did attempt to use the civil bureaucracy to further his vision of what Pakistan ought to be.

Finally, through nationalization, he substantially expanded the size and role of the public sector. The need for a greater number of managerial and technical personnel to fill public enterprise sector positions severely strained the already limited pool of trained workers available—many workers took advantage of job opportunities available to trained Pakistanis in the Middle East and North Africa. The government's inability to secure trained personnel contributed to greater inefficiency of government, particularly in its public enterprise sector.

### **Zia's Restructuring of the Administrative System**

What was General Zia's attitude toward the civil service immediately after he seized power and how did it change? It might best be summarized by an observation by a British journalist in a recent book published on Pakistan. Emma Duncan states:

At first Zia reckoned that the civil servants must be the puppets of Bhuttoism, as Bhutto had imagined they were the pawns of the military. A civil servant I now remembers that, "soon after taking over, he assembled the top-level bureaucrats in an auditorium. He said words to the effect that the civil servants were sabotaging his mission. It was so tough that even General Chisti (a ruthless soldier and prime mover in the *coup*) told him to go easy." Zia's subsequent order that civil servants should wear *shalwar kamees* instead of trousers and shirts in the office was at once a petty irritation and a clear statement of his disapproval of their westernized lifestyles and aspirations. He earned their gratitude, though, because he sacked hardly any; and Zia and the bureaucrats soon began to get

---

<sup>124</sup> Roland Egger, *The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan*, Karachi: Inter-Services Press, 1953. This was the first foreign examination of the civil service in Pakistan. There were other analyses that the Administrative Reforms Committee drew upon including Bernard -Gladieux, *Reorganization of Pakistan Government for National Development*, mimeographed, 1955; and the Pay and Services Commission Report of 1962. The Pay and Services Commission was appointed by Muhammad Ayub Khan and chaired by Chief Justice A. R. Cornelius. The report is often referred to as the Cornelius Report.

<sup>125</sup> "Prime Minister's Address to the Nation."

along. As a soldier said to me, "They are bureaucrats and we are military bureaucrats. We have a lot in common."<sup>126</sup>

On October 1, 1977, not quite three months after he seized power, General Zia ul-Haq announced that a "process of accountability" regarding the alleged misdeeds of the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had to be completed before elections could be held. The final act in Zia's accountability process was the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on April 4, 1979. For this action, General Zia earned the enmity of the Bhutto family and Zia's removal from power became the main objective of Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party.<sup>127</sup>

One aspect of Zia's accountability process that received some attention was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's alleged mistreatment of state institutions, including the civil bureaucracy and civil officers.<sup>128</sup> In addition to launching the investigations that resulted in the publication of the four-volume *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime* and the *White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977*,<sup>129</sup> Zia appointed the Civil Services Commission chaired by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Sheikh Anwarul Haq, in February 1978.<sup>130</sup> The modifications Zia made in the changes Bhutto introduced had some of their roots in the work of this commission. Therefore, the major findings and recommendations of the commission, which were presented in a report issued in November 1979, deserve some attention.

---

<sup>126</sup> Emma Duncan, *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey Through Pakistan*, London: Arrow Books, 1989, pp. 246-247.

<sup>127</sup> After the fatal plane crash which caused the death of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto stated: "I would have preferred to defeat Zia at the polls, but life and death are in God's hands."

<sup>128</sup> See Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Administering Development," in Shahid Javed Burki and Robert LaPorte, Jr. (eds.), *Pakistan's Development Priorities: Choices for the Future* (second impression), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986; and Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987. Whether or not Bhutto misused his power depends upon whom one talks with—pro- or anti-Bhutto individuals. Zia certainly believed this to be the case. In his October 1, 1977 announcement, General Zia said, "I wish I had known one-hundredth of this [actions by Bhutto] before I took over on July 5. . . .He [Bhutto] was running this country on more or less gestapo lines, detaining them illegally and even, perhaps, ordering people killed."

<sup>129</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's rebuttal of these allegations is contained in his, *If I Am Assassinated* New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, Ltd., 1979. Pran Chopra (who wrote the Introduction to that book) quotes Bhutto as saying that he wrote this document "with paper resting on my knee" and maintains that "an anonymous enterprise smuggled it out of the 'stinking death cell.' Benazir Bhutto also refutes these allegations in her autobiography, *Benazir Bhutto: Daughter of the East*, London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1988.

<sup>130</sup> The establishment of civil service reform commissions and committees has become a tradition with Pakistani leadership. Ayub's first reform commission was the Pay and Services Commission headed by Chief Justice A. R. Cornelius, which was established in 1959. Ayub also established the Reorganization of Service Structure Committee (the Power Committee) in 1969 and the Services Reorganization Committee (the second Cornelius inquiry) in 1969. Bhutto's reform commission was the Administrative Reforms Commission headed by Khurshid Hasan Meer (1972). Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's adviser on establishment, Rao Abdur Rashid Khan, announced the establishment of a Services Reforms Commission.

## *The Civil Services Commission*

The charge of this commission was to "recommend measures for making the public services an effective instrument for national development and for the promotion of the good and the welfare of the people."<sup>131</sup> The commission did several things. First, it criticized the 1973 reforms by indicating that many were not fully implemented. It recommended that a system based on a thorough classification of all positions in government be established. It also recommended that position descriptions be developed for all government positions and that standardized, valid, reliable, and objective performance evaluation procedures be developed and used. It called for the strengthening of existing training institutions and improvements in recruitment and selection procedures. It also criticized the non-implementation of equal employment procedures contained in the 1973 Civil Service Reform Act.

Second, its greatest criticism of the Bhutto reforms was leveled at the elimination of the constitutional guarantees that afforded security to the civil service. The commission recommended the immediate amendment of the 1973 constitution to incorporate the safeguards found in Articles 181 and 182 of the 1956 constitution. It recommended the establishment of a "Pakistan Public Service" (PPS) that would encompass all posts in the government of Pakistan. According to the commission, this would lead to a "truly unified services structure with different branches representing a distinct occupation to be called occupational branches."<sup>132</sup>

Third, it recommended that the "Deputy Commissioner should retain the regulatory functions relating to law and order, police, treasury, jail, and certain matters pertaining to general administration."<sup>133</sup> Further, local government institutions should be established and delegated powers "in respect to development."<sup>134</sup>

## *What Zia Did Not Do*

In examining the personnel procedures and practices of the government of Pakistan, it appears that the commission's recommendations regarding a thorough classification of positions, the development of position descriptions, and the improvement of performance evaluation procedures were not acted upon. Government positions are still not defined precisely in terms of duties and responsibilities, and performance evaluations still lack standard, valid, reliable, and objective criteria. To the layperson, improvements in these procedures may seem to be minor issues, but to managers, their

---

<sup>131</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Civil Services Commission*, Islamabad: November 1979, pp. ii.

<sup>132</sup> "Proposals to Reform Services," *Viewpoint*, November 28, 1979.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*



absence can create major administrative problems. Zia, however, did not follow the commission's recommendations in these areas.

Regarding the commission's recommendation to restore constitutionally based guarantees affording security to the civil service, Zia chose not to act on this issue. None of the amendments Zia made to the 1973 constitution relate to civil service security. He also did not establish a "Pakistan Public Service."

Zia did implement some of the commission's recommendations and ignored others. If he had implemented all of the recommendations made by the commission, he would have negated the entire reform effort of the Bhutto period. The changes he decided to make might appear to be simply adjustments on the margins of the Bhutto reforms. This interpretation might be considered an accurate assessment if one only looks at the major issue pushed by the commission, namely the resurrection of constitutional guarantees for the civil service. However, as the next section argues, Zia avoided the political conflict that might have arisen had he publicly resurrected the Civil Service of Pakistan. At the same time, he elevated the status of the civil service and resurrected the partnership between the military and the civil service that was first established under Ayub.

### *Changes that Zia Made*

Occupational Groups. What Zia did do is important. He did establish occupational branches in the civil service. There are about fourteen groups which include -the District Management Group (DMG), the Foreign Service, the Secretariat Group, the Political Group (i.e., political agents who serve in the tribal agencies—this group was later merged with the DMG), the Police Group, the Customs and Revenue Group, among others. Those officers who opted for the DMG tended to be individuals who would have become CSP officers prior to the Bhutto reforms.

The establishment of occupational branches was important for the civil service. Although it did not reinstate the use of service labels such as CSP, it is clear that key appointments went to members of the DMG. There appeared to be an esprit de corps among junior officers who were members of the DMG, a factor which seemed to be absent during the Bhutto years. Senior officers who were CSPs were not reluctant to be identified as such. In fact, with the investments that were made in civil service training in-country and abroad during the Zia period, some of these officers felt that being a high ranking civil servant in Pakistan was once again very desirable. A few years ago, when a senior officer (CSP) was asked if the changes Zia made had resurrected the CSP, he responded by saying "no, but it is even better for us now than it was before Zulfikar Ali Bhutto."<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>135</sup> Interview with senior civil servant, May 1984.

### *Civil Service Training.*

On the issue of improving the training of the civil service, Zia took some steps. He required that all civil servants who were to be promoted from grade 19 to 20 complete training at one of the national institutes of public administration (NIPAs). He also added two new NIPAs (in Peshawar and Quetta) to the two already established (in Lahore and Karachi). He mandated training for officers being promoted from grade 20 to 21, requiring them to complete the training course at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College. In addition, he moved the Academy for Administrative Training from Walden outside Lahore back to the Mall in Lahore and changed its name back to the Civil Services Academy. This latter step removed the "insult" that Bhutto had added to the "injury" he inflicted upon the CSP.

Zia also invested government funds and channeled bilateral assistance into the training academies. Major building funds were allocated to NIPA/Karachi. Additional staff were allocated to the Organization and Management (O&M) wing of the Establishment Division (O&M was later renamed the Management Services Division) so that this organization could improve its training operations and its management analysis services to the rest of the government of Pakistan. Building funds for the Civil Services Academy at its Mall campus in Lahore were also allocated.

Although U.S. assistance was officially terminated in April 1979 following the Carter administration's assessment that Pakistan was developing a nuclear bomb, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December 1979 triggered discussions between the Carter administration and the government of Pakistan regarding the resumption of U.S. assistance. The end product was the agreement signed in 1981 between the Reagan administration and the government of Pakistan that called for a total economic and military package of \$3.2 billion to be spent over a five-year period. (One half of the package was for economic assistance.)

One project in this assistance package which benefited the civil service and its training institutions directly was the Development Support Training Project (DSTP). Although its original price tag, in 1982, was approximately \$15.2 million, by the time the first phase of DSTP was completed in 1988, the total spent was in the neighborhood of \$80 million.<sup>136</sup> The DSTP has two components, in-country training and participant or overseas training. In the project paper for the DSTP written in 1982, it was planned that a total of thirty-eight Pakistanis be sent abroad for long-term training (degree work) and another 190 receive short-term training over a five-year period. What actually happened was that by 1988, 4,089 Pakistanis had completed or were undertaking long-term

---

<sup>136</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development documents. The data on the Development Support Training Project come from United States Agency for International Development sources.

training. Of this total, 85 percent were sent to the United States. More than 85 percent of the Pakistanis sent abroad for training through this project were government employees. The vast bulk of trainees in the in-country training component of this project were also government employees. In addition, the other USAID projects such as the Rural Electrification Project, the Irrigation Systems Management Project, the Food Security Management Project, among others, all had or have training components within them. If the Zia regime had not been receptive to training, these projects would not have been designed and implemented.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 triggered both interest and subsequent investments in Pakistan by multinational and bilateral assistance agencies. Zia's policy of welcoming and accommodating Afghan refugees who fled the war and of assisting the Afghan *mujahiddin* (the "warriors for the faith" or resistance fighters) made him a favorite of the Reagan administration, and both bilateral and multilateral assistance increased during his period in power. Pakistan under Zia became the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance after Israel and Egypt.

### *Elected Local Government.*

Local government and rural development has a long history of experimentation in Pakistan. In the early 1950s with assistance from the United States, the government of Pakistan established the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (Village-AID) scheme. This program was abandoned in the late 1950s by the Ayub regime and the Basic Democracy scheme with its Rural Works Programme was initiated in both West and East Pakistan. The most publicized feature of the Ayub effort was the Comilla Project in East Pakistan. In 1969, Ayub's Basic Democracy scheme was dismantled and in the early 1970s, Bhutto established the Integrated Rural Development Programme built upon the markaz, or rural development services delivery center concept. This scheme lasted until 1979. Each of these schemes attempted to improve the links between government in its urban setting and the large rural population of Pakistan. Both the Basic Democracies Scheme and the Integrated Rural Development Programme were used as ways and means of developing and maintaining political support for the government in power. Each scheme was used as a means to distribute patronage in terms of funds and jobs. None of these schemes threatened or challenged the traditional powers (law and order and revenue collection) of the civil servants who ruled the districts.

Zia also established his own local government institutions called "local bodies." As local development institutions, they replaced the Integrated Rural Development Programme that Bhutto established in the 1970s. In 1979, each province enacted a local government ordinance that established district councils, municipal corporations/committees, town councils, and union councils. Elections on a non-party basis were held in 1979, 1983, and 1987. The district councils, municipal corporations/committees, town councils, and

union councils were given the responsibility for small-scale development activities in their areas of control. In addition, they were provided with minimal revenue bases to support their development programs.<sup>137</sup> Some of the provinces also allocated funds to local bodies from their Annual Development Programme allocations.

The reasons for establishing the local bodies system appear to be principally political. Zia had postponed elections once in the fall of 1977. He had tried to placate the demand for participation by appointing a partyless *Majlis-i-Shura* (an assembly of notables) at the federal (central) government level who would debate selected issues. The members of this assembly were appointed by Zia and came from business, the professions, educational institutions, and religious organizations. However, the demand for elected government continued despite Zia's attempt. It was at that point that Zia established the local bodies scheme. Unlike Ayub's Basic Democracy scheme, Zia's local government officials did not serve as an electoral college for provincial assemblies, the national assembly, or the office of the president. In addition, the deputy commissioner was not a voting member in the deliberations of these bodies. In fact, in some districts, the deputy commissioner remained aloof from the proceedings of the council in his district.

Zia's local bodies were not given powers "relating to law and order, police, treasury, jail, and certain matters pertaining to general administration." These powers remained vested in the deputy commissioner as recommended by the Civil Services Commission. Without the provision of these powers, district council members, even if elected, were seen as relatively powerless individuals. In this case, Zia sided with his Civil Services Reform Commission.

In some provinces, the Northwest Frontier Province is an example, district councils were successful in completing small-scale development projects (farm-to-market roads, building of small irrigation channels, etc.) at costs less than those charged by the provincial governments' communication and works (C&W) departments. In other provinces, the district councils were failures in terms of their developmental impact. However, the local bodies scheme did not reduce the pressure for provincial and national assembly elections. Some officials have argued that Zia's local bodies scheme was an attempt to develop a new cadre of politicians, ones that would be supportive of the Zia regime. Certainly, government funds were allocated for development works and channeled through these elected officials. But Zia's attempt to establish elected local bodies who had no power or influence over the traditional functions of government (law and order and tax collection) appeared to be questionable even shortly after the scheme was initiated. The chairman of a district council in NWFP who had entered politics for the first time through the local bodies elections remarked:

---

<sup>137</sup> Octroi, or a tax assessed on goods entering a district, municipality, or town was a revenue source given to many local bodies. Some district councils had more unique revenue sources. The Sibi (Balochistan) District Council received funds from annual horse and cattle shows held in Sibi.

"... at present, politics are at the local level and issues that should be dealt with by provincial or national assembly members are debated in the local election. Once we have elections for provincial and national assemblies, local elected officials like me will no longer have development funds or the attention of the people."<sup>138</sup>

The local bodies scheme did not reduce the demand for assembly elections. In other words, the voters could not be "bribed" by their partyless elected leaders at the local level to forgo the demand for more participation at the provincial and central government levels.

### *Elected Provincial and National Government.*

In 1985, General Zia held partyless provincial and national assembly elections as the next attempt to placate public demand for more participation in government and to further develop an opposition to the Bhutto family and the Pakistan People's Party. Zia also attempted to eliminate political parties. He was unsuccessful in eliminating political parties, but he was partially successful in placating demands for participation and developing an opposition to the PPP. Although there appears to be no quantitative indication based on the 1985 partyless elections or the 1988 party-based elections for the provincial and national assemblies that shows the extent to which Zia actually fostered a new political cadre through the local bodies scheme, the Zia regime was successful in inducting new blood into the political arena and, once in, cultivating and promoting these new politicians. The case of Mian Nawaz Sharif, who served as Chief Minister of Punjab during the Zia regime and was elected prime minister after the elections of October 1990, is the best known and most prominent case in point.

### *Reappointment of Civil Servants Dismissed by Bhutto.*

Other actions that Zia took were also important to the power and decision-making authority of the civil service. He reappointed many of the civil servants who were dismissed, by Bhutto. He replaced some Bhutto appointees on boards of the public enterprises with both civil and military officers, but he did not engage in wholesale dismissals of those appointed to civil service positions during the Bhutto period.

