

PAKISTAN PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

Mushahid Hussain
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REPRODUCED BY

SANI H. PANHWAR

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GOVERNING SOUTH ASIA

South Asia a habitat of over a billion people, is now one of the most difficult regions to govern. Governance means more than maintaining law and order. It involves managing the affairs of the state, especially political, economic and social change. All South Asian governments are now beset with formidable problems of governance.

This book is part of a series of five volumes on South Asia on Governance, the study was conducted by Centre for Policy Research, for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. We are reproducing the part written on Pakistan.

Pakistan: Problems of Governance by Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's noted journalist and Dr. Akmal Hussain, a leading Pakistani political economist.

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FOREWORD

This study of problems of governance in Pakistan which we bring with great pleasure to the attention of policy makers and concerned citizens of South Asia, and particularly those in Pakistan, is part of a major project of Centre for Policy Research (CPR) attempting a comprehensive multidisciplinary study of Problems of Governance in South Asian countries. The four other volumes in the series are on Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Together, these five volumes, written by some of the finest analytical minds in South Asia, scholars who have long been concerned with the quality of governance of their respective countries and of the region as a whole, offer perhaps the most comprehensive academic meditation on the ills and evils of our political systems and processes as well as their strong and healthy points. Together, these five volumes are a substantial addition to current political literature on South Asia.

The special value of the Pakistan study lies in the fact that Pakistan is a democracy of very recent vintage. After several discontinuities in its political history and many years of military rule, democratic values and institutions are necessarily fragile. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia also happen to be the only parliamentary democracies among the community of Islamic states. The success of democratic governance in Pakistan will certainly influence the Islamic world in the years to come.

As in the case of the other volumes in the “Problems of Governance” series, the Pakistan volume is written by two outstanding intellectuals of the country, Mr. Mushahid Hussain, former Editor of The Muslim, and Dr. Akmal Hussain, a brilliant political-economist.

We congratulate them on the fine work they have done and also extend our thanks to those who helped them with research and collaboration.

The study of governance problems is, in essence, a search of ways and means of managing the affairs of the state, taking into account the obstacles inherent in changes taking place in South Asian countries. These accumulate from various acts of omission and commission on the part of the rulers, and also result from the increasing complexities of each political society and the international milieu in which these political societies function. From the time of the ancient city state of Athens and the kingdoms and empires that flourished in ancient India, giving benign, good and compassionate government unto the people has been a continuing concern of political gurus or saints concerned with governance. Various schools of thought have contended in this field from the dawn of humankind’s political history. Socrates and Plato held different convictions from Aristotle, father of empirical studies. In our own country, the

concept of Dharma has been and continues to be essentially a praxis of good governance. So are Islam and Buddhism with precepts of good governance.

Now at the end of the second millennium of the Christian calendar, we live in a world which is a melting pot of a very large variety of objective and subjective forces. The entire human race is fast coming to its own though at different levels of development. Science and technology press the planet towards a single interwoven universe and at the same time spawn divisive forces. While on the one hand, there are unprecedented opportunities for human development, there are, on the other hand deadly instruments of destruction at all levels of the world, domestic as well as international.

The task of governing diverse, often seething large populations is no longer easy or simple. "A King is history's slave" declared Tolstoy. In that vein, all governments and their leaders are slaves of the time that loom over and before them.

All the studies in the present series recommend policy packages to the rulers to make better government practicable if the necessary will and leadership are available. However, there is no escape from the adage: "People get the government they deserve". In the first and the last analysis, it is the people who have to govern themselves and govern well. The tide of history has brought nearly the whole of South Asia under democratic rule. The people now have to seize the opportunities created by history and global change to shake off misrule and misgovernance and lead our societies and civilizations to days of peace, development, justice and reasonable harmony.

I should like to record my sense of gratitude to all scholars and thinkers of South Asia who have participated in the CPR project on problems of governance in South Asia. This project, one may note with a sense of happiness, has created a small community of concerned scholars and men and women of public affairs who are now better equipped to understand and analyse why governments go wrong, and how to bring them back to the right track.

My colleague, Prof. Bhabani Sen Gupta, who is in overall charge of the project, and who has been deeply concerned with South Asian affairs for nearly a decade, deserves a word of special mention. So does the Ford Foundation who funded the project with characteristic total non-intervention in its execution and complete trust and confidence in CPR's ability to turn out solid and substantive academic and intellectual products. Many senior colleagues in CPR especially Mr. L. P. Singh, Mr. Nirmal Mukarji, Mr. Pran Chopra, Mr. George Verghese and Mr. A. P. Venkateswaran have made their valuable contributions to the success of the project. I thank them all with all my sincerity.

Centre for Policy Research,
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V. A. PANANDIKER
Director

PREFACE

This book attempts to examine governance in Pakistan from the perspective of the relationship between the development of state institutions and the decision making styles of key individuals within the power structure. Three military *coup d'états* and frequent changes in Constitution have created instability in the relationship between various institutions of the state. At the same time, the personalities of key political leaders, civil servants and military chiefs have contributed to constraining the emergence of a balance between state institutions on the one hand and state and civil society on the other. This study analyses why the rules of the game in the exercise of state power had not been established up to the early 80s and how such rules have begun to evolve over the last six Years.

The book starts with an analysis in Chapter 1 of the economic crisis and the impact of continued poverty, unemployment and regional disparity on the polarization of society. While the task of governance within a polarized polity has become increasingly difficult the ability of the civil bureaucracy and the democratic political system to deal with the crisis has weakened. The consequent change in the balance of power between the bureaucracy and the military on the one hand and the state and civil society on the other is analyzed. In this regard, the actual as opposed to the formal exercise of state power is investigated. In Chapter 2, the changing rules of the game, the nature of political culture and the criminalization of the political process are examined on the basis of hitherto unpublished information and illustrative examples. This is followed in Chapter 3 by an analysis of the power structure with reference to three critical institutions: The Pakistan Army, Intelligence Services and the Civil Bureaucracy. The analysis in Chapter 4 places the exercise of state power in the context of the relationship between foreign and domestic policies. The American involvement in Pakistan's politics is analyzed on the basis of new data, the role of the India factor and the influences of the Muslim world on the nature of governance are analyzed. The book ends with a chapter on styles of governance. Here the personalities and modes of decision making of a number of key leaders are examined, to show how their individual propensities affected the evolution of state institutions.

AUTHOR

CHAPTER-1

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER: MILITARY, BUREAUCRACY AND THE PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

The available literature on the nature of state power in Pakistan has essentially examined how the state apparatus came to predominate over the political system.¹ Within the state apparatus, the bureaucracy and the military have so far been lumped as co-sharers of the piece of the power cake that has accrued to the 'state apparatus' as opposed to the political elites in the civil society. The dynamics between the bureaucracy and the army and the changing internal balance of power within the state structure itself have hitherto not been analyzed. It would be useful to examine these dynamics, since the bureaucracy and the military are two quite different institutions. They not only relate in differing ways to the civil society, but in fact, it can be argued, have moved in opposing directions in terms of the nature of internal changes within these two institutions of the state respectively.

This chapter is an attempt at examining the changing balance of power between the bureaucracy and military within the state structure. In Section I, we examine the nature of the crisis that any authority purporting to govern has to confront. In Section II, the intra-institutional changes, as well as the inter-institutional changes with respect to the bureaucracy and military respectively are analyzed. Finally, in Section III the role of the people is examined, as a factor influencing the power structure, in a situation where institutions in the civil society have eroded.

ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOCIAL POLARIZATION AND STATE POWER

The ruling elite at the dawn of independence consisted of an alliance between landlords and the nascent industrial bourgeoisie, backed by the military and the bureaucracy. The nature of the ruling elite conditioned the nature of the economic growth process. However, the latter, in turn, influenced the form in which state power was exercised. Economic growth was of a kind that brought affluence to the few at the expense of the many. The gradual erosion of social infrastructure, endemic poverty and the growing inequality between the regions undermined the civil society and accelerated the trend towards militarization.

¹ See for example, Hamza Alavi, "Class and State in Pakistan", in H. Garden and J. Rashid (eds.) 1983: *The Unstable State*. Vanguard, Lahore.

Ayesha Jalal: *The State of Martial Rule*, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1990.

Akmal Hussain, "The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan: Militarization and Dependence", in Wignaraja and Hussain (eds.): *Challenge in South Development. Democracy and Regional Cooperation*. Oxford University Press, 1990.

In this section we will examine the relationship between an increasingly militarist state structure, and the nature of economic growth.

1. Economic Growth and Social Polarization

While the average annual growth rate of GNP fluctuated during the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto, the overall trend of growing poverty and social and regional inequality continued.

During the Ayub period (1960-1969) the basic objective of the development strategy was to achieve a high growth rate of GNP within the framework of private enterprise supported by government subsidies, tax concessions and import controls. Investment targets were expected to be achieved on the basis of the doctrine of functional inequality. This meant a deliberate transfer of income from the poorer sections of society who were thought to have a low marginal rate of savings, to high income groups who were expected to have a high marginal rate of savings. It was thought that by thus concentrating incomes in the hands of the rich, total domestic savings and hence investment could be raised.

During the decade of the sixties when the above strategy was put into practice, while income was transferred into the hands of the rich, they failed to significantly increase their savings, thereby obliging the government to increase its reliance on foreign aid in order to meet its ambitious growth targets. The particular growth process in Pakistan during this period generated four fundamental contradictions:

1. A dependent economic structure and growing inflow of foreign loans. (They increased from US \$373 million between 1950-55 to US \$2701 million in 1965-70.)²
2. An acute concentration of economic power (43 families represented 76.8 percent of all manufacturing assets by the end of the 1960s).³
3. The polarization of classes in the rural sector and a rapid increase in landlessness.⁴ For example, while the incomes of the rural elite increased sharply

² For an analysis of the economic strategy practiced during the Ayub period see: Keith Griffin: *Financing Development plans in Pakistan*, Griffin and Khan: *Growth and inequality in Pakistan*, Macmillan, London. 1974.

³ Akmal Hussain, "Civil Society Undermine" Chapter 1st Strategic issues in Pakistan's Economic Policy. Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1988. "Past Mistakes, present Follies", *Newsline* Article. December 1990.

⁴ For a detailed evidence on industrial concentration see: L.J. White Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1972.

following the “Green Revolution” the real incomes of the rural poor declined in absolute terms. The per capita consumption of food grains of the poorest 65 percent of Pakistan’s rural population fell from an index of 100 in 1963 to 91 in 1969.⁵ Similarly, according to a field survey, 33 percent of small farmers operating less than 8 acres suffered a deterioration in their diet. During the 1960s as many as 794,042 small farmers became landless laborers.⁶

4. A growing economic disparity between the regions of Pakistan.⁷

These consequences of the economic growth process during the Ayub period generated explosive political tensions which not only overthrew the Ayub government bringing in Yahya Khan’s martial law, but also fuelled the secessionist movement in East Pakistan which ultimately resulted in the formation of Bangladesh.

During the Bhutto period economic growth slowed down sharply. Industrial growth fell from an average of 13 percent during 1960 to only 3 percent during the period 1972 to 1977. Similarly, the agricultural growth declined from an average 6.65 percent in the 1960s to a mere 0.45 percent in the period 1970 to 1976.⁸ At the same time, the nationalization of banks and credit expansion for financing loans to capitalist farmers and industrialists led to heavy deficit financing and an associated increase in the money supply. (Notes in circulation increased from 23 billion rupees in 1971-72 to 57 billion rupees in 1976-77.) The sharp increase in the money supply during the period of virtual stagnation was reflected in a sharp rise in the inflation rate. (The whole sale price index rose from 150 in 1971 to 289 by 1975.)⁹

It appears that although nationalization of industries and credit expansion enabled the PPP to acquire the support of a section of the urban petit bourgeoisie through the provision of jobs, licenses and loans, the available funds were not enough to enrich the entire petit bourgeoisie. In fact, the section of the lower middle class that did not gain

⁵ For an examination of the polarization phenomenon in Pakistan’s rural sector see: Akmal Hussain, *Changes in the Agrarian Structure of Pakistan. with special reference to the Punjab Province 1960-1970*. D. Phil Thesis, Sussex, 1980. *Technical Change and Social Polarization in Rural Punjab*. in K. Au (ed): *Political Economy of Rural Development*. Vanguard. Lahore. 1976.

⁶ N. Hamid: “The Burden of Capitalist Growth: A study of Real Wages in Pakistan”, *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*. Spring 1974.

⁷ Akmal Hussain: *A Note on Rural Poverty and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan*. Paper presented at the 18th World Conference. SID. Rome 10-14 July, 1985.

⁸ For detailed analysis of disparities among regions of West Pakistan see: Naved Hamid & Akmal Hussain: “Regional Inequalities and Capitalist Development”, *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, Autumn 1974, Lahore.

⁹ Akmal Hussain, *Strategic issues in Pakistan’s Economic Policy*. op. cit.

from the PPP suffered an absolute decline in their real incomes owing to the high inflation rate. It was this frustrated section of the petit bourgeoisie and the large lumped proletariat stricken by inflation, that responded to the call for a street agitation in March 1977. Although the apparent form of the street agitation was spontaneous, it was orchestrated and given political focus at key junctures of the movement. This organizational and coordinating function was performed by trained cadres of the Jamaat-i-Islami, allegedly with support from the U.S. The agitation was, of course, fuelled by the fact that the PPP was alleged to have rigged elections in a number of constituencies. The overthrow of the Bhutto regime and the subsequent hanging of the first popularly-elected Prime Minister of Pakistan dramatically represented the limits of populism within a state structure dominated by the military and bureaucracy.

2. The Fragmentation of Civil Society

Each regime that came into power sought to legitimize itself through an explicit ideology: The Ayub regime propounded the ideology of modernization and economic development. The Bhutto regime sought legitimacy in the ideology of redeeming the poor (Food, Clothing and Shelter for all) through socialism. It is an index of Zia's fear of popular forces, that he initially sought justification of his government precisely in its temporary character. If anything it was the ideology of transience (that he was there for only 90 days for the sole purpose of holding fair elections). It was this fear that impelled the Zia regime to seek (albeit through a legal process the physical elimination of the one individual who could mobilize popular forces. It was the same fear that subsequently induced Zia to rule on the basis of military terror while propounding a version of Islamic ideology. Draconian measures of military courts, arbitrary arrests and public lashings were introduced. Thus the gradual erosion since Independence of the institutions of civil society, brought the power of the state into stark confrontation with the people. Earlier in 1971, this confrontation had been a major factor in the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. Now a protracted period of Martial Law under the Zia regime served to brutalize and undermine civil society in what remained of Pakistan.

As the Zia regime militarized the state structure, its isolation from the people was matched by its acute external dependence. In the absence of domestic political popularity it sought political, economic and military support from the United States. This pushed Pakistan into becoming a "front line state" in America's Afghan war which was an important factor in further undermining civil society.

Between 1977 and 1987, with the steady inflow into Pakistan of Afghan refugees and the use of Pakistan as a conduit for arms for the Afghan war, two trends have emerged to fuel the crisis of civil society:

1. A large proportion of weapons meant for the Afghan guerrillas have filtered into the illegal arms market.
2. There has been a rapid growth of the heroin trade. Powerful mafia type syndicates have emerged which operate the production, domestic transportation and export of heroin. Many Afghan refugees who now have a significant share of inter-city overland cargo services have also been integrated into the drug syndicates.

The large illegal arms market and the burgeoning heroin trade have injected both weapons and syndicate organizations into the social life of major urban centres. At the same time, the frequent bombings in the NWFP during the late 1980s resulting from the Afghan war, and the weakening of state authority in parts of rural Sindh has undermined for many people confidence in the basic function of the state: That of providing security of life to its citizens. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that an increasing number of people are seeking alternative support mechanisms in their communities to seek redress against injustice and to achieve security against a physical threat to their persons and families. The proximate identity or group membership through which the individual seeks such security can be an ethnic, sub-religious, sub-nationalist or *Biraderi* (kinship) group. Thus, civil society has begun to get polarized along vertical lines. Each group, whether ethnic, sub-religious, sub-nationalist or *Biraderi*, has an intense emotional charge and a high degree of firepower derived from the contemporary arms market.

3. The Crisis of Development

In the context of development, governments in Pakistan are up against a crisis that has four features:

1. Economic growth has been associated with poverty, and in some areas growing poverty. Almost 40 percent of the people are unable to consume 2100 calories a day per person. There has been impressive GNP growth (5.5 percent annual growth rate during the Ayub period, 6.5 percent during the Zia regime, and just over 5 percent during the brief tenure of the Benazir Bhutto government). Yet, after forty three years, a substantial proportion of the population remains deprived of even the minimum conditions of human existence.¹⁰ As much as 64 percent of the population does not have access to piped drinking water. (The percentage without 'safe' drinking water is probably larger since piped drinking water frequently carries bacteria.) The housing situation is so bad that 81 percent of the housing units have an average 1.7 rooms which are inhabited by an average of seven persons. Finally, the literacy rate of 28 percent is amongst the

¹⁰ *ibid.*

lowest in the world. The standards of those few who make it to college are plummeting at a dizzying pace.

The overall consequence of these features is a growing pressure on a fragile democratic polity. A significant section of the population perceives that there is nothing in this growth process for them, which is a factor in the resurgence of sub-national groups. Consequently, a new conflict may be emerging between centralized state structures and a polarized polity, which is associated with a heightened level of violence in society.

2. The second element in the crisis is the rapid urbanization rate. In Pakistan, it is estimated that at current trends the urban population will double over the next decade, and what is worse, it is likely to be concentrated in large cities. Given the prohibitive cost of providing basic services in large cities, and the financial squeeze on government, a growing proportion of the urban population would be deprived of even minimum civic services. Thus, the percentage of urban population living in unserviced localities (called Katchi Abadis) is expected to increase from 25 percent today to 65 percent by the end of this century.¹¹ The level of social stress and associated violence may become difficult for any future government to handle. Thus, policies for slowing down the urbanization rate, and increased investments in basic services is an imperative of sustainable development.
3. The third element of the existing development process is rising debt. With existing levels of indebtedness, and government expenditure on unproductive purposes, an attempt to substantially accelerate GNP growth could land Pakistan into an intolerable debt-servicing burden. Latin America can be quoted as an example of what can happen when high growth rates are attempted with high levels of debt. For example, the total debt in just four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) was until recently over US \$ 282 billion. Their debt constitutes two-thirds of the outstanding loans of banks to all developing countries. When debt-servicing burdens in Latin America rose, the creditors placed a squeeze, which slowed down GNP growth to a point where real per capita income actually declined in some cases.

In Pakistan, the situation today is not as acute as in Latin America. Yet, debt servicing as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings has touched 25 percent. An alarmed IMF has placed a credit squeeze, which is already slowing down the GNP growth rate in Pakistan.

¹¹ For evidence on shortage of basic services, see: Akmal Hussain: "Behind the Veil of Growth", Chapter in Strategic issues in Pakistan's Eco Policy, c cit.

4. The fourth feature of the development crisis is the rapid erosion of the natural resource base. The depletion of forests, desertification resulting from soil erosion and salinity, the rising toxicity levels of rivers owing to untreated disposal of industrial effluents, and also rising levels of air pollution are not only making present life hazardous, but limiting the possibility of getting out of the poverty trap in the future.¹²

Failure to devise a strategy that could come to grips with this development crisis has been an important factor in social polarization and the resultant difficulty in strengthening democratic institutions, particularly a culture of democracy. The deepening of this economic and social crisis presents a challenge of governance to the three centres of power that purport to govern. The civilian political elite (through parliament and its executive authority), the bureaucracy and the military. One of the factors that may well determine the relative power that each of these protagonists is able to wield may depend on the effectiveness with which it can provide solutions to this crisis. Later on in this volume we will examine how the balance of power within the state structure has shifted from the bureaucracy towards the military.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND STATE POWER

In recent years the polarization of society along religious, ethnic, communal and regional lines has been accompanied by an under mining of social values through which diverse communities had lived together in a pluralistic society. The social polarization is now fuelled by violence and various forms of banditry which have reached a scale that threatens not only the credibility of political institutions, but raises the question of whether governance based on a centralized state structure is feasible at all. This is a question that confronts not just Pakistan but a number of other South Asian countries.

In South Asia, since the seventeenth century, political centralization and imposition of a state sponsored cultural homogeneity have been imperatives of capital accumulation and the process of appropriation of the economic surplus. Both these inter-related processes require an integrated market within the state and the progressive concentration and centralization of both economic and political power in the hands of the ruling elite.

During the Mughal period, owing to relatively poor communications and low volume of exports, the autonomy of localized market persisted. The colonial period however, saw the production of a larger surplus as well as its transfer abroad systematically

¹² Ayub Qutub: Walking Lightly, in: A. Qutub (ed.): Towards a National Conservation Strategy for Pakistan, IUCN/CIDA/GDP.

organized by the colonial state. This required a much greater integration and restructuring of the domestic economy for the export of primary goods, and an associated centralized state structure that could manipulate the local elites for the service of metropolitan political and economic interests.

In the post-colonial period, parliamentary models of the Westminster variety were inherited by fragile elites with access to coercive colonial state apparatuses. The process of economic growth initiated by these elites occurred essentially within the framework of private enterprise. The capitalist growth process in the post-colonial period in South Asian countries had the following three characteristics which were to have a profound impact on the relationship between state and civil society:

1. The domestic economy became increasingly integrated with the world capitalist economy through the market mechanism. The structure which these economies had inherited from the colonial period made them essentially exporters of primary commodities. Continued integration with the world capitalist system resulted in large resource transfers to the metropolitan economy. This occurred through declining terms of trade, monopolistic prices of imported technologies, profit repatriation, and debt servicing. Thus, a large part of the fruits of growth in the domestic economy were lost to the metropolitan economy simply through the operation of the market mechanism.
2. Economic growth was predicated on an unequal distribution of productive assets, resulting in growing inter-personal and inter-regional income inequalities.
3. The bottom 40 percent of the population continued to be deprived of the basic necessities of food, housing, health and education. The state had only a very limited surplus available owing to a narrow tax base and large resource transfer abroad through the market mechanism. Apart from this, its own elite interests prevented an aggressive resource mobilization drive. Consequently, the state has been unable so far to overcome poverty.

The centralized administrative system inherited from the British Raj, and a political leadership drawn from a narrow social base proved problematic in a society marked by diverse linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups. Under these circumstances, an elitist administrative and political system effectively denied large sections of society any participation in the decisions that affected their economic and social existence.

After four decades of unequal development and in the absence of visible opportunities of redress within existing institutions, the deprived sections of society responded by asserting their ethnic, linguistic and regional identities. Through such an assertion they

could use an easily accessible emotive charge to mobilize militancy and thereby exercise political pressure.

Faced with this crisis the ruling elites over the years have been unable to grasp the problem as essentially arising from a failure to either deliver the goods to the poor, or to involve them in economic and political decision making. Rather, the elites have understood the assertion of sub-nationalism as a law and order problem located in the colonial discourse, and have attempted to use selective coercive force in attempting to quell it. Understandably, this response has not only intensified the 'problem' but has also allowed a growing importance to the security agencies in the structure of state power itself.

THE CHANGING INTERNAL BALANCE IN THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER

The changing relationship between the military and bureaucracy, the two vital elements of the state apparatus in Pakistan, can be understood in the context of three analytically distinct but interactive processes. (These processes were conditioned by the dynamics of Pakistan's security environment and its foreign policy priorities, particularly the nature of its relationship with the United States):

1. Changes in the internal sociology of the military and bureaucracy associated with changes in the social origins of officers in these two institutions respectively.
2. Changes in the professional quality of officers and the internal cohesion of the institutions.
3. The balance of power between the state apparatus on the one hand, and the institutions in civil society such as parliament, political parties. Media and various form of public expression, on the other.

We now examine how these three processes influenced the dynamics within and between the bureaucracy and the military respectively.

Over the last three decades the social origins of both the bureaucracy and the army have shifted from the landed elite to a wider base in the urban middle strata and the burgeoning class of rural capitalist farmers.¹³ The latter class did include scions of some of the former feudal landlords who had transformed themselves into capitalist farmers following the Green Revolution in the late 1960s, when the HYV made owner cultivation with hired labor an economically attractive venture. However, these

¹³ For evidence on the state of Pakistan's environment see: Sayyed Engineers Calendar 1991.

capitalist farmers also included many rich peasant families who were able to move up the social scale by reinvesting the increased profits that became available from farming.¹⁴ While the change in the social origins of the officers in both these institutions has been in the same direction (a broadening of the social base), changes in the level of professional competence and indeed the internal institutional cohesion have moved in opposing directions with respect to the bureaucracy and military respectively.

1. Institutional Decay of the Bureaucracy

During the last forty years, Pakistan's bureaucracy, has undergone a gradual process of institutional decay.¹⁵ Perhaps the single most important factor in the process has been a sharp decline in the intellectual caliber of the civil servant. This has been primarily caused by the virtual collapse of academic standards at colleges and universities from where prospective candidates for the civil service entrance examination are drawn and the institutional failure to provide them with high quality in-service training. To make matters worse unlike the 1950s and 1960s, with the decline in social status and prestige of a civil service job, together with opening up of lucrative alternatives in business and other professions, it has been observed that the best products of even the present poor education system do not normally sit for the civil service examination. The structure of the civil service is still predicated on the now unfounded assumption that the 'intellectual cream' of society applies for and enters the service. Having entered the civil service, the poorly educated young officers face a future in which there is an absence of rigorous formal education to equip them professionally at each stage of their careers for the tasks they are supposed to perform.

There are three types of institutions which purport to provide a semblance of 'training' to the civil servant: The Pakistan Academy for Administrative Training which organizes courses for each crop of fresh entrants to the civil service; the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) which runs courses for officers at the middle stage of their careers (deputy secretary level), and the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC) which imparts training to senior officers, federal joint secretaries and heads of departments. In all three categories of institutions, there is a virtual absence of a high quality faculty, and reliance is placed almost exclusively on invited speakers who lecture and then leave. The courses are so superficial and the evaluation of participants so soft as to pose no great intellectual challenge even to the current generation of officers with rather modest intellectual endowments.

The decline in the intellectual quality of individual officers has been accompanied over the last two decades by an erosion of Institutional mechanisms of decision making in

¹⁴ Akmal Hussain: "The Political Economy of State Power". Part I of book titled, Strategic Issues in Pakistan's Economic Policy. op. cit.

¹⁵ Akmal Hussain: Changes in Agrarian Structure op. cit

the civil service. Arbitrary interventions of political factions at different points in the political power structure interfere in a wide range of decisions whether it is transfers, promotions and dismissals of officers or judicial decisions by district commissioners on land disputes, right up to the issues of the arrest of drug barons or approval of major projects. The integrity of institutional decision making is often undermined by vested interests outside the civil service. This has resulted in increasing insecurity, corruption and on occasions demoralization of civil service officers. Such attitudes may have been reinforced by the large scale dismissals of senior officers, sometimes on flimsy charges by successive regimes. For example, Ayub Khan dismissed 1300 civil service officers in 1959 by a single order, again in 1969, 303 were dismissed by General Yahya Khan; during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto, as many as 1400 were dismissed through a single order and again in 1973, 12 senior civil service officers were unceremoniously removed. At a structural level the CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan) was the elite cadre within the civil bureaucracy and its members inherited the ICS (Indian Civil Service) tradition. The CSP cadre remained dominant in the bureaucracy and indeed over national decision making, right up to the end of the Ayub period. During the subsequent brief regime of General Yahya Khan the dominance of the CSP began to be broken by the military authorities. Subsequently, the regime of Z.A. Bhutto further eroded the internal cohesion and *esprit de corps* of the CSP by a policy of 'lateral entry' into the service. This meant that individuals who were politically loyal to Mr. Bhutto, whether they were from various government departments or outside the bureaucracy altogether, could be appointed in key civil service positions. During the days of General Zia-ul-Haq (later President), the position of the bureaucracy within the structure of state power was rehabilitated, and Zia gave greater confidence to civil servants by putting an end to the practice of 'screening' civil servants which during the regimes of General Yahya and Mr. Bhutto was like a sword of Damocles hanging over in-service bureaucrats who could be dismissed or transferred at short notice. General Zia-ul-Haq gave senior bureaucrats relatively long tenures.

In the regime of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto new stresses were placed on the structure of the bureaucracy as a result of the growing political conflict between a PPP government at the centre and the opposition UI government in Punjab, the largest province. The historically unprecedented contention for power between the federal and the Punjab Provincial governments was often done by manipulating individuals or groups of civil servants. The use of bureaucrats as instruments of the political power struggle between the centre and the province was manifested in a dramatic form in two cases. The first was the Federal Government's decision to transfer to Islamabad five senior officers working in the Punjab provincial administration. (The I.G. Police. S.P. Police, Information Secretary. The Additional Chief Secretary and the Chief Secretary in the Punjab.) The federal government's perception was that these officials were misusing their power for the pursuit of the political interests of the provincial government. The Punjab Government initially resisted and then acquiesced in the federal government's transfer orders for four of the five officers. In the case of the Chief Secretary of the

Punjab Government, Mr. Anwer Zahid, the Federal government's instructions to transfer him to Islamabad were successfully resisted by the then Chief Minister, Punjab (Mr. Nawaz Sharif).

The second case concerned the implementation of the federal government's People's Programme for Development (PPD). This programme envisaged providing basic services to the poor at the grassroots level, such as schools, drinking water, brick lined village streets and drains. The federal government which had also provided the funding, attempted to run as a federal government project, a set of development activities which normally fall within the purview of the provincial government. The provincial government decided to resist the implementation of the People's Programme for Development, on grounds that it was an attack on the authority of the provincial government. This conflict created surrealistic scenes of villagers building village roads and drains with bricks, and the local deputy commissioner sending bulldozers to demolish the construction and arresting the workmen on charges of disturbing the public peace.

The typical civil servant today is faced with formidable problems of poverty, social polarization, breakdown of law and order and erosion of infrastructure. He is expected to tackle these problems in an environment where often conflicting demands from a still nascent political system are impinging upon an administrative institution whose internal stability and cohesion has already been undermined by the arbitrary and piecemeal interventions of successive regimes. To be able to function effectively in such a situation civil servants would have to be men of considerable professional acumen, integrity and initiative. Few of them today could claim to be imbued with these qualities. Given the poverty of their education and institutional environment, they are in most cases incapable of even comprehending the nature of the problems they face, let alone conceptualize, formulate and evaluate policy interventions to overcome them.

2. Institutional Growth of the Military

While there has been a rapid deterioration in the level of professional competence, institutional procedures for decision making and an absence of effective methods of in-service training in the bureaucracy, by contrast in the case of the military there has been a significant improvement in each of these spheres.

In the military, unlike the civilian bureaucracy, the officer has to study acquire new skills and pass an examination at each stage of the promotion ladder. Over the last forty years the military has developed a sophisticated infrastructure of education from military public schools, through specialized colleges for professional training in various fields of engineering, electronics, and aeronautics, to high quality command and staff training institutions.

The two institutions in the latter category, i.e, Command and Staff College Quetta (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels), and the National Defence College Rawalpindi (for Brigadiers and above) not only provide training in defence planning and war gaming at the highest international level, but also enable officers to conduct inter-disciplinary studies in national policy analysis in the fields of foreign policy, internal security and economic policy. The quality of the teaching staff, the methods of instruction, and the intensity and rigour of the study programmes make them into genuine centres of excellence.

One of the senior instructors at the Command and Staff College, when asked what was the guiding principle of their training programme, replied: "To develop a mind that can think on its own, that does not take anything for granted." It is ironic that the notion of the critical mind charged by the spirit of enquiry which over the last forty years has been gradually banished from educational institutions in civil society. Actually constitutes the basis of education in the higher military institutions. The officers study long hours. Use the library intensively, engage in high quality seminar discussions and write policy papers, all activities which are mostly absent from the civilian sphere. It is not surprising that military officers trained at such institutions develop a far more sophisticated understanding of governance than any products of civilian educational institutions in contemporary Pakistan.

Apart from the quality of intellectual training imparted to the military officers, the decision making structure and coordination amongst the various services (Army, Navy, Air Force) have also improved. We have argued that in the bureaucracy, contrary to service rules, there is political interference in promotions, appointments and operational decisions. In sharp contrast to the bureaucracy, the military over the years has not only strengthened and professionalized its internal decision making but has also increasingly insulated itself from involvement of civilian authority at both administrative and operational levels, even in spheres which could be legitimately regarded as the domain of civilian executive authority. For example, the Prime Minister can under the law make appointments. Promotions and transfers up to the rank of Lieutenant General. (The four star Generals or service chiefs are supposed to be appointed by the President.) In 1988, when General Zia-ul-Haq, then Chief of Army Staff, sent the name of Major General Pir Dad Khan to Prime Minister Junejo for signing the order of promotion to Lieutenant General, Junejo refused on grounds that a General who was responsible for losing Siachin did not deserve to be promoted, and, in fact, suggested to Zia, that Major General Shamim Alam Khan should be promoted instead. There was a deadlock on the issue, with Zia refusing to withdraw Pir Dad Khan's name. Finally, a compromise was struck and both Major General Pir Dad Khan and Major General Shamim Ajam Khan were promoted to Lieutenant General.

A case that occurred under the public gaze was the famous order by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to retire Admiral Sirohey. The officer in question who had been

promoted to the rank of admiral was appointed Chief of Naval Staff in 1986. Before his three-year term could end, he was appointed Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) in 1988. In 1989, the Prime Minister decided to retire Admiral Sirohey on the basis of her view that (i) While the President was the appointing authority for this rank of officer under the Constitution, the Prime Minister had the authority to retire him. (ii) The retirement of Admiral Sirohey became due three years after his appointment as Admiral, that is, in 1989. The President supported by the military took the contrary view that: (i) Admiral Sirohey's retirement became due not three years after his appointment as Admiral but three years after his appointment as Chairman JCSC, that is, in 1991. (ii) It was the President who was both the appointing and retiring authority. The contention on the Sirohey issue between the Prime Minister, on the one hand, and President and the military, on the other, became public and was reported in the press. Sirohey did not leave—his post. Finally, the Prime Minister under pressure was obliged to quietly let Sirohey continue in office.

An example of the military achieving institutional insulation from civilian authority in operational matters even in cases where important foreign policy considerations were involved is provided by the Afghan operation. This consisted of providing material support to Afghan Mujahideen more or less autonomously from civilian authority even after the latter had signed the Geneva accord which formally committed the Pakistan government to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Thus, the military has become increasingly sophisticated in terms of the quality of its professional expertise and has achieved greater insulation from interventions by civilian authority. At the same time, it has developed a powerful corporate image of itself. The officers owe their privilege, prestige and economic welfare to that organization. Even after they retire they know they will be looked after, given a whole range of military run welfare societies, housing societies and manufacturing units where post-retirement service can be sought. Thus, while morale and *esprit de corps* has grown rapidly in the army after the 1971 fiasco, the bureaucracy has undergone a gradual decline in its morale over the last three decades.

