COMMENTARY

On the book

THE CONQUEST OF SINDH

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL JAMES OUTRAM, C.B.

Volume I

Reproduced By

Sani Hussain Panhwar
THE CONQUEST OF SINDH

A COMMENTARY

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL JAMES OUTRAM, C.B.
(Later, General Sir James Outram, Bart. G.C.B.)

RESIDENT AT SATTARAH

Volume I

GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER’S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMEERS

Reproduced By:
Sani Hussain Panhwar
California; 2009
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INTRODUCTION

I have reproduced set of four volumes written on the conquest of Sindh. Two of the books were written by Major-General W.F.P. Napier brother of Sir Charles James Napier conquer of Sindh and first Governor General of Sindh. These two volumes were published to clarify the acts and deeds of Charles Napier in justifying his actions against the Ameers of Sindh. The books were originally titled as “The Conquest of Scinde, with some introductory passages in the life of Major-General Sir Charles Napier”; Volume I and II.

Replying to the allegations made by the Napiers’ Colonel James Outram who was also a key official of the British Government and held important assignments in Sindh before and during the turmoil wrote two volumes titled “The Conquest of Scinde a Commentary.” Volume I & II.

It will be very interesting addition for any student of history to know the facts behind the British take over. The summer of 1842 saw the beginning of the tragic events that were finally to give the province of Sindh to the British.

Eastwick, a key figure for stability in the province, fell ill and had to retire. He had been a moderating force, trying to temper the greed of “the avaricious, grasping, never satisfied Faringi, (the English).

Eastwick, while commenting upon this passage, asked, “Can these be the words of the man who waded through blood to the treasures of Hyderabad?” and remarked that the Directors had in fact “pronounced the war in Sind uncalled-for, impolitic, and unjust.” To highlight the hypocritical cast of the war in Sindh for all the parties condemned, despite Napier’s professed sorrow over the invasion and the Company’s shock over what the General had done, the Directors awarded him £60,000 in silver rupees for taking Sindh. It may be noted that only five hundred of Napier’s forces were white; the rest were natives.

The “mulatto” and the “Talpur traitor” who had betrayed the Sindhis in the heat of battle had been approached and bribed by one Mirza Ali Akhbar, who arrived from Persia. He had served first as munshee or personal secretary to James Outram and then to Napier. Ali Akhbar, Burton said, served with special bravery at the Battle of Miani and then at Dubba. Napier had remarked later to Burton that the Mizra “did as much towards the conquest of Scinde as a thousand men,” for as a fellow Muslim he was able to enter the enemy camps and bribe some of their best forces to desert the battlefield.

Later on Napier had some inkling of the injustice of the invasion, for he said, “We have no right to seize Sindh, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful and humane piece of
rascality it will be." A telegram was sent to announce his victory with the message consisting of a single word... ‘Peccavi’... I have sinned.

Ignorant of India and the people, Napier was able to carry out his commission oblivious to the fact that several fair and sensible treaties forced upon the Sindhis by the Company had been abrogated when greed demanded. Not only did the General fall into Ali Murad’s schemes — which Outram had tried to warn him against — but, wrote Eastwick, he said “he saw the only chance of goading the Ameers into war would be by persecuting Mir Rustam”.

The English were the aggressors in India, and, although the sovereign can do no wrong, his ministers can; and no one can lay a heavier charge upon Napoleon than rests upon the English ministers who conquered India and Australia, and who protected those who commit atrocities. The object in conquering India, the object of all our cruelties was money . . . a thousand million sterling are said to have been squeezed out of India by 1845. Every shilling of this has been pick out of blood, wiped and put in the murderers’ pockets.

I am sure you will enjoy reading these volumes; I have made few changes in the lay out of the books and also made few spellings corrections corresponding to the way they are spelled currently. However I did not make any changes in the spellings which are close in the pronunciation of the current day except the word Scinde.

Sani Panhwar
California, 2009
PREFACE.

Some explanation may be necessary to account for the delay which has taken place in the appearance of this work, as well as for its being now published in an incomplete form. The work was commenced by Colonel Outram immediately upon the appearance of General Sir William Napier’s History of the Conquest of Sindh, and put in type in India. Thence the sheets were transmitted to some of Colonel Outram’s friends in this country for the purpose of revisal, before being reprinted in their present form. This necessarily occasioned considerable delay, and the whole work is not yet ready, although long ago out of Colonel Outram’s hands. It would have been desirable that the Commentary should have appeared at first in a complete form, but the great interest which at present attaches to the affairs of India, and the probability that the recent settlement of the Punjaub on principles of such admitted liberality and moderation, may lead to some reconsideration of our former policy in Sindh, have induced the Editor at once to publish the first portion of the volume, which contains the Negotiations of Sir Charles Napier with the Ameers.

The remainder of the work, comprising the actual operations against Sindh, and the subsequent treatment of the Ameers, will be published as speedily as it can be got through the press.
SECTION I.

MATTERS PERSONAL.

General William Napier has recently published a book, entitled “The Conquest of Sindh,” in which, while he attempts to vindicate the policy which led to the subjugation of that country, and to exalt the merits of the General by whom that policy was carried into effect, he has thought fit to bestow on myself no small measure of censure and aspersion. In that work, I am systematically represented as destitute alike of military and diplomatic skill, the pertinacious opponent of a policy, at once conducive to the civilization of India, and essential to the maintenance of our Indian Empire, and the adviser of measures which would have led to the annihilation of a British force. Grave as these accusations are—acquiring an additional importance as put forth by one enjoying a high reputation both literary and military—and embodied in a work which, with much of the spirit, and something of the interest of fiction, affects an historical character, it will not, I think, appear unnatural that I should seek to expose these misrepresentations, to vindicate a reputation which for a quarter of a century I have maintained unimpeached, and to satisfy those friends who have honored me with their support through good report and bad, that their esteem was not bestowed on one undeserving of their kindness. To the public, the only apology I can make for intruding on their notice is, that so inextricably has General Napier mixed up the grounds on which he rests the justification of his brother’s public measures with the calumnies so industriously heaped on myself, that, in exposing and refuting the latter, I shall in reality be correcting misrepresentations of important facts of public interest, having a direct bearing on our national character and honor, and furnishing to some extent the materials from which a “History of the Conquest of Sindh” may yet be written.

Before proceeding to examine and correct the misstatements of General Napier’s “Conquest of Sindh,” which I propose to do under separate heads, (to each of which a separate section shall be devoted,) let me advert generally to the circumstances which brought me into contact with Sir Charles Napier.

A lengthened residence in Sindh as British Political Agent, had enabled me—if I may venture to rely on the expressed opinion of those well qualified to judge—to acquire a practical and accurate knowledge of the characters and feelings of its princes and its people, qualifications for which Sir Charles Napier has never disguised his contempt. The results of my experience I communicated to Sir Charles, when, in October 1842, on my summary removal from Sindh, I finally resigned into his hands the supreme authority in that province. To the value of the information supplied, he then bore very handsome testimony, and did me the honor publicly to express the high sense he entertained of my military and diplomatic talents. We parted from each other with expressions of mutual
esteem and regard— he to carry out the instructions of the Governor- General, and I to make arrangements for visiting England. Before I could do so, however, my services, for which a requisition had been made by Sir Charles Napier, were placed at his disposal by Lord Ellenborough, and I joined him on the 4th of January in the capacity of British Commissioner. I observed with regret, that during my absence he had been betrayed into the adoption of measures which were impolitic, and, as I conceived, unjust; but I regarded them as the natural blunders of a man suddenly invested with unlimited powers, among a people of whom he had neither knowledge nor experience, and impressed with the erroneous but sincere belief, that the policy he pursued, was, to use his own words, that on which the tranquility of Sindh depended. I endeavored to impress upon him, however, that the result to which his measures inevitably tended, was precisely the reverse of that "peaceable settlement" of the country which he professed to have in view, and that the course he was pursuing would necessitate war. Nearly a month before the battle of Meeanee, I not only clearly foresaw the sad events that were to follow, but I declared to Sir Charles Napier my conviction, "that every life which might hereafter be lost in consequence, would be a murder." Admiring him as a gallant soldier, and giving him credit for his professed anxiety to maintain peace, I could not disguise my regret at his persisting in what I deemed unjustifiable proceedings, and my sorrow that his should be the hands to work results so disastrous—disastrous, I mean, not in a military, but in a political and moral sense.

The leading events which preceded and followed the annexation of Sindh are familiar to all; the less creditable details have, however, been studiously concealed.

Like all Orientals, the Ameers were childish in disposition, constitutionally addicted to intrigue—and their conduct had afforded us an excuse for imposing on them more stringent bonds than those previously in force. They had, however, been without distinction accused, as a body, of deeply laid schemes for our destruction; this accusation I knew to be false, and its falsity was demonstrated by the friendly aid they had given us when our national honor, and the safety of our armies, were in imminent peril. They had urged much, very much, in their own behalf, through myself, their only medium of communication with Sir Charles Napier. Their spoliation and imprisonment had been justified solely on the grounds of a treacherous attack made on myself: not only did I know them, with the exception of Meer Shadad, to be entirely guiltless of all participation, direct or indirect, in that attack, but I knew farther, that to their protection I owed my life. In spite of the assurances I had given them, the Ameers not present at the battle of Meeanee were despoiled, imprisoned, and transported. A ward of my own, the youthful Ameer Hoossain Ali— entrusted to me by a dying father, and that father a staunch friend of the British nation—for whom I had solicited and obtained the General’s pardon, was, without a pretence, condemned to the same fate. Even had the wretched captives been guilty of all the atrocities charged upon them, but of which I knew them to be innocent, their treatment was, I considered, unnecessarily harsh, and contrasted strangely with that of the family of Tippoo Sultan, on the fall of Seringapatam.
All these circumstances my conscience impelled me to make known to those who had a
right to interrogate me on the subject; and I sought, by every means in my power, to enlist
the sympathies of those in authority in behalf of unfortunate princes, who, by a series of
unjust acts of aggression, and by the rude violence of their followers, anxious only for the
independence of their country, were forced to resistance, and then punished for it—their
possessions confiscated, and themselves sent into captivity and treated with indignity.
Could worldly considerations have swayed me, I should doubtless have pursued a very
different course; but I should have been unworthy of my country, unworthy to claim
kindred with Englishmen, or longer to serve my honorable employers, had I hesitated
between my duty and my interest under such circumstances.

In making the revelations which I did to the home authorities, I only gave effect to
intentions of which I had long before apprized Sir Charles Napier. Yet, when we parted
on the 21st of February, we did so with assurances of mutual regard. He expressed
himself of me, both orally and in writing, in the warmest and strongest language; and I
gave him credit for that rarest of all virtues in men vested with despotic power, which
accords to others what it claims for itself, the right to form and express an independent
judgment. In this conviction, and with the same frankness that I had displayed towards
him in Sindh, I duly apprised him of my proceedings in England. I was, however, soon
painfully convinced that I had overrated the magnanimity of his disposition, and I learned
with surprise and grief, that his friendship was the penalty I had to pay for my honesty.
True, in his reply he thus expressed himself:— “I neither do, nor have I a right to object to
your defending both the cause of the Ameers and your own exertions; nor am I at all
worried at any one defending them.” As to my “own exertions,” I may say at once, I had
neither made a merit of, nor founded claims upon them. No: my urgent pleas in behalf of
the Ameers, and the disclosures I was compelled to make, constituted the head and front
of my offending.

From the moment that the nature of my advocacy of the Ameers was known, I was loaded
with obloquy and ridicule—my diplomatic talents, once highly lauded, were now
decried—my judgment was vilified—the former estimate of my abilities was suddenly
discovered to have been greatly exaggerated, and I was pronounced the dupe of native
intrigue, devoid of the most ordinary penetration. I was attacked in the newspapers both
by General William Napier and anonymous scribblers—and a Second Sindh Blue Book
was prepared, to destroy my reputation and prospects. In this, foot-notes of surpassing
bitterness were appended to letters which had been replied to, at the time they were
written, without animadversion; much of my correspondence tending to exculpate the
Ameers was suppressed, none of my personal representations on the subject alluded to;
but all having an opposite tendency were duly paraded, and enforced with comments,
notes, and explanations. As a climax to these persecutions, General William Napier
collects all the slanders with which I have been aspersed, and for the benefit of those who
care not to wade through a Parliamentary Blue Book, weaves them into an exciting
romance, which he dignifies with the title of a history.
Intemperate and unmannerly as were the personalities indulged in by General William Napier in his newspaper effusions, I did not seek to repel them:—*for this I knew I could not do, without exposing to the public the less creditable features of the Sindh policy.*

Even after seeing the Second Sindh Blue Book, my sense of public duty and obedience to my superiors, restrained me from making a public appeal through the press. I did at one time present a memorial to the Government of India, craving permission to vindicate my character, and this I accompanied with “Observations,” embodying a review of the Second Blue Book. Having been advised, however, by those whose opinions I valued, that to press my memorial might prove injurious to the public interests, I was induced to withdraw it. I was, moreover, assured by high authority, that my public character had not really suffered in the estimation of those who best understood the merits of the case,—the present Government of India, the Ministers connected with its affairs, and the Court of Directors; and I saw that I had not fallen in the estimation of my comrades.

These considerations reconciled me to the sacrifice of my private feelings to the public good; but to appreciate my forbearance, let it be borne in mind how grievously during the debates on the Sindh question my public character was traduced, on the authority of the Second Sindh Blue Book, both in Parliament and in the Court of Proprietors: how the world was likely to be misled by the publication of Sir Charles Napier’s letter to my address of July the 22d, 1843, a reply to which I was prohibited from publishing,—and how, again, I was assailed in the first volume of General Napier’s “Conquest of Sindh.” Even then I refrained from a public reply, because I felt assured, that the same authority which had imposed silence on me on public grounds, would deal equal justice to my assailant, by interdicting the continuation of the latter work. I was mistaken; and the second volume, now published, contains even grosser attacks on my public character, than did its predecessor. To vindicate that character, therefore, is no longer optional; it is a duty I owe to myself and to my family; and though my defence must be greatly weakened by my want of power to refer to unpublished official documents, sufficient, I trust, will be found to vindicate my character from the gross calumnies to which it has been exposed.

Having thus adverted to the cause of the hostility to which I have been exposed on the part of Sir Charles Napier and the Historian of Sindh, I proceed to notice some of those misrepresentations, or invidious and depreciatory remarks, which, as they have reference rather to my individual than my public character, it may be as well to dispose of in advance, and to separate from the consideration of matters of more public interest.

First, let me advert to a charge of ingratitude which General Napier hints at rather than expresses. At page 466, vol. ii., he says:—”After a short stay at Bombay, he (Major Outram) proceeded to England, openly professing his obligations to the man who had risked the Governor- General’s displeasure to get him restored to a public situation.”

The impression which this passage is calculated to convey to the minds of those who are ignorant of the real state of matters is erroneous in the extreme. So far from my recall to
Sindh in the capacity of a Commissioner, being a kindness to myself, or having been esteemed by me as such, it is notorious to all my friends who were in Bombay at the time, and to many still in Sindh, that I returned to that country at great personal inconvenience, and, as Sir Charles Napier himself knows, entirely at my own cost, having declined to accept any salary from Government.\(^1\) I had, at the time obtained furlough to Europe, and engaged my passage in the January steamer, and was induced to join Sir Charles, solely from a desire to aid him in effecting, what I took for granted he desired, a peaceable settlement of the province, and to preserve him from the machinations of Ali Morad—against whose intrigues I had previously warned him,\(^2\) as one who would endeavor to embroil his relations with the General.

How Sir Charles Napier could risk the displeasure of the Governor-General, by getting me restored to a public situation, it were difficult to discover. His Lordship had never charged me with any offence, and the ostensible reason for abolishing the office I had previously held, was, that the withdrawal of our troops from Baluchistan—which had been the principal burden of my charge—rendered it no longer necessary. Before my first departure from Sindh, Sir Charles Napier had received the Governor-General’s permission to appoint whom he pleased, as Commissioner, and asked me to accept the post. \textit{This I declined doing, unless Lord Ellenborough, who had so unceremoniously dismissed me, should direct my return.} The order to return reached me in Bombay, and in obedience to that order, and in the hope of saving Sir Charles Napier the troublesome task of arranging the terms of the treaty, I went back to Sindh, but with no intention of remaining. So confident was I, that I should be able to return to Bombay, in time to embark for England on the 1st of March, that I again secured my passage for that date, and took only the servants and apparel requisite for a month’s trip. So much for the risk incurred by Sir Charles Napier, and the obligation in this matter conferred on myself!

In reference to my previous services in that country, General Napier at page 112, (Part I.,) indulges in the following depreciatory observations:

\begin{quote}
“Major Outram himself publicly intimated, that his political efforts in Sindh were remarkable in themselves, and productive of the most beneficial results, and that his removal was productive of deplorable consequences. But no facts have been made known to bear out the opinion,—vide his letter to Major-General W. Napier, Sun Newspaper.”
\end{quote}

I intimated in the letter alluded to by General Napier, which his unprovoked and unwarrantable attack\(^3\) compelled me to address to him, no more than what I am fully able to substantiate. I stated, what is notorious to every one conversant with the history of those countries during the troubled period that preceded his brother’s advent, that, with a much smaller force than Sir Charles had in Sindh alone, I not only restrained the bigoted

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\(^1\) See Letter, Appendix
\(^2\) Extract No. 381, First Sindh Blue Book
\(^3\) See Appendix.
population of that country and of Baluchistan from open hostilities, but rendered them instrumental in retrieving our Affghans disasters. I shall have occasion hereafter to refer to this subject; I shall in this place only add, in relation to the “deplorable consequences,” of which he makes me say my removal was productive, that had my counsels been followed, the “consequences,” of the policy pursued—and surely, events which Sir Charles and General William Napier only attempt to justify on the ground of an alleged and overwhelming necessity, were deplorable—would have been averted. At all events, from the moment that a different course from that which I recommended was resolved on, I foresaw and foretold what must be its inevitable result. But “no facts have been made known to bear out the opinion.” True; no facts have yet been made known, for I have already adverted to the considerations which prevented me from appealing to these facts, and the evidence by which they are to be established. In the letter to which he refers, I explained to General William Napier, that having been employed in an official capacity in Sindh, I was not at liberty to defend myself against the unprovoked attack which elicited it, and, that the same delicacy prevented my making known my proceedings during the period of my connexion with Sir Charles Napier. In reply, he declared that he should be happy when the moment arrived, in which I should “feel at liberty to give a full explanation of the affairs of Sindh.”

Let us hear General Napier’s version of the cause of my dismissal.

“Mahommed Shurreef’s capture was the last act of Major Outram as supreme Political Agent. It was not Lord Ellenborough’s policy to divide power between political and military chiefs; nor to place the latter below the former, when war was at hand. Hence the removal of Major Outram was a necessary consequence of Sindh being placed under a General; but there were other causes for dismissing him. The Governor-General did not think highly of his talents, and had been forced to withdraw all confidence in him, on specific grounds of a serious and public nature, distinct from the offence he gave by urging his own opinions and views upon his superiors against all reason. Sir Charles Napier, a better man for war or policy, and of a surer judgment in what constitutes greatness, then took the entire charge of Sindh, and its troubled affairs.

“The clamor of many tongues has been Raised against Lord Ellenborough for this summary dismissal—as if a man of incredible genius and unmatched services, had been foully driven from a sphere of utility where he alone could guide events to a happy ending. Major Outram has, himself, publicly intimated that his political efforts in Sindh were remarkable in themselves, and productive of the most beneficial results, and that his removal was productive of deplorable consequences. But no facts have been made known to bear out this opinion. No indications of great ability are to be found in his official correspondence. Neither Lord Ellenborough nor Sir Charles Napier were able to detect the mark of this superior genius, which seems to have its birth and resting-place in the columns of a despicable Indian newspaper. It is true that the General, influenced by a generous warmth of temper, and admiring the daring courage and activity of an able partisan, such as Major Outram is universally admitted to be, offered a glowing compliment to him at a public dinner. It is true also, that, giving him credit for greater ability than he found him on trial to possess, Sir Charles obtained permission from Lord Ellenborough to recall him to active political service in Sindh.
But these were only the measure of the General’s liberal feelings, not of Major Outram’s talents; and they were impulses which have not been responded to generously."

The capture of this Mahommed Shurreef, which General Napier is pleased, not very correctly, to describe as the result of a stratagem, was an event of very considerable political importance. The Syed was surprised in the midst of hostile Kaukur clans, who were flocking to his standard, and was carried off before their faces. His capture at once broke up a dangerous conspiracy of the native tribes.

How far my removal, as Political Agent, “was a necessary consequence of Sindh being placed under a General,” is a question on which I am not called upon to enter. It was probably a part of Lord Ellenborough’s general system with regard to the diplomatic agents of the Company. It is with the insinuations or charges against myself alone, contained in the passage above quoted, that I have to do. And these seem to resolve into three; first, that I had pertinaciously urged my own opinions and views on my superiors against all reason; second, that the Governor-General had been forced to withdraw his confidence from me, “on specific grounds of a serious nature;” and lastly, that neither the Governor-General nor Sir Charles Napier had formed a favorable estimate of my talents for the important duty of Political Agent.

To the first of these charges, I must plead guilty to this extent, that I did urge on Lord Ellenborough, (though I trust not against all reason, since the views I advocated were in truth ultimately adopted,) my views and opinions with regard to the Sindh policy. I acknowledge, further, that the opinion I so “pertinaciously urged,” Was THE ADVANCE OF OUR TROOPS UPON CABOOL, AND THE RELIEF OF THE BRITISH PRISONERS IN Afghanistan, measures which, though long delayed, were at last resorted to. Whether my opinion was right or wrong, it was conscientiously entertained; and I considered that I did but my duty, in the official situation I held, by “pertinaciously urging” that course which I believed could alone save The British Honor, and avert the total destruction of our army.

To the second charge, it is impossible to make a specific answer, because nothing specific is referred to in support of the accusation. If General William Napier conceived himself to be at liberty to make such a charge or insinuation, common justice might have suggested to him, that the charge should be put in a tangible form.

I now advert—though with great reluctance — to the third charge contained in the above paragraph, namely, my ability or inability for the duties of Political Agent, and the degree of success or failure with which my efforts were attended. That my talents for such employment, and my experience of those among whom the duties of the office were to be exercised, was originally estimated somewhat differently, both by the Governor-General and Sir Charles Napier, will scarcely, it is supposed, be disputed.

As all my political measures were eminently successful, Lord Ellenborough, as I have said, had found no fault with me on that ground. I had, on the contrary, ere my removal
from office, added to those services. On the 22d of May 1842, his Lordship voluntarily made to me the following announcement through the Secretary to the Government of India:— “It is necessary for me to acquaint you that, on the formation of the reformed establishment, it is the intention of the Governor-General to bestow upon you the appointment of envoy; his Lordship being perfectly satisfied with the zeal and ability you manifest in the discharge of your duty.” That Sir Charles Napier did not then consider me wanting as a politician, or deem my official correspondence devoid of ability, is sufficiently proved—not by his having, on the 5th of November 1842, publicly compared me with the chivalrous Bayard, particularly specifying him as “a Knight renowned for wisdom in Council;”—for it is not on compliments passed at a public dinner that I rely, but on his more deliberately expressed written opinion; for a few days previous to this, he had officially acknowledged “the high sense he entertained of my zeal and abilities in the public service, and of the obligations he personally felt towards me, for the great assistance I had so kindly and so diligently afforded to him; thereby diminishing, in every way, the difficulties that he had to encounter as my successor in the political department of Sindh.” These sentiments of Sir Charles Napier were expressed, after perusing my correspondence with the Government of India on all political matters relating to Sindh and Baluchistan, wherein I had at all differed in opinion with Lord Ellenborough; as well as that with his Lordship’s Secretaries and other high functionaries, in reference to his Lordship’s Afghan policy.

These tributes to my merits, as a soldier, as a man of honor, and as a politician, were offered to me on the eve of my departure from Sindh. I did not rejoin Sir Charles Napier, nor enter on public affairs, until the 4th of January 1843; and that he still retained the same respect for my judgment up to the 25th of that month, is proved by the following extract from a letter which he addressed to me on that day:—

“Believe me I am too much impressed with the great responsibility of my position, to listen to your arguments with prejudice; on the contrary, every thing you say has full weight. *** I am not likely to be influenced by the opinion of every whipper-snapper-chap, that fancies he can govern; nine years at the head of a Government, taught me that very few know any thing about the matter; were I to assume that I am one of those few—which I do not assume—still I should feel bound to attend to, and give my best consideration to every thing said by such a man as you.”

It is a singular coincidence that the discovery of my inferior ability should only have been made after Sir Charles Napier was aware that I had found it necessary, in the discharge of an imperative duty, to advocate the cause of the Ameers, and, in so doing, to condemn the policy he had adopted.

But let the reader judge between the later opinion alleged to have been formed by Sir Charles Napier, and the judgment formed by such men as the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone and Lord Auckland—men of extensive experience—aware of the difficulties of my position—of the resources at my command, and in a condition to form an impartial
estimate of my capacity and conduct of affairs. These opinions have been recorded, and they have kindly permitted me to avail myself of them in my own defence.

Extract From A Letter Addressed By The Honorable Mounstuart Elphinstone To John Loch, Esq., East India Director.—Dated July 7, 1843, published by the author’s permission.

“I am going to write to you on a subject on which I am very much interested, as I daresay you are yourself, or will be, when your attention is drawn to the matter. It relates to Colonel Outram; not, however, to any general question between him and the Government, but to a personal matter. *** My present letter is not written at his request. ****

“Some time after the success in Afghanistan, he received a notification (I believe officially) from the Indian Government, that he was to be made a Lieutenant-Colonel and C. B., and I understand a similar notification is on the records of the Court of Directors; I do not know in what form, but probably in a letter to the Indian Government.

“After this announcement, no further step seems to have been taken, and Colonel Outram remained unrewarded, until the late battles in Sindh. He then received, with a crowd of other Officers, the two distinctions which had been promised (or more than promised) to him long ago. Had he received these honors at the time, he would now (on the principle which must have been observed, of advancing each Officer one step) have been made Aide-de-Camp to the Queen and K.C.B. ***** “All this is written, as if Colonel Outram was merely a Military Officer who had distinguished himself in the Afghan Campaign, and who now again shared with many others in the services lately performed in Sindh; but you are well aware how far this is from Colonel Outram’s real position. Besides his ample share in the planning and conduct of various military enterprises, his political services for several years have been such, as it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy. We forced a subsidiary grant and tribute in Sindh — we made open war on the Brahoes of Kelat—killed their Chief, and took their capital; and on these two powers all our communications with Candahar depended. To keep them quiet, and prevent them thwarting our measures, would have been difficult even in times of peace and prosperity; yet such was Colonel Outram’s management, as to obtain their cordial cooperation during the whole of our dangers and disasters in Afghanistan,—our movements in every direction from Candahar depending on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld, without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us. Had they been disposed for more open enmity, General England’s detachment could neither have retired or advanced, as it did, and it is doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the opposition and privations he must have suffered in such case: advance towards Cabul he certainly could not, without the assistance he received through Sindh and the Kelat country. Considering all these services, and the high station held by Colonel Outram when he performed them, the appearance of his name among crowds of subalterns, is rather a humiliation than an honor. ***** Your previous knowledge renders all testimonials unnecessary, but I cannot help enclosing an extract of a letter from Lord Auckland, (sent to me by Colonel Barnewall,) which was written at the beginning of the disasters at Cabul, and, consequently, before the most difficult part of Col. Outram’s career had begun.

Yours, &c.
(Signed)
“M. Elphinstone.”
Extract of A Letter From Lord Auckland to Major Outram.—Dated Calcutta, 26th Feb. 1842.

“This is probably the last letter I shall write to you, and I would take my leave of you, with an assurance to you, that you have from day to day, since your late appointment, added to that high estimate with which I have long regarded your character, and which led me to place confidence in you. It is mortifying and galling to me to feel, that plans which you had nearly brought to a successful maturity, for great improvement—for the consolidation of security and influence—for the happiness of the population of immense tracts—and for your own and our honor—should be endangered by events of which our military history has happily no parallel. You will, I know, do well in the storm; and, as far as the interests confided to you are concerned, you will enable us to weather it.

Most faithfully yours,
“Lord Auckland.”

To these written testimonies I may be permitted to add a few sentences from the Debate in the House of Lords, in which his Lordship was pleased to advert to my humble services in these terms:—

“He took that opportunity of saying, that throughout their transactions, to no man in a public office was the public service under greater obligations than Major Outram; a more distinguished servant of the public did not exist, and one more eminent in a long career. Major Outram exerted himself in collecting camels and stores.—From Rajpootana, Jeendpoor, and other places, 3000 camels were obtained, and marched on the 10th April from Sukkur to Quetta, and thence to Candahar; and with these camels General Nott was enabled to effect his march, for which he was indebted, in a great degree, to the promptitude and zeal with which Major Outram acted.”

Lord Fitzgerald, the President of the Board of Control, spoke as follows:—

“When the noble Earl (Auckland) opposite talked in the high terms he had employed of the services of Major Outram—terms in which he cordially concurred.”—(See Hansard’s Debates, p. 914.)

General Napier, in the paragraph now under review, with his usual good tastes, but in this case truly, declares his brother to be a better man for war than the humble individual whom he asperses. I should as soon have thought of comparing Sir Charles Napier to the Duke of Wellington, as myself to a man every way so distinguished as the former. But, he adds also, “for policy;” and since the comparison is thrust upon me, I may, without incurring the charge of vanity or presumption, decline to bow to General W. Napier’s estimate of his brother’s diplomatic superiority. The comparison can of course be instituted in reference to Oriental diplomacy alone—the only field in which I have labored. How stand matters? In the solitary instance in which the elder Napier’s talents have been tested, he failed—most egregiously failed. I go upon the assumption that the duty assigned to him was really that which Lord Ellenborough declared to be his object—amicably to control the Ameers; to secure for their country tranquility; and for ourselves
the terms deemed requisite for placing British interests on a sound basis. To affect these objects, not in Sindh only, but also in Baluchistan, was the duty imposed on me by Lord Auckland, during one of those most exciting and eventful periods in the history of those countries. They were affected with unvarying success. The Government of India well knows; the high functionaries in this country, civil and military, in any way connected with the operations of the war, and the authorities in England well know, that the following picture of the services of the Political department under my charge, is painted in truthful and subdued colors; and I defy any man who was then with the army in Afghanistan, Baluchistan, or Sindh, to gainsay the truth of my assertions. I extract from my manuscript Observations:—

"Notwithstanding the smoldering volcano then existing in Baluchistan, whose people still smarted under the wrongs and injuries they had suffered from the British; notwithstanding that emissaries from the Afghan insurgents were strenuously urging the fanatical populations of that country and Sindh to rise in the common cause of Islam; notwithstanding the small military force I possessed, to overawe such a people, so excited, and occupying a country of the strongest nature, and nearly equal in extent to Great Britain—at a time, moreover, when no support could be given from India; I assured Government of my confidence in the success of my measures (aided by the zealous endeavors of the gentlemen in the political department under me,) to preserve tranquility throughout my vast charge, on which, not only the support, but the very existence of General Nott’s Army in Southern Afghanistan depended.” * * * “In this arduous task I was encouraged by Lord Auckland, who, after anxiously observing my proceedings, until the period of his departure from India, thus wrote, (26th February 1843,)—’You will, I know, do well in the storm, and as far as the interests confided to you are concerned, will enable us to weather it.’ * * * It has been seen that I fulfilled his Lordship’s expectation, and not only preserved Sindh and Baluchistan true to British interests at this momentous crisis, but also from these very countries supplied the means, and gave the support, which enabled the British Armies to retrieve their honour at Cabul, and General England’s weakened column, together with the immense convoy under its charge, to withdraw from Baluchistan without loss.”

It is as painful as it is invidious to institute comparisons of this kind—but they are not of my selection; with pre-eminently bad taste, they have been forced upon me by the inordinate vanity of the brothers—and distressing as it is to do so, I am compelled in self-defence, once more to refer to the lamentable diplomatic blunders of Sir Charles Napier.

Concentrated in Sindh alone, he had quadruple the force which was placed at my disposal, for the control both of that province and Baluchistan; he was unshackled by any ties to the latter country; and had in his favor the moral influence of another immense army within call, flushed with victory and well appointed. Our recent triumphs in central Asia had restored the prestige of British prowess, and read an emphatic “lesson to every prince in India,” and yet, within two months of his arrival in Upper Sindh, he, whose avowed object was tranquillization, found himself involved in war! He who sought not “subjugation,” was compelled to march into Hyderabad over the bodies of six thousand “fierce warriors,”—so fierce, so eager for our destruction, that they had not only befriended when their opposition might have ruined us, but for fifty-seven days after Sir
Charles Napier had commenced hostilities, abstained from inflicting the slightest injury on the persons or property of British subjects!

Page 140, Vol. I.—” Major Outram, then, after delivering over the papers of his office, returned to Bombay, after telling the General that with the reduced establishment, he would not be able to conduct the public business. Yet he did conduct it, and most successfully, when it was tenfold greater than any which had fallen to Major Outram’s direction.”

My remark applied only to the political business of the office of course. So far from Sir Charles Napier’s political responsibility, when he took charge of my office, exceeding that which I had laid down, it was then reduced to the political control of Sindh alone, whereas I had had to maintain in addition to that charge, a strict control over the kingdom of Kelat—the state of Luss—and the independent Murree, Boogtee, Jukranee, and other mountain tribes; and had also to conduct the direct revenue management of the provinces of Cutchee and Shaul besides. By “conducting the public business “of the political office in Sindh, of course I looked to fulfilling the duties of that office, which were, patiently to adjudicate in all cases of dispute arising between the Ameers and their neighbors; to mediate in their disputes among themselves; to investigate the complaints of British subjects against Sindhian, and vice versa; in fact to maintain tranquility, to preserve peace! Sir Charles Napier did not fulfill these duties two months; well might he dispense with all the machinery requisite for pacification, when he thus thought and acted :—” The intrigues of these people are very silly, and like a tangled web; we can cut the Gordian knot, as Alexander did—we are too strong to take the trouble to untie it.”

The letter from which this is extracted is given as No. 32 of the Second Blue Book on Sindhian Affairs, but the words marked in italics are omitted! On his principle, all policy but the application of force is waste of time—all instruments but sword and bayonet useless. With such political supervision no native state, under British protection, could exist longer than did that of Sindh under Sir Charles Napier’s Political management. Fortunate, indeed, is it for the princes of the other Hyderabad, for those of Nagpoor, Lucknow, Baroda, Gwalior, &c., &c., that they have men of a different “ judgment in what constitutes greatness,” to control—but also to protect—them. Placed at the mercy of such a modern Alexander, who when strong enough to cut the knot of political difficulty will not “take the trouble to untie it,” their rich capitals would be sacked, and their kingdoms appropriated, with even less trouble than was required for the spoliation of the unfortunate princes of Sindh. I was employed amicably to control, not to subvert the Ameers, and did so for three years. Sir Charles Napier had ostensibly the same duty to perform for his Government; in less than as many months he picked a quarrel with them and commenced hostilities; drove them from their habitations; hunted them until compelled to resist; hurled them from their thrones; sacked their capital; and seized their country!