### *Resurrection of Technically Based Planning.*

He restored the Planning Commission to its position of power, resurrected the technically based planning process, and gave technocrats more say in major economic policy making. He brought prominent civil servants and technocrats back into government, appointing Ghulam Ishaq Khan as chairman of the Planning Commission and minister in charge of the ministries of finance, economic development, and

---

<sup>138</sup> Interview with a chairman, District Council, NWFP, February 1982.

commerce in 1977 (positions he served in until 1985) and Mahbub ul-Haq as minister of Planning and Development in 1982 (Zia later appointed him finance minister in 1985—a position he held until the Junejo government took office).<sup>139</sup>

Denationalization and the Public Enterprise Sector. Zia reversed Bhutto's policy regarding the nationalization of private firms. Almost immediately after assuming power, Zia denationalized some two thousand ginning mills nationalized by Bhutto. Zia also tried to reassure the private sector that the government had no intentions of nationalizing other private firms and that the government welcomed private investment. He also attempted to denationalize other public enterprises but was unsuccessful.<sup>140</sup>

To a large extent, Zia's game plan regarding the economy of Pakistan was influenced and controlled by Ghulam Ishaq Khan.<sup>141</sup> As a former secretary general of the civil service and an individual known for his distrust of the private sector and as one who encouraged the use of public enterprises in the 1960s,<sup>142</sup> Ghulam Ishaq Khan did not push for the wholesale denationalization, disinvestment or liquidation of the public enterprise sector. Neither were there new public enterprises established. In fact, Ishaq's approach to managing the economy has been characterized as one of "deliberate caution."<sup>143</sup> Attempts were made to make public enterprises more efficient from a public profit standpoint<sup>144</sup> and to stress the improvement of performance. Some highly unprofitable enterprises were closed. Toward the end of the Zia period, government was beginning the process of taking off the national budget some of the major public enterprises (the Water and Power Development Authority, for example) and permitting them to raise financial resources through the floating of bond issues.

---

<sup>139</sup> Mahbub ul-Haq returned as finance minister in the caretaker government Zia appointed after he dismissed the National Assembly in May 1988. Mahbub held this office until the November 16, 1988 National Assembly elections.

<sup>140</sup> See Robert LaPorte, Jr. and Muntazar Bashir Ahmed, *Public Enterprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development*, for an analysis of why the Zia regime was unsuccessful.

<sup>141</sup> In a recent article, Shahid Javed Burki reported on a meeting he held with General Zia in which Zia said, "My instructions to Ishaq Sahib are quite clear. I really don't care what he does as long as the economy continues to function smoothly and the poor and the middle classes continue to see some hope for them[selves]." *Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-88*, p. 109.

<sup>142</sup> He served as chairman of the Board of Directors of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (one of Pakistan's largest public enterprises) in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

<sup>143</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-88*, p. 109. Burki concluded: "The temptation must have been great for Ishaq to dismantle all that Bhutto had done ... Instead, Ghulam Ishaq Khan moved with deliberate caution."

<sup>144</sup> In the early 1980s, public enterprises under the federal Ministry of Production were directed to install new management information systems (the so called "signaling system") that would provide information to the Ministry of Production regarding the extent to which these enterprises had achieved objectives related to public profit. The effort was directed by the Experts Advisory Cell which is located in the Ministry of Production. See EAC: Experts Advisory Cell, no date. For an analysis of the use of the public profit concept in the case of the Ministry of Production enterprises, see "The Management of Public Enterprises," Chapter 5, in Robert LaPorte, Jr. and Muntazar Bashir Ahmed, *Public Enterprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development*.

The Zia government continued to appoint civil servants and military officers to the boards of directors of public enterprises. This practice predates the Bhutto period (Ayub appointed civil servants and military officers). A difference between the Zia and Bhutto years and the governments in the 1950s and 1960s was that because of the expansion of the public enterprise sector through nationalization in the 1970s, both Bhutto and Zia had many more positions to fill.

### *The Role of the President.*

The final changes made by General Zia that have importance for the administrative and political structure of Pakistan were those made in the 1973 constitution pertaining to the relations between the president and the prime minister and incorporated in the Eighth Amendment. Although these changes are discussed elsewhere in this book, it is important to note that by making the president more than just a figurehead, Zia inserted this office and its incumbent directly into the politics and administration of the nation. The president can exercise discretion in the appointment of important officials such as the governors of the provinces. Already, this administrative discretion has been exercised by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in his decision to retain the present governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, Brig. (Retd.) Gulistan Janjua, over the desires of elected political leadership of that province. According to more than one source, Ishaq was following the advice of the military in making this decision.<sup>145</sup>

Zia's decision to change the 1973 constitution to make the president a more active participant in governance appears to have emanated from his analysis of the Bhutto and Ayub periods. Unlike Ayub through the Basic Democracy Scheme, Zia permitted direct, albeit partyless, elections for assembly seats at the national and provincial levels. Somewhat like Ayub, however, the election of the president would be the responsibility of an electoral college consisting of members of both houses of the National Assembly and members of the provincial assemblies. An "invigorated" (through the Eighth Amendment) president, elected by individuals who represented substantial interests in the society, would be in a position to control what James Madison in *The Federalist Papers* referred to as the "violence of faction."<sup>146</sup>

The changes in the role of the president reflect Zia's (and the military's) distrust, if not dislike, of civilian politicians. To avoid a return to "Bhuttoism," the amended 1973 constitution gave a greater role to the president and made him a barrier against the effects of "rabble rousing" which surfaced during the Bhutto period.

---

<sup>145</sup> Interviews with several individuals, January 1990.

<sup>146</sup> See "Federalist Paper No. 10," in *The Federalist Papers*, New York: Mentor Books, p. 77.

## *Conclusions*

In part, General Zia restored the "steel frame" and the viceregal system that had been suspended by Bhutto. He also resurrected the partnership between the military and civil bureaucracy initiated by Ayub.<sup>147</sup> The managers of the bureaucracy under Zia were military and civil officers as well as technocrats and handpicked politicians. His use of civil officers as both policy makers as well as administrators and managers brought a feeling of *deja vu* to those who have studied Pakistan over the years.

Unlike Ayub, Zia relied on his military colleagues, appointing many military officers to civil service and public enterprise management positions.<sup>148</sup> The governors of the provinces, all of whom were military officers until the Junejo government took office in 1985, exercised considerable power. In addition, many federal ministers and the chairmen of the boards of directors of major public enterprises were or had been military officers. With the exception of economics and finance, the key decision-making positions had a decidedly military cast to them during the first nine years of the Zia regime.

Zia's changes in the role of the president transformed the political system originally laid out in the 1973 constitution from a parliamentary to more of a presidential system. Power is now shared between the prime minister and the president.

Finally, it appears that Zia's legacy included both a strengthened military and civil bureaucracy. These two important institutions were weakened in the 1970s—the 1971 civil war and resulting war with India brought disgrace to the military, and the changes in the civil service instituted by Bhutto brought despair to the civil service. Zia did not restore the pre-1971 military nor the pre-Bhutto civil service. His investments in both institutions, however, and the passage of time have provided them with vital roles in the post-Zia political system.

### **Conclusions: Changes in Zia's Administrative Legacy?**

On December 2, 1988, Benazir Bhutto became prime minister of Pakistan. Administering the oath was Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of the

---

<sup>147</sup> One factor that may have contributed to Zia's decision to dismiss the National Assembly in May 1988 may have been his displeasure with confrontations that had taken place between the politicians associated with Junejo and the civil and military bureaucracy. One case in point involved delays in military promotions caused by Junejo (acting as prime minister holding the defense portfolio) refusing to act on Zia's (as chief of army staff) recommendations.

<sup>148</sup> However, Zia learned two lessons from Ayub's handling of the armed forces: (1) "... a military president should not leave military matters in the hands of another officer..." and (2) "... senior military commanders should be made to accept the principle of job rotation and fixed term assignments." Shahid Javed Burki, "*Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-88*," p. 109. With regard to the second lesson, only Zia himself was the exception because he extended his term as chief of the army staff three times.



Senate, Zia's finance minister from 1977-85, and a highly respected former secretary general of the civil service. Benazir Bhutto's selection as prime minister followed her party's victory in the National Assembly election on November 16, 1989, in which the PPP won 93 of the 205 seats contested. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was elected president succeeding General Zia in that critical position.

The transition process was smooth. The elections held at the national and provincial levels were conducted with few protests by competing candidates. Bhutto appointed her cabinet members and a group of some forty or more advisers. She retained for herself two of the most important portfolios—defense and finance.

In the economic policy-making area, Bhutto created an Economic Policy Committee chaired by a Karachi businessman, and appointed V. A. Jaffrey as adviser for finance, economic affairs, and planning and development. Jaffrey had served in a similar capacity under Zia. Jaffrey was a CSP officer with considerable experience in finance, having served as governor of the State Bank. Bhutto followed the economic game plan developed for her by the civil service and remained faithful to her 1988 campaign pledge not to nationalize private firms but encouraged private investment for the purposes of further industrialization.

Bhutto tried to avoid confrontations with either the military or the civil service. However, she was dismissed from office on August 6, 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of "corruption, mismanagement and violation of the constitution."<sup>149</sup> One political analyst maintained that she erroneously assessed her partners (President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and chief of the army staff General Mirza Aslam Beg) in the triarchy that had ruled Pakistan since December 1988.<sup>150</sup> It appears that she thought she had developed a working relationship with key government officials outside the PPP.

What will remain of the restructuring of the administrative system of Pakistan during the Zia regime will depend to a great extent on what successor leaders want to continue or to abandon and whether or not they can muster the political power to make them.

On a more technical note, the government faces a crisis in analytic capability. The government of Pakistan is deficient in personnel trained to conduct economic policy analysis. This has been the case for a number of years.<sup>151</sup> The Zia regime tried to attract talent in this area but had only limited success. Government departments and public enterprises also have great -difficulties in locating and hiring trained managers, other

---

<sup>149</sup> Maleeha Lodhi, "A Shadow Military State?," *Newsline*, August 1990, p. III.

<sup>150</sup> Mushahid Hussain, "The Dissolution: An inside story unfolds," *The Nation*, Wednesday, August 8, 1990, p. 1. Hussain states: "In her understanding of the dynamics of the Pakistani power structure, Benazir Bhutto erroneously assumed that her real problem was in the person of the Chief of the Army Staff, while she felt that she had 'won over' the President by taking two of his sons-in-law into her camp."

<sup>151</sup> Interviews with officials in the Planning and Development Division, Government of Pakistan, February 1989.

professionals, and technical staff, despite the investments that have been made in human resource development by the government of Pakistan and bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies. Any administrative restructuring should take into consideration the human resource situation.

One area that is difficult if not impossible to document and quantify is corruption in government. There is no question that it exists at all levels. It appears to be systematic in that, in certain government departments, officials know exactly what percentage of a project's funds are theirs for the taking. Pakistanis often describe government officials that they admire as, first of all, honest. Did corruption increase during the Zia period? His critics say yes. His supporters defend him, saying that the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto period was worse. Even after two years after the August 1988 plane crash, no substantive allegations of personal corruption have been made regarding General Zia. That he was personally honest seems to be a fact. That he may have ignored the corruption that took place during his tenure in office also seems to be a fact. If what one hears among the middle class communities in the urban areas of Pakistan is true, corruption in government is an issue with which Zia's successors will have to deal.<sup>152</sup>

In essence, it appears that the administrative structure left by General Zia cannot change in a substantial, structural way, at least in the short run. After Benazir assumed the prime ministership in December 1988, some civil servants were removed from their positions and placed in the temporary status of "officers on special duty." However, the number was less than one hundred, and it is reported that all of them were given new posts without loss of grade. This move was quite different from that taken by her father. She did not embark upon radical changes in economic policy and she refrained from pursuing a policy of revenge for her father's death. Given the politics of Pakistan at this stage in its development, radical changes in the administrative system are a low priority regardless of who sits in the prime minister's chair.

---

<sup>152</sup> Sometimes the foreign observer can misinterpret empirical data. After observing and then discussing the poor condition of several of Pakistan's major roads with a government of Pakistan official, the author stated that the government was going to have to invest more in road maintenance. The government official replied that the government was already spending billions of rupees on road maintenance. The problem was that the rupees were not going into the roads, the implication being that they were going into the pockets of government officials!

## **Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena**

### **Craig Baxter**

In 1977, far from being a major participant in the international community, Pakistan could be better described as a backwater. It still was looked upon as a country that had butchered its former compatriots, the Bangladeshis. Although Bhutto and Indira Gandhi had signed the Simla agreement in 1972 in which both agreed to settle the outstanding disputes between the two countries peacefully through negotiation, none of the causes for contention had been settled—most importantly to Pakistan the matter of Kashmir. Relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated further when India carried out what it called a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in the Rajasthan desert in 1974 and Bhutto responded with a pledge to match India's action. Bhutto had taken considerable steps to increase Pakistan's relations with Muslim countries in West Asia and this resulted in a payoff that was important in both economic and military terms. Relations with the Soviet Union were endemically poor, and those with the United States showed signs of deteriorating as the Carter administration with its emphasis on both human rights and nuclear non-proliferation began its term in office. China could be counted on for such tasks as blocking the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations, but little practical help other than supplying antiquated weapons could be expected. As Bhutto was pushed from office and Zia ul-Haq became head of government, the international standing of Pakistan was not at all prominent.

### **The Takeover**

The imposition of a military government in Pakistan for the third time since 1958 was not greeted favorably by the outside world. Despite Bhutto's statement to the National Assembly on April 28, 1977, that the United States had launched a conspiracy with his domestic opponents,<sup>153</sup> the United States opposed the military action, hoping for a final agreement that would lead to new elections. India, having earlier the same year ousted the authoritarian regime of Indira Gandhi through free and fair elections, looked for a new election in Pakistan as the means to solve the dispute between Bhutto and the opposition; India is always wary of a military government in its strongest South Asian neighbor. The Soviet Union also did not welcome a military government. Almost no one, then, could be expected to approve of Zia's action, although many hoped that his initial declaration that martial law was temporary and that elections would be held

---

<sup>153</sup> *Viewpoint*, July 8, 1977.

within ninety days would prove correct and Pakistan would return to a parliamentary system.

### South Asia

Under Bhutto, Pakistan may have tried to orient its foreign relations toward West Asia and the Gulf and Zia would continue this policy of close relations. Nonetheless, Pakistan's history remains enmeshed with South Asia and has done so, in the words of one book title, for "5000 Years."<sup>154</sup> As we have noted, the advent of the Zia regime followed closely the establishment of the Janata Party government in India. It seemed then, as it may now with the Janata Dal government of Vishwanath Pratap Singh, that a non-Congress ministry in India wished to improve relations with its South Asian neighbors. The Indira Gandhi government, as later that of Rajiv Gandhi, appeared to the other countries of South Asia to pursue what has been called the "Indira doctrine." To the other states this has meant a system of Indian hegemony in the sub-continent. Among the tenets of this doctrine were the recognition by the other states that India was the leader among the former British colonies and protectorates, that outside interference and interest in the region was unwelcome, and that the foreign policies of the smaller states should be guided by India. That India itself during Indira Gandhi's first term in office had invited the Soviet Union formally into the region through the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 was a matter that was to be, according to India, of no concern to the others. India as far back as the 1950s had stood against the then special relationship between the United States and Pakistan and would look with concern on the renewal of that relationship in the 1980s. India would also be unhappy about any close contact between either Pakistan or Nepal and China.

Zia, who had earlier expressed his desire to visit India, received the Indian foreign minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, in February 1978. It is interesting that Vajpayee represented the Jana Sangh group within the Janata Party, a group that as a separate party had often expressed its displeasure with the partition of India and its goal that India be reunited. The talks were reported as having gone well, as Zia commented to Burki in their discussion in July 1980. There were exchanges of views on the Simla agreement, Kashmir, and an Indian dam on the Jhelum River at Salal. No formal agreements were made but the ice had been broken and further talks could take place. A number of agreements were eventually signed covering such areas as trade, cultural exchange, and communications, but no settlement of the key issues of nuclear development (to India) and Kashmir (to Pakistan) Was made.

It is to the nuclear issue that we now must turn. Later in this chapter nuclear matters involving the United States will be discussed, but the key event so far as Pakistan was concerned was the demonstration of nuclear competence by India in 1974. As has been

---

<sup>154</sup> Mortimer Wheeler, *Five Thousand Years of Pakistan* (London: C. Johnson, 1950).

noted, Bhutto responded to this by declaring that Pakistan would develop a weapon of its own even if Pakistanis had "eat grass" to meet the cost. Zia thus inherited a pledge by Pakistan that for domestic political reasons he could not discard, unless India would help him do so. India, fearing the nuclear capability of China but protesting that its own test was "peaceful," did not accept any of the several proposals made by Zia regarding nuclear development restrictions.

Zia asked India to agree to several steps. One of these was the simultaneous signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a multilateral agreement that pledged non-nuclear states to refrain from nuclear weapon development. A second was a joint agreement to accept inspection of all nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also proposed a pact between the two nations that each would terminate weapons development programs and would allow mutual inspection of each other's facilities. Another suggestion was that India and Pakistan join the other South Asian countries in declaring South Asia to be a nuclear-free zone. India in each case either did not respond or rejected the proposals. It seems clear that Zia was looking for a means to end the Pakistani program, but could only do so with some concession from India. Ending the program would presumably save resources and would get Zia out of a serious bind with the United States, especially with many in the United States Congress. Pakistan also offered India a "no-war" pact, but this was not seriously pursued by India.

As the Pakistan nuclear program expanded, it was necessary for Pakistan to procure raw materials and equipment from elsewhere. It has been rumored that advice was given by China and that Libya provided raw materials and funding for the "Islamic bomb," but public evidence for either of these has not been provided. Persons of Pakistani origin have, however, been apprehended and in some cases convicted of conspiring to acquire technology and equipment in the United States and in Europe.