3. Relations between Military and Bureaucracy

Relations between military and bureaucracy over the last four decades have been determined partly by the differing internal processes of change in the two institutions and partly by pressures emanating from civil society, on the one hand, and the international environment on the other.

There have been four broad phases in relations between the military and bureaucracy:

(1) 1951 to 1958. During this period there was an alliance between the bureaucracy and the army through the “gang of four” consisting of Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry

Muhammad Ali, Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub Khan. The dominance of the bureaucracy supported by the any *vis-a-vis* the political system can be judged from the fact that in April 1953, the then Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, who was an old bureaucrat, dismissed the Khwaja Nazimuddin government even though the Constituent Assembly had given it a vote of confidence. Soon after this arbitrary dismissal of the government by the Governor-General, the Constituent Assembly met again and passed another vote of confidence, this time in favor of the new Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra who had been nominated to this office by the Governor-General. Not only did the Governor-General appoint the new Prime Minister but he also nominated ministers of the cabinet and assigned them their respective portfolios. Thus, state power effectively passed into the hands of the Governor-General and the bureaucracy and military whose interests he pursued. The function of the Constituent Assembly was reduced merely to rubber-stamping his actions.

(2) 1958 to 1968. There was a formal military takeover by General Ayub Khan in 1958 (a process that had begun in 1951). Soon after the *coup d'état*, Ayub Khan began to constitute a civilian structure of government which was formally established with the introduction of the system of "Basic Democracy". Under this system the President was to be elected not through direct popular vote but indirectly through an electoral college of individuals called Basic Democrats who, in turn, had been elected through local bodies elections at the village level. Given the structure of political power at the village level which was based on clans and *biraderis* of the landed elite, the composition of the electoral college was overwhelmingly in favor of the interests of landlords and rich peasants. These influential landlords who were instrumental in getting the B.Ds elected had direct links with the bureaucrats. Thus, the B.D. system, in effect, constituted an instrument through which the bureaucracy could have an outreach into the village level clans and *biraderis* and through which it could maintain the political system of the Ayub regime.

During the Ayub regime there was a power sharing arrangement between the army and bureaucracy, with the bureaucracy being a dominant partner. An important factor explaining why the internal balance of power within the state structure shifted into the hands of the bureaucracy after the military coup of 1958, was that both Ayub Khan and the military behind him recognized the experience and ability of the civil bureaucracy in wielding state power. Equally important was the fact that the bureaucracy at that stage could still boast of highly competent professional administrators inherited from the ICS tradition and an institutional cohesiveness in its decision making structure.

(3) 1971-1977. During the early period of the military regime of General Yahya Khan (1969-1971) the position of the bureaucracy had been relegated to a relatively minor role compared to the military, in the task of governance. The bureaucracy had also been fragmented and demoralized by the dismissal of 303 civil servants. In the subsequent period of the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the bureaucracy was

further fragmented and demoralized. The new government of Mr. Bhutto carved out from the bureaucracy a personalized chain of command through the appointment of politically loyal individuals in key positions. At the same time, an attempt was made to reduce the power of the elite CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) cadre of the bureaucracy. This was done first by purging 1300 officers on grounds of misuse of power and filling their vacancies by individuals person all loyal to Mr. Bhutto. These were either drawn from other sections of the civil administration or from outside the bureaucracy, by instituting a system of "lateral entry". Under this system direct appointments at all levels of the administrative services could be made on recommendations from the PPP leadership. By thus short-circuiting the hierarchy of the CSP and penetrating it with officers who were loyal to the PPP, large sections of the bureaucracy were politicized and made amenable for direct use by political forces.

(4) 1977-1988. During this period President General Zia-ul-Haq stabilized and rehabilitated the bureaucracy although it was very much a junior partner to the military in the task of governance. There was a clear demarcation of roles. The military was formulator of the policy and the bureaucracy was made responsible for implementing it. Although General Zia-ul-Haq relied for his power on the military even in the daily running of state affairs (there was a regular meeting of the Corp Commanders and Principal Staff Officers under the Chairmanship of General Zia-ul-Haq in his capacity of Chief of Army Staff, to discuss national policy). Yet, General Zia-ul-Haq maintained three senior bureaucrats as close confidants in the administration. They were Secretary General Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Interior Secretary Roedad Khan and Defence Secretary Ijlai Haider Zaidi. Until his retirement in 1982 Agha Shahi was also an influential bureaucrat on whom General Zia-ul-Haq relied for implementing the foreign policy of what was essentially a military regime.

The history of the changing balance of power between the army and bureaucracy shows a rapid increase in the weightage of the military relative to the bureaucracy in determining national policy in the major spheres of foreign policy, the economy, and internal security. This shift in the internal balance of power within the state structure was due not merely to the weakening of the civil society relative to the state apparatus as a whole but equally importantly due to the institutional deterioration in the bureaucracy as an arm of governance.

THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER AND THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN

At the time of Independence in 1947 the bureaucracy and the army had a predominant position in the structure of state power relative to the institutions in civil society. This was due firstly to the form of the freedom struggle on the one hand, and the nature of the Muslim League on the other. Since the freedom struggle was essentially a constitutional one, the state apparatus of the colonial regime remained intact, albeit in a weakened condition. The bureaucracy which constituted the steel frame of the Raj and

the army, continued after the emergence of Pakistan to determine the parameters within which political and economic changes were to occur. However, as we have argued earlier, the position of the military relative to the bureaucracy within the power structure became increasingly important, partly because of the different internal dynamics within each of these two institutions of the state apparatus.

The second factor in the failure to subordinate the state apparatus to the political system lay in the two basic characteristics of both the Muslim League before partition and the PPP during the two decades between 1970 and 1990:

1. In the pre-Independence period the Muslim League as well as the Pakistan Peoples Party were movements rather than parties. They were, therefore, unable to establish an organizational structure and develop a political culture on the basis of which the power of the people could be institutionalized and used to subordinate the army and the bureaucracy to a stable political system.
2. The Muslim League in the decade before partition, and the PPP during the early 1970s were taken over by landlords whose political interest lay in constraining the process of political development, and while ruling in the name of the people to confine politics to a struggle for sharing the economic spoils amongst various factions of the political elite.

The political elite in Pakistan has so far demonstrably failed in fulfilling its historical role of building a modern democratic polity marked with social justice within the state of Pakistan, as envisaged by the founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Fulfilling this role would have meant building institutions through which the will of the people could become operative within the power structure, developing a political culture which could strengthen and sustain these institutions, and finally, in initiating an industrialization process through which the people of Pakistan could make a contribution to the contemporary world. Members of Pakistan's political elite have in most cases preferred narrow personal gain to national interest, have engaged in internecine quarrels fuelled with greed in situations which required unity and self-sacrifice for the nation state.

Yet, despite the failure of the political elite, the dominance of the military in the structure of state power and growing social polarization, it is remarkable that whenever the people, as a whole, have intervened, they have shown not only a high level of political consciousness but, in fact, it can be argued that their political maturity has grown over time. For example, in 1956 when Western powers were involved in a conflict with Nasser's Egypt, even though the government and the political elite supported the Western allied powers, the people of Pakistan came out on the streets in large numbers to voice their support for the nationalist struggle of the people of Egypt. Again in 1968, the people of Pakistan expressed their opposition to the regime of Ayub

Khan which at the political level had repressed popular aspirations, at the economic level had generated acute inequality between social groups and regions and at the foreign policy level had compromised Pakistan's national pride in the Tashkent Agreement. After the Pakistan Movement whose struggle for Pakistan resulted in the creation of a new State, the movement against the Ayub regime was the second great movement. It generated demands of social equality, justice and political representation of the dispossessed.

It was Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who articulated the deep seated aspirations of the people during this period, and in a short span of time, he was catapulted into power in 1971. Yet, within six years the people grasped the failure of Prime Minister Bhutto to build a state structure in which power could actually go to citizens at the grassroots; a political system within which the ruling Peoples Party could generate a new leadership at different levels of society, and an economic system in which drastic measures could be taken to alleviate poverty, unemployment, hunger and disease. The disillusionment of the people with their beloved leader was expressed by their silence when the PNA led an urban revolt to destabilize the regime of Prime Minister Bhutto. However, the enduring contribution of Mr. Bhutto in articulating the aspirations of the poor and in giving a new dignity and pride to the wretched of the earth. was acknowledged by the people of Pakistan in the widespread anguish expressed after his judicial assassination. When his daughter Benazir Bhutto took on the mantle of leadership in the struggle against the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, the people once again responded with both passion and heroism. The popular struggle against the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq found its high points first in the 1983 movement and later in the unprecedented demonstration in Lahore on the arrival of Benazir Bhutto in August 1986. Finally, within twenty months of coming into power of the popularly elected Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, when the people once again went to the polls they expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of her regime by voting in favour of IJI.

Thus it is that the people of Pakistan, the poor and downtrodden, in spite of the erosion of institutions of civil society have, nevertheless, demonstrated a high level of political consciousness, and emerged as a factor to be reckoned with by those who pull the levers of power within the state structure. It is for this reason that the military, even when there was no apparent obstacle to the reimposition of military rule, after the death of Zia on 17 August 1988, sought a civilian dispensation within which it could exercise its power as a major (but not the sole) actor, and through which the subterranean tensions of the populace could be defused.

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN

RULES OF THE GAME

An essential component of the crisis that the Pakistani state has endured through most of its forty four years has been absence of “rules of the game” defining the relations among the ruling classes, between different components of the power structure and among the provinces that constitute the federation of Pakistan.¹⁶ An important reason why such “rules of the game” did not emerge was the frequent experiments with various constitutions and political structures. For instance, the principles which were first enshrined in the 1956 Constitution, seeking a federal parliamentary set up were reversed when the 1962 Constitution imposed a unitary, presidential system of government. This in turn collapsed under the 1968-69 mass movement directed against Field Marshal Ayub Khan and the new 1973 Constitution, under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, vested tremendous powers in the Prime Minister as part of a federal, parliamentary structure. In what was subsequently termed by General Zia-ul-Haq as a bid to “balance” the powers of the President and the Prime Minister, the 8th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution made the Presidency into a powerful authority with the discretion to dismiss the Prime Minister at will, dissolve the National Assembly and appoint the Armed Forces chiefs.¹⁷

Pakistan, which started off as a federation of five provinces, saw the imposition of One Unit in 1955, with the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and NWFP amalgamated in what was termed as West Pakistan. In 1969, Pakistan’s second Martial Law Regime was quick to undo the One Unit and the provinces were then restored.

A similar confusion prevailed over the question of Islam in the national polity. Two different strands defined what is an abiding debate: the extent of Islamization of the

¹⁶ The chequered nature of Pakistani political development is assessed in a number of studies from various perspectives including: Pakistan: The Long View, edited by Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggings, Duke University Press, USA, 1977, especially, its Chapter 9 ‘Political Leadership and Institution-building under Jinnah, Ayub, and Bhutto’ by Khalid Bin Sayeed; Pakistan: Failure in National Integration by Rounaq Jahan, Columbia University Press, 1972; Friends not Masters by Mohammad Ayub Khan, Oxford University Press, 1967; Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 by M. Rafique Afzal, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976.

¹⁷ For an informed backgrounder on events leading up to the passage of the Eighth Amendment and appraisal of its various clauses, see three- pan series on it in The Daily News, by Dr. Safdar Mahmood, “Eighth Amendment Beginning of the Controversy”, 14 May 1991, “Passage of the Eighth Amendment Bill”, 15 May 1991 and “A Blessing in Disguise?”, (16 May 1991); Professor Khurshid Ahmad, Eighth Constitutional Amendment Bill: A critical appraisal, Makiaba Mansoor, Lahore, 1985.

state structure as opposed to a loose delineation of the role of religion *vis-a-vis* the constitutional and political structure prevailing in the country. The Father of the Nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisaged a Pakistan where religion would have a role in individual and social life but not in the functioning of state institutions. Z.A. Bhutto while amending the Constitution to classify Qadianis as non-Muslims and later passing a law banning alcohol for Muslims under pressure of the religious lobby, nevertheless, held the view that while Pakistan's social ethos could be Islamic, religion need not be extended to all aspects of political life by the state. Conversely, Pakistan's third Martial Law Regime led by General Zia ul-Haq made Islamization the principal plank of polity and used Islam during his eleven-year regime, as the basis of the ruling ideology.¹⁸ A vocal and increasingly influential clergy became a major constituency of the Zia regime. Interestingly, these different perspectives were unable to bridge the dichotomy which Pakistan has manifested in its successive election campaigns (with the exception of the 1990 election): Islamic parties with programmes of Islamization of the country in most cases end up polling lesser votes than those generally termed as "secular" parties. For instance, both during the 1965 election campaign which was contested by Miss Fatima Jinnah (the sister of the Quaid-e-Azam), and the 1988 and 1990 election campaigns in which Miss Benazir Bhutto was a major contestant, the issue of women and their rights to contest and hold political office was confined to a few critics from among the clergy, and it did not elicit an emotive response among Pakistan's highly politically conscious electorate. For the greater part, the people of Pakistan treated this virtually as a non-issue, preferring instead, to cast their ballot on the basis of what they saw were the "real issues".¹⁹

Probably the single most important expression of the absence of the "rules of the game" in Pakistan's polity resulted, in large part owing to the recurrence of military intervention in Pakistan's political life. A total of three martial law regimes have ruled Pakistan for twenty-four out of its forty-four years as a sovereign state. Civil military relations have become such a key index of a civil government's stability that two of Pakistan's last three prime ministers lost their jobs because they were unable to function effectively in the absence of an operational balance between army and civil society.²⁰

¹⁸ The Islamization debate in Pakistani politics has been aptly summed up in Anwar Hussain Syed. *Pakistan, Islam and National Solidarity*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982. Muhammad Munir *From Jinnah to Zia*. Vanguard, 1980.

¹⁹ Prior to the passage of the Shariat Bill by the National Assembly, the Islamic debate was revived in the Pakistani press with a critique of the clergy's role from such sources as: Benazir Bhutto "Shariah Bill and its Impact" *The News*, May 16, 1991; Ghanie Eirabi "The PM has no Mandate to put Clergy in Power", *The Muslim* 15 May 1991; Israrul Haque four-part series on "What is Fundamentalism?" *The Muslim*, 10.14, 15.16 May 1991; For a different view: Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi "Constitutional issues in the light of Islamic Injunctions", *The Ms* 8 May 1991.

²⁰ For an informed perspective on the debate in civil-military relations see: Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86*, Progressive Publishers, 1988; also Mushahid Hussain "Civil military Relations under Civilian Regimes", *The Frontier Post*. 23 March 1990.

This balance could not be attained owing to a number of reasons including encroachment on each other's turf, debate over the defence budget or the desire to trim it, appointment of key military personnel and a certain restiveness among the khaki when in its view, the Mufti leadership had become "too big for its boots". Even in 1991, the single most important question, in the minds of informed Pakistanis was whether the Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, who had succeeded General Zia-ul-Haq in the key slot of Chief of Army Staff and remained virtually a king-maker during two important political transitions in Pakistan, would be retired on schedule or not, He himself had to signal publicly his intention to retire or not to seek extension of his tenure as COAS, only then was he able to set at rest the speculation in this regard.²¹

Compounding these problems pertaining to the constitutional balance between such offices as the Prime Minister and the President and among the provinces as well as civil military relations, is the absence of strong non-governmental institutions. Civil institutions such as the judiciary, the press and intelligentsia have been weak and political parties with grassroots organizations have been absent in Pakistan's political life. Ironically, it was in the eighties under a repressive military regime, that a culture of resistance was able to develop, indigenously and spontaneously, whose essence was a commitment to democracy irrespective of the differences in political orientation. For both civil and military authoritarian governments, a favorite target of systematic assault has been institutions of the judiciary, the press and the intelligentsia. For instance, the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq, all tried, with varying degrees of success, to snuff out the voice of dissent from within the judiciary through selective purges or amendments of the Constitution that deprived the judiciary of its teeth.²² The press was controlled through the go monopoly over the issuance of licenses to publish and the distribution of newsprint, whose control eventually became an important part of government leverage over the newspaper industry. Such was the state of the media that by 1979, there were only two major English language newspapers – *The Pakistan Times* and *Dawn* – and two major Urdu language newspapers – *Jang* and *Nawa-e-Waqt* – in the country.²³

Universities and institutes of higher learning which provide the institutional base for generating intellectual thinking became the victims of an authoritarian regime whose worst expression was the 1963 Press and Publication Ordinance which enabled the incumbent government to deprive students of their university degrees on political

²¹ The affirmation of the Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg in this regard was published in the Nation, 15 May 1991. Underlining that he would retire on schedule and categorically stated that "there is no possibility of Martial Law".

²² Mushahid Hussain Judiciary: A Political Profile", The Frontier Post, 5 October 1990; also "Human Rights and the Judiciary". The Nation, 22 March 1992.

²³ Zamir Niazi, *Press in Chains*, Royal Book Company: Karachi, 1987.

grounds, a legislation without precedent in any civilized country. These assaults on the intelligentsia were reinforced by the recurring purges of dissident teachers and intellectuals from the universities and institutions of higher learning, together with concerted efforts to permit violent student groups working in collusion with the administration to stifle dissent on campus.²⁴

Given the politics of personalities that have been prevalent in Pakistan, political parties have invariably revolved around personalities rather than programmes and policies and, in fact, it is the personality which invariably defines a party programme in Pakistan. Additionally, given the feudal nature of Pakistani politics the accent is on dynastic politics with scions of leading families dominating political parties, and by extension, the seats in the legislature of the country. Even Bhutto who won the 1970 elections on an issue-based programme, had, by the time of the 1977 elections, reversed himself politically preferring to patronize the traditional political elites rather than giving strength to new forces such as the urban middle and lower middle classes, who had constituted the social base of the anti-Ayub struggle.²⁵

The most damaging feature of the Pakistani political system has been the failure to evolve a democratic political culture based on political coexistence of contending politicians and political parties and tolerance of dissent, which constitute the *sine qua non* of democracy. The absence of a democratic political culture has tragically manifested itself on key occasions in Pakistan's politics when politicians, preferring to subordinate their larger political interests to petty rivalries and infighting, have sought the army's intervention to oust a political rival rather than to achieve an accommodation with their political opponent. This was the case with Ayub Khan in 1969, when despite his concessions to the political forces on the question of a federal parliamentary structure, politicians like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto preferred to extend support to the group of ambitious army officers who were keen to abort any political settlement between Ayub Khan and the politicians so that they could impose martial law and run the country themselves. Ironically, the chickens came home to roost when Bhutto himself was facing pressure from the political forces opposed to his government in 1977. Despite having reached an accommodation with his political opponents, some politicians like Air Marshal Asghar Khan preferred the option of military rule rather than the continuance of a weakened civil government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto which had, by July 1977 agreed to hold fresh elections. Similarly, in April 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq was able to order the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with the tacit concurrence and, in some cases, connivance of most of the major politicians of the country.²⁶

²⁴ Mushahid Hussain, "University Administration: Tackling Campus Violence", The Frontier Post, 23 August 1987.

²⁵ Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan's Politics: Nature and Direction of Change*. Praeger Publishers: New York, 1980.

²⁶ While there is little hard evidence to implicate politicians in conniving with the Army, sufficient circumstantial evidence exists, e.g., Tehrik-i-Istaqlal leader, Air Marshal Asghar Khan's letter to the Services Chiefs, May 1977,

THE AMERICAN CONNECTION

From the very beginning, since independence in 1947, the United States has been perceived to be the most significant foreign player in Pakistani politics and probably the most vital element in the formulation of the country's foreign and defense policies. Pakistan's pursuit of a policy of intimacy with the United States was determined by a combination of circumstances, including insecurity generated by fear and distrust of a larger and stronger neighbor India — which in the view of Pakistani policy makers had not reconciled itself to the existence of the country. The Indian attitude was certainly the initial impulse that determined Pakistan's desire for a close military and political connection with Washington. This, in turn, was reinforced by the political and ideological proclivities of Pakistan's decision makers whose Westernized ethos was more compatible the emerging world view of Washington during the height of the Cold War.²⁷

This eagerness to seek an embrace with the United States was made conducive on account of a number of elements. There was, at one level, particularly after the death of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, a general weakening of politicians and political forces in Pakistan with a corresponding strengthening of the control of the civil and military bureaucracy. The latter was less responsive to popular aspirations and more at home with the "free world" which promised it generous financial assistance and supply of state-of-the-art military equipment. Consequently the military tended to deepen its dependent relationship with the US. In 1952, when Pakistan sent its first Military Attaché to Washington, whose mandate, as conveyed to him by his superiors in Pakistan, was quite clear. Brigadier Ghulam Jilani, the Military Attaché, was told by his Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan and the Defense Secretary, Iskandar Mirza, that his main task was to procure military equipment from the Pentagon. In the pursuit of this task, he was told by his superiors, he need not take either the Ambassador or Foreign Office into confidence because, as they put it, "these civilians cannot be trusted with such sensitive matters of national security".²⁸

asking them to "Not to obey an unconstitutional government"; even recent statements of politicians like the Pir of Pagara "jang", 13 May 1991 and Malik Qasim who bluntly said "all Martial Laws have been imposed in Pakistan with connivance of politicians", The Frontier Post, 15 May 1991.

²⁷ Studies on Pakistan's foreign policy confirm this perception: SM. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis*, Oxford University Press, 1975; G.W. Chaudhry, , *India, Bangladesh and Major Po Politics of a Divided Subcontinent*, New York: The Free Press, 1975; MS. Venkatramani. *The American Role in Pakistan 1947-1958*, Vanguard, 1984; Mushahid Hussain. *Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario*. Progressive Publishers, 1988.

²⁸ Major General Gilani himself stated this in his conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

In 1953, the visiting US Vice President, Richard Nixon, was pleased after his meeting with General Ayub Khan. He wrote in his memoirs that General Ayub Khan impressed the visiting American leader as “one Pakistan leader who was more anticommunist than anti-Indian”.²⁹ In later years, it was this dichotomy regarding the compatibility of common feelings on anti-communism with the lack of correspondingly strong concern of the US regarding Pakistan’s political and security interests *vis-a-vis* India, that was to lay the basis of the cleavage between Pakistan and the United States. Ironically, it was the same General Ayub Khan who was instrumental as President in pursuing a policy that brought about this divergence of perceptions between the two countries.³⁰

Interestingly, the Pakistan-American connection was initiated at a time when relations with the other superpower — the Soviet Union — had not really started deteriorating. Since the partition of the sub-continent, the Soviets under Stalin had viewed with suspicion both the newly emerging nations of Asia — Pakistan and India. They essentially saw them as countries which were “under the influence of British Imperialism”, although this view was tinged with an initial empathy for the Muslim State of Pakistan, given the fact that their local protégé, the Communist Party of India, had in 1942 supported the demand of the Muslim League for self-determination of the Muslims of the sub-continent. Stalin’s coolness to India was also demonstrated by the fact that the first Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the sister of the Indian Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, failed to get even a personal audience with Stalin.³¹ It was apparently in pursuit of such a policy, somewhat sympathetic to Pakistan, that the Soviet Union took the initiative of extending an invitation to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the Soviet Union. Conversely, the United States had extended an invitation to the Indian Prime Minister to visit Washington. Liaquat Ali Khan initially accepted the invitation to visit Moscow, but later on, he used it to fish for an invitation from the United States and, as a consequence, his visit to the Soviet Union never materialized.³² Liaquat Ali Khan’s 1950 visit to the United States set the pace for the growth of Pakistan-American relations and it was not long afterwards that Pakistan was said to be afflicted with a disease called ‘PACTITIS’, which meant that Pakistan was willing and ready to join virtually any Pact

²⁹ RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon.

³⁰ Ayub Khan was so disillusioned with the United States that he titled his memoirs *Friends not Masters*, Oxford University Press, 1967.

³¹ Mushahid Hassain “Pakistan-Soviet Relations 1947-1981” in three parts, *The Muslim*. 13, 14 and 16 August 1981; Syed Rifat Hussain “Soviet Response to Pakistan Resolution”. *The Frontier Post*. 17 May 1991, quotes the September 1942 Resolution of the Communist Party of India (CPI) saying that “the CPI saying very close to recognizing the legitimacy of the idea of Pakistan and the two-nation theory”.

³² The various dimensions of this controversy regarding the Soviet invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan are discussed, among others, in Ayaz Naseem *Pak-Soviet: Relations 1947-65*. Progressive Publishers, 1989.

that the Americans were sponsoring in the region to counter “communist expansionism”.³³

The American connection was significant in reshaping Pakistan politics in at least three respects. First, through the supply of arms to the armed forces and in the context of the 1948 conflict, which had already taken place with India, the American connection was able to establish the primacy of the Pakistan Army in the Pakistani power structure. The result was the emergence of General Ayub Khan, the Army Commander-in-Chief, as virtually the “king-maker” in Pakistani politics, a fact recognized and accepted by the Americans as confirmed in official American reports that have been declassified by the State Department in 1987.³⁴ It was perhaps no accident that when Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, after dismissing Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimud-din in 1953 and dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954, had Ayub Khan in his Cabinet, as one of the key members occupying the slot of Defence Minister.³⁵ Second the American connection established anti-communism as a vital element of Pakistani state policy, both at home and abroad. Soon after Pakistan’s entry into a military alliance with the United States in 1954, the Communist Party of Pakistan was banned and its members arrested or harassed. Third, the American connection also laid the basis for creeping authoritarian rule in the country. Soon after the conclusion of the Pakistan-United States military linkage in 1954. For instance, the elected government of the province of East Pakistan which had won the election under the banner of “Jugtu Front”, including left wing elements was quickly dismissed after remaining in office for a few months and the province placed under Governor’s Rule.³⁶

The Soviet Union, till 1953, had supported the Pakistani stand on the question of Kashmir that there should be a plebiscite in Occupied Kashmir under the United Nations auspices to determine the rights and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Following the initiation of Pakistan’s American connection, Moscow switched sides and started taking a strong pro-Indian position on Kashmir. In fact, in 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin,

³³ Supra. Burke.

³⁴ “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957” Volume VIII South Asia. US Government Printing Office. 1987. P. 436. refers to Ayub Khan as “final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets”.

³⁵ Ayub Khan by his own admission, had prepared a master plan for a Pakistani political system called “A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan” way back on 4 October 1954: Ayub Khan, op. cit. p. 187; Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit. pp. 253-254.

³⁶ The US announced military aid to Pakistan on 25 February 1954. while elections were scheduled for 10 March 1954 and the timing, according to Sidney Seltzberg article in Commentary (New York) June 1954 was “to help Prime Minister Mohammad Ali’s Muslim League in the elections in East Bengal” in Rafique Afzal. op. cit. p.127; and after the Pakistan-US Military Aid Pact on 19 April 1954. 162 members of the East Pakistan Assembly condemned it while also observing a province- wide protest. Afzal. op. cit pp. 131-132.

endorsed the Afghan Government's position on what was termed as the "Pakhtoonistan question".³⁷ Another significant aspect of the American connection was a change in Pakistan's policy from 1956 to 1960 on the question of the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. Under American prodding, Pakistan started opposing China's admission to the United Nations during that period, although Pakistan had no bilateral problems with its neighbor to the north. A high point in Pakistan-American relations was the famous incident in 1960 when an American spy plane, U-2 which flew from the American air base in Peshawar, was shot down over the Soviet Union and its pilot.

Francis Gary Powers was captured. This incident was unfortunate for Pakistan not only because Pakistan had been involved as a partisan in the Cold War between the Soviets and the Americans, but also because this incident was an infringement of Pakistan sovereignty as the plane had flown from Peshawar without either prior information or concurrence of the Government of Pakistan.

The American connection, also influenced decision making on foreign policy at the highest levels of the Government of Pakistan. For instance, in September 1954, when the Americans were keen on constructing a new military alliance in South-East Asia to be known as SEATO – South East Asia Treaty Organization, a meeting of the regional Foreign Ministers was called in Manila. Pakistan sent its nominee, Foreign Minister Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, with the express instructions that he should sign on any agreement in Manila that envisaged merely assisting a member in the event of "communist aggression". Pakistan's primary fear, quite naturally, emanated from possible aggression by India rather than the Soviets or the Chinese. Amazingly, the Foreign Minister flouted the instructions of his government by signing on the dotted line of the draft prepared by the Americans as a result of which SEATO came into existence with no concern for Pakistani sensitivities regarding possible Indian aggression as its thrust was on "communist aggression" alone. From Manila, Sir Zafarullah Khan flew directly to Washington where he sent a long-winded explanation to his government as to why he had signed, despite orders to the contrary. The suspicion in Pakistan that Sir Zafarullah Khan had gone along with the Americans because he had been assured by the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that as a *quid pro quo* he would be rewarded with the membership of the prestigious International Court of Justice, was reinforced when Sir Zafarullah Khan was later elected to this position, which has a tenure of nine years. He won the election by a margin of one vote, and interestingly, the Israeli delegate, Abba Eban was absent from the vote on that particular day in the United Nations General Assembly. In February

³⁷ Mushahid Hussain. op. cit.. "Pak-Soviet Relations".

1955, the Cabinet ratified this decision of Sir Zafarullah Khan on SEATO membership which he had taken in September 1954.³⁸

On occasion, Pakistan's intimacy with the United States also colored the political perceptions of the Pakistani leadership. For instance, during his 1957 visit to the United States, Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was ebullient over the results of his talks with President Eisenhower. His Personal Secretary, Aftab Ahmad Khan, told the Pakistani Political Counsellor at the Embassy in Washington, Agha Shahi, who was later to be Foreign Minister, that "my boss has really performed a miracle. He has managed to wrest a commitment from Eisenhower that Kashmir will be ours". Agha Shahi asked Aftab Ahmad Khan "What will be the *quid pro quo*?" Replied Suhrawardy's aide: "In return, we will allow the Americans to establish a military base at Badaber, near Peshawar".³⁹ The base became operational in July, 1959.

There is also a view in Pakistan that Pakistan's first Martial Law, imposed by General Ayub Khan in October 1958, had American blessings. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support this view. Pakistan's first free general elections were scheduled for March, 1959 and it was expected that the Muslim League under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan would emerge as the winner in the elections. A key plank of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan's foreign policy programme was the establishment of a confederation between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, a sort of nascent Muslim bloc in south west Asia that would be independent of the power bloc created by the respective superpowers.

In March, 1958, a high level Pakistani delegation went to Washington for consultations with US officials under the leadership of Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali and included the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Asghar Khan. During this visit, the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, held separate consultations with the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor. In fact, Syed Amjad Ali recalls that one evening he got an invitation over the telephone for dinner at the Pentagon hosted by General Taylor. When he arrived at the dinner, he was surprised to see General Ayub Khan seated at the right of his host, Maxwell Taylor, although he, Syed Amjad Ali, was the leader of the delegation and by virtue of that position and seniority, should have been placed according to protocol on the hosts right side. To top it all, the dinner was capped by a speech by General Taylor who pinned a medal at General Ayub Khan from the United States Army. Later, on Ayub Khan sheepishly told Syed Amjad Ali "I never knew General

³⁸ Agha Hilaly, a Senior Pakistani Foreign Service Officer, who accompanied Sir Zafarullah Khan to Manila and Syed Amjad Ali, former Pakistan Ambassador to the US, confirmed this in conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

³⁹ Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

Taylor was going to give me that medal".⁴⁰ Six months after this Washington visit, General Ayub Khan launched his military coup in the country, which was the beginning of authoritarian rule and the first of three Martial Laws, that ran Pakistan for twenty-four of its forty-four years as an independent state.

Soon after General Ay Khan became President of Pakistan through his military coup. He was quick to sign a Mutual Security Agreement with the United States in 1959. And in 1961, General Ayub Khan proclaimed in an address to the joint session of the American Congress, the "Pakistan today is the most allied ally of the United States". However, these professions of solidarity wore thin very soon after when, during 1962, even without bothering to consult their "most allied ally" the US airlifted military equipment to India. It was that single event which sparked off a reassessment among policy makers including General Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, for the need of an opening to the People's Republic of China as a counterweight to India.⁴¹ In November, 1963, when Foreign Minister Bhutto went to Washington to represent Pakistan at the funeral of President John Kennedy, the new occupant of the white House, President Lyndon Johnson, told Bhutto what he thought of Pakistan's "growing flirtation" with China which was then a major American obsession in Asia. Lyndon Johnson bluntly told Bhutto; "I do not care what my daughter does with her boy-friend behind my back, but I will be damned if she does something right in front of my own eyes"⁴² the message from Washington was that the United States was not going to tolerate Pakistan seeking a relationship with China at a time when the Americans were expending all their energies in Asia to "counter Chinese expansionism".

When the September 1965 war erupted between India and Pakistan on the day the Indians attacked across the international border at Lahore on 6 September it was a beaming American Ambassador who told the Pakistani President with a combination of arrogance and satisfaction that "the Indians have got you by the throat, Mr. President haven't they?"⁴³ A week later, on 13 September 1965, the British daily *The Telegraph* reported that just prior to the war, the American had tried to topple the government of General Ayub Khan through fomenting a coup via one of his close associates, General Azam Khan, but, said the newspaper, "General Azam Khan refused to play ball". The divergence in Pakistan-American perceptions was apparent when General Ayub Khan traveled to Washington in December 1965 following the end of the war with India and

⁴⁰ Syed Amjad Ali conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

⁴¹ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "A South Asian View" (Washington. DC: Embassy of Pakistan, 1963) carries the text of the Bhutto interview with Harrison Salisbury of The New York Times where he likened Pakistan's opening to China with US wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union.

⁴² C.L Sulzberger, *A Postscript with a Chinese Accent*, Macmillan, 1974.

⁴³ Air Marshal Asghar Khan, *The First Round: India - Pakistan War 1965*. Tabeer Publishing House: Lahore, 1979.

he told Johnson quite plainly “if I break with America, I will simply lose my economy, but if I break with China, I may even lose the country”.⁴⁴ In fact, Pakistan’s preference of China over the US was guided by its national interest and was not simply a question of spiting an enemy by befriending his enemy. The culmination of this break on the part of General Ayub Khan with his American friends was his 1967 autobiography, which he appropriately titled *Friends nor Masters*.