4 Extract Letter, 23d January 1843.
SECTION II.

THE TREATIES WITH THE AMEERS AND THE CASUS BELLII THENCE SUPPLIED.

It is an object with General Napier to impress on his countrymen that the war in Sindh, and its result, the annexation of that province to our empire, arose out of the refusal of the Ameers to comply with certain Just demands made upon them by Lord Ellenborough, and sought to be enforced by his General: demands he is pleased to compare with the propositions recommended by myself, and to characterize the latter “as quite in the aggressive spirit of Lord Auckland’s policy, which never appears to have been distasteful to Major Outram, until Lord Ellenborough deprived him of his situation; but then the Ameers seemed to rise in his estimation.”*

General Napier, has, by his reiterated endeavors to fix on me the responsibility of the demands made on the Ameers, rendered it necessary that I should enter more fully into the Sindh policy than I intended or could have wished.

The “aggressive spirit” of my views will be best appreciated by placing them in contrast with the forbearance of his brother. To do so satisfactorily, it will be necessary to give a brief historical sketch of the events which preceded the tendering of the treaties of 1842-43.

In 1832, the British authorities deemed it advisable to seek a closer alliance with the “barbarians” on their western frontier, and Sir Henry Pottinger was deputed to Sindh to arrange a new treaty with its rulers. In virtue of that treaty, merchants and travelers were allowed ingress to the country, under certain restrictions, and the Indus was opened to our commerce—but specially closed against armed boats, and declared to be unavailable for the transport of troops and military stores. The treaty contained a few other comparatively unimportant items, and was declared confirmatory of pre-existing ones, as well as a guarantee of perpetual friendship between the two contracting parties, who solemnly pledged themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

In 1834, a tariff, the preparation of which was stipulated for in the treaty of 1832, was definitively fixed, and the amount and mode of collection of the river tolls, satisfactorily arranged.
In the beginning of 1838, further concessions were obtained. The permanent residence at Hyderabad of a British Political Agent, with a suitable escort, was consented to, and the friendly mediation of the British with Runjeet Sing, king of Lahore, formally accepted. Towards the end of the same year, the Ameers were induced to admit our troops into Sindh, on the understanding that these were to pass on to Afghanistan; and the venerable Roostum Khan was persuaded to grant the loan of the fortress of Bukkur "during the continuance of the war." The importance of this concession, in the then existing position of our affairs, scarcely admits of calculation, and deeply enhances the guilt of the subsequent conduct towards this chief, which I shall have occasion hereafter to expose. The British had scarcely obtained a footing in the country, ere an obsolete claim of twenty-one lakhs on behalf of Shah Shooja, was pressed, and the location in Sindh of a subsidiary force, and three lakhs of annual tribute towards its maintenance, demanded, besides the entire use of the Indus, free from any transit duties whatever. This exemption was afterwards decided to extend even to the subjects of Sindh, a decision which caused much umbrage to, and was never cordially acquiesced in by the Ameers, who declared that they understood the treaty, even in its broadest interpretation, to apply only to British and foreign commerce and traders. Lord Auckland had done me the honor to place me in political charge of Sindh and the neighboring States. During my incumbency, I observed that the treaties then in force were far from satisfactory,—both as less explicit and less favorable to both parties than they might be rendered. The defects I pointed out, and the required remedies I suggested. The existence of the former was recognized by those in power, and the latter were acknowledged to be alike suitable and adequate. Precipitancy, even in effecting good, I had ever shunned; but a fitting period soon arrived for removing the defects alluded to.

To our triumphs in Afghanistan had succeeded an unsettled period, terminating in calamities that finally drove us from the country. The Dooranee alliance was at an end; the decree went forth that every British soldier was to be withdrawn from the country, and that the line of the Indus was for the future to be our western frontier. Ambiguities, which formerly were productive of inconvenience, might, under our altered circumstances, lead to more serious evils, and on every view of the case it became advisable to remodel our treaties with the Ameers of Sindh— as well for our own immediate benefit as to enable us to exert a beneficial control over that country. To strengthen our military position by obtaining territorial possession of Kurrachee and Sukkur Bukkur—the sites of our two camps; totally and beyond cavil to abrogate the river tolls, thereby unfettering commerce and removing a prolific source of misunderstanding between the Ameers and ourselves; and to procure for the steamers composing the Indus flotilla, an ample supply of fuel, which, by the restrictions then existing, was inadequate and likely soon to be exhausted—were the principal objects sought to be attained in the new treaty.

5 Afterwards increased by half a lakh from Meer Shere Mahamed.
The basis on which I sought to frame it was an equitable one—a fair purchase of the privileges sued for—by relinquishing the three lakhs and fifty thousand rupees (£35,000) of tribute hitherto furnished, and arrears due, of considerable amount.

Deeming it advisable, with reference to the security of our position in Sindh, that we should acquire Shikarpoo and its dependencies, as well as Sukkur Bukkur, I tendered this as an alternative suggestion, adding, that were it adopted, Kurrachee and our river relations must be left as they were. Either arrangement I considered just; to exact more than the one or the other, in consideration of the pecuniary value tendered, would be, I considered, unjust. Yet this is the proposition which the General characterizes, in the quotation already given from page 99, as “quite in the aggressive spirit of Lord Auckland’s policy.”

Though to render “the British power invulnerable,” was undoubtedly an object of primary importance, and one never lost sight of by me, yet my principal reason for wishing to acquire Shikarpoo was my anxiety to further another of the professed ends we had in view in framing the new treaty—the amelioration of the condition of the people of Sindh. This was an object I had long desired to attain by fair and honorable negotiation, and to it I had devoted much anxious consideration; but, however desirable in itself, I considered that we were not warranted in forcing emancipation even on an oppressed people, in revolutionizing the institutions of a country, or perpetrating injustice on its rulers, in order to give to its inhabitants a milder or better code than that to which they had been accustomed. As is the case with all semi-barbarous nations, there was occasional oppression practiced in Sindh, and appeals were from time to time made to myself and my assistants, against particular acts of individual functionaries. But, beyond friendly intercession, we had no right to interfere with the course of justice, nor with their fiscal arrangements. The systems in force were rooted in, and sprang from, the habits and ideas of the people, and were as much a reflection of the national mind of Sindh, as our own constitution is of that of Britain. To improve those habits, to enlarge their minds, and thereby to render them fit for a better system, appeared to me the object we should propose to ourselves. Actuated by these views, I readily concurred in the proposition of Lord Auckland, that we should negotiate for the acquirement in perpetuity, as British territory, of the district of Shikarpoo; advancing as an argument in favour of the plan, that it would enable us to guide the Sindh rulers by example, without that interference betwixt them and their subjects which I so much deprecated. I pointed out that the acquired territory would afford an asylum to the oppressed, and that the neighboring Native Governments would be constrained to imitate our mild and enlightened sway, lest their people should desert from their dominions to ours.

And while I think I have sufficiently vindicated the suggestion made by me against the charge of being aggressive or unjust, I trust I may also plead, that I must also have had strong grounds for believing it to be safe and practicable, since at the time when I made these suggestions I had been informed, that the appointment of “Envoy” to the States on the Indus, was to be conferred on me, and had every reason to believe, that on myself
would devolve the responsibility of maintaining, within those limits, the security of our power and the prosperity of our commerce.

Nor is there the least reason to doubt, that these terms, if then proposed, would have been readily assented to. On the 20th of June 1842, I officially reported as follows:—” If I am allowed to communicate with the Ameers on the above grounds, I anticipate little difficulty in satisfactorily concluding the arrangements desired by his Lordship, before the army returning from Afghanistan passes through Sindh.”

The terms proposed, were not only devoid of injustice, but imposed no penalty whatever, even on those Ameers who had been implicated in the puerile intrigues against us. I deemed none such absolutely necessary. On the return of our troops I well knew, as I assured Lord Ellenborough that all cabals against us would cease. Such as had been indulged in, were caused by a distrust of our intentions, and, with one exception—the attempt of Meer Roostum’s minister, Futty Mahommed Ghorree, to embroil us above the passes through the agency of Mahommed Sheriff,—they were of a petty character, such as ever abound at oriental courts. I thus explained my views of their extent on the 21st of May 1842,—” neither do I think that such changeable, puerile, and divided chieftains are ever likely to enter into a very deep, and consequently dangerous conspiracy.”

I expressed similar sentiments in my private letters to Mr. Secretary Maddock on the 20th of August, and to Sir Charles Napier on the 14th of September. In the latter communication I observed:—

“You will have learned from my assistants in Lower Sindh the divided and weak state of the Ameers’ government, and the puerile spirit of the Ameers themselves, from which you will doubtless be satisfied that no formidable hostile combination could be organized against us, either in Upper or Lower Sindh, even should the Ameers have the hardihood to assume the offensive, which I consider is not now to be apprehended.”

Still, strictly just and favorable to the Ameers as were the proposed terms, and unwilling as I was to punish them for their past offences, when danger could no longer be apprehended from their intrigues, I was well aware that unless good ground was shown for interfering with the previous treaties of 1839, those Chiefs would not consent to any alteration thereof, and that similar objections would now be advanced by them, (and with still greater force,) to those urged when the existing treaties were tendered. “Yes, here is another annoyance,” said Meer Noor Mahommed, showing the previous treaties; since the day that Sindh has been connected with the English, there has always been something new; your Government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship; but we cannot be continually persecuted.”

I accordingly in my dispatch of the 21st June, thus expressed myself:—

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6 Lieutenant Eastwick’s Dispatch, dated 26th January 1839.
7 Page 373, No. 356, First B. B.
“I respectfully premise, that I think it would be necessary to show, as a ground for requiring new arrangements, that we have of late been exposed to the inimical intrigues of some of the Ameers; that, therefore, we are called upon to demand such arrangement as will ensure security for the future to our power and to commerce, which, as at present situated, is liable to be interrupted.”

It was, therefore, merely with a view to facilitate negotiations for what I deemed really necessary, and no more than just, that I availed myself of the intrigues in which some of the Ameers had become involved, but which, otherwise, would have been unworthy of notice.

As much unfair use is made by General Napier of the intrigues of the Sindh Chiefs, it is essential to examine into this matter a little more closely. At page 99, vol. i., he says:—

“Major Outram at this period, (June 1842,) told him, (Lord Ellenborough,) that he had it in his power to expose the hostile intrigues of the Ameers, to such an extent as might be deemed sufficient to authorize the dictation of any terms to those Chiefs, or any measures necessary to place British power on a secure footing.”

As I have already on more than one occasion said, the cabals of the Ameers were the result of that spirit of intrigue which is inherent in oriental character. Puerile, and easily frustrated by a mixture of discretion and firmness, they originated in a distrust of our intentions, (since, alas, too sadly justified,) and were fomented by emissaries from above the passes. At one period, and then only, were they a legitimate source of alarm, when our disasters in Afghanistan placed us in a great measure at the mercy of the Chiefs of Sindh. At that fearful crisis no “organization” was required; less than “a deep conspiracy” would have sufficed to work results the most disastrous to us—even their negative hostility, evinced by withholding supplies, would have placed us in a position which it is fearful even to contemplate. But I knew the people with whom I had to deal, and they in turn knew me.

Strong though the temptations were to which they were exposed, I throughout expressed my confidence, that aided by zealous, intelligent, and practical officers, then constituting the political department of Sindh and Baluchistan, I should be able to restrain them. Events have amply justified that confidence. It would not, however, have been right to neglect taking precautions for the future; I therefore deemed it proper to convince the Ameers, that, though silent, we had not been unobservant. In forgiving what had taken place, I was anxious to guard against its recurrence. On the 21st of June I therefore expressed myself as follows; and I request attention to the subjoined extract, as confirming what I have stated as to the extent to which I thought it either advisable or justifiable, to avail ourselves of those charges of intrigue or double-dealing, with which some of the Ameers appeared to be chargeable.
“The evidence which I have already submitted to Government, even if deficient in legal proof, gives, I consider, sufficient data for suspecting that intrigues were in progress, and for taking the precautions necessary for self-preservation.” “These considerations would, I should suppose, justify the dictation of our own terms to the Ameers, although generously at the same time relinquishing for ever, as an equivalent for what we justly assumed the right to demand, all pecuniary claims we possess on them, and even making up to such Chiefs as ice have no claims against, what we estimate they may sacrifice pecuniarily by the arrangement.”

At no time, however, were the intrigues referred to universal, and the parties implicated, were so in very different degrees; many of the Ameers being entirely innocent. Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad is represented throughout the Blue Book as having been one of the most active in intrigue from first to last, and therefore justly amenable to a greater degree of punishment than the others, should punitive measures be had recourse to. In the treaty which I drew up, no penal clause was actually introduced, but I should not have been unwilling at the time to inflict some punishment on this Chief. Believing that sufficient proof was at hand to substantiate all the charges brought against him, I wrote, (page 357, First Blue Book,)—“I should not be sorry to afford Government grounds for making an example of Nusseer Khan ;” adding, “one such example would effectually deter the other Chiefs of this country from plotting in future.” Yet, General Napier, quoting a portion of my words, describes me at page 103, as exhibiting the warmth of a partizan and “ diligently collecting proofs,” &c.; leading the reader to infer that I included the other Ameers in my penal recommendations, and neglecting to add, that my treaty did not seek to punish even Meer Nusseer. Meers Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, were suspected to be concerned in hostile intrigues, but to a less extent. Roostum, although not personally culpable, was politically answerable for the conduct of his minister Futteh Mahommed Ghorree, but his former acts of friendship towards us gave him strong and unquestionable claims on the forbearance of the British Government;9 Meers Mahommed Khan and Shadad of Hydrabad, were very slightly, if at all implicated ; and of the remaining reigning Ameers, Meer Mahommed of Khyrpoor, (whose fort of Emaum Ghur we destroyed,) Hoossain Ali, and Sobdar Khan of Hyderabad, not one had been even accused of a single hostile or unfriendly act. The latter, on the contrary, had proved himself the fast friend of the British from our first entry into Sindh.

Nor can I at all admit, that even in those cases where I officially preferred or forwarded charges against some of the Ameers, they were so forwarded, on the footing that I myself considered them as warranting a conviction. My orders, (imperative,) were to lay before

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8 No. 343, Page 341, First Blue Book.
9 Note 5. “That Chief's hitherto uniform friendship to the British Government may fairly entitle him to more lenient treatment for his recent infidelity, than is due either to Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, whose intrigues, &c., or, to his namesake of Khyrpoor.” — (See Dispatch, dated 26th June 1842, No. 347, pp. 346 of Blue Book.)
Sir Charles Napier, “the several acts whereby the Ameers or Chiefs may have seemed to have departed from the terms or spirit of their engagement, and to have evinced hostility or unfriendliness towards the Government of India.” In obedience to those orders, I preferred charges against some of the Upper Sindh Ameers, and forwarded the mass of charges, most of them very frivolous, which had been furnished by my assistant at Hyderabad against certain of those of Lower Sindh. The degree to which the two Ameers of Upper, and one of those of Lower Sindh, were supposed to be implicated, I considered to afford fair grounds for requiring the consent of Durbars of Khyrpoor and Hyderabad, to such modifications of the previous treaties as our altered circumstances rendered necessary; for the Chiefs not personally implicated, had, I conceived, by concealing the intrigues of their comrades, to some degree participated in their guilt.

But it will be apparent from this preamble, that I neither assumed that all the Ameers were implicated, nor grounded even on the participation of those whom I had reason to believe guilty, any actual penal treatment against them. But with reference to what I have already stated to be the object I had contemplated, I considered that the existing state of the circumstances and of the evidence, entitled us to assign the following grounds as the preamble of the treaty.

No. 357, First Blue Book.—“Quetta, June 21st, 1842.—Whereas it has become known to the Governor-General of India, that Certain of the Princes of Sindh had entered into treasonable correspondence with the enemies of the British Government, with a view to the expulsion of the British troops from Sindh, and closing the river Indus; the following additional stipulations to the treaties formerly contracted between the British Government and the Ameers of Sindh, are found necessary to secure the British power and commerce on the Indus, on the one hand, and the Government of Sindh, on the other, from being endangered in future by the factious intrigues of any individual Ameer, which, if proceeded in, would sacrifice the whole.”

It subsequently turned out that the proofs of the correspondence were less satisfactory than had been assumed; nay, that strong reason existed for believing a portion of it, at least, fictitious. By that time I had ceased to exercise authority in Sindh, but I strongly urged on Sir Charles Napier the impropriety of assigning as the justification of the new treaty— which then contained penal clauses—offences which it was impossible to prove, and which were strenuously denied. Yet these supposititious offences, which Sir Charles Napier is applauded by his brother for punishing, the latter blames me for having alluded to, in a preamble written when the evidence was supposed to be valid, and prefixed to a treaty no less beneficial to the parties accused than to ourselves. He sneeringly remarks at page 108, vol. 1st:

“Lord Ellenborough rejected Major Outram’s counsel and treaty, and condemned the offensive tone of the preamble.”

His Lordship merely objected to the preamble, on the score of expediency; he had no objection to it on that of its tone. Lord Ellenborough simply observed, (page 381, First Blue Book):—
“The Governor-General would not deem it expedient to make any reference in the preamble of the treaty to the treachery attributed to the Ameers, although in negotiating such treaty, his lordship might avail himself of such proofs as might exist of that treachery; neither would his lordship deem it expedient to go beyond the actual necessity of the case, and to make any promises or stipulations, as to the future, which could be avoided.”

The concluding article of the treaty, as proposed by myself, was (vide No. 357, First B. Book,)

“...In consideration of the above cessions, and that the Sindh Government has yet derived none of the benefits held out to it by throwing open the river, the British Government releases the Ameers from all pecuniary obligations whatever, i.e. from the payment of tribute, by the Ameers of Hyderabad, of three lacs of rupees annually; from ditto, by the Ameer of Meer-pore, of half a lac of rupees annually; from ditto, of one lac of rupees annually, and arrears of three years past, due by the family of the late Meer Moobaruck Khan, of Khyrpoor, also of the installment of seven lacs of rupees, due by Meer Moobarnck Khan’s family, on behalf of Shah Soojah. The British Government further pledges itself, never, hereafter, to make any further claims on the Sindh Government, either pecuniary, or for cession of territory.”

In addition to the terms proposed by my draft treaty, Lord Ellenborough desired that those Ameers against whom the evidence of inimical designs were strongest, should be punished by depriving them of a small portion of their territory, and that this should be added to the dominions of Bhawul Khan, an ally whose conduct was deemed deserving of reward. The justice of this could not be disputed, and in conformity with instructions received to that effect, I submitted, on the 26th of June 1842, an arrangement by which Subzulkote, which had recently been wrested from Bhawul Khan, should be restored to him. This transference was at the expense of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, and the Ameer of the same name of Khyrpoor, the chiefs who had rendered themselves most amenable to punishment. To this his Lordship afterwards added Boongbarra, of which Bhawul Khan had also been despoiled, and which was in the possession of Meer Roostum Khan. This also I considered reasonable, as the forfeited property bore but a fair proportion to the fine imposed on Nusseer Khan. The annual value of the confiscated districts was 130,000 rupees; which, together with other stipulations embraced in the arrangements, gave an aggregate of 446,000 rupees, a sum nearly met by what we relinquished in tribute, and more than met by relinquishing the claims which still existed against the family of the late Meer Mobaruc,¹⁰ whose possessions had now devolved upon his son, Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor above-mentioned.

In a letter dated 3d November 1842, his Lordship, however, gave instructions to the General to impose a further forfeiture of all the territory extending from Bhawul Khan’s frontier to Roree, the aggregate mulct being of the annual value of 840,500 rupees, (vide Table I., Appendix C.)—an increase on that last proposed of 394,000 rupees.

¹⁰ Annual tribute, 100,000 rupees; and 700,000 rupees, claimed on behalf of Shah Soojah, and arrears. Total, 1,328,000 rupees.
The draft treaties had reached Sir Charles Napier on the day I left Sindh for the first time — the 12th November. Concluding, on seeing this additional exaction, that there must be some mistake, I suggested his referring the matter to his Lordship before presenting the treaties. This he appears not to have done for two months and eighteen days — not till the 30th January 1843! The Governor-General’s answer, authorizing him to remit this additional exaction, was dated the 9th of February, and could not have reached him till after the battle of Meeanee had, to use his own term, “cut the Gordian knot,” consigning thousands to a bloody grave; the country to the British: the Ameers to captivity and exile.

It was not, however, in their territorial exactions alone, which, in truth, never came into practical operation that these last instructions of the Governor-General were felt to be hard, and tended to provoke hostilities. By it the Ameers were to be deprived of the privilege and profit of coining. The pecuniary value of their mint operations I do not exactly know; but it was not so much the money consideration involved, as the abandonment of a highly cherished prerogative of sovereignty, which rendered the proposed arrangement most obnoxious to the Ameers. The proposition that the money intended for circulation in Sindh should be coined in their behalf, with the Queen’s image on one side, plausible as it might appear to those at home, simply betrayed an entire ignorance of the Mahometan creed and code, and of its influence on the Indian mind. Such a coinage was, in fact, in direct contravention of the principles of Islam.  

Though milder far than Sir Charles Napier’s subsequent unauthorized exactions, let the terms of the treaty, as it stood at the moment of which I am speaking, be contrasted with the equitable purchase which I had recommended. This recommendation, as we have seen, General Napier described as evincing a aggressive spirit! — adding at the same page—

“It was not, however, in the spirit of that nobleman’s (Lord Ellenborough’s) instructions, which, far from desiring to take advantage of past misdeeds, gave warning for the future only, and expressed a desire to believe the Ameers faithful, offering them a new intercourse on well understood grounds.”

He here alludes to certain warning letters sent to me by Lord Ellenborough, for transmission to the Ameers suspected of hostile designs, which I withheld, and for

\[11\] The following may be cited as a remarkable instance of the opinions entertained on this point:—Some years ago, the Home Government, anxious to evince their friendship towards our old ally, the Imaum of Muscat, dispatched from England a splendid vessel —” The Prince Regent Yacht,” —believing the gift would be very acceptable to his Highness, who has always prided himself in the possession of a numerous fleet of vessels of war. Unfortunately, however, from inattention to, or ignorance of, the Mahometan feeling on this point, this princely gift was worse than worthless in his Highness’ eyes. The yacht was most handsomely carved, gilded, and figured: the tenets of his faith were thus violated; and, after retaining possession for a short time, the Imaum requested permission to return the vessel. This was acceded to; and the quondam yacht of the most powerful monarch of Europe, was, I believe, converted into a transport. This anecdote will enable my readers to form a judgment of the feelings with which Lord Ellenborough’s proposition regarding the future Sindh currency would have been received by the Ameers.
withholding which, General Napier condemns me. My reader must excuse the digression, while I turn aside to expose the gross ignorance of my assailant.

The following were the instructions which accompanied the letters in question:—

“The Governor-General is led to believe that you may have some reason to doubt the fidelity of one or more of the Ameers of Sindh. He, therefore, forwards three similar letters, to be addressed according to circumstances, and at your discretion, to such one or more of the Ameers as you have ground for suspecting of intrigues hostile to the British Government; and you will distinctly understand, that the threat contained in this letter is no idle threat, intended only to alarm, but a declaration of his Lordship’s fixed determination to punish, cost what it may, the first chief who may prove faithless, by the confiscation,” &c., &c.

The letter for the Ameers was thus expressed:—

“I will confide in your fidelity and in your friendship, until I have proof of your faithlessness and of your hostility in my hands; but be assured, that if I should obtain such proofs, no consideration shall induce me to permit you to exercise any longer a power you will have abused,” &c. &c. &c.

Here was not merely a warning for the future, but an intelligible denunciation of vengeance for the past, whenever proofs should be obtained of hostile designs; and such proofs the Governor-General believed to be already in my hands, or in course of preparation. Threats like these, affording no locus penitentice, but, on the contrary, shutting the door of hope, not only on those who had directly committed themselves, but on all who had indirectly been cognizant of their intrigues, could have had no other tendency than to drive them to desperation. Concerning the cabals of the Ameers I had no misgivings, provided I were allowed to counteract the machinations of those enemies who were striving to turn them against us. Only three of the Ameers were seriously committed, and they mainly from mistrust of our intentions towards them; for they had been led to suspect that we purposed appropriating their country, when our withdrawal from Afghanistan afforded facilities for so doing. The other Ameers, who gave us credit for greater generosity, could not be persuaded to turn against us. They were, however, aware of these intrigues, which honor forbade them to betray, and the receipt of the threatening letters referred to, offering no indemnity for the past, would have terrified them into making common cause with their more guilty brethren, as the only course by which they could hope to avert the vengeance denounced against the “faithless;”—for in this category, they must have concluded that they were placed by their non-revelation of the plots of which they might have been cognizant. If not driven to hostilities I was confident I could control them until the return of our armies from Afghanistan, and I assured the Governor-General that their intrigues “would cease, so soon as our troops were released from above the passes.” But my apprehension was, that if letters containing such a menace were sent, they would be precipitated into hostilities—a consummation especially to be avoided at the tremendous crisis during which the letters arrived, and I therefore took upon myself to withhold them. To avail myself of them or not, had been left to my
own discretion; and his Lordship approved entirely of my not having presented them. This fact that the Governor-General approved of this step, General William Napier is obliged to admit; but the following is his commentary on the subject:—

“Major Outram withheld the Governor-General’s warning letters to the Ameers lest, as he said, fear should drive them, and the chiefs of the tribes, to extremity, all being alike conscious of treasonable practices. This view of the matter was approved of by Lord Ellenborough, and it was a convincing proof that his object was tranquility not subjugation; but he seems to have committed an error, inasmuch as he should have been careful to keep his own manly policy clear of the crooked paths of his predecessors. To declare oblivion of the past, to look only to the future.”

It was, as I have shown, just because these letters did not declare oblivion for the past, but rather the reverse, that I objected to them; and I venture to think that in approving of my conduct in keeping them back, his Lordship neither committed an error, nor compromised the manliness of his policy, but simply showed that he was aware of the danger of driving the Chiefs of Sindh to extremities, at a time when the safety of our armies depended on their assistance.

At page 109, vol. i., General William Napier continues:—

“Even this he (Lord Ellenborough) did not positively contemplate; he desired the Ameers’ minds should be left tranquil, and disclaimed any intention of making hasty changes in his political relations with them, hoping no doubt that the operations of Nott and Pollock, then in full activity, would, in conjunction with the presence of General England’s column, check any further disposition for hostility.”

“Fresh offences on the part of the Ameers soon dissipated this hope, and showed the error of withholding the warning letters of the Governor-General to the Ameers. If they had failed to quell the angry spirit of the Ameers, they would have placed the British cause in a more dignified posture, and could scarcely, as Major Outram supposes, have hastened an outbreak, seeing,” &c.

The drift of this passage—which seems expressed with studied obscurity—is to convey the impression that all danger from the effect of the letters to the Ameers would have been counteracted by the effect of Nott and Pollock’s operations, “ then in full activity,” and the advance of England’s column.

Now, the letters destined for the Ameers were intended to reach them upwards of two months before “the operations of Nott and Pollock were in full activity,” And While The Governor-General Was Reiterating His Order For Retreat! So far from England’s column being in Sindh, or its neighborhood, “to check any further disposition to hostility,” on the part of the Ameers, that officer was shut up in Candahar, and entirely dependent on their

12 No. 349. First Blue Book.
friendly aid to enable him to escape from Afghanistan. For, be it remembered, that this was the very period described by General Napier, (page 104, vol. i.) when, as he says, there existed “a secret confederation of the Brahooees and Belooch tribes, known to, and encouraged by the Ameers, with a view to a general revolt against the British supremacy, whenever new reverses in Afghanistan, which were expected, should furnish an opportunity. The sword was drawn for Islam.” At this time a feather might have turned the scale, and less inducement than these threatening letters supplied, would have sufficed to make the Brahooees and Belooches join the Afghans against us. In the words of Mr. Elphinstone—certainly as good an authority on Oriental matters as General Napier—“Our movements in every direction from Candahar depended on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us. Had they been disposed for more open enmity, General England’s column could neither have retired or advanced as it did; and it is very doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the opposition and privations he must have suffered in such a case.”

At such a crisis, then, it seems, the historian “would have placed the British cause in a more dignified position,” by driving those on whom our armies depended for the means of moving, to refuse their aid. Without that aid, it would have been impossible to retrieve the honor of our arms at Cabool; the communications between the different divisions of our force could not have been maintained, nor the troops withdrawn from Afghanistan, except at an entire sacrifice of baggage and materiel: and instead of a triumphant march through, and honorably conducted evacuation of that country, an ignominious and disastrous retreat must have followed. For, had such counsels as General Napier tends, been adopted, we should have had every tribe arrayed against us, from Kurrachee to Cabool. Destitute of carriages and indigent of supplies, our armies would have had to cut their way at a fearful sacrifice of life; and the defeated remnant that escaped from above the passes, would, on their arrival in the plains, have had to contend against the whole power of the then hostile and elated Belooches.

But General Napier professes to believe, that the letters “could scarcely have hastened an outbreak, seeing that the resolution of the Ameers was fixed to regain their independence, and their preparations to affect that object were steady, changing only as the mutations of the Afghan war gave them hopes or fears.”

How far do the facts bear out this bold assertion? At the time referred to, we had barely troops enough to afford guards for the two small camps at Sukkur and Kurrachee, with the outposts of Dadur, Shikarpooor, and Tatta—to the best of my recollection, scarcely 2000 men in all; and during the season when no reinforcements can proceed from India to Sindh, either by sea or land. Our armies were shut up in Afghanistan, and their return, in any state of organization, the Ameers could, as I have already shown, have easily prevented. Is it not, then, strange—passing strange—that, with so great an object as “their independence” so steadily in view, they should not have struck the requisite blow, at the time when it could have been dealt with such terrible effect? Strange, that with a deeply
laid, and perseveringly entertained determination to attack us, they should not only have delayed hostilities till we had retrieved our disasters in Afghanistan, but have supplied to us the resources which enabled us to do so; that they should have waited till, by their assistance, General England’s column, with all its munitions of war, was safely in their country, and an army of 25,000 men within a few marches of their country—reinforcements the while pouring in by sea. Does General Napier himself believe, or does he merely presume so far on the credulity of his countrymen, as to hope to make them believe that the Ameers of Sindh were totally destitute of all sense, of all foresight, of all knowledge of the practices of war—blind to all prudential considerations? Does he think it probable—will he assert that he conceives it possible—that, if bent on war, they would not only have neglected the means of turning it to their own advantage, but have assisted in strengthening their enemy, and done their utmost to enable him to escape from the toils of their own net?

He proceeds—

“To destroy Colonel England’s column, on its return from Candahar, when Nott moved against Cabool, was part of this scheme; its success was to be the signal for a gathering of all the nations, to fall on the British force, which would then have been weak and isolated at Sukkur and Kurrachee. Some default of concert, and the unexpected strength of England’s column, far more numerous than the one he led up to Candahar, prevented the meditated attack on that officer; and by his arrival at Sukkur, Sindh was once more strongly occupied.”—P. 106.

Whatever intrigues were entered into by Afghan, Brahois, Seikh, or Belooch chiefs, and the Ameers of Sindh, they are well known to the Government of India to have been counteracted by my measures; and that such was once Sir Charles Napier’s opinion, is shown by the following extract from a letter which that officer addressed to me on the 25th January 1843:—“Lord Ellenborough seeing everything going wrong, and very dangerously wrong, too, had you not saved England’s column” It does not, however, suit General William Napier to accord to me any merit whatever: he, therefore, assigns the frustration of those schemes to other causes, and endeavors to give the credit to his brother, who only reached Sukkur when General England’s last detachment having descended from Afghanistan, and cleared the Bolan pass, was beyond the possibility of opposition, and an end had been put to any dreams of “expelling the British from Sindh,” that might heretofore have been indulged in.
England’s army) was a check and discouragement to the Ameers; and the Ghoree’s policy was then thwarted by the vigorous and dexterous diplomacy of Sir Charles Napier. * * * A great commotion, extending probably to Nepaul and Gualior, to Bundelcund and the districts south of the Nerbuddah, would then have shaken India to its centre, and proved the foresight with which Lord Ellenborough assembled the army of reserve on the Sutledge. It was, therefore, most necessary to the general interests of India, that Sir Charles Napier, by an adroit and firm diplomacy, and an imposing military attitude, should keep the Ameers in a state of irresolution as to their intended outbreak during that critical period.”

I have carefully looked over the Parliamentary papers, but can find no data on which the historian founds his assertion that all these nations had “combined to fall on the British stations with 200,000 men,” &c.; and as the reports of such plots, had they ever been made, must at that time have passed through my hands, I can have no doubt, that, like much of what General William Napier has put forth, “ all this,” to quote an expression of his brother’s, “ is a picture of imagination.” Far from Sir Charles Napier’s interference with the Ghoree’s policy, or the exertion of his “vigorous and dexterous,” “adroit and firm” diplomacy, having anything to do with the counteraction of the dangers which caused the assembly of the army of reserve on the Sutledge, the following extract from a letter, addressed by the Governor-General to Sir Charles Napier, dated Simla, 8th October 1842, (page 1, Second B. Book,) shows that General England’s army had been released from Afghanistan, and that all danger had passed away before Sir Charles Napier appeared on the stage. “The Seikh Government acts in the most friendly manner, and the successes obtained in Afghanistan secure the continuance of the aid we have hitherto received from it. There is, therefore, no longer any necessity for holding a considerable force together at Sukkur. The army marches from Cabool to-day, and the last column of Major-General England’s troops will probably be at Dadur13 to-day.”

The reader will now be able to form his own opinion how far Major-General William Napier has succeeded in his attempt to show, that whilst in authority in Sindh, I advocated a course of policy, the adoption of which I have strenuously opposed since that authority was transferred to others,—in fact, in his own words, that the measures of aggression only became

“Distasteful to Major Outram, when Lord Ellenborough deprived him of his situation; but then the Ameers seemed to rise in his estimation.”