Pakistan was also concerned about space programs in India that could and have led to the development of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and of reaching important Pakistani targets. Pakistan again has responded in countervailing fashion by attempting to develop its own missiles. A successful firing would come only after Zia's death.

Not all relations within South Asia were to be negative. Bangladeshi president, Ziaur Rahman, during a series of visits to each capital in the region, floated the idea of a cooperative agreement among the states of South Asia under the name South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC). Although Ziaur Rahman's proposal received a good hearing in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives, he was not as successful in either Pakistan or India. The Indians seemed to view SARC as a ganging-up-on-India device, perhaps fearing that on any important issue there would be a six-to-one vote

against India. Pakistan initially took an opposing view, that SARC would be a means to Indian hegemony.

Ziaur Rahman eventually won the day, partly by limiting the scope of SARC. Bilateral issues were to be excluded from discussion in SARC forums, as were political, security, and general economic matters. The group would use the meetings to discuss less volatile questions relating to such topics as culture, economic development, communications, and meteorology. India and Pakistan agreed to join the others. It was well after Ziaur Rahman's assassination in May 1981, that the group formally came into being under the slightly revised title South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at a summit meeting held in Dhaka in 1985. A secretariat in Kathmandu, coordinates the work of SAARC, which is carried out largely by ministerial and lower-level meetings on various topics. The annual rotating summit meeting, held in Pakistan in 1988, does provide the opportunity for the leaders to meet in "corridor" discussions about those bilateral issues that are barred from the formal meetings.<sup>155</sup>

The 1988 meeting in Islamabad provided the first official visit of an Indian prime minister to Pakistan since Jawaharlal Nehru went to Karachi to sign the Indus waters treaty in 1960. (Rajiv Gandhi had earlier visited unofficially and briefly to express his condolences on the death of a noted political figure, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.)

Zia visited Rajiv Gandhi on December 17, 1985, for a brief luncheon stopover in New Delhi while en route to Indonesia. He again visited India in February 1987 and caused some amusement as he accepted a non-governmental invitation to attend an India-Pakistan cricket match in Jaipur and also caused an unplanned adjustment in the schedule of Rajiv Gandhi who met with Zia. He had hoped to extend his "cricket diplomacy" later in 1987 to attend the final match of a cricket tournament in Calcutta; this plan was changed when both Pakistan and India were upset in the semi-finals. Not one to avoid some degree of "grandstanding," he expressed his annoyance when I met him the day of the Pakistani defeat.

The two countries have been involved in a conflict that has included sporadic military combat over an area in the north of Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier. In drawing the line of control following the 1971 war, the negotiators simply left the northern end in the frozen wastes of some of the world's highest mountains undemarcated except to say that the line ran north. Each side has claimed that Siachen, a spot that previously appeared on almost no maps, is on its side of the extended cease-fire line. Each claims, with little practical justification, that control by the other side would give that side important strategic advantages. Pakistan, on its side, claims that the Indians would threaten the Karakoram Highway to China, although it is unclear to the general

---

<sup>155</sup> For a discussion of SAARC, see Emajuddin Ahamed, SARC [sic]: *Seeds of Harmony* (Dhaka: University Press, Ltd., 1985).

observer how India would cross the forbidding intervening territory in any strength. The dispute remains on the table as each side remains adamant about what ought to be a resolvable matter.

A much more serious issue arose during the winter of 1987-88. India mounted a large military exercise in Rajasthan and (Indian) Punjab called Operation Brasstacks. As the Pakistanis saw it, the operation could have been converted into an attack on Pakistani Punjab. There was a potential *casus belli* at the time as the Indians accused Pakistan of giving assistance and possibly sanctuary to Sikh terrorists operating in Indian Punjab. There has been no publicly offered proof of the Indian allegations, but they are a matter of faith to the Indian government and many of India's people.

Pakistan responded by mobilizing its forces to repel a potential attack. Tensions mounted as neither side seemed ready to back down. Zia communicated with Rajiv Gandhi, however, and the tensions were lessened as meetings of Indian and Pakistani officials took place. I met with Zia while the tension was high. He seemed much concerned, but he was also confident that he would be able to intervene diplomatically to decrease the pressure caused by the maneuvers.

To say that Indo-Pakistan relations made no significant progress during the Zia period would be correct. The reassertion of the "Indira doctrine" by Rajiv Gandhi made Indian relations with all neighbors, not just with Pakistan, more difficult as Indian actions with regard to Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal attest. But it is also correct to say that there was a more realistic relationship, partly gained by Zia's visits, even though the major problems such as nuclear development and Kashmir remained.

Pakistan developed quite good relations with the other states of South Asia. Despite Indian complaints, Pakistan assisted Sri Lanka in facing the threat to its unity caused by the Tamil insurrection. It helped Nepal by beginning direct air services, thus permitting Nepal to avoid India's control on the transit of some imported and exported items. Relations with Bangladesh that had begun only in 1975 at the ambassadorial level were expanded as the two countries found that they shared many common interests. Zia, so far as I am aware, never used the Bhuttoesque expression "Muslim Bengal," by which Bhutto meant to indicate that the two countries might join hands again.

### **The Middle East**

Ties between Pakistan and the Middle East, especially the Gulf region, are both ancient and modern. The ancient tie is Islam, and Zia would use this to his advantage by playing a leading role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and, to some conservative Islamic nations, through his move toward an Islamic state in Pakistan. Zia continued the development of trade with the Middle East. He stationed Pakistani military forces there and sent Pakistani labor to the area. (The domestic economic

impact of the migration to the Middle East is covered in the chapter of this book devoted to economics.) All of these actions were profitable to Pakistan.

Religious ties with the Middle East are important to Pakistan, which came into being as a homeland for the Muslims of India. With the exception of Afghanistan with which there has been frequent friction, Muslim countries have played an important part in Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan has played a prominent role in the OIC. This was especially true at the 1984 summit of the OIC in Casablanca where Zia played a key role in permitting Egypt to rejoin the organization. Zia made the point that the OIC was not an Arab organization, but a Muslim one, and that Muslim nations should not be excluded from it simply on the basis of a disagreement among Arab states. During much of the Zia period, a Pakistani, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, was the secretary general of OIC. Pakistan was also a member of the committees on conciliation in the Iran-Iraq war and on the liberation of Jerusalem (to the Muslims, al-Quds).

During the Zia period, the new markets found by the Bhutto regime in the Middle East were further developed. The balance of trade with many of these countries is unfavorable to Pakistan as Pakistan imports large quantities of oil and cannot offset this with exports of manufactured and agricultural goods. This, in 1981-82, was especially true with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi (treated in the accounts as separate from the United Arab Emirates or UAE). Conversely, significant trade surpluses had been developed with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, Qatar, Libya, and Oman.<sup>156</sup> Agricultural goods have become important as the proximity of the Gulf states and the availability of air transport for perishable goods have combined to make Pakistan a useful source. Fruits, vegetables, meat, rice, and, in surplus seasons, wheat are among the goods sent to the Gulf, which also supplies a market for Pakistan's textile and clothing manufacturers.

Pakistan has exported both civilian and military personnel to the Middle East. It was estimated in 1983 that some thirty thousand Pakistani military personnel were on duty abroad, almost all in the Middle East. The bulk, some twenty thousand, were in Saudi Arabia, but this unit was withdrawn as the result of a Saudi decision in 1987. It was said that the unit in Saudi Arabia served in the capacity of a palace guard for the Saudi royal family. It has also been said that the Saudis had insisted that Pakistan not send Shi'a officers to Saudi Arabia, but this was specifically denied to me by a senior Pakistani officer who had served in the Middle East. Other Pakistani units serve principally as training teams, although there have been reports that earlier Pakistani personnel served with operational units. Zia himself served with Pakistani forces in Jordan as part of an anti-aircraft formation. The Iran-Iraq war seemed to have placed some restrictions on the location of Pakistani personnel because of the close ties between Iran and Pakistan

---

<sup>156</sup> *Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83*, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1983), pp. 172-173.



and may have contributed to the Saudi requirement for Pakistani withdrawal.<sup>157</sup> However, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Pakistani units have re-entered Saudi Arabia as part of the multinational forces there.

Civilian employment overseas and the remittances to Pakistan by these employees has been a major factor in Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings. It has been estimated that in 1985 more than half a million Pakistanis were employed in the Middle East and North Africa in categories ranging from "professional and technical" to unskilled.<sup>158</sup> Pakistan was the second largest supplier of the approximately 3.5 million foreign workers, following only Egypt. Remittances from overseas workers (not all in the Middle East, but this region accounts for by far the bulk of remitters) peaked at about \$3.0 billion through official channels in 1982-83, according to the then finance minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan.<sup>159</sup> Other funds come to Pakistan through informal bills of exchange (*hundis*), merchandise imports, postal system devices, and directly from cash brought into the country when overseas workers visited home. The overall total from official and unofficial sources perhaps reached as much as \$4.0 billion. With the drop in oil revenues in the mid- and late-1980s and the concomitant decline in economic activity in the Gulf region, there has been a drop in remittances. The latest available official figure is \$2.6 billion, still a substantial amount, coming to about 9 percent of Pakistan's gross national product.

Pakistanis and other non-Arab Muslims are often preferred in the Gulf region as they are less likely to settle permanently and less likely to become involved in local politics than, say, Palestinians or Egyptians (the 1989 and 1990 experiences of Egyptians in Iraq is a case in point). Most Pakistani migrant workers fall into the category of semi-skilled and unskilled (e.g., household servants), but some with high-level skills are employed as teachers, doctors, bankers, and similar professionals. An example of this is the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, funded largely by residents of the Gulf but very largely managed by Pakistanis at all levels.<sup>160</sup>

The Middle East has also served as an important source of investment funds for Pakistan. Many hotels and other properties in Pakistan are Arab-owned, and Karachi serves as one of the "off-shore" points for vacationing Arabs.

---

<sup>157</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan in 1983," *Asian Survey*, 14:2 (February 1984), citing *The Military Balance, 1983-84* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 97. See also *Christian Science Monitor*, October 3, 1983, and Fergus M. Bordewich, "The Pakistan Army: Sword of Islam," *Asia*, 5:3 (September-October 1982). The Saudi action terminating the troop agreement was reported in *The Nation* (Lahore), December 6, 1987.

<sup>158</sup> See Ismail Serageldin, et.al., *Manpower and International Labor Migration in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, for the World Bank).

<sup>159</sup> Ijaz Gilani, et.al., *Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Middle East and Its Impact on the Domestic Economy* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, June 1981, Research Report Series No. 126).

<sup>160</sup> *Economist*, January 27, 1990, pp. 84-86.

The advent of the Khomeini regime in 1979 did not lessen the close relations between Pakistan and Iran that had flourished under the Shah. Iran has been the third largest destination for Pakistani exports (behind Saudi Arabia and the UAE) during the revolutionary period in Iran (Iran held second place during the time of the Shah).<sup>161</sup> Pakistan and Iran have been linked together with Turkey in the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Although RCD as such no longer exists, the connections continue and have been economically valuable to Pakistan, even though Iranian refugees and militant Shi'a propaganda have at times been troublesome. The same three countries were the regional members of the Central Treaty Organization, from which both Iran and Pakistan withdrew in 1979. There are, however, troubling aspects of the revolution in Iran. These include the potential spread of radical Shi'a ideas to Pakistan's Shi'a and the presence of anti-revolution refugees in Pakistan.

The relationship with the Middle East is thus one of importance to Pakistan for many reasons. It is a relationship that any Pakistani regime would expend much effort to maintain, cultivate and expand.

### **The United States: Before Afghanistan**

The United States, as noted, did not welcome the military takeover led by Zia, a point that was expressed more emphatically after Zia canceled the elections he had promised. The Carter administration, which had taken office in January 1977, placed importance on matters such as representative government, human rights, and nuclear non-proliferation, all issues on which Pakistan failed to measure up to Carter's and congressional standards. Narcotics would become another area of contention; here Pakistan also failed. The execution of Bhutto in 1979 would increase U.S. unhappiness with the Zia regime, especially as the United States had added its voice to the international request for clemency for the former prime minister.

In March 1979, Pakistan, along with Iran, terminated its membership in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), one of the alliances on which U.S. policy of containment was built. In fact, the alliance had been dormant for some time. The loss of Iran was hardly unexpected considering the radical change of government in that country. Pakistan, seeing no advantage to its continued membership, dropped out, but the important regional country, Turkey, retained its ties with the West as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), billed originally as the economic and development adjunct to CENTO, also faded away although Pakistan's agreements with Iran and Turkey remained.

---

<sup>161</sup> *Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83*, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1983), pp. 172-173.

Carter had also affronted Zia and Pakistan when during his Asian tour in December 1978, he by-passed Pakistan while visiting both India and Iran. This was, it seemed, a signal that the Carter administration disapproved of much that was being done by Zia, and it was taken as such despite a visit to Pakistan by Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain, a U.S. ally, earlier in the year.

The termination of U.S. economic assistance came in April 1979, when the Carter administration cut off all non-food aid by implementing the Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (Coincidentally, this was the month of Bhutto's execution.) A number of nuclear non-proliferation laws are on the books in the United States, some of them predating the Carter period and others post-dating the Soviet invasion; it is best to summarize them here. The Symington amendment was added in 1976. It provides that economic assistance will be discontinued to non-nuclear-weapon countries that import uranium-enrichment technology. The next year (1977), the Glenn amendment was added to the act to prohibit aid to countries importing reprocessing (i.e., plutonium-extraction) technology; Pakistan had contracted with France for the purchase of a reprocessing plant, a proposal that was later dropped by France under U.S. pressure. Later, in 1985, the Solarz amendment was passed. This prohibits aid to non-nuclear countries that illegally export or attempt to export nuclear commodities from the United States for use in nuclear explosives. Also in 1985, the Pressler amendment was added to ban assistance and military sales to Pakistan (specifically) if it be found that Pakistan possesses a nuclear device; an annual certification by the president that Pakistan does not have a nuclear device is required. For Pakistan (only), a six-year waiver of the Symington amendment was granted in 1981; this was extended for two and a half years in 1987, and a further extension was given in early 1990. Under the law, the president may waive the Glenn amendment and he has done so. The Solarz amendment has not been waived and could be invoked as the result of a 1987 conviction of a Pakistani-born Canadian who attempted to export special steel that may have been intended for the Pakistani nuclear program. The amendment on the confirmation of the possession of a nuclear device has been met by presidential certification that Pakistan does not have such a device, but it has been reported that Pakistan has been warned that continued certification may become impossible, and in October 1990 additional misgivings about the Pakistani program have been raised.<sup>162</sup> On October 1, 1990, U.S. assistance was "suspended," at least temporarily, pending the presidential certification required under the Pressler amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. In addition to these amendments, an important law passed in 1977 provides that any non-nuclear-weapons country that explodes a nuclear device will have aid suspended. There is a provision for a presidential waiver of this law, but a waiver must be approved by a joint resolution of Congress. Pakistan is, of course, fully aware of the provisions of the amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and of the 1977 law.

---

<sup>162</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 1989, and *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 11, 1990.

There was no waiver of the Symington amendment in 1979 when the United States determined that Pakistan was importing uranium-enrichment technology and economic assistance was terminated. Other than an expression of further deterioration in relations between the two countries, there were no decisive consequences. Except for a few special cases, military sales and assistance to Pakistan had not been resumed following the suspension during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Economic assistance had decreased. The important PL 480 food assistance was not affected by the Symington amendment action.

Relations between the two countries further deteriorated after demonstrations in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi in November 1979, resulted in the deaths of four persons at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad and extensive damage to U.S. properties in each city. The riots were touched off by an erroneous report that the United States was somehow involved in a fire at the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Pakistan was slow to react to the demonstrations. Although Zia eventually apologized and Pakistan reimbursed the United States for repair costs, relations between the United States and Pakistan were at their lowest ebb when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.

### **The United States: After Afghanistan**

December 27, 1979 brought a sharp reversal in U.S.-Pakistani relations when the Soviet Union launched its invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan became a "frontline" state. The history of Pakistan-Afghan relations begins with the independence of Pakistan and has had a long and checkered career. Afghanistan distinguished itself by being the only country to vote against Pakistan's entry into the United Nations. Afghanistan claimed a large portion of Pakistan, called by the Afghans "Pukhtunistan," that included all of the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan and even extended, on some maps, into the Punjab and Sindh. Relations between the two ebbed and flowed; at times Afghanistan's land route through Pakistan to the Pakistani seaport of Karachi was closed and there were frequent exchanges of much less than friendly words.

The pre-communist Afghan government of Muhammad Daud, however, seemed ready to accept the British-drawn Durand Line as the international boundary, and talks were held with both Bhutto and Zia. The Saur revolution of April 1978, displaced (and killed) Daud and replaced the former government with a communist government. Although this change in Kabul brought the first refugees to Pakistan, Zia visited the then Afghan president, Nour Muhammad Taraki, in Kabul in September 1978. By the time the Soviets invaded, Taraki had been removed and his successor would disappear as the Soviets brought in Babrak Karmal as the new Afghan president.