By the time General Ayub Khan fell as a consequence of the mass agitation led by Bhutto in February 1969, although the level of intimacy between Islamabad and Washington had attenuated, politically, the Americans retained an importance in the eyes of influential Pakistanis. During the 1970 elections Bhutto contested and won on two issues, namely, socioeconomic change and popular anti-imperialism, including a hard line on India. After winning the election he sent a message to the US through his interview with Peter Hazlehurst of *The Times* (London) in December 1970. He said, I have done more to block communism in Pakistan than the millions of dollars which the Americans poured in the region”. What he was saying was that the Americans should be doing business with him since he had stolen the thunder from the Left by using their programmes and slogans.⁴⁵

During the 1971 war, the Pakistani military regime badly miscalculated when it tried to trade in its “IOUs” with America on the question of the opening to China, which Islamabad had expedited, through seeking US support in crushing the insurgency in East Pakistan. Despite being the “most allied ally” of the United States, Pakistan had the dubious distinction of being the first country after World War I to be partitioned with its boundaries altered as a consequence of civil war and external intervention.⁴⁶ Bhutto took office in the aftermath of Pakistan’s defeat in the Bangladesh war with India. He too was convinced of the need for an alliance with the US and it was precisely for this reason that he revived the US sponsored CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). During negotiations conducted in Islamabad between the Opposition and the Government to frame a constitution for the country by consensus, it was none other than Sydney Sobers, the US Charged Affaires, who was significant in pushing Pakistani opposition politicians to cooperate with Bhutto.⁴⁷ However, Bhutto’s coziness with America proved to be short-lived simply because issues came to the surface that brought about a divergence of interests between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan decision to

⁴⁴ Tune. December 10.1965.

⁴⁵ Peter Hazelhurst, *The Tunes*, December 1970.

⁴⁶ Leo Rose & David Sisson. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Emergence of Bangladesh*. University of California Press. 1990.

⁴⁷ Mian Anwar Ali. Intelligence Bureau Chief during the early Bhutto period, in conversation with Mushahid Hussein.

purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France sparked off American concerns regarding Pakistan on the nuclear issue. Soon after this agreement between Pakistan and France in March, 1976, the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, flew into Lahore in August 1976 to hold talks with the Prime Minister on the nuclear issue. He offered a simple deal to Bhutto: scrap the agreement of the nuclear reprocessing plant with France and in return, the United States would supply 110 A-7 planes to Pakistan.⁴⁸ If Pakistan still refused to relent, then in the memorable words of Henry Kissinger “we will make a horrible example out of Pakistan”. From Lahore, Kissinger flew directly to Paris to put pressure on the French Government to renege on the nuclear issue. Two years later, in September 1978 after a change of government both in Pakistan and the United States, the US finally managed to “convince” the government of President Giscard d’Estaing, to cancel the nuclear processing agreement with Pakistan.⁴⁹

The importance that the United States attached to the nuclear issue in its bilateral relations with Pakistan was evident from the fact that soon after the July 1977 coup launched by General Zia ul-Haq against Prime Minister Bhutto government the first senior American visitor to Pakistan within the first month of the coup, was none other than President Carter’s Science Advisor, Dr. Joseph Nye, who came with the message to Pakistan to cease its nuclear programme. The United States also used the good offices of two Muslim countries who were close friends of Pakistan, to pressurize Pakistan on the nuclear issue. Pakistan was told by Iran and Saudi Arabia that the Americans were “very unhappy” about the pursuit of the nuclear programme and the message to Pakistan from both its Islamic friends was to avoid earning the ire of the United States on this issue.⁵⁰

Even with General Zia, although there was a close relationship with the Americans, the nuclear factor was a recurring irritant in bilateral relations and on two occasions in 1978 and 1987, the United States cut off aid to Pakistan because of alleged Pakistani efforts on the nuclear front. Suspicion between General Zia and the Americans grew to such an extent, (in spite of the collaboration on the Afghan issue), that by 1983, General Zia actually suspected the Americans of maneuvering to oust him from power. In September 1983, after the MRD agitation had emerged as one of the most serious political threats to his regime, the US Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger, arrived in Islamabad for talks with General Zia-ul-Haq. En route to Islamabad he talked to a group of journalists accompanying him and when asked what would be the American attitude should the agitation against General Zia-ul-Haq continue, Weinberger

⁴⁸ Air Chief Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Chief of Air Staff under Bhutto, confided this to Mushahid Hussain.

⁴⁹ “Documents from Espionage Den” (Tehran 1982) volume on Pakistan has specific details on US-France collusion which led to France unilaterally abrogating the Nuclear Processing Agreement with Pakistan.

⁵⁰ Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

responded in a manner that was bound to send ominous signals to General Zia: “In that event, we will have to look for alternatives”. Already, General Zia-ul-Haq had privately confided to a Pakistani editor that “the Americans are behind this agitation because Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi could not have begun it on his own”.⁵¹ By the time of General Zia’s mysterious air crash in 1988, the gulf between Pakistan and the US had widened. General Zia’s agenda on the nuclear issue, Afghanistan and Iran and even on Central Asia, was viewed with suspicion by Washington and he himself was perceived as a political liability.⁵²

However, the heyday of the American influence in Pakistan had yet to come and now the United States worked hard to achieve Pakistan’s transition from a pro-American dictatorship to a pro-American democracy in a manner similar to what the US had been able to achieve in the Philippines, South Korea and Panama. After the 16 November 1988 elections in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto’s PPP emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly.

In the midst of the complicated political transition in Pakistan, two important American visitors arrived in Pakistan, namely Assistant Secretary of Defence, Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Murphy. It was under their auspices that a “deal” was brokered between Benazir Bhutto and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Some of this deal’s key elements were:

- Retention of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan;
- Continuation of Foreign Minister, Sahibzadah Yaqub Khan; pursuit of an economic policy devoted to free enterprise and withdrawal of government controls, plus implementing the agreement on the economy signed between IMF and Pakistan on 15 November 1988, that is, just a day before the elections;
- No interference in internal army matters such as postings, transfers, promotions and retirements.

Initially, Benazir Bhutto was given two names — one for Foreign Minister, which she accepted and the other for Finance, which was Dr. Mahboob ul Haq, which she turned down. The latter name she rejected on grounds that Dr. Haq had opposed her father way back in May 1977 when during the PNA agitation he had written a letter to *The Washington Post* comparing her father with Ugandan military dictator, Idi Amin. It was after this rejection of Dr. Haq as Finance Minister that the Principal Secretary to the President Mr. V.A. Jaffrey, who had extensive experience in economic matters as a bureaucrat, received a telephone call from the American Ambassador Robert Oakley,

⁵¹ Mushahid Hussain, “Defining attitude towards In The Nation, 28 April 1991.

⁵² “Shaheedul Islam Muhammad Zia ul Haq” foreword by Salem Azzam, Indus Thames Publishers, 1990, carries articles by General K.M. Arif which lists “five plausible reasons” for CIA trying to eliminate Zia. P. 37.

inviting him to a meal. The luncheon was apparently devoted to economic matters, but the very next day Mr. Jaffrey was surprised to receive a call from the office of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto telling him that he would be sworn in as Advisor to the Prime Minister on Economic Affairs. When Mr. Jaffrey arrived for his swearing in, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto asked apparently in all innocence amongst those who had gathered for the ceremony, "one of you is Mr. Jaffrey". Mr. Jaffrey promptly stood up so that the Prime Minister could recognize the person whom she had just nominated as her Advisor on Economic Affairs.⁵³

It was during the Benazir Bhutto government that the American Ambassador was labeled with the title of "Viceroy" for his high profile interference in various facets of Pakistani political life.⁵⁴ He tried his hand at mediation between the federal government and the opposition IJI government in the Province of Punjab, between the Prime Minister and the provincial government of Baluchistan led by Akbar Bugti. Perhaps precisely for this reason when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto faced difficulties with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan over the question of the retirement of Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohey. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, she was said to have personally telephoned President Bush seeking his intervention and Support on this issue.⁵⁵ It was ironical that on 6 August 1990 when rumors of an impending dissolution of the National Assembly and dismissal of her government by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan were afoot, Benazir Bhutto sent one of her top aides to the American Embassy to check from Oakley whether the President had finally decided to dump her.⁵⁶ It is, of course, a remarkable coincidence that on both occasions, 29 May 1988 and 6 August 1990, when two different Presidents sacked two different Prime Ministers by dissolving the National Assembly, on both occasions before announcing these fateful decisions, the last visitor to see them was the American Ambassador. Arnold Raphael met General Zia on 29 May 1988 just an hour before he dismissed Junejo and Ambassador Robert Oakley met with Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan about five hours before he announced his decision. Both the Ambassadors later proclaimed their innocence in this regard and in fact, both were heard complaining that they had not been taken into confidence by the respective Presidents when they were going to announce these decisions. It is thus no accident that Pakistan's political elite apparently seems convinced that the road to Islamabad lies through Washington.⁵⁷

⁵³ V.A. Jaffrey conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

⁵⁴ Mushahid Hussain, "Profiles of Washington's Viceroys", *The Nation*, 6 August 1989.

⁵⁵ Lally Weymouth in the *Washington Post*, August 1989.

⁵⁶ Mushahid Hussain, "The dissolution: An inside story", *The Nation*, 8 August 1990.

⁵⁷ Mushahid Hussain, "May 29 mini coup: The Foreign Policy dimension", *The Frontier Post*, June 5, 1988.

POLITICAL CULTURE

A saving grace for the country and indeed the source of its resilience, has been the political maturity of the masses and their ability to spontaneously further the political process even under circumstances of adversity when institutions of civil society have been eroded. Such political maturity has been demonstrated on several occasions, at key moments in Pakistan's political history. The tendency of the masses to act spontaneously stem from various sources of motivation. These include the people's Islamic identity, their aspirations for democracy and their strong anti-imperialistic sentiments. On several occasions, the masses have demonstrated their feelings in a manner, which leaves no doubt as to where they stand. Seven such occasions in the last forty-four years are noteworthy and bear testimony to the nation's political maturity. Take the case of the Pakistan Movement, the second major upsurge of Muslim masses in the South Asian sub-continent since the Khilafat movement after the First World War. A party which had proclaimed its goal of a sovereign state for the Muslims in India only in March 1940 was able to attain its objective within seven years due to the indefatigable efforts and single minded determination of one man, the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was able to lead the Muslim masses, notwithstanding opposition from influential quarters including the British colonial administration, which were keen to quit India leaving a legacy of a unified India, Hindu chauvinists and Nationalist Muslims who were keen to place the Muslim destiny in a united India rather than seeking a separate sovereign state for them. But what was significant was that the Muslims of India reposed their faith in an individual who had, but for his religion and his unwavering commitment to their cause, little in common with them since he neither spoke their language nor followed a lifestyle that was compatible with the overwhelming majority of the teeming millions of the Muslim masses of South Asia. But the basic fact was clear. Notwithstanding these dichotomies the Muslim masses saw their salvation in the leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League since they were convinced that there was a light at the end of the tunnel, namely, Pakistan.⁵⁸

A similar demonstration of political maturity among Pakistan's masses was evident in 1956 when during the Suez war the Government of Pakistan took a position which was at variance with that of the overwhelming majority of the people and political forces. In that situation, with the people coming out on to the streets to agitate against the government while the government was behaving in a subservient manner toward the West, the popular impulse was guided both by Islamic affinity with Egypt and anti-imperialistic sentiments that condemned the aggression jointly carried out by Israel, France and Britain.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ For a full appreciation of the centrality of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's role in the creation of Pakistan, see: Stanley Wolpert *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press. 1984. especially his tribute to the Quaid in the Preface.

⁵⁹ Mushahid Hussain, "Gulf War: Impact on Pakistan", *The Frontier Post*. 3 February 1991.

The anti-Ayub movement demonstrated once again that in the eyes of the people, tall claims of “stability, progress and solidarity” did not wash since they were well aware of the fact that the decade long dictatorship had been detrimental to not just their own well-being but the country as well. Ayub Khan had been a strong leader, probably Pakistan’s first internationally acclaimed public figure since the Quaid-e-Azam and one whose policy contributed to achieving an impressive growth rate of GNP (although generating growing aid dependence and income inequality), as well as an independent foreign policy. However, after a decade, it was clear that his regime had become a corrupt, self-serving dictatorship governed by the twin instincts of self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Indeed, Ayub Khan had presided over a crucial moment in Pakistan’s history namely, the 1965 war with India which has been seen by many as Pakistan’s finest hour when almost the entire nation reposed unqualified confidence in his leadership with the popular urge to resist aggression serving to unite among the political forces, the masses and the military throughout the conflict. In the popular view, the confidence which the people had reposed in Ayub Khan’s leadership was in contrast to what was generally perceived as a “betrayal” at Tashkent. It was not just a removal of an autocrat through street agitation but also the unravelling under popular pressure, of an entire system of authoritarian control which had been knit together by Ayub Khan after he had seized power through his coup of 1958.⁶⁰

A similar situation prevailed when, in the views of many, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto too had betrayed the popular trust and the mandate bestowed upon him in the 1970 elections. A combination of corruption and coercion was corroding the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and by 1977, the election campaign and the resultant selective rigging provided an opportunity to the right wing parties to launch a movement against him. Significantly, his erstwhile supporters refrained from countering the street agitation after they felt that his performance in office did not match his earlier promises.⁶¹

A similar situation was faced by General Zia-ul-Haq when he was confronted with a strong agitation in the province of Sindh under the banner of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). What was more interesting in the context of the Zia regime was the ability of the people to make the fine distinction between their own affinity with Islam and an Islamic identity from General Zia’s cosmetic Islamization, whose underlying purpose was to forge his own “Catholic marriage” with power.⁶² An apt manifestation of the political maturity of the masses were two events within a three-

⁶⁰ Khalid Bin Sayeed, *“Pakistan Politics: Nature and Direction of Change”*, op. cit see Chapter on “Mass Urban Protests”.

⁶¹ Sayeed, op. cit.

⁶² Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan’s Politics: The Zia Years*, Progressive Publishers, 1990.

month span during the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. In December 1984, General Zia-ul-Haq suddenly announced the holding of a referendum, which, in his view, would be an ingenious way of linking his political legitimacy with Islam. People were asked to respond either in the affirmative or the negative to a single, simple question on whether they wanted an “Islamic System”. According to the election procedure if they would answer in the affirmative (as they were expected to since, surely, the people could not vote against an Islamic system!), General Zia-ul-Haq would be deemed to have been elected to a five year term of office as President of Pakistan. Contrary to all official expectations, particularly, General Zia’s own, the turnout in the referendum, despite much canvassing, lobbying and persuasion on the part of government functionaries, was a dismal 10-15 percent or so.⁶³ General Zia was confident that a structure which he had personally created and which he thought provided him with a grassroots base could be mobilized to take people out to vote during the referendum. Referring to these institutions as “my army” General Zia told a referendum rally at one of the cities during his campaign that this “army” included 37,000 elected councilors of local bodies, 175,000 Nazimeen-i-Zakat and 180,000 Nazimeen-i-Salat.⁶⁴ Conversely, in February 1985, when the same government of General Zia-ul-Haq decided to hold general elections minus the political parties who in fact boycotted these polls, 52 percent of the population turned out to vote despite the MRD call for a boycott. This ability to distinguish between the farce of the referendum and some semblance of representative rule offered by the election, in which there was enthusiastic participation, testifies to the level of political consciousness and maturity of the masses.

Another event which exemplifies this level of popular maturity are the results of the elections in 1988 and 1990, the former probably the most vicious in Pakistan’s history with all sorts of allegations leveled against Benazir Bhutto. However, the people ignored her gender, ethnicity or sect, and voted her into office because they saw her as a young, but untested political leader wearing the mantle of her father, and who deserved to be given a chance. But when she failed to deliver, during her 20-month rule, the same electorate deserted and ditched her since they felt she had nothing new to offer and unlike Mrs. Indira Gandhi who was returned to her office, Benazir Bhutto was neither filled with remorse nor willing to atone for any of the mistakes and blunders committed by her government).⁶⁵ What was significant in the defeat of Benazir Bhutto was not just the collapse of charismatic politics ‘but the fact that it signified an important watershed in Pakistan’s history when, for the first time, one democratic government was replaced

⁶³ No empirically-collected data on turnout exists, only estimates: This figure was cited by an Intelligence Chief in conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

⁶⁴ Mushahid Hussain, op. cit.. p. 156.

⁶⁵ Benazir Bhutto even stated that “We were removed because we were too competent” during a party dinner party at which Dr. Akmal Hassan was present.

by another democratic government. The fairness of these general elections has however been questioned by the Pakistan People's Party.

Finally, in terms of instances in Pakistan's history in which the maturity of the masses was demonstrated irrespective of the stand of the political parties or of the government of the day, the most recent manifestation of this maturity has been the Gulf War in 1991. This even evoked an emotive resonance among Pakistanis, quite unprecedented for a foreign policy issue since the 1956 Suez War, when Pakistanis came out in the streets organizing demonstrations in favor of Nasser of Egypt against the aggression of France, Britain and Israel. In the Gulf war as well, while the official stand of the government of Pakistan was supportive of the multinational forces in which it made a token contribution of 11,000 troops, the popular pulse read otherwise. The reason for these popular sentiments in Pakistan in support of Saddam Hussain and against the US can be analyzed on four counts. First, in the popular perception, the issue was seen as that of a small Muslim state defying the military might of a superpower, a sort of Muslim David facing a Christian Goliath. Second. Pakistanis saw double standards in the attitude of the American led coalition which was prepared to go to war to vacate Kuwait while similar and more longstanding occupations in the region including Israel over Palestine and India over Kashmir, were being ignored. Third, the issue was seen as that of Saddam Hussain becoming the first Arab and Muslim leader to launch a direct attack on Israel in the last forty-two years. Finally, such sentiments among Pakistanis were not surprising, given their instinctive sympathies with the cause of Muslims all over the world. After all, within a ten-year period, Pakistanis resorted twice to demonstrations against US diplomatic installations in Pakistan on account of international Islamic issues. In November 1979 the Mecca Mosque takeover prompted an attack on the American Embassy in Islamabad and in March 1989, the publication in the US of Salman Rushdie's blasphemous book provoked a similar reaction. Equally significantly. in the mindset of most Pakistanis the actual American agenda was not the liberation of Kuwait or Defence of Saudi Arabia but the destruction of the military power of another Muslim country and shifting the balance of power in the Middle East in favor of Israel.⁶⁶

CRIMINALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

One of the features of Pakistani society during the 1980s has been the linkage of geo-political changes with internal unrest. The nexus of drug money, Pakistan's politics and the culture of Kalashnikov developed into a triangle that was a classic combination of internal and external factors.

⁶⁶ Mushahid Hussain, "Gulf Crisis: Impact on the Muslim World". Strategic Studies. Volume XIV. Autumn/Winter 1990-91 Numbers 1 and 2.

Three specific events brought out this nexus. The first was the Afghan war in which Pakistan served as a conduit for weapons for the Afghan Mujahideen to the tune of US \$1.2 billion in money from the United States alone over a decade long period. Additionally, such assistance helped in creating a trained cadre of some 200,000 Afghan Mujahideen, half of them based in Pakistani territory, and the rest operating from inside Afghanistan. Some of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders were equally active participants in the drug trade as a means of financial support.⁶⁷

The second aspect has been the unrest in the province of Sindh, particularly after the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the suppression of the PPP with the result that in 1983 a sense of deprivation and alienation made for an explosive mix. In Sindh, more than any other province of Pakistan, dacoits and politicians who had been historically linked together, became meshed into a process which was the glorification of crime as a political act, a sort of revolt against the iniquitous *status quo*. Inside the country, during the 1983 MRD agitation in Sindh, the targets of popular wrath were not the ethnic non-Sindhi community which was not harmed at all, rather the focus was on all symbols of state power such as police stations, government build in banks or prisons. Prominent dacoits like Mohib Sheedi, who were killed in an encounter with police, were often glorified and acclaimed in Sindh popular folklore. This was largely so because the very act of committing a crime by violating the law of the land, was perceived at the popular level, as an act of defiance, an action that was to be lauded.⁶⁸

In parts of interior Sindh, there have also been unconfirmed reports that the educated unemployed are joining the ranks of dacoits who offer them monetary compensation and protection in return for “services” rendered. The result is that today a thin line divides crime from politics, a gap that is likely to be bridged further by the gradual collapse of the state machinery in the interior of Sindh.

The third aspect of this process, again an offshoot of an external event like the revolution in neighboring Iran, has been the induction of dissidents, refugees, political activists and even smugglers from Iran, many of whom were accused of criminal acts in their home country. In 1987, for instance, two separate instances bear testimony to these linkages of external factors with the internal unrest in parts of Pakistan. Earlier that year, a dissident Baluch Sirdar from the Iranian province Sistan Baluchistan was killed

⁶⁷ Ikramul Haq. *Pakistan from hash to heroin* (Alnoor Printer and Publishers, 1991. Lahore) is probably the most comprehensive survey of the contemporary drug scene in Pakistan: Kathy Evans, “Bhutto tells Britain to act against drug uses”. *The Guardian*, 12 July 1989.

⁶⁸ A document circulated in Islamabad on the eve of the 1983 upsurge in Sindh best expressed this deep sense of deprivation among Sindhis. Titled “Statistical self-speaking facts on employment of officers of Sindh (rural), i.e. Old Sindhis in Federal Government 1977 – 1983” pointed, for instance, to only one Sindhi posted out as Ambassador out of a total of 60 Ambassadors.

in an encounter with the Iranian border police. He had been living in exile in Pakistan and was wanted by the government under various violations of the law there. In July 1987, an office of the Iranian opposition group, the Mujahidin-e-Khalq, in Karachi was attacked by a group of Revolutionary guards who had apparently been sent on a mission from Iran. There was an explosion, followed by a gun battle when these Iranian dissidents, based in a Karachi residential area, were attacked by Iranian Revolutionary guards. Given the proximity of Iran-Pakistan ties, the Government of Pakistan chose not to make this issue into a diplomatic tow between the two countries and it was quietly hushed up and the 13 Revolutionary guards were returned to their country without any charges being pressed against them.⁶⁹

Karachi is said to be one of the major exit points for Iranian refugees including political dissidents fleeing their country since the revolution whose number is reckoned to be in the vicinity of 10,000. In June 1991, during joint border talks between senior officials of the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran which were held in the Iranian city of Zahidan, Pakistan, for the first time, agreed to the Iranian request to extradite those Iranian nationals from Pakistan to Iran who in the view of Tehran were wanted for crimes in their country. This was largely viewed as a measure from Pakistan to appease Iranian sensitivities as well as curbing the activities of those Iranian refugees in Pakistan who opposed the revolutionary regime in Tehran. Fear of extradition, it was felt, would be conducive to containing the activities of these Iranian dissidents in Pakistan. As far as drug barons go, Pakistan is said to be one of the major points of export of heroin and other drugs into Europe and North America with the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) replacing or even matching the Golden Triangle (Burma and Laos) in the export of drugs. So far the evidence of linking drug money with politics has been empirically difficult to find, although in a much publicized case during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto in 1989, a prominent drug baron, Haji Iqbal Beg, whose name was mentioned in a BBC television documentary, confessed to supporting prominent politicians of the PPP and UI during the election campaign, a statement that was not contradicted by any of the politicians and according to *The Herald*, Haji Iqbal Beg's contacts with the government were secured through the good offices of a politician of the PPP whom he had financially supported during the elections, namely, the then Speaker of the National Assembly, Malik Miraj Khalid.

During the 1990 elections, one of the eight members of the National Assembly elected from the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), was said to be a drug smuggler, although he was sitting in the National Assembly. There have also been allegations against officials of the provincial government in the frontier province, although these remain unsubstantiated. During the tenure of Prime Minister Junejo, Governor of the

⁶⁹ Lt. General Hamid Gul, the Director General, Inter Services Intelligence, personally confirmed to Mushahid Hussain that the government overlooked this episode given the larger interest of Pakistan-Iran relations.

Frontier Province, Abdul Ghafoor Hoti had to resign from his office when his son was arrested in the United States on charges of drug smuggling.

Although the formal influence of criminals and drug smugglers on Pakistan politicians is less apparent at an informal level, with the decline of moral values and the emergence of a crude materialist political culture, the source of funds has become less of an issue than it should have been. The result is an informal nexus where access to big money helps in purchasing political influences and even respectability in society. A key element is the lack of information of the law, since to date no prominent drug smuggler has ever been convicted in a Pakistani court of law, although since 1989 three drug smugglers have been extradited to the US under American pressure and two have already been convicted in American court of law. The establishment of a separate Ministry of Narcotics Control has not helped to rectify this abysmal state of affairs in a country where drug money is now managing to permeate through different layers of society and politics.

THE EMERGING STATE

As the turbulent decade of the eighties drew to a close, Pakistan's politics were undergoing changes and shifts of a qualitatively new character. In fact, the process of change that began in the eighties in terms of its content and depth was similar to the profound transformations in the 1940s and 1960s. It has almost taken the shape of a generational political cycle of turnover for the inhabitants of this part of the world. The 1940s galvanized the Muslim masses to seek a separate state in South Asia, and launched the Pakistan Movement which eventually changed the political map of the subcontinent. Central to the politics of that period for the Muslims was the question of an Islamic identity and assertion of Muslim nationalism.

Some two decades later, when Pakistan's fist military regime had brought forth industrial progress in the country which spawned income inequalities and the creation of an embryonic proletariat, new forces were unleashed which sought radical change through economic salvation. The Bhutto Phenomenon was a product of such a milieu and it shattered the assumptions of the earlier phase of politics which were based on palace intrigues by cliques of vested interests rather than the Bhutto-type mass politics.⁷⁰

During the country's longest Martial Law, qualitative changes took place in national politics. Turmoil in the region plus polarization following the ouster of the Bhutto regime coupled with social phenomena more general to the South Asian region such as

⁷⁰ The Bhutto Phenomenon is discussed in detail in Anwar Hussain Syed's forthcoming book on the Bhutto years, to be published simultaneously in US, Pakistan and India (Conversation of author with Mushahid Hussain).

increased urban affluence and regionalization of politics. These, in turn, resulted in new realities in Pakistan's politics. The electorate of Pakistan underwent a change in the last twenty years and so did the issues. Charisma and dynastic politics were unable to substitute for a stand on issues vital for a politically conscious electorate. It is important to understand that the coalition of various forces that brought the PPP to power in 1970 and which was based on an alliance of the urban poor in Punjab, rural poor in Sindh plus the rural poor and urban middle class of central Punjab had, by the late eighties, ceased to exist. It was replaced by a broad, ill-defined ideology identifying democracy with resisting domination of the majority province over the smaller provinces and at a national level, to a popular anti-imperialism, which expressed itself in an antipathy to overriding dependence on external factors, particularly the United States.⁷¹

During this period, Pakistan saw several processes at work which were running concurrently. There was the process of fragmentation of political parties, one expression of which has been the lack of consistency and abiding loyalties and a remarkable ability to quickly switch parties without batting an eyelid. It is thus not surprising that the credibility of the already weak political institutions including political parties has been eroded. At the same time, a parallel politics of sorts developed, marked not by the usual "government versus opposition" but consistent support for issues that appealed to various constituencies. The Left-Right polarization which was an important feature of politics during the 1970 elections was now absent with both the Left and Right lacking credibility.

The affluence that came to Pakistan in the wake of the "Dubai factor" generated greater self-confidence and more initiative among the people. This affluence plus opportunities to travel abroad and to make money also raised popular aspirations for a representative government. After all, in a 15-year period from 1973-1988, approximately US \$ 22 billion flowed into Pakistan as a result of remittances by overseas Pakistanis. Cumulatively, over a period of time, this resulted in a more positive national self-image for Pakistan and its people.

A related fact was that Pakistanis as a whole, (the people as well as the Establishment), have become more secure about the state of Pakistan and despite the narrow social base of the existing order, politically it is able to let "a hundred flowers bloom." There is more openness and a greater willingness to tolerate widely differing elements within the political spectrum ranging from SBPF, the MQM, the TNFJ and the ASS to the Communist Party. A reflection of the changing times is that such national figures as Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were honored, though belatedly, by the Establishment. The state's capacity for tolerance has certainly grown, particularly with reference to dissent from the officially certified truth. And the dynamism of the people

⁷¹ For implications of the Dubai factor on Pakistan's economy, see: Dr., Akmal Hussain Strategic Issues in Pakistan's Economic Policy, Progressive Publishers, 1988.

of Pakistan is being channelized in different directions despite institutional decay. Basically, these changes also reflect a process that is sweeping across the entire region, namely that of the unraveling of the post-World War II *status quo* which was so assiduously nurtured by the victorious powers of the war in certain countries, as in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, it has come at a lightning pace and in others including Pakistan and India its pace has been somewhat slower.⁷²

Given this altered geo-political and national environment of the eighties, political forces in Pakistan, particularly the MRD, failed to keep pace with such changes. These political forces were unable to grasp and adjust to the “new realities” in Pakistan’s politics. Three basic “new realities” are noteworthy. First, the emergence of the Armed Forces as a political factor willing, ready and able to play a role in national life commensurate with its self- image of being the most important component of the power structure. A “defender of the faith” role for the Armed Forces is a significant aspect of this framework? Secondly, it should have been clear to the political forces that after 4 April 1979 the Armed Forces would not be amenable to a total transfer of power to the civilian politicians. At best, it could be power sharing and that too on “ground rules” which the Armed Forces would set. Finally, the political forces overplayed the importance of the “triple alliance” between the Army, Afghanistan and America. Basically, this alliance was tactical in nature and some of the political forces, particularly the PPP, made the mistake of playing on the same American wicket as the army had done. That the nature of this alliance was tactical was proven by historical precedents such as the fact that it was, after all, a staunchly pro- American military regime that defied the United States on its China policy twenty-five years ago. And it was an equally staunchly pro-American military regime that resisted American pressure on the nuclear programme. It was therefore, not surprising to see the military trying to take the initiative for a new relationship with Iran in the 1990s, and opposing America during the 1991 Gulf War.

For the future, grasping “new realities”, the political forces will have to struggle to widen the social base of the political system, which is currently knit together by an arrangement of the urban rich and the rural rich. The emergence of a strong middle class, which is assertive as well as politically conscious, has to be reflected in the political system in the 1990s, if it is to retain its representative character.

Three factors have been significant in the evolution of Pakistan as a more confident and self-assured state as it enters the last decade of the twentieth century. These factors are Pakistan’s nuclear capability, the dilution of provincialism through frequent recourse to the ballot-box, a national consensus on democracy, and the emergence of a nascent middle class capable of taking economic and political initiative backed by greater affluence generated in the last two decades. The nuclear capability is viewed in Pakistan

⁷² Mushahid Hussain. “Army’s Political Role” *the Nation*, September, 16. 1990.

as having contributed to the creation of a new balance in South Asia *vis-a-vis* India. It has also succeeded in generating greater self-confidence in the Pakistan Army and in the Pakistani state. At one level, this is a reflective confidence arising from the fact that India is facing internal crises and instability best illustrated by the emergence of four Prime Ministers within an 18- month period, the uprising in Occupied Kashmir and the separatist movement in East Punjab and Assam. Additionally, in its first foray, outside its borders since Bangladesh in 1971, the Indian army returned badly bruised and battered from Sri Lanka. Conversely, Pakistan felt that its nuclear and missile capability had neutralized to a suitable extent, the awesome Indian superiority over Pakistan in conventional weapons. Then the Indo-Soviet political and military axis stood shattered with the destabilization of the Soviet Union and the cessation of cold war politics. The Indo-Soviet axis was seen as being central to the defeat of Pakistan in 1971.⁷³

Pakistan also felt that it had gained “strategic depth” as a consequence of the events in Afghanistan and the new linkup with Iran. Additionally, for the first time in forty-three years in their bilateral relations, India had sought and received Pakistan’s assistance on a matter that it had all long considered purely “an internal affair”, namely, the situation in Occupied Kashmir. In December 1989, and March 1991, Indian Prime Minister sought Pakistan’s assistance for the release of Dr. Rabia Saeed and Dr. Naheeda Imtiaz respectively, who were held hostage by Kashmiri freedom fighters. Finally, while almost one-third of the Indian army was engaged in quelling an insurgency in Punjab. Kashmir and Assam, the roles seem to have reversed with the Pakistan Army, probably for the first time being freed of the “extra baggage” of running the country under martial law or battling internal unrest. Aggregative, for the first time since Independence in 1947, Pakistanis felt that their country was in a better shape as opposed to India in most respects — politically, economically, psychologically and strategically.⁷⁴

The elections in 1990 in Pakistan were also pointers to political progress in the country. Apart from the fact, that there was a change of government through the ballot box, a first for Pakistan, the elected National Assembly had a sprinkling of three former Prime Ministers and scions of three former Presidents gracing the House. This was certainly an improvement over Pakistan’s political past where Prime Ministers have been hinged or hounded into oblivion. For Pakistani politics, elections in 1990 can be viewed as a political plus on at least three counts. First, with the absence of an American role during the transfer of power in 1990, which was unlike the case in 1988, the revival of the

⁷³ General Aslam Beg’s “Strategic Defiance”, theme was the thrust of his two, December 1990 and 28 January 1991 speeches, both of which earned American ire.

⁷⁴ Mushahid Hussain. 1990: The Year of India’s Decline”, The Nation, 30 December 1990: An entire issue. January 1991 of Globe, Karachi was devoted to this theme: Dr. Naveed Iqbal, “The People of Pakistan are better off”, The Dawn, 19 April 1991.

democratic process has meant the weakening of Pakistan's sovereignty. The second important aspect for Pakistan and democracy after the 1990 elections is that more of the political forces now have a stake in the electoral process given that the two principal contestants switched sides in government as a consequence of the elections. In that significant respect, the elections contributed more to national integration by bringing into the National Assembly, diverse sections of the political forces having faith in the system. The ballot box is now seen by most political forces as the main mule of political change and attainment of political power. Additionally, the National Assembly is a representative one since personalities including prominent political dissidents, who had returned to Pakistan after many years in exile in Kabul, now sit in the House.⁷⁵

Finally, the 1990 elections helped to bury the politics of "ghosts and graves" which had dominated much of the last decade. Benazir Bhutto did not invoke the name of her late father nor did Nawaz Sharif bank on Zia-ul-Haq during most of the election campaign. Both preferred to concentrate their energies on each other's track record.

In this emerging Pakistani state, the changing role of two important but somewhat controversial institutions is quite note worthy: the judiciary, and the media.

1. The Judiciary

The judiciary has essentially been a political institution whose role and decisions have had political fallout. The 1953 decision of Justice Munir, upholding the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, contributed more to the weakening of the democratic process in Pakistan than any other single decision in the first decade of the country's independence. Again, the 1979 Supreme Court decision, (albeit a split one), to convict Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the famous murder trial added more to the sense of alienation and deprivation amongst Sindh his than any other event.

Pakistan's judiciary is one of the three institutions of Pakistan which are not just surviving but indeed have strengthened during the last forty-three years. The first, naturally, is the Army, and the other, surprisingly, given the recurrent pressure to conform is the Media which is today showing a zest for enquiry and a commitment to democracy which was rare in the first three decades of an independent Pakistan. Pakistan's judiciary understandably has had a mixed record, but, on the whole it has acquitted itself well. The judiciary has up to the rule of law, defended civil liberties and contributed to breaking political deadlocks, thereby serving to push the political process forward.