In the succeeding chapters of this commentary, the subject will be still more clearly elucidated. I shall only here observe, that according to my arrangement, the Ameers were to be required to make a territorial cession of the value of 316,000 rupees; receiving more than pecuniary equivalent in remission of annual tribute, and arrears of tribute due from them under former treaties. Lord Ellenborough next directed, that lands of the annual value of 130,000 rupees should be transferred from the Ameers to the chief to whom they had recently belonged—Bhawul Khan. To this also I assented, not only on the above

13 In the plains below, and free of the Bolan pass.
account, but because the loss fell on those Ameers only who I really believed had, by their conduct, rendered themselves justly liable to the penalty. When, however, his Lordship’s fiat had gone forth for my summary removal from Sindh, my successor, Sir Charles Napier, was instructed to extend the confiscation to Roree, whereby lands of the annual value of 840,500 rupees were taken from the Ameers. I immediately did Lord Ellenborough the justice to assert that this order had been issued by mistake. To Sir Charles Napier alone is blame due for having neglected, for two months and eighteen days after I had pointed out the error, to bring it to his Lordship’s notice; when at last he did so, it was too late: the battle of Meeanee had in the meantime occurred, and his Lordship could not rectify the grave error which had been committed, though evidently he would have done so, had he received the timely information I suggested. Finally, by Sir Charles Napier’s arrangement with Ali Morad, further exactions, to the amount of 507,250 rupees, were made from the Ameers of Upper Sindh, which swelled the total amount of our demands to 1,347,750 rupees, out of a revenue estimated at 2,039,500 rupees. This fact the Governor-General does not appear to have been made aware of, until the 12th August 1843, (vide page 18, Second Sindh B. Book,) six months after the battle; although my letter, dated 24th January 1843, and acknowledged by him, (No. 33, Second Sindh B. Book,) furnished Sir Charles Napier with the information. The impositions by Lord Ellenborough’s treaty would, however, I contend, have been submitted to, but for the engagements to Ali Morad, and especially the most unwisely conceived, and fraudulently executed arrangement, depriving Meer Roostum Khan of the turban, or sovereignty, of Upper Sindh: a subject to which I shall devote a separate inquiry.
SECTION III.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER’S DIPLOMACY—THE CHARGES AGAINST THE AMEERS.

To understand the intricacies, to appreciate and make allowance for the peculiarities of Oriental character,—so as to administer the affairs of native states with advantage to them, and with credit to the Government of Great Britain—study and experience—a knowledge of the habits, customs, and institutions of the people is indispensable. Among Asiatics, as among the more civilized inhabitants of Europe, there are many apparent anomalies, but anomalies only to those who do not understand them; many social, legal, and political fictions, licenses, and discrepancies, which, to persons unacquainted with the people, appear as questionable and absurd as those which prevail in Europe would to Asiatics. Under the system of administration which has raised and supported the mighty fabric of our Indian empire, it may with truth be said, that no one is entrusted with political responsibility who is not presumed to have acquired this information and experience. In addition to these intellectual accomplishments, there are moral qualifications indispensable to a beneficial exercise of political authority in native states; firmness tempered with forbearance, that delicacy which shrinks from giving offence, and that magnanimity which avoids taking it—a disposition ever ready to put the most favorable construction on ambiguities, and, where punishment is not necessary, to pass lightly over misconduct. In these qualifications, Sir Charles Napier was singularly deficient: not only totally unacquainted with the language, feelings, and customs of those whom he undertook to manage, but rude and domineering in his demeanor, prejudiced by anticipation against the Indian character, suspicious and distrustful even where there was no reason to doubt the good faith of the native princes, and probably from this very feeling of his own incompetence to separate truth from falsehood, or discriminate between candor and imposture, naturally, though it may be unconsciously, or even unwillingly, led to precipitate an appeal to that weapon, of which he felt himself to be a greater master—the power of force, and the terror of the British arms.

To appreciate the provocation which the Ameers of Sindh experienced at his hands, it is necessary, in the outset, to bear in mind that they were independent sovereigns, receiving from their own subjects the homage due to royalty, and, up to the moment of Sir Charles Napier’s arrival, continuing to be addressed by all British functionaries in the respectful tone suited to their exalted position, and in that conventional language of respect and compliment which Oriental custom has established, which Oriental feelings demand, which sound judgment forbids to be discontinued, and which, in fact, had been specially enjoined by the supreme authority in India.
On his arrival in the country, Lord Ellenborough issued rules for the guidance of all political officers, in which they were directed, on all occasions to manifest the utmost personal consideration and respect to the several native princes with whom they might communicate; to attend to their personal wishes; to consider themselves the representatives of the friendship, as much as of the power of the British Government; and to be mindful, that even the necessary acts of authority may be clothed with the veil of courtesy and regard.

To the system thus acted upon from the first, in regard, not only to Sindh, but to all our Oriental relations, and so recently enforced by the supreme authority of India, the whole course of Sir Charles Napier’s policy and conduct was in direct contradiction.

His diplomatic career in India, prior to the commencement of the campaign in Upper Sindh, is elaborately divided by General William Napier into three periods.

“To the first period belongs Sir Charles Napier’s assumption of the political duties in Sindh, his immediate perception of the weak and vacillating system of his predecessors, in respect to the Ameers, his frank and vigorous intimation to those princes that the time was come when they must cease.”

“The second period was marked by a precise and vigorous analysis in pursuance of the Governor-General’s orders, of the proofs furnished by Major Outram, some direct, some circumstantial, of the Ameers’ hostile designs against British power.”

“The third period was marked by negotiations to induce the Ameers to accept quietly the new treaty, which Lord Ellenborough thought fit to impose on them, as a consequence of their frequent infractions of the old treaties, and to punish their secret measures of hostility to the British. This was doubtless the point, on which the question of justice or injustice rested, and it has been seen with what care, and pains, and acuteness, he examined and verified the proofs of the Ameers’ delinquency.”

The two first of these periods will form the subject of the present Section.

A quick perception of danger and hostility in Sindh, Sir Charles Napier undoubtedly evinced; a perception so swift, indeed, as to outrun probability, and so keen as to discern sources of alarm which to other eyes were invisible. He arrived in Sindh on the 9th of September 1842, when that province was in a state of complete tranquility, when all danger of an outbreak had passed away, when British officers of all ranks, and British subjects of all conditions, accompanied by their wives and families, traversed Sindh in every direction, by land and by water, unguarded and unmolested.

Long, indeed, after the period of Sir Charles’ arrival, and long after his harsh measures had driven the Ameers to resistance; and when the Sovereign of Upper Sindh was a
houseless wanderer from his capital, officers passed unguarded to and fro through the
hostile districts, and beneath the “high embattled gates” of the hostile forts.\footnote{14}

Yet four months prior to that date, Sir Charles Napier styled Sindh a hostile country;
spoke of traveling up the Indus with a guard of fifty men, as a feat of daring approaching
to folly, and only to be justified by necessity.\footnote{15}

At Hyderabad he had his first interview with the Ameers; and here he gave the first
intimation of that “frankness” and “vigor” which are said to have characterized his
policy;—for, “while the flow of their politeness seemed to invite friendship,” he gave them “an
austere warning” for the future. Already, we are told, he had obtained proof that the
Ameers were acting “a disloyal part,” and he accordingly addressed to them a letter,
penned in that dictatorial and offensive tone which pervaded all his “negotiations.”
Without any complimentary preamble, deemed essential in letters to Eastern Princes,
without a single word of friendly preamble introduction, he thus abruptly commences:—

Page 358, First B. Book.—“General Napier has been informed, First, that your Highnesses
have prohibited the inhabitants of Kurrachee (a town belonging to them) to settle in the
Bazaar (of the British cantonment.)

“Second, That you have ordered every thing landed at the Bunder (the Ameers’ wharf) to be in
the first place taken to the Custom House, and taxed.

“Third, That your Highnesses levy tolls on the boats belonging to subjects of Sindh.

“Fourth, That your Highnesses ground your infraction of the articles, words, and spirit of the
treaty upon article V. of that treaty.*

“Upon the above four points General Napier does in the most explicit manner state, ‘First, That
the Governor-General of India will not suffer the slightest infraction of the treaty.\footnote{16}

“‘Second, That article of the treaty does not, and cannot guarantee to the Ameers the power to
break any other article of the treaty, still less the spirit of the treaty throughout.’

“*** General Napier, therefore, informs the Ameers that they must at once furnish the acting
political agent, Lieut. Mylne, with an order to the Kardar at Shikarpoo, directing him to
abstain from every direct or indirect toll on boats, whether they, the said boats, belong to Sindh

\footnote{14 Witness Lieut. Fitzgerald’s solitary journey from Emamghur to Hyderabad, via Omercote, in January 1843; my own
from the same starting point to Khyrpoor, through the camp of the fugitive princes, full of “fierce and ferocious
warriors”; and that of Dr. Ogilvie, from Sukkur to Jeyesalmer, by Khyrpoor, in the same month.}

\footnote{15 P. 20, vol. i—“I have now to travel 200 miles up the Indus with a guard of fifty men, through a hostile country. This
appears foolish, but I must do it.”}

\footnote{16 Article V. of the Treaty provides that “the jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into their
(the Ameers’) territories” and that “the officers of the British Government will not listen to, nor encourage, complaints
against the Ameers from their subjects.”}
or otherwise. And a second order to the authorities at Kurrachee, commanding them to abstain from any the slightest hindrance to the convenience and supplies of the inhabitants within the British cantonments at that station,” &c.

Let us examine the propositions so rudely and dictatorially put forth, in this his initial step in negotiation.

He interdicted the Ameers from levying customs at their own wharf at Kurrachee. In virtue of the treaty? No. For it was not stipulated that they were to relinquish what constituted the principal revenue of that place; and they had as much right to impose a duty on all imports, as had the British Government on the merchandize from Sindh, landed at our own wharfs; which the Custom-house returns of Bombay will prove it did.

But the historian, at page 114, assures us that the levying of such imports was a violation of the 12th and 13th articles of the treaty. Like very many of General Napier’s assertions, this is at variance with fact; and it is the less excusable, since he had the treaty to refer to.

The 12th article has reference merely to levying duties “on trading boats passing up and down the River Indus,” and only provides that goods landed “from such boats, on their passage up and down the river, and sold in a British camp or cantonment, shall be exempt from the payment of duty.” It expressly declares, that all merchandize not designed for a British camp or cantonment, “landed from such boats, on their passage up or down the river, shall be subject to the usual duties of the country.” The 13th article stipulates, that goods brought to the mouths of the Indus, (Gorabaree,) “and kept there at the pleasure of the owners, till the best period of the year for sending them up the river,” shall not be taxed; “but should any merchant land and sell any part of his merchandize, either at Gorabaree or anywhere else, (except at the British cantonment,) such merchant shall pay the usual duties upon them” But, perhaps, General Napier’s topographical ignorance may have led him into the mistake, and he may imagine that Kurrachee bunder is a river wharf, solely designed for the accommodation of the British troops. If so, I beg to inform him that Kurrachee is a seaport town, the exclusive property of the Ameers, unconnected with, and independent of, the British cantonment; and that the customs collected at its bunder, are sea customs.

The right of the Ameers to impose duties at their port of Kurrachee was never disputed; but, on the contrary, was officially recognized by the British Government. Colonel Pottinger, on the 14th October 1839, (vide First B. Book, p. 227,) submitted to the Ameers a memorandum, expressing the Governor-General’s expectation that their Highnesses “would fix, in concert with the Resident, a fair and moderate rate of port dues and customs.” They acquiesced; and though the tariff had not been framed when I relieved Colonel Pottinger, it was subsequently definitively settled, as will be seen by a reference to No. 271, First B. Book, p. 270. Yet Sir Charles Napier presumes authoritatively, and in a style the most offensive, to set aside an arrangement ratified by Government; thereby inflicting pecuniary loss on chiefs, whose minds the Governor-General desired might be
kept “tranquil.” This was the first act of spoliation; great, indeed, in itself, but rendered comparatively insignificant, by those which followed in quick succession.

Another ground assigned for addressing to them the abrupt communication above quoted was, that their Highnesses had “forbidden the inhabitants of Kurrachee to settle in the Bazaar” of the British cantonment, which General William Napier describes as “the hostile measure of isolating the British stations, by driving their subjects from the Bazaar.” This, we are told, “was a breach of the 1st article of the preamble, and of the whole spirit of the treaty, which professed amity and free intercourse.”

The 1st article of the treaty provides, that “there shall be lasting friendship, alliance, and unity of interest, between the Honorable East India Company” and the contracting Ameers. Let us see on which side the violation of the treaty rests.

The Ameers had, as an act of favor, remitted all land taxes on supplies required for the consumption of the camp—an act of generosity, which, on the 24th of June 1842, only eight months prior to the date of Sir Charles Napier’s arrogant letter, I was directed by the Government of India suitably to acknowledge, communicating to them “ the satisfaction with which the Governor-General in Council has received this additional proof of their friendly disposition, and of the liberal policy with which their administration is conducted,” (First B. Book, p. 309.) They neither could prevent, nor had they sought to prevent their subjects taking refuge, if they so desired, in the British camp, nor could they have “driven” one of them out of our Bazaar; but they had a right to expect, that, in return for their liberality, we would discourage the Kurrachee merchants from defrauding the revenue, by transferring their shops from the town where certain taxes were and always had been imposed, to our cantonments, which their friendly disposition had exempted from impost. Independent of the loss to their revenue, by such a perversion of their boon, the Ameers had claims against many of those who thus migrated, and placed themselves under British protection. To prevent their subjects deserting their own town for our camp, by confiscating the property of those who did so, was their undoubted right; as indefeasible as any exercise of sovereign power, and no more tyrannical than the rules enforced on wards in Chancery—our own “ Foreign Enlistment Act”—or the issuing of a ne exeat regno, by competent authority. It was a duty the Ameers owed themselves, to prevent their revenues being injured by a fraudulent abuse of the privileges accorded to us; and it was a duty we owed the Ameers to second their efforts. To encourage such evasions, betokened anything but a “friendly disposition” on the part of the British General: it was a direct invasion of the treaty, which provided for “unity of interests between the Ameers and the British Government.”

The exaction of river tolls from their own subjects, had been decided to be an infraction of the treaty, though the Ameers argued against such construction. Those of Lower Sindh had less to urge in support of their construction of the treaty than their brethren of Khyrpoor; and Sir Charles Napier was perfectly justified in directing a discontinuance of the practice. Whether he was justified in neglecting the express order of the Governor-
General—to clothe this necessary act of authority with the veil of courtesy and regard—is another question.

The second period of the Historian, viz. that devoted to the precise and vigorous analysis of the proofs against the Ameers, dates from the 5th of October, the day when Sir Charles Napier arrived at Sukkur. Here he found the following instructions awaiting him:—

“Should any Ameer or Chief, with whom we have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power, it is the present intention of the Governor-General to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend, so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct; but the Governor-General would not proceed in this course, without the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt in the person accused.”

The offences charged against the Ameers of Khyrpoor, were in all five. Three of these implicated Meer Roostum, the Rais or head of the family.

The first, was the charge of having authorized the writing of certain hostile letters. The second, was the levying of tolls from his own subjects, contrary, it was alleged, to the terms of the treaty. The treaty ratified in 1839 with the Ameers of Upper Sindh, though contemporary with, was distinct from, that imposed on their brethren of Hyderabad. The latter was of a penal character, in consequence of unfriendly acts towards us, and prohibited the levying of tolls; by the former, the contracting party merely bound itself to “cooperation with the other powers, in any measures that may hereafter be thought necessary for extending and facilitating the navigation of the Indus.” (First Sindh Blue Book, No. 106, p. 107.) As “the other powers” could only, by a very forced interpretation, be made to embrace the Hyderabad Government, which had been expressly prohibited from levying tolls at all, Meer Roostum understood it to refer to the Seikh and Bhawulpore authorities, who then retained, and still exercise the power. There certainly existed no documentary evidence, of any kind, to show that he had ever relinquished the right in this matter enjoyed by his neighbors. The question had, however, been decided against him by the Supreme Government; and by making restitution on demand, in the first case that occurred after Sir Charles Napier’s assumption of power, he conceded the point. By doing so, he surely merited indemnity for the past.

The third count in his indictment was, “seizing and confining British subjects, released on demand, but no reparation afforded.” The party claiming to be a British subject, in virtue of a temporary residence in the Bazaar of the British camp at Sukkur, was a native of the neighboring town of Roree, belonging to Meer Roostum, against whom the Sindh Government appear to have had pecuniary claims. He was apprehended by the Ameer’s officer as a revenue defaulter, when found within his master’s jurisdiction. In handing up this charge, I reported that I was “scrupulous in submitting it; as it does not appear that any reparation beyond release was ever demanded,” and the man had been released on application.
The fourth charge was against the minister of Meer Roostum, for aiding the escape of Mahommed Sherreef. Of the act, there was no doubt; but there were no grounds for suspecting Meer Roostum of having been privy to it. To have demanded his Minister’s expulsion from Sindh, we were perfectly entitled—and this I recommended. It was, however, determined by Sir Charles Napier to make the sovereign answerable for his minister, and on this principle he acted.

The fifth and last charge was against an agent of Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, for “placing in the stocks, and otherwise maltreating the servant of a British officer, and no punishment inflicted on the offender.” This man, though in the temporary service of a British officer, was a Sindh subject, and residing within the Ameers’ jurisdiction. He was suspected, and not without good reason, of acting as a spy. The Ameers’ officer had charged him with this offence, and with having, by his representations, caused all the liquor shops—which I need not observe are heavily taxed throughout India—of the city of ancient Sukkur, then belonging to the Ameers, but in the vicinity of the cantonment, to be closed. He was placed in the stocks for about an hour, and afterwards confined; but released immediately on an application to that effect being made from the “Agency.” It further appears, that Meer Nusseer Khan tendered a very adequate apology, when informed of the conduct of his servant, and expressed himself “certain that nothing of the kind will again occur.”

Similar to these, and even still more frivolous, were the mass of charges preferred against the Ameers of Lower Sindh.

Against Meer Nusseer of Hyderabad, however, as well as against Roostum of Khyrpoor, there stood an accusation of having, by letter, endeavored to excite certain of their neighbors to hostility against us. This charge, could it have been substantiated, would have fully justified the imposition of Lord Ellenborough’s demands, if not of even more stringent terms; and believing that sufficient evidence might be obtained, I introduced it into the preamble of my proposed treaty. It will presently be seen that the evidence was not only insufficient, but that strong reason existed for believing one of the parties, at least, to be innocent. So implicit was the confidence reposed in Sir Charles Napier by the Governor-General, that he believed he might safely rely on the reports of the former,—reminding him, however, that the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt was indispensable, and that, as we are told by General Napier—

“These acts must be clearly traced home to the Ameers, ere any demand in reparation can be justly made.”

P. 135.—” The demand for territory was a punishment to be inflicted only on proof of actual hostility evinced by the Ameers in their secret negotiations for an armed confederacy against the British; and to obtain this proof, the General tvas exhorted to use his utmost diligence” &c.
How, then, were these different charges dealt with?

By the collection of tolls, it had been decided, that the Ameers had infringed the existing treaty; and their collection was not sought to be denied. But the more closely I investigated the charge of hostile negotiations, which the accused parties resolutely denied, the greater appeared the difficulty, if not impossibility, of proving the authenticity of the intercepted letters on which it was founded. This I mentioned to Sir Charles Napier, strongly recommending him to ground the new treaty, since some reason must be assigned, on the admitted exaction of imposts, which, however regarded by the Ameers, had been definitively pronounced an infraction of the treaty. Such, I pointed out, would be the more manly course, and one not liable to misconstruction. It might be considered severe, but could not be caviled at as dishonest. He did not see fit to follow my advice; and on the 17th November 1842, (vide First B. Book, p. 453,) he thus wrote to the Governor-General:—

“The whole proceedings towards the Ameers, now depend, as I construe your decision, upon three things.

“1st, Is the letter of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, to Beebruck Boogtie, an authentic letter, or a forgery?

“2d, Is the letter of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor, to the Maharajah Shere Sing, an authentic letter, or a forgery?

“3d, Did Futteh Mahommed Ghoree, confidential agent of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor, assist at the escape of Mahommed Sherreef?”

These questions of guilt or innocence, on which so much depended, the “Historian” thus disposes of, (vol. i. p. 135) :—

“The required proofs were obtained, yet by a most rigid process. The General took an acknowledged seal of Nusseer’s, and compared it with that attached to the intercepted letter to Beebruck. They appeared similar. But when, with a minute earnestness, he measured each letter, and their distances, with a pair of compasses, a difference was perceptible. He was, however, assured that to have two seals thus differing to deceive, was notoriously the custom of the Ameers; whereupon he desired the persons who intercepted the letter, to procure for him also the secret seal of the prince. This they tried, but could not do; and thus removed from the General’s mind all suspicion of their treachery, seeing that a second forgery would have secured the object of the first, and was not more difficult. None of the persons, English or native, cognizant of the Ameer’s signet, doubted the authenticity of the intercepted seal; ** ** at last he obtained an authentic paper with the secret seal of Nusseer attached, and it was precisely the same as that of the intercepted letter; moreover, the writing accompanying the undoubted seal was known to be the writing of the Ameer’s favorite Moonshee, or scribe. The proof was therefore complete, &c. ** ** Roostum of Khyrpoor’s intercourse with the Maha Rajah was likewise proved by his seal, the authenticity of which was never questioned; and by the concurrent testimony of persons conversant with such matters, as to the style and verisimilitude of thought, but that the writing was that of his minister,” &c. &c.
Such is a specimen of the bold assertions with which General Napier endeavours to mislead his readers. No legal proof of the authenticity of the document was obtained; the rigid process by which it was sought to be acquired was merely so much time thrown away. The assertion that—"none cognizant of the Ameer’s signet doubted the authenticity of the intercepted seal," is entirely at variance with the truth. Seals are a species of evidence, which every one acquainted with judicial proceedings in India, knows to be most deceptive and untrustworthy, therefore never held alone to constitute legal proof. In Sindh especially, it is notorious that seal-forging is a trade. My assistant, Captain French, must remember the circumstance of a person being seized in the Sukkur Bazaar, (September 1841) on whom were found several seals of the Upper Sindh Ameers—which the prisoner declared he had stolen from the house of a Khyrpoor merchant, for whom these facsimiles must have been manufactured for dishonest purposes. I myself, had, on the 1st of January of the same year, to complain to their Highnesses the Ameers, of frequent forgeries of my own seals, which, appended to letters professedly written by me, had so far imposed on themselves, as to procure for their bearers grants of land. The “rigid process” of measuring by compasses, only proved two things,—the industry of the General, and that, if the seal were a forgery, it was well executed. It left the question of its authenticity where it found it. As regarded the authenticity of the hand writing of either of their letters, Sir Charles Napier had not the means of arriving at a correct conclusion. One of them, that purporting to be from Meer Nusseer Khan to Beebruck Boogtie, might, I thought, be authentic; but actual proof was required before punitive measures could justly be had recourse to. The authenticity of those which Meer Roostum was said to have sent to Shere Sing, was very doubtful. Both were obtained from a party in the interest of Ali Morad, whose object it was, as will afterwards be seen, to make the other Ameers, especially those of Khyrpoor, appear hostile to the British. My suspicions of Ali Morad were recorded so early as May 1, 1842, (page 324, margin, First B. Book,) and on transmitting the intercepted letter ascribed to Meer Roostum, on the 30th October (page 430, margin, First B. Book) I reiterated them as a reason for viewing with distrust evidence proceeding from such a quarter.

The letters to Shere Sing, Lieut. Postans, one of my assistants, had deemed genuine, and although skeptical myself, I handed them to Mr. Clerk, political agent at Umballa, who, being in frequent communication with the individual to whom they were addressed, was the person best qualified to test them, in the hope that he might be able to throw farther light upon the subject, and in order that, if proved genuine, he might make use of them. That gentleman professed himself unable to determine the question, at the same time declaring that he shared my doubts. I left Sindh on the 12th November, expressing these doubts, and advising Sir C. Napier to ground the demand for the new treaty on less questionable data—yet five days after, he thus writes to Lord Ellenborough (page 455, First B. Book) :—
“There are doubts in Major Outram’s mind whether Meer Roostum Khan was privy to this letter or not; but of its having his seal and being written by his confidential minister, Futty Mahommed Ghorree, there is no doubt.”

And on the next day he delivers himself as follows:—

“I have procured not only a similar seal to that of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, but on the cover of the letter to which it is attached, is writing known to be that of Chotram the Ameer’s confidential Moonshee. There now remains no question of the fact.”

The testimony of the seal I have shown to be valueless. Let us see how far the General was justified in passing judgment on the identity of the handwriting, where forfeiture of property was involved in that judgment.

On the 23d of the same month he received the original letters from Mr. Clerk, before whom they had lain from the 1st of May till the 12th of November, and who on the latter day, in writing to Lord Ellenborough, thus expressed himself:—

“The authenticity of these letters is still a matter of some doubt to me, as it was to Major Outram in sending them: my expressing an opinion, therefore, can serve no practical end.”—Page 478, First B. Book.

Though Mr. Clerk’s communication to Sir Charles Napier, accompanying the suspected letters, is not given in the Blue Book, nor any allusion to it made in the dispatch in which the latter announced to the Governor-General the receipt of the documents in question,—yet it is very improbable that Mr. Clerk would have transmitted them without expressing similar doubts of their authenticity to those contained in his letter of the same date to his Lordship. Mr. Clerk’s qualifications for deciding on the matter, his high official character, his well known abilities, his perfect acquaintance with the language in which the documents were written, and his intimate connexion with those to whom they were addressed, appear to have been lightly esteemed by Sir Charles Napier, for though he himself knew nothing of the Persian language, and those of my assistants who were masters of it had left the country, yet on the 23d, the very day on which he received the originals, he thus summarily disposed of the whole matter in a communication addressed to the Governor-General:—

No. 457, First B. Book.—” I have just received from Mr. Clerk the original letters from the Ameer Rustum Khan of Khyrpoor to the Maha Rajah. Of their being authentic original letters, Lieutenant Brown assures me that there cannot be the slightest doubt.”

Lieutenant Brown, on whose authority the above decision was pronounced, was one of my assistants. He was with me when I was investigating the subject, and assisted in it; and when on the 1st of May 1842, I forwarded the letter to Mr. Clerk, neither myself nor my assistant had been able to decide on the point at issue. Up to the period of my departure from Sindh on the 12th of November, Lieutenant Brown had obtained no
farther light to clear up the doubt. On that date, this officer, to my knowledge, could neither speak nor write Persian, yet within eleven days his testimony is deemed conclusive as to a point on which accomplished Persian scholars would speak with diffidence!

It is, however, no violent or improbable surmise, nor a breach of Christian charity to suppose, that Ali Morad, whose deceit and cunning I shall presently expose, had been at work corrupting the Moonshee, who had gained the confidence of both Lieutenant Brown and the General: for throughout India, Moonshees are a class notoriously venal and corrupt. No opportunity had been afforded to the Ameers of disproving the charge of which they were thus so summarily convicted. The witnesses, whose evidence was received against them, they were neither confronted with, nor permitted to examine. The alleged treasonable letters were not shown to them, nor the documents, said to be authentic, with which these had been compared. Is it then wonderful, that on the occasion of my conference with them on the 8th of February following, the Ameers should have expressed their indignation at the non-production of the intercepted letters, on their presumed guilt with respect to which, such stringent terms were imposed upon them; and which they had demanded to see two months previously, when Lieutenant Stanley presented to them the treaty.

Ameers.—“It was written that treasonable letters had been sent to Beebruck Boogtie and Sawun Mull; why were those letters not produced? Why don’t you give us an opportunity of disproving them? We never wrote them.”

Commissioner.—“They are with the Governor-General.” Ameers.—“You say that seals prove them. How easily are seals forged you yourself know, having required us to punish one of our own subjects who forged yours, when you resided here two years ago.”

Commissioner.—“The handwriting also is ascertained to be that of one of your confidential scribes.”

Meer Nusseer Khan.—“I solemnly deny that it was written by my authority; why was not the paper shown to me?”

This brings us to the conclusion of the second period of Sir Charles Napier’s administration in Sindh, marked, according to his brother, by a “vigorous analysis of the proofs furnished by Major Outram.” The authenticity of the letters and seals he had set his mind on demonstrating; it is for the reader to judge with what success he accomplished it.
SECTION IV.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER’S NEGOTIATIONS.

In judging of the third period of Sir Charles Napier’s career in Sindh, marked, as we are told, by negotiations to induce the Ameers quietly to accept the new treaties, one essential point is to be kept in view. The previous policy of the British Government, as fixed and guaranteed by the treaty of the 11th March 1839, had been to recognize each Ameer as independent, and irresponsible for the acts of others. Sir Charles Napier adopted a different resolution,—

“I was resolved, when there was a breach of treaty, whether great or small, I would hold All the Ameers responsible, and would not be played off like a shuttlecock, and told this was done by one Ameer, that by another, and so have a week’s inquiry to find out who was responsible for the aggression.”

It may be observed, then, in the outset, that the principle, according to which Sir Charles Napier avowed his intention of acting towards the Ameers, was equally opposed to the dictates of justice, to the stipulations of treaties, and to the intentions of the Governor-General.

On the 6th of May 1842, the Governor-General, in reference to the charges against the Ameers, intimated that there must be clear proofs of their faithlessness, and that “it must not be provoked by the conduct of the British agent producing apprehensions in the mind of any Chief, that the British Government entertains designs inconsistent with his interests and honor.”

Since the date of those instructions, no orders abrogatory of them, so far as I am aware, had been issued; on the contrary, all his Lordship’s intermediate communications, published in reference to Sindh, breathe the same sound diplomatic morality. The sequel, however, will show, that Sir Charles Napier not only set at nought the spirit of these instructions, by neglecting all measures calculated to allay the alarm already existing, but violated their very letter—producing, by his conduct, the most intense apprehensions in the minds of the Chiefs.

The fears which had been naturally suggested by the tone of Sir Charles Napier’s first communication with the Hyderabad Ameers, and the abolition of rights guaranteed to them by treaty, which it so unceremoniously announced, were increased by other just

17 First Sindh Blue Book. No. 164.
Art. V. The four Ameers, parties to this treaty, shall remain absolute rulers in their respective principalities, and the jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into their territories.
18 Page 191, vol. i.
19 No. 329, First Sindh B. Book
causes of alarm, during the early period of his negotiation. Our intention to exact a new treaty was the current gossip of the Bazaars, and, as is usual in such cases, the terms were greatly exaggerated. The diplomatic agency, to the establishment of which so much importance had been attached by the British Government—which the native princes had been taught to regard as the natural and only medium of communication with that Government, and to which, quoting their own words, they “looked for everything,” they saw abolished:—no formal intimation given—no reasons assigned; and they beheld in its place a General exercising a military dictatorship, and spurning every conventional amenity in manners.

Reviews, rocket practice, and military preparations engaged such portion of his time as was not devoted to the examination of the charges against the Ameers of all the petty instances which I had been ordered to lay before him, “whereby the Ameers or Chiefs may have seemed to have departed from the terms or spirit of their engagements.” The former category of occupations were seen by all; and, to the agitated minds of the Ameers, must have appeared confirmatory of the rumors afloat: the latter cannot be supposed to have remained secret. They were, in fact, bruited abroad.

His army had now been augmented by General England’s column, and still no intention was manifested of dispatching to their own provinces the superfluous Bengal troops detained at Sukkur. Is it wonderful, under these circumstances, that the Chiefs of Upper Sindh, whose capital, Khyrpoor, was only a few miles distant from our military cantonment at Sukkur, did become nervous; or that, in the absence of any assurances, or measures calculated to remove their fears, they should have anticipated the worst? And yet, menaced as they were, I was able to report with truth, on the 6th of November 1842:—“I note the daily intelligence I have received during the past week, as displaying the temper of the Chiefs under the alarm caused by the suspicious appearance of the troops delaying here; all their measures and preparations, however, are merely defensive, and will lead to nothing offensive I consider.” (First Sindh B. Book, p. 433.)

If the quiet acceptance of the treaties, by the Ameers, was truly Sir Charles Napier’s object, as it was the instruction of the Governor-General, is it not surprising that he should have neglected to demand an interview with Meer Roostum, to explain away the suspicious appearances referred to, and thereby remove the alarm which prompted these defensive measures? A few words, courteously and kindly uttered, would have sufficed. Without compromising himself or the Government, he might, in general terms, have informed them, that some were to be visited with no penalty whatever; and that even those who had rendered themselves amenable to punishment, would be lightly dealt with—for he was aware that such were the arrangements contemplated, up to that period. Nay, his Lordship’s letter of the 14th of October, (1st Sindh B. Book, p. 359,) which authorized him, if necessary, to employ the troops at his disposal to enforce the observance of the existing treaty, expressly enjoined him to prepare the Ameers for the one which was to supersede it, and to explain the equitable character of the arrangements then in view.
“The Governor-General desires that you will at the same time intimate to their Highnesses, that you are authorized to treat with them for a revision of the treaty; and the Governor-General is willing, upon proper and just conditions, to relieve them from the payment of tribute to the British Government.”

There was to be no intimidation; the justice of the new treaty was the foundation on which it was to rest, and the benefits it conferred on themselves, were to recommend it to those to whom it was offered. Lord Ellenborough clearly intended that its character should be comprehended, and its acceptance negotiated,—negotiated in the ordinary English meaning of the word. As it was, the Ameers were left to gather its provisions from the gossip of the Bazaars. In the words of the Historian, “all being vague was magnified as usual by fear and hope. Territory or money they thought must be demanded, and the sudden reinforcement of Sukkur by General England’s column, led them to imagine the demand would be very great”

Far from being disposed to dissipate these apprehensions,—a duty which might be supposed to be as agreeable as it was easy of execution,—not an act of Sir Charles Napier, from his first arrival at Sukkur, was calculated to soothe or conciliate the Ameers, or to disabuse them of the fears they had been led to form of our ulterior intentions. On the 9th of November, after he had been upwards of a month at Sukkur, Futty Mahommed Ghoree came to express his master’s anxiety to meet the General, and the 14th was fixed for the purpose. Meer Roostum subsequently deferred his visit on the plea of sickness. Sir Charles Napier knew through his “Intelligence” department,20 that the old chief was deterred, partly by Ali Morad, on the pretence that the latter would first “find out whether the General proposed making any demands for money or territory, or assert his intention of seizing any portion of it by force of arms,” and partly, as he expressed himself confidentially to Jeth Sing, his correspondent at the “Agency,” “by desire of the other chiefs, as in case of any misunderstanding in the course of the negotiation he might be made a prisoner.” A more pungent comment on the offensive nature of Sir C. Napier’s demeanor, and of the distrust of his intentions which it had produced, could hardly be furnished than the existence of such an apprehension.

Still no measures were taken to set the Ameers’ minds at rest. This might easily have been affected by deputing to them Captain French, a late political assistant, still with Sir Charles Napier, an officer on whose honor they knew they could rely. This step was not followed. On the 4th December, it is true, he was sent, but only to tender the treaty; neither to offer an interview on the part of the General, nor to soothe, nor to negotiate, but simply to present the document, and admit of no remonstrance.