The Soviet action had two immediate results for Pakistan. One was the flood of refugees who joined the earlier trickle. Another was an offer of U.S. economic and military assistance. In his 1980 state of the union address, President Carter referred to Pakistan as a "frontline" state in the battle between the "free world" and the communist empire. Zia, to an extent, supported the concept of the "free world" when he said that the people of Afghanistan should be permitted to select a government of their own choosing, leading to comments in Pakistan that he was prepared to allow Afghans a right he denied to his own Pakistanis. Pakistan did, however, immediately begin to assist the refugees at great cost to itself. The cost was soon shared by other countries, although the major burden remained on Pakistan, not only in terms of cost but also of disruption of the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan.

In addition to the refugee issue, Pakistan became the base for many of the rebel groups (*mujahiddin*) that were formed to resist the Afghan communists and the Soviets. Most had their headquarters in Peshawar, with some also located in Iran. Pakistan called on the OIC, which condemned the Soviet invasion at a foreign ministers' meeting in Islamabad on January 29, 1980. The *mujahiddin* also gained the support of China, and China's assistance to them was added to by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States. India stood almost alone among third-world countries in not condemning the Soviet Union and throughout failed to join the annual overwhelming vote against the Soviets at the United Nations General Assembly.

On February 1, 1980, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Islamabad to begin talks that would lead to a U.S. aid offer. Earlier, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington had visited. To both groups, Zia said Pakistan would accept aid only if it were given without strings attached.

It should be pointed out here that U.S. assistance to the *mujahiddin* groups was handled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Pakistan, of course, was the conduit for this aid. The Pakistani agency involved was the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, headed for much of the time by General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, a close associate of Zia who was killed with him in the Bahawalpur aircraft crash. Zia and Akhtar appeared to favor the "fundamentalists" among the *mujahiddin* organizations rather than the "moderates," a position accepted by the United States even though, in the view of some U.S. observers (including the present writer) this was contrary to the best interests of the United States. It is assumed that Zia envisioned a string of strict Islamic states: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. It has been asserted, with good reason, that Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo, who was installed after the 1985 election, disapproved of this policy, but even under the new Benazir Bhutto government control of the flow of arms to the *mujahiddin* remained in the portfolio of ISI. This chapter will not deal with how the United States, Pakistan, and others funneled supplies to the *mujahiddin*, but will consider the supplies intended for Pakistan itself.

In addition to the declaration that Pakistan was a "frontline" state, the other early steps taken by the Carter administration against the Soviet Union were ineffectual. A grain embargo against the Soviet Union only hurt U.S. farmers who were developing the rather new Soviet market; other nations were prepared to replace U.S. grain. The embargo was lifted as soon as Reagan took office. A boycott of the Moscow Olympics was equally without effect as no other major athletic power joined it. It was, of course, repeated in reverse when the Soviet Union refused to journey to the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984.

After the Brzezinski and Christopher visit, the U.S. administration did offer Pakistan a package of military and economic assistance of \$400 million to be divided equally between the two categories. Zia, fearful of provoking the Soviets, rejected the offer declaring it, in an apt word, "peanuts." Carter did receive Zia in October, 1980, when Zia attended the United Nations General Assembly session.

It was not until the Reagan administration took office that an offer of assistance acceptable to Zia was made. The policy of confrontation with the "evil empire" caused the ante to increase and Zia accepted the new and larger offer. The new package was to be \$3.2 billion over a period of six years, the amount to be equally divided between military and economic assistance. The Symington amendment was waived, but still the amount would be subject to the annual appropriation process.

The appropriation debate would cause Pakistan difficulties as each year questions of representative government, human rights, nuclear issues, and narcotics would be raised. There was little controversy over the economic assistance portion of the package. However, the military portion raised heated debate. A separate issue concerned the permission to Pakistan to purchase forty F-16 advanced aircraft. This request raised strong objections from India and these objections were listened to by some members of Congress. The sale, nonetheless, was approved, as was the military assistance program. Pakistan was, however, put on notice that there were doubts among many in the Congress and elsewhere.

The initial six-year program was completed and a new program was announced on March 24, 1986. This was to be larger, \$4.02 billion, but the split between military and economic assistance was changed, with economic aid increased to 57 percent of the total (i.e., \$2.28 billion). Pakistan was told that the program would continue even if the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Nonetheless, in early 1990 there was some question about this as the Republican leader in the Senate, Robert Dole, suggested that the five largest recipients of U.S. aid, including Pakistan, have their aid reduced in order to fund other demands on the foreign assistance budget. As already mentioned, there have been other questions raised about the Pakistani nuclear program, and there could

be further questions as a result of the dismissal of the Benazir Bhutto government in August 1990.

The Soviet Union under its new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, began to question the wisdom of retaining Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Earlier, in June 1982, indirect (referred to as "proximity") talks through United Nation intermediaries had begun in Geneva between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the Soviet Union and the United States as interested observers and occasional participants. Finally, in April 1988, a series of agreements were signed among Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union that called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops by mid-February 1989, a withdrawal that was completed on schedule.

Since then U.S. assistance to the *mujahiddin* and Soviet assistance to the Kabul regime has continued. From the Pakistani side which has charge of distributing the assistance, it seems that the rigid fundamentalist group headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar continues to be favored, although this group ought to be anathema to the United States. Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on "negative symmetry" (the ending of both Soviet and American assistance to Afghan groups) have, to the date of this writing, been inconclusive. Meanwhile, battles continue to rage in Afghanistan causing casualties to many of the about two-thirds of the Afghans remaining in Afghanistan. The remaining third are refugees in Pakistan or Iran or elsewhere. American assistance continues to flow to the *mujahiddin* through the government in Pakistan as it did to Zia's regime.

The nuclear issue did not go away when assistance was resumed. As has already been noted, additional legislation was passed including one act aimed specifically at Pakistan. The United States would continue to press Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program, even without acceptance by India of any of the Pakistani proposals. Pakistan is widely believed to have continued to press on with the program although not to the extent of actually testing a device.

Another issue became important: narcotics, specifically opium production and refining in the Northwest Frontier Province and the tribal territories and the transport of heroin into the international market. Zia, who once could say that the problem was one for the West and that demand should be eliminated so the flow would stop, could no longer say this. Heroin addiction rose rapidly in Pakistan during his time in office. It is estimated that 800,000 Pakistanis are addicted.<sup>163</sup> It is also evident that drug trafficking and competition among traffickers is an important contributor to the violence in Karachi. Some of the problem may be caused by Afghan refugees who have moved from the NWFP and are engaged in the traffic of opium derivatives originating in Afghanistan, but much of the problem is home grown—both the dealers and the

---

<sup>163</sup> *Viewpoint*, January 18, 1990.

product. The United States has given assistance to Pakistan in combating the problem, but it also seems likely that there is a network that includes some corrupt officials. Whatever the case may be, drug production and trafficking is a major international and domestic problem for Pakistan, one that grew sharply during the Zia regime.

Thus of the four key issues between Pakistan and the United States that existed before Zia or became important during his time, only two—representative government and human rights—have been solved, and with the dismissal of the Benazir Bhutto administration new questions on representative government have been raised. The nuclear and narcotics issues remain on the agenda.

### **The Soviet Union**

Relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union have never been cordial. When the Soviet Union opened close relations with newly independent states following Stalin's death, its choice in the sub-continent was India, both for its size and as Pakistan was already seeking U.S. military aid to bolster its defensive stance against India. Even Ayub's and Bhutto's attempts at "trilateralism,"— equally close relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China—failed to warm significantly the ties with Moscow. Nonetheless, the Soviets have provided some economic assistance, the centerpiece being the Karachi steel mill. A brief period of a military relationship in the 1960s was aborted following the strenuous objections of India, the country clearly favored by the Soviets in the sub-continent. The Soviets made no secret of their support for Bangladesh in 1971, topping this off with a treaty with India.

Zia did visit the Soviet Union for the funerals of the Soviet leaders who died in the 1980s, even while opposing the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Under the circumstances, however, cooperative relations were impossible. Some economic assistance did continue to flow and diplomatic relations were kept at a proper level. The withdrawal of Soviet troops did little to improve relations as Pakistan remained firm that the communist-controlled Kabul regime and its latest leader, Najibullah, must be ousted.

### **China**

China and Pakistan maintained the close relations they had developed in the pre-Zia period. Pakistan had served as a window to the outside for China and later, during Yahya's rule, had been the intermediary as China welcomed the advances of the United States toward the regularization of Sino-American relations. China supported Pakistan's position on Afghanistan (as it had in 1971 on Bangladesh) and provided assistance to the *mujahiddin*. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was one of the three conditions set by China for improved Sino-Soviet relations, the others being concerned with Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet border.



There have been reports, so far unsubstantiated, that China has given technical assistance to Pakistan in the latter's nuclear program. Pakistan's need for assistance from China for major military items lessened following the new period of U.S. assistance. But the two countries do work together diplomatically and that side of the Ayub and Bhutto "trilateralism" has been the least affected by the changes in the international climate.

### **A Prominent International Role for Pakistan?**

There can be no doubt that Pakistan now plays an important role in the international community. There is little doubt that the skillful handling of foreign policy by Zia contributed to this, a point underscored by Burki in the opening chapter of this book. Nonetheless, it was Afghanistan that propelled Pakistan to this level, and Zia used this to promote Pakistan from a relative backwater to a "frontline" position, whether or not all involved would agree on the term "frontline." Pakistan is now also an important country in terms of the Islamic world. It gained admission to the Non-Aligned Movement. Nonetheless, Pakistan remains subordinate to India in the sub-continent even though through SAARC it has, along with all other South Asian countries, gained equality in the formal actions of that body.

The question remains whether Pakistan can retain the position it has gained as the Afghan issue winds down. The answer is not yet available.

**Zia's Eleven Years:  
A Chronology of Important Events  
Shahid Javed Burki**

**1976**

*March 1:* General Tikka Khan retired from the army and was appointed special assistant to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and was given the responsibility for national security. The president promoted Lt. General Zia ul-Haq to the rank of a full general and appointed him chief of staff of the Pakistan army.

**1977**

*July 5:* Army chief of staff, General Zia ul-Haq, removed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from office and put the country under martial law. Zia appointed himself the chief martial law administrator (CMLA). Bhutto and several members of his cabinet were detained by the military authorities.

*July 10:* Martial law regulations were issued decreeing traditional Islamic punishments for certain crimes.

*July 28:* Bhutto and fifteen other political leaders were freed from detention.

*August 1:* Martial law authorities announced that national elections would be held on October 18, 1977.

*September 3:* Bhutto was arrested on charges of having conspired to murder a political opponent.

*September 6:* French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringoud met with Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in Paris and confirmed that France would sell a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan.

*October 1:* General Zia cancelled the scheduled parliamentary elections and extended martial law indefinitely.

*October 11:* Bhutto was formally charged with plotting to murder a political opponent, Ahmad Raza Kasuri. Bhutto pleaded not guilty.

## 1978

*January 14:* General Zia named a sixteen-member council of advisors. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, A. K. Brohi, General F.A. Chisti, and Agha Shahi were some of the prominent members of the council.

*February 28:* General Zia banned all political activity for a period of one month.

*March 12:* Nusrat Bhutto, wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was placed under house arrest.

*March 18:* Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was sentenced to death by the Lahore High Court after being convicted for charges of conspiracy to murder a political opponent.

*March 25:* Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appealed the death sentence to the Supreme Court.

*April:* The Supreme Court agreed to hear Bhutto's appeal against the award of the death sentence by the Lahore High Court.

*June 25:* General Zia said that he had abandoned attempts to bring political parties into a national government and would instead appoint a cabinet of his own choosing.

*July 5:* On the first anniversary of his *coup d'état*, General Zia swore in a twenty-one-member cabinet. A number of members of the Advisory Council were retained in the cabinet. These included Ghulam Ishaq Khan, General F.A. Chisti, and Agha Shahi. Also included were a number of politicians who had opposed Bhutto. Among them were Mahmood Haroon and Muhammad Khan Junejo.

*August 24:* A new twenty-four-member cabinet was sworn in by President Fazal Elahi Chaudhury. A number of politicians from the Pakistan National Alliance were taken into the cabinet in place of military and civil personnel. However, Ghulam Ishaq Khan remained in the cabinet as the senior most minister. He was put in charge of finance and planning.

*August 31:* General Zia met with Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai on bilateral relations.

*September 16:* Following the resignation of President Fazal Elahi Chaudhury, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq was sworn in as Pakistan's sixth president.

*October 4:* Benazir Bhutto was arrested at Multan airport. Her arrest sparked violent demonstrations in Multan.

*October 30:* President Zia dismissed the president of Azad Kashmir and appointed Muhammad Hayat Khan in his place.

*November 18:* A court ordered the government to release Nusrat Bhutto from house arrest.

*December 18:* Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appeared before the Supreme Court in Rawalpindi to appeal against his conviction on murder charges and said he was being mistreated in jail.

## 1979

*January 22:* Chinese Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien pledged support for Pakistan against "foreign aggression" and said China "firmly supported Pakistan's demands for "self-determination" in Kashmir.

*February 3:* Police arrested Bhutto supporters in a nationwide sweep.

*February 6:* The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bhutto case in the murder case for which he had received the death sentence from the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court gave a split judgment, four in favor and three against.

*February 10:* New penal measures based on Islamic principles of justice went into force.

*February 13:* Lawyers for Bhutto filed a request for a stay of his execution.

*March 12:* Pakistan withdrew from the Central Treaty Organization.

*March 25:* Prison officials in Rawalpindi served a warrant notifying Bhutto that the death sentence would be carried out within seven days.

*April 4:* Bhutto and four other men were executed in Rawalpindi. Bhutto's body was transported by a military aircraft to Larkana, his home town, and buried in the family graveyard before the news of the execution was made public by the government.

*September 22:* Maulana Abu Ala Maududi, Islamic scholar and cofounder of the Jama'at-i-Islami, died in Buffalo, New York, of a heart attack at the age of 76.

*October 2:* The Election Commission ruled that the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance had failed to fulfill rules governing political parties. It said that only sixteen of the more than one hundred political parties that had applied for registration would be permitted to participate in upcoming elections.

*October 16:* General Zia ul-Haq announced the postponement of elections, banned all political parties and meetings, closed some periodicals, and imposed censorship on the rest.

*October 17:* Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto were placed under house arrest. Several other opponents of the regime were also detained.

*November 5:* A Pakistani who tried to hijack a jetliner in 1978 was executed in Rawalpindi.

*November 11:* The Lahore High Court admitted a petition challenging the ban on political parties, the revocation of the second amendment to the constitution, and the postponement of the general elections.

*November 13:* Salamat Ali, a Pakistani correspondent for Hong Kong's *Far Eastern Economic Review*, was arrested at his residence. He was accused of false reporting about the situation in Balochistan.

*November 21:* Hundreds of demonstrators stormed and set fire to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees of the embassy. Pakistani troops rescued about one hundred people trapped in the embassy chancery. Demonstrators also set fire to the U.S. cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore. A British cultural center in Rawalpindi was burned. The attackers were responding to the rumor that U.S. citizens had been responsible for the attack on November 20 on the Grand Mosque in Mecca.

*November 22:* Iranian leader Ayatullah Khomeini called the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad "a great joy for us."

*November 24:* General Zia deplored the attack on the U.S. Embassy building and ordered it rebuilt "at the maximum speed."

*November 29:* The government announced that it had amended the penal code to permit imprisonment of journalists who published "defamatory material."

*November 29:* Salamat Ali of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* was sentenced to a one-year imprisonment.

*December 21:* U.S. officials said that the Soviet Union had moved three army divisions to the border with Afghanistan and had sent about fifteen hundred combat troops to an air base near Kabul.

*December 26:* A U.S. government spokesman said that in the past twenty-four hours there had been a "large-scale Soviet lift" to Kabul raising Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan to "new threshold."

*December 27:* Fighting broke out in Kabul and President Hafizullah Amin was overthrown and executed. Former Deputy Premier Babrak Karmal assumed the post of president. It was reported that Soviet troops had taken part in the fighting in Kabul.

*December 28:* President Kartnal said the Soviet Union had agreed to supply Afghanistan "urgent political, moral and economic aid, including military aid." U.S. President Jimmy Carter called the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan "a grave threat to the peace" and a "blatant violation of accepted rules of international behavior."

## 1980

*January 1:* Afghanistan said it had invited Soviet troops into the country "in view of the present aggressive actions of the enemies of Afghanistan."

*January 4:* U.S. President Jimmy Carter said the United States would provide military equipment and other assistance to help Pakistan "defend its independence and its national security" against the "seriously increased threat" from the north.

*January 13:* U.S. officials said the United States had offered Pakistan a tentative economic and military aid package of about \$400 million.

*January 17:* Zia ul-Haq said the size of the offer of U.S. aid was "peanuts" and not worth the risks Pakistan was being asked to take.

*January 18:* Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua arrived in Islamabad for talks on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

*January 24:* The European Economic Community said it would give more than \$20 million to Pakistan to aid refugees from Afghanistan.

*February 1:* U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski arrived in Islamabad for talks with Pakistani leaders.

*February 3:* Zia ul-Haq said that the talks with U.S. officials had given "new life" to a 1959 U.S. security accord with Pakistan.

*March 11:* Pakistani officials denied foreign press reports that a coup had been attempted the week before against the government.

*March 15:* The government told the Punjab High Court that retired Major General Tajammal Hussain had been arrested and charged with attempting to turn members of the armed forces against the government.

*March 30:* General Zia accepted the resignation of Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti, petroleum and labor minister.

*April 18:* General Zia met with Indian Premier Indira Gandhi in Harare, Zimbabwe, and asked her to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.