Some of the judiciary's characteristics are noteworthy:

⁷⁵ Mushahid Hussain, "New National Assembly: A Political Profile" The Frontier Post, 8 November 1990.

- It is a political institution, whose mental makeup is conservative and whose ethos is steeped in the British legal tradition. It has a general tendency to uphold the *status quo* and not to “rock the boat”. Given this makeup, it is inconceivable for brilliant but anti-establishment lawyers to ever occupy a position in the high benches of Pakistan’s judiciary.
- As a political institution more often than not, the judiciary reflected “ground realities”, including mood of the masses, preferences of the power structure and, when the occasion so demanded, the judiciary’s own sense of history.
- More than any other institution in Pakistan, the judiciary has been asked to play a role, with recurring frequency which is above and beyond the call of duty.

What is this role of the judiciary “above and beyond the call of duty”? Often, the judiciary has been asked to adjudicate in disputes amongst politicians (Wali Khan’s case in 1975 and the imposition of limited Martial Law in 1977), between politicians and bureaucrats (the 1953 Ghulam Muhammad dissolution decision), politicians and the military (1959 Dosso, 1973 Asma Jilani, 1977 Doctrine of Necessity, and 1988 Haji Saifullah) to set “rules of the game” in politics, as it did in 1988 when it decided against non-party polls. It has also been entrusted to try a former Prime Minister, something which most other judiciaries in the world have probably not encountered. Every enquiry into a major event in Pakistan is held by a judge, every election is sought to be supervised by the judiciary, and the judiciary is also being depended upon to preserve, protect and promote democracy. Some of these are integral to the basic functions of the judiciary, others indicate a failure on the part of Pakistan’s political leadership to devise “rules of the game” in national politics. Even for the media. the first blow to the despised Press and Publications Ordinance, came not from any government, professions of press freedom were not matched by its practices, but it came from the judiciary when the Shariat Bench deal some of its provisions “un-Islamic”, a decision which the Zia regime challenged in court. The political importance of the judiciary can be underlined by successive attempts on the part of governments both military and civilian to tamper with its independence. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Fifth Amendment and Zia-ul-Haq’s Provisional Constitutional Order were both directed against the judiciary and in December 1989, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Benazir Bhutto fought one of their toughest battles over the is of appointing judges to the Supreme Court. For civilian governments in Pakistan seeking to appoint their nominee as Chief Justice is probably politically as significant as the decision to have a nominee of their choice as Chief of the Army Staff.⁷⁶

In popular perception, there is a criticism of the judiciary and its role in certain situations. It is viewed as a *status quo* institution, which does not go against an

⁷⁶ Conversation of a highly-placed Junejo confidante with Mushahid Hussain.

incumbent government. The 1959 Supreme Court decision justifying Martial Law, the 1972 Supreme Court decision declaring Martial Law illegal and Yahya Khan an "usurper" (after he was out of office), the 1977 Supreme Court decision on the "Doctrine of Necessity", and the 1988 Supreme Court ruling against Zia's dissolution of the National Assembly after his death are cited as examples of the judiciary endorsing the executive's decisions. Circles close to Mr. Junejo, once privately remarked that the only reason the former Prime Minister did not go to court after his dismissal was his view that the judiciary would not go against General Zia in his lifetime. In this context, there are aberrations like the May 1977 Lahore High Court's decision declaring Mr. Bhutto's limited Martial Law illegal the recent judgment of the Peshawar High Court which restored the NWFP Provincial Assembly and the Provincial Government. Even the 1979 Bhutto murder trial is so controversial that it has not been even once cited as a precedent in any subsequent criminal case. The popular perception viewed the executive as exercising an overweening influence in this case. Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, who had served as a Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court when the Bhutto trial began, was treated in a most humiliating manner by the same generals with whom he was so intimately associated till the hanging of Mr. Bhutto. In 1980 after he was kicked "upstairs" to Supreme Court, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain had shown his reluctance to leave Lahore, but he was bluntly told that if he did not go voluntarily he would be forced to do so.

During the 1984 Referendum, which is now generally accepted as having being rigged, the "result" was being doctored in the Joint Chief of Staff Headquarters and then transmitted to the Chief Election Commissioner, a Judge of the Supreme Court, who was duly announcing it on the official electronic media. The credibility of the judiciary suffered on this occasion. Matters are not helped when the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court demeans himself in the quest for a job. Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman willingly served as an Advisor with General Zia on Constitutional Affairs with the rank and status of Federal Minister and Justice S.A. Rehman was the Chairman of the National Press Trust, a position normally reserved for a Federal Secretary in Grade 22. And matters are not of course helped by the unfortunate fact that two of Pakistan's most brilliant lawyers, Manzoor Qadir and A.K. Brohi, in their time, were the best friends of military dictators, rendering them expert legal advice on how best to scuttle the democratic process. However, on the plus side, it is a matter of record that unlike generals, bureaucrats and politicians, no judge has been a parry to a military coup or dissolution of parliament. And as compared to most of our politicians who are now becoming corrupt as a group, the judiciary has been relatively clean. And there are more examples of judges with integrity and acting according to their conscience than people of equivalent rank in other institutions. Even today in the political battle between Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan's Establishment, the outcome rests, in large measure, on the judiciary. The crucial issue whether she is disqualified from Pakistan politics will be taken by the judiciary, which in turn, will have a significant political fallout.

For the future, in terms of the role of the judiciary, two questions are pertinent. Can the judiciary alone act to protect, preserve and promote democracy in Pakistan, despite the continued failure of politicians on both sides of the political divide to seek a *modus vivendi* amongst themselves? The issue is not that of UI or PPP, since the politicians keep trading places. The judiciary is too often being asked to perform a task which is primarily that of politicians. And the other related question for the future is whether the judiciary can remain immune for an indefinite period from the Plot and Pajero Culture" that has now come to permeate Pakistan's society at all levels with corruption institutionalized from top to bottom.

2. The Media

There are a number of inputs that influence various decisions of any government. These include the government's priorities and programmes, the interests of those affected by such decisions, the role of political and bureaucratic decision makers, influence of foreign aid donors and, on occasion the media. In this entire situation, the weakest role has been that of the media, because its leverage is intangible, that is, in influencing opinion via the printed words.

Governments in Pakistan are in most part remote and aloof from them and they generally do not consider themselves accountable to the people. In most case, the interests of government are limited to preservation of the *status quo* and self-perpetuation. Given this context, responsiveness to popular needs or popular aspirations is limited. And if there is any responsiveness to the media, indeed, it is selective. This process is further hampered by the fact that, in large measure, the government itself controls the electronic media and a substantial chunk of the print media. As one perceptive observer commenting on the government media has said "government media is like a bikini, what it reveals is suggestive and what it conceals is vital". Or there is that famous saying about newspapers in Pakistan by the prominent Bengali politician, AK. Fazal-ul-Haq. He said: "Those who read newspapers do not vote and those who vote, do not read the newspapers".

In Pakistan, four types of media are relevant in this discussion: electronic media, official print media, independent print media and foreign, namely, Western media. The electronic media comprising the radio and television are entirely owned and controlled by the government. Since they parrot the officially certified truth, they have little or no credibility. The official print media also falls in the same category since it is run by the National Press Trust, established by Ayub Khan in 1964.

The impact that the media has on government decision-making in Pakistan is, therefore, limited to the independent print media or the Western media. Basically, this is limited to editorial analyses, news stories and letters to the Editor's column. Since the media is

seen as a useful vehicle for propaganda and for promoting a positive picture so as to give the “all is well” line, the government is keen that the media hide the truth. The impact of the Western media on the government is far more than that of its own independent print media. That is why the government is always keen that favorable quotes from the foreign journals should be publicized. For example a *Time magazine* article about the unusual influence on the government and politics by the ISI in which Benazir Bhutto was shown finally to be gradually getting the better of the notorious Intelligence outfit received wide publicity.⁷⁷

In recent years, there are a few instances of how newspapers had an impact on government decision-making. These include:

- The resignation of Ch. Anwar Aziz as Minister for Local Government in the time of Junejo;
- The cancellation of the deal to buy frigates by the Pakistan Navy at a cost of approximately US \$ 1.2 billion;
- Stories of drug barons living in hospitals under false pre texts;
- The release of Rasul Bux Palejo;
- Campaign against corruption under Benazir Bhutto.
- Influencing opinion on foreign policy issues.

These are a few examples of how the media managed to have an impact on government decision-making. There are other instances where, despite the media campaign, the government remained unmoved. These include the decision to establish the FECTO cement plant in Islamabad although it was a pollution hazard through arbitrary alteration of the city’s Master Plan. Then there are instances of how officially sponsored campaigns had little impact on popular thinking, particularly under authoritarian regimes. Take, for example, the family planning campaign launched in the 1960s during the days of Ayub Khan or the campaign to motivate a high voter turnout during the 1984 Presidential Referendum. Both failed miserably.

⁷⁷ Time, 27 March 1989: the article had several quotable quotes. For instance, “The conductor may have died, but this orchestra plays on” (The reference is to the death of Zia-ul-Haq but the continued influence of ISI). Another, “We have no control over these people (ISI). They are like a government unto themselves”. See also the New York Times, 23 April 1989: The Nation, 26 April 1989: Mushahid Hussain, Media under Benazir Bhutto”, Index on Censorship, June 1989.

In examining trends in the Pakistani press in the last few years, a couple of basic facts need to be kept in mind. There is, at one level, a linkage between freedom of the press and restoration of democracy. At another level, particularly given the linkage between struggle for a free press and struggle for democracy, the journalistic community is highly political and has played an active role in the political process. The trends in the Pakistani press need to be examined in three broad contexts: the media under Martial Law, the media under democracy and changes of various kinds in the media.

During Martial Law, the media worked under great constraints and compulsions because of the Black Laws in force (like the 1963 Press and Publication Ordinance) which was reinforced by various provisions of Martial Law that went against freedom of expression. The media also experienced repression of various kinds including closure of newspapers, arrests of journalists, dismissal of journalists, and the first such instance in Pakistan's history, the lashing of three journalists on political grounds. Forms of censorship varied till early 1982, there was pre-censorship which meant that all the subject matter that would be printed in newspapers had to have prior clearance from official censors before it was permitted to be published. This was followed by scholarship under which newspapers themselves had to decide what could be printed with newspaper managements themselves being held accountable. This was complemented by the system of "Press Advice". In most cases, it was presumed to be binding and penalties for "not accepting the advice" included a cessation of government advertisement. However, journalists in the print media and electronic media were among the first to promote the culture of resistance, which included other segments of society as well. This was in keeping with the historical role of Pakistani journalism, or at least its substantial sections, to resist authoritarian rule. This political role of journalists, and that too in the opposition, further accentuated the adversarial relationship between the government and the media.

During this period, some major contributions of the media can be cited. First, the media kept the opposition politicians politically alive by publishing news of their activities and statements. This role was important since it gave an impression of political activity and a political process continuing although nothing extensive was happening on the ground. During almost all briefings held for editor journalists by General Zia, the question of holding elections and making the press freer were raised. Second, with the emergence of new newspapers, a transformation took place in terms of the quality of journalists and journalism. The profession of journalism became more respectable and people from an affluent and educated background, particularly young men and women, entered the profession voluntarily. Previously, the profession of journalism was seen as a profession of "drop outs". This process also expedited a generational turnover in the leadership positions in different newspapers both in the editorial and management sections.

A number of developments have taken place since 1947 which are quite unprecedented in the media in Pakistan. The Press and Publications Ordinance were already abolished in October 1988 for which credit must be given to the post-Zia interim government. What the government of Benazir Bhutto did was to open up the electronic media to the opposition point of view as well, reinstate some of the journalists who were dismissed, remove the stringent provisions of the NOC for travel abroad by journalists and appoint known anti-establishment journalists to the position of Editor in NPT newspapers. However, there remained areas of misuse of official media by the Federal Government particularly in the context of its differences with the Punjab Provincial Government. These included negative television coverage of the then Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif as well as the use of the APP, the official news agency, to disseminate patently false news. However, after a long time if not the first time, the Ministry of Information was playing a low-key, non-interfering role *vis-a-vis* the independent newspapers. That the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has largely maintained this pattern reflects the fact that the media's hard-won liberties have come to stay. Another new element in the media's role is to function as a forum where political battles are fought given Pakistan's multiple and competing channels of authority (e.g., ISI 1989 stories). There are a number of positive trends at the institutional level in the Pakistani press. These are the pluses of democracy but there is need to guard against possible minuses. Apart from freedom of the press, other pluses pertaining to the trends in the Pakistani press include:

- The technological revolution in printing, particularly the use of color and other high technology;
- Readers are now able to exercise a choice in the purchase of newspapers, both in terms of regions and political views. something very healthy;
- Working conditions for journalists have improved, with greater choice to join/leave a newspaper as well as higher emoluments. The fact that Pakistan has become important internationally owing to the geopolitical situation has generated tremendous interest in Pakistan and coverage from Pakistan with the result that several international media outlets are available to Pakistani journalists.

Among some of the negative features in the environment in which the press function, we can include:

- The inability of officialdom to cope with criticism since they are used to functioning in the "all is well" mould; intolerance is increasing among the political forces and there have been instances of attacks/pressures/threats against practically every newspaper and in some cases even journalists have been assaulted by various political, religious or student groups; strong,

independent editors are threatened by the growing tendency of proprietors to act as Editors which affects the internal independence and professionalism of newspapers.

However, in one respect, there is no change and this pertains to the fact that invariably despite having a larger circulation, the Urdu press has less of an impact and influence than the English press since the ruling elite is essentially Western-educated and English-speaking.

CHAPTER 3

PROFILE OF THE POWER STRUCTURE

If Pakistan's political history is to be presented in a capsule form, it will be seen largely as an interplay of three competing and often conflicting elements: (i) the popular forces seeking to assert themselves either spontaneously or organizationally on foreign policy issues as well as domestic ones; (ii) the power structure, sometimes cohesively responding to individual instructions or an institutional interest, or multiple channels, often working at cross purposes; and (iii) the American factor which has sought with varying degrees of success, to alimentally or concurrently influence both the popular forces and the power structure.

In this interplay of forces, the most important element has been the power structure which has grown and evolved over time. Its present profile does not represent a monolith but multiple and competing channels of authority that derive strength from the institutions established by the state. The position of the various components in the power structure has changed and often the wielders of power have to become mere implementers of decision making as is the case of the foreign office or others like the civil bureaucracy. These are now viewed lower in authority than, say the Intelligence, which today ranks second only in importance to the army in the power structure.

During the decade of the eighties the change in the power structure was characterized by two significant developments. First, the nature of the power sharing experiments which General Zia-ul-Haq initiated in 1985. The power structure was influenced by a diarchy in the person of the President and Chief of Army Staff, (since General Zia held both offices on the one hand, and the Prime Minister on the other. Later a triarchy emerged when the office of the President, Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff began to be held by three different individuals. The second significant change was the extent of American involvement, both in Pakistan's power structure and at the popular level.

THE PAKISTAN ARMY

The most important component of the power structure, predictably, is the Pakistan Army. Three elements of the army's role in the power structure are

noteworthy: Its objectives, the way it wields powers and its internal sociology.⁷⁸ In terms of its objectives, the army's self-image is important, it sees its role as an institution different from the rest, that is, the civilians, and it prides itself on what it sees as its professionalism, patriotism and discipline. It was in General Zia's period that an ideological component was added to its role, which apart from defending national security became a "defender of the faith" as well. This was what General Zia frequently referred to as defence of the country's "ideological frontiers". If in the fifties the American connection was initiated by the army, in the eighties it became the vehicle for formulating and implementing the Afghan policy in close concert with the Americans via the ISI.

The broader self-image of the army as the backbone of national security and by extension, national unity, is exemplified by what it sees and refers to as "nation building" activities. Assisting the government in the provision of disaster relief during floods and earthquakes, the distribution and sale of food and other supplies under Benazir Bhutto through the National Logistics Cell, the building of the Karakoram Highway and the Kahuta project are all elements of a role that the army sees for itself that is not merely confined to the defence of the country's geographical frontiers.

As far as its internal sociology goes, the army sees itself as an indigenous and Islamic force. During the Zia years, the components of what constituted the "Club", remained closely knit on policy matters. A largely corporate view of issues prevailed. These two elements were retained in the aftermath of General Zia's demise, and were manifested by the position taken on such issues as the Survey Episode, the attitude towards Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and the decision to oppose Benazir when she wanted to grant an extension to Lt. General Alam Jan Mahsud.

This process was helped, of course by the fact that the Pakistan army continues to be insulated from "outside influence", that is, interference from the civilian leadership. The military continues to enjoy considerable internal autonomy, certainly more than any other component of the power structure, with the COAS deciding on internal army matters, particularly those pertaining to retirement, extensions and promotion of personnel.

In the wake of the end of the third and longest Martial Law in Pakistan's history it would be instructive to examine how this military regime functioned. In 1987, under pressure of the Prime Minister some close associates of the President

⁷⁸ Major General Fazal Muqem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (Oxford University Press, Karachi. 1963); Lt. Gen. Attiqur Rahman, *Our Defence Cause* (White Lion Publishers: London, 1976); Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (University of California Thesis: Berkeley, 1984).

ceased to hold office. They included General K.M. Arif and General Rahimud din Khan as well as Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. It would be interesting to analyze the impact of these developments on the power structure. Two aspects are important: the relationship of the President with 'his men' (i.e., colleagues in the power structure) and the manner in which this 'club' changed over time.

When he came to power in July 1977 a 'club' functioned and General Zia was initially considered merely the first among equals. This was in line with his image then of being a 'reluctant coup-maker' who was 'pushed' into ousting the civilian government. In those days, referring to his *rufaa* (colleagues), he was fond of saying that 'we came together and we will go together'. However, after that shaky start, General Zia managed to comfortably occupy the chair of authority and slowly but surely he did 'load-shedding' of extra-baggage.

A close camaraderie and relaxed relationship defined the bond between the General and the 'club'. For the first year of the regime a military council functioned which comprised General Zia's three other service colleagues: the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, (General Sharif), Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan and Admiral Sharif. They were also the four signatories to the 26 April 1977 joint statement swearing loyalty to the Bhutto government. Although they were members of the military council, General Zia and the 'club' had not taken them into confidence regarding the plan to make the coup on 5 July. The original coup-makers, led by General Zia, included all the Corps Commanders: Chishti. Sawar Khan, Iqbal Khan, Ghulam Hassan Khan and Jahanzeb Arbab.

The first major change in the 'club' took place in March 1980. During this period between 1977-1980, there was a tussle for the number two slot. This Chishti-versus-Arif conflict ultimately resulted in the exit of the former while the latter continued in his powerful position as Chief of Staff to the President. This tussle was only a part of the reason for Chishti's exit, the other more important being that he had started giving 'presidential looks'. Tall, heavy-built with a moustache, Faiz All Chishti, a Lt. General from the Artillery, was Corps Commander based in Rawalpindi. In this position he prided himself on being the 'real power and motivator' of the coup.⁷⁹ In fact, around that time, stories were being spread that while General Zia was the General Najib of the regime, Chishti was the Nasser. Najib was the titular head of the July 1952 military coup in Egypt, and it was Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser who emerged later as the real strongman. In March 1980, two members of the 'club' Chishti and Ghulam Hassan, were sent out. The next change in the 'club' came in March 1984 when another two members of the 'club' Iqbal Khan and Sawar Khan, both Pothwar

⁷⁹ For Chishti's view of Zia see his book: "Betrayals of Another Kind" (Asia Publishing House London, 1989).

protégés of Tikka Khan, were retired and replaced by Rahimuddin and Arif respectively.

During this period, between 1980-1984, three important developments had taken place with reference to the military regime. First, the revival of the American connection, which was a source of strength and stability for the regime. Given a weak domestic base, regimes in Pakistan have relied on intimacy with America to bolster their domestic confidence and signal their political opponents that the US is lined up behind them. When the regime had rejected Carter's \$ 400 million aid offer in February 1980 as 'peanuts', the regime had to look around for political allies at home.⁸⁰ General Fazle Haq was deputed to talk to Wali Khan and Mahmood Haroon had a dialogue with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

After the revival of the American connection, the regime felt no need to talk to the political forces and after that it decided to 'go it alone' bypassing the politicians and political panics. Another implication of the revival of the American connection was in the realm of foreign policy, with a direct channel established between the military regime and Washington, there was no need for intermediaries like Agha Shahi. A more trusted man was now needed to occupy the key slot of foreign minister. In any case, in his negotiations with the Americans in 1979 and 1981. Mr. Agha Shahi had come across as a rigid proponent of Pakistan's position on non-alignment and the nuclear programme.⁸¹

Second, the two changes in the 'club' in 1980 and 1984 respectively followed feeble in-house 'conspiracies' against the regime. In February 1980, retired Maj. Gen. Tajammal Hussain, who had commanded a division in Jehlum in 1976, was arrested for planning an assassination, together with a couple of junior officers who were his relatives. Soon after these arrests, Chishti and Ghulam Hassan Khan were retired.⁸² In January 1984, a group of junior army officers was said to be involved in an anti-regime conspiracy that was linked to the London-based Ghulam Mustafa Khar who, in turn, was said to be linked to India. Soon after the arrests of these junior officers, Iqbal and Sawar were retired.

Third, within the military regime a modern-day version of the old Chinese system of 'warlordism' was in operation. The four provincial Governors, as well

⁸⁰ Zia's intimacy with CIA Chief Bill Casey is discussed in Bob Woodward's *Veil*, Simon & Schuster, 1987, P. 310-312.

⁸¹ "Documents from the Espionage Den", Volume I on Pakistan, P. 19. *Profile of the Power Structure*, P. 107

⁸² Khar's Indian connection is described in detail in Tehmina Durrani's *My Feudal Lord*, Lahore, 1991: An Indian Mole in Pakistan, *The Telegraph*, 11 May 1991.

as some generals occupying key governmental sectors, ran their respective domains as 'warlords', the only proviso being that they do not 'rock the boat'. There were powerful governors like General Fazle Haq in the Frontier and General Ghulam Jilani Khan in Punjab plus Generals like Mujib who ran the media, Saeed Qadir responsible for Production and Rahim Khan heading the Defence Ministry, including PIA. The only civilian members of the 'club' were Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan.

Informal linkages of rank, position and relationship were institutionalized during this period. For example, every cabinet meeting was preceded a day or two earlier by a 'club' meeting, where the real decisions were taken, which were then formalized in the Cabinet. On Afghanistan a committee used to meet every month to review the situation with 'club' members in attendance plus the governors of Frontier and Baluchistan.

It was only after the lifting of martial law that the 'club' ceased to exist in terms of its composition and manner of functioning. The devolution of power that followed brought about a new balance within the Establishment, which caused infighting and other problems, such as tensions between the President and the Prime Minister.⁸³

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Apart from the army, a key component of the power structure is the Intelligence, whose role, for the most part, remains shrouded in secrecy.

In Pakistan, the Intelligence network has basically comprised the two main organizations, namely the Intelligence Bureau (IB) staffed by the police, and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) run by the military. The IB has been used by civilian governments and the ISI has been the reliable mainstay of military regimes. Even during the early period of Independence, in the fifties, the role of the police was politically important. The IG Police in Punjab, Qurban Ali Khan was more powerful than the ministers and the IG Police in the Frontier Province, Sardar Abdur Rashid was appointed Chief Minister to replace Qayyum Khan way back in 1952. Even then the Intelligence was used by the government for political purposes and during the Prime Ministership of Liaquat Ali Khan, he ordered the Intelligence to ensure surveillance of Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the Father of the Nation. She was then seen by Liaquat as being in the 'opposition'.

⁸³ An account of how the Zia-Junejo diarchy collapsed is in Mushahid Hussain's *The Zia Years*.

Soon after the 1965 war with India had begun, Ayub Khan faulted the ISI for not providing 'timely and correct intelligence.' The DG, ISI candidly replied, "all these years because we were not doing our real work, i.e., counter intelligence, because we were too busy chasing your domestic political opponents."⁸⁴ In fact, one task entrusted by Ayub Khan to ISI during that period. Which they commendably refused to do, was to 'eliminate' Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who was Ayub Khan's political opponent. The ISI reported back to Ayub Khan, after thorough investigation that since Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan had no personal enmity, the crime, if committed, by an organ of the State, would probably be traced back.⁸⁵

In the days of Yahya Khan the head of IB, N.A. Rizvi, and Chief of Security, Maj. Gen. (Reid.) Omar, were part of his inner circle. During the Bhutto period, Lt. Gen. Ghulam Gilani Khan was the only senior holdover from the days of Yahya Khan to retain his position as D.G., ISI which he continued even during the early period of General Zia, thus spanning three administrations. During the civilian interlude of Mr. Bhutto, his D.G. Federal Security Force, Masud Mahmood and Chief Security Officer, Saeed Ahmad Khan, were quite influential. ISI carried their intelligence operations to such ridiculous lengths that even the popular 'Pak Tea House' cafe in Lahore was bugged with view to knowing what the intellectuals of Lahore were saying and thinking about the Bhutto regime!

Under General Zia, two things happened on the intelligence front. The ISI grew in size and strength in the power structure due to the dependence of the regime on intelligence information and the Afghan operation. Probably no Third World Intelligence Agency had such a huge budget to oversee such vast political cum-paramilitary operations on such a scale. The closest other parallels could be the RAW in East Pakistan in 1971 and Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon.⁸⁶ Over time the D.G., ISI Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rehman became the *de facto* number two of the Zia regime. Secondly, the IB became weak and sidelined owing to the instinctive distrust by the army of the police, it was only in 1985, just a week before the inauguration of Mr. Junejo, that General Zia-ul-Haq appointed Maj. Geri. Agha Nek Mohamad, a serving Army Officer, as Director of IB.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am assassinated*, Vikas, 1979.

⁸⁵ Mushahid Hussain, "Intelligence and the Politics of Power in the Third World: The Pakistani Experience", Outline Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 1-13, 1990; Agha Shahi Conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

⁸⁶ Mushahid Hussain, "Intelligence and the Politics of Power in the Third World: The Pakistani Experience", Outline Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 11-13, 1990, Washington, DC, USA.

⁸⁷ Mushahid Hussain, *The Zia Years*, op. cit.

From implementer of policy, the ISI became the policy maker. In early 1987, when there was a 'problem' between General Akhtar Abdur Rehman and the Vice Chief of Army Staff, General K.M. M General Zia preferred Akhtar and promptly retired Arif. In 1982, following the resignation of Agha Shahi as Foreign Minister, he was asked by a confident Akhtar Abdur Rehman:

"What do you think of our choice of Yaqub Khan as your successor. We deliberated this matter a great deal before appointing Yaqub." This clearly indicated that Akhtar was one of the persons close to General Zia who was calling the shots.⁸⁸

The problem of IB is a hangover of the colonial days. Basically, the IB is an extension of the Police, since it comprises cops who alternate stints in IB with field duty as police officers. Thus the IB lacks professionalism which a first-class Intelligence Organization must have. In fact, the IB is very jealous about its 'turf' since it is assumed to be the 'exclusive domain' of the police. In 1967, when Ayub Khan proposed putting a senior civil servant, Roedad Khan as Director of Intelligence Bureau, there was a near revolt in the police ranks.⁸⁹ The IB approach to collecting intelligence is often puerile and even semi-literate. In 1954, when the Communist Party of Pakistan was banned and the communists were being rounded up by the Intelligence, there was a raid on the house of a prominent communist. The Intelligence chap said to him "We have come to arrest you because you are a communist." He replied, "I am anti-communist". The Intelligence Officer replied with an air of supreme confidence: "We don't care what kind of a communist you are, anti or whatever, as long as you are one." Similarly, when Faiz Ahmed Faiz was in jail, he was not allowed to receive 'the Communist Manifesto' since it prominently carried the label 'communist', when he requested that he be given Marx's Capital, this was promptly allowed!

It needs to be understood that there is a consistency in the pattern of behavior of all governments in Pakistan *vis-a-vis* Intelligence.

Ali governments civilian or military have used intelligence for political purposes, particularly through the pursuit of opposition figures;

At almost all crucial moments in Pakistan's politics, the intelligence have been proven wrong, either in their assessments of the popular mood or

⁸⁸ Akhtar Abdur Rahman's role is examined in detail in a flattering biography by Haroon Rashid Faith (Victor). *Jang* Publishers, 1990: Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

⁸⁹ Roedad Khan conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

intentions of the opposition; even in 1988, the intelligence misread the mood in Sindh;⁹⁰

All governments have used the intelligence for political contacts and dialogue with the opposition.

During Benazir Bhutto's days, both of the country's premier Intelligence organizations were much in the news, and interestingly the activities of both were highlighted in the context of domestic politics. In May 1990, the National Assembly even admitted a privilege motion moved by an Opposition member against the alleged efforts of the ISI to keep tabs on him, the first such instance in Pakistan's history. And another important Opposition leader, the UI Parliamentary Grief, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, accused the IB of spending Rs 80 million on influencing loyalties of members of Parliament during the crucial days in October 1989 when a motion of no-confidence was tabled against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. He also accused the IB of spending much of its budget on keeping track of those politicians who opposed the PPP government.⁹¹

Whatever the truth or otherwise of these allegations, the fact remains that the role of intelligence in Pakistan does not change with the change of government. Both military and civilian governments find intelligence a handy tool to hound their political opponents. Some can perhaps justifiably argue that the very nature of Intelligence, a covert, secretive body, digging up information, condemns it to a role that is at variance with democratic professions and practices. Others can also attribute the use of Intelligence by successive governments the insecurity of weak, civilian governments that have traditionally had a relationship of mutual distrust with other components in the power structure are perceived to be attempting destabilization of civilian.

However, the real reason for the excessive reliance on Intelligence is because successive governments have tended to repeat the mistakes of their predecessors. All governments in Pakistan without exception, have used Intelligence to wiretap the Opposition, for dirty trick operations and for a host of other political purposes since they invariably assume that governmental interest and the national interest are synonymous. The misuse of Intelligence is, of course, not just a characteristic of an authoritarian society. Even in a democratic country like India, one of the first things when Prime Minister V.P. Singh came to power was to accuse RAW of all sorts of illegalities, including disinformation against the Opposition, and in one of his first measures, he proposed the establishment of a

⁹⁰ Mushahid Hussain, "The Invisible Government", *The Nation*, 5 February 1989.

⁹¹ Mushahid Hussain "Is Bureaucracy Hostile to PPP Government", *The Nation*, July 1, 1989.

National Security Council to collate and oversee all Intelligence operations. An important underlying purpose of V.P. Singh's proposal for a NSC was to clip the wings of RAW.⁹²

Similarly, when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took office, one of her first acts just after four weeks in Islamabad was to set up a high-level committee to reorganize Pakistan's Intelligence set-up. Headed by Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who also served as Ambassador in Washington, the committee was entrusted with proposing long term measures to revamp the various Intelligence organizations in Pakistan.⁹³ Regrettably, like other steps which have been steeped in adhocism, nothing much came out of the report. According to what was published in the national and international media when the report was formally submitted to the Prime Minister in May 1989. The report had apparently made some useful recommendations which, had they been implemented, would have gone a long way in strengthening the work of Pakistani Intelligence organizations. The Intelligence Reorganization Committee was, for instance, said to have recommended the establishment of a National Security Council, to be headed by the Prime Minister as well as a new body called the Joint Intelligence Committee, as a permanent body staffed by a small secretarial and headed by a Chairman who need not be professionally an Intelligence man. It was envisaged that such a body would perform two key functions, namely, coordinate the work of all Intelligence organizations in Pakistan and function as a crisis-management group whenever situations required it.

According to other reports, the Committee was also said to have proposed the setting up of a Joint Intelligence Training Academy for integrated training of all Intelligence services in Pakistan, rather than separate training schools as is the case at present. And it was said to have also recommended a specialized.

National Intelligence Service, similar, say to the Foreign Service or the Police, to provide officers for all the intelligence organizations in Pakistan. Sadly, none of these recommendations were ever implemented and even in the case of the removal of heads of Intelligence organizations, the purpose seemed more to effect a change of face, not reorganization of the Intelligence apparatus.

⁹² Dilip Mukerjee, "National Security Council", *The Times of India*, 23 January 1990; *The Hindustan Times* "Charges against RAW denied", 4 February 1990; *The Times of India* "RAW accused of creating rifts", 9 May 1990.

⁹³ Mushahid Hussain, 'Forwards a more Intelligent Intelligence'. *The Nation*, July 8, 1990.

Few governments in Pakistan have really understood that no Intelligence organization has ever saved a government of a ruler in Pakistan. Perhaps, a brief look at the Intelligence track record in Pakistan would be instructive:

Intelligence was not able to forewarn Ayub Khan that his Generals were readying to dump him in 1969.

The Intelligence assessment fed to Yahya Khan was not even remotely accurate as to what the 1970 election results would be.

Intelligence was not able to tell Mohammad Khan Junejo what General Zia had in store for him when he returned from a triumphant foreign tour on 29 May 1988.

Intelligence was not able to know before-hand that General Zia was to be assassinated in the company of his best foreign friend – the American Ambassador – and his closest military confidante – General Akhtar Abdur Rahman – and that too within the confines of his core constituency, the Army, on 17 August 1988.

The Intelligence was never able to gauge the popular mood in rural Sindh in the November 1989 elections, thereby upsetting all official projections as to the eventual outcome.

The Intelligence was never able to inform Benazir Bhutto that the no-confidence move was in the offing in November 1988 or that the MQM had decided to ditch the PPP even earlier.

Even when it comes to external events, the Intelligence performance is hardly any better. Two examples will suffice: The Tanai coup had already collapsed in Kabul when the intelligence was feeding the government tall tales of victory and even tentative lists were said to have been drawn up as to which Cabinet Minister would like to land in Kabul with the first triumphant flight amidst all this 'glory'! And regards Kashmir, a senior Intelligence official privately admitted that 'we were wrong in predicting events there.'⁹⁴

Basically, three kinds of roles can be attributed to Pakistani intelligence organizations: -

Dabbling in domestic politics, which essentially means acting as the 'eyes and ears' of a regime and keeping track of political opponents;

⁹⁴ Highly-placed official's conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

Counter-intelligence, which is after all, the primary professional function of any intelligence outfit, and

Formulation and implementation of a given policy in a specific area, as the ISI has been doing on the Mg issue since 1979.

Some of the problems that arise in Pakistan, in the context of the role of the Intelligence, pertain to the peculiar nature of the Pakistani power structure with its multiple components and often divergent, if not conflicting perspectives. This has been the case since the lifting of Martial Law in 1985, first spawned a diarchy when General Zia was alive and after his death, a trarchy. The result has been three-fold. First, the intelligence organizations are perceived to represent opposing power structures, the civilian government by the IB and the military by the ISI. They end up working more as rivals, with overlapping functions and compete roles. The hostility among them is often not concealed as is evident by the fact that, on both occasions, 29 May 1988 and 6 August 1990, when Prime Ministers were dismissed by the Presidents, the IB headquarters was the first target, with offices sealed and records scrutinized, in "operations" reminiscent of the style of a *coup d'état*. Second, the role of Intelligence under the triarchy is specified in a loose but unstated manner, that is, the civilian governments repose their trust in the IB, while treating ISI with varying degrees of suspicion. The fact that the D.G., ISI who is a serving Army officer, invariably reports to his boss, the Chief of Army Staff (barring the case of Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.R. Kallue who was Benazir Bhutto's nominee), adds to the distance between the ISI and the civilian Prime Minister. Third, decisions related to the Intelligence, taken by the Prime Minister, are often linked to assertion of Prime Ministerial authority *vis-a-vis* other components of the triarchy.