The unfortunate chieftains of Upper Sindh had “one and all, by general consent, invested Meer Ali Morad with full powers to treat with the English General.”—(First Sindh B. Book, page 449.) Sir Charles Napier’s “intelligence” of the 13th November, app

20 Vide page 449, First Scinde Blue Book.
of this circumstance, as also of the true cause of Meer Roostum’s hesitation to meet him. The General was not then in possession of any information which could have led him to doubt that Ali Morad was acting as the friend as well as the envoy of his brethren. But did he seek by means of an interview with him, in that character, to remove the alarm and anxiety which agitated the minds of the Khyrpoor chiefs? No. On his arrival at Buberlow oil the morning of the 12th—when Sir Charles Napier had become aware of the ambassadorial functions with which he was invested, Ali Morad solicited a conference, and received for answer, that “arrangements for a meeting with the Rais (head) of the family being still pending, a reply could not be given at present.”

The interview with his accredited envoy being thus declined, Roostum himself came to Abad, only four miles from Sukkur, on the opposite side of the river, and requested a meeting. The reply was in the negative. This must have occurred on the 15th or 16th, one, or at most but two days after that previously fixed for the interview, which Roostum put off on the plea of sickness. No report, if we may judge from the Parliamentary Blue Book, was made by Sir Charles Napier of this second petition, nor of his reasons for spurning it.

The following passage in the work of General William Napier seems to point partly to an apprehension of treachery on the part of Sir Charles as the cause of his refusal; partly to a feeling of pique at the excuse originally sent by Roostum. For the former there appears to have been no cause; the latter could afford no justification of a step which, more than any other, was calculated to inflame the apprehensions of the Ameers, and to frustrate the chances of an amicable settlement.

Page 143, vol. i.—“Roostum and the inferior Ameers of Upper Sindh having now two thousand armed men as a guard, again demanded a conference with the General, to take place four miles down the river from Roree. But he, seeing the condition of their minds, and thinking fit to resent their former neglect, refused. Then they proposed to have it held, as before proposed, in their Garden of Roree, but he replied, ‘I will not go;’ I will not suffer you to treat me with rudeness, and as a treacherous person.”

The venerable Prince who sought an interview, was eighty-five years of age, one whom Sir Charles Napier delights to describe as an infirm old man; and such indeed he was,—bowed down by the weight of years, not as his despoiler and his despoiler’s brother ungenerously misrepresent him, effete through debauchery. Evil days had come upon him. Strangers whom he had admitted as friends, and whom in their hour of need he had befriended, now occupied his country with an army sufficient for its subjugation; and rumor told him such was their object. No word of comfort had been uttered, no friendly assurances vouchsafed, and he, who for three score years and ten had only been addressed in terms of adulation and affectionate homage, was now addressed in that of authority and menace. To use an expressive phrase in his own language, he felt that his face was blackened in the sight of his people, and his grey head dishonored. He sought an

21 First Sindh Blue Book, p. 448.
interview with the man in whose hands reposed the destinies of himself, his country, and his subjects; hoping to avert the injuries about to be inflicted on him, or at all events, to learn their extent; for as yet he knew of them only by report. A brother whom he trusted, and of whose diplomatic skill he felt assured, offered to precede him, and acquire the requisite information, whispering at the same time that treachery was intended. The poor old man believed the tale, for the shadows which coming events—spoliation, captivity, and exile,—cast before him, had fallen on his heart, and clouded his mind with suspicions which the conduct of the General was little calculated to dispel. Even these suspicions, it appears, he had breathed only to those in his closest confidence. To the General he had expressed none: he had simply assigned as the ground of his inability to meet him, his age, and his inability for immediate exertion.

Was this apology a matter to be visited as it was by Sir Charles Napier? The Ameer’s suspicion of treachery, confidentially communicated by him to his own agent alone, was neither a personal affront, nor a valid argument for withholding the desired interview. No,—the refusal, couched in coarse and unmeasured expressions, as was his wont, appears to have been dictated by distrust—distrust excited by “the condition of the Ameers’ minds,” and the “two thousand armed men” who constituted their guard. On the General’s entrance into the country, his prejudiced mind appears to have conjured up visionary phantoms of hostility and danger; he had persuaded himself that the Ameers were the bloodthirsty and treacherous ruffians which, since they became his victims, he and his brother have continued to describe them, and the fate of Sir W. M’Naughten appears to have ever haunted him. It did so on subsequent occasions, as we shall see, when we come to consider his military exploits in Lower Sindh, and it evidently did so when, as Governor of the subjugated province, he summoned the chiefs to meet him at Hyderabad in May 1844. On that occasion, not only did he cause them to appear before him with their followers unarmed, contrary to the custom of the country, and their own ideas of dignity and propriety, but his excessive carefulness led, under the pretext of doing honor to his guests, to the exposure to a fierce sun of two companies of the 86th Regiment, several of whom died in consequence from coup de soleil. Alas! That one so brave where open danger is to be met, should be oppressed with such timidity where danger does not exist, or, if it did exist, where it is a duty to encounter it, under reasonable precautions. Neither the venerable Prince, whose friendly advances were so uncourteously repelled, nor any of his brethren, had ever injured the hair of a head of any British subject, but they had, in the hour of our greatest need, placed their country and its resources at our disposal, and even given us full possession of the strong and important fort of Bukkur; and now, when terrified by rumors, to which his whole conduct gave

22 One of the first steps by which I gained the confidence of both Beloochees and Brahooes, was discontinuing a practice of my predecessor in Upper Sindh, who allowed neither the chiefs nor their followers to bring their arms into his presence. I desired them never to come without their arms, as customary among themselves: and at the height of our disasters I went among them alone, on no occasion displaying the slightest distrust.

23 A letter from Hyderabad of the 7th, published in the Bombay Times of the 20th November 1844, states that the flank companies “were kept out on the 24th May, in the sun till long after noon, by express order of his Excellency, to do honor to the ragamuffin Beloochee chiefs,” and that on the 24th and 25th, fifteen men died of coup de soleil.
weight and confirmation, when a few friendly words, and an interview to inspire, and at the same time, to evince confidence, were all that was required to secure their compliance with our demands—those words remained unspoken, that interview was denied.

Had Sir Charles Napier met Meer Roostum, a sovereign to whom he was the delegated British representative, and with whom it was his duty to confer, amity would have been preserved, and he would have been spared the humiliation of becoming an instrument for evil in the hands of Ali Morad, whose dupe he was destined to become from the moment that chief was made the medium of communication with his brethren.

The interview being withheld, the result was that the assembled Ameers forthwith removed their camp to Pattanee; a conference was held; Ali Morad was sent for to meet them at the capital to give them the benefit of his counsels: and arrangements were made to place their families in safety. The “Intelligence” of the 20th November informs us that,

“As soon as the Ameers reached Khyrpoor from Pattanee, horsemen were sent to (naming several chiefs), to desire their attendance, informing them that No Doubt Could Exist That The English Intended To Attack Them.”

Meer Mahommed Hoossein, the eldest son of the ill used Roostum, was not present at the Khyrpoor council; he, however, sent thither his son, Emam Buksh, with 400 men, but at the same time expressed his disapprobation of the proposed measure of sending their families away from the capital, lest the English should regard it as a preparation for hostilities. He advised them to remain till an advance was really made, and then, when all hope had fled, and not before, to cut the throats of their wives,—a horrible procedure, but one not uncommonly had recourse to in Asia, when chiefs of distinction are driven to despair; for theirs is a pride that deems death far preferable to dishonor. The Asiatic chief is denounced by General Napier as a sanguinary monster, for preferring that his wives should taste the bitterness of death, rather than meet the fate which he feared awaited them. But, had the deed been perpetrated, it may be asked, whose would have been the greater guilt— that of the Moslem husband, who made the fearful sacrifice demanded by his ideas of honor,—or that of the General, who, by his menacing and repulsive treatment, by exciting instead of allaying the vague apprehensions of the native princes, had driven them to despair and to resistance?

Now, for the first time, did the Ameers seriously set about calling in their feudatories, if really even then; upwards of forty days after the date assigned by the trustworthy historian. And here it may be noticed in passing, that General Napier, with regard to this question of the commencement of hostilities, actual or constructive, confuses dates in a manner which, though it may lead to some tedious detail, requires notice.

At page 142, General Napier writes,—
“Roostum having broken his appointment, his son took Afghan horsemen into pay, and wrote to the Boordees and other tribes to be ready, and at the same time the Brahooee Prince Newaz Khan, who had been deposed in favour of Merab’s son, and was living on the bounty of the British Government at Shikarpoor, resigned his allowance and returned to his tribe. *****
Letters also came from Nusseer of Hyderabad, encouraging Roostum, and promising the aid of troops, under the command of his son and nephew, the two Hoosseins. At the same time Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor was constituted commander of the forces in Lower Sindh, and he promised to add 16,000 fighting men of his own to the general levy.”

Roostum “broke his appointment” on the 14th of November; from that date till the 3d of December, a period of three weeks, the “Intelligence” says nothing of his son having taken “Afghan horsemen into pay,” beyond that on the 15th November “Noor Mahomed says, Patan horse cross the river daily in small bodies,” and are entertained by the Ameers. On the latter date we are informed that he enlisted “a number of Sikh and Patan horse,” who had been discharged by Ali Morad. But that this, and the other contemporaneous preparations of the terrified Ameers, were measures of self-defence, is obvious from the circumstance, that when they learned the terms of the treaty, and were assured by the envoys whom they had sent to the General, that “The English Were Well Disposed,” they instantly paid up and discharged half their fighting men!

Had Sir Charles Napier obeyed the Governor-General’s instructions, and communicated the spirit of the new treaty, on its receipt, the defensive measures, adopted subsequent to the 12th of November, would never have been taken; Meer Roostum would not have “broken his appointment,” nor would his son have taken “Afghan horsemen into pay.”

On the 13th of December, one month after the venerable Roostum had deferred his visit, we learn that his son enlisted 300 horsemen under Secunder Khan Patan, who had been discharged by Ali Morad, and the reader will hereafter see that the General’s conduct had been such, as to render preparations for self-defence on the part of the Ameers, absolutely necessary.24

Shah Newaz Khan, it is true, left Sindh on the 5th of December, three weeks after Meer Roostum pleaded indisposition as an excuse for not meeting Sir Charles Napier; but far from his departure having any connexion with the Ameers’ proceedings, Khelat was his destination, and a war on his own account against its Khan, his object.

As for Nusseer’s letters to Meer Roostum, they may have been sent, though the “Intelligence” of the 13th November, furnished from Hyderabad, entirely contradicts that furnished at Sukkur on the same date, relating to the asserted proceedings in Lower Sindh; but were it the case, it is no evidence of hostile designs on the part of the Upper

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24 It is obviously General Napier’s intention to lead the reader to infer, that the employment of “Afghans” and “Patans” betokened a combination with other powers. These “Afghan horsemen” were Mooltannee Patans, nationally unconnected with the Afghans or Sikhs,—moving mercenary adventurers, who offered their services to any one who would accept them.
Sindh Ameers; and the time was surely come when defensive union and support might reasonably be tendered by the chiefs of Hyderabad.

That Roostum’s son “wrote to the Boordees and other tribes to be ready,” is simply a fiction of the General’s. With the exception of a report in the “Intelligence” of the 12th November, two days previous to that fixed for the interview, that Mahommed Hoossein had sent for two Boordee chiefs “to confer with them;” the first reference to that tribe occurs in the “Intelligence” of the 1st December, a fortnight after the Khyrpooor consultation, when we are told Meer Roostum himself made arrangements with certain Boordee chiefs; but this is rendered very improbable by the “Intelligence” of the 18th, a month after Meer Roostum broke his appointment, when it is stated that,

“Khyran Khan Boordee makes a petition to Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpooor, that with his permission he will render the road impassable for the Bengal force either to advance or retreat.

The Boordees will not be able, he says, to meet them in the open field; but with his Boordees, he can harass, and plunder, and destroy, in a manner to make them ineffective.”

Colonel Wallace’s column of Bengal troops passed through the country referred to, after Sir Charles Napier had commenced war against the Ameers, without being “harassed,” “plundered,” or “destroyed,” or in any way molested! Could a stronger argument be adduced in proof of the pacific intentions of the Khyrpooor Chief, than that, in spite of the most fearful provocation, he withheld the permission solicited by his feudatory to harass the British troops? Does not this circumstance, of itself, afford a sufficient refutation of the intelligence of the 1st of December—doubtless furnished by Ali Morad’s bribed tools—that Hoossein had sent for the Boordee chiefs, to make arrangements for hostilities against the English?

On the 5th November, Sir Charles Napier reported that “the Ameers have not committed any overt act, (First B. Book, p. 444,) and up to the 6th (p. 433,) my reports of the Ameers’ proceedings stated, “that all their measures and preparations are merely defensive, under the alarm caused by the suspicious appearance of our troops delaying here” Trifling as their armament was then represented to be, even that was most probably exaggerated—exaggerated by themselves, under the impression that by magnifying their force, they might obtain better terms. It follows, therefore, that the Governor-General must have had very imperfect information before him, when on 20th of December he thus wrote:—

25 It was afterwards ascertained that such was the case. I represented the fact to Sir Charles Napier, when I joined that officer, on the 4th January; and afterwards, in a letter addressed to him on the 22d January, I thus alluded to it:—“Pray, recollect that they were misled into flight, &c. * * * that they had not armed to the extent that was represented; and that whatever rabble soldiery they had assembled, was solely with a view to self-defence, in misapprehension of our real objects, misrepresented as they were to them by Ali Morad.” (No. 31 of Supplementary Blue Book.) If Sir Charles Napier was not conscious that what I thus stated, and in a manner which showed that I was satisfied that he was as fully informed as myself, was true, I think it may be fairly presumed that he would have corrected me in his reply of next day.

26 Vide p. 479, First Blue Book.
“Forces were collected by these Chiefs, before they had any intimation of the intention, on the part of Government, to insist upon a revision of the treaties;”

—evidently believing himself, and conveying the impression that the collection of troops by the Ameers took place prior to, and independent of, any aggressive demonstration on our part;—that it was in fact, an act of “constructive hostility, justifying the warlike attitude assumed by Sir C. Napier.” On the 8th of October, his Lordship held and expressed correct views on this subject, as is evident from the communication of that date, given in the first page of the Supplementary Blue Book. “It appears that the assembling of the men by the Khyrpoor Ameers, was only for a settlement of a quarrel among themselves, and nothing in it of hostility against us.” The decided change in his Lordship’s views was most probably effected by two letters addressed to him by Sir Charles Napier, on the 17th of October. These are thus referred to in Lord Ellenborough’s communication of the 25th October:27 — “You may be quite right with respect to the unfriendly intentions of the Ameers assembling their troops,” &c. His Lordship’s altered sentiments on the subject of the Ameers and their levies, elicited from him, three days later, a letter of instructions, which is thus acknowledged by Sir Charles Napier, on the 5th November (p. 444):—“Your Lordship’s postscript to your letter of the 28th, has just arrived, Both the letter and postscript shall be rigidly attended to, as the base of all intercourse with the Ameers.”

Although the Blue Book abounds with reports that purwannas or orders had been issued to “call,” “warn,” “prepare,” &c., the fighting men of Upper Sindh, yet the utmost number ever reported to have been actually assembled, is on the 17th of December, when the British General, having repelled the friendly advances of the Ameers, was about to march on their capital. On that day, the fighting men28 at Khyrpoor and Mungaree were represented at “upwards of seven thousand.”

The real nature of these musters of the national troops is well displayed in the Intelligence of the 15th November.29

“He (the informer) saw no appearance of a force beyond the few horsemen attached to the persons of the abovementioned servants of Meer Nusseer Khan, though he is aware that long since, the fighting men of the villages and towns have been warned to be in readiness to obey the call for service, should such be issued; but from such a force, he says, no very great or prolonged duties could ever be expected. Two or three days of absence from their homes, and short commons, would disperse the whole fabric.”

It was not, as we have seen, till Sir Charles Napier denied Meer Roostum an interview, that the terrified Ameers of Upper Sindh contemplated collecting troops to any extent; and then, by no means to the amount which the Historian would have us to infer, and

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27 P. 361, First Sindh Blue Book.
28 Page 476, First Sciude Blue Book.
29 Page 452, Ibid
only in self-defence. Well might the various suspicious circumstances to which I have alluded, coupled with this indignity, appear to them evidence of “constructive hostility,” and induce them to believe that “the English intended to attack them.”

That, on the 13th of November, the Lower Sindh Ameers entertained no hostile intentions, we learn from a report of that date, furnished by the officer in charge at Hydrabad. Captain Mylne writes, in the report referred to:

“I cannot learn that any purwannas or messages have been sent to any of the Belooch tribes, or that the Ameers meditate collecting any troops, in consequence of the large assemblage of forces at Sukkur; but their Highnesses continue very uneasy on the subject, and impute any but friendly motives to it.”

And well they might. They had been advised to make the war a religious one. Had they sent the lighted faggot through the plains of Sindh and the mountains of Baluchistan, and awakened the slumbering fanaticism of the neighboring countries, who could have blamed them? Not, certainly, with any justice, the General; who, aware of their alarm, and of its causes, had not adopted one single measure calculated to remove it, but had treated them from first to last with rudeness and insolent bravado. Such is a specimen of the mild and soothing “negotiations” with which Sir Charles Napier strove to induce the Ameers “quietly to accept the treaty.”

But General W. Napier pleads that we must regard his brother’s offensive demeanor towards the Ameers, as “an adroit and firm policy, and an imposing military attitude, requisite to keep the Ameers in a state of irresolution as to their intended outbreak during that critical period.” The critical period referred to, was that during the assembly of the “Army of Reserve,” when—

“If the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh had been united among themselves, and had agreed together to commence the war they had so long contemplated, the Seikhs could not have been controlled by their prince. A great commotion, extending, probably, to Nepaul and Gwalior—to Bundelcund, and the districts south of the Nerbudda—would then have shaken India to its centre.”

The Indian reader must be already aware, that this pompous passage is a piece of mere unmeaning or unfounded assertion; and even the English reader, who has devoted the slightest attention to Indian affairs, must know, that before the period referred to by the “Historian,” the political horizon had become clear and cloudless. We have it on the authority of Lord Ellenborough, that no danger was then to be apprehended from the Seikhs.30

30 The Governor-General to Kir Charles Napier, dated 6th October 1843, (p. 1, Second Blue Book.)

(Extract.)

“The Seikh Government act in the most friendly manner, and the success obtained in Afghanistan secures the continuance of the aid we have hitherto received from it. There is, therefore, no longer any necessity for holding a
The unsettled state of Bundelcund depended on local causes, for which local remedies were demanded and applied; and its affairs, and those of Nepaul, had no connexion with, or dependence on, the state of Sindh. The Gwalior insurrection was yet in the womb of time—undeveloped, undreamt of: it arose in consequence of the demise of a sovereign who was yet alive while Sir Charles Napier’s “adroit policy, and imposing military attitude” were driving to despair the Princes whom he had been ordered to conciliate and soothe. So far as Sindh was concerned, no deep conspiracy was ever hatched—nothing resembling one. Petty intrigues might, and doubtless did, occur during our Afghan disasters; but the return of our armies in triumph was the signal for their cessation.

Before Sir Charles Napier entered the country, all hostile machinations had been frustrated;— profound tranquility prevailed. This is a fact notorious to all in India, of which the Indian Government at home are well aware, and of which the Governor of Sindh cannot be ignorant. When Sir Charles Napier entered that province, he did so as a mere General of Division, invested with political authority. The eyes of India were not fixed upon him, as his brother assumes, nor were its destinies or safe custody for one moment entrusted to his keeping ; and beyond his own personal friends, his tradesmen, and the Poona Division of the army, who changed their commander, his departure from Bombay was scarcely noticed. His duties were obvious; and, though important, of a very subordinate nature. To examine the charges preferred against the Ameers; to guard against infractions of the existing treaty; to prepare them for the reception of that which was to succeed it, by showing its necessity and justice; to treat them as sovereigns and allies, to whom he was the deputed representative of the friendship, as much as of the power, of the British Government; to remove their doubts, allay their fears, and candidly and respectfully to hear what they had to say in their own favor:—such were his duties; and if, instead of discharging them, he busied himself about foreign matters, he grievously mistook his vocation. There were authorities already constituted, and at least as competent, to watch over and control Gwalior, Nepaul, and Bundelcund, States with which he was no more concerned than with Otaheite or Nova Zembla. But there is no reason to believe that he acted on any far-sighted and provident views, such as those ascribed to him by his friendly historian. Ignorance of Oriental character, rather than any clear-sighted view either of the actual position of affairs, or their probable results, lay at the bottom of his policy. Prejudiced against those with whom he was sent to treat, he mistook violence for vigor, obstinacy for firmness, and by an insolent demeanor towards a “barbarous” ally, conceived that he was best upholding the national dignity of a civilized country.

The results of his policy will be speedily apparent, in the ruin brought upon the princes of Sindh, the suffering and the bloodshed which ensued; and with the annals of these considerable force together at Sukkur. The army marches from Cabool to-day ; and the last column of Major-General England’s troops will probably arrive to-day at Daru.”
disastrous events before them, it will be for those who celebrate in pompous strains the exploits of Sir Charles Napier, to pause for a moment, and to reflect whether the boasted glories of the Sindh campaign are to be coveted, when accompanied with the responsibility for its guilt.
SECTION V.

ALI MORAD’S INTRIGUES, – MEER ROOSTUM’S FORCED RESIGNATION.

In order to concentrate under one head the intrigues by which the sovereignty of Upper Sindh was wrested from the existing possessor, Meer Roostum, to be conferred on his treacherous and designing brother Ali Morad; — the complicated series of frauds by which the design was accomplished; — and the credulous and misjudging part played by Sir Charles Napier throughout this discreditable transaction, I shall devote to it a separate section, though in doing so, I shall be led to anticipate, in some measure, the narrative of the events which followed the presentation of the treaties.

The office of Rais, or chief paramount of Upper Sindh, was naturally an object of ambition to the several Ameers of that province. During the period of our connexion with the country, the turban had been worn by the venerable Roostum, and the advanced age of that Prince, rendering its early vacancy almost a matter of certainty, imposed on us the necessity of taking measures to secure a peaceable succession. There were, at the period of Sir Charles Napier’s arrival in the country, two candidates in the field, preferring their claims to the sovereignty, when it should become vacant,—Ali Morad, the brother, and Mahommed Hoossein, the eldest son of the reigning Ameer. By the customs of the Talpoors, inheritance did not necessarily follow in lineal descent; on the contrary, it was usual for the brother to succeed in preference to the son, and Ali Morad claimed to be the successor of Roostum by consuetudinary right. Roostum, however, maintained that he was entitled to bequeath the turban to his son, or even to invest him with it during his own life. This measure Ali Morad would probably have forcibly resisted, and but for our presence in the country, a civil war must have arisen. By the existing treaty, however, all quarrels were to be referred to British arbitration, and I had deemed it my duty carefully to examine the merits of a question which involved such important results, and on which it might speedily become necessary to pronounce a judgment.

On the score of abstract right, I soon discovered that the claims of the two parties were equally balanced; and it became a mere consideration of expediency, to which of them we should give our support. It was obviously for our interests, and those of the country, that the office of Rais should be held by the most vigorous. Ali Morad was, in this point of view, decidedly more eligible than his nephew; and as at that time Meer Roostum and his family were believed to entertain no friendly feelings towards the British, I had no hesitation in recommending the recognition of the claims of the former, “on the demise of Roostum.” This I did on the 21st of April 1842, upwards of four months before Sir C. Napier’s arrival in Sindh.31

31 Supplementary Sciude Blue Book, page 113.
My suspicion of Meer Roostum was never justified by proof. The foundations on which it rested, were the intercepted letters before referred to, and the further I examined the evidence on which their authenticity was sought to be established, the greater reason had I ultimately to believe that they had been fabricated by Ali Morad’s agents, with a view to prejudice Hoossein’s claim. The circumstance of their having been obtained through a party in Ali Morad’s interests, I pointed out to Sir Charles Napier on the 30th of October 1842, as in itself suspicious; and I recommended him to receive with distrust any testimony tending to criminate Roostum proceeding from the same quarter. “It is,” I observed, “the interest of the latter (Ali Morad) to place the other Ameers of Khyrpoor at enmity with the British Government, as well to gratify revengeful feelings, as to secure our support to his claims to the principal chieftainship of Upper Sindh, on the demise of Meer Roostum Khan”32

Those claims were then recommended to our support by Ali Morad’s superior qualifications for the office, and their recognition was in no way dependent on the authenticity of the intercepted letters; though, doubtless, the suspicion of hostile views on the part of his rival might have afforded us grounds for congratulation that he was the more eligible candidate.

Ali Morad, however, was not cognizant of the bearings under which we viewed the question. He had long been aware of the preference which with which we regarded his pretensions to the office of Rais, when vacant by his brother’s death, but he neither knew the reasons for that preference, nor was he certain of its permanence. He had learned that the new treaty was to contain penal clauses; and the confiscation of the turban, as well as of territory, might, he thought, be effected through the instrumentality of the British authorities, on his producing strong proofs of hostility on the part of Roostum. While, therefore, he hoped, by rendering his brother’s family odious to the British Government, to effect his nephew Hoossein’s exclusion from the turban, and thereby remove the only obstacle which existed to the gratification of his own ambition, he did not despair of finding means of supplanting his brother while yet alive; and unhappily a combination of unfortunate circumstances enabled him to succeed beyond what may be supposed to have been originally his most sanguine expectations.

Sir Charles Napier had not long taken up his residence at Sukkur, ere Ali Morad appears to have discovered, through his hirelings, the peculiarities of the man he had to deal with. He learned that he was ignorant of Oriental customs, feelings, and modes of thinking. He knew that he was prejudiced against the Ameers, and this prejudice he readily saw, might be made to operate in his own favor. The General, he had been told, was credulous and suspicious, yet fiery and self-opinionated; and these were failings to which he well understood how to address himself, for he was proud—and as the result showed, with good reason—of his capabilities in intrigue. All that he required was a personal interview, to enable him to master the details of the character, with the outlines of which he was thus

32 Page 430, First Sindh Blue Book.
familiar, and to establish his first parallels of approach to the General’s favor. We have seen how artfully he contrived, with this object, to have himself elected as the deputy of his brethren to negotiate with Sir Charles Napier, and how insidiously he not only prevented the proposed interview with Roostum, which might have frustrated his plans, but, by suggesting that treachery was intended, labored to preclude the possibility of any future intercourse between them.

On the 23d of November, he succeeded in obtaining an interview. His object was now gained. Accurately did he take the moral and intellectual dimension of the man in whose hands reposed the destinies of himself and his brethren; he formed his plans while yet in the General’s presence; and by his agency he was resolved they should be carried out. Nor did he over-estimate his resources.

I subjoin the report of this interview, made by Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General.

(No 413, First Sindh Blue Book.)

Sukkur, November 23, 1842.

“My Lord,—I this day had an interview with Meer Ali Morad Khan. His object was, to know if we would secure to him ‘the turban,’ or chieftaincy. As I have read all the papers on this subject which are in this office, I was not taken by surprise; and, knowing your Lordship’s general policy, I felt no difficulty in replying to him, that your Lordship’s intentions were to punish your enemies, and to support your friends in all that was just; that you adhered to treaties; that the treaties with the Ameers obliged us to protect each Ameer in his right; that the chieftaincy of the Talpoors was Meer Roostum’s, during that Ameer’s life; and, unless he forfeited the protection of your Lordship, it would be preserved to him, and, at his death, would be transferred to Ali Morad, if he continued to act loyally towards the British Government, because such was the treaty. He answered, that he wanted only to know if we would protect Meer Roostum against him in an intrigue to get the chieftaincy away from him, (Ali Morad,) by nominating his son, Meer Mahommed Hoossein, to be chieftain during his (Roostum’s) life. My answer was—‘That it would be against the treaty for any one Ameer to defraud another of his right; and, therefore, Meer Roostum would not be permitted by the Governor-General to invest his son with the dignity in question.’

“He then said, that Meer Sobdar of Hyderabad had written to him to say that they two were the only friends of the English, and ought to make a treaty to stand by each other. He asked if I agreed to their doing so. I said, ‘Yes; you should agree to stand faithful to the English openly; but do not make any secret treaty: and the English are sufficiently powerful to make their allies conform to treaties.’” * * *

If Sir Charles Napier had no difficulty in replying to the cunning inquiries of his guest, the latter had as little in gathering from his replies ample encouragement to proceed in his villany. He coveted the turban: it was to be obtained during Roostum’s life, by a forfeiture, on the part of the latter, of the Governor-General’s protection; — that forfeiture he was resolved to effect. Ali Morad departed, to carry his designs into execution,
congratulating himself on the dazzling prospect which the General had held out to him, and confident of success; while Sir Charles Napier proceeded to his desk, to communicate to the Governor-General the happy augury he had formed of the future.

“I hope what I have said will meet with your Lordship’s approbation. It does three things which are desirable:—

“1. It is just. Ali Morad has the right to the ‘turban’ for his own life, after the death of Meer Roostum; and it promises to protect him in this right.

“2. It detaches Ali Morad from any league among the Ameers, and consequently diminishes the chance of bloodshed.

“3. It lays a train to arrive at a point which I think should be urged, viz. that we should treat with one Ameer instead of a number.” ***

Little did he know of Ali Morad’s character, if he believed that prince would wait till his brother’s death, when he had himself shown him how it might be earlier obtained? He flattered himself that, by detaching Ali Morad from the other Ameers, he had diminished the chance of bloodshed! Grievous and fatal delusion! While he thus fancied he was treading the highway of an honourable and peaceful diplomacy, he had been beguiled into the tortuous paths which ultimately led to the bloody fields of Meeanee and Dubba!

He was aware, that in the alarm which his violent and menacing conduct had created, the Ameers had, twenty days before this interview, agreed to sink their minor differences, and not add to their other calamities the misery of a house divided against itself. He knew, that foremost in the reconciliation was Ali Morad; who, in token of his sincerity, not only affianced a son and daughter of his own, to a daughter and son of one of those he now described as enemies of the English, but had labored to arouse his brethren from their despondency. “The British troops,” he said, “were prostrate from sickness: even were it not so, they were but a handful compared to the forces which the Ameers could bring into the field; and had they not,” he encouragingly added, “been turned out of Afghanistan?” and he accepted from Roostum the command-in-chief of his forces, such as they were. Of all this, Sir Charles Napier was aware: against Ali Morad’s intrigues he had been warned; the interest the latter had in maligning his brethren had been fully pointed out to him; and he knew that his unprincipled visitor had sought the interview, in the sacred character of an ambassador—deputed by his confiding brethren to attend to their common interests. Does it not seem strange, and, but for its painful historic truth, incredible, that the British representative should have tamely submitted to hear this betrayer of his own blood characterize his kinsmen as enemies of the English, and propose an English alliance against them; and yet that he should have treated him with distinction, and have condescended to write of him to the Governor-General as a creditable ally?

Meantime, Ali Morad steadily pursued his grand object. While, on the one hand, he endeavored to excite the Ameers to some open movement, by undervaluing the British
force, and assuring his brother “that he had seen the whole English force, and that the Ameers need not be under any apprehension to encounter it;”\textsuperscript{33} on the other, he contrived that the most exaggerated accounts of the levies made by the Ameers; their preparations for war; their resolution to make a combined attack upon the British force, should almost daily reach the camp of Sir Charles Napier.

Sir Charles Napier eagerly listened to, and readily believed these reports; and though their falsehood was demonstrated by subsequent events, he doubtless still believes them, as he does many others of the ludicrous fictions with which his credulity has been abused.\textsuperscript{34}

The result was that fresh indignities and further menace were offered to the unhappy Roostum, whose capital of Khyrpoor Sir C. Napier had threatened, and was now preparing to march upon. On the 20th December, occurred the first of that series of strange events which more immediately led to the appropriation of Sindh. On that day the General reports that he had received (on the 15th) a secret message from Meer Roostum.

“The bearer had an open letter in the usual unmeaning style of the Durbar: but the messenger privately informed Lieutenant Brown that Roostum could do nothing, and would escape to my Camp. I DID NOT LIKE THIS, AS IT WOULD HAVE EMBARRASSED ME VERY MUCH HOW TO ACT: BUT THE IDEA STRUCK ME AT ONCE THAT HE MIGHT GO TO ALI MORAD, WHO MIGHT INDUCE HIM, AS A FAMILY ARRANGEMENT, TO RESIGN THE TURBAN TO Him, (Ali Morad) ESPECIALLY AS ROOSTUM HAS LONG BEEN DESIROUS OF GETTING RID OF THIS CHARGE OF THE TALPOORS. I THEREFORE SECRETLY WROTE TO ROOSTUM AND ALI MORAD,” &c.—B. Book, vol. i. No. 439.

Let us assume, in the meantime, that such a message had ever been sent. The matter would have stood thus. Meer Roostum, terrified by a threatening letter which he had received from the General in the early part of the day, offers, as the only means of pacifying the violent and suspicious man, who was rendering his life miserable, to come into his camp, and to place himself at once in his power, and under his protection.

It was as though he had said, “you accuse me of meditating a night attack upon your camp, of collecting armed bands, of making preparations to oppose you, of tampering with your soldiers, and of plundering your mails. I assert my innocence and you but further taunt me. I am an old man, and feeble; and but little able to contend with the

\textsuperscript{33} Intelligence from Scinde, 26th Nov. 1842, Blue Book, p. 461.

\textsuperscript{34} e. g. That the Ameers were habitually addicted to intemperance, and were in the habit of chastising their wives with a scourge of brass wire! that they chopped to pieces their illegitimate children, or squeezed them to death by the superincumbent pressure of their own portly bodies!! and that they meditated in the exuberance of their frolicsome fancies, catching himself, boring a hole through his nose, introducing a ring, attaching a rope, and dragging the Feringee General in triumph through their towns and villages !!! In saying that Sir Charles Napier believes these, and similar childish stories, I, of course, speak under correction; I merely assume, that had he been aware of their utter falsity and absurdity, he would not have allowed his brother to malign unfortunate and royal captives, or to make himself the laughing-stock of India by narrating them as grave realities!
adverse events which throng upon me; let me therefore come to your camp,—let me but
know what your will is, and I will issue orders accordingly. I am beloved by my people,
and they will obey me. But cease to persecute me as you have done. I come to you. Can I
give you more conclusive evidence of the friendly feelings by which I am actuated, or
more satisfactorily disprove the calumnies with which my enemies have thought to injure
me in your estimation?"