*April 25:* Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said in Paris that Pakistan had been a base for "foreign interference" in the affairs of Afghanistan.

*May 2:* General Zia arrived in Beijing on a one week visit. Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng said that China would "stand firm" with Pakistan "against foreign aggression and interference."

*May 17:* A conference of Islamic foreign ministers opened in Islamabad.

*June 3:* President Zia said that general elections to establish a civilian government would be held. He set no date for their occurrence.

*July 4:* A convention of Shi'a Muslims began in Islamabad.

*July 5:* Shi'a demonstrators protesting against government tax laws (*zakat*) clashed with police in Islamabad. At least one person was killed.

*July 6:* A government communiqué said that President Zia had promised changes in a tax law (*zakat*) that Shi'a protestors had charged was contrary to their religious beliefs.

*August 9:* Former President General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, aged 63, died.

*August 20:* A military court sentenced three leaders of the Pakistan People's Party to a year each in prison for political activity.

*August 31:* The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission said that Pakistan had become self-sufficient in the production of nuclear fuel from uranium.

*September 1:* Japan signed a \$75 million aid package for Pakistan and pledged \$1.5 million in aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

*September 3:* Acting leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party, Nafees Siddiqi, was arrested on charges of violating the martial law ban on political activity.

*September 23:* The Swiss government said it was investigating the sale of Pakistan by Swiss companies of certain industrial items because of U.S. fears that the equipment could be used to make nuclear weapons.

*October 3:* President Zia met with U.S. President Jimmy Carter in Washington.

*November 24:* The International Monetary Fund approved a \$1.7 billion loan to Pakistan to assist the country in the stabilization of its economy.

*December 2:* Former Prime Minister Chaudhury Muhammad Ali died in Karachi.

## 1981

*January 30:* President Zia returned to Rawalpindi after attending the Islamic Conference summit.

*February 16:* A grenade exploded at the national stadium in Karachi, killing the person who was carrying it and wounding two others. The explosion occurred minutes before Pope John Paul II was to arrive at the stadium to celebrate mass.

*February 26:* Nusrat Bhutto was arrested in Lahore after her meeting with opposition leaders.

*February 27:* Nusrat Bhutto was released from jail.

*March 2:* A Pakistani International Airlines (PIA) plane with 141 on board was hijacked on a domestic flight from Karachi to Peshawar and forced to fly to Kabul, Afghanistan.

*March 4:* The PIA hijackers released twenty-nine hostages.

*March 6:* The PIA hijackers killed a Pakistani diplomat aboard the plane.

*March 9:* The hijacked plane was flown to Damascus, Syria. President Zia swore in a twenty-member cabinet including Ghulam Ishaq Khan (finance and economic affairs), Agha Shahi (foreign affairs), and Mahmood Haroon (interior affairs).

*March 14:* The hijackers surrendered to Syrian authorities after a plane carrying fifty-five political prisoners released by the Pakistani government arrived in Damascus.

*March 22:* President Zia said that he had asked Syria to extradite the three hijackers. Syria refused the Pakistani request.



*March 24:* President Zia promulgated a new law authorizing him to amend the constitution.

*April 9:* The government said it would pay the United States \$13.6 million to rebuild the U.S. Embassy, which was burned down by demonstrators in November 1979.

*April 19:* According to a BBC report from London, Murtaza Bhutto, the son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had taken responsibility for the March hijacking of the Pakistani plane. The hijacking was the work of his organization, al-Zulfikar, created to avenge his father's execution.

*April 21:* Agha Shahi said the United States had offered a five-year economic and military assistance package to Pakistan.

*April 25:* The three hijackers of the Pakistani plane and twenty five of the political prisoners released by Pakistan were reported to have arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, and joined the al-Zulfikar organization.

*June 1:* Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang arrived in Pakistan for a four-day visit.

*June 6:* Martial law authorities extended by a ninety-day period the detention of Nusrat Bhutto.

*June 15:* The U.S. State Department announced that an agreement had been reached on a \$3 billion, six-year aid package to Pakistan. The amount was to be divided equally between military and economic assistance.

*July 18:* Murtaza Ali Bhutto told the Indian magazine, India Today, that thousands of Afghan-based guerrillas had infiltrated into Pakistan and were awaiting instructions for an uprising.

*July 25:* Monsoon rains flooded Lahore, killing twenty-one people.

*August 15:* Authorities released eight imprisoned political leaders including former Defense Minister Tikka Khan, former Communications Minister Khurshid Hasan Meer, and former Production Minister Farouk Leghari.

*August 21:* Foreign Minister Agha Shahi met in Washington with Secretary of State Alexander Haig to discuss military and economic aid.

*September 15:* Pakistan accepted a six-year U.S. aid program valued at \$3.2 billion, divided equally between military and economic assistance.

*September 25:* Chaudhury Zahur Elahi, a former leader of the Muslim League and a member of an earlier cabinet under Zia ul-Haq, was assassinated in Lahore.

*September 30:* Pakistani commandos stormed a hijacked Indian plane and arrested five Sikh separatists who had boarded the plane in Delhi.

*October 8:* Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain met with President Zia and visited the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

*October 15:* Journalists in five cities gathered to protest official censorship of the press. The demonstrations were organized by the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists and the All-Pakistan Newspaper Editors Convention.

*October 24:* President Zia reiterated Pakistan's commitment to continue its nuclear development program.

*December 3:* Student elections sparked gun battles between rival groups at Karachi university. An Islamic student group, Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, won the election.

*December 14:* U.S. House and Senate conferees lifted a ban on military aid and arms sales to Pakistan but approved measures decreasing assistance to non-nuclear countries that acquired and detonated nuclear weapons.

*December 24:* President Zia announced the formation of a 350-member nominated assembly called Majlis-i-Shura.

## 1982

*January 14:* Interior Minister Mahmood Haroon said 480 suspected members of the al-Zulfikar organization were arrested.

*February 16:* Pakistan's foreign minister Agha Shahi resigned because of ill health. He was succeeded by the ambassador to Paris, Sahabzada Yaqub Ali Khan.

*March 17:* From Delhi, India radio reported that the Zia government had 3,500 political prisoners.

*March 18:* The government warned four opposition leaders including Nusrat Bhutto that a recent call for elections and release of political prisoners violated martial law and could result in the Bhuttos' imprisonment. In Lahore twenty thousand teachers demonstrated for higher pay.

*March 21:* Fifteen thousand striking teachers were prevented from entering Islamabad to attend a planned demonstration.

*March 24:* In Peshawar, police broke up protests by 25,000 striking teachers. Fifteen people were reported wounded and one hundred arrests were made.

*April 10:* President Zia said he rejected last year a U.S. request to station troops and arms in Pakistan. The U.S. State Department refused to comment.

*April 15:* The Reagan administration requested congressional approval for \$275 million in military aid to Pakistan.

*April 24:* The All Pakistan Newspaper Society called for a national strike to protest an attack by the religious student organization Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba on newspaper offices in Lahore. In Sindh, three thousand professors boycotted classes to support wage-hike and other demands.

*May 10:* Over 2.7 million Afghan refugees were reported to be living in Pakistan.

*May 29:* The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the administration's request for aid to Pakistan of \$500 million.

*June 22:* Minister to the Federal Advisory Assembly Malik Shahzadah Khan was killed by unidentified gunmen near Islamabad.

*August 14:* President Zia promised to present the nation with "the framework of an Islamic system of government" within one year.

*August 22:* Pakistan and China signed an agreement opening their borders.

*October 17:* President Zia arrived in China on an official visit.

*November 2:* U.S. Attorney General William French Smith, on a visit to northwest Pakistan, assured Afghan refugees of his government's full support to them and their cause.

*November 13:* The government lifted an order of house arrest on Nusrat Bhutto and permitted her to travel abroad. It was reported that she was suffering from cancer.

*November 20:* President Zia told reporters that between 2.8 and 3.0 million Afghan refugees had fled to Pakistan.

*December 1:* The government started soliciting bids for the construction of a second nuclear reactor.

*December 7:* While on a state visit to Washington, President Zia told President Reagan that Pakistan was not interested in making nuclear weapons.

## 1983

*January 16:* The first three of forty F-16 fighter aircraft arrived in Pakistan from the United States.

*January 29:* Shi'a and Sunni Muslim groups clashed in Karachi, wounding at least thirty people.

*March 23:* In Karachi, five days of Shi'a and Sunni riots left eleven people dead and ninety-four houses destroyed. Two hundred seventy-four people were arrested.

*March 28:* President Zia lifted formal press restrictions but warned the press to practice self-censorship.

*March 29:* French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson announced in Islamabad that France was negotiating the possible supply of nuclear technology to Pakistan.

*April 12:* In Karachi, religious strife erupted between Shi'a and the Sunni Muslims. Troops were called in to quell the rioting.

*April 14:* Shi'a leaders called off a demonstration of 100,000 Shi'a Muslims in Karachi in an effort to diffuse religious tensions.

*May 8:* In Punjab province thousands of students and teachers demonstrated against government's plans to denationalize schools.

*May 19:* The Human Rights Society of Pakistan charged the government with torturing to death at least nine prisoners since President Zia ul-Haq came to power.

*July 2:* U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz arrived in Pakistan on an official visit.

*August 12:* President Zia announced that elections to the National Assembly would be held within eighteen months.

*August 13:* Opposition leaders rejected President Zia's pledge to hold elections by March 1985. They said a civil disobedience campaign would begin on August 14.

*August 14:* Throughout the country, protestors defied martial law to open a campaign against the government. In Karachi tens of thousands of pro- and anti-government protestors fought in the streets.

*August 15:* Anti-government protests continued in Sindh province. Over four hundred demonstrators were reported arrested, including opposition leader Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

*August 17:* Police and protestors clashed in the Sindh province town of Dadu, killing one policeman.

*August 18:* Police killed four people and wounded seventeen during anti-government protests in Sindh province.

*August 21:* The military government threatened stiff penalties against protestors.

*August 22:* Up to fifty thousand demonstrators protested in the town of Khairpur in Sindh province. Police fired on the crowd, killing one person and wounding a second.

*August 23:* Police fired on anti-government demonstrators in the Sindh town of Kandh Kot, killing at least two people and wounding over fifty.

*August 24:* Over five thousand protestors rioted in the Sindh town of Shandadkot. Demonstrations-took place throughout Sindh including in Karachi.

*August 24:* One policeman and one protestor were killed in riots near the home town of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

*August 28:* Police in Naudero, the site of the tomb of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prevented a planned anti-government protest.

*August 29:* President Zia rejected talks with the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, calling its leadership "riff-raff."

*September 3:* Seven people, five policemen and two protesters, died during violent demonstrations in Sindh.

*September 24:* Police in Sindh province reportedly arrested over two hundred people as campaigning began for local elections on September 28.

*September 26:* Nusrat Bhutto called on the army to overthrow President Zia.

*September 27:* Police in the Sindh village of Chandio killed at least seventeen anti-government protestors attempting to halt local elections.

*October 2:* Anti-election violence in Sindh province led to at least six deaths as opposition protests continued.

*October 6:* About four thousand lawyers staged an anti-government protest in Lahore.

*October 19:* A gun battle between security forces and villagers in Sindh, killed five people and wounded sixty.

*October 23:* According to the government over four thousand people had been arrested in ten weeks of civil protest, with 2,527 remaining in jail.

*October 26:* Over ten thousand people participated in anti-government demonstrations in Lahore.

*November 10:* Interior Minister Mahmood Haroon said sixty-one people were killed and 4,691 wounded in anti-government demonstrations in Sindh over the last three months. Unofficial estimates put the death toll at three hundred and the wounded at over eight thousand.

*November 12:* Police fired into a crowd of protestors during an anti-government rally in Sindh.

*December 24:* President Zia extended a ban on political activity by members of the Pakistan People's Party for ten years, saying the PPP had brought Pakistan to the brink of crisis and would not be allowed to rule again.

## 1984

*January 7:* Police fired on rioting prisoners attempting to escape from a Sindh jail. One inmate was killed and five were wounded.

*January 19:* According to the opposition seventy members of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy were freed from jail by the government.

*January 24:* President Zia said that he would free opposition politicians before parliamentary elections scheduled for March.

*February 13:* President Zia denied that Pakistan had plans to make a nuclear bomb.

*February 19:* Karachi University was closed for seven days due to student violence on campus.

*February 21:* President Zia set October as the date for general elections.

*February 27:* Six opposition leaders were freed from jail including Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, leader of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.

*March 9:* India announced that negotiations on an India-Pakistan treaty would be held in May.

*March 9:* Three opposition leaders in the Northwest Frontier Province were freed from house arrest.

*March 12:* President Zia said that national elections would be held on an Islamic basis.

*April 9:* Zia said he would not run for president in elections now promised for March 1985.

*April 12:* The government freed 281 political prisoners held in Sindh.

*April 26:* The government banned members of the Ahmadiya community from calling themselves Muslims and using Islamic terminology or preaching to Muslims.

*May 9:* The government banned all reporting on outlawed political parties. Students in all major cities boycotted classes and marched to protest a government ban on student unions and the detention of about one hundred students.

*May 15:* U.S. Vice President George Bush held talks with President Zia during a four-day visit to Pakistan.

*May 21:* Thousands of Muslims from rival sects clashed in Lahore leaving thirty-five people injured.

*June 21:* U.S. Senator Alan Cranston said U.S. government sources had told him that Pakistan had developed the ability to make nuclear weapons after obtaining design assistance from China.

*June 26:* An Indian defense ministry spokesman said Pakistani and Indian troops had clashed on June 11 along the border in Kashmir state, resulting in one Indian death and "heavy" Pakistani casualties.

*July 9:* President Zia denied allegations by Senator Cranston that Pakistan was developing a nuclear bomb.

*July 12:* Legal sources said forty-one people had been charged with conspiring to overthrow the Zia government in 1980 with Libyan help.

*July 16:* Three Pakistanis were indicted in Houston, Texas, trying to ship nuclear weapons parts to Pakistan.

*August 9:* Over fifty women defying a ban on demonstrations protested approval of a draft bill revising the law of evidence to conform with Islamic law.

*August 30:* Twenty-two supporters of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, including two former members of Parliament, were sentenced in absentia for aiding the underground al-Zulfikar organization.

*October 7:* Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi warned Pakistan that if it did not meet India's demands for a treaty to reduce border tensions, India would be prepared to "meet any eventuality."

*December 1:* President Zia announced a December 19 referendum on his Islamic policies, approval of which would mean his reelection for another five years.

*December 5:* The eleven-party alliance Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) called for a boycott of the December 19 referendum.

*December 20:* Government election officials announced the results of the referendum: 62 percent of the voters participated of which 97.7 percent voted in favor of continuing Zia's Islamic policies. The MRD denounced the results as "an unprecedented fraud" and said only 510 percent of eligible voters had participated.

*December 24:* At least six Pakistani opposition leaders, including Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and MRD Secretary-General Khwaja Khairuddin, were arrested prior to an opposition rally.

*December 26:* Khan Abdul Wali Khan, principal opposition leader in the Northwest Frontier Province, was placed under house arrest. Jatoi and Khairuddin were released.

## 1985

*January 12:* President Zia announced that elections would be held on February 25 to replace the-parliament disbanded in July 1977.



*January 20:* Opposition parties decided to boycott the February elections unless the suspended 1973 constitution was restored.

*February 21:* Air Marshal Jamal Ahmad Khan was appointed air force chief effective March 6.

*February 25:* Elections were held to the National Assembly.

*February 26:* Election results were announced by the Election Commission. Seven of Zia's cabinet ministers were ousted from office by voters, and thirty out of seventy members of the existing national legislature, whose members had been picked by Zia, also lost their seats. However, the government expressed satisfaction with the results, claiming an unexpectedly high 52 percent voter turnout.

*February 28:* Voting took place for the provincial assemblies.

*March 2:* Zia announced planned amendments to the constitution that would give him sweeping powers even if martial law was lifted.

*March 10:* Zia used a martial law decree to revive parts of the 1973 constitution but kept the sections on fundamental rights suspended.

*March 18:* Zia promulgated new amendments to the constitution, one of which specified that "the president's orders made since the 5th of July, 1977, shall not be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the president."

*March 20:* Zia appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as prime minister.

*March 25:* Junejo received a unanimous vote of confidence from the National Assembly.

*April 10:* Prime Minister Junejo appointed a thirteen member central cabinet.

*July 14:* Seven army officers were condemned to long prison terms for conspiring against the military government of President Zia ul-Haq.

*July 18:* The body of Shahnawaz Bhutto, the son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was found in his residence in Cannes, France.

*July 22:* Benazir Bhutto returned to Karachi with the body of her brother. Tens of thousands of mourners attended funeral rites for Shahnawaz Bhutto in Larkana.

*August 29:* Benazir Bhutto was placed under house arrest for ninety days.

*September 22:* President Zia ul-Haq said that martial law would be lifted by December 31, 1985, whether or not the national assembly passes the controversial constitutional amendment bill.

*November 4:* Benazir Bhutto was released from house arrest and went abroad for medical treatment.

*December 17:* In a meeting in Delhi between President Zia and Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian prime minister, Pakistan and India pledged not to attack one another's nuclear installations. Pakistan's parliament passed a bill reviving banned political parties, paving the way for the lifting of martial law.