Politically, some of the most significant decisions taken by civilian Prime Ministers in Pakistan in the last six years, were all related to the intelligence. At the first opportunity after what was perceived by him to be an immensely successful journey to the United States, in July 1986, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo removed Major General Agha Nek Mohammad as the Head of IB and replaced him by Malik Aslam Hayat, a senior Police official. Agha Nek Mohammad had been put in charge of the IB only a week before the installation of Mr. Junejo as Prime Minister by General Zia and he was the first Army officer to head the IB.

When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto removed Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul as the Head of ISI in May 1989, it was then seen as her most significant political move. Even today, Benazir Bhutto privately concedes that "this was my most significant blunder since Hamid Gul is a brilliant man and I could have put him to good

use".⁹⁵ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also was quick to appoint a former senior ISI official, Brig. (Reid.) Imtiaz Ahmad as Director of the IB. Brig. Imtiaz had been removed by Benazir Bhutto from the ISI in March 1989 and he had then served in the provincial administration of Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab as Additional Chief Secretary.

As there is little possibility of changing the nature of the power structure in Pakistan, given both the constitutional compulsions and the political realities in the country, successive governments have failed to devise some institutional mechanism of a permanent nature for Pakistan's intelligence, rather than relying on ad hoc measures that can, at best, add to the "spy versus spy" nature of the relationship among the intelligence organizations.⁹⁶

THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

The civil bureaucracy, essentially a body of conservative bastions of the *status quo*, feels comfortable with whatever is perceived by it to be ensuring 'stability and security'.⁹⁷ Its role and response to a particular regime stems from two essential considerations. First, the feeling that there is security of service, which essentially means the, sense of political pressures and the lack of any 'tampering' of the system or purges in their ranks. The bureaucracy was, for instance, very uncomfortable in the days of Yahya Khan who dismissed 303 bureaucrats, or in the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who had removed from service 1,400 of them. Second, the bureaucracy has a good sense of where 'power lies'. For the civil bureaucracy, 'power' is operationally defined as the ability to grant them promotions, transfers, and extensions. In other words, 'power' emanates from the source where the file eventually ends i.e. For instance, till 29 May 1988, in the case of Pakistan, that source happened to be Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo.

Given this context, it is not surprising that the civil bureaucracy had gaited looking up to Mr. Junejo for the seeking of favors and the extension of patronage. In other words, in their eyes, he was the Boss to please and the one who mattered. Conversely, in the situation that prevailed till 29 May General Zia felt ignored and isolated within the system that he himself had spawned. He had two basic complaints regarding the senior civil servants, many of whom have felt

⁹⁵ Comments at a Private dinner of journalists.

⁹⁶ Mushahid Hussain, "Spy Wars", *The Nation*, 21 April 1991.

⁹⁷ Different perspectives on the bureaucracy include: Dr. Muneer Ahmad, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press 1964; Hassan Habib, Babus, *Brahmans and Bureaucrats*, Lahore 1970.

his ire in various ways following Junejo's sacking. Zia felt that the bureaucracy switched sides and effectively ditched him. It was not just as if they would not call on him or not respond promptly enough to his occasional communications. In a situation of polarization within the system between the President and the Prime Minister, the bureaucracy invariably went in the direction of the files. The second complaint that General Zia had regarding most of the bureaucracy was that it failed to make the fine distinction between the formal power structure headed by the Prime Minister and the real structure that General Zia continued to lead, despite the absence of his direct involvement in the day-to-day running of the administration.⁹⁸

However, the senior segments of the civil bureaucracy felt that such criticism on the part of the President was unjustified. As one of them aptly put it: "The President appoints a Prime Minister and Rules of Business are framed which say all files go to the Prime Minister. Despite this if we are expected to play a double game and report to him on the Prime Minister, that is grossly unfair." Ironically, the political ministers who retained their slots despite the ouster of Mr. Junejo, were apparently "smarter" than their bureaucratic counterparts since they maintained contact with the President during this entire period being aware of the realities of Pakistan's power structure.

Zia's behavior towards the civil bureaucracy after 29 May 1988, both in style and substance, was atypical of Pakistani rulers. In terms of style General Zia was generally more stable in his relationships with the senior civil bureaucracy. During the years of Martial Law, it was perhaps for the first time in Pakistan's history that such key Secretaries to Government those responsible for Finance, Information, Defence, Establishment and Interior remained in position for a good five years each without change. In substantive terms, General Zia was the first ruler since 1958, which did not begin with a purge of civil servants. In fact, he did a lot to undo the impact of some of Mr. Bhutto's administrative reforms, which had diluted the importance of the old CSP cadre. He also did away with the lateral entry system, although it was replaced by institutionalized induction of army officers. Unlike Mr. Bhutto, who was seen by the civil bureaucracy to be 'pampering the public', General Zia more or less restored the bureaucracy as a junior ruling partner of the army — a role that first began in the early sixties during the rule of Ayub Khan. Another hallmark of General Zia's Martial Law years was the frequency of extensions granted to senior civil servants.

However, after Junejo's dismissal, General Zia's behavior towards the civil bureaucracy was in marked contrast to those 'good old days' of Martial Law. It

⁹⁸ For General Zia's relations with civil bureaucracy, after Junejo's sacking, see: Mushahid Hussain, "Civil Bureaucracy, and Power Structure". *The Nation*, 7 August 1988.

was almost as if General Zia had ‘captured’ state power and he wanted to ensure that the bureaucrats ‘fell in line’. However, this attitude ignored one vital ingredient of every bureaucracy, namely, that its loyalty is always to whosoever is in charge. Therefore, its loyalties are seldom, if ever, personalized.

If the bureaucracy “switched” to Junejo in Zia’s presence, it would be instructive to examine its relationship with Benazir Bhutto’s short-lived regime. During her twenty months, the Government of Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented “openness” given the frequency of disclosure of what would usually be deemed as official or “confidential” communication. Some major examples of “leakages” of official communication under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto:⁹⁹

a letter from the Finance Minister to the Banking Council instructing it to investigate the bank accounts of twenty top Opposition leaders;

a letter from the Labour Minister to the Prime Minister seeking Rs 1.5 million so that this amount could be used to achieve “positive results” in support of a preferred union in a referendum in the PTA; all official communication, including summaries addressed to the Prime Minister, regarding the notorious Lake View Hotel, which turned out to be a key deal involving financial and legal irregularities; communication between the Ministry of Defence and the Chairman, PIA, regarding various appointments including reinstatement of a Captain “dismissed for smuggling of summaries regarding a contract with an American Company worth \$450 million for establishing a Satellite Communication System, which was initially rejected by the government on the advice of its own experts but this decision was later retracted for inexplicable reasons, giving rise to speculation that somebody may well be “on the take”;

a letter sent from the Prime Minister’s Secretariat to the Director General, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), ordering the agency to keep tabs on a prominent IJI Member of Parliament, who, in turn, filed a privilege motion in the National Assembly terming this act as “a breach of privilege”. This privilege motion was admitted by the Speaker, the first time there had been such a move against an intelligence agency in Pakistan’s Parliament.

All these events indicated a growing disillusionment within the bureaucracy with the PPP government, lack of effective control by the PPP government over its own official apparatus, and a polarized polity whose cleavages extended to

⁹⁹ Mushahid Hussain *Supra* 14.

various layers of the bureaucracy as well. By the time of its ouster in August 1990, the hard fact was that most of the bureaucracy in Islamabad had been successfully alienated by the PPP government through its acts of omission or commission.

Such a state of affairs was in marked contrast to the situation that existed when the PPP came to office in December 1988. An overwhelming majority of the bureaucracy in Islamabad had welcomed and indeed supported this change in the expectation that Benazir Bhutto and her team of young political loyalists would be the harbingers of fresh initiatives in better governance. The bureaucracy had hoped that their core interests would be well protected in the new order. And they felt a certain affinity with the PPP given their own anti-Army ethos since the civil bureaucracy and the military are rivals in the power structure. Their 'core interests', as perceived by the bureaucracy, are security of service, acceptance of the established criteria for inductions, promotions and transfers and no 'outside' inductions into the system so that the hierarchy of decision-making is not unduly disturbed.¹⁰⁰

All these hopes and expectations were dashed and twenty months into its second stint in office, the PPP government ended up presiding over a lax and disaffected bureaucracy. There were a number of reasons why the bureaucracy was alienated from the PPP government whose leaders many of the bureaucrats had privately admired or sympathized with when it was out in the political wilderness. At least three such reasons merit attention. The PPP began its rule in Islamabad with a basic distrust of the system and its cogs, which were under its cogs. This situation was accentuated by the grudges and grouses which the PPP and its top leadership carried owing to their decade-long 'struggle against the system.' The result was a broad, often senseless removal of officials from their positions and placing them for long periods as Officer on Special Duty (OSD). Second, there was an attempt to bypass the established procedures for induction of Party loyalists via an institution which was termed as Placement Bureau, functioning directly under the Prime Minister's Secretariat. Although it was wound up in the second half of 1989, the damage had been done since the Placement Bureau's arbitrary actions generated a lot of resentment within the bureaucracy. Even the lateral entry scheme of the first PPP government had an institutional character, unlike the Placement Bureau. Finally, there were the widespread allegations of corruptions at the top layer of the PPP government, aptly summed up by a remark of a leading bureaucrat "all that most Ministers are interested in is making money".¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ This definition of "core interests" came from a senior bureaucracy.

¹⁰¹ Op. cit.

On top of these difficulties, the PPP had yet to grapple with the task of governance, a task made much more difficult by the broader political situation in the country with a strong Opposition coupled with non-PPP governments in the Punjab and Baluchistan. In terms of running the government in Islamabad, examples of three specialized areas which are vital in any administration will suffice. The Foreign Office had just too many Foreign Ministers, and often one did not know what the other was doing. (Apart from Sahibzada Yaqub Khan who was formally the Foreign Minister, Happy Minwala and Iqbal Akhund functioned as *defacto* foreign ministers.) The “good work” that the Information Ministry had done for the PPP was reflected in the fact that by the summer of 1990 not one journalist worth the name was willing to publicly defend the government’s performance or most of its actions. And both the intelligence agencies, the Police-dominated Intelligence Bureau and the Army-dominated ISI, were being run by retired Army Officers who did not enjoy the confidence of most of their own colleagues.¹⁰²

Additionally, it was dangerously simplistic on the part of the PPP to dismiss most of the bureaucracy as being “remnants of Zia-ul-Haq”. Since the government failed to take account of the fact that just a couple of years before, when General Zia was still President and Mr. Junejo Prime Minister, almost the entire bureaucracy had switched to the civilian Prime Minister from Sindh. Even making a genuine allowance for inexperience, the teething troubles for the PPP government *vis-a-vis* the bureaucracy were unending.

An extension of the civil bureaucracy, the Foreign Office is one of its vital specialized components since it straddles the divide on the realm of national security, where increasingly, its functions have overlapped with the military. Basically, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministers can be slotted into three broad categories: those who were bureaucrats, (i.e., from within the Foreign Office), those who were technocrats and others who were politicians.¹⁰³ Pakistan’s bureaucrat Foreign Ministers have included Mian Arshad Hussain, Aziz Ahmed and Agha Shahi. Among its technocrat Foreign Ministers were Sir Zafar-ul-lah Khan (who, with seven years in the Foreign Office, had the second longest tenure), Manzoor Qadir, Sharifuddin Pirzada and General Yaqub Khan. The politicians who became Foreign Ministers, included Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, Sir Feroze Khan Noon, Mohammad Ali Bogra. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zain Noorani.

¹⁰² Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.R. Kallue, DG. ISI and Major (Retd.) Masood Sharif, Joint Director. Intelligence Bureau.

¹⁰³ Mushahid Hussain. “Pakistan’s Foreign Ministers: A Profile”. *The Nation*, 17 March 1991.

Certain traits have been common to most of Pakistan's Foreign Ministers. The majority has been pro-American, have had little link with their own people, and have lacked an imaginative approach in the conduct of foreign policy. Mr. Bhutto was the exception to the rule and apart from him. Pakistan's political Foreign Ministers have been the weakest.

While most Foreign Ministers have merely continued existing policies, implemented new ones, three have been crucial to the conception, formulation and execution of major policy initiatives. In September 1954, Foreign Minister Sir Zafar-ul-lah Khan went to Manila to attend the formative meeting of SEATO as an observer. He had no authorization from the Cabinet to sign on the dotted lines of this US-sponsored pact. But apparently on his own initiative, he made Pakistan a partisan of the Cold war and it was much bier, in February 1955, that Pakistan's Cabinet ratified its Foreign Minister's decision. In 1963, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto presided over the first major re-orientation in Pakistan's foreign policy from exclusive reliance on the West to a cautions opening to the East. In 1981, it was Foreign Minister Agha Shahi who negotiated the revival of the 'special relationship' with the United States following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. His subsequent insistence on Pakistan's commitment to non-alignment alienated him both from the Army and the Americans, leading to his exit from office.

However, in one at the most historic events in contemporary diplomacy, in which Pakistan played an important role — the opening to China — the Foreign Office had little or no input. It was Yahya Khan himself who handled the secret message from the Americans which he personally passed on to the Chinese. Some of the notes were in Yahya Khan's own handwriting. Probably the only Foreign Office role in this opening to China was when Foreign Secretary Sultan Mohammad Khan accompanied Dr. Henry Kissinger in his car in July 1971 to the Chakala Airport to put him on board the secret historic flight to China?¹⁰⁴

In many of the vital decisions affecting Pakistan's foreign policy, the involvement of its Foreign Ministers and Foreign Office was minimal. In 1952, when the first Pakistan Military Attaché went to Washington to take over his assignment, he received an important briefing from his superiors in GHQ but not from the Foreign Office. He was told clearly by his Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan and Defence Secretary, Iskandar Mirza, to go and seek aims from the Americas but, added the Military Attache's superiors, he was not supposed to

¹⁰⁴ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 740.

take the Ambassador or the Foreign Office into confidence because 'these politicians cannot be trusted with such sensitive matters'.¹⁰⁵

In 1956, when the Suez crisis was developing, Foreign Minister, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry went to Cairo, met Gamal Abdel Nasser and assured him of Pakistan's support to Egypt. From Cairo he went to London, where he reversed his position, an act for which Nasser never forgave Pakistan. When Foreign Minister Feroze Khan Noon tried to pursue a policy somewhat independent of the British on Suez, he was reprimanded by Iskandar Mirza for 'betraying my friends'.¹⁰⁶

In more recent times, both under the Bhutto regime as well as under General Zia-ul Haq, details of the Afghan operation which was coordinated by General Nasirullah Babar and General Tikka Khan, aimed at the destabilization of the Daud regime in Kabul and an attempt to restore Zahir Shah in collaboration with the Shah of Iran. The rationale behind it was kept secret even from the Foreign Office. This was aptly summed up by Mr. Bhutto to one of his confidants: "Let Agha Shahi not know about it, so that he can deny it with a clear conscience."¹⁰⁷ Under General Zia, the Afghan policy was being run by General Fazle Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rahman on the domestic front, while General Arif and General Yaqub coordinated diplomacy not just on Afghanistan but on such key issues as India and the United States.

Interestingly, General Zia continued the pattern that Mr. Bhutto had set of keeping the Foreign Office out of vital aspects of the Afghan operation. In October 1979, when Foreign Minister Agha Shahi went to Washington to negotiate with the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, his American counterpart, took him aside during a break in the talk and casually made a remark which stunned Agha Shahi since he was totally in the dark about it. Vance asked Agha Shahi: "*I hope the Afghan Mujahideen have started receiving the shipment of arms which our two countries had agreed upon earlier.*" Agha Shahi could only nod diplomatically, since a statement to the contrary would have been embarrassing, given that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had not been taken into confidence on a decision which had essentially been arrived at between the CIA and the ISI.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Major General Mini Ghulam Jilani conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

¹⁰⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States; 1955 -95 Volume VII, South Asia.

¹⁰⁷ Major General Nasirullah Babar conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

¹⁰⁸ Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

Often there is a reverse bypass of the Foreign Office, that is, the Ambassador of an important country can develop a certain intimacy with the President or play a key role during a sensitive situation. In Pakistan, there were at least five such envoys who played key roles over the heads of the Foreign Office. US Ambassador Horace Hildreth, who served in Karachi during the Iskandar Mirza period used to see the Pakistan President several evenings every week and it is said that major decisions would be taken during those encounters. The fact that Hildreth's daughter was married to Mirza's son added to the intimacy between the American Ambassador and the President of Pakistan.¹⁰⁹

In the 1973 book, *The Anderson Papers*, written by the investigative reporter Jack Anderson, there is a chapter called The Dictator and the Diplomat. It reveals: "Yahya Khan had an extraordinary relationship with American Ambassador Joseph Farland, they met almost daily and sometimes shared a bottle of Scotch. With a ring of military reverses in Bengal, Yahya depended on Farland more than ever, and the two men developed a relationship that was unusual for a Head of State and a Foreign Ambassador. The Pakistani President needed a friend to confide in, as his army fell back day after day."¹¹⁰

In 1973, American Charge d' Affaires Sidney Sobers played a significant behind-the-scenes role in talking to opposition politicians to forge the consensus that brought about the 1973 Constitution. However, the most unprecedented of any Ambassador in Pakistan was that of Saudi Arabia's Riaz al-Khatib, who was the mediator between the PPP Government and the PNA during the 1977 agitation. Probably the most influential American Ambassador after Horace Hildreth was Robert Oakley. Oakley's influence was at its peak during the PPP period, when he personally sat in on meetings of the Afghan Cell,¹¹¹ which took policy decisions on the Afghan operation, and when Benazir Bhutto reportedly rushed to him to verify whether "rumors of a coup are true or not". Even on 6 August 1990—the day of her dismissal—Benazir sent one of her trusted Ministers to the US Embassy to 'check from Oakley' whether the President had finally decided to dump her.

As events have proven in Pakistan, Foreign Ministers have not only little to do with their own people and also other parts of the government that they serve as well. For example, on July 5, 1977, Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed went to his

¹⁰⁹ Hildreth's role is documented in *Supra* 29.

¹¹⁰ Jack Andersen, *The Anderson Papers*, Ballantine Books, 1974, especially Chapter "The dictator and the Diplomat", p. 274.

¹¹¹ *The New York Times*, 23 April 1989.

office early in the morning business-as-usual, and it was the somewhat unpleasant and embarrassing task of his Foreign Secretary to inform him that a military coup had taken place at dawn and ousted the government of which he was Foreign Minister!¹¹²

RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILIAN REGIMES AND THE MILITARY

Well before the first martial law was imposed in October 1958, the Pakistan Army had emerged as an autonomous power centre not subordinate to civilian authority. This creeping militarization of the Pakistani power structure began soon after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951. Two factors were largely responsible for this growing ascendancy of the Army. The first was the American Connection, which made the Army the most important institutional vehicle for US political influence in Pakistan. Brig Mian Ghulam Jilani (who later joined the NAP) was going on his assignment as Military Attaché to the United States, when he was called by General Ayub Khan, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. Ayub's instructions to Jilani were quite clear: "Your basic task is to establish a military aid relationship with the Pentagon. You must deal directly with them and don't take the Ambassador into confidence. After all, we cannot mist these civilians with such sensitive matters." The second reason for the creeping military influence in the power structure was political instability in Pakistan aggravated by weak politicians who increasingly lost control within the power structure. As early as March 1955, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, in a dispatch to the State Department, was already referring to Ayub Khan as the "final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets", in the same dispatch, the American Ambassador made a revealing appraisal, which was a pointer to Pakistan's political future: "After more than two years of recurrent crises, political power in Pakistan has been openly assumed by a small group of British- trained Administrators and military leaders centering around Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and his two principal associates, General Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub Khan".¹¹³

Ever since Pakistan's first military regime took over in 1958, Pakistan has seen three civilian interludes in the last thirty-one years. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Prime Minister for five years in 1972-1977, Muhammad Khan Junejo was Prime Minister from 1985-1988 and Benazir Bhutto was in office for twenty months.

In all these civilian governments, problems of control over the army and relations between the civilian structure and the Armed Forces cropped up and

¹¹² Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

¹¹³ Op. cit. p. 423.

these subsequently proved a catalyst for the downfall of at least two regimes. Within the first ninety days of taking over as Prime Minister, Benazir's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto removed the Chiefs of the Army and Air Force who were perceived to be playing the role of "king makers". When he ousted Lt Gen. Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan in March 1972, this was probably the first time in Pakistan's history after Quaid-e-Azam's death that civilian supremacy was enforced over the Army.¹¹⁴ In an address to the Pakistani people on the occasion, Bhutto also attacked Bonapartism: "The people of Pakistan and the Armed Forces themselves are equally determined to wipe out the Bonapartist influence from the Armed Forces. It is essential so that these tendencies never again pollute the political life of Pakistan. Bonapartism is an expression which means that professional soldiers turn into professional politicians. I use the word Bonapartism because what has happened in Pakistan since 1954 and more openly since 1958, is that some professional Generals turned to politics not as a profession but to plunder and as a result, the influences that crept into Pakistan's socio-political life destroyed its fabric as the influence of Bonapartist had affected Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. But come what may, these Bonapartist influences must be rooted out in the interest of the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan".¹¹⁵ Bhutto also changed the designation of the Services heads from Commander-in-Chief to Chief of Staff, fixed their tenure at three years and in what was labelled as reorganization of the defence structure, created the position of Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) who would act as a Coordinator of all the three Services.¹¹⁶ Unlike, say, the case of Turkey where the Chief of Joint Staff has direct command of the three Services, the case of Pakistan's Chairman JCSC is different since he has no direct authority and command of the troops, which remains in the hands of the particular Chief of Staff of that service. Despite these attempts, the civilian government of Mr. Bhutto was unable to prevent a military coup in July 1977 which led to the longest period of Martial Law in Pakistan's history.

In March 1985, after elections had been held. General Zia handpicked Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister who also did not take long in attempting to assert Civilian control over the Armed Forces. In March 1987, Mr. Junejo insisted upon the retirement of General K.M. Arif as Vice Chief of Army Staff (General Zia had continued to hold the position of Chief of Army Staff) and General Rahimuddin Khan as Chairman JCSC (who was also a relative of

¹¹⁴ They were removed in rather dramatic fashion: See excerpts from Bhutto's speech on the occasion in Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, (Progressive: Lahore), pp. 287-88.

¹¹⁵ Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit.

¹¹⁶ Op. cit.

General Zia) upon completion of their three- year tenures. A year later, in March, 1988, there was a sharp difference of opinion between Mr. Junejo and General Zia over the promotion of Lt. Generals, who would later serve as Corps Commanders. Under the Pakistani Constitution, while the President has the power to appoint the Services Chiefs and Chairman JCSC, all appointments up to the rank of three star Generals are done by the Prime Minister. Mr. Junejo even went to the extent, and this goes to his credit, to endeavor to establish Parliamentary control over the purse-strings of the military. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the question of defence spending was brought before the public and critically examined. This was done through the Parliament's Public Accounts Committee (PAC).¹¹⁷

In March 1988, the PAC had a press conference in Islamabad and criticized the pattern of defence budget which sought to 'hide' specific information about the quantum of expenditure on various functions of the defence services unlike the practice on the civil administration side. Conversely, the Defence Ministry had responded to this criticism with the conventional argument that since the military budget is a "sensitive sub its details could not be divulged to the public. The PAC based its argument for more openness on the defence budget on the plea that "if you don't keep our people informed of our defence potential, it does not mean that the others do not know about it".

Apart from this "public's right to know" principle, the other rationale provided by the PAC was that "the confidence of the people is based on the information they have and if they feel that the resources made available by them were not being effectively utilized for furtherance of the objective for which they are meant, they would resist parting with such resources. However, if the people are aware that the expenditure is essential for their security, they would gladly come forward to share the burden". The Junejo government took this argument further when in early May, 1988 the Finance Minister announced that a Special Review Committee of the government had even decided to reduce defence expenditure. He said that "real defence capability of the country could be protected, even increased, while reducing the expenditure on defence". He added that during the deliberations of the Special Review Committee, composed of members of Parliament and officials from the Economic Ministries, proposals were also put forward for raising a small professional army, comprehensive training for all citizens and the setting up of a National Defence Council, functioning under the Parliament to scrutinize defence spending. While there was no formal feedback from the military quarters to what were definitely revolutionary proposals by Pakistani standards, a rejoinder came from General Zia-ul Haq himself during a

¹¹⁷ This aspect is examined in Mushahid Hussain, Civil Military Relations under Civilian Regimes". *The Frontier Post*. 23 March 1990.

speech in Islamabad on 22 May 1988. General Zia lauded greater public discussion of defence issues saying that 'we are not angels in uniform and we should be open to persuasion and correction and the Armed Forces need not be sensitive to public criticism since the institution of the Armed Forces is no longer a sacred cow'. However, responding to proposals for slashing defence expenditure, General Zia was quite categorical that "the situation demands that national defence must be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defence expenditure, since you cannot freeze threats to Pakistan's security" - It not surprising that exactly a week after this speech, on 29 May 1988 General Zia sacked Prime Minister Junejo and the National Assembly which had become increasingly critical of the Armed Forces.¹¹⁸

During her twenty months in office, while Benazir Bhutto was certainly not oblivious of these developments *vis-a-vis* the unmilitary during the tenure of her civilian predecessors, she too fought at least three major "battles" to assert her control over the military. In May, 1989, she insisted on removing Lt. Gen Hamid Gul as Director General inter Services Intelligence (ISI) despite reluctance from both President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg." Similarly, the controversy over Admiral Sirohey again indicated the desire of her government to ensure that key appointments in the military were subject to civilian control.¹¹⁹ Additionally, just weeks before her ouster, Benazir Bhutto tried but failed to get "her man", Lt. General Alam Jan Mahsud, appointed as Vice Chief of Army Staff, since General Beg opposed it strongly.¹²⁰ These problems notwithstanding, Benazir Bhutto was careful in not annoying General Beg or the rest of the military brass. On the occasion of Pakistan Day, on 23 March 1989 she proclaimed the award of the Medal of Democracy to all members of the Armed Forces "for their meritorious services in upholding the Constitution and restoration of democratic rule"¹²¹. She publicly reaffirmed her praise and respect for the Armed Forces saying "by keeping out of politics, the Generals and the people are now one."¹²² In another gesture to demonstrate her support for the military's professional role of defending slate frontiers. Benazir Bhutto personally visited Siachen Glacier where she indicated "there would be no compromise over the national interest". She also appealed the military by

¹¹⁸ Op. cit.

¹¹⁹ Mushahid Hussain, "Benazir tightens grip over power structure but ..." *The Nation*, 18 June 1989.

¹²⁰ Mushahid Hussain, "The Mufti and the Khaki", *The Nation*, 13 August 1989.

¹²¹ Mushahid Hussain, "Khaki Versus Mufti " *The Nation*, 15 July 1990.

¹²² Mushahid Hussain, "PPP's Counter Offensive", *The Nation*, 10 September 1989.

personally visiting Pannu Aqil¹²³ Cantonment in Sindh, a politically controversial issue in her home province, in marked contrast to Junejo who declined the military's invitation to visit Pannu Aqil. Equally importantly she ensured that there was no large scale purge in the civilian government structure of military officers who had been appointed during the days of General Zia. In fact, key positions in her government were also occupied by military officers, all retired of course. For example, her Foreign Minister, her Minister of State for Defence, key civilian intelligence aide, Press Secretary and her Chief of Staff who headed her Secretariat were all Army Officers. In her time, three out of Pakistan's four provinces were headed by governors who were former Generals.

Basically, the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto seemed to be following a three-pronged strategy to deal with the Army since that was viewed as the main source of 'threat' to Pakistani civilian regimes. First, she continued to appease the Armed Forces through various gestures, including en the Army's presence in Sindh, particularly the Pannu Aqil cantonment which was controversial in provincial politics. Second, she allowed the Army exclusive responsibility for the conduct and co over Afghan policy.¹²⁴ Third, she was banking on support from the United States, whose key members of Congress made it clear that "the United States will stop all aid, military and economic, in case of a military coup."¹²⁵ Despite this attempt in purchase political risk insurance at home and abroad against a possible threat of military intervention, Benazir Bhutto had to employ all the political skills that she could command so that she was not haunted by the specter of "Bonapartism", like her father.¹²⁶ As her own short-lived tenure showed, such tight-rope walking is always easy.

However, 6 August 1990 was avoidable had Benazir Bhutto demonstrated skills in governance and seriously attempted to resolve some of the real problems which eventually led to her dismissal and dissolution of the National Assembly. These pith lens were linked to specific political issues and increasing complications within the Pakistani power structure. If specific issues are any guide to why the President acted the way he did on 6 August 1990, then a linkage can be drawn between the situation in Sindh, the crisis in Kashmir and the sudden surfacing of the Shariat Bill as yet another point of controversy in Pakistan's already divided polity. In the backdrop of these issues was Benazir Bhutto's deteriorating relationship with the other members of what had

¹²³ Op. cit.

¹²⁴ Supra 46.

¹²⁵ Op. cit.

¹²⁶ Op. cit.

constituted the triarchy in Pakistan's power structure since December 1988, namely, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg. In her understanding of the dynamics of the Pakistani power structure, Benazir Bhutto in 1990, just before her ouster, erroneously assumed that her real problem was in the person of the Chief of Army Staff, while she felt that she had "won over" the President by taking two of his sons-in-law into her camp. Interestingly, for the greater part of 1989, Benazir had assumed that within the triarchy, it was the President who was her main "adversary" while the Army, particularly General Beg was on her side.

The hard fact is that both these assessments were nor quite correct. Tactical considerations notwithstanding, the Pakistani Establishment basically viewed Benazir Bhutto as a temporary intruder into the corridors of power and their view of her conduct in office confirmed some of their worst suspicions about her. Their initial feeling later turned into a conviction that Benazir Bhutto simply failed to outgrow her partisan or parochial considerations. Additionally, this perception was reinforced by the feeling in the Pakistan Establishment that Benazir Bhutto and her team could not quite be "trusted" with sensitive national security issues.¹²⁷

Ironically issues such as Sindh and Kashmir which were the initial bases of Benazir's political strength later turned out to be catalysts for her dismissal. It was the overwhelming mandate which the PPP received in Sindh in the November 1988 elections that clinched the Prime Ministerial office for Benazir Bhutto. But it was her abject failure to defuse the Sindh situation that convinced the Establishment that her continuance in office would further aggravate matters in that troubled province. The Kashmir issue, which some of her confidantes had viewed as "our Afghanistan", increasingly became an albatross around the PPP neck. The reason was simple: Kashmir given its linkage to Pakistan-India relations and the menacing deployment of Indian troops on the border, lifted the Army to a 'driving seat role' on this question of national security. And the feeling in the Army was with the 'respite' they had got in terms of time could then be utilized to "settle" Sindh since the Army understandably dreaded fighting on two fronts, one external and the other at home. However, a feeling grew since early 1990 that somehow the PPP government was not providing the Army with this opportunity and the time that the Army felt it had gained on Kashmir was being frittered away at the altar of PPP's petty partisanship in Sindh.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Mushahid Hussain, "The Dissolution: An Inside Story", *The Nation*, 8 August 1990.

¹²⁸ Op. cit.

The Shariat Bill also injected a new element of danger in what was already a growing drift in national politics. The Army also felt that the timing of the tabling of the Shariat Bill, courtesy the incompetence of the PPP government and the rank opportunism of the opposition, would contribute to further divisions, this time of a sectarian kind, among the Muslims of Pakistan, a situation which the country could ill-afford given the looming threat on the borders. The timing of the dissolution was, therefore, linked with the convening of the National Assembly since it was assumed that once the Assembly was convened on 8 August 1990 and it started discussing the divisive Bill, events would not be in the control of the government. Three separate incidents during Benazir Bhutto's tenure provide an insight into the extent of deterioration of relations between the PPP government and the Pakistan Army. The Army developed certain views of the Prime Minister and her team, not views of individual Generals, but what can now be clearly analyzed as the "corporate view" of the Pakistan Army. First, sortie of the conversation Benazir Bhutto had with former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Islamabad, which were motioned, showed that she had certain views on the Army's role in the past, that she expressed in private to her Indian counterpart, which were at variance with her public professions. It was some time during the second half of 1989, in this context of suspicion about the Prime Minister, that she and her team were declared a "security risk". Sensitive matters of national security were handled by the President and the Chief of Army Staff with the Prime Minister taken into confidence only on perfunctory and routine matters.¹²⁹

The second incident which indicated the military view of the PPP government was the 7 May 1990 briefing at GHQ for fifty four Generals who had gathered together for their annual Promotion Board parleys. It was in the course of this briefing that a key member of the former Prime Minister's team was dubbed a "RAW agent", by the Director General, Military Intelligence.¹³⁰ The third incident which showed the deep divide between those in Islamabad in the PPP government and those in Rawalpindi in the GHQ occurred on 17 July less than three weeks before her ouster. On that evening at 6 p.m., the Corps Commander in Karachi was summoned to the Chief Minister's house to meet the visiting Federal Interior Minister and Minister of State for Defence. The Corps Commander, who had felt that the government had botched up matters by reneging on a personal commitment of Benazir Bhutto to give all the powers that were needed by the Army to tackle Sindh, declined to come to the Chief Minister's House for that meeting. Instead, he invited the two visiting Ministers

¹²⁹ Op. cit

¹³⁰ Op. cit

to join him for a cup of tea in his house the next morning, which they predictably declined.¹³¹

The countdown towards dissolution began in earnest from May 1990 onwards. Serious thinking started, the President began legal consultations and he started raising the issue of dissolution in his conversations with visiting Opposition politicians. During three such separate conversations in May, the President wondered aloud whether there was “any utility left in the National Assembly.”¹³² The President had legal consultations with his lawyer- confidants, Sharifuddin Pirzada, Aziz Munshi and Rafi Raza. With the acrimonious debate over the deployment of the Army in Sindh becoming public and the government virtually paralyzed by indecision and inaction, by the middle of July, the President had made up his mind. He revealed his intentions to a senior COP leader, who supported the proposed move. All that was now left to do was to put the modalities together, decide on the new team and on the caretaker Prime Minister. The date of the ‘operation’ was decided to be any time between 3-7 August, that is, soon after the Muharram weekend and just before the National Assembly session. The Army had told the President that they needed just 48 hours prior notice to move the troops, although they later reduced this to 24 hours. When Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi arrived in Islamabad on 30 July he was informed of the impending ‘operation’ and of his own proposed role in it. During the Muharram week end, on 3 August the President busied himself in the draft of his speech and dissolution order (both of which had been prepared in July), plus preparing the lists of people who were to be given important slots in the hierarchy. Jatoi’s name was picked for Prime Ministership from among a short list of three, the other two being Malik Miraj Khalid and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was finally picked because he was an ‘old friend’, he was a Sindhi like Benazir and he was sufficiently antipathetic to her.¹³³

On 6 August 1990, Benazir Bhutto had sent her Ambassador at Large, Happy Minwalla, to the President who apparently assured the Prime Minister’s emissary that “I will not do anything against the Constitution”.¹³⁴ Ironically, for Benazir, who had laid great stress all through the twenty months of her bumbling government, on cultivating the Americans on the assumption that if they were on her side nobody could touch her, the last ‘outsider’ to see the

¹³¹ Op. cit.