But to receive this venerable suppliant for mercy, “would have embarrassed” Sir Charles
Napier “very much.” How? Wherefore? Could it have irritated the other Ameers by
leading them to infer that Roostum was in fact a prisoner? Such is the reason assigned by
the Historian for rejecting the alleged proposal of the Ameers.

Page 164.— “It was an embarrassing proposition. Too favorable for a peaceful settlement of the
disputes to be rejected, it had however this drawback, that every proceeding of the Ameer
would be imputed to coercion.”

The remedy was obvious,—to treat the Ameer with distinction, to leave his movements
unwatched, and unimpeded, and to allow his sons and other relatives access to him as
they chose,—in a word, to recognize him as an allied sovereign, from choice residing in
the British camp. To any one not trammeled, as Sir Charles Napier was by his connexion
with Ali Morad, this would have seemed a most favorable opportunity for establishing at
once, and on a secure basis, that peaceable settlement of the country which his policy had
so long unnecessarily delayed, and which it eventually frustrated. By having Roostum in
his camp, and thus under his influence, Sir C. Napier might have controlled Sindh as he
chose, even had the old chief been as much an object of indifference to the people, as he
was beloved and venerated by them. Not only would his presence there as an honored
guest have been powerful, but omnipotent for every legitimate purpose the General could
have had.

But Sir Charles Napier was in the toils of his cunning friend. By all those nameless arts, by
which an Asiatic so well knows how to win his way to favor, Ali Morad had persuaded
him that it was of the utmost importance he should speedily obtain the turban; and
although in one of his letters he went through the farce of endeavoring in appearance to
dissuade Ali Morad from accepting the turban, the General longed to confer it on him. He
in fact admits as much. But how was this to be effected? Unless forfeited, it had been
guaranteed to Roostum during his life. Rather, I should say, Ali Morad had been
informed, that unless forfeited, it would be so preserved to his brother; for to the
unfortunate Roostum not a word of assurance or friendly promise had been spoken, and
he had little reason to believe that the General, who spurned his amicable overtures and
insulted his grey hairs, would hesitate to deprive him of his dignities or possessions.

Yet this pledge to support Roostum, though made only to Ali Morad, and declared to be
foundered on the unalterable policy of the Governor- General, decency demanded should
not be at once broken. Had the Ameer come into his camp, it would have become the
General’s duty to protect him against intrigues; the forfeiture on his part of British protection was, under the circumstances, very improbable; and Ali Morad would not have obtained the object of his ambition. The Ameer’s arrival would therefore have “embarrassed” the General “very much.” But, as General William Napier elsewhere assures us, his brother is “subtle of genius, sagacious in perception, and ready in expediency” and the happy “idea struck him at once,” that he could persuade him to go to Ali Morad, he might be induced to resign the turban, as a family arrangement,—nothing more! And then, “Roostum had long been desirous of getting rid of this charge of the Talpoors;” so, after all, it was a kindness to the old man! Sir Charles Napier was well aware, that though still practically regarded as Rais, Roostum had, as far as “family arrangements” were concerned, abdicated in favor of his son a fortnight previous. If the proposed “family arrangement” were permissible, that already entered on was likewise legal; and it was still in force. So long as no claim was set up by the young Hoossein to the prejudice of the succession guaranteed his uncle, he was entitled to be regarded as his father’s deputy and the legal chief of the Talpoors. All this Sir Charles Napier knew, but so regardless was he of mere considerations of “abstract right,” so enamored of his protégé and his family, that in the very letter in which he announced to the Governor-General that Meer Roostum was “safe” with his brother,—he artfully proposed to his Lordship fixing the succession in Ali Morad’s family, to the exclusion of Hoossein!

“How far your Lordship would think it justifiable to promise that Ali Morad’s son should succeed to him, I cannot say; the rightful heir at Ali Morad’s death, is his nephew, the son of Meer Roostum: As I have no doubt that Ali will ask me this question, I should like to know your Lordship’s decision.”—Blue Book, p. 479

This deliberate proposal to violate that just policy, the maintenance of which he had declared to be the unbending resolve of the Governor-General, it is unnecessary to say, was rejected by Lord Ellenborough. His Lordship replied, that however he regretted and should wish to see changed, “the unreasonable course of descent obtaining amongst the Talpoors,” he “could not recognize the eldest son of Meer Ali Morad as his successor, in contravention of the very principle on which his father’s rights are founded.”

Actuated by these feelings towards the son, it is not surprising that he should willingly sacrifice the father. He accordingly wrote the subjoined letter to Roostum:—

“My own belief is that personally you have ever been the friend of the English, but you are helpless amidst your ill judging family. I send you this by your brother, Meer Ali Morad. Listen to his advice; trust to his care; you are too old for war. If you go with your brother, you may either remain with him, or I will send an escort for you to bring you to my camp, where you will be safe; follow my advice, it is that of a friend,—why should I be your enemy? If I was, why should I take this trouble to save you? I think you will believe me; but do as you please.”—No. 10, Supplementary Blue Book.

This missive the Historian—incorrect as usual— informs us “the General prevailed on Ali Morad, who was then with him, to carry back.” Ali Morad was not with the General; but
the letter was forwarded to him for delivery to his brother. That he might know its contents, a copy of it was sent for his perusal, and lest he should allow this golden opportunity to pass unimproved, he was urgently pressed to second Sir Charles Napier’s endeavors; “try all you can to induce him (Roostum) to leave Khyrpoor with his family.” Meer Roostum went to Dhejee, but he was entrapped thither. The result was the receipt of the subjoined letter, signed by Roostum, and dated 20th December. After the usual respectful preamble, it proceeds: —

“As, hitherto, the management of my kingdom has not been according to the wishes of the illustrious English Government, I have, therefore, invested the excellent, &c. &c., Ali Morad Khan, who is fully competent to rule; and do so in accordance with the desires of the British Government, with entire powers as my successor, (or representative,) and have, of my own free will, made over to him the entire power over my kingdom, army, and forts. God willing, he will act in every respect according to the desires of the British Government, or the Ameer in question, i.e. a dear friend of mine, and a well-wisher of the English Government. This should be announced to the illustrious Governor-General. May the days of friendship be prolonged.”

Here was the General’s favorite object gained. As to the propriety of the step, however, he had some misgivings, and the reference to the desires of the English Government was evidently distasteful, as giving grounds for the surmise that undue influence had been exercised; but his scruples were easily disposed of. He thus wrote to Ali Morad, 23d December 1842: —

“I think your Highness will do well not to assume the turban, for the following reasons:— people will say that the English put it in your head against the will of Meer Roostum. But do as you please.” —Supplementary Blue Book, No. 14.

And on this feeble recommendation to him not to assume the turban, after acknowledging to Lord Ellenborough that Roostum had expressly been sent to Dhejee, in order that his brother might induce him to resign it, does Sir Charles Napier, seven months after the event, declare that the transfer was made without his connivance and knowledge! On the 18th July 1843, he wrote: “It (the abdication) was the positive act of Meer Roostum, without my connivance or even knowledge till it was done;” and, again, on the 12th August 1843, he wrote to the Governor-General: “I assuredly did not press the abdication of the turban by Meer Roostum, nor did I advise it.” Compare with these Sir C. Napier’s statements at the time. On reference to the Blue Book, at page 478, we find that he then wrote to the Governor-General, (20th December 1842), “that Meer Roostum has thrown himself into his brother’s power BY MY ADVICE;” and, again, on the 27th December 1842, he informed the Governor-General, with self-satisfaction, that he had induced Meer Roostum to resign the turban. “This,” he says, “I was so fortunate as to succeed in, by persuading Meer Roostum to place himself in Ali Morad’s hands.” These facts require no comment.

35 Note to No. 52, Suppl. B. Book,
The abdication, as I shall presently show, was fraudulently extorted from the unhappy Roostum. That it was so, Sir Charles Napier himself suspected, and had he been formally made cognizant of this at the time, it would doubtless have been set aside; for, entangled though he was in the toils of his cunning ally, the latter could not have hoped to be supported in so gross a violation of the treaty and of justice. A personal interview with Roostum would have led to the discovery of his brother’s villany: Ali Morad, therefore, determined that the General and Roostum should not meet. How little able was the former to cope with the wily Asiatic, and how sedulously Ali Morad pursued his object, is evident from the following extract from a letter, addressed by Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, on the 27th of December:—

“There is one point which I do not yet understand—some trick, probably; but I cannot yet clearly see it. There is an evident objection to my seeing Meer Roostum. Why, I do not know; but I told Ali Morad, I must and will see his Highness.” —No. 445, First Sindh Blue Book.

Whatever difficulty the General had in clearly seeing through the motives whence the objection sprung, the reader will probably have none. Nor will he be surprised to learn, that on Sir Charles Napier’s expressing his determination to see the Ameer, Ali Morad caused him to fly, assuring him, that if he remained, he would be made a prisoner by the English General. “The trick” on which he had speculated, was now transparent even to Sir Charles Napier. He thus reported the circumstance to the Governor-General:—

“And now, my Lord, I have to tell you, that Meer Roostum has decamped yesterday morning. I met Ali Morad the night before, and desired him to say that I should pay my respects to his Highness the next day; and the next day I heard of his flight. I can only account for this in one of two ways:—

“1st, Meer Roostum, who is a timid man, and has all along fancied that I want to make him a prisoner, believed that the time for this step had arrived, and that his brother and I were about to execute his conspiracy against him; or,

“2d, That Ali Morad drove his brother to this step. Meer Roostum had resigned the turban to his brother Ali, in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Koran, before all the religious men collected to witness the resignation at Dhejee. Ali sent the Koran to me to see it. * *** Now, it strikes me that Ali Morad may have frightened the old man into the foolish step he has taken, on purpose to make his possession of the turban more decisive; that to do this, he told him I intended to make him (Roostum) a prisoner, Ali pretending to be his friend, and only waiting for his opportunity to betray us.” — No. 446, First Sindh Blue Book.

Meer Roostum was timid. Eighty-five years do not roll over a man’s head, without leaving their traces on his mental, as on his bodily faculties. He had all along believed that Sir Charles Napier intended to deal treacherously by him; for Ali Morad had, as we have seen, long since told him so, and the General’s subsequent conduct had not tended to remove his suspicions. That Ali Morad now persuaded his brother to fly, from the same dread of being seized, was a correct surmise on the part of the General—under the
circumstances which he had the day before narrated to the Governor-General, none other was tenable. But wherefore did his suspicions halt here? Had Meer Roostum’s abdication been voluntary and just—full and formal; had it been really “written in the Koran, before all the religious men collected to witness the ceremony,” as represented to him; what further necessity was there to render Ali Morad’s possession of the turban more decisive? How could it have been rendered more decisive legally? And a strange confirmation would have been afforded of the legality of the proceeding, by the midnight flight of the abdicating party. That the General did not take immediate steps to investigate the matter, when the suspicion occurred to him that the Rais-ship had been unfairly obtained, is, like much in his Sindhian career, marvelous and perplexing. One would have imagined that he would not have rested neither by night nor by day, until he had removed from his mind the suspicion which it is plain he felt, that the venerable Roostum had been beguiled, by his advice, to place himself in Ali Morad’s power in his castle of Dhejee, and the still more foul suspicion, that whilst there, Ali Morad had frightened his victim into a resignation of his birthright, by working on his fears, and casting on the General the dishonorable imputation that he meditated treachery, by making him (Roostum) a prisoner. More marvelous still, and still more lamentable, was the sequel. On the 1st of January, two days after, Sir Charles Napier issued one of a series of arrogant, goading, and irritating proclamations, which were alone quite sufficient to drive sovereign princes, heretofore accustomed to every mark of respect and courtesy, to desperation, and to kindle the flame of disaffection and rebellion throughout the country wherein they were circulated.

“Ameers and people of Sindh—His Highness the Ameer Roostum Khan sent a secret messenger to me, saying he was in the hands of his family, and could not act as his feelings of friendship for the English nation prompted him to do; and if I would receive him, he could escape and come to my camp. I answered his Highness, I would certainly receive him; but my advice was for him to consult with his brother, the Ameer Ali Morad Khan. He took my advice. He went to the fort of Dhejee, to his brother. When I heard this, I was glad, for I thought that Sindh would be tranquil; that his Highness would spend his last days in honor and in peace. I moved with my troops towards Khyrpoor, to force his violent family to disperse the wild bands they had collected. I sent his Highness word I should visit him. I wanted to ask his advice as to the arrangements for the new treaty. I thought he had again become the friend of the Government I serve. That night I heard he had solemnly conferred upon his brother, the Ameer Ali Morad, the turban of command over the Talpoor family, which brother is lawful heir to that honor. I thought this a very wise proceeding; and it added to my desire to meet his Highness, that I might hear from his own lips all about these things, and report the same to the Governor-General, being assured that these acts would recover for him the good opinion and friendship of the Governor-General of India; my feelings towards his Highness were those of friendship, honor, and peace. I even advised his Highness’ brother not to accept the turban, but to assist his brother, the Chief, in the cares of Government. I labored for the honor of the Talpoor family. What, then, was my astonishment to find, that when I expected to meet the Ameer Roostum Khan, his Highness had departed from the roof of his brother, THUS INSULTING AND DEFYING THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, WHOSE COMMANDER I AM; but my surprise is greatly increased, by hearing that his Highness has joined his family and the armed bands who have cut off our communications and stopped our mails. These things have surprised me; but my course is plain, and I thus publish it to the country, that all may know it,
and conduct themselves accordingly. I will, according to the present treaty, protect the Chief Ameer, Ali Morad, in his right as the justly constituted Chief of the Talpoor family. God willing, I will march into the Desert.” * * * —Suppl. B. Book, p. 6.

To the portions of this memorable proclamation which I have marked in italics, I would draw the reader’s particular attention.

Sir Charles Napier proclaims, and thereby stakes his and his nation’s honor on the truth of the averment, that when asked by the aged Ameer to receive him, his answer was—” Certainly, I will receive you; but I advise you to consult your brother.” I leave it to the General and the Historian to reconcile this with the “embarrassment” felt by the former, and with his exulting communication to the Governor-General of the happy idea by which Roostum was to be made to resign the turban. I appeal to every honest reader, whether the proclamation was not calculated to give a very erroneous idea of the nature of the occurrence. Sir Charles Napier’s refusal to receive the aged Ameer at once was as distinct as though the monosyllable no had been his sole reply. On the very next day, in a letter to Meer Roostum, he thus modifies his account of the transaction.

“You know that you offered to come to my camp, and that I advised you to go to your brother’s fortress instead of coming to my camp.”

To the fortress he must first go: once in Ali Morad’s power, and “induced to resign the Turban to his brother,” Sir Charles Napier would receive him,—for then all sources of embarrassment would have been removed! “I sent,” proceeds the General, “his Highness word I should visit him; I wanted to ask his advice as to the arrangement of the new treaty. * * * * THAT NIGHT I HEARD HE HAD SOLEMNLY CONFERRED UPON HIS BROTHER THE TURBAN OF COMMAND.”

On the 20th the General received the extorted letter of abdication; on the 27th it was that he intimated his intention of visiting the Ameer; on the 28th the old man fled! and Sir Charles Napier, who had previously stated that he had little doubts that Ali Morad had first “ bullied his brother into making over to him the Turban and his estates;” and then driven him to fly—now expresses blank astonishment at the step! Construes it into a new ground of accusation against Roostum, and engrafts on it a fresh series of insulting epistles and menacing proclamations.

Ali Morad’s villany had now prospered far beyond his most sanguine expectations. Not only had he prevented the interview between the General and his victim, which would have exposed the nefarious extortion of the turban from the latter; but he had, as he hoped, closed the door of reconciliation between them for ever. The deposed and trembling Roostum, infirm in body and crushed in spirit—one who had far exceeded the allotted span of human life, and who, the General thought, had been terrified by his brother into flight—was now proclaimed by that flight to have INSULTED AND DEFIED THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL; and the artful Ameer, by whose treacherous intrigues this
had been effected, was now declared to be “the justly constituted chieftain of the Talpoor family.”

On the day on which Sir Charles Napier issued this proclamation, he was in possession of Meer Roostum’s protest, in which the Ameer says,—

“When, according to your direction, I went to the fort of Dhejee (Ali Morad’s,) the Illustrious, &c. Ali Morad informed me that it was resolved that the turban of sovereignty, and the ‘Rais’ of government of my God-given kingdom should be given over to him. / therefore, being entirely helpless [under restraint*] made over the turban to the above-mentioned Ameer in this hope, that, since my connexion with your Government, as I had committed no fault with regard to it, and as I possessed sealed treaties, solemnly executed by the Governor-General, I retained the hope that my right would be restored to me in virtue of their pledged faith, by the British Government. Besides, the day before yesterday, at midnight, Hafiz Noor Ahmed, a confidential person of the above Ameer’s came to me at Dhejee, and told me that you wished to get me out of the Meer’s hands into your own, and he counseled me to go and encamp some twelve coss from Dhejee. On this account I came here, and sent confidential ambassadors to explain all, and I confidently expect, (hope), that as I have in no way offended, and as the pledged faith of the British Government is like an engraving on adamant, when my case is examined by the scales of justice and kindness, that I will receive my right according to the treaty. May the days of friendship be lengthened?”

What the ambassadors, whom Roostum sent, told the General I know not, as I had not then rejoined him, but if allowed access to him, they told him I doubt not the same story, as a few days after, (6th January) they repeated in public, to Captain Brown and myself, and which that officer must recollect. On that occasion, they distinctly accused Ali Morad and that in presence of his own minister, of having first confined him and extorted the resignation of the turban, and of having afterwards caused him to fly on the approach of the General.

The proclamation above given would almost appear to have been elicited by the humble appeal of Roostum, received the same day. Had the Ameer’s flight alone caused it, it should have been issued three days earlier!38 Be this as it may, on the 2d of January, Sir Charles Napier addressed the following insulting letter to the fugitive Ameer:—

38 On learning that Roostum had fled, Sir C. Napier wrote to Ali Morad, recommending him to proclaim himself chief of the Talpoors, (vide First Sindh Blue Book, No. 451,) in which he made no allusion to any intention of issuing a proclamation himself. Had he intended doing so, then Ali Morad’s proclamation was unnecessary. What subsequent event imposed the necessity for the proclamation of the 1st January? The receipt of Roostum’s protest is the only one which occurs to me.
HIGHNESS TO TAKE SHELTER UNDER SUCH MISREPRESENTATIONS. * * * You have solemnly resigned the turban, and you now avow that you look upon this, the most solemn and important act of your life, as a farce and a mockery! AMEER, I DO NOT UNDERSTAND SUCH DOUBLE CONDUCT. I HOLD YOU TO YOUR WORDS AND DEEDS; I NO LONGER CONSIDER YOU TO BE THE CHIEF OF THE TALPOOHS, NOR WILL I TREAT WITH YOU AS SUCH, NOR WITH THOSE WHO CONSIDER YOU TO BE RAIS."

In judging of the spirit and temper of this characteristic epistle, let it be kept in view that Sir Charles Napier had as yet but Ali Morad’s own assurance that the turban had been voluntarily resigned to him. He admits that at the time of the transfer He Believed That “ALI MORAD BULLIED HIS BROTHER INTO MAKING OVER TO HIM THE TURBAN AND HIS ESTATE.”

The party most interested takes the earliest opportunity of denying the validity of the transfer, as having been extorted from him by mingled fraud and violence; yet the General who had made such reiterated and loud protestations of his determination to prevent one Ameer defrauding another, not only refuses to investigate the matter, but spurns from him the venerable suppliant for redress and justice; upbraiding him with subterfuges and falsehood. Meer Roostum asserts, what Sir C. Napier had suspected, and what all must believe, and that his brother had persuaded him to fly at the General’s approach, lest he should be made a prisoner. But the Ameer’s letter contained not a sentence, a word, or a syllable, that justified the General in saying.

“You now pretend that you flew from me, not from any desire to avoid a meeting with me, but because I advised you to be guided by your brother’s advice and he caused you to fly.”

Meer Roostum pretended nothing of the kind. He told Sir Charles Napier, that at midnight Hafiz Noor Ahmed, a confidential agent of Ali Morad’s, came to him, and informed him, that the General wished to get him out of the Meer’s hands into his own, and advised him to fly, and encamp at a distance of twelve miles from Dhejee. He had been enticed from his relatives, and when every object which he had in view in tendering the turban to his brother had been frustrated by their flight, it had by force been extorted from him. Betrayed by the brother in whom he had confided, and separated from his other kinsmen, a solitary man and under restraint, the future appeared to him as dark as the past had latterly been. He hearkened to his betrayer’s counsels, and he fled.

The poor old man, when his fears and his confusion allowed him for a moment to reflect, regrets his conduct, suspects his brother’s motives, addresses the General, sends his ambassadors, and craves to be heard. He is denounced as a liar unworthy to be listened to! Not only is redress refused, but inquiry into his allegations, though consistent with the General’s suspicions, peremptorily denied!

Ali Morad was to be supported,—and not only was Roostum to cease to be regarded as Rais, but with none who esteemed him such would the General treat. Sir C. Napier was well aware that the other Ameers and the Belooches continued to regard Roostum or his

39 Supplement to B. Book, No. 17.
son, as Rais,—all therefore were debarred from intercourse with him. He first forbade their approach, and their keeping aloof he afterwards charged on them as a crime! The Historian, with his wonted accuracy, however, asserts that “the General had repeatedly told the old man, if he had been unjustly or harshly used by Ali Morad, he would right him,” and in support of this unfounded assertion, a letter from Sir C. Napier to the Government of India, dated the 16th of August 1843,—sewn months after the battle of Meeanee is cited.

But here the injustice complained of was the extortion of the turban, the emblem of sovereignty in Upper Sindh. Did Sir C. Napier ever promise that this should be inquired into? Major-General William Napier, for once but too accurately replies to this important question, “that officer (Major Outram) asked permission to go to him (Roostum), and obtained it, because the General thought at the time Ali Morad might have frightened the old man, and caused him to flee into the desert. He wished therefore to reassure him, yet forbad Outram to give Roostum assurance or hope of anything more than personal security, and the quiet enjoyment of his property as one of the Ameers; NO CONCESSION OR SUBMISSION WOULD SERVE TO REINSTATE HIM AS RAIS.” Sir Charles wished to reassure Roostum, whom he believed to have been betrayed or frightened into flight; and this is to be effected by informing him that his person would be safe, but that his right to the sovereignty of Upper Sindh was irrevocably and for ever at an end!

Farther, the whole of these proceedings rest for their justification on the alleged secret message sent by Meer Roostum to the General on the 18th of December.

No SUCH MESSAGE WAS EVER SENT. The Unhappy Roostum, terrified by Sir Charles Napier’s menaces, smarting under the indignities which he had heaped upon him, and suspicious of treachery, beheld a powerful army about to approach his capital. It was little likely, under such circumstances, that he would have sought to place himself in the hands of one whom no submission had satisfied, and whom he believed to be bent on his destruction. As soon as he saw the proclamation in which that message was referred to, he solemnly denied to his people that such a message had been sent. To Captain Brown and myself he denied it on the 6th of January, in the presence of his friends and of Ali Morad’s minister; and again at my conference with the Ameers at Hyderabad in February, on the only opportunity the Ameers ever had of vindicating themselves, he emphatically denied it, before the assembled chiefs of the nation, myself, and the English officers who accompanied me. When the proclamation of the 1st of January was read in public Durbar, he at once stopped the reader at the passage where allusion is made to the alleged message, and indignant denying it, demanded to be confronted with the party said to have received it from him. As the man was then a prisoner in the General’s camp, on account of his treasonable correspondence with the enemy, I was unable to produce him, and the melancholy events of the next few days prevented my confronting the parties before my departure for Bombay. But as I had expressed a very strong wish to the General that the Ameer should be confronted with the soi-disant messenger, as Sir Charles Napier
was well aware of the solemn denial of Meer Roostum that such a message had been sent, as I had expressed my conviction that it never had been sent, and as upon its authenticity or falsity depended, in a great measure, the justice or injustice of the war, it does seem strange that he should have neglected to bring the parties together, during the long period that Roostum remained a prisoner in his camp.

The messenger, a man named Moydeen, was a moonshee or scribe, employed by the British, occasionally by Sir C. Napier, and sometimes by myself. He had been often implicated in bribery transactions, for which he would have been dismissed, but for the difficulty of procuring good Persian scribes at Sukkur. So early as the 24th November, the General was informed that he supplied the Ameers’ spies with information. Again, on the 30th November, it was reported to Sir Charles “that a bukshish of 200 rupees, and six pots of sugar-candy were given to Moonshee Moydeen.” And again, on the 10th December, he was reported to the General as having received a bribe of 1500 rupees from the Ameers’ Vakeels, for information given to them. He was deemed by me so untrustworthy, that I never employed him in confidential matters; and I had described him to the General, before the Hyderabad conference took place, as “one of the bribed tools of Ali Morad, who surround me.” I have mentioned, that when I wished to confront him with the Ameer, he was a prisoner with the General, charged by him with corresponding with the enemy,—”Major Clibborn having intercepted letters from the hostile chiefs, thanking him for his information” And yet this man, who had sold himself to both parties, is again taken into the General’s confidence, his bare assertion preferred to the solemn assurance of Meer Roostum, and his testimony gravely recorded by Captain Brown, as confirming evidence taken by himself! But independently of the want of confidence we must place in the evidence of so unprincipled a man, his testimony bears tokens of its own falsehood.

First: Moydeen declares that the message was delivered to him, when he accompanied Captain French, on that officer’s mission to Meer Roostum. Captain French went on the 4th of December, returned the same day, and never afterwards visited Khyrpoor. In reference to this message, Sir Charles Napier writing to his brother says, “One night, 18th December 1842, a secret messenger came to me from Roostum,” —a discrepancy between the General and the moonshee of fourteen days.

Secondly : Moydeen says—”And the same day I mentioned the case to the General, through the head Moonshee;” whereas Sir Charles Napier, on reporting the circumstance immediately after, states that “ the messenger privately informed Lieutenant Brown.”

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41 Intelligence, 24th Nov Blue Book, p. 461
42 Blue Book, p. 464
43 Intelligence, 10th Dec. Blue Book, p. 470.
44 Supplementary Blue Book, p. 16.
45 Supplementary Blue Book, p. 25.
46 No. 439, First Sindh Blue Book.
In the third place: On the 16th of August—eight months and twelve days after the alleged event—Moydeen repeats, word for word, a long message, occupying nine of the fourteen lines within which his statement is comprised, and which, he says, “he remembers well;” yet he cannot recollect the names of certain members of Meer Roostum’s family, with whom he had, in the interim, been engaged in a traitorous correspondence! Charged with that correspondence, of which Major Clibborn supplied the most irrefrangible proof, I left him a prisoner, on my final departure from Sindh. How he escaped punishment for the offence, became reinstated in employment, and so far Raised to favour and to confidence, as to have his word believed in opposition to the solemn declaration of Meer Roostum, made to me as British representative, and in the assembly of the Chiefs of his nation—does not appear!

Such, and so supported, with its allegations denied—the ordeal of a meeting between the parties withheld by the General, and its embodiment as a state document demonstrably false—was the alleged message, which forms the sole justification of the subsequent persecutions of the aged Roostum.

In justice to Sir Charles Napier, I have narrated the events connected with Ali Morad’s intrigues, not in the order of their occurrence, but in that in which he became cognizant of them,—avoiding to urge arguments in proof of the Ameer’s turpitude, which were not at the time known to the General. I have said that the abdication of the turban was extorted from Roostum, and therefore illegal, and to be set aside. Let us now examine this question more closely. To have done so earlier, would have unnecessarily prejudiced Sir Charles Napier’s cause.

In the Supplementary Sindh Blue Book, is to be found an elaborately worded treaty, said to have been written in the Koran by Meer Roostum, in the presence of “all the religious men collected to witness the resignation at Dhejee,” —which, on the 29th of December, Sir Charles Napier reports to the Governor-General, Ali Morad had sent to him for inspection. It appears remarkable that no reference should have been made to this document,—the most important that passed through Sir Charles Napier’s hands during the whole of the Sindh transactions,—until it was necessary to report Roostum’s flight. And yet stranger will the reader regard it, that no copy of it, and no proofs of its authenticity, should have been forwarded to his Lordship, till July 1843,—seven months after its alleged ratification by Roostum, and not until after the injustice committed towards that unfortunate Prince had become the war-cry throughout Sindh, its plains had been deluged with blood, and himself and fifteen other Princes were pining in captivity at Sassoor in the Deccan, the monument at once of the power, and—with grief I say it—of the injustice of the British Government.

I have already submitted to the reader, the letter of the 20th December, in which Meer Roostum was compelled to say he had voluntarily resigned the turban. In that letter, he merely informed the General, that he had given to his brother entire power over his kingdom, army, and forts; not a word is said about any cession of territory; and that Sir
Charles Napier never fancied that he therein alienated his possessions, is evident from the tone of his communication to Ali Morad. “If to be Chieftain gives you power, I should say, assume the turban. But it gives you none; you are strong without it. No one in Sindh can oppose you: no one out of Sindh can oppose you. But do as you please.” Here is no reference to the territorial gifts, which the treaty in the Koran conferred upon him, but simply such a letter as any one might write in reference to the missive of Roostum; a document which merely granted a power of lieutenancy over his kingdom, army, and forts, to Ali Morad. With the full, minute, and lawyer-like treaty said to have been written in the Koran, wherefore the necessity of the letter to the General, so insufficiently describing the nature of that elaborate deed of donation? A priori, the writing in the Koran would seem to have been an ingenious after-thought of Ali Morad, who, dissatisfied with the letter extorted from Roostum, fabricated this as more suitable to his own taste, and likely to satisfy the General of the propriety of assuming the turban, which he now decorated with these valuable appendages.

**MEER ROOSUM’S LETTER**

_Written At The Time._

“As hitherto the management of my kingdom has not been according to the wishes of the illustrious English Government, I have therefore invested the excellent, &c. &c., Ali Morad Khan, who is fully competent to rule, and do so in accordance with the desires of the British Government, with entire powers as my successor, (or representative,) and have of my own free will, made over to him the entire power over my kingdom, army, and forts. God willing, he will act in every respect according to the desires of the British Government. The Ameer in question is a dear friend of mine, and a well-wisher of the English Government. This should he announced to the illustrious Governor-General. May the days of friendship be prolonged?”

**THE TREATY SAID TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN THE KORAN.**

_Praise be to God, and blessing on the Prophet and his family._

Meer Roostum Khan Talpoor has made a compact, and formed a treaty with Meer Ali Morad Khan Talpoor, to the following effect:— At this time, during the supremacy of the powerful and exalted English Government, and from the autumn of 1252, Meer Roostum Khan, of my own free will and pleasure, according to the rule and custom of the Chiefs of Hyderabad, present to Meer Ali Morad Khan, (who is worthy of the Chiefs,) the turban of the Chiefship brotherhood, with the control of my whole country, with the [sur shumari] capitation tax, [meer buhureej river dues, and [jaziga] tax on others than Mohammedans, and farms, tolls, and fisheries, as specified below, so that during my lifetime, having occupied the seat of the Chiefship, he may take into his entire possession the countries specified below: no one of my sons or nephews has, or shall have, claim or entry in this same turban, and this same country, which I, of my free will and pleasure, bestow in gift. If any one advances a claim, he is a liar. The administration of affairs, the control of the army, and the negotiations with the English, all now depend on the will of Meer Ali Morad Khan. In this compact, the oath of the Koran is used: there shall not be the variation of a hair’s breadth. God is a sufficient witness. Written on the 17th of Zekiad, 1258, H.H.” (December 20,1842.)
Here follow the districts, forts, &c., alleged to be ceded, including Khyrpoor, the capital!

The treaty in the Koran appears to have conveyed to Ali Morad not only the estates attached to the turban, but all the personal property of Meer Roostum.

That the treaty said to have been written in the Koran, by Roostum, required further confirmation, occurred to Sir Charles Napier himself, nearly a year after the event; and to whom does the reader think he applied for it? To the party, certainly, best acquainted with its parentage and birth—Ali Morad himself! The answer of the latter, dated the 9th of October 1843, he forwarded to the Governor-General on the 24th of the same month. It forms No. 176 of the Supplementary Sindh Blue Book. Ali Morad says:

“Meer Roostum Khan, a week before he granted me the turban and territory, importuned me to accept them, saying that none of his sons appeared qualified to possess the turban and rule the country, and that I should, therefore, take possession of the turban and territory from him. He deputed to me at Khote Dhejee, his eldest son, Meer Mahommed Hoossein, Meer Nusseer Khan, Futty Mahommed Ghoree, Peer Ali Gohur, and certain other confidential persons, to solicit me earnestly to accept the turban and territory.

“At last he came in person, bound the turban with his own hands, and of his own accord round my head, made the entry in the Koran, of his having granted me the whole of his country, sealed it, and ratified it with his seal and signature, and thus distinctly made over his country to me.”

Of this pretended cession of territory—this spontaneous request, on the part of Roostum, that Ali Morad would accept not merely the supreme command, but the actual sovereignty and territory of Roostum, there is not only no evidence, but every consideration leads to the inference that the whole is an utter fiction, subsequently devised by Ali Morad, when endeavoring to support, by some appearance of an antecedent cession, the forged treaty in the Koran. If such a request had been made, and followed by the entry in the Koran, what was the necessity of the subsequent letter of the 20th? Wherefore was not the slightest allusion made in it to any gift beyond that of power over his kingdom, and army, and fort? Wherefore, if the deputation “earnestly solicited him in their own names and that of Roostum, to take the turban and territory,” did he not forthwith comply? Wherefore did he not at once accompany them to Khyrpoor, and apprize the General of the family arrangement,” which he knew must gratify him?

“The troubles of Sindh are at an end: my kinsmen have pressed the turban and territory on me, and they have agreed to abide by my decision in all things. Of my attachment you are assured: the perfect submission of my brethren to all your demands is now guaranteed, for they have voluntarily offered to be guided by my advice; and that advice, of course, is a compliance with all your wishes’”

Even had Ali Morad made no report of the circumstance, could it—the most momentous in the annals of the Talpoor dynasty and big with the fate of Sindh—have really occurred,
without its having been speedily narrated to Sir Charles Napier? That no rumor of it had ever reached his ears on the 20th of December is evident from the doubt he expressed as to Roostum’s is prevailed on to resign the turban. On that day he thus wrote — Roostum being safe with his brother:—

“Ali Morad is now virtually Chief; for if Meer Roostum does not bestow the turban on him, he will, at all events, be guided by,” &c.