*December 29:* President Zia named civilian governors for Pakistan's four provinces: Lt. Gen. (retired) Jehan Dad Khan for Sindh; Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi for Punjab; Abdul Ghafoor Hoti for the Northwest Frontier Province; and General (retired) Muhammad Musa for Balochistan. Muhammad Halim was sworn in as new chief justice

*December 30:* President Zia ul-Haq announced the end of martial law in a speech to a joint session of Parliament.

## 1986

*January 16:* Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo formally adopted the Muslim League as the ruling party and became its leader.

*January 29:* Prime Minister Junejo named a new cabinet with Yaqub Khan in charge of foreign affairs, Yasin Khan Wattoo in charge of finance, and Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak in charge of the Interior.

*March 8:* Government troops in the Gendaf area in the North clashed with opium poppy-growing tribesmen leaving at least thirteen dead and more than sixty injured.

*April 2:* Authorities promised to pay \$13,000 to each family whose members died in a clash with armed forces in Gendaf.

*April 10:* Benazir Bhutto returned from self-imposed exile and was welcomed by more than a hundred thousand supporters in Lahore. She called for new elections and urged President Zia ul-Haq to resign.

*April 22:* An estimated crowd of 100,000 greeted Bhutto in a rally in Peshawar.

*May 4:* At a rally in Karachi estimated to have drawn a quarter of a million people, Bhutto threatened to mobilize her supporters against the government if President Zia ul-Haq failed to set a date for elections.

*May 10:* Five people were injured in a gunfight that erupted after a bus, operated by a Pathan driver, ran over and killed a *muhajir* boy.

*May 11:* Police used tear gas to disperse rioters as disturbances continued between rival groups of Pathans and *muhajirs*.

*May 14:* President Zia issued a decree backdated to December 30, 1985 (when martial law ended), protecting Prime Minister Junejo and other Muslim League members who had joined the party before it was registered by the Election Commission in February.

*May 26:* The National Assembly passed a no-confidence motion against Speaker Fakhr Imam by a vote of 152 to 72.

*June 8:* Rasul Bakhsh Palejo of the leftist Awami Tehrik Party was freed from jail where he had spent more than seven years.

*July 14:* Prime Minister Junejo arrived in Washington for a state visit.

*August 14:* Benazir Bhutto was arrested for speaking at a banned political rally in Karachi.

*August 30:* Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a leading member of the Pakistan People's Party, was arrested at the Karachi airport when he returned to Pakistan after nine years of self-imposed exile in London.

*September 5:* A Pan Am Boeing 747 was hijacked while taking on passengers at the Karachi airport. The four hijackers, identified as Palestinians, called for the release of friends from a prison in Cyprus.

*September 6:* Sixteen people were killed in the Pan Am plane when the hijackers panicked and opened fire on the passengers. The hijackers were arrested by an army commando unit that was planning to board the plane.

*September 8:* Benazir Bhutto was released.

*September 15:* Chinese and Pakistani officials signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement.

*November 3:* In Karachi, for the second day, troops fired on rival ethnic groups. At least forty-four people were killed since rioting began on October 31.

*December 13:* Three thousand troops backed by tanks and artillery moved into Sohrab Goth, a Pathan settlement on the outskirts of Karachi, and confiscated drugs and arms. Pathans protested and riots spread to other parts of the city. A curfew was imposed and trucks moved in to remove some 25,000 Pathans, some from Afghanistan, from the area.

*December 14:* Pathans attacked *muhajirs* in the Orangi section of Karachi as government troops continued its sweep through Sohrab Goth. Troops enforced a round-the-clock curfew.

*December 15:* Mobs of Pathans and *muhajirs* continued to kill each other in Karachi, raising the death toll to 122. A curfew was imposed on Hyderabad after rioting flared up there.

*December 17:* Karachi began to return to normalcy. The death toll from four days of rioting was estimated at 174.

*December 20:* The central cabinet resigned after a meeting called to review the situation in Karachi.

*December 22:* A new twelve-man cabinet was sworn in with Muhammad Khan Junejo remaining prime minister. Yasin Khan Wattoo (finance) and Sahabzada Yaqub Khan (foreign affairs) also retained their portfolios. Mahbub ul-Haq, planning minister in the old cabinet, was conspicuously absent.

## 1987

*January 1:* The cabinet of Sindh province resigned in order to allow Chief Minister Syed Ghous Ali Shah to form a new cabinet in the wake of communal riots. Bhutto and other opposition leaders asked for the resignation of Shah as well as that of the Sindh governor Jahan Dad Khan.

*January 4:* Jahan Dad Khan, governor of Sindh, was replaced by Ashraf Tabbani.

*January 13:* Ethnic violence erupted again in Sindh.

*January 23:* India announced it was moving fresh army troops into position along its border with Pakistan. Pakistani forces were placed on high alert.

*January 25:* Prime Minister Junejo, in an emergency session of Parliament, said Pakistan had stressed its desire for peaceful relations with India and asked for immediate negotiations with Delhi.

*February 4:* Pakistan and India reached an agreement which provides for the withdrawal of their troops to peacetime positions in some sectors of their common borders.

*February 11:* Pakistan and India began withdrawing more than 150,000 soldiers from their common border following the agreement reached on February 4.

*February 21:* President Zia was entertained by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi. Zia had gone to India at the invitation of the cricket authorities of India to watch a cricket match between India and Pakistan.

*February 25.* The United States warned Pakistan that it must halt progress toward building an atomic bomb or face a cutoff of economic and military assistance.

*March 1:* An Indian journalist reported Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of Pakistan's nuclear research program, as saying that Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb.

*March 8:* According to U.S. officials, the United States decided it could not stop Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons and was unwilling to cut aid because of the country's strategic importance.

*March 17:* Canada changed development assistance to Pakistan from loans to grants, saving the country \$40 million.

*May 7:* France offered to build a nuclear power plant in Pakistan after a settlement is reached on France's 1978 decision to pull out of a similar deal.

*May 19:* Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan met with U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz in Washington. Khan said a Pakistani defense team was meeting with a U.S. team to assess Pakistan's defense needs.

*May 28:* According to press reports emanating from Washington, the U.S. has agreed in principle to supply Pakistan with AWACs or E2C Hawkeyes for airborne surveillance.

*June 4:* Islamabad announced plans for a 5 percent tax on all imports and domestic industrial production to finance the \$2.6 billion defense budget.

*June 6:* Pakistanis took to the streets of Karachi to protest proposed taxes announced in the 1987-88 budget.

*June 8:* In response to public reaction, Prime Minister Junejo appointed a fourteen-member committee to revise the budget to make it more acceptable to the people. The committee was given twenty-four hours to complete its task.

*June 11:* Police broke up traders demonstrating against proposed new taxes. Protests were reported in Lahore, Karachi, and Rawalpindi.

*June 13:* Changes and concessions in the 1987-88 budget were announced in the National Assembly.

*July 8:* Prime Minister Junejo confirmed recent "skirmishes" with Indian forces in the disputed Siachen Glacier area.

*July 14:* In Karachi at least seventy-two people were killed and more than 250 wounded when two car bombs exploded in the crowded Bori Bazaar shopping district. The blasts caused riots in which demonstrators chanted slogans against the three million Afghan refugees who have entered Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of 1979.

*July 16:* The government denied any involvement in a plot to obtain a steel alloy from the United States that is used in the production of nuclear weapons. The denial follows the arrest of a Pakistani citizen, Arshad Pervez, for attempting to export the alloy illegally.

*July 28:* Prime Minister Junejo made several changes in the cabinet including the appointment of Malik Nasim Ahmad Ahir as minister of the interior.

*August 28:* Troops were called out in Karachi to control Pathan-*muhajir* violence. The death toll was estimated at twenty-eight.

*August 30:* Over four hundred people, including Altaf Hussein, leader of *Muhajir Quami Mahaz*, were arrested in Karachi.

*September 29:* India said its forces repelled a battalion-sized attack by Pakistani troops on a post in the Siachen Glacier area.

*October 1:* The United States terminated aid to Pakistan because of Pakistan's nuclear development program and the expiration of a six-year-old waiver for Pakistan allowing it to receive economic and military aid despite the program.

*November 1:* Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan resigned, citing personal reasons.

*November 4:* At the summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Katmandu, Nepal, Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo

and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi agreed to a series of diplomatic meetings to improve bilateral relations.

*December 7:* The Supreme Court agreed to examine a constitutional petition submitted by Benazir Bhutto which challenges the authority of President Zia ul-Haq. The hearings were scheduled for February 1988.

*December 17:* U.S. Congressional negotiators decided to reinstate aid to Pakistan despite its nuclear weapons' program.

*December 24:* Zain Noorani was appointed minister of state for foreign affairs.

## 1988

*February 1:* Four leading members of the People's Party of Pakistan resigned their central committee posts citing "deep differences with the high command."

*February 11:* In Philadelphia, Arshad Pervez was sentenced to five years in prison for trying to ship restricted metals to Pakistan for use in its nuclear weapons program.

*March 5:* Air Marshal Hakimullah Khan was appointed chief of the air force replacing retiring Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmad Khan.

*March 7:* In Rawalpindi political leaders including Prime Minister Junejo and opposition leader Benazir Bhutto met in an "all parties conference" and urged all involved in the conflict in Afghanistan to end the war in that country.

*March 24:* After the completion of the first six-year program of special assistance to Pakistan, the United States announced agreement on a new program, also for six years. The new program was valued at \$4.02 billion with 57 percent (i.e. \$2.28 billion) for economic assistance and the remaining 43 percent for military aid.

*April 10:* In Ojhri Camp near Rawalpindi an explosion at an ammunitions dump killed at least one hundred persons when rockets, artillery shells and other weapons-showered the city.

*April 25:* Pakistan was reported to have test-fired a missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. The missile was reported to have been developed with the help of Chinese experts.

*April 26:* Oil and gas were reported discovered in four areas in Sindh. The discoveries were expected to increase the share of domestic output to one half of total consumption.

May 12: The National Economic Council approved the draft of the seventh five-year plan (1988-93).

May 23: President Zia ul-Haq announced that he would step down as army chief in 1990 though he may stay on as president for another term.

May 29: President Zia ul-Haq dismissed Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo along with his cabinet, citing their inability to maintain law and order and establish an Islamic society as the causes for their dismissal. He promised elections within ninety days.

May 30: President Zia dissolved the four provincial assemblies.

May 31: President Zia announced that he would lead a caretaker government to replace one dismissed on May 29.

June 9: President Zia named a sixteen-member caretaker government that included Yaqub Khan (foreign affairs) and Mahbub ul-Haq (finance and planning) from the dismissed Junejo cabinet.

June 15: The cabinet approved a draft ordinance decreeing shariah supreme law in Pakistan. President Zia said the next National Assembly would have the power to ratify or rescind the order.

June 20: The Supreme Court upheld a petition by Benazir Bhutto against the requirement that political parties register with the Election Commission. The ruling allowed Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party to contest elections though it was not registered.

June 25: President Zia announced the introduction of an Islamic economic system. In addition to an interest-free economy, Zia also announced plans for a new welfare system and an income tax (outside the *zakat*) for persons of a specified income.

June 28: Oil and gas deposits were discovered in the Sanghar district of Sindh. Future output was estimated at two thousand barrels of oil a day and 1.38 million cubic feet of gas a day.

July 10: Pakistan announced it had reached an agreement with Bangladesh for the return of some 250,000 Biharis living in sixty-six Bangladeshi camps since the latter achieved independence in 1971.

July 20: President Zia announced that national and provincial elections would be held November 16.



*July 21:* President Zia announced that elections would not be held on a party basis.

*August 17:* President Zia ul-Haq, along with twenty-nine other people, including General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and Ambassador Arnold L. Rafael of the United States, died when their Pakistan airforce C-130 aircraft crashed near Bahawalpur, a city in central Punjab. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of the Senate, was sworn in as president and General Mirza Aslam Beg, vice chief of army staff, was appointed as the army's chief of staff.

*August 20:* Zia ul-Haq was buried in the compound of the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad. His funeral was attended by a large number of foreign dignitaries.

## **Biographical Sketches of Important Personalities During the Zia Period**

### **Robert LaPorte, Jr.**

#### **Abassi, S. M.**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan Army. Appointed governor of Sindh Province by General Zia in 1978 and served in that position until 1984.

#### **Agha Khan**

Spiritual leader of the Ismaili sect of Islam. The Agha Khan Foundation played an important role in Pakistan's human resource and rural development during the Zia period by establishing the Agha Khan Medical University in Karachi (the first private institution of higher education in Pakistan) and establishing the Agha Khan Rural Development Programme in Gilgit.

#### **Ahmad, Qazi Hasan**

Fundamentalist religious leader. Replaced Mian Tufail Muhammad as the amir or leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1979. Under Qazi Hasan's leadership, the Jamaat broke with General Zia and joined with the PPP in the opposition's campaign against Zia.

#### **Akbar Khan, Zahid Ali**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Born in Jullundur, East Punjab in 1933. He was appointed corps commander of Rawalpindi by General Zia in 1985 and chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) in 1988, a position in which he was retained by the government of Benazir Bhutto.

#### **Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan**

General Akhtar was one of General Zia's close associates at the time of the *coup* against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP government. He was appointed director general of Inter-Services Intelligence and therefore was a key person in decision making on Afghanistan. He was later appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee by General Zia and died in the same plane crash that killed General Zia.

#### **Ali, Imtiaz**

Major General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Served as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's military secretary. After Zia's coup, he remained in the army for a short period but then went into self-imposed exile. He returned to Pakistan in 1988 and was appointed defense adviser by Benazir Bhutto.

### **Anwarul Haq, Sheikh**

Born in Jullundur, East Punjab. Was appointed chief justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court by General Zia. During his tenure as chief justice, the Supreme Court of Pakistan provided a legal cover under the "doctrine of necessity" for Zia's *coup d'état* of July 5, 1977, and confirmed the death sentence handed down by the Lahore High Court to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He also chaired the Civil Services Reform Commission appointed by Zia in 1978. In 1985, Anwarul was quoted as saying that Zia had far exceeded the judges' original intention regarding Zia's imposition of martial law in 1977. He died in 1989.

### **Arif, Khalid Mahmud**

General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Born in Jullundur in East Punjab, he was a close associate and political confidant of General Zia from 1977-87. In 1980, General Zia appointed him minister of state, adviser on military affairs. In 1981, he was appointed chief of staff to the president and served in that position until Zia appointed him to succeed General Muhammad Sawar Khan as vice chief of the army staff in 1984. He served in this capacity until 1987.

### **Asghar Khan**

Air Marshal (retd.) of the Pakistan air force. A vocal and very public opponent of Field Marshal Ayub, General Yahya, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia. Leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, which he founded in 1970. The Tehrik, however, has not emerged as a strong (in terms of popular support) political party and failed to capture a seat in the national assembly election of 1988.

### **Azim, Ejaz**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Appointed by General Zia as Pakistan ambassador to the United States in September 1981 and served in that capacity until November 1986.

### **Beg, Mirza Aslam**

General of the Pakistan army and chief of the army staff. He comes from the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh and was appointed by General Zia as vice chief of the army staff in 1987, succeeding General Arif. Beg became chief of the army staff upon the death of General Zia.

### **Bhutto, Benazir**

Born in 1953, she is the oldest child of Zulfikar Ali. Educated at Radcliffe College and Oxford University. Co-chairperson, along with her mother, of the People's Party of Pakistan following the execution of her father. As co-chairperson, she was the most visible opposition leader during the Zia Period. She became prime minister of Pakistan after the November 1988 elections but was removed from office by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on August 6, 1990.

### **Bhutto, Mumtaz Ali**

Cousin of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Sindhi politician. Served in various political positions during the Bhutto period (1971-77) and was one of the "uncles" who split from the PPP led by Benazir.

### **Bhutto, Nusrat**

Coming from an Iranian family, she was the second wife of Zulfikar Ali and mother of Benazir. She was active in the opposition to General Zia before and after her husband's execution. From December 1988 until August 1990, she served as senior minister in her daughter's government. She serves as co-chairperson of the PPP.

### **Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali**

Born in January 1927, he was president and then prime minister of Pakistan (1971-77). Educated at the University of California, Berkeley, and Oxford University. A Sindhi landlord and lawyer, Bhutto entered national politics as a member of two of Ayub's cabinets in the 1960s. He left Ayub's government in 1968. He was a founder of the People's Party of Pakistan and its most prominent leader. He appointed General Zia as chief of the army staff in March 1976. Zia removed Bhutto from office by a *coup d'état* on July 5, 1977. After a lengthy trial, Zia had Bhutto executed on April 4, 1979.

### **Chisti, Faiz Ali**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Born in 1927 in Jullundur, East Punjab. An Arain, he was the commander of Operation Fairplay, the military operation that performed the coup against Bhutto in 1977. He was appointed chief of staff to the chief martial Law administrator in 1978 and minister of labour and manpower, northern areas and Kashmir affairs, petroleum and natural resources in 1979, and was an important adviser to General Zia during the early years of the Zia period.

### **Fakhr Imam, Syed**

Landlord and politician from Punjab. Educated at the University of California, Davis. Elected as member and later chairman of the Multan District Council in 1979. Was appointed federal minister of local government and rural development by General Zia and served in that capacity until 1983. Elected as an independent member in the National Assembly (1985-88). Served as the speaker of the National Assembly (1985-87). Leading member of the opposition to Prime Minister Junejo's government (1987-88).