¹³² Op. cit.

¹³³ Op. cit.

¹³⁴ Op. cit.

President at high noon on that fateful day was none other than the Ambassador of the United States of America. It is perhaps no accident that the first foreign reaction to the President's action was from the United States which called it "a constitutional change and an internal matter for the people of Pakistan to decide."¹³⁵

In her first press conference after her ouster, Benazir Bhutto, shocked and bitterly accused the Military Intelligence (MI) of masterminding "this constitutional coup". She even alleged that GHQ's Judicial Branch, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) had prepared the Presidential Order of her dismissal and the National Assembly's dissolution although these allegations were not repeated. They brought into focus a larger issue, namely, the Army's role in Pakistan's politics.¹³⁶

Interestingly, the discussion that followed Benazir's ouster regarding the Army's political role also contained suggestions that it should be granted a 'constitutional role on the Turkish model'. Ironically, the first public suggestion in this regard came from a political leader belonging to the PPP, although he tempered his remarks by saying that it was just his "personal opinion". In fact that he chose to air these publicly, in September 1990, without being contradicted by any of the PPP high command indicated that it was a trial balloon of the former ruling party in one of its sense of moves at back tracking from its initial criticism of the Army in the aftermath of 6 August including Benazir's allegations regarding the MI and JAG.¹³⁷

Before examining various perspectives of this issue, it would be necessary to set some myths at rest in this regard. Three such myths, both in the popular perception as well as in statements of politicians are noteworthy. First, the question of the Army's 'constitutional role' is somehow always confused with its political role. As the most powerful component of the power structure in Pakistan, the Army has been a key political player since the 1951 assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Yet, there has never been any formal political role assigned to the Army in any Constitution of Pakistan. The closest that the Army came to acquiring a constitutional role was in 1985 when General Zia-ul-Haq added the provision of a National Security Council (NSC) as part of the 8th Amendment But he deleted this provision during the bargaining under which the 8th Amendment was passed by the National Assembly and made a part of the 1973 Constitution. Such legalism notwithstanding, the hard fact is that when

¹³⁵ Op. cit.

¹³⁶ Op. cit.

¹³⁷ Mushahid Hussain "Army's Political Role". *The Nation*, 16 September 1990.

the Chief of the Army Staff was 'elected' President through the rigged Referendum of 1984, an 'election' subsequently ratified by the National Assembly, the Army's role in the power structure was of course given legitimacy, both constitutionally and politically.

The second myth is regarding what is bandied about in Pakistan as the "Turkish model". The Turkish Constitution, which was approved in November 1982, does not provide for any formal, constitutional role for the Army it has only two provisions, one for a National Security Council comprising all the Services Chiefs under the chairmanship of the President for the purposes of "formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State". The other provision is the power given to the President to "declare Martial Law in one or more regions or throughout the country", but this is subject to the approval of Parliament which, according to the Turkish Constitution, may "reduce or extend the period of Martial Law or lift it". This provision adds that "the Martial Law Commanders shall exercise their duties under the authority of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff". This provision is similar to what Mr. Bhutto attempted in April 1977, namely, imposing a "limited Martial Law" in three cities where he was facing political agitation. The important thing to note in the context of the Turkish political experience is that, unlike Pakistan, after three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the Turks have managed a *modus vivendi* between civilian politicians and the Army.

Pakistan's failure is more waited since its squabbling politician have not even managed to have a *modus vivendi* among themselves, let alone between themselves and the Army. This is where the third myth comes in which sees politicians as "defenders of civil society locked in an intractable battle for democracy against the Army". The, truth, regrettably, is quite the contrary. At least two of the three military interventions in Pakistan – 1969 and 1977 – took place with the active connivance and concurrence of politicians who sought the removal of their political opponents from office through a con with the generals. In 1969, Mr. Bhutto was in close contact with Yahya Khan to remove Ayub Khan and in 1977, important sections of the PNA were in league with General Zia to remove Mr. Bhutto. Similarly, Mr. Junejo's sacking by a President who also doubled as Chief of the Army Staff was with the concurrence of all political forces, including the PPP led by Benazir Bhutto.

In fact, politicians of both Left and Right have actively cooperated with the Army to defeat their political opponents in an unfortunate replay of events which illustrate their inability to devise even basic "rules of the game" in Pakistani politics. During the 1965 Presidential elections, which, were also rigged, the prominent leader, Maulana Bhashani actively cooperated with a military dictator to oppose Miss Fatima Jinnah. During 1971, Mr. Bhutto connived with the

generals to ensure that power was not transferred to the leader of the majority party of that time, namely, Sheikh Mujib. Similarly, in 1979, most of the politicians including those of the Left and the Right concurred in the decision to hang Bhutto.

Regarding the Army's political role, it would be instructive to briefly examine the track record of the two major forces on the Paki political horizon: PPP and IJI. In 1970, Mr. Bhutto was the first politician to give the thesis "the three political forces", in which he included the PPP, the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib and the Army. After the 1988 elections, the PPP, led by Mr. Bhutto's daughter, sent its first emissary not to the President but to the Chief of the Army Staff, prior to the transfer of power. It was after these contacts that a four-point deal was brokered, in which the Americans were also invited to participate. It included a PPP commitment to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan for President, retain Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan for 'continuity in foreign policy', uphold the accord with the IMF on the economy, and not to meddle in internal army matters like transfers, promotions and retirements of senior officers. The PPP willingly and eagerly agreed to abide by this arrangement, and it was only after its concurrence to these four points, that Benazir Bhutto took office as Prime Minister on 2 December 1988.¹³⁸ After the renewal of us government on 6 August 1990, the PPP was the first political party to moot the idea of "a constitutional role for the Army".

As for the IJI, it owes its genesis to GHQ in September 1988.¹³⁹ Interestingly, the architects of IJI provided two reasons for it. If no alliance had been formed prior to the polls in 1988, the IJI founding fathers felt, then elections would have been difficult since most of the smaller, splinter parties were fearful of the PPP majority. And the second reason given for the formation of IJI was that it would be "good for democracy since a basis of a two-party system was laid, both representing constituencies with their respective vote-banks".¹⁴⁰ According to G.M. Syed, during an October 1983 interview at his residence in Sann, Wali Khan told him in 1971 that "one-fourth of the generals are from the Frontier Province and, therefore, we will also get our share of power."¹⁴¹

Regrettably, Pakistani politicians track record smacks of duplicity publicly saying that the Army should have no political role while privately deals are

¹³⁸ Op. cit.

¹³⁹ Op. cit.

¹⁴⁰ Op. cit.

¹⁴¹ Mushahid Hussain , Pakistan Politics: *The Zia Years*, p. 44.

struck with the Army to attain power and the Army's help eagerly sought to "sort out" political opponents, as Mr. Bhutto sought in 1977 or his daughter med in Sindh in 1990. Had Mr. Bhutto tolerated opposition governments in the two provinces of Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto similarly accepted opposition governments in two other provinces of Pakistan during her tenure, the history of Pakistan would have been different and neither the 5 July 1977 coup, nor the 6 August 1990 action would have taken place. Civilian democracy failed to find sustenance in Pakistan because politicians could not develop a collective stake in the political process, preferring to expend energies in seeking each other's elimination.

As far as the presidential dimension goes, the President's authority as the supreme civilian leader is acknowledged by the armed forces. The President apparently wanted to go down in history as die second civilian leader, after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who presided over a normal transition among the service chiefs. During Bhutto's time General Tikka Khan completed his normal tenure as Chief of Army Staff and this time around as well President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was keen to answer that all the vices chiefs, who were retiring in 1991 were able to do soon schedule with his nominees succeeding them in a normal, routine manner.

It is perhaps for this reason that President has reportedly turned down two proposals said to have emanated from the military: One pertaining to the establishment of a National Security Council which could coordinate and formulate all decision making in the realm of defence, foreign office, intelligence and national security. The other was a proposal, again from the brass, which was also turned down by the President, seeking the establishment of the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which would put effective control of the three services in one office replacing the current office of Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee, which remain essentially a staff position with no operational control over the three services. Such an office as that of a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Force would have been similar in scope and content to Turkey, which has a Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces who wields effective control over all die three services including army, navy and air force.¹⁴²

Regarding relations of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with the Army, in this key responsibility he is a Pakistani politician with a difference. His level of intimacy with the army has probably been without precedent for a Pakistani politician

¹⁴² Mushahid Hussain, "Army and National Politics", *The Nation*, 19 May 1991: Dilip Mukerjee, "Zia's Military Legacy", *The Round Table* (1989), 310, 179-191.

before becoming Prime Minister, save perhaps for Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who also enjoyed a cordial and intimate relationship with the brass before becoming Prime Minister. Three facts testify to this past intimacy between Nawaz Sharif and the army. First, as a politician who began his political career under a martial law government when he became Finance Minister in the Punjab in 1981, Nawaz Sharif's political career has been characterized by eschewing any opposition to martial law or any aspect of military role or army rule in Pakistan's politics. Second, in September 1988 there is little doubt that Nawaz Sharif may lose, after the death of General Zia and on the eve of the November 1988 elections with the live assistance, encouragement and support of the military. The IJI proved to be an effective counter weight to the PPP, serving first as an opposition and then as the coalition, which successfully defeated the PPP during the 1990 elections. Third, as Pakistan's principal opposition leader during the twenty months of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif enjoyed support from his powerful allies in the Pakistan Establishment during his political battles with Benazir Bhutto, particularly from the Armed Forces. In March 1989, after Benazir Bhutto's attempt to destabilize the Punjab Provincial administration headed by Nawaz Sharif had fizzled out, at a time when the ISI backed assault on Jalalabad had also failed, a senior general was heard to remark "although we could not take Jalalabad, we managed to save the Punjab."¹⁴³

Since taking over as Prime Minister there have been signs of Nawaz Sharif distancing himself from the army. This is part of the process of Nawaz Sharif coming into his own as a political leader with a popular power base who no longer needs military props for his political purpose related to this distancing is the assertion of Prime Ministerial authority *vis-a-vis* the military. This process began soon after he became Prime Minister when he took the decision to send an armored brigade to Saudi Arabia after his brief visit there in the second half of November 1990, a decision that followed the earlier refusal of the army high command to the Saudi request in this regard. On the Gulf War there was a divergence of perceptions between the Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff and during his 4 February address to parliament, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even made a veiled public criticism of the Chief of Army Staff's 28 January speech. Subsequently, at a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet during February their perceptions on the Gulf again differed. One reason why Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Defence Advisor Ijlal Haider Zaidi lost his job, somewhat suddenly, was because the Prime Minister apparently suspected Zaidi of having bypassed him on the question of appointing the Chief of Air Staff more than one specific occasion, pertaining to the new air chief was the fact that it was as a prelude to what will was anticipated to the most significant event in the tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, namely, the appointment of a new Chief

¹⁴³ Mushahid Hussain, "Civil-Military Relations", *The Frontier Post*, 5 May 1991.

of Army Staff in August 1991. Ground rules which were set in the “test case” of the Chief of Air Staff would operate between the President and the Prime Minister when the “real” decision for COAS comes up.¹⁴⁴

Then there is also a question of a distance and even a distrust of sorts between the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the military run ISI in suspicion between the two that is remarkably similar to the distrust of ISI that was evident under Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and Benazir Bhutto. That suspicion was illustrated by the fact that, at the first available opportunity, both changed the ISI chiefs with nominees that they had personally picked.

Four aspects have determined the direction of civil military relations during the tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif so far. First, as a Punjabi, he does not see himself as an “outsider” in a power structure that is essentially northern-dominated, namely, by Pakhtoons and Punjabi. For one, unlike Junejo and Benazir, Nawaz Sharif should not have much of a problem in socializing with the men in khaki with whom he has cultivated a comfortable rapport in the last decade or so. Second, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif managed to play a role in influencing the appointment of a new Chief of Army Staff under the Constitution, while the President is responsible for appointments of the services chiefs, the Prime Minister has the discretion to appoint and promote an officer up to and including the rank of a three star general. In this regard, past practice is also a guide to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, especially the experience of Junejo and Benazir. The third aspect of civil military relations under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is a conscious attempt to strengthen himself politically at home so that his differences with other political forces are not susceptible to be “exploited” and nor is there a need on his part to seek the military’s support as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or Benazir Bhutto did in Baluchistan and Sindh respectively. This effort at strengthening himself politically on the part of Nawaz Sharif is evident in his gestures of accommodation with the PPP, his desire to defuse inter-provincial tensions through the water agreement and his attempt to cover his flanks with respect to the clerical lobby over the Shariat Bill. Finally, Nawaz Sharif is attempting to tilt the balance in civil military relations in his favour through foreign policy moves aimed at reducing tensions with India, reviving the American connection and restoring an economic role for Pakistan in the oil-rich Persian Gulf states.

However, in the coming years, the Prime Minister will have to tackle “gut Issues” in civil military relations that are vital for the stability of his government and its relations with the brass, including, issues like the defence budget, the shape of relations with India especially in the context of the uprising in Kashmir,

¹⁴⁴ Op. cit.

and the degree of compromise he is willing to seek on the nuclear programme in order to generate closer ties with Washington. These “gut Issues” will determine how civil military relations eventually develop during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs tenure and how stable his government will be.

CHAPTER 4

GOVERNANCE: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR

AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN PAKISTAN'S POLITICS

Following the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, in December 1988, the question of American involvement in national politics was much discussed. There were statements issued by the American Ambassador, Robert Oakley, in Islamabad regarding the 'important role' that his country played in the period leading up to the elections in November, 1988.¹⁴⁵ After the induction of the PPP Government, there was speculation regarding the appointment of certain key personnel at the behest of the United States. There is little doubt that the American involvement in the politics of Pakistan is long standing and has a basis in the past history of Pakistan-American relations.

An interesting pointer to this fact has been the publication of a 500-page volume on South Asia by the US Department of State as part of its series on Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. Under American law, official documents are declassified after every thirty years and these include diplomatic correspondence, memoranda of conversations between American officials and foreign leaders plus dispatches from their embassies. This volume, based on original official documents of the United States Government, is quite instructive and informative in that it brings out with candor the American interests and activities in Pakistan during that period, the US attitudes towards various individuals, particularly those it was trying to promote politically, plus the manner of interaction between leaders of Pakistan with US officials and diplomats. In an assessment prepared in March 1955 on probable developments in Pakistan. "the US felt that" after more than two years at recurrent crises, political power in Pakistan has been openly assumed by a small group of British-trained administrators and military leaders centering around Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad and his two principal associates, General Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan". The assessment, written four years before Pakistan first formally granted bases to the Americans, adds. "We believe that the present leadership would be favorably inclined towards US peacetime development of air bases for US use". Ayub Khan seems to be a special focus of American interest, much before he became President. In a dispatch sent to the State Department. By Ambassador Horace Hildreth (the daughter was to many the son of Iskandar Mirza), Ayub Khan is referred to as the "final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets." In a following dispatch in October 1955, it is said that "we should strengthen

¹⁴⁵ US Ambassador Robert Oakley's interview with Arif Nizami, *Nation* 14 December 1988.

Ayub's pos in Pakistan" and calls him "a statesman with integrity". However, the Americans did not seem to be unmindful of Ayub's political power base as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the need to meet his request for military aid. In another assessment in November 1955, Ayub is referred to as "an extremely powerful figure in the country" and there seems to be concern that "he may be strong enough to bring about, if he chooses, a general feeling of disappointment and frustration towards the United States by asserting that we have failed to keep our promise to Pakistan."¹⁴⁶

The Americans seemed to be quite clear during that period regarding who "their boys" were and those deserving favorable treatment as compared to those who were not quite in their camp and who should, therefore, be treated accordingly. For example, soon after the induction of Ch. Mohammad Ali as Prime Minister in August 1955, an American official memorandum said. "The combination of General Mirza (who had become Governor General) and Ch. Mohammad Ali represents a top leadership very friendly to the United States". Conversely, the United States seemed to be suspicious of politicians like Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abdur Rab Nishtar.

They fell in the category of those who were then derided by the Americans as being "neutralists". In an August 1955 dispatch sent by Ambassador Hildreth to the State Department, regarding the possibility of the inclusion of Suhrawardy in the Cabinet, it is stated in a somewhat imperial tone: "Ambassador (of the US) has told Iskandar Mirza, and it will be made clear to Suhrawardy by others, that the United States has no objection to inclusion of Suhrawardy in a high Cabinet Post". The apparent reason for this NOC to Suhrawardy is because the US desired that "One Unit legislation be done on non-partisan basis and Suhrawardy's talents and cooperation as legislator could be of utmost importance", in this regard. The assessment of Ambassador Hildreth regarding his own country's role in Pakistan and attitude towards Suhrawardy in the same dispatch is even more interesting. It continues:

"While fully understanding the necessity to avoid US involvement in internal politics through any public stand, the fact is that US relationship is so important to Pakistan that complete non-involvement is impossible. If Embassy officers ignore Suhrawardy, for example, for the next two weeks this may well be interpreted here as official policy indicative of disapproval of his inclusion in Cabinet, if he is cultivated by the Embassy even on a purely social basis, an interpretation of US approval may be placed on such actions. Conclusions, in the light of our appraisal are: (1) we should encourage Suhrawardy through third parties to take a Cabinet post under the new Prime Minister, protecting our public position at all times. (2) Embassy officers should make some effort

¹⁴⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States. 1955-57 (US Government Printing Office Washington, DC). p. 447.

to maintain pleasant personal social contacts with Suhrawardy". In another despatch, Hildreth refers to Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar as "no friend of the West or US".¹⁴⁷

Despite the apparent intimacy between the two government, occasional suspicions also crept in regarding each other's mien lions. For example, in a February 1956 dispatch, Ambassador Hildreth wrote: "The US Embassy is convinced there is del effort at least encouraged by the government of Pakistan to stage a campaign prior to the visit to Pakistan of the US Secretary of State (Dulles) to squeeze the US for additional aid and probably a substantial element of Pakistan officials and public opinion ear neatly believe the best way to get the most from the US is to emulate the example of Afghanistan, India and Egypt and try to play both sides." However, the US Ambassador added that if this was the game that Pakistan may warn to play, then it should be told by the US in no uncertain terms: "If now you wish to follow the same course as India then Pakistan, considering its size and resources necessarily must become the tail of the dog and our interest in Pakistan will tend to diminish and our interest in India increase."¹⁴⁸

The most unflattering portrait of any Pakistani leader that emerges from these declassified documents is that of President Iskandar Mirza. He comes across as bending over backwards to appease the American is critical of his own Prime Minister (Ch. Mohammad Ali) before the US, has a first-name relationship with the American Ambassador is critical of the Chinese, of Gamal Abdul Nasser and is contemptuous of 'neutralists' and reaffirms to the US that he 'would not stand for change in Pakistan's foreign policy". Worse still, as a September 1956 dispatch by Hildreth dearly indicates, Iskandar Mirza showed Hildreth and his British counterpart a copy of a four-page letter that he had drafted, but had not yet sent to Suhrawardy regarding foreign policy. In other words, the President of Pakistan showed a private. Official communication addressed to his Prime Minister to the foreign ambassadors even before it was seen by the Prime Minister! Perhaps, even more unbecoming than this breach of security, is Iskandar Mirza's assessment of his Prime Minister (then it was Ch. Mhammad Ali) which he conveyed to Ambassador Hildreth and which the Ambassador sent to Washington in a telegram in February 1956. Calling Ch. Mohammad Ali "timid, weak and perhaps cowardly", he even went to the extent of telling Hildreth to advise US Secretary of State Dulles to talk "very bluntly with the Prime Minister and scold him for allowing an official of the Foreign Office for publicly saying that the reception given to Chinese Vice-President Madame Sun Yat-Sen was greater than that given to Vice-President Nixon."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Op. cit., p. 459.

¹⁴⁸ Op. cit., p. 456.

¹⁴⁹ Op. cit., pp. 457-458.

While the conduct of Pakistani leaders, as manifested in these documents, is not befitting leaders of a sovereign state, some American self-images are also interesting and perhaps even relevant to the period after Zia's death. There is, for instance, an American assessment contained in a November 1957 dispatch that "the only reason why Pakistan is able to keep going is US aid." And finally, there is an interesting reference in a May 1957 dispatch from the American Consul-General in Lahore which mentions a slogan then making the rounds in Pakistan that "the real Pakistan Prime Minister is a person named Hildreth"¹⁵⁰

THE INDIA FACTOR

Given the conflicted relationship between Pakistan and India, which is an abiding feature since the two countries emerged as sovereign states in 1947, the domestic consequences of these adversarial ties have been considerable. The biggest manifestation of this conflict was during 1971 when the Pakistan military action in East Pakistan led to an exodus of Bengali refugees into West Bengal and the concurrent fomenting of a revolt inside East Pakistan by India through what was known as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces). Such a direct linkage between an external power and domestic insurgency had hitherto not been seen in South Asia before, although this was re-enacted on a smaller scale in Sri Lanka during the mid 1980s when the Tamil Tigers received encouragement from India in their running battle with the Sinhalese majority community.

The removal of the Bhutto government in 1977 through a military coup and the execution of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1979, spawned the Al-Zulfikar organization, a militant offshoot of the PPP created and led by the sons of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Al-Zulfikar organization which initially had its headquarters in Kabul later developed links with a support from the countries, India, Syria and Libya and a number of Al-Zulfikar activists received training while in exile in India as well. Indian empathy for the Pakistani political opposition including Al-Zulfikar was manifested during the mass upsurge in Sindh against the Martial Law regime which was led by the MRD in October 1983, when the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi issued a public statement expressing solidarity with the struggle in Sindh.

This action convened what was an indigenous struggle for democracy into a foreign policy issue through this "linkage" with India and ensured that it would not extend into the other provinces, particularly Punjab and NWFP, where it was perceived as "Indian interference in internal Pakistani affairs".

¹⁵⁰ Op. cit., p. 480.

As Sindh had been the home and the power base of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it was viewed by India as a vulnerable point for Pakistan. This aspect was clearly evident during the largest military maneuvers ever held in South Asia, initialed by India, known as "Exercise Brass Tacks", which began in the fall of 1986 and whose direction and point of pressure was the province of Sindh. This Exercise reinforced the impression in Pakistan that Sindh had been singled out by India for "special attention".

A more recent phenomenon has been the emergence of what is perceived as a "Triple K" linkage of Karachi, Khalistan and Kashmir. According to this view, the unrest in Kashmir and the insurgency in the Indian Province of Punjab, for which India blames Pakistan, in turn, has led to violence in Karachi and in other parts of Sindh which is encouraged and abetted by India. In effect, domestic strife both in Pakistan and India has also now become victim to the tension-ridden bilateral relations between both the countries. On 2nd November 1991, Pakistan's Foreign Office, in a statement publicly referred to India's involvement in terrorism in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Recently, during the trials by speedy courts established under the 12th Amendment to the Constitution, there have been convictions of those who are charged with sabotage and subversion allegedly at the behest of RAW, India's Research and Analysis Wing the premier intelligence organization of that country.

An important new feature of the injection of the India factor in domestic destabilization in Pakistan, apart from "Triple K" factor is the eruption of the Kashmir uprising. Since Kashmir like Afghanistan has a contiguous border with Pakistan and the insurgency there seems to be taking on a protracting nature, an inexorable process of "Afghanising" of the Kashmir conflict is apparently in the offing. Three sets of consequences are now clearly visible for Pakistan, smaller in scale but similar in scope to the violation of the insurgency in Afghanistan. There is, first of all the inflow of refugees from Indian held Kashmir into Azad Kashmir, with unofficial figures listing the number up to 20,000 men, women and children, some of whom are housed in refugee camps and others with their relatives. Additionally, there is a pressure from Kashmiris, who are Indian citizens, and who have difficulty in getting their visit-visas extended indefinitely. They are then keen on acquiring Pakistani citizenship or seeking such a citizenship. This is similar to the process that helped Afghans to achieve the same sort of Pakistani nationality, owing to the conflict in Afghanistan.

Finally, the Kashmiri political organizations like the Afghan Mujahideen groups have established offices in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir as these groups range from the Jammu and Kashmiri Liberation Front (JKLF) to the Hizbul Mujahideen. In fact, earlier this year, a prominent political figure of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front had his offices bombed in the heart of Rawalpindi city. Dr. Haider Farooq was rocked by a bomb blast, thus replaying a cycle of terrorism on the Kashmir Issue within Pakistan similar to that witnessed in the case of the Afghan Mujahideen.

FALLOUT FROM THE MUSUM WORLD

With the major geo-political changes taking place in the region around Pakistan, particularly the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the resultant rivalry between Iran and most of the Arab countries, Pakistan, perhaps more than any other country in the Muslim world, felt the fallout of all those tensions, rivalries and conflicts. The injection to influences from various Muslim countries on Pakistan's body politic, particularly on different religiously oriented political parties, was a direct consequence. This was manifested through an ideological affiliation with another Muslim country, sectarian solidarity, financial support and different kinds of political and theological linkages.

Although this process reached its peak during the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, its basis was laid during the days of the tottering regime of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when, in a move unprecedented among Muslim countries, the Saudi Ambassador in Islamabad, Riaz Al-Khatib, was invited both by the PPP and PNA to mediate in a political dispute among two rival forces in April 1977. This was apparently the first ever mediation in an ii political dispute by the Ambassador of a fellow Muslim country and since it was undertaken with the initiative of both the protagonists, the principle of foreign involvement in domestic conflict in Pakistan was given an element of credence and legitimacy.

During the 1980s, three separate but related aspects contributed wed to the emergence of Pakistan as a country at the receiving end of sectarian politics, whose origins were to be found externally. These three aspects included the process of Islamization initiated by the Martial Law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan which caused a cleavage in Pakistani society on sectarian line since the Shia community saw it as an attempt to impose a particular brand of jurisprudence to regulate their public and private lives in contrast to their *Fiqh* (School of Jurisprudence). In fact, the first serious threat that the Zia regime faced in terms of popular pressure emanated nor from any political party but from the Shia agitation in Islamabad in July 1980 which virtually dosed down government offices in the Federal Capital for two entire days, something without precedent in Pakistan's history.¹⁵¹

Concurrent with this upsurge of Shia protest directed against the Islamization policy of General Zia was the fallout of the Islamic revolution in Iran which, at one level, inspired Muslim masses in Muslim countries that Islam could serve as a catalyst for revolutionary change but, at another level, it generated a certain fear among the Muslim regimes regarding its impact on their own people. Often, these contrasting reactions were reflected through divisions on sectarian lines, with the Shias sharing an empathy

¹⁵¹ Sec Chapter on Regime in *Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years* by Mushahid Hussain, pp. 107-138.

for the Islamic revolution and the non-Shias feeling threatened. This process was sharpened through the Iran-Iraq war when Iraq and its Arab allies, made a conscious effort to present the conflict with Iran as one between Shias and Sunnis or between Arabs and non-Arabs.

In a more recent reflection of the infighting in the Muslim world which has been felt in Pakistan is the ideological and the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia which was aggravated by the violent dashes in Mecca during the Haj in July 1987 as a result of which Iranian pilgrims and Saudi Security numbering 400 in all were killed.¹⁵² It was after this episode in Mecca, that the political temperature between Iranis and Saudis was raised to new levels. The Saudis, for instance, made it clear after this development that “we will fight Iran on all fronts – politically, economically ideologically and spiritually” Conversely, Ayatullah Khomeini made it clear in a famous speech in Iran a few weeks after the Mecca violence that “I can forgive what Saddam has done to Iran and I can even forgive what the Zionists are doing in Palestine, but I cannot forgive what the House of Saud has done to the Muslims of Iran in the House of God.”

The result for Pakistan has been the unleashing of a proxy war in which different religious organizations assumed a sectarian coloring and promoted the political goals of various Muslim countries. For instance, the primary battle in Pakistan has been between organizations such as the Tahrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh Jaafria (TNFJ), which is a Shia and a pro-Iranian party, with the Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS), which is a Sunni and pro-Saudi and pro-Iraqi party, in the small southern city of the Punjab, Jhang serving as the main battle ground. Since the violence began in 1988, at least seventy four persons have lost their lives in sectarian clashes which have transformed the city of Jhang area into a mini-Beirut, with the transfer of population and demarcation of relemi localities on sectarian grounds, complete with patrol ling of these neighbor by their respective aimed gangs. The TNFJ and ASS and other religious organizations have had close link with the Muslim countries such as the JUP with Iraq, the JUI with Libya and the Ahl-e-Hadith with Saudi Arabia.

These affiliations are often publicized and demonstrated during violence. For instance, in March 1987, when a leader of Ahl-e-Hadlth, Allama Ehsan Illahi Zaheer, was critically wounded in a bomb blast in Lahore, the Saudi monarch, King Fahd, sent his personal plane to fetch him for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. Allama Ehsan Illahi Zaheer succumbed to his injuries en route to Saudi Arabia. And again, in 1988, when the leader of TNJF, Allama AM Al-Hussaini was assassinated in Peshawar, a high level Iranian delegation flew in a special plane to attend the funeral of the slain Shia leader. Similarly, in August 1991 when the Saudi-Afghan leader who was leading the Al-Dawa party, Maulvi Jameel-ur-Rehman was assassinated, the Saudi government sent a special

¹⁵² Mushahid Hussain “Eye-witness in Mecca”, *The Washington Post*, 20 — 1987.

delegation for his funeral and sought the reconciliation of Al-Dawa with its principal antagonist, the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmat Yar which also enjoyed Saudi patronage.¹⁵³ In October 1991, a former Frontier Governor, Lt. General (Retd.) Fazle Haq was assassinated. Although his assassins remained untraced, his son filed a complaint with the Police alleging that the Iranian diplomat based in Peshawar was one of these who “conspired” to kill their father.¹⁵⁴

Another manifestation the fallout of the Muslim world politics on Pakistan was during October 1989 when the opposition led by IJI moved a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly to remove the government of Benazir Bhutto. Benazir Bhutto privately approached Muslim countries such as Libya and Saudi Arabia urging them to put pressure on the JUI to disassociate them from such a movement, an initiative that implicitly acknowledged the role and influence of these two Muslim countries on particular political parties in Pakistan. Libya, for instance, was approached to influence the JUP so that JUI would urge its members not to participate in the vote of no-confidence against the government while similar soundings were made to Saudi Arabia as well.¹⁵⁵ Hopefully, the recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia would lay the basis for promoting sectarian harmony¹⁵⁶ in Pakistan and ensure that the country ceases to be a battleground of a rivalry between these two Muslim countries with divergent political and ideological perspectives.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ “Leading Afghan Leader gunned down”, *The Muslim*, 31 August 1991; see also ‘Mujahideen infighting in Kashmir escalates’, *The Muslim*, 26 August 1991.

¹⁵⁴ “Fazle Haq shot dead”, *The Muslim*, 4 October 1991; “Iran Centre attacked in Peshawar and ‘Sajid denies TNFJ link with murder’”, *The Muslim*, 5 October 1991; “Iran to take legal action against ‘propagandists’”, *The Muslim*, 7 October 1991.

¹⁵⁵ According to authoritative sources, PPP leader Mustafa Khar went to the Libyan Ambassador in Islamabad and Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) Zulfikar Ali Khan, talked to his Saudi counterpart in Washington, DC, Prince Bandar bin Sultan.

¹⁵⁶ The government has been making efforts for sectarian harmony at the highest level being aware of the gravity of the problem .. See: ‘Ishaq decries kafir-dubbing slogans’. *The Muslim*, 27 August 1991; “PM voices concern over sectarian violence”. *The Muslim*, 9 September 1991.

¹⁵⁷ At the height of the Saudi-Iran ideological conflict, a sample of criticism in Iran’s press was illustrative of the deep chasm: The British colonialists had rightly apprehended that the Saudis were the most proper dynasty so rule over the oil-rich peninsula as they were obedient to act along with the British interests”, quoted in “Press attacks against Saudis continue”, *Tehran Times*, 9 July 1989.

CHAPTER 5

STYLES OF GOVERNANCE

INTRODUCTION

Individual Style and State Structure

The personal proclivities of individuals in positions of power within the state structure not only found increasingly free play as the civil institutional structure weakened, but in turn, individual leaders, unrestrained by institutional accountability were able to further undermine the state institutions themselves. This dialectic between individuals and history perhaps comes out more sharply when we examine the peculiar style of governance of Pakistan's rulers. How their modes of operating state institutions were rooted in their psychological makeup on the one hand, and their relationship with the people on the other. For example, Sandhurst trained General Ayub Khan with his thinly veiled condescension for the people felt that they were still not ready for full-fledged democracy. He, therefore, chose the indirect system of "Basic Democracy" which, in his paternalism be thought was more in consonance with the rudimentary stage of political consciousness of the people he wished to rule. Whenever the reality of a developed political consciousness of people manifested it, Ayub Khan came down with the iron hand of a military disciplinarian. It was in this context that he chose to throttle freedom of speech through the Press and Publications Ordinance, and under mined the universities by crushing dissent. These steps combined with the BD political system which prevented the emergence of political parties with national programmes, constrained the emergence of a democratic political culture. Similarly, Ayub Khan's emphasis on uniformity and inability to grasp the diversity of Pakistan's regional cultures led to his decision for the "One Unit" system under whose deceptively placid surface, the passions of provincialism were ignited, and erupted ultimately in the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971.¹⁵⁸

Bhutto's decision to cut the nascent links of the PPP from its mass base soon after coming into power in 1971 and to hold back internal democracy within the PPP organization by his autocratic establishment of a personality cult was an important factor in constraining the growth of a healthy political culture. Tragically, seven years later when he needed the PPP to mobilize popular support to prevent his hanging, the necessary organizational structure did not exist. Similarly, Mr. Bhutto's reliance on state

¹⁵⁸ In this article in "Pakistan: The Long View", Khalid Bin Sayyed refers to Ayub Khan never having a feel for what urban aspirations or frustrations were all about. He tended to dismiss the intellectuals as impractical bookworms and the urban politicians as either selfish or irresponsible: and then goes on to cite some of Ayub's thoughts in this regards as published in his book *Friends not Masters*, PP.245-255.

institutions on the basis of a personalized chain of command for exercising power not only undermined the institutional coherence of the bureaucracy, but also turned large sections of the bureaucracy against him. This led to a planned effort by the state apparatus between 1977 and 1979, to launch a campaign of character assassination while he was in jail and later to eliminate him physically¹⁵⁹.