And on the 27th of the month, ten days after the alleged earnest solicitations, he congratulates the Governor-General on having secured for Ali Morad the “exercise of the power of Rais” during Roostum’s life. “This,” he exultingly adds, “I was so fortunate as to succeed in, by persuading Meer Roostum to place himself in Ali Morad’s hands.” Not an allusion appears to the urgent entreaties made by Roostum to his brother, to accept from him his turban and his lands. The resolution to present their “earnest solicitation” if ever formed, was not whispered in the closet: the functions of the deputation were discussed and determined on in public durbar, and had they been of the nature represented by Ali Morad, how does it happen, that during the ten months that elapsed between the sederunt and the preparation of his statement, no respectable witness could be adduced to testify to its truth? Are none of the confidential persons,” said to have swelled the mission, available as evidence?

In reporting Roostum’s flight to the Governor-General, on the 29th of December, Sir Charles Napier assured his Lordship that—

“Meer Roostum had resigned the turban to his brother, Ali Morad, in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Koran, before all the religious men collected to witness the resignation, at Dhejee.”

Had the ceremony been thus public, would not Ali Morad have advanced the circumstance, to remove Sir Charles Napier’s expressed anxiety, lest “people will say the English put the turban on your head, against the will of Meer Roostum.” Would he not have mentioned it when he transmitted Roostum’s letter of abdication?

The first intimation of this important, and to him necessarily gratifying fact, which Sir Charles Napier gives to the Governor-General, is in the report made of Roostum’s flight. The latter was an event as well calculated to excite Lord Ellenborough’s suspicions, as was the assurance that the resignation had been formal and in public, to allay them. Wherefore was it not made earlier, if earlier the General was cognizant of it—and if then he heard it for the first time, why were not his suspicions of perfidy awakened? Had Roostum resigned his turban and territory in the manner specified, in presence of “ all the religious men collected at Dhejee,” I should certainly have heard of it when in the neighborhood of Khyrpoor, where I subsequently remained for several days. Nor would Roostum have dared to accuse Ali Morad of having “basely treated him with respect to the turban,” as he
afterwards did on the 6th of January, in the presence of Ali Morad’s own minister, Lieutenant Brown, myself, and a large assembly of people.

After all I have said of Ali Morad, and the exposure which I have made of his villany, the reader will doubtless be surprised to find Sir Charles Napier quoting me as the person on whose authority he formed so high an opinion of that Ameer.47

Unquestionably I readily admitted Ali Morad to be the most powerful, able, and influential of the Ameers of Upper Sindh—and as such, the most eligible to succeed Roostum; his pretensions in point of the law of inheritance being on a level with those of Hoossein. But it will be recollected that on the 30th of October, I cautioned Sir Charles Napier against attaching any weight to accusations brought by Ali Morad against his brethren, pointing out that “IT WAS HIS INTEREST TO PLACE THE OTHER AMEERS OF KHYRPOOR AT ENMITY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AS WELL TO GRATIFY REVENGEFUL FEELINGS, AS TO SECURE OUR PREFERENCE TO HIS CLAIMS TO THE PRINCIPAL CHIEFTAINSHIP OF UPPER SINDH, ON THE DEMISE OF MEER ROOSTUM.”48 If, like Sir Charles Napier, I were in the habit of carrying tablets in my pocket to take notes of private conversations, I could prove that I expressed myself still more strongly on the subject in personal interviews.

Sir Charles Napier, referring to this subject, proceeds:—

“Major Outram here speaks of the death of Meer Roostum; but his resignation of the turban, whether to Ali Morad, or to his son Hoossein Ali, was the same thing. It was the cessation of Meer Roostum to wear the turban himself. It was his political death, and the real heir became the rightful owner.”

A more striking proof could not be afforded of the incompetence of one ignorant of Oriental feelings, to adjust the disturbed affairs of an Eastern nation. For the assumption is totally incorrect; it was not the same thing; and while there was yet time to remedy his error, I pointed out to Sir Charles Napier that it was a very different thing. On the 26th of January, I thus addressed him:—

“You observe that I myself had pointed out Ali Morad’s consistency of character, and advocated his claim to the Rais-ship. I did recommend that his claim to Rais, when vacant by Roostum’s death, should be admitted, as consonant with the customs of the country, and as politic, because Ali Morad never would have submitted to the domination of any of his nephews, and in any struggle with them would have been victorious; whereas, the mere admission on our part would settle the question without a murmur, and because Ali Morad is personally a more able man, as far as we can judge, than any of the others, and under our control and guidance would be prevented from misusing his power; but I never contemplated conferring the Chief-ship on him before the demise of Meer Roostum—an usurpation which must turn all classes against him, who otherwise would have been as ready to support Ali

47 See Appendix.
48 Blue Book, No. 381, p. 430.
Morad as any of the others; and I never had any idea of dispossessing any of the other Chiefs of any portion of their territory to uphold Ali Morad’s power, which is sufficiently secured by our countenance; which is unnecessary against foreign power under our protection; and which is unnecessary for internal government, where each chief is answerable for his own portion, and the Rais merely required to give his casting vote, and rule as the patriarch of the family.”
SECTION VI.

THE TENDERING OF THE NEW TREATY.

In the last Section, I was led to anticipate the course of my narrative, from a desire to concentrate the facts bearing on the forced resignation of Roostum, and the too successful intrigues of his brother. I now retrace my steps to the point where I parted from the General’s negotiations, at the end of Section IV. Having already shown how he prepared the Ameers for the reception of the new treaty, I proceed to discuss the mode of tendering it.

“Acting upon the policy he had before publicly proclaimed to all India,” says General W. Napier, “the Governor-General offered the new treaty. It did but slightly punish the infractions of the old; and was, in truth, framed with a view rather to benefit the civilized world generally, than to press on the Ameers. Its unaggressive and disinterested character was marked by restoring the districts taken from the Ameers to Bhawul Khan; his territories they rightfully were, and his undeviating fidelity as an ally merited the reward. THIS WAS A CRITICAL TIME FOR INDIA. THE ARMIES OF NOTT AND POLLOCK WERE DANGEROUSLY SITUATED, and any misfortune was sure, aided by the treason of the newspaper editors, to produce wide spreading mischief.”—P. 246.

When General Napier affirms, that at the time of tendering the treaty, India was in a critical state, and the armies of Nott and Pollock dangerously situated, he either misrepresents, or is ignorant of the state of the facts. The treaties were received by Sir Charles Napier on the 12th of November. On the 9th of that month, the armies of Nott and Pollock had descended in triumph from Afghanistan, and were enjoying repose at Peshawur. On the 4th of December, the treaties were presented to the Ameers, and, within a few days, the avenging heroes of Candahar, Cabool, and Jellalabad, with the prisoners whom they had rescued, were feted at Ferozepore by the Governor-General. The troops were providing themselves with ribbon, to suspend the medals promised to them, bearing the exhilarating motto of "Pax Asie Restituta," and Lord Ellenborough had announced that our western frontier had ceased to afford any grounds for alarm. Never did the political horizon appear more cheerful, or more promising of continued serenity; all around was calm, and clear, and cloudless.

“In this state of affairs, the favorable season for acting having set in, the General *** judged it time to present the new treaty, which he had been again peremptorily commanded to enforce, as an act in itself just, and not to be departed from. It was, therefore, delivered to the Ameers of Upper Sindh on the 4th of December, and to the Ameers of Lower Sindh on the 6th of that month, together with official notes from Lord Ellenborough, marking the estimation in which the conduct of each Ameer was separately held by the Governor-General.”
Along with the treaty, General Napier has forgotten to add that his brother forwarded certain letters which he deemed it advisable to withhold from the Governor-General, and which the latter saw, for the first time, on the 18th July 1843,—seven months after they had been sent, and five months after the Princes to whom they were addressed had been hurled from their thrones, and transported to India! These letters are diplomatic curiosities, and singularly attest the conciliatory manner of their illustrious writer, the friendly freedom with which he was wont to make use of the Governor-General’s name, his delicate perception of the nature of his own functions, and his just appreciation of the relation in which he stood to their Highnesses the Ameers. I subjoin them.

To the Ameers of (Upper and Lower) Sindh.
December 1, 1842.

“I have received the draft of a treaty between the Ameers of Khyrpoor (and Hyderabad) and the British Government, signed by his Excellency the Right Honorable Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, whose commands I have to present to your Highnesses, for your Highnesses acceptance and guidance. In obedience to the commands of the Governor-General of India, I shall proceed to occupy Roree, and the left bank of the Indus, from the latter town to the Bhawulpore frontier, including the whole districts of Boongbarra and Subzulcote, as set forth in the treaty,” &c.—P. 2, Second Sindh Blue Book.

To Meer Roostum, individually, he thus wrote on the 3d:—

“I have sent my commissioner to wait upon you, and to agree upon the day and the hour of the ensuing week on which your Highness will receive a new treaty, which the Governor-General has ordered me to place in your hands, and to carry into immediate execution.” —P. 3, Supplementary Blue Book.

The assertions which I have placed in italics, were the offspring of the General’s powerful imagination—utterly destitute of foundation in fact. In his letter of the 4th November, which accompanied the draft treaty, the Governor-General directed Sir Charles Napier to appoint a commissioner for “negotiating the treaties” and “carrying the details of the treaties, When Concluded, into effect” True, in an after communication he wrote, “really of negotiation there should be little; we make a demand we believe to be just and expedient, and we are prepared to enforce it:” but this was written in reference to the hypothetical delay of all procedure in the matter, until my return to Sindh in the capacity of commissioner, which his Lordship dreaded might be construed into hesitation on our part, “and thereby seriously prejudice the negotiations.” The treaty was considered to be just, and, if not quietly acceded to, it was to be enforced by arms; but the Governor-General never contemplated its “execution” before the parties interested had had full time to consider its terms, and to give in their adhesion. Even now, on presenting the treaty, Sir Charles Napier did not inform the Ameers of Lord Ellenborough’s just intentions towards them of remitting an equivalent, in tribute, to all but Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, for the value of territory he meant to appropriate. The object of Lord Ellenborough was to punish Meer Roostum, and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, by the confiscation of part of their property for their supposed infidelity,—and to indemnify the
other Ameers for their losses, by a remission of tribute. Meer Nusseer Khan was the only sufferer by this last addition to the treaty, and the Governor-General, in his letter to Sir Charles, of 4th November, expressed himself as follows:—

"I am not acquainted with the value of these pergunnahs, formerly belonging to Meer Moobaruck Khan, or with their exact position, and it is possible that some of them, or all, may have been allotted to his other sons, and not to Meer Nusseer Khan, who alone, as far as I am informed, has placed himself in the position of an enemy by his conduct. If these pergunnahs should belong to the late Meer Moobaruck Khan’s other sons, the surplus tribute to be surrendered to us (in excess of the annual value of the lands to be demanded”) may be made the means of compensation to the present possessors,” — Blue Book, p. 439.

Sir Charles Napier had, at the time, in his possession Mr. Bell’s schedule, which informed him that the pecuniary value of the cession demanded was 610,500 rupees (£61,050);—he had himself previously formed a table by which the excess of tribute above the value of property formerly intended to be confiscated, amounted only to 33,856 rupees (£3385);—and I had called his attention to the mistake which I suspected the Governor-General had committed, when he showed me the treaty on the day he received it, although he kept private the letter of instructions which accompanied it, of the 4th November, above alluded to;—still, with the full knowledge that the Governor-General’s intentions could not be realized, he kept his Lordship in ignorance of the facts for two months and eighteen days;—he presented the treaty to the Ameers without any explanation of his Lordship’s instructions,—and demanded of them to fix an hour for receiving the treaty, which, he stated, “the Governor-General has ordered me to place in your hands, AND TO CARRY INTO IMMEDIATE EXECUTION.”

The treaty was presented—and accepted. Captain French communicated to the General the assent of the Chiefs of Upper Sindh to the new treaty, though he at the same time explained that they regarded it as both oppressive and unjust; and on the 7th of December, Sir Charles Napier reported to the Governor-General as follows:—

"I have received a deputation from the Ameers of Khyrpoor. They profess perfect submission, but deny any conduct except what has been loyal. I believe them to be made to gain time, in order to hear from Hyderabad, where the treaty was delivered on the same day. I will not, therefore, take public possession of Roree, till I hear the answer of the Ameers of Hyderabad. If they remain all quiet, and profess submission, I will take possession of Roree,” &c. —First Sindh Blue Book, No. 498.

Placed in the same circumstances as Sir Charles Napier, an Indian politician would have afforded the Princes, whose acquiescence to the terms of our dictation was so readily obtained, an opportunity of ratifying the treaty while yet in this happy mood. Treaties once exchanged with them, no difficulty need have been apprehended in the settlement of the details.

49 No. 253, Blue Book
50 Blue Book, p. 367.
But Sir Charles Napier must needs wait till he heard from Hyderabad. A moment’s reflection would have satisfied him, that from that quarter no danger was to be apprehended. With the exception of Meer Nusseer, none of the Ameers of Lower Sindh suffered by the provisions of the new treaty, and on that chief the penalty was not heavy. What he lost in revenue he gained in peace and quietness; for his northern possessions had been to him a continual source of anxiety and trouble. But even had it been otherwise, had a refusal been anticipated, it seems strange diplomacy to defer amicable arrangements with potentates who are ready to embrace them, because neighboring princes decline our alliance on the terms we tender. When symptoms of a hostile combination between our professed friends and our foes manifest themselves, it is time to treat the former as faithless. To do so sooner, is to invite the consummation we profess to dread.

The “Intelligence” of Major Clibborn’s spies report on the 8th of December, that—

“The vakeels (who had been sent to communicate the Ameers’ submission to Sir C. Napier,) returned yesterday evening to Khyrpoor, and went and made their salaam to the Ameers, and gave such a favorable account of their reception by the General, adding also, that he, the General, had no intention of advancing on Khyrpoor, and that the Bengal force was to depart shortly for Ferozepoor, that the Meers were greatly pleased, and immediately repaired to Shah Morad Mohurro, outside of Khyrpoor, where they hunted for an hour or two, and returned to Khyrpoor.”

And at page 471 we are informed, that at four P.m. on the same day,—

“Meer Mahommed Hoossein made a petition to Meer Roostum to the effect that now the English are so well disposed towards us, (as reported by the vakeels,) would it not be as well to discharge the Luskhur? (troops.) On this Meer Roostum ordered that half the followers should be paid up and discharged.”

The fears which had so long distracted these unfortunate princes were now in some measure, and for a time removed. The threatened invasion of their territory, and the dreaded hostile march upon their capital, they learned were but idle gossip, and the General, whose overbearing conduct had well nigh driven them to despair, was, they were assured by their own vakeels, a more courteous man than his acts betokened him, or rumor described. But the hopes they had thus begun to cherish were soon to be dispelled.

That the sentiments of Sir Charles Napier were entirely misrepresented by the vakeels, there is abundant proof, for we have the evidence of Sir Charles himself, in his letter to the Governor-General of the 7th December, reporting the interview he had that day had with the vakeels, in which he informs his Lordship:—”If they all remain quiet, and profess submission, I shall take possession of Roree, and move a portion of the Bengal Brigade, or

51 Blue Book, page 470.
the whole of it, (according to circumstances,) upon Bhoong Bhara and Subzulkote, till further orders from your Lordship. I hear the Ameers are trying to levy, not only this year’s taxes, but those for next year, upon the Ryots in those districts. I shall therefore issue a proclamation forbidding the latter to pay taxes beyond the 1st of January. And on the following day (the 8th of December) he issued at Roree the proclamation he alluded to, as follows:—

“The Government has now commanded that from the 1st of January 1843, the above named country from Subzulkote to Roree inclusive, in accordance with the new treaty concluded between the English Government and the Ameers of Khyrpoor shall be given up by them. Again, be it known, and it is proclaimed, that after this season (autumn) one cowree shall not be paid to the kurdars of the Ameers.”

Whence this difference of sentiment between the parties? Whence the joy of the Ameers, which was to be so speedily blighted? Most probably it originated in the artful intrigues of Ali Morad, to which I have already alluded,—and it may without difficulty have been effected by the agency of the unprincipled Moonshee Moydeen, or whoever acted as interpreter at the interview with the vakeels, as neither Sir Charles Napier nor his assistant, Captain Brown, understood the least of the Persian language in which the conversation was conducted.

On the 14th December, Sir Charles again wrote to the Govern or-General,—

“Should your Lordship decide upon giving up the new territory to the Nawab, Wallace will be prepared to do so. In the first instance I shall occupy it in the name of the British Government. The Ameers say I have proclaimed the occupation ‘in the name of the Nawab.’ This is not true.”

These documents leave no doubt as to the General’s determination during the interview he had with the vakeels; and sad was the disappointment of the Ameers when they were undeceived. The Intelligence of the 10th December informs us, that,—

“Yesterday the 9th, about noon, Moolah Mahommed Tooma arrived from Roree, and had an audience of the Ameers, when he informed them of the proclamation respecting the transfer of territory to Bhawul Khan, and that it had been made public by beat of tom-tom. On this announcement the Ameers and all present were astonished, and exclaimed, ‘How are the Ameers to exist?’ and immediately messengers and horsemen were dispatched in all directions to re-engage the discharged fighting men,” &c.

The treaty was delivered to the Ameers on the 4th December; they had known the provisions of it for several days, and had consented to it under protest. The cause of their

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52 The General’s believing these reports, shows his ignorance of the customs of the country. The land revenues in Sindh are principally gathered in kind, and cannot therefore be collected in advance.
53 Blue Book, page 466.
54 The treaty had not been concluded between them.
55 Blue Book, page 471.
alarm, therefore, must be looked for, not in the insulting character of the proclamation, but in the fact that its publicity destroyed some hope which had existed in their minds that it would be materially modified ere it was acted on. It cannot be supposed that the General held out any hopes to them, and the conclusion is therefore natural, that it was done by the hired tools of Ali Morad, who was the only one interested in exciting animosity between the parties.

The proclamation not only crushed the hopes of a modification of the treaty with which the Ameers had amused themselves, but rendered them still more distrustful of the British representative, whose conduct on the 8th was in such direct contrast to the assurances which they had received from their vakeels on the 7th. And if their territory was thus proclaimed away, ere yet the treaty was ratified, what, they probably argued, was to prevent further encroachments being made, on the plea of a “verbal submission” — that now tendered by the historian in defence of the proclamation and the seizure of the ceded districts.

The remonstrance of the venerable Roostum, like all his addresses to the General, was at once becoming and affecting. While firmly maintaining that he was innocent of the charges—on his assumed guilt of which these penalties were imposed—pointing out how hardly they bore upon him, and denying that as yet the treaty had been concluded, his letter breathes the most perfect submission to the will of the British Government, as expressed through its representative. After referring to his previous treaties with the British, the friendly services he had rendered, and the reliance he had placed on the pledges by treaty which he had obtained, the Ameer proceeds:

“The result to me is, that you have issued a proclamation that, in accordance with the new treaty, my country, from Roree to the boundary of Subzulkote, shall be considered as belonging to the British Government from the 1st January: as yet, I have not entered into any treaty to this effect. It is well known to all—rich and poor—that the treaties between the English Government and Princes and Rulers of India are never broken: moreover, the justice and rectitude of the English is known throughout the world, and is ever more resplendent than the sun; therefore, why, without fault or offence, has the English Government not acted up to its treaty with me? I feel conscious that, from the beginning to the present day, I have never entertained enmity or ill-will towards the Government: impartially and with care investigate this matter. In equity and justice, the reports of the interested are not attended to. The English possessions extend over thousands of miles, while my country would scarcely suffice for the maintenance of one Sahib; moreover be it known, that I have distributed the district (above alluded to) among my kindred, and Chiefs of Belooches. Every one of my Chiefs and Belooches derive their livelihood from it. I depend on the promise and treaty of the English Government, that it will not place faith, or give credence to the false reports and lies of those who wish to ruin me; and that it will not alter the old treaty entered into between our Governments, but act according to it. Kindly send me a reply to this, as quickly as you can.”

The remonstrance of Roostum remained unnoticed. The proclamation was followed by another threatening missive from Sir Charles Napier, dated the 9th December, called
forth, it would appear, by a report that the Ameers contemplated a night attack upon his
camp:—

"* * * Your subjects, it is said, propose to attack my camp in the night time. This would, of
course, be without your knowledge, and also be very foolish, because my soldiers would slay
those who attack them, and, when day dawned, I would march to Khyrpoor, transplant the
inhabitants to Sukkur, and destroy your capital city, with the exception of your Highnesses’
palace, which I would leave standing alone, as a mark of my respect for your Highnesses, and
of my conviction that you have no authority over your own subjects. **I therefore advise
your Highnesses, * * * in order that you may warn your people against any such act of
hostility."

Surely a more courteous message was due to allied sovereigns, who had complied with all
our demands, from one knowing, as the General did, that the same gossip which brought
the rumor of permission having been asked to make the attack, brought with it also the
intelligence that permission had been peremptorily refused. "Meer Roostum," we are told,
"being pleased with the reports of the vakeels, deprecated the idea, and directed that no
further mention of the subject should be made."" Roostum's reply was simple and
affecting:—

" Your letter has reached me, in which you have written—' I have been given to understand
that your Ryots and people have agreed to make a night attack on my camp, which I believe is
without your knowledge or consent,' &c. I understand all you have written. God forbid that I,
or my people, should think of fighting with you, or making a night attack on your camp. It has
never been my wish to fight with you; for myself, I have only one desire, which is, to be
friendly with the English; beyond that, I want nothing. I throw myself on your mercy and
protection.

"You are a wise Sahib, not to listen to those who wish to ruin me. Your informant has told lies:
do not put any faith in what he tells you. I and my people are humble servants of the British
Government, and wish for its favour and support; I have no evil design towards you, and trust
you have none also towards me. What I have written consider as true; but do not believe what
is said against me."

Sir Charles again addressed Meer Roostum as follows, which, though not dated, was from
its contents evidently written on the 12th December, as it was eight days after the treaty
had been tendered on the 4th:—

"The men you sent to Roree are robbing you. They will tell you that they are bribing my
soldiers, and they extract money from your Highness under that pretext. If they were really
bribing my soldiers to desert, I would punish them; but they are doing no such thing. Your
Highness is robbed by your servants. However, if you are not robbed, and that, as they
pretend, they were bribing my soldiers, it was high time to turn them out of Roree, which I
have done; and if I find them attempting to disturb the loyalty of my troops, it will be the
worse for them. Ameer, I have received my orders, and will obey them. I laugh at your
preparations for war. I want to prevent blood being shed. Listen to my words: consult with
your brother, his Highness Ali Morad. Your own blood will not deceive you; your servants
will. These men were four days in Roree, and did not deliver your letters to me; had I not sent for them, they would still have kept them from me to gain time, that they might rob you. Eight days have passed, (since the treaty was tendered on the 4th December,) and I have not heard that your Highness has nominated a commissioner of rank to arrange the details of the treaty. I expect to have, in writing, your full acceptance of the draft thereof, by the return of the bearer. Your Highness is collecting troops in all directions; I must, therefore, have your acceptance of the treaty immediately,—yea or nay. I will not lose the cold weather. Your Highness must be prompt, or I shall act without consulting your Highness; my time is measured, and I cannot waste it in long negotiations.

“Your Highness’ letter is full of discussion; but, as there are two sides of your river, so are there two sides of your Highness’ arguments. Now, the Governor-General has occupied both sides of your Highness’ river, because he has considered both sides of your Highness’ arguments. Many of your Highness’ family have taken the same view of the case that the Governor-General has; and the respect which they have shown to the British Government is repaid to them by the Governor-General. But I cannot go into the argument, I am not the Governor-General; I am only one of his commanders. I will forward your letter to him if you wish me to do so; but in the meantime I will occupy the territories which he has commanded me to occupy. You think I am your enemy; why should I be so, I gain nothing for myself— I take no gifts; I receive no jagheers. What is it to me whether your Highness or any other person occupies the land? The Governor-General has given to you his reasons and to me his orders—they shall be obeyed.”

To this most extraordinary and arrogant letter from a military officer to a sovereign Prince, Meer Roostum returned the following touching reply:—

“I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter through Mr. Brown. You state that several people, agents of mine, have gone towards Loharee to seduce your troops, and that those agents deceive me, if they flatter me with prospects of succeeding in that sort of way. Further, you say, that you have received your orders, which you intend to execute; that hostile preparations appear to be going on here, and that you fear there will be bloodshed! You then recommend me to consult my brother, Meer Ali Morad Khan, and you conclude by mentioning that you have not yet appointed agents to see the provisions of the treaty carried out, because you first expect a plain ‘yes or no’ from me. My friend, in answer to all this, I can only declare that we have never given money to any one for the purpose of corrupting your troops, and we challenge you to prove the charge. God knows we have no intention of opposing neither the British, nor a thought of war or fighting—we have not the power. Ali Morad Khan is indeed a brother, and as such, we shall of course consult him. A messenger has been sent off to him, and I expect him here in a day or two, and then I shall have the honor of reporting to you the result of our conference. Mr. Brown has left without waiting for this event.

56 It has been said by General William Napier, page 85, “Fear and cupidity! These were the springs of action. Sir Alexander Burns had said their treasury contained twenty millions sterling. ‘The Ameers may lie supposed wealthy, was one of the earliest intimations given by Lord Auckland to his negotiator.” Such were the inducements for Lord Auckland’s policy, as insinuated by General William Napier. Does he not perceive how easily such insinuations are capable of being retorted? Sir Charles Napier’s share of the Hyderabad prize money is reported to exceed £70,000, sterling!

57 Supplementary Blue Book, No. 8.
“Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me and my posterity, by the British Government, under a formal treaty, I have considered myself a dependent of theirs, and have thought myself secure. I have always attended to the least wish of the British officers; and now, that my territory is being taken from me, I am at a loss to find out the reason of so harsh a measure. I have committed no fault; if any is alleged against me, let me hear what it is, and I shall be prepared with an answer. I feel strong in the possession of that treaty, and I trust to the consideration of the British; still, if without any fault on my part, you choose to seize my territory by force, I shall not oppose you, but I shall consent to and observe the provisions of the new treaty. However, I am now, and shall continue to be, a suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your hands.”

But no submission would suit the General; and accordingly, on the 18th December, he promulgated the following proclamation, again exposing them to the contempt of their subjects, by the transfer of a large portion of their dominions to a neighboring state:—

“The Governor-General of India has ordered me to take possession of the districts of Subzulkote and of Bhooong-Bhara, and to re-annex the said districts to the territory of his Highness the Nawab of Bhawulpore, to whom they will immediately be made over, his Highness guaranteeing all contracts made between the Ameers and private individuals, not within the said districts, in such manner as shall be hereafter arranged in fulfilling the details of the treaty.

“It is hereby also made known, that if the Ameers collect any revenue in advance after the 1st January 1843, or shall impose any new tax upon the Ryots of the above named districts, the said Ameers shall be amerced to that amount in arranging the new treaty, and this amercement shall be enforced to a larger amount than the Ameers may have so levied upon the people of the said districts.”

Thus we have seen that the treaty which was tendered to the Ameers on the 4th December, was verbally acceded to by the vakeels on the 7th; on the 8th, before it was ratified, their territory was confiscated by proclamation. On the 9th, a letter is sent by the General to Meer Roostum, threatening to destroy his capital. On the 12th, he is again goaded to opposition by the most insulting language. On the 18th, he is urged to go to his brother—he is informed of the General’s intention of marching on his capital; and a large portion of his country is publicly proclaimed to be transferred to the Nawab of Bhawulpore. On the 19th, Meer Roostum fled from his capital to Dejee-Ka-Kote, the fort of his brother Ali Morad; “the greatest excitement prevailed at Khyrpoor,” and “the capital of the country, Khyrpoor, was abandoned, and very considerable property and valuables of the Ameers were at the mercy of the Beloochees;” on the 20th, Ali Morad informed the General “that his brother was safe with him;” and on the same day, Sir Charles exultingly wrote to the Governor-General, “That the Chief of the Talpoors,

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58 Blue Book, page 473.
59 Suppl. vol., No. 9.
60 B. B. p. 467
61 Suppl. vol. No. 8.
62 Suppl. vol., No. 10
63 Suppl. vol., No. 11
64 Suppl. vol., No. 9
65 B. B., p. 478
66 B. B. p. 482.
67 B. p. 482.
68 B. B. p. 478.
frightened at the violence of his family, and at our steady operations to coerce them, has thrown himself into his brother’s power BY MY ADVICE.”\(^6\)

Though at the time I believed, and all who are ignorant of the real state of matters probably still believe, that the measures adopted towards the Ameers were but in obedience to the orders of the Governor-General, and that to him consequently attached their entire moral responsibility,—such really was not the case. Having fairly developed his views to Sir Charles Napier, Lord Ellenborough had as perfect confidence in that officer’s sound discretion, and strict adherence to the spirit of the policy thus propounded to him, as in his able generalship: and all the information regarding the position of matters in Sindh, of which he was in possession, must have appeared to him to justify Sir Charles Napier’s conduct. The Supplementary Sindh Blue Book, containing by far the most important of the papers submitted to Parliament, demonstrates how scanty, and practically, therefore, how erroneous, was the information supplied to his Lordship, while the events now under consideration were in progress. The majority of these papers were withheld, till months after the unhappy Ameers were exiles in India.

But Sir Charles Napier had on the 30th November announced to Lord Ellenborough that he “saw his way clearly,” and the Governor-General was entitled to rely on that assurance, and to leave him to follow out, as he did, a policy which he had reason to suppose, from the only information submitted to him, to be founded on necessity.

On the 15th of December, the vakeels deputed by the Hyderabad Ameers, arrived at Sukkur; and on the evening of the 16th, Sir Charles Napier gave to some of them an audience.

Those of Meers Sobdar Khan, and Hoossein Ali Khan were first received, “and expressed the friendliness of their masters to the British Government, and their willingness to accept the new treaty.” The vakeels of Meers Meer Khan and Nusseer Khan, we are told, did but little more than express the value their masters placed on the friendship and protection of the British Government. “These vakeels,” Sir Charles Napier states, “remain at Sukkur, pending the receipt of a petition from their masters to the address of the Governor-General.” Meer Shahdad, in his petition, which forms No. 148 of the Second Sindh Blue Book, explicitly states, that “his vakeels did not get an opportunity of even paying their respects to the General.” This statement has never been contradicted, and it receives confirmation from the circumstance that no allusion is made by Sir Charles Napier to the ambassador of that Ameer.

So favorably, however, did matters stand, that in spite of the General’s violence—the result of Ali Morad’s reports and intrigues—everything promised a speedy and peaceable settlement of the unhappy Sindh question. But Ali Morad, resolved on obtaining the
turban, redoubled his efforts to effect the condition on which alone he could gain it—the forfeiture, by Roostum, of the Governor-General’s protection. Reports of hostile preparations, on the part of the other Ameers, continued to pour in; and the intelligence of the 17th apprized the General that their professions of friendship and submission were made but to gain time that:

“As soon as the English shall be weakened, and shall be impressed with the idea that they have established themselves as masters of the country, then will be the time to light the torch and consume them. The Ameers of Khyrpoor are removing their valuables. The force now in Khyrpoor and Mungnee is upwards of 7000, and parties are daily arriving.”

The same night the English mails were robbed! That this was affected by Ali Morad’s agents, no one who has read the preceding pages can, I think, doubt, even were other evidence wanting. That they were robbed by the subjects of Roostum, or his other brethren, is a supposition extravagantly improbable. Those Chiefs were suitors for a remission of the hard terms, which, in their utter helplessness, they had been compelled to accept; and it is most unlikely that they would commit so suicidal an act, pending the reference of their remonstrance’s to the Governor-General. Sir Charles Napier had reported to Lord Ellenborough that their cunning and hostility were on a par—both intense; and strangely inconsistent he showed himself, if, for a moment, he believed the improbable tale. That Sir Charles Napier afterwards disbelieved that the Ameers of Khyrpoor had any cognizance of the occurrence, is, I think, rendered evident by his silence on the subject, when he replied to my letter of the 22d January. “Pray, recollect,” I then wrote, “that they were misled into flight; that they had agreed to sign the treaty, and would have done so, had it not been Ali Morad’s policy to sever them from us, that he might obtain their confiscated estates; that they were innocent of the acts laid to their charge, (robbing the dawks, &c.) which led them to fly, and you to pursue.” Had Sir Charles Napier not been aware of the truth of what I then stated, and which I stated in a manner implying that he also was aware of it, I think it probable he would have said so in his answer of the next day.

He, however, believed at the time that the mails had been robbed by “Meer Roostum’s people,”— for so he reported the circumstance to the Governor-General. “The poor old fool,” he wrote, “is in the hands of his family. I have sent him orders to disband his troops instantly. I suspect he has no power, and I must rule his bands for him.” The letter conveying this order I subjoin; and I appeal to every officer, civil or military, who has at any time been connected with our Eastern empire, if such a communication, addressed by the chief military and political authority to the rulers of any frontier State in India, and backed by such extensive preparations, would not drive them to some act of indiscretion, if not to open insurrection:—

“My dawks have been robbed, either by your orders or without your orders. If you ordered it to be done, you are guilty j or if it was done without your order, you are not able to command your people, and it is evident they won’t obey you. In either case, I order you to disband your armed men; and I will myself see in Khyrpoor that you obey my order.”
Roostum, in his reply, solemnly denied that he or his people were concerned in the robbery. "God forbid" wrote the helpless and heart-broken old Prince, "that I should have given orders to rob the dawk. I have given none." And reasonably did he inquire, "before this, when was I warned to look after the safety of the dawks? Had I been so, I would have given orders to my people, seized the offenders, and publicly have punished them." He invited the General to depute any one in whom he had confidence, to reside in Khyrpoor, and examine and report. His letter concluded with protestations of friendship, and assurances of entire submission.

But Sir Charles Napier had brought his army into a state of great efficiency; he had performed the troublesome and expensive, though not, as he seems to think, unprecedented feat of transporting his troops across the Indus,—without necessity, or the shadow of it; he seems to have labored under a habitual suspicion of Indian sincerity, and to have resolved, from the first, that any difficulties which occurred should be submitted to a warlike, rather than a peaceful solution. Whatever were his motives, instead of acting on Roostum’s invitation, in deputing officers to reside at Khyrpoor, and report to him what occurred, he resolved to march at once on that capital.

The letter, in which he intimated his intention of adopting this step, was forwarded to Roostum on the 18th of December, the day on which the pretended message from Roostum is said to have been sent to the camp. The results of that message, the happy idea which at once occurred to the General when he heard of it, the measures he took to place Roostum in a position to be induced to resign the turban, Lieutenant Brown’s impressive injunction to Ali Morad, the extortion of the abdication, and the flight of Roostum, have already been discussed.