### **Fazle Haq, Sahibzada**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Appointed governor of the Northwest Frontier Province in 1978 by General Zia and served in that position until 1986. He was an important adviser to General Zia during the early years of the Zia period. He also served as caretaker chief minister of the NWFP between May 1988 and December 1988.

His party, the Jamaat-ul-Mashaikh, joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad in opposition to the PPP in the 1988 elections.

### **Gokal, Mustafa**

Industrialist. Worked with Ghulam Ishaq Khan, A.G.N. Kazi, Vaseem A. Jaffrey, and Habibullah Khan Khattak during the early years of the Zia period in managing the economy. Gokal and Habibullah, were the two representatives of the business community on this team. The other three were civil servants. In 1980, General Zia appointed him minister of state, adviser on shipping, and he served in that capacity until 1984.

### **Habibullah Khan Khattak, M.**

Industrialist and Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army from the NWFP. Founder of the Ghandhara group (the eleventh largest business group in Pakistan in 1968). Arrested by the Zulfikar A. Bhutto government in 1971. Was appointed adviser for industries and production by General Zia in 1978. During the first two years of the Zia period, Habibullah worked with Ghulam Ishaq Khan and others on managing the economy and was one of two businessmen to serve in this capacity.

### **Haq, Mahbub ul**

Economist. Born in Jamun in 1934. Served as chief economist with the federal Planning Commission during the Ayub Period. Was the director of the Policy Planning Department of the World Bank (1970-83). Appointed minister of planning and development by General Zia (1984) and also served as finance minister (1985-88). Currently he is serving as a senator.

### **Haroon, Mahmood A.**

Appointed first as minister of interior, religious affairs, minorities affairs and political affairs by General Zia in 1979 and continued to serve as minister of interior until 1985.

### **Iqbal Khan, Mohammad**

General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Appointed by General Zia as deputy chief of the army staff in 1978. Zia created this post and Iqbal was the first person appointed to it. He also served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1979 to 1984.

### **Ishaq Khan, Ghulam**

Civil servant (CSP) from NWFP. President of Pakistan. Ishaq was a member of the Provincial Civil Service in the NWFP at independence. He became a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). He has served in several important positions during almost every government since independence, including chairman, West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA—the major public utility in Pakistan); secretary, federal Ministry of Finance; and secretary-general. In 1977, General Zia appointed him secretary-general in chief and adviser for planning and co-

ordination. In 1979, he was appointed minister of finance, provincial co-ordination and commerce. In 1982, he became minister of finance and economic affairs and held that position until 1985 when he was elected as a senator. He became chairman of the Senate and succeeded General Zia as acting president upon Zia's death in August 1988. He was elected president in December 1988.

### **Jaffrey, Vaseem A.**

Civil servant (CSP). Former governor of the State Bank and secretary, federal Ministry of Finance. Worked with Ghulam Ishaq Khan on managing the economy during the Zia period. Financial adviser to Prime Minister Junejo. Appointed financial adviser to the prime minister by Benazir Bhutto.

### **Jahan Dad Khan**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. One of the army corps commanders at the time of the military takeover in 1977. He was appointed governor of Sindh Province in 1985 by General Zia and served in that capacity until 1986.

### **Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan**

Landlord and politician from Sindh. Opponent of General Zia. Member of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's cabinet (1971-77). Was a founder and leader of the PPP in Sindh and one of the main forces behind the creation of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1981. Was one of the "uncles" who broke with the PPP led by Benazir. Joined with Khar in establishing the National People's Party in 1986. Appointed prime minister of the caretaker government (August 1990 to October 1990) by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

### **Jilani Khan, Ghulam**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Was important adviser to General Zia during the early years of the Zia period. Appointed governor of Punjab Province in 1980 by General Zia and served in that position until 1986.

### **Junejo, Muhammad Khan**

Sindhi landlord and politician. Member of one of the cabinets in the province of West Pakistan in the 1960s. Elected to the National Assembly in 1985 and was picked by General Zia to be prime minister in 1985. Served as prime minister until Zia dissolved the assembly in May 1988.

### **Kazi, A.G.N.**

Civil servant (CSP). Former governor of the State Bank and Secretary of the federal Ministry of Finance. Served as secretary-general for finance and economic co-ordination under Zia in 1978. Also served as deputy chairman of the federal Planning Commission during the Zia period. Worked with Ghulam Ishaq Khan on managing the economy

during the Zia period. Was appointed as deputy chairman of the federal Planning Commission by Benazir Bhutto.

### **Khar, Ghulam Mustafa**

Landlord and politician from Punjab. Opponent of General Zia. Early PPP leader and supporter of Z. A. Bhutto. Served as governor of Punjab during the Z. A. Bhutto period. Left the PPP when Benazir took charge. Joined with Jatoi in establishing the National People's Party in 1986. Broke with Jatoi in September 1989 and joined PPP. Ousted from the PPP in August 1990. Served as water and power minister in the caretaker government (August 1990 to October 1990).

### **Mahmood, Masud**

Head of the Federal Security Force during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto period. After Bhutto was charged with murder of a political opponent by the Zia regime, he accepted a "plea bargaining arrangement" with the prosecution and testified against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his (Bhutto's) murder trial.

### **Marker, Jamsheed K. A.**

Diplomat. Member of the Parsi community. Served as Pakistan's ambassador to several important countries, including the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany. Appointed by General Zia as ambassador to the United States in November 1986 and retired from that position in August 1989. He was recalled and appointed ambassador to the United Nations in August 1990.

### **Maudoodi, Maulana Syed Abul A'la**

Deceased religious leader. Founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a fundamentalist religious party in Pakistan. Zia "drew some inspiration from [this] religiously conservative party and that party's founder."

### **Musa Khan, Muhammad**

General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Was appointed governor of Balochistan Province by General Zia in 1986 and continued to serve in that capacity in 1990.

### **Mushahid Hussain, Syed**

Journalist. Educated at Foreman Christian College (Lahore) and Georgetown University (Washington, D.C.). Editor (1980-87) of The Muslim, one of Pakistan's most influential English language newspapers, until he resigned following the publication of an interview he arranged to be conducted by a prominent Indian journalist with Abdul Qadeer, the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear program.

### **Pagara, Pir**

Spiritual leader and Sindhi politician. Important in Muslim League politics prior to the 1977 coup. Active in opposition politics during the period when Zia banned political

parties. The Pir established his own Muslim League faction (the Muslim League, Pagara group). The Pir was involved unofficially in the Junejo government and his Muslim League group joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad to contest the 1988 elections. In these elections, the Pir of Pagara was unsuccessful in winning a seat.

### **Pooya, Agha Murtaza**

Founder of The Muslim. Established his own political party, the Hizbe Jihad, and joined the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad to contest the 1988 elections.

### **Qadeer, Abdul**

Referred to as "A. Q.," he is regarded as the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear program.

### **Rahimuddin Khan, Muhammad**

General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Appointed governor of Balochistan Province by General Zia in 1978 and served in that capacity until 1984. He was then appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.

### **Sawar Khan, Muhammad**

General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. From the Potahar plateau of North Punjab, Sawar was appointed Governor of Punjab Province in 1978 by General Zia and served in that position until 1980. In 1980, he was appointed by General Zia as vice chief of the army staff. Zia redefined the position of deputy chief and retired as Vice Chief. Sawar served in this capacity until 1984.

### **Shahi, Agha**

Civil servant. Served in several important positions in Pakistan's foreign ministry and rose to the rank of secretary-general. He is a member of the Shi'a sect of Islam. He was appointed by General Zia as Pakistan's foreign minister in 1977 and served in that capacity until he stepped down in 1981 and was replaced by Sahibzada Yaqub Khan.

### **Sharif, Mian Nawaz**

Industrialist and politician from Punjab. Nawaz became chief minister of Punjab in 1985 after the partyless elections. He was part of the new political leadership cultivated by both Zia and Junejo. He served as the caretaker chief minister of Punjab during the period between the dismissal of the assemblies (May 1988) and the November 1988 elections. After the 1988 elections, he was one of the few Pakistan Muslim League leaders to continue in power. He was a leader of the nine-party Islami Jamhoori Ittehad group established to challenge the PPP in the national and provincial elections. After the October 1990 elections, he was elected prime minister.

### **Tikka Khan**

General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's first chief of the army staff (1972-76) and was replaced by General Zia. Very active in the PPP. Opposed



General Zia. Was appointed as governor of Punjab Province following the November 1988 elections and removed August 1990.

### **Tufail Muhammad, Mian**

Fundamentalist religious leader. An Arain from Jullundur, he was amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami during the early years (1977-79) of the Zia period and supported Zia and his decision to postpone the elections.

### **Wali Khan, Khan Abdul**

Pukhtun politician from the NWFP. His father was Abdul Gaffar Khan, the so-called Frontier Gandhi. Wali Khan was a founder (in 1986) and is the leader of the Awami National Party, a party based on the merger of four political parties—the National Democratic Party (Wali Khan's party), the Awami Tehrik (led by Rasool Bux Palijo), major factions of the Pakistan National Party, and the Mazdoor-Kisan Party. Wali Khan was a major regional political opponent of General Zia.

### **Yaqub Khan, Sahabzada**

Lt. General (retd.) of the Pakistan army. Appointed as ambassador to the United States in February 1974 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and served in that capacity until February 1979. Was also an adviser to Bhutto on affairs which related to the armed forces. Appointed as Pakistan's foreign minister in 1981 by General Zia. He succeeded Agha Shahi in this position. He continued to serve as foreign minister under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

### **Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad**

Born in Jullundur, East Punjab on August 12, 1924. An Arain from a lower-middle-class family, he was educated at St. Stephen's College in Delhi and joined the British Indian army in 1944. He was commissioned into the Indian cavalry in 1945. He was appointed chief of the army staff in 1976 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. According to some sources, he was a reluctant leader in the coup against Bhutto in July 1977, but declared martial law and assumed the title of chief martial law administrator. He assumed the office of president of Pakistan in 1978 but retained his position as chief of the army staff until his death five days after his 64th birthday on August 17, 1988.

## The Zia Period: A Bibliography

Craig Baxter

Abbasi, A., "Thirty-Five Years of Pakistan-China Relations," *Strategic Studies*, 9:4 (1986).  
"Afghanistan Crisis: Policy Positions," *Strategic Studies*, 11:3 (1988).

Ahmad, Aijaz, "The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet," *South Asia Bulletin*, 4:1 (Spring 1984).

Ahmad, Akbar S., "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: A Response from Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 6:3 (Spring 1983).

Ahmad, Akbar S., *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988).

Ahmad, Akbar S., *Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity, and Leadership in South Asia* (New York: Oxford, 1986).

Ahmad, Akbar S., *Religion and Politics in a Muslim Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Ahmad, Manzooruddin, ed., *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1980).

Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Islamic Revival in Pakistan," in Cyriac K. Pullapilly, ed., *Islam in the Contemporary World* (Notre Dame, IN: Cross Roads Books, 1981).

Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Pakistan," in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).

Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Parliament, Parties, Polls and Islam: Issues in the Current Debate on Religion and Politics in Pakistan," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 2:1 (1985).

Ahmad, Mumtaz, "The Current Internal Constellation in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 6:4 (Summer 1984)

Ahmed, Munir D., "The Shi'as of Pakistan," in Martin Kramer, ed., *Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).

Ahmed, Mushtaq, *Pakistan at the Crossroads* (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1985).

Ahmed, Vigar, and Amjad, Rashid, *The Management of Pakistan's Economy, 1947-82* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Akram, Muhammad, *Martial Law Proclamation 1977 and Laws* (Lahore: Lahore Law Times Publications, 1977).

Alexiev, Alex, "U.S. Policy and the War in Afghanistan," *Global Affairs*, 3:1 (1988).

Ali, Akhtar, *Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma: Energy and Security Dimension* (Karachi: Economic Research Unit, 1984).

Ali, Mehrunnisa, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties Since the Afghan Crisis," *Asian Survey*, 23:9 (September 1983).

Ali, S., "Pakistan's Islamic Bomb Reconsidered," *Middle East Review*, 17:3 (1985).

Ali, Salman A., "Alternative Futures for US-Pakistani Relations," *Asian Affairs*, 9:5-6 (May-August 1982).

Ali, Sheikh R., "Pakistan's Islamic Bomb," *Asia Pacific Community*, 16 (Spring 1982).

Ali, Tariq, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State* (New York: Schocken Books, 1984).

Andersen, Walter K., "The Domestic Roots of Indian Foreign Policy," *Asian Affairs*, 10:3 (Fall 1983).

Asghar Khan, Mohammad, *Generals in Politics 1958-1982* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983).

Ayoob, Mohammed, "Dateline Pakistan: a Passage to Anarchy?" *Foreign Policy*, 59 (1985).

Ayoob, Mohammed "India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry," *World Today*, 38:5 (May 1982).

Azam, Ikram, *Pakistan and the Asian Collective Security System* (Rawalpindi: Matboat-e-Hurmat, 1983).

Azfar, Kamal, *Pakistan: Political and Constitutional Dilemmas* (Karachi: Pakistan Law House, 1987).

Banerjee, Jyotirmoy, "Hot and Cold Diplomacy in Indo-Pakistani Relations," *Asian Survey*, 23:3 (March 1983).

Baxter, Craig, "A New Pakistan Under a Revised Bhuttoism," *Middle East Insight*, 6:4 (Winter 1989).

Baxter, Craig, "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia," *Journal of International Affairs*, 38:2 (Winter 1985).

Baxter, Craig, "India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Emerging Cooperation?" *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Affairs*, 11:1 and 2 (Fall/Winter 1987).

Baxter, Craig, "India's Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan," in Hafeez Malik, ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan* (London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

Baxter, Craig, "Pakistan and the Gulf," in Thomas Naff, ed., *Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985).

Baxter, Craig, "Pakistan Under Zia ul-Haq," in David H. Partington, ed., *The Middle East Annual: Issues and Events* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1986).

Baxter, Craig, "The United States and Pakistan: the Zia Era and the Afghan Connection," in Adam Garfinkle, ed., *Friendly Tyrants* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

Baxter, Craig, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

Baxter, Craig, et.al., *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987).

Bhutto, Benazir, *Daughter of Destiny: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). (Published in the United Kingdom as *Daughter of the East*).

Bhutto, Benazir, *Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Lahore: Classic, 1978).

Bhutto, Benazir, *Pakistan: The Gathering Storm* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983).

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, *If I am Assassinated...?* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).

Blau, Thomas, "Small Nuclear Forces in South Asia," in Rodney W. Jones, ed., *Small Nuclear Forces and U.S. Security Interests: Threats and Potential Conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).

Bokhari, I., "Pakistan and West Asia," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 3:1 (1986).

Bokhari, Imtiaz H., "South Asian Regional Cooperation: Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects," *Asian Survey*, 25:4 (April 1985).

Bordewich, Fergos M., "The Pakistan Army: Sword of Islam," *Asia*, 5:3 (September-October 1982).

Burki, Shahid Javed, "Pakistan Under Zia, 1977-1988," *Asian Survey*, 28:10 (October 1988).

Burki, Shahid Javed, "Pakistan's Development: an Overview," *World Development*, 9:3 (March 1981).

Burki, Shahid Javed, *Pakistan, a Historical Dictionary* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989).

Burki, Shahid Javed, *Pakistan: a Nation in the Making* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

Burki, Shahid Javed, and LaPorte, Robert, Jr., eds., *Pakistan's Development Priorities: Choices for the Future* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988).

Carroll, Lucy, "Nizam-i-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamisation, with Special Reference to the Position of Women," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 20: 1 (March 1982).

Chaudhri, Mohammed Ahsan, ed., *Pakistan and Regional Security* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1984).

Cheema, Parvaiz Iqbal, "Pakistan's Nuclear Option," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 7:4 (1984).

Cheema, Parvaiz Iqbal, "The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, 23:3 (March 1983).

Cheema, Parvaiz Iqbal, "The Imperatives of National Security: the Case of Pakistan," *Asian Defense Journal*, (November 1983).

Cheema, Parvaiz Iqbal, "The Relationship of Gulf Security with Pakistan's Policy on Afghanistan and India," *Strategic Studies*, 11:2 (1987).

Chopra, Pran, ed., *Contemporary Pakistan: New Aims and Images* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983).

Chopra, V.D., ed., *Pakistan and Asian Peace* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1985).

Choudhury, Golam W., *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule* (London: Scorpion Publishing, 1988).

Cohen, Stephen P., "Geostrategic Factors in Indo-Pakistan Relations," *Asian Affairs*, 10:3 (Fall 1983).

Cohen, Stephen P., "Identity, Survival, Security: Pakistan's Defense Policy," *Punjab Journal of Politics*, 6:1 (January-June 1982).

Cohen, Stephen P., "Pakistan and America: The Security Dimension," *Defence Journal*, 7:8 (August 1981).

Cohen, Stephen P., "Pakistan," in E.A. Kolodziej and R.E. Harkavy, eds., *Security Policies of Developing Countries* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1982).

Cohen, Stephen P., "Pakistan: Army, Society and Security," *Asian Affairs*, 10:2 (Summer 1983).

Cohen, Stephen P., "South Asia and Afghanistan," *Problems of Communism*, (January-February 1985).

Cohen, Stephen P., "The Role of the Military in Contemporary Pakistan," in Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr., eds., *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

Cohen, Stephen P., *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

Cohen, Stephen P., and Weinbaum, Marvin G., "Pakistan in 1981: Staying On," *Asian Survey*, 22:2 (February 1982).