General Zia-ul-Haq's carefully calibrated dictatorship combined the selective use of terror with various political and financial inducements to some of his political opponents and for the nation of a new political organization on the basis of ethnicity in an attempt to undermine the political forces against him.¹⁶⁰ These features of Zia's policy contributed to the fragmentation of parties, further corruption among politicians and a violent polarization of civil society along ethnic, communal and regional lines.

The ensuing analysis of the styles of governance of some of the key leaders in Pakistan's history attempts to show how the personal traits of these leaders and their operation of state institutions on the one hand, and the development of civil society on the other.

AYUB KHAN

Ayub Khan was the last of a particular type of leader in the Third World whose authoritarian paternalism was combined with an idea of progress, to produce a ruler removed from his people and the realities of the country that he was leading. Western political scientists and economists (e.g., Samuel Huntington and Gustav Papanek) looked upon such a leader with much favour. He was eulogized as an "*Asian de Gaulle*", that is, a military leader who could also be a statesman with vision.

The problem with such a leader is that he feels he has all the solutions and only he is in a position to tell what is right for the illiterate masses". Ayub's view on this count was formed well before he launched his coup in October 1958,¹⁶¹ a view which was probably reaffirmed by the subsequent shenanigans of the country's politicians who, lacking a political base, sought props either from the power structure or patronage of the Americans. The biggest problem for such an "instant" politician with "instant solutions" for the country is that he starts believing in his own propaganda, with a wall of deception that surrounds authority ensuring a distance from the "real" world. Ayub Khan, for instance, started calling his coup a "Revolution", assumed that his rank of Field Marshal (a self conferred designation) was well-deserved and that his view of "reality" matched the situation on the ground. His paternalism made him see Pakistan

¹⁵⁹ White Papers on the performance of Bhutto regime, published by the Government of Pakistan, August 1978.

¹⁶⁰ MQM's formation is generally attributed to the Zia regime.

¹⁶¹ Ayub, for instance, had prepared as working paper on the outlines of his "solution" to Pakistan's problems as far back as October 1954, *Supra*, 1.

as a country that was “not fit for democracy”, hence the need to erect a system of grassroots local bodies knit together by clans, and a strong bureaucracy. The Basic Democracy system, which was another way of providing local influential with institutional legitimacy, never got off the ground. Central to this structure was a determination to declare politicians as either “incompetent” or “unpatriotic”. With a single executive order — The Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) — an entire generation of politicians and political workers was made redundant.¹⁶²

That Ayub Khan was remote from reality was best exemplified by his simplistic view of the Bengalis, when he talked of their “complexes” and “character traits” as a colonial administrator would have classified his subjects. An equally naive view premised Ayub’s method of quelling political dissent among students. He made physical training compulsory in schools and colleges on the basis of the view that “it will take the devil out of them” by presumably channelizing their “extra” energies. After having promulgated the most repressive press laws in Pakistan’s history. Ayub Khan’s ghost written political autobiography, *Friends not Masters* in 1967 had this observation “there has never been so much freedom in the country as there is today”¹⁶³. Repression was institutionalized not simply by laws that regulated political life but also through a policy that banned political parties, student unions and trade unions.

If politically the system was regressive, socially Ayub’s vision saw a secular, progressive Pakistan. In 1963, his government initiated the Family Laws Ordinance, the same year he banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and made family planning, one of the major planks of his “reforms”. While the cleavage between East and West Pakistan grew, a popular joke aptly summing up the reality:

“Only three things unite East and West Pakistan — Islam, English and PIA.” Ayub’s simplistic recipe for this problem was “national integration”. Bengalis in West Pakistan were encouraged to learn Urdu and West Pakistanis in East Pakistan, Bengali. An Inter-wing students exchange programme was initiated and Dacca was proclaimed the “second capital”, as if such moves were sufficient to assuage the alienation felt by the Bengalis from Islamabad.

Ayub’s own relationship with his colleagues was marked by a cordiality that lacked intimacy. With the notable exception of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayub’s cabinet lacked spark and substance. After removing the popular Lt General Azam Khan as Governor of East Pakistan and the powerful Nawab of Kalabagh as Governor of West Pakistan (both were seen as threats by him), he had them replaced by flunkies like Monem Khan in the East and General Musa Khan in the West. While a certain amount of nepotism

¹⁶² Lawrence Ziring, *Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969*, Syracuse University, 1971.

¹⁶³ Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, Oxford University Press, 1967. pp. 217-218.

flourished with Ayub Khan's sons benefiting financially from their father's position, he ensured that such factors did not influence his decision-making in the power structure. For instance Lt. General Habibullah Khan Khattak, who was father-in-law of Ayub's eldest son, was Chief of Staff in the Pakistan Army and a leading contender for the Army's top slot, passed over by Ayub in favor of Mussa. This was because the latter was perceived to be more "reliable" in terms of loyalty. Ayub's insecurity *vis-a-vis* colleagues in the power structure also stemmed from inability to come to grips with a somewhat modest family background. He was ill-at-ease while discussing his father, a junior commissioned officer (JCO). During a 1966 visit to a party in his honor, some Pakistanis distributed an anti-Ayub pamphlet to the guest entitled "From a Bugler's son to a millionaire", referring to the popular perception as to how Ayub and his family enriched them after his taking office.¹⁶⁴

However, Ayub's leader when put to the rest in times of crisis, never quite measured up. After presiding over all decisions, preceded the 1965 War with India, Ayub backtracked under the pressure of war and blamed his Foreign Minister for embroiling him in a conflict with India. The retreat was complete, at Tashkent. In 1968, Ayub initiated the Agartala Conspiracy Case against Sheikh Mujib, the Awami League leader, but, with his back to the wall in 1969 after the prolonged street agitation, he not only withdrew the charges of treason leveled earlier against Mujib but invited him to the deliberations of the Round Table Conference that he was carrying on with opposition politicians. At the end of it all, Ayub violated his own Constitution when instead of following it by transferring power to the National Assembly's Speaker, he meekly handed it over to the Army Chief who promptly proclaimed Martial Law. The country was put back to square one, with Ayub leaving precisely where he had begun, that is, with a Martial Law.

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

Mr. Bhutto's style of governance was a combination of some of the cultural attributes of populism, liberal democracy and feudal despotism. He had reached out to the people like a messiah of the poor racked by an inner pain. His ability to communicate to the people, his emotional experience of their misery as well as their great potential, enabled him to achieve a special chemistry with the downtrodden. He had a powerful rhetoric whose images were drawn from the contemporary nationalist struggles in the Third World, the ideology of liberal democracy, socialism and the folklore of the Indus Valley Civilization.¹⁶⁵ Some of the institutions whose formal structure he attempted to construct (like the Constitution of 1973, a number of universities, autonomous industrial corporations and progressive labor laws) were all indicative of his modernist

¹⁶⁴ Narrated by a person who was personally present in London on that occasion to Mushahid Hussain.

¹⁶⁵ The cover of Shahid Javed Burki's study *Pakistan under Bhutto 1971-77*, Macmillan, 1980, on the Bhutto regime has a portrait of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto being driven in colonial pageantry.

and liberal democratic dimension. Yet, at the same time, a despotic streak was manifested in his restructuring of some institutions like the civil services and the paramilitary Federal Security Force in an attempt to create within them a personalized chain of command based on fear of and loyalty to him. He was a leader with a potent political vision and, at the same time, a sharp eye for detail. He saw some current events in the context of the grand sweep of history, yet he sometimes reveled in trivia. He could be, in turn, arrogant and generous with his colleagues, and looked upon criticism from within his party or from senior administrative personnel with intolerance and occasionally even hostility.

The apparently conflicting dimensions of Mr. Bhutto's magnetic personality may have been rooted in the powerfully polarized experiences of his early childhood. He admired and looked up to his father Mr. Shahnawaz Bhutto whose feudal mould was reinforced by a flair for politics during the Raj. Mr. Bhutto's penchant for an aristocratic life style perhaps came from an internalization of the image of his father. He introduced gold braided uniforms for his senior party colleagues, reveled in the imperial horse-drawn carriage and other symbols of the pomp and panoply of power. At the same time, Mr. Bhutto was deeply attached to his mother who came from a humble background and, in the feudal household of the Bhuttos, was not only treated with condescension but was psychologically persecuted by members of the Bhutto clan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in his childhood years, experienced through the link with his mother, the pain, oppression and sense of injustice of the downtrodden. Perhaps the resonant images of the aristocratic men of his father and the memories of injustice against his mother contributed to molding his mercurial and brilliant mind. Bhutto writes in one of his books how pleased he was when he received a gift on his birthday from his father which was a set of biographical books on Napoleon and, at the same time, he received a gift of Karl Marx's *The Communist Manifesto*¹⁶⁶. He wrote about the intellectual impact of these books on him: "The one (Napoleon) I learnt the politics of power from the other (Marx), I learnt the politics of power."¹⁶⁷ His academic training was at the University of California, Berkeley, and later at Oxford where he got an exposure to the nineteenth century philosophical traditions of liberal democracy, the intellectual intoxication of socialist ideas propounded by Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zetong and the expression of Third World nationalism articulated by such magnificent personalities as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ho Chi Minh and Nkrumah. Bhutto saw himself in the mould of these Third World nationalists, including leaders like Indonesia's Soekarno.

¹⁶⁶ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am assassinated*, Vikas, 1979.

¹⁶⁷ Eqbal Ahmad "Signposts to a Police State", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, November 1974.

His favorite historical figure was Napoleon. (Biographies and books about Napoleon formed a substantial chunk of Mr. Bhutto's personal library.)¹⁶⁸ Perhaps Napoleon's imperial personality, the scale of his military endeavors and the dramatic fluctuations of his fortunes caught Mr. Bhutto's imagination, who regarded himself to be a man of destiny, placed in a position of unquestioned power at a conjectural moment in the history of Pakistan. "I was born to make a nation, to serve a people, to overcome an impending doom ... I was born to bring emancipation to the people and honor them with a self-respecting destiny. Sooner or later for every people there comes a day to storm the Bastille The people of Pakistan are bound to have their day of Bastille if not in 1978 in 1989. The day is coming and nobody has yet been born to stop its advent I am the only person to reverse the march towards self-annihilation. I have the confidence of the people..."

Mr. Bhutto was perhaps the only charismatic leader of Pakistan after Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. His charisma was derived from the image of efficacy in actualizing the dream of the poor for a society where they could have dignity, equality and where they could be part of the decisions that affect their economic and social life. While Mr. Bhutto stood apart in splendid isolation from his colleagues he was able to achieve a visceral contact with the masses.

He developed a unique grammar of style, gesture and language that he employed during mass rallies.¹⁶⁹ For example. The dress, bearing and the design of the stage in sub-continental *Jalsas* had traditionally been a device of psychologically distancing the audience from the speaker. The speaker normally gave a spruce look, dressed in stiff *ackhan* or in a western suit, speaking in "*Nastaleek*" Urdu or Oxbridge English. The stage was usually a raised platform with a stylized setting (flowers in a vase and water in a glass jug). The speaker stood immobile behind the rostrum. Each of the elements of a highly structural stage design and the formal bearing of the speaker emphasized the distance from an audience that was unkempt and chaotic. Mr. Bhutto undermined this psychological distance by means of a number of symbolic gestures such as:

(1) During his speech he took off his coat, then progressively loosened his tie and unbuttoned his shin sleeves. By means of these gestures he was demolishing the image of the conventional speaker and symbolically acquiring the unkempt appearance of the audience. He often wreaked havoc on the tidy stage. On one occasion, during his speech

¹⁶⁸ "Napoleon was a giant. There was no man more complete than him. His military brilliancy was only one facet of his many sided genius. His Nap Code remains the basic law of many countries. Napoleon was an outstanding administrator, a scholar and a romanticist. In my opinion his prose was superior to that of Charles de Gaulle. "See Z. A., Bhutto, If I am assassinated, op. cit.

¹⁶⁹ The analysis in this section is based on Akmal Hussain. "Charismatic Leadership in Pakistan's Politics'. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Bombay. 21 January 1989.

at Ichhra, in Lahore, he picked up the flower vase and threw at his audience, smashing a symbol that served to separate him from them.¹⁷⁰

(2) His language did not have the streamlined sophistication of the traditional politician, but was often grammatically incorrect, in fragmented, laced with earthy epithets from the local dialect. As he built up to an emotional crescendo, his voice often cracked and halted in mid-sentence. Through these devices Mr. Bhutto was reaching out to his audience. He was sending the coded message that he was not delivering a speech but rather participating in a collective emotion; he was suggesting that contact with the audience was cracking his emotional defenses: that at a psychosomatic level he was one with the crowd.¹⁷¹

(3) He achieved participation through rhetorical questions and rhythm. For example, he often posed a question and let the audience answer it in a single joyous roar. Perhaps the most important gesture that brought the speaker and audience into visceral contact, was breaking into the dance rhythm of *Dama Dam Mast Kalander*,¹⁷² the ancient rhythm through which the individual could momentarily transcend his separateness and experience the intoxication of collective being.

The intimate contact that Mr. Bhutto was able to achieve with the people enabled him to unleash such mass emotion that drove other politicians into a sense of inadequacy and members of the establishment into a sense of fear. That is why Mr. Bhutto induced such extremes of love and hate.

¹⁷⁰ Speech at election rally in Ichhra, Lahore, March 1970. A similar scene was evidenced at the Lahore Airport in June 1972, when Bhutto returned from India after signing the Simla Agreement. He was jubilant over the fact that he had returned not as an empty handed leader of a vanquished country but one who had managed to extract substantial concessions for his country. It was at his moment of emotional contact, when leaving a crowd that was keen to touch him, Bhutto took off his coat and just threw it out in the air. Many hands seized it from several directions and tore it apart.

¹⁷¹ Bhutto was a very good mimic and put this talent to use during his major election rallies. For instance, during his maiden election rally at the Mochi Gate which kicked off the campaign for 1977 elections in March Bhutto spoke for 2 hours and 20 minutes in a speech that was vintage Bhutto. During speech he poked fun at his political and related political history by mimicking such personalities as Ayub Khan, Musa Khan and Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan along with audience participation. Often, he would refer to somebody sitting in the audience and sometimes he would involve the entire audience by making them raise their hands to endorse a particular policy. Bhutto's public rallies reflected, new styles of Pakistan's politics and his public meetings invariably were transformed into carnivals, with lessons in political history laced with some sort of entertainment.

¹⁷² The rhythmic beating of drums to the music of *Dama Dam Mast Kalander*, in Bhutto's meetings was essentially a recognition of the fact that the mystic poet Shahbaz Kalander had a deep influence on the masses which Bhutto used to add special flavor to his rallies. For instance, during a November 1971 meeting in Lahore after a visit to China and just three weeks before the beginning of the war over Bangladesh, he remarked that according to my assessment of the international situation there will be no war and India will not attack Pakistan. However, if India does attack Pakistan then these will, and there will be *Dama Dam Mast Kalander*.

In his relationship with his senior colleagues Mr. Bhutto sometimes displayed a feudal hostility when his authority was questioned, or a paternal generosity when they begged forgiveness. For example, on one occasion, Mr. J.A. Rahim was waiting asking with other dinner guests in the Prime Minister's house for Mr. Bhutto to arrive. After waiting for over two hours he verbally expressed his impatience at the delay and then left the party. Mr. Bhutto was informed of Mr. Rahim's decision to leave in a huff. The same evening he ordered the Federal Security Force "to teach Rahim a lesson". Operatives of the paramilitary Federal Security Force stormed J. A. Rahim's house a few hours later, woke him from his sleep and beat him up along with his son Mr. Sikandar Rahim who was living in the same house. The FSF assault was led by the Prime Minister's Chief Security Officer Saeed Anwar Khan. He was accompanied by gun-toting goons of this proto fascist organization, and one of them hit J. A. Rahim with a rifle butt. Rahim suffered multiple fractures and had to be removed to a hospital. He was also immediately dismissed from all his official and party positions. Thus, by May 1974 when the Rahim episode took place Bhutto had started using the slate apparatus which he had restructured and partly personalized. It manifested the autocratic pan of his personality that would ultimately be a key reason for his subsequent downfall.¹⁷³ Another aspect of Bhutto was the manner of forgiveness of his past political enemies. Altaf Gauhar, for instance, who had been a close associate of Ayub Khan as a civil servant at a time when Bhutto was serving in the Ayub Cabinet, later fell out with Bhutto and when Bhutto took office in December 1971 Gauhar became editor of *The Dawn* which he quickly transformed into an opposition. Bhutto arrested him on trivial charges like "smuggling of foreign currency" and humiliated Gauhar. He personally dictated a 50 page note to his intelligence chief Mian Anwar Ali, on how to interrogate Altaf Gauhar. This showed the extent to which Bhutto was prepared to expend his energies on harassing a relatively unimportant political critic. Bhutto "forgave" him by appointing Gauhar's brother as Ambassador to Malaysia and awarded a lucrative turnkey contract, the Rou Plain, to Gauhar's son, Humayun Gauhar.

In spite of mercurial personality traits that led him to move quickly from vindictiveness to forgiveness, Bhutto nevertheless was a competent ruler. He had a depth of understanding of political issues, thoroughness in policy formulation, and an eye for detail that was without precedence in Pakistani rulers. He was known for giving detailed comments on notes that were put up to him, and for preparing long drafts which were sometimes brilliant in their formulation. He used to work long hours, frequently putting in 16 hours into a work schedule that may have been helped by a chronic insomnia.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Zamir Niazi in his landmark *The Press in Chains*, (Royal Bock Company. 1986), refers to J. A. Rahim's "humiliation and physical torture". p. 146.

¹⁷⁴ Conversation with Dr. Mubashir Hasan, who served as Bhutto's Finance Minister.

During the PNA movement against him Mr. Bhutto suspected fairly early that the American CIA was supporting the agitation against him because he had defied Henry Kissinger during his visit to Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto, drawing upon his sense of history, his courage and commitment to Pakistan, had refused to give in under this pressure. During the early days of the PNA Movement (April 19th, Mr. Bhutto held an impromptu public meeting in Raja Bazar, Rawalpindi and declared that the Americans were ret against him for taking a stand on Pakistan's Nuclear Programme. He stood up in his open jeep and read out a letter from Cyrus Vance.¹⁷⁵ He was dearly under pressure and responded initially by attempting to mobilize the people in his favor. However, his earlier failure to establish the Peoples Party as a political organization which could institutionalize public support and bring it to bear in a moment of crisis now became a factor in the inability of his supporters to come out to face the PNA agitation. As the anti-Bhutto demonstrations began to get out of control and his political position became untenable, Mr. Bhutto switched from a populist to an authoritarian mode. Having unsuccessfully tried to mobilize political support in his favor, he thought that he could not be removed, became the seat of the Prime Minister is a strong one.¹⁷⁶ Mr. Bhutto's effort to assert the authority of the Prime Minister was a lost cause where the sneer agitation was swinging the pendulum of power once again towards the military.

Through his charismatic personality and populist rhetoric, Mr. Bhutto had in his early years galvanized mass consciousness and unleashed powerful popular forces. His failure to institutionalize these essentially spontaneous forces within a grass roots party and the associated failure to subordinate the military and bureaucratic elks to the political system, led to his tragic downfall. Yet, the style and content of Mr. Bhutto's political message left a lasting legacy in popular consciousness: That the poor have the right and the ability to be freed of the shackles of oppression; that they too can dream of threatening the citadels of power.

For all his failures and negative personality traits, Mr. Bhutto's ordeal in the death cell, and his lonely defiance of dictatorship, has left the image of a martyred hero in the minds of a large proportion of the dispossessed population in Pakistan. In the popular psyche, his pain and incarceration began to represent the suffering of the people under Zia's Martial Law.

¹⁷⁵ On 28 April 1977, Bhutto accused the United States of destabilizing his government in a speech before the National Assembly and the next day he showed up in a crowded bazaar in Rawalpindi waving the letter that he had received from the American Secretary of State.

¹⁷⁶ Soon after the election process was over, and the opposition, refused to accept the election results citing massive rigging. On 12 March 1977 Bhutto made a strong speech on television confidentially proclaiming, while pointing to his e that "This is a strong seat".

His period in the death cell created the image of a Prince sacrificing his body in slow degrees for the people. The broken wire mesh of his bare bed drawing blood from his back; the slow loss of body weight due to an untended stomach ailment.

His body shorn of its flesh, was held only by a fierce spirit of defiance. He continued to smoke his customary cigar and sip his coffee as his life ebbed away. Before the curtain went up, the body, shorn of its flesh as much as of its sins, stood in stark silhouette on the horizon of public consciousness. For many, a flawed politician by the form of his death, had passed into folk myth as a Faqir.

GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ

With his sudden death on 17 August General has left Pakistan in the same state of uncertainty and fear of the future that existed eleven years earlier, when he seized power in a military coup. He had come a long way since 1977, when he was initially seen as a “reluctant” coup-maker. By 1988, Pakistan’s longest-ever ruler was perceived as a shrewd, calculating politician who always managed to outsmart his opponents.

Perhaps deliberately, General Zia allowed himself to be underestimated, both by friends and foes alike. The result was that there were frequent miscalculations about General Zia. Writing in her memoirs, the Shah of Iran’s elder sister who was a good friend of Mr. Bhutto, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, talks of her visit to Pakistan in May 1977 during the height of the PNA agitation. They discussed the Pakistani political situation during the banquet given by Mr. Bhutto. She expressed her concern about the role of the Mullahs during the agitation and also worried aloud about possible repercussions in the Army. Bhutto replied with characteristic confidence: “As far as the Army is concerned, you know that man (pointing to General Zia who was sitting at a distance), he heads the Army. He is in my pocket”.¹⁷⁷ He always assured and supremely confident Bhutto, General Zia, at least in his early years in power, gave the impression of being unsure of himself. Those present on the afternoon of 4 July 1977 at the National Day reception at the American Embassy saw a uniformed man of medium height, nervously chain-smoking his Dunhill cigarettes while standing alone in a corner.¹⁷⁸ The same night when he told his commanders to move against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he was said to be worried until the Corps Commander of Rawalpindi and then his closest confidant, Lt. Gen. Chishti, came and told him “*Murshed*, (a term of deference used by disciples when referring to their spiritual leader), we have got all of

¹⁷⁷ Ashraf Pahlavi, Memoirs.

¹⁷⁸ Ambassador of Philippines Angara narrated this to Mush Hussain.

them”.¹⁷⁹ Knowing that the PPP high command had been hauled up. General his managed a smile and then seemed to relax.

In many ways, he was an enigmatic, authoritarian military leader who could not easily be slotted in the category of classic.

Third World tin pot despots or military dictators. He presided over Pakistan’s longest period of military rule, but then himself lifted Martial Law to begin a unique power-sharing experience with handpicked civilian politician. His rule saw one of Pakistan’s worst periods of human rights abuses, which included for the first time in the country’s history the whipping of journalists. But he also tolerated a press more lively and free than the Ayub regime. He had his predecessor. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, hanged, but did went ahead to appoint as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court one of the three judges who had sought Bhutto’s acquittal. During his rule he continued to lead and strengthen Pakistan’s only organized institution – the Army – but, at the same time he ensured the weakening of many other institutions – the judiciary, the political parties and, of course, the Constitution. He loved to be in the limelight and call the shots, but at the same time, consciously avoided a personality cult, unlike his predecessors. Despite his abiding pro-Americanism, he defied Washington on the nuclear issue and built a rapport with Iran.

If one word can describe his rule, it would be “*ad hocism*”. There were no long term, well thought out policies for specific sectors such as industry, agriculture, education or health. He followed a cautious, moment to reactive, one-step-at-a-time approach that was guided more by his instincts for political survival than a well-defined vision of Pakistan.

However, he was clear on the basics as he saw them. For instance soon after overthrowing Bhutto, there was little doubt about what General Zia had in mind about the fate of his predecessor. A month after the coup, in August 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq went to Multan to address Army Officers, where he was asked about Mr. Bhutto. Till then, no charge had been pressed against the former Prime Minister and he was not under arrest on the charges of having conspired to murder one of his political opponents. General Zia responded to this question with a wide grin and looked at two of his Staff Officers, Brigadier Mian Afzaal and Brigadier Ilyas, who were standing close by: “Why should I kill Afzaal myself when I can make Ilyas do it”.¹⁸⁰ The long-drawn judicial process, which began in September 1977 with the arrest of Mr. Bhutto ended in April 1979, eighteen months later, with his execution under a split Supreme Court

¹⁷⁹ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by Brig. T.H. Siddiqui who was then Director, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR).

¹⁸⁰ Mushahid Hussain. *Pakistan Politics: The Zia Years*. Konark, Delhi, p. 265.

verdict. Some time later, in July 1978, when General Zia was told that the Supreme Court might acquit Bhutto (then two judges of the Supreme Court, allegedly sympathetic to Mr. Bhutto, had not retired), General Zia responded: "If the Supreme Court releases him, I will have the bastard tried by a military court and hang (sic)".¹⁸¹

The fact was that General Zia perceived Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his family as his main political adversaries and the Court came in handy in that regard. After all, General Zia was well aware that successive Pakistani government had used official instruments as a tool for political assassination. For instance, (during the days of Ayub Khan; the Field Marshal personally ordered Major General Riaz Hussain, the then Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to "bump off" Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who was active in mobilizing the people against Ayub. The D.C., ISI, instructed his juniors to "do the needful", but after a thorough full investigation led ISI to the conclusion that since Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan had no personal enmities, there could be no plausible motive for any individual to kill him. It, therefore, advised Ayub against this move since the suspicion would "point at the government". Ayub reluctantly dropped the idea.¹⁸² Later, during the 1971 military action in East Pakistan, political assassinations were undertaken on the basis of prepared lists.

If General Zia was clear on the future of Bhutto, he was equally clear on the question of his own relationship with power, which was more like a "Catholic marriage", in which there could be no divorce. He wanted to rule to the exclusion of political parties or politicians of stature; real, genuine power-sharing was out as the 29 May 1988 dismissal of Junejo exemplified. He wanted to maintain the *status quo* as far as possible. Finally, all through this, he knew that the army was his primary constituency.

Throughout his rule, General Zia, as if like Macbeth, seemed to be haunted by "Bhutto's ghost". During an October 1980 visit to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly, General Zia went to visit the Pakistan Consulate General. When he entered the library, he picked a book at random and opened it. A colored portrait of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stared General Zia in the face. Immediately, as if instinctively, General Zia flung the book across the room and shouted, "Don't you have better books" and angrily walked out of the library.¹⁸³ In April 1981, Lt General Ejaz Azeem, also of the Armoured Corps was one of General Zia's close confidants and favorite Corps Commanders, posted at Mangla. Since he happened to be a family friend, General Zia was in the habit of visiting the aging father of General Ejaz Azeem, Sardar Mohammad Azeem, who lived in Jhelum. Hanging in the drawing room of Sardar Azeem was a photograph of his grand children presenting a bouquet of flowers to Mr. Bhutto.

¹⁸¹ Op. cit.

¹⁸² Mushahid Hussain, "The Invisible Government. The Nation, 5 February 1989.

¹⁸³ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by Brig. T.H. Siddiqui, Director ISPR who was eye-witness to this incident.

Whenever General Zia used to visit Sardar Azeem, a visit normally announced beforehand, the photograph used to be taken down. Once, General Zia came unannounced to the residence of Sardar Azeem and walked into the drawing room where he saw the photo of Mr. Bhutto prominently displayed. General Zia said nothing, and showed no reaction upon seeing the photograph and left after exchanging the usual pleasantries with Sardar Azeem. A couple of weeks later, Lt. General Ejaz Azeem, during the peak of his military career, was retired and sent off as Ambassador to the United States? In the end when General Zia was pursuing his Afghan policy after the signing of the Geneva Accords with great zeal and tenacity, it was as if he wanted to prove he had “gained” territory, while Bhutto had “lost territory”. Even his falling out with Junejo occurred because, increasingly in the view of General Zia, Junejo reminded him of Mr. Bhutto. During a private dinner at Army House on 23 May 1988 just six days before he knocked out Junejo and the National Assembly, General Zia remarked to his dinner guests: “Have you noticed how arrogant Junejo has become. He even walks and behaves like Bhutto”.¹⁸⁴

General Zia’s emphasis on Islam stemmed from a combination factors which included a conviction arising out of personal piety as well as the perception that Islam could be an effective political plank given the popular identification with Islam as a religion and way of life. It also helped General Zia to create a constituency based on support of the Islamic ethos among Pakistan’s clergy, sections of the middle-class and other conservative other conservative segments of society.

It is important to differentiate between Zia the person and Zia the politician. Pakistan’s first genuinely “native” ruler, General Zia can be credited with introducing a new style in politics with his now legendary manner of greeting all and sundry with his double handshake, triple embrace, wide grin and hand on his heart. His superb public relations won blur many admirers, particularly among the intern community. Even in Pakistan a country known for the arrogance of its rulers, General Zia’s hallmark was humility that was reinforced by a remarkable memory and an eye for it. In his own way, he tried to inculcate pride in a national dress (*shailwar-kameez*), language (Urdu), religion (Islam) and the state of Pakistan particularly through popular celebrations on national days.

Zia built no political institution that could outlast him. Neither was the old constitution properly preserved nor anything new put in place. Even when he spawned a new political cider through non-party pools in 1985, he himself demolished it three years later. His rule turned out to be a running battle between General Zia and the political forces, with him usually holding the initiative live. He, alternately, tried to use the political fortes, repress them, confuse them and confront them, combining the military techniques of surprise and deception. Towards the end of his rule, they were all getting together against him. They were always suspicious of him as if waiting to be

¹⁸⁴ Mushahid Hussain, “General Zia Versus Mr. Junejo”, The Nation, 4 June 1988.

“ambushed by his next move. For his part, he defied predictions about his “fail” particularly in cons situations such as in 1979 (after Bhutto’s hanging) 1981 (PIA hijacking), 1983 (MRD agitation), 1984 (failed Referendum), and 1986 (Benazir’s return). On a more positive role, General Zia will be remembered for his deft handling of Pakistan’s difficult regional position. His foreign policy successes included a cool handling of India, continuing Pakistan’s nuclear programme despite US opposition, using the Soviet blunder in Afghanistan to Pakistan’s advantage and strengthening Pakistan’s regional position, particularly in ties with Iran, Bangladesh, China, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Gulf states. He was the one Pakistani leader who had a South-Asia policy a somehow, diplomatic he was always able to put the Indian government on the defensive, even when Mrs. Gandhi was in power. He came under tremendous pressure from the United States on the nuclear issue and in 1981, President Reagan sent his Special Envoy, General Vernon Walters, on three different occasions to pressurize General Zia on this issue. While General Zia would assure his American visitors that Pakistan would “never embarrass” the Reagan Administration on this issue, he would arid in his inimitable style: “We can hardly make a bicycle, how can we think of making a bomb”.¹⁸⁵

General Zia was basically his own Foreign Minister, like his predecessors. But the country had to pay a heavy price for General Zia’s Afghan policy with the “culture of Kalashnikovs”, destabilizing Pakistani society plus the spread of drug abuse, sectarian tension and ethnic animosities. Ironically, General Zia person ally remained above ethnic and sectarian considerations, despite the divisions in Pakistani society on these counts. This is best reflected in the present power structure in Pakistan, which has a healthy combination of people from different parts of the country.

During his eleven years in power, General Zia managed to develop quite a long reach to different sections of Pakistani society. Despite being a military autocrat, General Zia was never aloof, arrogant or inaccessible. Having only a modest academic background General Zia was in rather than cerebral with sharp survival instincts, and remained a careful reader of newspapers and intelligence reports. He had an abiding contempt for politicians and the press, both of whom he felt could be easily used and manipulated. In the end, he became a lonely figure, particularly after 29 May 1988 he was increasingly a prisoner of his own fantasies and saw his salvation through the liberation of Afghanistan. When his death came, he had shed all political allies and it was “back to the bunker” for him.

The Army remained his primary power base and it was this institution, which he headed for over twelve years, the longest in the history of Pakistan. Three characteristics made General Zia both as Chief of Army Staff and President somewhat different from the other leaders of Pakistan. One was his relationship with his “*Rufaqa*”

¹⁸⁵ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by a high level source.

(colleagues) which was defined by a close camaraderie and a relaxed bonhomie other was the degree of trust and delegation of authority to his *defacto* number two, General Arif, for a relatively long period (almost 7 years). In Pakistan, given the suspicions that exist at that level, such a concept of a trusted number two had hardly ever existed. Another important difference compared to his military predecessors was that he was probably the first representative of a new generation of “native” Generals, with an indigenous ethos. He was unlike the Sandhurst trained, trained, stiff upper-lipped Anglicized types. Deep religiosity apart, he was also the first of his type who spoke Urdu without an English accent.

However, his mist in his army colleagues was never absolute. The same General Arif who was once his misted confidant was later seen by General Zia to be moving “too close to Junejo” and he was given his marching orders at five days’ notice. This was despite the fact that General Zia had told General Arif three months earlier that he would be given an extension and General Arif had accordingly planned a visit to China beginning 29 March 1987.¹⁸⁶ Similarly, in October 1983, General Zia flew into Peshawar to inform the NWFP governor, Lt. General Fazle Haq that he would be superseded by him who would take over as Vice Chief of Army Staff the following March. However, he premised the somewhat disappointed Fazle Haq that when Arif would be promoted to a four-star General, Fazle Haq would also get a similar promotion. After the elevation, Fazle Haq had to wait in vain for an announcement of his promotion which never came and he ended retiring as a three-star General.¹⁸⁷ In the summer of 1986, there were rumors in Rawalpindi that the Corps Commander of that area, Lt. General Zahid Ali Akbar Khan, who was also related by marriage to the President, would be the next Vice Chief of Army Staff. When asked to comment on this, one of the President’s close confidants remarked: “The President knows Zahid is an ambitious man”.¹⁸⁸ In such sensitive power-play at the top, relative or no relative, General Zia was not going to take any chance.

BENAZIR BHUTTO

Benazir Bhutto unlike her father was at outsider to both the political system and, at the same time, uninitiated in the exercise of state power. Her father had almost ten years experience as Minister in Ayub Khan’s cabinet before he launched his campaign to seek the highest office Benazir, while she was steered as a politician by her suffering during the incarceration and subsequent hanging of her father had no experience of building a party organization, conducting a political struggle or running the institutions of the state. Although she was educated in the elite western institutions at Harvard and

¹⁸⁶ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by General K.M. Arif.