"From the flight of Roostum," the Historian informs us, "may be dated the commencement of the Sindhian war." If war imply, as I believe it does, reciprocity of hostilities, no war commenced in Sindh for fifty days after the assigned date. Till the 15th of February, when Sir Charles Napier’s advance led to the attack on the Hyderabad Residency, such British officers as had occasion to move about the country, did so in peace, meeting on all sides with civility. Before the flight of Roostum, Sir Charles Napier had invaded his territory, and by his brother’s confession, placed his army in “an offensive and menacing position”. But the Ameers did not return evil for evil. It may be that fear, not affection, prompted their forbearance. But such forbearance they did show; and to call that a war which consisted only in invasive acts of provocation by one party, is grievously to abuse the English language.

The pretext, on which Sir Charles sought to justify his march, was the dispersion of those armed followers by whom the Ameers were accompanied:—

“Sir Charles Napier, after occupying Boree and the ceded districts, could not longer delay executing the Governor-General’s orders to disperse the armed bands. He had repeatedly
warned the Ameers that his orders were to that effect, and he must obey them. The constant answer was, ‘there are no armed bands, and we are all submission.’ Nevertheless the bands were there, strong in number and in violence, and they were increasing. They exacted the revenues of the Ameers in advance; they robbed the people and the merchants; they drove from the country all the camels to prevent the British troops obtaining any; they stopped the dawks coming to Sukkur, and intercepted the communications of the army. Remonstrance thus failing, there was no remedy but force; and accordingly, the General knowing how useless and how dangerous it would be to send movable columns in pursuit of separating bands, through so large and intricate a country,— resolved to strike at their head-quarters. This was Khyrpoor, the capital of the Ameers, which, being filled with fighting men, he resolved to storm.” —P. 212.

That the Princes of Sindh had an undoubted right, so far as the treaty was concerned, to have around them what armed followers they chose, their conqueror will not attempt to deny; and had he known anything of Oriental customs, he must have been aware that every Eastern Prince is attended by “armed bands.” These are as essential to his dignity—as indispensable an appendage of royalty in the East—as is the throne or the sceptre in European estimation. To demand that they should be dismissed, was but adding another to the many indignities offered to the Ameers—to degrade them still farther in the eyes of their subjects. I unhesitatingly affirm—and I appeal for confirmation of my statement to all who are conversant with India, that this demand of Sir Charles Napier stands without parallel in the history of our Eastern empire. I will assume that the usual retinues of the Ameers were augmented by all the exaggerated levies reported by the spies, and I maintain that on this assumption Sir Charles Napier’s orders to disband them, and his march on Khyrpoor to see that his orders were obeyed, were a breach of treaty, and as morally unjustifiable as unnecessary. The Ameers’ preparations, Sir Charles Napier himself admits, were originally purely defensive: the result proved they never were otherwise till, by his advance on Hyderabad, resistance became inevitable. Beholding, as the Ameers did, the extensive military preparations made by the General himself, and combining these with his violent conduct and apparent contempt of treaties, they were not only justified in doing what they did, but it was their duty to avail themselves to the uttermost of the defensive resources of the country. As it was, Sir Charles Napier took no means of ascertaining whether the alleged bands were in existence; but assuming that he had, and that the greatest number ever reported, 7000, had been collected, it would have caused no apprehension in the mind of any one better acquainted with Oriental character than himself. The armies of the east are little better than a multitudinous rabble — in Sindh they are emphatically such: they are incapable of any prolonged service, and cannot be held together save by a lavish expenditure of money, and a common sense of danger. Sir Charles Napier knew that they could not place him in peril, for he continued to speak of them contemptuously,—he boasted that he could put them all into the Indus: by his vaunted politico-military movement he had, he said, guarded the ceded districts; —the assent of all parties to the treaty had been obtained, and yet he was not satisfied. How differently did Sir Henry Pottinger think and act under really trying circumstances in 1839. But he knew the people he was dealing with: Sir Charles Napier was profoundly ignorant of them. The one was a practical man, who understood the workings of the human mind, and could read its manifestations; the other was a theorist who invented
systems, and acted on them as if they were realities. The one has conferred the most substantial benefits on his country, and his name is honored by his nation: the other has—*added a province to the British empire, fertile as Egypt, but deadly as Batavia!*

But the Historian describes these armed bands as strong not merely in numbers, but “*in violence.*” This is as unfounded an assertion, as totally opposed to fact, as any of the other fables which General Napier gravelyputs forth as narrative. No violence was offered by the “*armed bands,*” or by individual Belooches, till by our own measures we had driven the unhappy Princes of Sindh to the resistance of despair. Neither the Ameers nor their armed bands had “*exacted in advance*” a single rea of the revenues of the ceded districts,—it was merely reported that they would do so! And on this report Sir Charles Napier forcibly seized their country.

The “*armed bands,*” we are told, “*robbed the people and the merchants.*” Even had such robbery taken place, as far as the “*people*” were concerned, not only did we possess no power to redress their grievances, but we were by solemn compact prohibited from even listening to their complaints. The clause which stipulated for the free navigation of the Indus, entitled us to interfere only if by any acts of the Ameers its navigation were impeded, or commerce shackled; otherwise, the “*merchants*” were in the same predicament as the “*people.*”

But even granting, for the sake of argument, that we had a right to protect either the merchants or the people, there was no opportunity for exercising it. The Sindh Blue Book contains every title of idle gossip and intelligence damnatory of the Ameers’ cause, which Sir Charles Napier was able to urge in his defence, while all that tended to their vindication was scrupulously withheld by him. I have carefully examined these volumes, and I can discover no reference to exactions on the “*merchants*” beyond the levying of tolls. Viewing that act in the most unfavorable light, it was a breach of the old treaty, for which the Ameers had paid the penalty in the imposition of the new.

Surely, the fine enforced, the offence ought to have been forgotten. Of plundering by these armed bands, I find no proof in the Parliamentary papers. I read in the “*Intelligence*” of the 2d of December, that “*accounts from Cutchee state that the Belooches are plundering in all directions, and murdering the people.*” But these were the Belooches, not of Sindh, but of Baluchistan. Cutchee is not in Sindh; it is separated from it by a desert, and is a dependency of Khelat. Robberies and murders committed there, no more called for coercion in Sindh than would agrarian disturbances in France justify the suspension of the habeas corpus in England. On the 7th of December there certainly is something that savors of robbery and spoliation, but not by the “*armed bands.*” At page 469 of the First Sindh Blue Book, we read that Meer Ali Morad, then in close alliance with Sir Charles Napier, “*has sent parties * * to seize grain, &c., in Meer Mahommed Khan’s villages, stating that as the latter had accumulated great riches, and has not any considerable body of men to protect them, he (Ali Morad) will relieve him of them, unless he pays him down a large portion; or, in the*
event of his objecting to this request, he will occupy his lands, Meer Mahommed Khan is said to have from twenty to thirty-six lacks of rupees (£200,000 to £360,000) in his fort of Emaumghur.”

The next accusation brought against the “armed bands” is, that “they drove from the country all the camels, to prevent the British troops obtaining any.”

Had they done so, far from its being what General Napier styles at page 218 “an act of war in itself,” they would have only done what they ought not to have left undone when they beheld an army invading their country, and by the confession of the invader’s brother, occupying “an offensive and menacing position.” But they do not appear to have taken even this precaution. All that I can discover from the Parliamentary papers is, that it was reported on the 24th November,—”The Ameers have given strict orders to all the camel-men and camel-owners not to supply camels for contract without their permission.” Had Sir Charles Napier condescended to ask their permission, not only would it in all probability have been granted, but the Ameers would, as they always had done, have sent some of their own messengers to assist the Commissariat Agent in procuring the requisite camels. In allusion to this “act of war in itself,” at page 217, General Napier writes,— “Moreover, the Ameers secretly menaced the contractors, and the principal one forfeited his deposits rather than risk their vengeance.” Our continued demand for camels had so drained the country of these useful animals, that their price was raised 300 per cent, above that which they bore on our entry into the country, and it was with the utmost difficulty, aided as it was most zealously by the hostile Ameers, that the Commissariat department succeeded in collecting the supply which was furnished to General Nott, and which enabled that officer to cooperate with General Pollock in the retrieval of our Afghan disasters. As it was, so small was that supply that many hundreds of the wretched little donkeys of Afghanistan had to be employed by General England in effecting the descent of the Bolan Pass. Many months had not intervened between this scouring of the country for camels, and Sir Charles Napier’s demand for more; it was therefore scarcely to be wondered at that the contractor was unable to fulfill his engagement.

Let Captain Pope, the Assistant Commissary General at Sukkur, be asked if the country was not then drained of camels; and let Major Blenkins, the General’s present Commissary at Kurrachee, say, if now, after two years and a half have been allowed to recruit the resources of Sindh, the supply is redundant.

The third count in the indictment of the “armed bands” is, that “they stopped the dawks and intercepted the communications of the army.” One, or at most two, dawks had been stopped, and, as I have, I think, rendered almost certain, by the agents of Meer Ali Morad. Beyond this, the communications of the army had not been interrupted. The statement that the armed bands had “filled the whole country with terror and wailing,” is destitute of all proof and of all foundation.
To disperse these bands was, we are assured, “not only a social right, but a duty on the part of the English General, even though he had received no orders from Lord Ellenborough to that effect.” What secret orders Lord Ellenborough gave, or did not give, to Sir C. Napier, I cannot pretend to say; but this I know, that there is nothing in the Parliamentary papers which justifies us in believing that his Lordship ever contemplated invading the country of the submissive recipients of the treaty. His published communications are exactly what might be expected from a Governor-General at a distance from the seat of operations, who, trusting implicitly to his General’s reports, had received from him intelligence of the nature and extent of that furnished by Sir Charles Napier. The General himself believed, and induced Lord Ellenborough to believe, that the Ameers’ preparations were of a more serious nature than they really were, and his Lordship was then in ignorance of many of the events of which the reader is now cognizant. Though Sir Charles Napier’s letter of the 17th of October produced an unfavorable impression regarding the Ameers, yet on the 14th of November his Lordship did not dream of positive hostility being intended. He thus wrote:—

“The designs of the Ameers would seem by the intelligence transmitted, to be of a ‘defensive character only;’ but I know that the least sign of hesitation on our part would at once convert these defensive preparations into measures of a hostile nature, and that to yield the smallest point in negotiation would have all the effect of a defeat in the field.”

On the same day—for the gossip procured by my Moonshee, and forwarded by me, was not of a favorable nature, but bore evidence of combinations among the Ameers, suggested by the alarm which Sir Charles Napier’s measures, coupled with the current rumors in the bazaar, had created—Lord Ellenborough thus expressed himself in a second letter to the General:—

“I think the disposition manifested by the Ameers will, whether we be compelled to use force or not, render necessary the presence in Sindh, during the next hot weather, of a larger body of troops than I had hoped would be required.”

But for no purpose of oppression or invasion. His Lordship merely hoped, by overawing the Ameers, to prevent any ebullition by which hostilities might be provoked. For on the 24th, he wrote as follows:—

“I am very desirous of affecting our purpose without bloodshed, and the presence of a preponderating force may enable us to do this.”

On the following day Lord Ellenborough acknowledged Sir Charles Napier’s dispatch of the 18th. In that dispatch the General had said:—

“Should the Ameers resolve to take the field (as their collecting troops seem to indicate), I have made up my mind to cross the Indus at once, and march to Hyderabad by land.”

In reply, his Lordship naturally expressed his concurrence in the proposition:—
“Your plan, if you should be compelled to resort to hostilities, is manifestly best.”

On the 4th of December, he replied in the following terms to Sir Charles Napier’s letter of the 26th:—

“As long as you have six regiments ready to support you just demands, I am inclined to think that they will be acceded to as they have been in this instance. And I am willing to hope that, with these aids to your negotiation, you may be able to make a settlement now, without the use of force: but I very much fear that until our force has been actually felt, there will be no permanent observance of the existing treaty, or any new treaty we may make.”

Nor was that fear unreasonable, considering the tone of the General’s previous letters, and his Lordship’s ignorance of what had taken place. The communication, moreover, to which this was the reply, furnished him with good reasons to fear. In that letter Sir Charles Napier had narrated the case of a merchant who had been “insolently treated” by the agent of the Ameers, and had been compelled to pay a toll “to the amount of above 100 rupees.”

“I made the people make out a list of their expenses, which, added to the toll, amounted to about 200 and some odd rupees. I, this morning at daybreak, sent off an aid-de-camp and fifty horsemen to Khyrpoor, accompanied by the complainants, and the letter, of which I send your Lordship a copy, and I have ordered six regiments to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, with which I will cross the river and march on Khyrpoor, if my messenger returns either insulted, or with a refusal to comply with the conditions proposed.”

The General’s messenger, however, was not insulted; the “200 and some odd rupees” were sent; and along with it,—

“A letter of high-flown Persian compliments, saying he perfectly understood my letter, and would send in the transgressing kardar; which I suspect he will evade doing.”

Believing, as his Lordship did, that Sir Charles Napier understood the character of the men he had to deal with, and assuming—as most probably he did—that in all his communications with the Ameers, the General had conducted himself “as the representative of the friendship, as much as of the power of the British Government,” it is not to be wondered at that he thought there was a danger of continued infractions of the treaty, when the danger of an envoy being insulted, and “two hundred and some odd rupees” being refused, was so urgent as to require six regiments to be held in readiness to march on Roostum’s capital. In reference to the opinion expressed by Lord Ellenborough, that the slightest indecision on our part might encourage the Ameers to convert their defensive preparations into measures of a hostile character, Sir Charles Napier had ingeniously given the proposition greater latitude; and he enunciated it in a manner that

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70 As nothing farther was said on this subject, it is to be presumed the kardar was sent.
doubtless recommended it to his Lordship’s acceptance, in its enlarged form:—

“I am entirely of your Lordship’s opinion, that all the defensive measures of the Ameers are only so till an opportunity offers of making them offensive.”

Continuing to hear of them unfavorable reports—learning that “the Ameers are trying to levy not only this year’s taxes, but those for next year” in the ceded districts; that Sir Charles Napier was doubtful of their professions of friendship—that they were collecting troops—that they sought but to gain time; and that their insolence had reached such a pitch, that insult to the General’s aide-de-camp was seriously apprehended, it is little wonderful, that on the 13th of December Lord Ellenborough wrote as follows:—

“Whether they submit or not to the terms of the new treaty, I think it most desirable that you should require the immediate dispersion of the forces, whatever they may be, which they have collected, and insist upon your requisition to that effect being complied with, supporting it with the movement of your army.”

But his Lordship, so far as I can learn from the published papers, never contemplated the movement of the army after the requisition had been complied with. That it would be obeyed, Roostum promised; and he invited the General to satisfy himself that it was so.

But General Napier seeks to justify his brother’s march on Khyrpoor by another line of argument. It was, he tells us, in strict accordance with the treaty of the Nine Articles, concluded with Roostum by Lord Auckland.

The treaty of the Nine Articles guarantees “perpetual Friendship, Alliance, and Unity of Interests, between the East India Company and Meer Roostum, his heirs and successors, from generation to generation.” Article V. provides, that “the Ameer, his heirs and successors, will not commit aggressions on any one; and if, by accident, any dispute arise with any one, the settlement of it shall be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.” What aggressive deed had Roostum committed? None! Neither Sir Charles Napier nor his brother can point to a single act on the part of the helpless old Prince, which, by the most violent distortion, can be made to appear such. But since on the treaty the historian grounds his brother’s justification, it may be well to examine it a little more closely. Article VI. Provides, that “the English Government will not covet a dam or drain of the territories enjoyed by his Highness and his heirs, nor the fortresses71 on this bank or that bank of the Indus.” Sir Charles Napier was well aware that many dams and many drains were comprehended in the territory by mistake demanded from the Ameers, yet for two months and eighteen days did he leave Lord Ellenborough in ignorance of his error.

71 By another clause of the treaty, it was agreed that Bukkur should be lent, if required by us, during the Afghan war. It was required: it was lent to us: its purchase I sought to have negotiated, but it is now ours by another tenure—that of the sword, and its owner is an exile at Poona!
Article VII. of the treaty stipulates, that “THE AMEER, HIS HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS, SHALL BE ABSOLUTE RULERS OF THEIR COUNTRY, AND THE BRITISH JURISDICTION SHALL NOT BE INTRODUCED INTO THAT PRINCIPALITY.” The order to disband their troops; the announcement that he himself would see in Khyrpoor that that order was obeyed, —was Sir Charles Napier’s commentary on this article. The same article, the seventh, pledges the honour of the British nation, that NONE “OF THE BELOOCHES, SERVANTS, DEPENDENTS, RELATIONS, OR SUBJECTS, OF THE AMEER, SHALL BE LISTENED TO, SHOULD THEY COMPLAIN AGAINST THE SAID AMEER.”— (Roostum.) I refer to the previous exposition of Sir Charles Napier’s conduct in regard to the intrigues of Ali Morad, and his treatment of Roostum, as evidence how far the spirit of this article was observed or violated.

And now, influenced by the reports of Ali Morad, he resolved to take a step which, as early as the 1st of November, I had warned him against, as one which might drive the Ameers, from a sense of the indignity offered to them, to resist. He was about to move upon their capitals. That he by no means contemplated opposition as probable, in spite of the alarming reports which he made of the numbers and violence of the “armed bands,” is evident from his letter of the 20th December to the address of the Governor-General:—

“There is not the least chance of resistance. I do not think I can be deceived. At all events, I am perfectly prepared; and if any resistance be offered, the Ameers will pay dearly for it. I have sufficient cavalry to make the result of a fight very decisive.”

Upper Sindh was at this time settled, and from Lower Sindh no opposition was to be apprehended. To none but Nusseer, of the Hydrabad Ameers, was the treaty penal; and the territory which that Prince was required to relinquish, had ever been to him a source of trouble and disquiet. Beyond remonstrance, he would have offered no opposition to its transfer to Bhawul Khan, even had it been of greater value than it was; for he never would have risked what remained to him, by engaging in a hopeless struggle against the British, whose power he had so recently seen put forth in Afghanistan. Had he been insane enough to do so, none of his brethren would have aided him; for they viewed with satisfaction the reduction of his possessions to equality with their own. Wherefore, then, the necessity of marching to Khyrpoor? Still more, of the advance on Hydrabad, for to “march in that direction” he had, on the 20th—when he learned that all the Belooches had gone to their homes, and that, consequently, there were no bands at Khyrpoor—apprised his Lordship was his intention. Let his own dispatch, from which the last quotation was made, answer the question:—

“With regard to Lower Sindh, THE HOSTILE AMEERS HAVE SUBMITTED IN WORDS. I have reason to believe they still assemble troops, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THOSE DISCHARGED HERE MAY TAKE SERVICE THERE, if they mean to fight. The march of the Bengal troops will give them courage, and I have troops enough to make them repent such a step.”
The submission in words, which authorized Sir Charles Napier to proclaim the treaty with their brethren of Khyrpoor Concluded, and to alienate and forcibly seize their lands is, on the part of the Princes of Hydrabad, a proof of hostility! No other submission was required, for no contumacy had been manifested. Sir Charles Napier “had reason to believe” they assembled troops. Had they done so, what justification would the measure have afforded for marching on their capital? It would have been no infraction of the treaty, and prudence ought to have dictated the step; but the Hydrabad Ameers Had Not Then Assembled Troops. The reported levies were subsequently proved to be fictions of the spies; and because it was possible that the men discharged at Khyrpoor might take service at Hydrabad—if the Ameers meant to fight; and because, if such was their intention, the march of the Bengal troops would give them courage; and, finally, because Sir Charles Napier had troops enough to make the Ameers repent of such a step, if they did mean to fight; therefore—by an “adroit and firm” logic—was it fit and proper that their capitals should be attacked, and every inducement to fight, which mortal man could have, be held out to them.

The reader will now be able to make his own comments on the following extracts from the “Conquest of Sindh:”—

P. 211.—” It is essential to a right understanding of his (Sir Charles Napier’s) character, to show, step by step, how exactly he ruled his conduct by the principles of honour and the rights of treaties; obeying his orders rigidly, yet making every effort to preserve peace, ere his sharp sword cut away the Talpoor dynasty from the land it afflicted. Cautiously and justly he proceeded with respect to the Ameers, and benevolently towards their people, but also with firmness he supported the dignity of his own country,” &c.

P. 172.—”It was not the English General, but the Sindhian Princes, who sought the contest. No Etruscan Fecial ever cast his spear across a boundary, invoking his gods to attest the justice of a war, with a purer conscience than Sir Charles Napier marched to battle.”

General Napier is not very fortunate in his classical allusions. The Fecials, I believe, waited upwards of thirty days ere they hurled the bloody spear into the territory of the enemy; and, if submission were in the mean time made, the spear remained unhurled. Sir Charles Napier, on the contrary, had received the submission of the Ameers, yet he continued to menace them, by occupying Roree. His brother tells us he had secured the object of the treaty; yet he deems it necessary to march in hostile array upon their capital, professedly to see that they disbanded their troops!

At page 137, the Historian thus expatiates:—

‘I will,’ he wrote to the man who had so confidingly placed him in this post of difficulty and danger, ‘I will present your treaty to the Ameers. I will spare no pains to convince them that neither injury nor injustice are meditated, and that, by accepting the treaty, they will become more rich and more secure of power than they now are. If they refuse to listen to reason, if they persist in sacrificing every thing to their avarice and their hunting-grounds, they must even have their way, and. try the force
They had not refused to listen to reason. All reasoning was peremptorily denied to them. They protested their innocence of the crimes laid to their charge, and were condemned, unheard, on evidence the most worthless! They pointed to existing treaties, and were told by the General—“I CANNOT GO INTO THE ARGUMENT. I am not Governor-General; I am only one of his commanders. I will forward your letter to him, if you wish me to do so; but in the mean time I will occupy the territories which he has commanded me to occupy.” On what occasion, and by what arguments, did Sir Charles Napier endeavor to persuade them that by accepting the new treaty they would become “More Rich, and more secure of power?” When did he afford the Governor-General the means of “considering both sides of their Highnesses’ arguments?” The only protest he ever transmitted to his Lordship was the very letter which he offered to forward, if the Ameers wished it— the offer being made in the communication in which he thus wrote,—“THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL HAS OCCUPIED BOTH SIDES OF YOUR HIGHLNESSES’ RIVER, BECAUSE HE HAS CONSIDERED BOTH SIDES OF YOUR HIGHLNESSES’ ARGUMENTS.” The Ameers had not “persisted in sacrificing every thing to their avarice and their hunting-grounds.” The encroachment which we demanded on their Shikarghas was readily assented to; and every thing that we insisted on wresting from them, in territory, had been yielded, though most properly remonstrated against. They did not resolve “to try the force of arms,” and never was more entire fiction introduced into a professed history, than the accusation against the Ameers of rushing to arms “with insane fury.” They fled to the desert; and not the sharpest-sighted man in the General’s army could discover an enemy, till, driven to despair, extermination stared them in the face, and they believed that no alternative remained—but to resist or DIE.
SECTION VII.

THE UPPER SINDH CAMPAIGN.

I have more than once observed that no act of hostility, implied or overt, was committed by the Ameers, or their Belooche subjects, till we, by our measures, had driven them to the resistance inspired by despair. General William Napier tells a different tale. At page 138 he promised to exhibit to his readers “with what insane fury they rushed to arms,” and at page 208 he endeavors to redeem his promise.

“Roostum’s sudden desertion of his family, the result of an old man’s selfishness, was therefore a great event; and it was by the ready sagacity of the English General rendered a decisive one. It caused the alliance of Ali Morad, and forced the other Princes of Roostum’s family to a premature display of their hostility.”

And how thinks the reader was that hostility displayed? Let the Historian answer. I quote continuously from the last extract.

“THEY ABANDONED UPPER SINDH AND ITS RESOURCES TO THE BRITISH POLICY WITHOUT A BLOW.” “This,” proceeds General William Napier, “prevented a war in the Upper Province, and irrefragably proved the sinister designs of the Khyrpoor Ameers, which they were professing friendship; yet it has been with stupid malignancy denounced as an injustice perpetrated by Sir Charles Napier, and as the real cause of the war.”

I assume that it was “Roostum’s sudden desertion of his family,” not the abandonment of Upper Sindh without a blow, that “has been denounced as an injustice perpetrated by Sir Charles Napier, and as the real cause of the war.” If so, I cannot see that the stupid malignants are so very stupid after all. Roostum’s desertion of his family was procured by the urgent solicitation of Sir Charles Napier, and that desertion was, by his “ready sagacity,” made so decisive a step as to Force the Ameers to a premature display of their hostility. For that display, surely Sir Charles Napier was responsible. But so far from its being the cause of the war, says the Historian, it prevented a war in Upper Sindh! The war, according to its consistent chronicler, did not commence till nine days after this premature display of hostility.

P. 171.—“From the Flight of Roostum may be dated the commencement of the Sindhian War.”

So! the appeal to arms, for a time prevented by the premature display of hostility to which his “sons and nephews” had been forced, is precipitated by the flight of the old Prince from a castle whither he had been entrapped, where he was subjected to violence, and whence he had been made to flee lest he should be imprisoned by the British General!

As Roostum’s desertion of his family had been effected by the General, as that desertion was taken advantage of by Ali Morad, to extort from him the turban, and as that extortion
led to his being made to flee, most men will believe that the General was the indirect, and Ali Morad the more immediate, cause of that war which dated from the octogenarian’s flight.

To most men, too, it will appear strange that Sir Charles Napier took no steps to arrest or put a stop to a war which, we are told, dated from Roostum’s flight; and which, therefore, he must have been conscious had been indirectly called into existence by himself. It betrayed either an inability to foresee events, a blindness to those passing around, or a recklessness of war, very different from the horror of it which characterizes THE GREAT CAPTAIN OF THE AGE, when he thus wrote to the Governor-General on the 31st of December, three days after the war commenced, according to the Historian:—

“NOW THAT I HAVE HAD TIME TO REFLECT ON MEER ROOSTUM’S FLIGHT, THE LESS I FEEL ANNOYED. IT ENABLES ME TO ACT WITH MORE DECISION REGARDING ALI MORAD. HE MUST BE MADE MASTER OF EMAUMGHUR, WHICH SEEMS TO BE THEIR GIBRALTAR.”

The war commenced, says the Historian, when Roostum fled; yet so ignorant was the General of what he was doing, and of contemporaneous events, that in announcing to Lord Ellenborough his intention of wresting Emaumghur from its rightful owner, who had committed no offence, that he might make the man whom he regarded as an usurper, master of the Sindhian Gibraltar, he wrote that he would do so “although war has not been declared,” “nor,” he adds, “is it necessary to declare it” It is a pity that, if, as is generally believed, Sir Charles Napier had the proof-sheets of the “Conquest of Sindh” before him, he did not corrector explain his own and his brother’s meaning. War or no war, it mattered not, the General had resolved to “walk over Roostum’s folly, and Ali Morad’s intrigues, and all the others going his own road” He did so, and that road led to Meeanee.

But how, the reader will naturally inquire, could the flight of “an old debauched wretch,” “drunk every day in his life,” dethroned and trodden under foot by one of the greatest of England’s captains, and that captain at the head of one of the finest armies that ever took the field in India, —lead to a war ? Did it arouse the chivalry of Sindh, to see the grey head of their aged Prince bowed down in sorrow and dishonor? Was the sword, which it was once supposed would be drawn for Islam, unsheathed to avenge the insults and injuries heaped on the Princely member of a class who, in all Moosulman countries are treated with peculiar tenderness and respect,—The Aged? Were the proposition true which General Napier advances after its falsity had been so painfully demonstrated, that “ the Belooches always obey him who wears the puggree, no matter how obtained,” it would have been impossible to begin a war even with such provocation. But the wrath of the Belooches was kindled, and the sympathies of all, even of the “oppressed” Hindoo, were enlisted in their sovereign’s behalf; to resist, they however knew was hopeless: till the last they did not despair of justice being rendered, and though the advance on Khyrpoor was an act of war on the part of the English General, and though spoliation was practised on our own and our ally’s part, no retaliatory blow was struck.
But, as the Historian says there was war, let it be so. We were told at page 171, that by detaching Roostum from his sons and nephews, “the sword had been taken from the Ameers of Upper Sindh, as it were by sleight,” though how the sleight was affected remains a secret. At page 167, General Napier endeavors to show how the Ameers regained the possession of the sword out of which they had been juggled, and how, therefore, from Roostum’s flight may be dated the commencement of the war. Sir Charles Napier, we are told, proceeded to visit Roostum at Dhejee—

“And to restore to him his dignity if he had been coerced. Roostum, far from accepting this friendly advance, immediately fled into the desert WITH HIS TREASURE, TWO GUNS, AND SEVERAL THOUSAND FOLLOWERS.”

And at the next page we are told that:—

“Moreover Roostum had Thousands Of Armed Followers, with whom he fled to join his sons, then openly in arms, and closely allied in hostility to the British with the Ameers of Lower Sindh.”

The old Roostum took no troops that we hear of, to Dhejee, and unless he had corrupted Ali Morad’s soldiers, he could scarcely have taken any thence. His escort thither must have been very small, for the intelligence, so minute in its details, which chronicles the movements of “twelve horsemen,” “one Hindostanee artillery man,” arid “a magician,” merely says that on receiving Ali Morad’s invitation to a conference at Khanpoor, “he entered his palanquin, and with his confidential servant Rumzan,” went thither. The same evening we gather that his family followed him to Dhejee. They were probably accompanied by a few Belooche horsemen and some of his own servants. At all events, on reaching Khyrpoor, such Belooches as went with him were “dismissed,” and his servants “confined,” so Roostum says in his memorial, and it is scarcely likely that he would say that, of the falsity of which—if false—he knew the most incontrovertible evidence could be obtained; and imbecile as the old man is, his reminiscences have proved more accurate than those of Sir Charles Napier and Mr. Brown, notwithstanding the records with which the two latter had it in their power to refresh their memories. Nay, the absurdity of believing his story incorrect is obvious and palpable. Is it likely; is it not preeminently improbable, that Ali Morad would allow “several thousand armed followers” belonging to the brother on whom he meant to practice violence, to enter his fort? And is it not still less likely that, had they gained admission, he would have permitted them to accompany their fugitive Prince, and carry with them two guns? Had Roostum taken any treasure with him to Dhejee, —and considering how suddenly he left Khyrpoor, and that he intended only going to Khanpoor to have an interview with his brother, it is exceedingly improbable that he did,—Ali Morad would doubtless have given it a cordial reception and tender treatment; but the reader has seen too much of the disposition of the lord of Dhejee to believe, that after having despoiled his brother of his turban and his lands, he would suffer his flight to be impeded by any superfluous specie. Roostum’s personal
servants, and those who had accompanied his family, were probably allowed to accompany him; and as, in the East, even camel-men are armed, they too, probably, were so. By degrees, the Prince’s retinue may reasonably be supposed to have increased, till it amounted to the number I saw in his encampment on the 6th of January,—about two or three hundred. I shall be most happy to procure for General William Napier fuller details of the dates on which the several accessions to Roostum’s retinue were obtained, when he explains how the several thousand followers and two guns became, on the 6th, five thousand five hundred men and seven guns, and whence the drafts were obtained by which they increased to a strength which was, “it appeared afterwards, seven thousand, with several pieces of cannon.” Roostum was beloved,—and guns and a guard were doubtless procured for him by his attached subjects, among whom he wandered a dethroned outcast. He had but to express a wish to that effect and fifteen thousand Belooches would have forthwith surrounded him, ready to do his bidding. But at no time did his followers exceed the escort which his rank authorized, and his fugitive life demanded. After his flight, Roostum became possessed of a little money, and we learn, that on the 1st of January he sent 40,000 rupees to his son Hoossein: this was, probably, part of the “thirty camels’ loads of Meer Roostum’s property” which Ali Morad had the decency to allow to be sent from Khyrpoor, on the 30th of December, to his unfortunate brother. But whether it were so or not, and how the fugitive Ameer became possessed of his slender means, are questions which I leave the Historian to settle. I merely maintain, that to suppose that Roostum fled from Dhejee with several thousand armed followers—whether five or seven thousand, and with several pieces of cannon—whether these were two or seven—and with any treasure beyond his personal trinkets and the little property belonging to his ladies, &c., is utterly absurd.

Before proceeding to narrate the movements of the fugitive Ameers, it will be well to give a brief history of Sir Charles Napier’s performances during the so-called campaign. On the 26th of December, he marched from Roree, and reached Mungaree, whose “armed bands” had evaporated. At Mungaree he was detained several days by the rain,—“because the camels slip in the wet, and dislocate their hips.” During his forced halt, the General, who had long been anxious to impress the Belooches with a wholesome conviction that their deserts could not protect them against British troops, intimated to Lord Ellenborough his intention of marching on Emamghur, a desert fortress belonging to an Ameer who had never injured him, as that “was perhaps the most difficult of any operations of the kind, and therefore would have most effect.” The rains having ceased, the General advanced from Mungaree, and on the 4th of January reached Dhejee-ka-Kote, the “strong fortress” of Ali Morad. At midnight, on the 5th, he started on the expedition to Emamghur, with 350 of H. M. 22d regiment placed on camels, “two soldiers” writes the General, “mounted

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72 Page 239.—“Roostum and his armed followers, ten times the number of the British, and having seven guns, were now discovered on the flank.” This alludes to the accidental meeting with Roostum on the 6th of January, when the General was proceeding to Emamghur with 350 of H. M. 22d regiment, and 200 of the Sindh horse.

73 In allusion to events occurring at an earlier date, the Historian says, at page 219:—“Roostum, who had numerous followers, it appeared afterwards seven thousand, with several pieces of cannon, was within the borders of the desert to the south,” &c., &c.
on each animal” and in addition to these he took two “24 Ib. howitzers, with double teams of camels to ensure relief, and 200 of the Sindh horse.” The next day he found forage scarce, and sending back one hundred and fifty of the Sindh horse, pushed on with the remainder. On the 12th, the General reached Emaumghur, which he found deserted,— its bands, like those of Mungaree, having vanished. Fortunate it was for him that they had. Although he had written from Doom, on the 7th, “if Emaumghur refuses to admit me, I can batter it with these guns,” he found, when he got there, that these guns, the 24 Ib. howitzers, could not batter it— that they were quite useless! As he had only taken water for four days, and provisions for fifteen, as he had been seven days on the march, as it was not till the third day that this undefended castle was demolished, and as, had an enemy been near him, his supply of water would have been cut off, he and his detachment must have found themselves in an uncomfortable predicament had “bands” been there, and had Emaumghur refused to admit him. He felt the awkwardness of the step he had taken, and, disgusted with the unexpected strength of the place, resolved that instead of making Ali Morad its master, he would blow up this Sindhian Gibraltar. Its demolition was effected on the 15th. On the 16th, he turned his back on its ruins, and, without halting, reached Tujujull on the 20th, thus returning for five marches by the road he had gone. From Tujujull he followed another route, and gained Peer Aboo Bukkur, ten miles from Dhejee, whence he had started. Here he halted, and was joined by the body of the army which had remained at Dhejee.