*Constitutional Recommendations for Islamic System of Government* (Islamabad: Council of Islamic Ideology, 1983).

Cronin, Richard P., et.al., "Symposium: Prospects for Detente in South Asia: Internal and External Factors in India-Pakistan Relations," *Asian Affairs*, 10:3 (Fall 1983).

Dahiya, M.S., "Military in Pakistan's Political System," *Journal of the United Services Institute of India*, 110:462 (October-December 1980).

Duncan, Emma, *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey Through Pakistan* (London: Arrow Books Limited, 1990).

Elkin, Jerrold, and Ritezal, W. Andrew, "The Indo-Pakistani Military Balance," *Asian Survey*, 26:5 (May 1986).

Esposito, John L., "Pakistan: Unity or Further Divisions?" in John L Esposito, *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1980).

Faruki, Kamal, "Pakistan: Islamic Government and Society," in John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

"Framework for Pakistan's General Election Scheduled for November 17, 1979," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 3:2 (Winter 1979).

Gable, Richard W., and LaPorte, Robert, Jr., "Planning and Budgeting in Pakistan", *Public Administration and Development*, 3 (1983).

Gardezi, Hassan, and Rashid, Jami, eds., *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State* (London: Zed, 1983).

Gilani, Ijaz S., *The Four "R"s of Afghanistan: Refugees, Resistance, Regime, Russia* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, n.d.).

Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, *Pakistan at the Polls: Campaign, Candidates, and Values* (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1985).

Griffith, William E., "Superpower Relations After Afghanistan," *Survival*, (July-August 1980).

Griffith, William E., "The USSR and Pakistan," *Problems of Communism*, 31:1 (January-February 1982).

Gustafson, W. Eric, and Richter, William L., "Pakistan in 1980: Weathering the Storm," *Asian Survey*, 21:2 (February 1981).

Harrison, Selig S., *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).

Hassan, Riaz, "Islamisation: An Analysis of Religious, Political, and Social Change in Pakistan," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 21:3 (July 1985).

Hassan, Riaz, "Religion, Society, and State in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 27:5 (May 1987).

Hayes, Louis D., "India and Pakistan: South Asian Security Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Asian Thought and Society*, 9:2 (1984).

Hayes, Louis D., *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Sind, 1986 (n.p., n.pub., n.d.).

Husain, Noor A., and Rose, Leo E., eds., *Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Social, Political and Economic Factors* (Berkeley: *Institute of East Asian Studies*, 1988).

Hussain, K., "Pakistan and Wullar Barrage," *Regional Studies*, 6:2 (1988).

Hussain, R., "Pak-Soviet Relations Since 1947: A Dissenting Appraisal," *Strategic Studies*, 10:3 (1987).

Hussain, Syed, "The Political Economy of a Dictatorship: The Case of Pakistan," *South Asia Bulletin*, 1:2 (Summer 1981).

International Commission of Jurists, *Pakistan: Human Rights After Martial Law* (Geneva, 1987).

Iqbal, Afzal, *Islamisation of Pakistan* (Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delli, 1984).

Islam, Safiqul, "Failure in State Building: The Case of Pakistan," *Asian Profile*, 12:6 (1984).

Jain, Rashmi, *US-Pak Relations, 1947-1983* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983).

Johal, S., "Regional Cooperation and Indo-Pakistan Relations," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 8:2 (1984).

Jones, Rodney W., "Mending Relations with Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly*, 4:2 (Spring 1981).

Jones, Rodney W., "Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Outlook for the United States," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 8:4 (December 1985).

Jones, Rodney W., and Roberts, Brad, "Pakistan and Regional Security," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 6:3 Spring 1983).



Kamal, K.L., "The Non-Military Activities of the Pakistan Military," *South Asian Studies*, 17:1 (January-June 1982).

Kamal, N., "Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia: Pakistan's Proposals and Problems," *Strategic Studies*, 10:3 (1987).

Kapur, Ashok, "A Nuclearizing Pakistan: Some Hypotheses," *Asian Survey*, 20:5 (May 1980).

Kapur, Ashok, "The Indian Subcontinent: The Contemporary Structure of Power and the Development of Power Relations," *Asian Survey*, 28:7 (July 1988).

Kapur, Ashok, *Pakistan's Nuclear Development* (London: Croom Helm, 1987.)

Kaushik, Surendra Nath, "General Zia and the Opposition in Pakistan: From Conciliation to Confrontation," *South Asian Studies*, 18:2 (July-December 1983).

Kazi, Aftab A., *Ethnicity and Education in Nation-Building: The Case of Pakistan* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).

Kennedy, Charles H., "Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances," *Asian Survey*, 28:3 (March 1988).

Kennedy, Charles H., "Politics of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 24:6 (June 1984).

Kennedy, Charles H., *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Khalid, Devlet, "Pakistan's Relations with Iran and the Arab States," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 5:3 (September 1982).

Khan, Asghar, ed., *Islam, Politics, and the State: The Case of Pakistan* (London: Zed Press, 1985).

Khan, Rais Ahmad, ed., *Pakistan-United States Relations* (Islamabad: Area Studies Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1983).

Khan, Sultan Muhammad, "Pakistani Geopolitics: The Diplomatic Perspective," *International Security*, 5:1 (Summer 1980).

Klass, Rozanne, "Afghanistan: the Accords," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 66:5 (1988).

Kochanek, Stanley A., *Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Korson, J. Henry, and Maskiell, Michelle, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan: the Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women," *Asian Survey*, 25:6 (June 1985).

Kurin, Richard, "Islamization in Pakistan: A View from the Countryside," *Asian Survey*, 25:8 (August 1985).

LaPorte, Robert, Jr., "Administrative Reform and the Evolution of the Administrative System in Pakistan," in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., *Administrative Systems Abroad* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982).

LaPorte, Robert, Jr., and Ahmed, Muntazar Bashir, *Public Enterprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in Economic Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

Lodhi, Maleeha, "Pakistan in Crisis," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 16:1 (March 1978).

Lodhi, Maleeha, "Pakistan People's Party and Pakistani Democracy," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 6:3 (Spring 1983).

Lodhi, Maleeha, "Pakistan's Shia Movement: An Interview with Arif Hussaini," *Third World Quarterly*, 10:2 (1988).

Lodhi, Maleeha, "Reflections on the Pakistan Dilemma," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 20:1 (March 1982). A review article.

Lyon, Peter, "Pakistan's Current Political Relations with Three Great Powers," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 5:3 (September 1982).

Malik, Hafeez, "Martial Law and Political Development in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 6:4 (Summer 1983).

Malik, Hafeez, "The Afghan Crisis and its Impact on Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 5:3 (Spring 1982).

Malik, Hafeez, ed., *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

Malik, Hafeez, ed., "Martial Law: A Select Chronology of Events," *Defence Journal*, 4:6-7 (June-July 1978).

McCain, Morris, "On Moscow's Southern Flank: Soviet Interests in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 9:1&2 (Fall/Winter 1987).

Mishra, Jitendra, "Military Regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan," *India Quarterly*, 37:4 (October-December 1981).

Mumtaz, Khawar, and Shaheed, Farida, *Women in Pakistan: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back* (London: Zed Press, 1987).

Munir, Muhammad, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1979).

Mustafa, Zubeida, "Pakistan-US Relations: The Latest Phase," *World Today*, 37:12 (December 1981).

Naby, E., "Islam within the Afghan Resistance," *Third World Quarterly*, 10:2 (1988).

Naghmi, Shafqat Hussain, "Pakistan's Public Attitude Toward the United States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26:3 (September 1982).

Naqvi, M.B., "One Year of Martial Law," *Defence Journal* 4:6-7 (June-July 1978).

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Pakistan Elections: Foundation for Democracy* (Washington, 1988).

Nayak, Pandav, ed., *Pakistan: Dilemmas of a Developing State* (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1985).

Nayak, Pandav, *Pakistan: Political Economy of a Developing State* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1988).

Nayak, Pandav, ed., *Pakistan: Society and Politics* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1984).

Newman, Karl J., *Pakistan Under Ayub, Bhutto, and Zia ul-Haq* (Munich and London: Weltforum Verlag, 1986).

Noman, Omar, "Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy," *Third World Quarterly*, 11:1 (January 1989).

Noman, Omar, *The Political Economy of Pakistan* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1988).

Noorani, Zain, "Foreign Policy of Pakistan", *Pakistan Horizon* 40 (1987).

Noorani, Zain, et.al., "The Geneva Accords and Afghanistan," *Pakistan Horizon*, 41:3 (1988).

Nuri, Maqsood ul Hasan, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: The Problem of Nuclear Proliferation Reconsidered," *Asia Pacific Community*, 25:26 (1984).

Nyang, S., "The Role of Pakistan in the Organization of the Islamic Conference," *American Journal of Islamic Studies*, 1:2 (1984). "Pakistan's Progress: On the Road to an Islamic Democracy?" *Arabia*, 4:47 (1985).

*Pakistan: Violation of Human Rights* (New York: Amnesty International, 1985).

Palit, D.K., and Namboodiri, P.K.S., *Pakistan's Islamic Bomb* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).

Patel, Rashida, *Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan?* (Karachi: Faiza Publications, 1986).

Pickard, Cyril, "Change in Pakistan," *World Today*, 33:12 (December 1977).

Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, "Pakistan and the OIC," *Pakistan Horizon*, 40 (1987).

"President Zia ul-Haq's Election Referendum in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 8:3 (Spring 1985).

Quddus, Muhammad A., *Pakistan: a Case Study of a Plural Society* (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1982).

Qureshi, Salim, "Islam and Development: The Zia Regime in Pakistan," *World Development*, 8:7-8 (July-August 1980).

Qureshi, Sameel Ahmad, "An Analysis of Contemporary Pakistani Politics: Bhutto versus the Military," *Asian Survey*, 19:9 (September 1979).

Rahman, Aatur, "Pakistan: Unity or Further Division?" in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton, eds., *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982).

Rahman, S., "Pakistan in 1984," *Asian Thought and Society*, 9:26 (1984).

Rais, Rasul B., "Pakistan in 1987: Transition to Democracy," *Asian Survey*, 28:2 (February 1988).

Rais, Rasul B., "Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics," *Asian Survey*, 29:2 (February 1989).

Rais, Rasul B., "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Prospects for Proliferation," *Asian Survey*, 25:4 (April 1985).

Rangoonwala, M., "Pakistan Today," *Asian Affairs*, 16:2 (June 1985).

Rashid, A., "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Gulf," *MERIP Reports*, 148 (September-October 1987).

Rashid, J., "Pakistan and the Central Command," *MERIP Reports*, 16:4 (1986).

Reeves, Richard, *A Passage to Peshawar: Pakistan: Between the Hindu Kush and the Arabia Sea* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

Reeves, Richard, "Domestic Factors in Pakistan's India Policy," *Asian Affairs*, 10:3 (Fall 1983).

Reeves, Richard, "Pakistan in 1984: Digging In," *Asian Survey*, 25:2 (February 1985).

Reeves, Richard, "Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order," *Asian Survey*, 26:2 (February 1986).

Reeves, Richard, "Pakistan: A New 'Front-line' State?" *Current History*, 81:474 (May 1982).

Reeves, Richard, "Pakistan: Impasse, Islamic Revolution, and Impending Crises," *Asian Thought and Society*, 4:10 (April 1979).

Reeves, Richard, "Pakistan: Out of the Praetorian Labyrinth," *Current History*, 85:509 (1986).

Reeves, Richard, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, 51:3 (Fall 1978).

Reeves, Richard, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 19:6 (June 1979).

Richter, William L. and Gustafson, W. Eric, "Pakistan 1979: Back to Square One," *Asian Survey*, 20:2 (February 1980).

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "Pakistan: Ideology and Foreign Policy," *Asian Affairs*, 10:1 (Spring 1983).

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 26:10 (October 1986).

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan," *Survival*, 31:3 (May-June 1989).

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan;" *Asian Survey*, 24:5 (May 1984).

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1986* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986).

Rizvi, Nihal H., "Military Intervention in Pakistan," *South Asian Studies*, 16:1 (January-June 1981).

Rose, Leo E., "Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia," *Asian Affairs*, 9:1 (September-October 1981).

Rose, Leo E., "The Superpowers in South Asia: A Geostrategic Analysis," *Orbis*, 22:2 (Summer 1978).

Rose, Leo E., and Husain, Noor A., eds., *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985).

Rothermund, Dieter, "Pakistan's Relations with India and Afghanistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 5:3 (September 1982).

Ruixiang, Z., "The New Development of Traditional Friendship Between Pakistan and China," *Strategic Studies*, 9:4 (1986).

Sayeed, Khalid B., "The Historical Origin of Some of Pakistan's Persistent Political Problems," in A. Jeyeratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton, eds., *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982).

Sayeed, Khalid B., *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

Seth, S.P., "The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and the United States," *Asian Survey*, 28:7 (July 1988).

Shah, Muwahid H., "Pakistan, Islam, and the Politics of Muslim Unrest," in Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Margaret W. Sullivan, eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

Shahi, Agha, "Pakistan-Indian Relations and Superpower Politics," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 10:4 (1987).

Shahi, Agha, "The Geneva Accords," *Pakistan Horizon*, 41:3 (1988).

Sims, Holly, "The State and Agricultural Productivity: Continuity versus Change in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab," *Asian Survey*, 26:4 (April 1986).

Smith, Thomas B., "Referendum Politics in Asia," *Asian Survey* 26:7 (July 1986).

"Special Report: Islamic Republic of Pakistan," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy*, 3:4 (April 1985).

Subrahmanyam, K., "Pakistan's Nuclear Capability and Indian Response," *Strategic Analysis*, 7 (March 1984).

Syed, Anwar H., "Pakistan in 1977: The 'Prince' is Under the Law," *Asian Survey*, 18:2 (February 1978).

Syed, Anwar H., *Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Solidarity* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

Syed, Riaz Ahmed, *Pakistan on the Road to Islamic Democracy: Referendum, 1984* (Islamabad: Historical Research Institute, 1985).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Defense Planning in Pakistan," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., *Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "India, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf," *Asian Affairs*, 10:3 (1984).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Martial Law Again in Pakistan," *Asian Affairs*, 5:4 (March-April 1978).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Option and U.S. Policy," *Orbis*, 22:2 (Summer 1978).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "Proxies and Allies: The Case of Iran and Pakistan," *Orbis*, 24:2 (Summer 1980).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, "The Military in Contemporary Pakistan," *Armed Forces and Society*, 6:4 (Summer 1980).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, *The United States and Pakistan: the Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, and Staudenmaier, William O., "The Saudi-Pakistan Military Relationship: Implications for U.S. Policy," *Orbis*, 26:1 (Spring 1982).

Taylor, David, "Pakistan Under Military Rule," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 5:3 (Spring 1982).

Taylor, David, "The Politics of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan," in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Thornton, Thomas P., "Between the Stools?: U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan During the Carter Administration," *Asian Survey*, 22:10 (October 1982).

Thornton, Thomas P., *Pakistan's Internal Developments and the U.S. Interest* (Washington: Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1987).

Van der Kroef, Justus M., "Pakistan's Search for Security," *Asian Affairs*, 9:1 (September-October 1981).

Van Hollen, Christopher, "Leaning on Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, 38 (Spring 1980).

Van Hollen, Eliza, "Pakistan in 1986: Trials of Transition," *Asian Survey*, 27:2 (February 1987).

Vertzberger, Yaacov, *The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960-1980* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

Waseem, Mohammad, *Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987).

Weinbaum, Marvin B., "The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation," *Asian Survey*, 29:3 (March 1989).

Weinbaum, Marvin G. and Sen, Gautam, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," *Orbis*, 22:3 (Fall 1978).



Weinbaum, Marvin G., and Cohen, Stephen P., "Pakistan in 1982: Holding On," *Asian Survey*, 23:2 (February 1983).

Weiss, Anita M., "Women's Position in Pakistan: Sociocultural Effects of Islamization," *Asian Survey*, 25:8 (August 1985).

Weiss, Anita M., ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: the Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

*White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979).

*White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections of March, 1977* (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1978).

Wirsing, Robert G., "The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications for the United States," *Asian Survey*, 25:3 (March 1985).

Wirsing, Robert G., and Roherty, James M., "The United States and Pakistan," *International Affairs*, 58:4 (Autumn 1982).

Wriggins, W. Howard, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Pacific Affairs*, 57:2 (Summer 1984).

Wright, Theodore P., Jr., "American Foreign Policy and Elections in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 9: 1&2 (Fall/Winter 1987).

Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, "General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, Chief of the Army Staff and Chief Martial Law Administrator Meets the Press, September 1, 1977," Rawalpindi (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1977).

Zingel, Wolfgang Peter; Ave Lallement; and Stephanie Zingel, eds., *Pakistan in the 80s* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1985.)

Ziring, Lawrence, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 24:9 (September 1984).

Ziring, Lawrence, "Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, 18:7 (July 1978).

Ziring, Lawrence, "Pakistan: Military Rule: Problems, Prospects, and Portents," *Asian Thought and Society*, 8:24 (November 1983).

Ziring, Lawrence, "Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan's Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul-Haq," *Asian Survey*, 28:8 (August 1988).

Ziring, Lawrence, "The Roots of Political Instability in Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 9:1&2 (Fall/Winter 1987).

Ziring, Lawrence, "The United States and Pakistan: a Troubled Alliance," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 6:4 (Summer 1983).

Ziring, Lawrence, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981).