¹⁸⁷ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq.

¹⁸⁸ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by high-level source.

Oxford she did not have the same depth of understanding of politics and history, which her father had. On the positive side, she was not burdened with the psychological conflicts of her father and by virtue of having had a more psychologically stable childhood, and being much more socialized in Western culture she was less prone to despotic tendencies than Mr. Bhutto. She entered Pakistan's politics with the inheritance of her father's mantle as a leader of Pakistan's dispossessed masses. She was in a position to rapidly make alliances with pro-democratic political forces (manifested during the MRD agitation) and being fresh to the Pakistani political scene was likely to receive the benefit of the doubt from her potential allies. At the level of devising the alchemy of charisma she had two vital ingredients available to her:

- (1) She was a Bhutto daughter who had undergone the anguish of Bhutto's last days more intimately than any member of the public. She embodied for many people the pain they themselves suffered as distant observers. She had thus a mystique arising from closeness to Bhutto who had achieved the status of a martyred folk hero through the form of his death.
- (2) Being a woman represented the archetypal image of both pain and the struggle to regenerate a community, in the folk tradition of Pakistan. As a woman she also represented the synthesizing forces in popular consciousness and a countervailing factor to the banality and manipulateness that had degenerated contemporary politics at the time that Benazir Bhutto entered the stage of history.

Politically, Pakistan's only woman prime minister was driven by three broad influences. First, there is her love and adulation of her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and she is very conscious of the fact that she represents his surname. Second, there is her hatred for General Zia, her father's hangman and executioner and the principal tormentor of her family for eleven years. Third, there is her infatuation with things American in politics (John F. Kennedy), in education (Harvard) and in foreign affairs (a desire to seek US goodwill). This approach is quite marked since she spent her formative years in the West, particularly the United States.

These three broad influences were also reflected in her maiden address to the nation as Prime Minister.¹⁸⁹ She invoked her father's name at least three times, quoted him and even raised the slogan of her party activists *Zinda hai Bhutto* during her speech. She castigated the Zia years for the policies in various areas, including a myopic foreign policy without once naming the man who had become her major political adversary. She named the United States as the first among the countries with which "relations will

¹⁸⁹ Mushahid Hussain, "Benazir Bhutto: A political profile", *The Frontier Post*, 3 December 1988; Benazir Bhutto, "Story of an arranged marriage", *New Woman*, August 1989; Richard Weintraub, "The symbols of Benazir Bhutto", *The Washington Post*, 31 May 1989.

be strengthened” and she ended her speech by quoting from the John F. Kennedy inauguration speech of 20 January 1961: “Ask what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.”

Benazir Bhutto’s political life can be seen in three main phases. From 1977-1984, soon after the July 1977 military coup, she was politically growing facing detention and pressure from the military government. During 1984-1986, she was in exile, taking charge of the PPP and developing skills in public relations, particularly with the Western media, which stood her in good stead later on. From 1986-1988, when she returned to Pakistan, she was battling General Zia with single-minded determination and exploiting the openings provided in Pakistan owing to the lifting of Martial law. All through this period, she showed tremendous political tenacity and unwavering courage despite the heavy odds.

Benazir Bhutto on her assumption of the prime minister’s office in 1988, was in a politically weak position in comparison with her father when he took over the same office in 1971. At least domestically, her father was the unchallenged leader but in foreign policy his problems were more serious due to the Bangladesh war and the suiting out of various problems with India.

Benazir Bhutto, despite her education at some of the best seats of learning in the West, has few serious works to her credit. In 1978 she wrote *Foreign Policy in Perspective*, a brief collection of her short articles in various newspapers and journals. But she also wrote two more detailed articles in *Musawwat* on 20 and 21 September 1978, on Quitting CENTO¹⁹⁰. Her recently published autobiography, *Daughter of the East* is more a personalized account of her ordeal during the execution of her father than a clear exposition of her views on economic or political issues. In this respect, unlike her father she cannot claim to be an intellectual. Her most challenging task was to make the transition from being the head of an opposition party for eleven years to being prime minister of Pakistan.

In spite of the charisma with which she entered Pakistan’s politics, Benazir Bhutto was unable to sustain it because of her failure to articulate a credible alternative to the *status quo* let alone take effective steps to actualize it. Benazir’s style was populist but she attempted to use mass mobilization with a restrained militancy in order to achieve her objective of finding a niche in the existing power structure and to make herself accept to its major elements, namely, the military, civil bureaucracy and the US Government. The PPP which during the late sixties had fired the imagination of the have-nots using the slogans of the nationalism, anti-imperialism, arid socialism, was converted by Benazir

¹⁹⁰ However, according to informed PPP source, the 1978 collection and the article on CENTO in *Mussawat* were actually written by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but published under Benazir Bhutto’s name.

Bhutto into a centrist party that instead of appearing as a party of change began to project an image of a *swats quo* party. (This was with respect to both her market orientated pro-entrepreneurial economic policy and a greater subservience to the US than even Zia-ul-Haq was able to boast of.) Benazir Bhutto gave the impression that she was a politician for whom America's blessings take precedence over the concerns of her own party and the public opinion of Pakistan. As a senior American officer remarked, "Benazir Bhutto's stand is a bonus for us because we did not expect it."¹⁹¹ During April 1986, when she returned to Lahore to a triumphant homecoming enthusiastic activists raised slogans against the US and burned the American flag. She publicly admonished them and told them not to burn the American flag. This was before she came to power and she continued this attitude towards the US during her 20-month stay in office and after her dismissal during the Gulf War at a time when the Pakistani people, including her party were demonstrating the US, she was busy touring America and placating the US with such statements as "President Bush went the extra mile for peace and the US is in Persian Gulf to defend the principle of opposing aggression".

Benazir Bhutto entered the office of Prime Minister within a very narrow political space that was granted to her by the establishment. As a condition for being allowed into the office of Prime Minister she had acquiesced to a set of light parameters within which she was to exercise her power. Pakistan's Afghan policy would remain unchanged and continue to be run by the ISI as before; to ensure an overall foreign policy orientation consistent with US interests, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, who was Foreign Minister in the Zia government would continue in office unchanged; and finally, economic policy would continue within the framework of the agreement signed by the previous "caretaker" Government. To ensure adherence to this latter stipulations was obliged to appoint Mr. V.A. Jaffery (whom she had never met before) as Adviser on Finance, (with rank of Minister), after he had been 'interviewed' by the US Ambassador. These parameters were imposed by the US on the one hand, and the military and senior bureaucrats on the other. Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto entered the inner sanctums of the state apparatus, but was dismissed by the major elements of the power structure consisting of the President, bureaucracy and the army. This distrust was based partly on the fact that she was the daughter of a man whom the establishment had hanged, her finger was on the trigger of mass emotion, and being a woman, the male dominated establishment suspected that she may not be able to perform her tasks competently.

Her style of governance which in any case was cramped by the limited space male available to her was mated by certain features which merely deepened the suspicions of the Establishment about her ability to rule effectively.

Her excessive reliance on cronies such as Happy Minwalla and friends of her husband gave the impression that she was ruling through herself and incompetent individuals.

¹⁹¹ Conversation with Mushahid Hussain.

She had three sets of advisors, some of whom were genuinely men of ability and integrity:

- (1) Her father's favorites (Rau Rashid, Chief of Air Staff Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Nasirullah Babur, Iqbal Akhund and Khalid Ahmad Kharal);
- (2) Benazir Bhutto's own political friends and colleagues (Aitzaz Ahsan, Itfikhhar Gillani and Tariq Rahim);
- (3) Her husband's cronies (such as Fauzi Ali Kazmi, Askari and Kamal Majeedullah).

In the end, Benazir Bhutto's downfall was hastened on two a quite similar to the beginning of the end of the first regime of her father. Like her father she turned many potential allies into adversaries with the result that a broad spectrum of political forces began developing against the government. Her allies like MQM and ANP were off loaded, almost in a casual way and dearly told they were no longer needed. And long standing in the MRD was simply ignored, particularly democrats like Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Secondly, Benazir made the mistake of endeavoring to use the army to tackle her problem in Sindh, similar to the manner in which her father had deployed the military in Baluchistan. In both cases, from an instrument of government policy, the army was quickly converted into an arbiter in what became a growing dispute between the government and its political opponents.¹⁹² The result was the political weakening and the eventual collapse of the PPP government.

COMPARATIVE STYLES

1. Ayub and Zia

Given that the military has ruled Pakistan for twenty-four of its forty-four years, a comparison of the rust military ruler, Ayub Khan, with the longest-serving one, Zia-ul-Haq. Although Zia-ul-Haq often eulogized the Ayub decade as a "golden era" in Pakistan's history, no two leaders could be more different in their ethos, worldview and the way they went about tackling Pakistan's problems. Ayub was a "*pucca sahib*" in the British military tradition, trained at Sandhurst; tall, fair and handsome, epitomizing the classic colonial view of the "martial races" from the north. Conversely, Zia, of medium height, belonging to the Arain caste, a most "non-martial" background, a refugee from East Punjab who joined the Army in the twilight of British colonialism in the subcontinent. An essential difference between them was also 'cultural', conditioned by

¹⁹² A catalogue of Benazir Bhutto's mistakes can be found in Mushahid Hussain, "Failure to evolve new rules of the game". *The Frontier Post*, 26 August 1989, and by the same writer in "How US views Ms. Bhutto", the *Frontier Post*, 26 April 1990; John Burns, "Bhutto survives nearly a year in office, but a new era still proves elusive", *The New York Times*, 8 November 1989; Christina Lamb, "Ghosts hunting Benazir Bhutto", *The Financial Times*, 18 August 1989.

the different historical time frames of their functioning Ayub, commissioned in 1928, was a Reader's Digest reading, general while Zia, commissioned in 1945, represented those seen as being 'nativised' via the Urdu Digest using the national language as their main medium of communication. Even in the Army, Ayub was an acknowledged leader, a Commander-in-Chief who, as the first Pakistani to occupy this slot, had seven years experience before assuming the Presidency after his coup in 1958. Zia was hardly the first among equals even within the Army having had a 16-month stint as Chief of Army Staff before leading the coup in 1977. And he happened to be the junior most Corps Commander who was promoted to the Army's top slot in March 1976.

The manner of their ascendancy to the power structure also determined their initial moves. Ayub, by his own admission had been seriously thinking about Pakistan's political problems for at least four years prior to his takeover, while Zia had actually been pushed into removing Bhutto after months of popular upheaval. While Zia took halting the hailing steps towards a political opening, indicative of his unsure and uncertain position. Ayub was clear from day one regarding the steps he would take. He didn't have to go through the charade of "90 days" that was Zia's policy to gain time before moving on to the phase of consolidation. Ayub took a series of thought measures in various areas, promulgated his Presidential Constitution which concentrated all power in his person—and lifted Martial Law, thereby formally delinking the Army from administering the country. He also quickly appointed a trusted loyalist — Musa Khan — as Army Chief. Zia lifted martial law after seven-and-a-half years and remained COAS throughout his eleven years in power.

Ayub's power base was the northern-based bureaucracy and Army, similar to Zia's although his regime had an interesting tripod of East Punjabi Army officers, Urdu-speaking bureaucrats and Pakhtoon military and civil officers. Both represented contrasting worldviews. Ayub was a modernist with an essentially secular vision (his initial draft of the 1962 Constitution deleted "Islamic" referring to the country simply as "Republic of Pakistan"). However, he was averse to a long-drawn political battle or to taking risks. He was to regret the only risk he took, launching the "Gibraltar Force" in occupied Kashmir which sparked the September 1965 War, and he later pinned the blame on what he called were "the childish antics of the Foreign Minister"¹⁹³ (Z. A. Bhutto). Zia was an Islamist with the zeal of a believer. He was capable of taking calculated risks (hanging Bhutto, cancelling elections, confronting the Soviets and dismissing Junejo). He was thick-skinned with an ability to engage in protracted political combat. Zia was more in the mould of Najib, Saddam or Hafez al Assad, who can fight to the bitter end; while Ayub can be compared to leaders like Marcos and the Shah of Iran, who take the first flight out when they faced serious trouble. Ayub's vision of Pakistan saw a modern society underlined by political conservatism, certainly less

¹⁹³ Ayub Khan's speech in Rawalpindi public meeting. March 1966.

ideological than ha whose worldview, however, had a pragmatic streak that relied on *ad hocism* and *status quo* for survival.

However, it was apparent that being a military successor to Ayub, Zia did see him as a model of sorts whose strength was perceived in such adjectives as “stability”, (a long term unchallenged by a strong opposition save for Miss Fatima Jinnah’s challenges or the final wrap-up initiated by Bhutto), “prestige” (international image and impact) and “progress” (economic development under free market conditions).

While he was willing to share power, Ayub was not, although both were willing to delegate to their colleagues and subordinates and allowed their provincial governors to act as virtual warlords. Both apparently also reposed faith and mist in the civil bureaucracy. Ayub’s period was intellectual suffocation and stagnation while, under Zia, Martial Law notwithstanding, a “culture of resistance” spawned intellectual vibrancy and ferment in the media, drama, and tire arts (e.g., television dramas became papa tar with an audience that stretched into India as well).

In foreign policy, both developed an interest and expertise that saw them seeking major initiatives: Ayub on China and Zia on Afghanistan, Iran and India. Both started off as friends of America but, at the end of the day, both were distrusted by Washington. Zia, it seemed, had learnt one basic lesson from his two military predecessors — Ayub and Yahya — not to fight on “two fronts”, namely, on the frontiers and at borne.

Zia certainly had more lasting impact. He died with his “boots on” and was given a hem’s funeral. Ayub left in disgrace, much- maligned, he died unsung with Bhutto not even bothering to attend his funeral Ayub had tried but failed to create a political constituency and the 1970 elections were cons by an absence of any reference to his person or politics. Conversely, Zia developed a political constituency and the 1988 elections were fought by the IJI using his name in a manner similar to tire PPP using the Bhutto name. However, tire domestic enduring legacies of both were political minuses. Ayub was remembered for the “22 families” who had caused the “problem” of East Pakistan, while Zia’s legacy was tire “Culture of Kalashnikovs” whose worst manifestation was the problem of Sindh.

2. Bhutto and Zia

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq will probably rank as among the most important personalities in Pakistani history. Their impact is certainly felt beyond their tenure of office. They were a certain mixture of opposites, with same similarities but sharp contrasts both in their style of politics and in the way they pursued the politics of power.

It would be interesting to compare anti analyze Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq, in terms of the political context of their roles, their personalities and their politics. After all,

the two, between the were responsible for running Pakistan for seventeen years since 1971, after the “parting of the ways” between the two wings of the country.

Bhutto was cast in the mould of a certain kind of Third World leader. He was nationalist, populist, and incorruptible hid but authoritarian like Ben Bella, Nasser and Soekarno. All were fiery orators and they all had a special rapport with the Zia-ul-Haq represented those Third World leaders, in the tradition of Suharto and Ne Win, who were self-effacing, and low-keyed. Their distinctive hallmark was continuity in office, they were instinctual in their approach and their political trait was conservatism. They did not believe in rocking the boat.

When Bhutto came to power, he had long years of experience in high level of government and he came to office with a reputation both at home and abroad. Since Bhutto was perceived as ‘ambitious’, a number of politicians in the country felt threatened by him. Conversely, General Zia was seen as unassuming, and a ‘reluctant coup-maker’, although he too had no desire, like Bhutto, of parting with power. Consequently, General Zia was constantly underestimated, both by his friends and his foes.

When he came to power; Bhutto faced serious difficulties in restoring the confidence and morale of a demoralized nation. In this respect, his problems were certainly greater than those of General Zia in his earlier years. In fact, Bhutto bandied that phase. The first two years of his rule, with statesmanlike skills both in domestic and foreign policy. General Zia had fewer problems in the earlier years and most people saw him as a temporary and transitional figure. There were fewer expectations attached to him, unlike Bhutto who had come to power through the electoral process where he knew his performance would be compared to his ability to delivery on his promises. The earlier years allowed General Zia to grow in office, because that period was notable for the exclusive attention that was devoted to the Bhutto trial.

In terms of their personality, Bhutto and Zia were strikingly different. Bhutto was a unique combination of affluence. Brilliance and good looks. He was easy to read, his reactions were never hidden and at times, he could be volatile, impulsive and unpredictable. He was also decisive in most policy matters. For his part, General Zia was extremely patient and never in a hurry. In fact he was slow to the extent that for him indecision, by design or by default, was almost an instrument of policy, probably in the belief that if a problem was allowed to drag on interminably, it would eventually go away.

In analyzing their personalities, it would be instructive to compare their treatment of their colleagues as well as their political opponents. Bhutto inspired awe and fear in his colleagues who were never sure of their position *vis-a-vis* him. He was quite insecure *vis-a-vis* his colleagues and few, if any, of his colleagues had a graceful exit. His

relationship with his closest colleagues is best summed by an anecdote during an election meeting in Lahore in February 1977. Bhutto was addressing a mammoth crowd, who were listening to him with rapt attention. Standing on the sidelines, slightly to the rear left of Bhutto were Dr. Mubashir Hasan, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and Rafi Raza. A couple of times they noticed that Bhutto, while speaking, had glanced at the three of them huddled together. At that point Mumtaz Ali Bhutto remarked: "Bhutto seems to be watching us. Let's stand separately, otherwise he may think that we are up to something"¹⁹⁴ Zia had a far more relaxed and stable relationship with his colleagues. He was probably the first Pakistani ruler to have informally incorporated the role of a *defacto* number two, General Arif, for a very big time, almost seven years. Normally, most of his colleagues parted with General Zia with a "golden hand-shake". However, it should be clear that both had a streak of ruthlessness in them the only difference being that while Bhutto deployed the steel-fist, General Zia used the velvet-glove nothing exemplified more than the manner of ouster of their respective close colleagues, J.A. Rahim and K.M. Arif.¹⁹⁵

There was an important difference in the way the two treated their political opponents. Bhutto would often drive his opponents up the wall or seek a humiliating rapprochement with them. There was an example of use of force, where knuckles could be rapped, Bhutto went for the big blow. Conversely, Zia was careful in most cases not to personalize his political enmities. Like Bhutto, he too had a very good memory, but was content to give a blow or two to his opponents at a time of his own convenience. There was no obsessive quest to go "for the kill".

In terms of their class background, General Zia was genuinely "native", from the middle class, speaking in chaste Urdu. He was no intellectual by any standards. In fact, his "heavy reading" was confined to rigorous perusal of newspapers, Pakistani and foreign, and intelligence reports. Conversely, Bhutto was an upper class feudal, urbane, westernized and modern. He was genuinely intellectual, well-read and well-versed in writings of history, political and foreign affairs. Their style of work also differed. Bhutto was partially a workaholic as far as spending time on office files went; Zia had mostly relied on subordinates for routing file work.

In human relations, three essential differences need also to be noted. Bhutto proved to be a poor judge of people. He mistook rogues who should not have been touched by a pair of tongs. Although both gave precedence to the loyalty factor, on the whole, Zia proved to be a better judge of people. Secondly while Bhutto was definitely arrogant at times and with some people, (in this way, his attitude was similar to that of Mr. Gandhi), Zia's hallmark was humility. His double handshake, triple embrace style of

¹⁹⁴ Narrated by Dr. Mubashir Hassan.

¹⁹⁵ The details of manner of their ouster can be found in earlier pages of his draft.

greeting was typical of him, together with his routine opening of car doors for his visitors and waiting in the driveway till the visitor departed. An anecdote in the White House in this aspect of General Zia, when he was planning to visit Washington in December 1982 a number of Senators egged on by Pakistani opposition leaders, urged President Reagan to put pressure on General Zia for freedom in Pakistan since "he was a military dictator." After General Zia had made his Washington visit, the Senators asked President Reagan whether he had discussed democracy and its restoration in Pakistan with General Zia. Regan replied: *"He's no dictator. He was a nice guy. He was the only foreign leader I have seen visiting the White House, who even took hands with the marine guards, with the waiters and with practically everyone in sight. If he was so good to people, he can't be all that bad!"*¹⁹⁶ Finally, their style of decision making differed a lot Zia was cooler, careful, sure-footed, he believed in moving forward step-by-step. Bhutto used to take giant strides do things in one grand sweep. Since both can be noted for their proclivity for being avid cricket fans, perhaps their styles can be better understood in cricketing parlance. Zia liked to play with a straight bat and did not go for the big hit except in the case of Bhutto's hanging. He preferred to score in singles and two to consolidate his innings through light strokes. Initially, the impact was minimum but over time, the presence was felt as the innings become more established.

Zia has had one distinct advantage over Bhutto: He was definitely the luckier of the two. Whether it was the liming of the Islamic revolution, which led to the ouster of one of Mr. Bhutto's closest supporters, the Shah, just before his hanging or the fact that the Bhutto hanging was followed three days later by the hanging of former Iranian Prime Minister, Hoveida, which mitigated the international impact of the act in Pakistan. These favored General Zia. So also did the Soviet military intervention which aroused Western interest in a country that was practically at international pariah; or the PIA hijacking which effectively scuttled the newly formed MRD's proposed agitation; or even the t of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, just when she was apparently planning a military strike against Pakistan. All these developments provided a political advantage to General Zia.

Both Bhutto and Zia as political leaders cannot be termed as "soft", like, say, Ayub, the Shah or Marcos. Basically tenacious fighters they had the capacity to take pressure by not cracking up in a crisis nor taking the first flight out.

In terms of their politics, there were interesting differences between Bhutto and Zia. While Bhutto was perceived to be on the Left and Zia on the Right, both could not really be slotted on an ideological basis. Zia was certainly the more pragmatic of the two, a fact reflected in his choice of such diverse friends as the communists of China, the capitalists of America, the Marxists of Zimbabwe, the secularists of Turkey and the theocrats of Saudi Arabia. While Bhutto had a worldview of how he wanted the country

¹⁹⁶ Narrated to Mushahid Hussain by Dr. Eqbal Ahmed.

to look in certain specific areas, General Zia had no worldview. He essentially improvised as he went along. He had institutionalized *ad hocism* as a policy and he was certainly not a problem-solver. That could also be a plus in certain situations where General Zia backed down and was prone to compromise during crises (as he did during the 1980 Shia agitation or the 1981 PIA hijacking). Conversely, Bhutto relied on brinkmanship, where crises were allowed to reach a pitch before he would 'solve' them. (The 1973 military action in Baluchistan which he tried to reverse in 1976 through a package deal with Sardar Daud and the 1977 PNA agitation which he first quelled through force, including Martial Law, and then subsequently tried to settle through negotiations.)

Both had a penchant for foreign affairs, a domain used by both Bhutto and Zia for increasing personal prestige. Neither could be faulted for either interest or expertise in economics. Both also were their own best PR men, whom foreign correspondents generally found to be "charming".

While Bhutto had a strange kind of impersonal rapport with the masses, General Zia relied more on a personal one-to-one contact.

Ironically, history will probably be harsh with both Bhutto and Zia for failure to build political institutions in the country. Both also failed to heal the wounds in the country's body politic. While General Zia muffled the political process by presiding over and prolonging the longest Martial Law in Pakistan's history, Bhutto began wrecking his own Constitution and politics process through the military action in Baluchistan in 1973, which followed the dismissal of an opposition majority government in that province followed by the exit of the other in the front. History will, however, credit Bhutto on at least three counts: For being the architect of a new kind of politics in Pakistan which generated mass consciousness about people's rights, for restoring morale to the country in the first couple of years of his rule which culminated in the Islamic Summit in 1974, and finally for initiating the nuclear programme. Similarly, histories will probably definite the two pluses successes of General Zia during his long tenure at the helm of affairs. First, in continuing with Pakistan's nuclear programme, which was inseparable from Pakistan's quest to establish itself as an independent country in the community of nations, and Second, his deft handling with India, which he managed to outsmart politically, even during a period when one wrong move on his part could have resulted in a state of war with a militarily larger, more powerful neighbor.

3. Bhutto's: Father and Daughter

Twenty-four years after its emergence, the Bhutto legacy looks a politically diminished phenomenon, with its earlier vitality buried under the blunders of the second PPP regime. Yet what has surprised most observers is its ability to endure the chequered nature of the country's politics.

When the PPP had its founding convention in November 1967 on the front lawns of the residence of an obscure Lahore engineer, few gave it any chance of success against the Ayub dictatorship. When it came to power four years later, few thought its rule would be so short-lived. When it was ousted from power following the July 1979 coup, few thought that it would survive the rigors of repression. In 1986 when Benazir returned to a triumphant homecoming, few thought she could be stopped. Later, few were willing to bet that the Pakistan Peoples Party would be in power in 1988. And fewer would have believed that the PPP's second tenure would be so short-lived as to last only twenty months. The zigs and zags of the PPP political fortunes reflect the hazard and uncertainties of politics in most Third World countries, amongst which Pakistan is no exception.

The PPP has experienced a generational "changing of the guard" from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was forty three in 1971, to Benazir Bhutto, who was thirty five in 1987. It would be interesting to compare the politics of the father and the daughter. Their political context, their political line and their political style.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a product of the Establishment, when he joined Pakistan's first Martial Law Cabinet at the age of thirty. In the regime of sycophants and mediocre time-servers, he stood out as a dynamic young nationalist. He soon became the "whiz kid" of the Ayub regime, whose affluence was backed up by ability and appeal. A product of the post-World War II, anti-imperialist Third World tradition, Bhutto was probably the first major Third World leader who had an intimate exposure to American society — as a student. Eight years in the Ayub cabinet gave him considerable experience. He learnt the ropes of 'the system' well and knew how it worked. Basically, he got to know personally the 500 or so individuals who mattered in the Pakistan Establishment linked together by ties of blood, money and mutual interest, these 500 or so individuals were in the army, bureaucracy, police, business, media or were scions of feudal families.

Unlike her father, Benazir Bhutto was an "outsider". She was neither part nor product of "the system". She had no experience in government of the kind that Bhutto had, the only similarity being her exposure to the West, initially as a student and later as an exile. She was keen to enter "the system", and to be accepted by the Establishment. Her path to power was by force of circumstance more uphill and more rocky. Her major minus was a lack of understanding of the inner workings of "the system" that she wanted to run. There was also a "cultural problem". Her knowledge of the 500 or so individuals "who matter" was extremely limited. She did not live in Pakistan in her formative years, and was later denied the opportunity of interaction with people owing to crises (Bhutto trial and execution) and incarceration.

Bhutto had also managed to put together a team, which proved to be a winning combination in 1970. This team was an assortment of diverse people which essentially defined the PPP's mass movement character rather than that of an organized, well-knit political force. There were retired bureaucrats old Leftists, young Leftists, lawyers, traditional feudals, technocrats and representatives of the urban middle class. In fact, the PPP itself was a sort of Grand United Forum representing the popular coalition that had ousted Ayub Khan. More than anything else, Bhutto's stand on issues, being clear and bold, had endeared him to the masses and earned him the respect of the intelligentsia.

Benazir Bhutto had popular support, but little respect among the intelligentsia despite her apparently impeccable academic credentials. She failed to evolve a method of governance through a well-knit team, with each member given specific tasks for providing expert inputs into important decisions. She had some bright experts contributing policy papers but she failed to consult them on a systematic basis, nor did she wield them into a team. Consequently, her government failed to establish itself as one that could guide the destiny of Pakistan in the 1990s.

It is important to understand the difficulties faced by Benazir Bhutto as compared to her father. There were three major differences in Pakistan that separated the period preceding Bhutto's ascension to power from that of Benazir. The army was neutral when Bhutto was campaigning for office. In fact, he had good contacts in the GHQ who kept him posted on major decisions and developments. Bhutto was thus able to anticipate and even preempt events given his inside knowledge into 'the system'. In Benazir Bhutto's case, the army was certainly not neutral. She had to face the hostility and bear the brunt of the state apparatus of Pakistan's Third Martial Law regime. However, as always, the army remained a political factor. Benazir's theory of three political forces in Pakistan's politics – army, America and PPP was a variation of Bhutto's own theory of the three political forces in 1970 – army, Awami League and PPP.

When Bhutto was campaigning for office in 1970, he was not carrying any "extra baggage". He was untried and untested as a national leader and represented freshness and change. Given the fact that Pakistan became a polarized polity, Bhuttoism was a divisive legacy. It worked both ways for Benazir. Since it was her main claim to fame, it was also her strength, but it also weakened her as a sizeable section of the Pakistani electorate feared Bhuttoism, given the PPP track record in power. Such "extra baggage" was absent in the case of Miss Fatima Jinnah, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mrs. Cory Aquino, but was very similar to the predicament of Sheikh Mujib's daughter, Hasina Wajid.

The geo-politics of the region had radically altered since the 1970s. The region was more unstable and more susceptible to outside interference. Owing to the increased

superpower contention for influence, strategically placed countries like Pakistan also had more room to maneuver and more freedom to pursue their objectives of balancing one superpower against the other. In the 1980s there was an American political presence in Pakistan and Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and resistance to both from the people in these countries. In fact, Iran by changing the rules of the game and telling both superpowers 'to go to hell' at the same time, had charted a new course in diplomacy. Bhutto was also aware of the American factor, but he used it effectively and subtly. For example, soon after he won the 1971 elections, he told *The Times* (London) in an interview: "*I have done more to stop communism in this part of the world than all the millions of dollars that the US had spent in Vietnam*". The message was clear: Basically Bhutto was telling Washington that he was no America-baiting Leftist, only a Third World nationalist. In 1963, responding to his pro-China image, Bhutto had told *The Washington Post*. "*Actually our relationship with China was similar to your wartime collaboration with the Soviets*". In other words, he was suggesting that Pakistan knows that China was an ideological adversary but it was mutual interests that have brought the two together. Similarly, on the eve of his return to Pakistan to take over in December 1971, Bhutto made sure that he met President Nixon at the White House.¹⁹⁷

During the period prior to becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan, Bhutto contradictions and political minuses were apparent. Her sense of timing had faltered badly. She first insisted on elections by Fall 1986 and when the agitation failed, she was willing to sit it out. In December 1986, when Karachi was burning, she was dining with Western Ambassadors in Islamabad. In April 1987, when Karachi was again gripped by political upheaval, she was dining with the parliamentary opposition in Rawalpindi. In July 1987, when the bomb blasts in Karachi resulted in the biggest death toll of terrorism in Pakistan's history, she merely telephoned her condemnation and concern from London, and failed to rush home. While Benazir Bhutto rejected the Parliament for not being representative, she accepted to dine with the parliamentary opposition and allowed her party to participate in a Punjab bye-election. While attacking the government's foreign policy, she refrained from pointing at the root of its failure: the degree of dependence on the United States. Although lacking in political acumen in certain cases, Benazir showed courage and perseverance during adverse circumstances.

As Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto failed to learn the fundamental lessons from three failures of her father:

- (i) Her father was the first genuinely popular mass leader in Pakistan's history, yet by 1977 he alienated the majority of politicians to the extent that they welcomed the military coup and eagerly concurred in his hanging.

¹⁹⁷ This was a brief meeting of about half an hour or less, although, according to one account, given by Dr. Eqbal Ahmed, Bhutto flew specially to meet Nixon at his retreat in Florida and not at the White House.

- (ii) Bhutto's intolerance of dissent and reliance on the state apparatus as opposed to the political forces proved to be his nemesis.
- (iii) Then there was the organizational failure of the PPP which could not politically counter the PNA in 1977 and which became a helpless spectator to the hanging of its leader. Like her father she failed to convert the PPP from a movement into a political organization, she similarly isolated herself by alienating her potential political allies, and finally began to increasingly rely on the very bureaucracy whose hostility she had earlier incurred. Thus despite the massive month-long mobilization by Benazir Bhutto in April-May, 1986, the PPP failed to take off in the agitation of August 1986. Similarly, it failed to respond to the situation after Benazir's dismissal and defeat in the polls. Basically, her team could not be made into a winning combination. Organizational weakness and intellectual fuzziness reinforced this failure.

Both the Bhutto's failed to politically govern the country in a manner that would strengthen political institutions. Both relied on personalized control as the basis for seeking administrative compliance. Yet they had contrasting attitudes towards the United States. While Zulfikar Ali Bhutto felt that the US was crucial in the destabilization of his government, Benazir Bhutto drew sustenance from her unqualified faith in American support.

CHAPTER 6

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing study of problems of governing Pakistan leads to four specific contextual problem areas. These are:

1. Persistence of Colonial Structure

The basic administrative, legal and state structure is a carryover from colonial times. It has not undergone any fundamental changes. The result is that such a structure, which was designed to meet colonial-era requirements, can no longer serve the needs of a country with complex problems. The overhaul of the structure should, therefore, be on the top of the agenda.

2. Need to have Greater Confidence in People

An offshoot of the colonial approach is the lack of confidence in the people. Hiding basic information about the country from the people is one manifestation of this mentality. It includes failure to involve the people in grassroots decision-making that affects their lives, to involvement of the people in issues such as law and order, construction and environment.

3. Erosion of State Institutions

Institutions of the state including police, bureaucracy, judiciary, and so forth have suffered in credibility, competence and integrity with the result that people are less willing to repose confidence in such state institutions.

4. Pakistan in the Hope of Geopolitical Change

Pakistan is today located in a region that is witnessing important qualitative changes. These changes reflect the unraveling of the post-World War II *status quo*, with the Revolution in Iran, the civil war in America the political emergence of Central Asia, the insurgency in Kashmir and the Khalistan movement in East Punjab. Given this geopolitical context Pakistan, perhaps more than any other state in the region, is feeling the fallout of such change. Any discussion on governance in Pakistan has to take into account this factor directly or indirectly as it impinges upon the country.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy package is recommended to meet the minimum demands and needs of governing Pakistan as a multinational democratic society:

1. Decentralization of administrative power involving policy participation at the grassroots level. This basically entails a change in the role and responsibilities of the institution known as Deputy Commissioner/(DC) who is the pivot of the administrative structure in the country since he combines influence in his person as Head of the District administration, executive authority, financial powers of revenue collection and judiciary powers as district magistrate. That role now needs to be redefined with devolution and division of powers in a manner that after these powers are not concentrated in one office and they are also to be shared by the locally elected representatives of the people.
2. Poverty alleviation problem.
3. Building up an infrastructure in the social sector particularly health, education, environment and housing.
4. Economic reforms.
5. Revision of foreign policy outlook and assumptions, particularly reversal of the military option in Afghanistan so that the refugees can return and Pakistan does not have to face terrorism from across the border which, in turn, is a major source of internal destabilization. Additionally, there is the need to rearrange relations with United States so that the American interference in Pakistan's internal affairs declines and a stable polity emerges, that is relatively immune from American efforts to destabilize it.
6. Reforms in the political system with the purpose of energizing what is currently a narrow based structure whose social base has led to an arrangement between urban and the rural regions. Better and stringent electoral laws, an in-house accountability process directed against both corruption and defection and ensuring periodical elections on party basis would be a step towards this direction.