Let us return to the Ameers. In tracking their flight, I shall have recourse to the “Intelligence,” given in the Sindh Blue Book; for though I regard it as untrustworthy, it is almost the only means now at our disposal for endeavoring to ascertain the state of matters. It was the material whence Sir Charles Napier drew his opinions and developed his plans; summaries of it were furnished to Lord Ellenborough, to enable him to judge of his General’s measures; and it has been placed in detail before Parliament as part of the documentary justification of Sir Charles Napier. Though much of it is demonstrably false, it must needs contain portions of truth, and these, by their consistency with each other, a little care will suffice to separate from the falsehoods with which they are mixed. Such as it is, it has been made to bear evidence against the Ameers, and ought to be equally available testimony in their defence.

On the night of 19th December, the day on which they learned that Roostum had been induced to place himself in Ali Morad’s hands, Mahommed Hoossein departed with the retinue, attended by which he had come to visit his father on the 1st of the month,— two guns, and, according to the estimate furnished by the spies, 2000 men.74 Meers Nusseer

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74 Two hundred would probably be a more accurate computation. Afterwards, as we shall find, when considerable additions to Hoossein’s force have been reported, the General estimates it at about 2000, and the accounts vary from 5000 to 600 or 700. When, as will presently be seen, all the Ameers, their wives and followers, are collected, 1500 is computed as the aggregate of souls, male and female, young and old, servile and high-born! And after the junction of Roostum’s large army, and the arrival of large reinforcements, the aggregate was at a subsequent date somewhere between 4000 and 5000!
and Mahomed, nephews of Meer Roostum, followed him at midnight, the latter having 
evacuated the fort of Mungnee: their escorts are not stated, and therefore we may infer 
they were small. We are informed that the kujawahs, containing the ladies and families, 
were accompanied by 500 or 600 horse, but the “armed bands” of those wild desperadoes, 
than whom “braver barbarians never gave themselves to slaughter,” whom the Ameers 
are said to have been unable to control, and who are represented as burning with hatred 
to the English, as suddenly disappear from the scene. The Princes, who are said to have 
instigated Roostum to provoke a war, and who prematurely displayed their hostility, by 
abandoning their country without a blow, made no effort to retain the armed bands by 
whose aid alone they could have hoped to make their hostility tell against the English. On 
the flight of the Ameers, we are informed that “the Belooches assembled in Khyrpoor, took 
their leave, and began to disperse to their homes;” and, proceeds the Intelligencer,—

“The town of Khyrpoor is abandoned, and very considerable property and valuables of the 
Ameers are at the mercy of the Belooches, and liable to be plundered, unless some of the 
English troops are sent as a safeguard. The greatest consternation prevails, and the 
shopkeepers and the merchants are more in alarm of the ragamuffins about them proceeding to 
plunder, than of anything else.”

Thus were the Princes of Upper Sindh, who had acceded to all our demands, through the 
violence and maneuvers of the English General, driven into flight, much of their most 
valuable property at the mercy of a rabble, and their capital exposed to all the horrors of a 
sacked city. No English troops were sent as a safeguard. But AH Morad, who assumed 
reversionary occupation of nearly every thing which his unhappy kinsmen were from 
time to time compelled to abandon, and forcibly seized what their dependents were 
unable to protect, sent his minister, Sheik Ali Hoossein, to take “charge of the city.”

No further information regarding the movements of the fugitive Ameers is given, till the 
27th, when it is reported that,—

“Both Meer Hoossein Khan, and Meer Mahommed Hoossein, are at Dhenjee, a fort six coss 
from Abad, and thirty-three coss from Khyrpoor, where they are said to be collecting a 
considerable body of men from every side; the horseman says that they may have about 4000 
men now, though a much larger number is mentioned. Jallee, the nephew of Wallee 
Mahommed, Chandia, a chief of some distinction among the Belooches, has joined them, and a 
large number of Belooches from Chandia were expected to join at Dingee. The Ameers declare 
their intention of opposing Meer Ali Morad’s sway in every possible way, and their 
determination in case they cannot prevail against him, to destroy the country and plunder the 
villages. They express their intention to try their arms against the British force first; in the 
meantime they are expecting daily reinforcements from Chandia; and the chief of the Abr as, 
Ali Murdan, residing at Turraee, eleven coss west of Sukkur, whose territory extends to 
Larkhanna, has been solicited to join the faction. If he should join it, Ali Murdan could take 
5000 men with him; but informant says that there is no doubt the Chandia Belooches are united 
with the Ameers at Dingeer.”
But some doubt did exist, for Major Clibborn winds up his report with an intimation that “the horseman says, if the General will detach four of the Kaheyrie horsemen with him, he will go into the Ameers’ camp at Dingee, and bring certain intelligence of their intentions.” The Kaheyrie horsemen were detached, and a woefully diminished muster roll of the enemy they brought back. In the interim, however, warlike rumors accumulated. “The Belooches are assembling in considerable force with the Ameers at and around Dingee,” reported the spies on the 29th, and not only so, but “the Ameers speak of their intention to oppose the British, if they advance beyond Khyrpoor.” On the same day it was reported that,—

“The Hydrabad Ameers have written to Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Mahommed Hoossein, to send their wives and families to the fort of Hadjee, in Hala range, behind Sehwan, which it is their present intention to do. They have also desired them to be of good cheer, and that money and men shall be sent them.”

Had the Hydrabad Ameers done so, they would have done no more than their duty; but danger makes men selfish, and even the assistance of relatives is frequently withheld in the hour of need. The Princes of Lower Sindh had, nine days prior to the date under consideration, come to the conclusion that nothing would satisfy the General but possession of the fort and guns at Hydrabad; and I fear that personal considerations prevented them doing anything so generous as that for which the Intelligence gives them credit. Their Khyrpoor cousins, as we shall presently see, did not avail themselves of the safe asylum said to have been offered for their families, which they doubtless would, had the offer been made, and they were at a later date almost in penury. But whether the report be true or false, what a comment does the dependence on eleemosynary aid of the Princes of Upper Sindh afford on the adroit and firm policy of Sir Charles Napier! Not only were they, without a fault, fugitives in their own country, but they knew not where to place those in safety—who to Christian and Mussulman are alike dear—their wives and children! And ladies who had been nursed in the lap of luxury were now, like themselves, wanderers, and condemned to all the privations and hardships of a fugitive life, in weather so inclement, that the hardy Peninsular veteran, who gloried in sharing with his soldiers their fatigues and exposure, thus apologizes to the Governor-General for the length of his letter:—“I am so cold, damp, and miserable, that I can hardly bring my ideas into any shape” On the 1st of January, it is reported that “the Belooches in the vicinity of Choondkee are making preparations—for flight.” These, however, were probably the 1000 men said to be with Mahommed Ali Khan, at “Sankeeara, four coss from Choondkee;” and these, we are told in the next sentence, were about “to retire and concentrate with Meer Mahommed Hoossein’s force in Dingee, which,” proceeds the informant, “increases every day.” But they did not concentrate; for on the 4th, we learn that “Meer Roostum, Meer Mahommed Ali Khan, Ali Akbar, Goolam Mahommed, and Wullee Mahommed, are all in Chickera, where there is plenty of water. Meer Mahommed Ali Khan has two guns with him, and Meer Roostum’s camp may contain two thousand men.” On the same day, “a Hindoo sent from Nusseer Khan’s fort to Lalloo and Dingee,” reports—
"That Meer Mahommed Hoossein, Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer All Murdan, Meer Shere Mahommed, Meer All Buksh, and between six and seven hundred men, are collected in and around that place"

Mahommed Hoossein was, on the 3d, reported to have collected five thousand men; and Ali Murdan, we are told, on the 27th of December, could himself have brought a like number to swell the levies: and now, we learn that from six to seven hundred fierce warriors embraced the total army of Dingeé! On the 5th, the messenger dispatched with the four Khyerie horsemen returned. The party left Dingeé on the 3d, and their intelligence is of some importance.

"We put up our mares in a small village, half a coss from Dingeé, for the night. In the morning, the Syud and myself walked into Dingeé, which is a mere ghurree, with walls about fifteen feet high."

This enclosed village, with walls about fifteen feet high, is the Intrenched Position spoken of by General William Napier! Such as it was, the “armed bands” did not occupy it: what tents they had they pitched outside its walls!

"We saw," proceeds the narrator, “four guns; and, both from actual observation and from inquiry, we calculated that the force with these Ameers could not be more than two thousand, or two thousand five hundred men in, and in the vicinity of Dingeé; and Meer Ali Murdan was said to have one thousand men under him **; but a good chappao, (sudden attack,) which might be made by the road we returned, would disperse the whole, WHO ARE ENCAMPED IN TENTS, OR PALS, OUTSIDE THE GHCRREE."

On the 8th, another informant brought intelligence that the Ameers endeavored to get their bands to enter the desert, “but, after going a short distance in the desert from Dingeé, had been obliged to return, as the Belooches refused to advance any further into it, as they and their horses must starve!” These are the men whom General Napier describes as looking on the desert as a stronghold—a favorite retreat, whence they intended to divert themselves by occasional inroads into the cultivated regions, to molest the English and their neighbours! The force at Dingeé, according to the same information, amounted to fifteen thousand men. But after he had left the place, at midnight on the 7th, a messenger arrived at Dingeé, sent by Meer Roostum, to apprise them that the General had gone to Emaumghur, and that that fort had been evacuated by Meer Mahommed; desiring, also, “that on receiving the letter they would instantly fly, or the English force would be on them, and make them prisoners!” Away they hurried, and it would appear that they scarcely drew rein till they had reached their wives at Koonhera, for it is deemed worthy of record in the “Intelligence,” that, “on the morning of the 8th, the Ameers stopped to take something to eat!” These were the men who were to resist to the death the advance of the English,— who had for months been maturing plans for their destruction,— and who, while at Dingeé, we are assured by the Historian, were putting these plans in execution! The bloodthirsty monsters, who had made the most extensive arrangements for a war of extermination, who had entrenched a position at Dingeé, and who had a large army with them— fly, lest our force, diminished
by three hundred and fifty Europeans, and fifty “wild horsemen,” without a general, and therefore, according to Sir Charles Napier, perilously situated, should fall upon them and make them prisoners! At Koonhera, they were joined by the despoiled owner of Emaumghur, and we hear nothing more of them till the 21st, when the following was the disposition of the hostile forces, as reported by “an informant sent to Koonhera to observe the Ameers Meer Mahommed Hoossein and Meer Nusseer Khan.”

“It is not the Ameers’ feelings of vengeance extended chiefly to Ali Morad; if they were directed against the British, it was only as His Allies! Thus, we read that on the 3d of January—

“Meer Nusseer, Meer Mahommed Hoossein, Meer Ali Murdan, Meer Shore Mahommed, Mahabut Khan Murree, Dingarah Khan Murree, and many other petty Belooche Chiefs * * * went a few days ago to Noushera, to swear on the Koran before Peer Jwabdeeson, the Moolla, that, except by the sword, they will come to no understanding either with Meer Ali Morad, or His Allies the English.”

And on the 4th January, Meer Roostum is reported to have made the following affecting appeal to the Belooches:—

“I HAVE BROUGHT MY WIVES AND CHILDREN AMONG YOU. I AM IN EXTREMITY; ALL MY PROPERTY, TREASURES, &C., HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY MEER ALI MORAD AND HIS ALLIES. I LOOK TO YOU TO DEFEND MY FAMILY. YOU HAVE EAT AND DRANK AT MY EXPENSE FOR MANY A YEAR; NOW IT IS INDISPENSABLE THAT YOU SHOULD UNITE AND SMITE WITH THE SWORD.”

On the same day, the “Intelligence” acquainted Sir Charles Napier with the fact that—

“They are all most inveterate against Ali Morad, and determined to resist his authority with arms in their hands.”

But that it was against him, rather than his allies the English, that the sword was to be drawn, may be gathered from the report of the 8th, when—

“It was generally understood that they had been written to by Meer Roostum, to abstain from any hostilities with the English; but when the British force moved down towards Hydrabad, the whole of the Ameers were to assemble and destroy Meer Ali Morad, against whom the bitterest feelings are excited, and chiefly from his conduct towards Meer Roostum.”
On the succeeding day, we are told that—

“The general opinion is that the Ameers have been given to understand by Meer Ali Morad, that if captured by the General, they will be imprisoned; they have no intention of hostility against the English, but they foster the idea that, as the British troops have been withdrawn from Affghanistan and Shikarpoor, at no very remote period they will also be withdrawn from Sindh, and then they meditate the destruction of Meer Ali Morad”

And was it to be wondered at? Besides the usurpation of the turban and lands of Roostum, their worthless relative had, as I showed in last chapter, before he assumed to be Rais, commenced his depredations on his kinsmen. On their flight he “took charge” of Khyrpoor. In the Intelligence of the 30th December I now read, and Sir Charles Napier at the time read,—

“Meer Ali Morad has seized in Khyrpoor, from Suleiman, Meer Roostum’s confidential servant, 150 khurwars of jowarree, and fifty khurwars of wheat; from Meer Ali Akbar’s Tosh Khanah, a large amount of valuable property, in guns, swords, and cloths. *** Meer Ali Morad has also seized from Meer Mahommed Khan’s fort at Ooberee, a vast quantity of all kinds of grain, several bricks of gold of one and a half seer weight, and some silver.”

For such was the trepidation of the Princes of Sindh, at the time when Sir Charles Napier was preparing to advance in hostile array against Khyrpoor, and when Roostum was inveigled to Dhejee, that we learn,—

“On the Ameers quitting Khyrpoor, Meer Mahommed Khan’s son left Ooberee, and all the valuables it contained.”

On the 3d of January it is stated in the “Intelligence,” that—

“Meer Mahommed Hoossein wrote to Meer Roostum to say that Meer Ali Morad having sent a body of horse to seize the grain in Khnndeeara, he had dispatched eighty horse to oppose him.”

The answer of the outraged Roostum was calm and just,—

“That Meer Ali Morad having already seized lacs of rupees’ worth of territory and property, he saw no necessity for sending out detachments to contest for a little grain: that it would be much wiser to preserve the force complete for one good which would decide the dispute between them and Meer Ali Morad and His Friends.”

But it was not yet spoliation and personal insult that alone agitated the unfortunate Roostum. His wife, and the mother of his first-born had met with a melancholy accident while flying from the palace where she had hitherto lived in honour. I read in the “Intelligence” of the 3d January, that—
“The Kujawahs conveying Meer Mahommed Hoossein’s mother fell, and her arm was broken near the elbow; the two female attendants in the opposite kujawahs are said to have been killed.”

Yet war had not been declared, nor, wrote Sir Charles Napier, was it necessary to declare it. No; certainly not, after every demand had been acceded to, and when a crowd of timid women and fugitive princes, with their followers, it is true, but in a country where all men go armed,—were the only apology for an enemy which existed. To Englishmen, however, it will seem strange that such things should have occurred in the territory of an allied sovereign, when war had not been proclaimed, and where its proclamation was unnecessary! Yet this was the General’s idea of the proper mode of negotiating a treaty which had been accepted! And “the farce of the Khypoor troubles,” we are told, had been at an end ere this melancholy event took place! I believe General William Napier will find as few among his general readers to regard these troubles in the light of a farce, as he will among his military readers to sympathize with him in the exultation with which he records the numbers who perished at Meeanee and Dubba. While yet receiving the report of the Dingee levies, Sir Charles Napier was well aware that the fugitive Princes, even had they contemplated hostility, were without the sinews of war; that they were in extreme poverty. It was stated in the Intelligence of the 8th, that—

“The Ameers are in much distress for money, and so pressed that Meer Nusseer Khan was obliged to sell some of his saddles and trappings, mounted in gold, at the rate of fourteen rupees the gold mohur.”

On the same day it was announced that Bhadoor Buksh Koshah had written to this Ameer to say that he was ready to join him with his tribe. Meer Nusseer commended him for his fidelity, and said that were he to require his services, he would confidently rely on their not being withheld, but that then, he did not need them; for, said the Ameer, “AT PRESENT I AM A FUGITIVE!”

Nay, so poor was Mahommed Hoossein, the reputed leader of the Dingee force, before he received the 40,000 rupees sent by Roostum on the 1st, that some days previous—(the date is not given, but the announcement is contained in the Intelligence of the 2d)—the Belooche chiefs with him are said to have persuaded him to give them permission to plunder for themselves, instead of his being obliged to pay them a daily allowance! And on the 21st, when the female hosts were assembled in Meer Sohrab’s and Jumeer Ali’s gardens, we are told that,—

“Meer Mahommed Hoossein and Meer Nusseer Khan, represented to Meer Mahommed Khan, that he was rich in treasure, and that if he would advance them money, they would collect a force to oppose the English. Meer Mahommed Khan gave them 15,000 rupees, stating at the

75 Sir Charles Napier, and the army he commanded, may find to their cost, that the omission to issue a declaration of war before commencing hostilities, may seriously affect their interests; the Chancellor of the Exchequer having recently resisted, with success, the strong claims of the British forces employed in China, on the above ground.
same time, that the vicinity of Koonhera was not the place for hostilities, but that if they would advance beyond Dingee, where water and grass was abundant, he would give them the remainder of two lacs of rupees, or even more if they required; but he would not advance any more money so long as they halted at Koonhera.”

These were the Princes who, with all their treasures and their troops, had fled from Khyrpoor only to Raise the standard of battle elsewhere! Such were the desultory movements, inspired by fear, which constituted the Ameers’ share in the Upper Sindh Campaign!

If General Napier’s repetitions serve to mystify his reader, they tend also to entangle himself. At page 171, we were told that the Ameers fled to Lower Sindh and to the desert, there to Raise the standard of battle in conjunction with their cousins of Hydrabad, and passim we have announcements that Meer Roostum joined them; not only so, but that on the first flight of his sons and nephews all chance of war in Upper Sindh was removed. Where, then, raged the war, which dated from Roostum’s escape from Dhejee? Not certainly in Lower Sindh, for on the 28th of January, one month after the Ameer escaped to join his relatives, Sir Charles Napier reported:—

“The Southern Ameers have all refused to join those of Khyrpoor in measures of opposition. **

* The Ameers of Hydrabad refused them entrance into Lower Sindh.”

Nor in the desert, for the Ameers, we are told, only hung on its skirts, and their followers refused to march into the wilderness to starve. An abortive attempt to reconcile his own statements with his brother’s contradiction is made by the Historian at p. 219, where we are informed that Dingee was “JUST ON THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN UPPER AND LOWER SINDH.” Yet at p. 247, “the efforts of Roostum and his sons to maintain a footing in Upper Sindh, their sudden occupation of Emaumghur and Shahgur, and the entrenching a position at Dingee” are described as a “MILITARY HOLDING OF UPPER SINDH BY THESE PRINCES.”

With regard to his own force, the General thus developed his views to the Governor-General on the 29th December. A reference to the map is requisite, to render his observations intelligible.

“In the want of precise information, I cannot tell what the Ameers are at, but I believe they mean to fight at Dingee. I have, therefore, changed my intention of marching direct on Emaumghur, and will march upon Laloo, about five marches. By the time I get there, my spies will have brought me intelligence both of the intentions of the Ameers, and of their strength at Dingee,76 as well as at Emaumghur,—and this intelligence will make me move to either flank, or direct on Hydrabad. Laloo is considered in the desert, and a march upon that point will alarm them, as they expect me to move by the usual road by the river. But if I did so, they would have free communication with the desert, which, by marching

76 Dejee is given in the Blue Book, but the mistake is obvious, so I have corrected it.
on Laloo I shall intercept, and oblige the Dingee force\textsuperscript{77} to fall back on Hyderabad, upon which I shall then march; or, if the Dingee people cross to Emaumghur before I reach Laloo, I will march on that fort and take it. \* \* \* As this new aspect of affairs (confirming all your Lordship’s apprehensions\textsuperscript{78};) seems to threaten a battle, I have ordered up the 19th Bengal Regiment, and the troops of Horse Artillery, though I feel quite strong enough without them.”

Ten days afterwards, he found the data on which these views were formed to be incorrect, and thus wrote to the Governor-General:—

“I shall now order the Bengal column to continue its march, I think, as I find the ‘large force’ assembled at Dingee amounts to four thousand men. I believe two thousand would be nearer the mark.”

His surmise proved correct. I subjoin General William Napier’s programme of the campaign:—

“Expecting that the General, so prompt and resolute as they had found him, would not fail to attack Khypoor, as indeed he designed,\textsuperscript{79} the first arrangement of the Ameers was that the Belooches of Upper Sindh should fall back, fighting from that capital to Dingee, where they were to be reinforced to the amount of fifteen thousand men; a like number, stationed at Larkhana, on the right of the Indus, being ready to attack the camp at Sukkur, while this retreat upon Dingee was effected. If this attack from Larkhana succeeded, the British field force would be isolated, they thought, without a base; and it was to be immediately opposed by the great mass of the Upper Sindh army, reinforced by the armies of Hyderabad and Meerpore, which were promptly to unite at Dingee, and give battle.”

The plan of campaign, General William Napier assures us, “was arranged with a skill and intelligence far beyond the Ameers’ capacity, having nothing barbarous in its onception.” As Generals of civilized nations, in making their arrangements calculate on the possibility of defeat, it would have been well to have said what the Ameers meant to do, if the attack from Larkhana failed. Probably, like the fierce warriors at Dingee, they would have hurried away to their wives, lest Roberts should fall on them, and make them prisoners. But we are told that the “foresight of the General, in strengthening Sukkur, and forming a new base of operations at Roree, was overlooked by the barbarians: with that error, their plan was well laid.” All the strengthening which Sukkur received, all of which an open, ill

\textsuperscript{77} In the General’s dispatch, the Dingee force is given as “No. 3,” in reference to a plan illustrative of his position and intended movements forwarded to the Governor-General. Not having the plan before him, the General’s dispatch would be unintelligible to the reader, but for the liberty I have taken with it.

\textsuperscript{78} Should not the General have said, his own apprehensions communicated to the Governor-General? The circumstances said to have been apprehended, proving fictions, show how erroneous were the General’s opinions; though from these being styled a new state of affairs, “all changed, as if by magic,” the General was evidently unprepared for them.

\textsuperscript{79} A somewhat rash admission, as the very day after he had marched, he intimated that neither was war declared, nor was it necessary to declare it!
laid out, and straggling camp was susceptible, would not have prevented Colonel Roberts encountering serious difficulty had the enemy existed, and an attack been made. As for the base “at Roree,” in what did it consist? There were no Commissariat, — no Ordnance Stores: simply a regiment of Native Infantry encamped in open ground. The General’s foresight in sending off the Bengal troops, left it unsupported; and had he followed the fighting Belooches to Dingee, the base at Roree would have been exposed to any force that chose to attack it from the desert—aye, to any force that chose to pass the General’s flank to attack it; for, in spite of the Historian’s assertion, a force could easily have marched upwards. Colonel Roberts would have been too busy with the fifteen thousand Belooches to be able to assist Colonel Brown, and the latter must have encountered a succession of attacks from the thousands of savage Belooches, whose souls are represented to have been on fire and eager for the fray; or, what is more probable, and would have been quite justifiable, the Colonel might have re-crossed the river, and the baseless base would have been no more. A base of operations! It was at best but an outpost to the base of Sukkur Bukkur.

The Historian assigns no satisfactory reason for the revolution affected in the councils of the Ameers. But a few months previously, we learn at page 105, that—

“The plan of the hostile Ameers was to take possession of Bukkur: all the fighting would be, they said, in Upper Sindh; * * * then the Hyderabad troops would move up, and the whole force of Sindh unite to give battle.”

Yet the new arrangement is spoken of as having been long agreed on. It would almost appear that the Ameers of the two provinces were unwilling to have their respective territories made the theatre of war, and compounded by agreeing to fight “just on the line of demarcation between Upper and Lower Sindh!” If this had nothing barbarous in its conception, it had something irresistibly ludicrous. But assuming that either one plan or the other had been contemplated, it does not exactly appear when either was first entertained. It is evident that the plan said to have been adopted, dated from an earlier period than the strengthening of Sukkur and the passage of the Indus, for these fine strokes of generalship deranged it. Yet we are told, at page 211, that the adroit and firm policy contemporaneous with these military feats, “prevented the adoption of any decided general measure,” and we learn from other passages, that when the sons and nephews had fled to the desert and to Lower Sindh, or rather to “the line of demarcation,” they were then only organizing a plan of opposition with their cousins of Hyderabad; though a month later these cousins had refused to have anything to say to them! And, equally strange, these very Princes, who are elsewhere represented to have been hourly instigating Roostum to provoke a war, by robbing the dawks, menacing the camp, &c., are at page 221, said to “HAVE TRUSTED TO THEIR FALSE NEGOTIATIONS FOR

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80 This is a part of the schemes reported to me to be contemplated early in 1842, at the time of our Afghan disasters; it will be found at page 333 of the First Sindh Blue Book. All these intrigues, as I have more than once repeated, I had frustrated long prior to Sir Charles Napier’s arrival in Sindh.
DELAYING THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN UNTIL THE HOT SEASON SHOULD BE NEAR.” “But,” proceeds the Historian, “the General’s detection of their real designs, and his prompt action, baffled their schemes on this point also; and then Roostum’s wavering conduct completed their confusion. Hence they fled, as we have seen, to Dingee, and the Larkhana people then repaired thither also, instead of storming the camp of Sukkur!”

“Still the Princes of Khyrpoor halted at Dingee, and prepared to put the second part of their plan of campaign in execution, and though necessarily modified by recent events, the leading principles were the same. They resolved, and had hopes of being able, to inveigle the British field force, whose number they well knew, down the left bank of the Indus, among the nullahs, and jungles, and swamps which abound there, and keep it stationary by fresh negotiations, and intrigues, and falsehoods, until the inundation should invade the camp, and the fierce sun should strike the soldiers down. Then the Belooche blades were to finish the war, or as they expressed it in the durbars, ‘to make the kaffirs, as they fell beneath their swords, cry out, oh, God! What have we done, that you let these devils loose upon us?’ “—Conquest of Sindh, p. 221.

The second part of the plan of the campaign, so ingeniously constructed by the Historian, was, that when assembled at Dingee, the British force was to be opposed “by the great mass of the army of Upper Sindh, reinforced by the armies of Hydrabad and Meerpore, which were promptly to unite and give battle.” We are therefore to infer that this was done: at all events that the Khyrpoor chiefs proceeded to put it in execution. How they were to do so, while the armies with which they were to be reinforced were not called into existence, the Historian condescends not to inform us. The Ameers must have been foolish indeed, if they hoped “ by fresh negotiations, and intrigues, and falsehoods,” to deceive the General, after having but a week before failed in doing so, and having thereby aroused his vigilance.

And all this elaborate scheme was frustrated by 400 men, with a Major-General at their head, marching unopposed to a desert castle, which contained not a living soul, blowing it up with some powder found in it, eating the grain, and marching back again. For thus does the Historian wind up his inflated account of the march to Emamghur, its plunder and demolition:—

81 At a later period, when Roostum’s 7000 men and seven guns had united with the army of Koonhera, and large reinforcements had arrived, under the impression that the Scinde Irregular Horse, who were sent to observe, intended to attack the Ameers, the aggregate number at Koonhera did not exceed 5000 men; and six crazy guns formed their park of artillery! This I know to be the case; if inaccurate, let the officer who commanded the corps contradict me. Equally to the point, as evincing the hostility of the Ameers, is the circumstance, that though for many days within twelve miles distance of this alleged enemy, the Sindh Horse, only 500 in number, without guns, unsupported by infantry, and between sixty and seventy miles from the army, were not only not attacked, or threatened with an attack, but were abundantly supplied with all that they required, and received every civility from the people of the country. One word from the Ameers would have altered this state of matters, but Roostum sought only safety and peace. “Show Me Mercy,” I have been assured, was the burden of all his petitionary letters addressed to Captain Jacob, to whom, during that officer’s sojourn in his neighbourhood, I understand he frequently deputed his Moonshee, to implore (since justice was withheld) for mercy!
“He came back triumphant, without a check, without the loss of a man, without even a sick soldier, having attained his object,

**DISPERSED THE AMEERS’ ARMY, AND BAFFLED THEIR PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.**

A sense of fatigue would now induce a termination to this record of General Napier’s fables as to the Upper Sindh campaign, were it not for a passage so extravagant as to put gravity at defiance, and provoke laughter. At page 214, after announcing the Ameers’ flight, and that no armed bands but Ali Morad’s remained in the province, of which Roostum and his family held military possession, and in which they occupied an intrenched position, he proceeds:—

> “Then the Sindhian labourer rose with a shout of exultation, and the trafficking Hindoo clapped his lean hands in joy, at the flight of these barbarous oppressors. Relieved from the Patan and Belooche swordsmen, whose ready and sharp blades cut short all remonstrance against their robberies, the husbandmen and traders flocked into the British camp, offering provisions for sale, and cowering with satisfaction under the protection of the just Feringhee General; and with a vigorous hand he guarded their rights of life and property.”

Had the just Feringhee General done anything of the kind, he would have been but adding another item to the catalogue of his violations of treaty. By the very treaty he so frequently quotes, we have seen that he was prohibited from even listening to the complaints of the Ameers’ subjects. But the just Feringhee General had other matters to think of than the husbandmen or the traders; his ear was too much occupied with the whisperings of Ali Morad to listen to their complaints. If the Sindhian labourer was ever silly enough to rise up with a shout of exultation, it was not long till he sat down again with a groan of disappointment, and the lean hands which the trafficking Hindoo clapped in joy, he has since wrung in anguish, as his unsaleable commodities—unsaleable, because high priced; and high priced, because heavily taxed—have stared him in the face. But, like most of the Historian’s averments, it is a pleasant fable. He doubtless thought that the labourer and the trafficker ought to have done as described, and he perhaps believed that they meant to do so, and with benevolent liberality he takes the will for the deed!

The length to which this Section has already extended, compels me to defer to the next, my examination of the march to Emaumghur, both in a military and a moral point of view.
SECTION VIII.

THE MARCH ON EMAUMGHUK, AND CONTEMPORANEOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

Having participated in the glories and dangers of the march on Emaumghur, I am enabled to record with the greater confidence my impressions on this act of the Sindh tragedy, so vividly described by the Historian. I shall show that had the circumstances connected with this much-vaunted expedition been truly represented by General William Napier, he would have deprived his brother of the high military reputation which has been assigned to him, for it must have terminated in the utter destruction of the small band of devoted soldiers by which it was accomplished. I shall show that this fort never appertained to the turban, and that this unjustifiable act of aggression was committed against a chief who had never offended the British Government by word or deed, but who, nevertheless, abandoned it without resistance on the approach of the despoiler. From these premises I shall deduce another convincing proof that the Ameers of Sindh had no intention of defying the gigantic power of the British nation, even under circumstances when both nature and art favored the design, until they were finally goaded by despair to strike a blow for the liberty and independence of their country.

Of all the feats performed by Sir Charles Napier, his march on Emaumghur is that which the Historian most delights to honour. Not even at Meeanee, where the Ameers were broken like potsherds,” and “their thousands went down before the bayonets of his gallant soldiers wallowing in blood,” did the hero, it seems, appear so remarkable, as when he journeyed into the desert, to place Ali Morad’s killadar in a fortress belonging to another Prince. Though it is my duty to expose the gross violation of justice and treaty involved in that act of spoliation, I would willingly have left Sir Charles Napier in possession of the false glory with which his brother has gilded it, had not its consideration in a moral point of view been so intimately connected with its military character, as to compel me to analyze its claims to be a feat worthy of “the men of ancient days,” as the Historian calls it. In justice to General William Napier, I subjoin a few of the leading passages in the “Conquest,” bearing on this subject:—

Page 225.—”As early as the 20th of December, he had informed Lord Ellenborough he thought the desert was the place to strike at; and he now conceived in that view, an enterprise as hardy as any of which military records tell. Similar it was in design, but more dangerous and more daring with respect to the chances of a battle, than that of Mariuus when he surprised the city of Capsa in the Jugurthine war. Like Capsa, Emaumghur was accounted by the enemy impregnable as a fortress, and inaccessible from situation. * * * * This hidden fortress of Emaumghur, so distant, so inaccessibly placed, the

English General resolved to seek out and attack, though it was, he knew, well provided and garrisoned by 2000 of the best Belooche warriors; for none but the best would encounter the
privations of the desert when absolute necessity did not urge them. And many thousands of
horsemens were also in the sandy skirts of the wilderness, acquainted with the water-pits, able
to fill them up, or to poison the waters, and ready to fall on the fainting soldiers in their
distress. To attempt the destruction of Emaumghur in the face of such difficulties and dangers,
was an enterprise worthy of Alexander and his Agrians.”

Page 235.—”The Belooche forces assembled at Dingee were said to have gone into the desert.
Roostum was there also with his force, but only just within the skirts, where water and forage
were still to be found sufficient for his horses and cattle. All these forces were supposed bound
for Emaumghur, and not less than twenty or twenty-five thousand fighting men, besides the
garrisons of the forts, were therefore to be expected in the waste. No exact intelligence could be
obtained at Dhejee ka Kote, of the roads, or rather tracts, to Emaumghur, or of the situation or
copiousness of the waters; and it was evident that Ali Morad was still averse to strangers going
there. The English General was not to be turned from his resolution; but he had now made four
marches from Roree with his whole disposable force, the two last actually within the precincts
of the desert; his next move must be into the heart of the wilderness, without sure guides,
without any well grounded expectation of finding water and forage, and with almost a
certainty of being met and fought with, or at the least harassed, by the Belooche cavalry in
great numbers. The enterprise was therefore most dangerous as well as difficult.”

Page 236.—”His first notion was to march upon Emaumghur with his whole force by the road
of Laloo, a place considered to be in the desert, though near the edge of the cultivated district.
This line would have turned the Beloochees’ position at Dingee, and cut their communication
with the fortresses in the waste. * * * * If, as his spies reported, the Dingee force had already
gone to Emaumghur, his resolution was to follow them, and fight a decisive battle at its gates
before the Hydrabad army could collect to harass his rear. If they retreated in confusion on
Hydra- bad, and thus furnished a good occasion, his intention was to relinquish the desert
march, and strike at them beneath the walls of the capital of Lower Sindh. “

I intended to have placed before the reader all the Historian had to say on the subject of
the desert march, before commenting on the extravagance of the narrative; but the inflated
extracts I have made contain such a perfect sketch of what he wishes us to believe the
General meant to do, but did not, that I proceed to dispose of the intent before examining
the actual performance. I beg the reader to refer to the quotation82 I have already given
from Sir Charles Napier’s dispatch of the 29th December, in which he made known to the
Governor-General the plans he had formed in consequence of the erroneous information
of the spies, presenting, as that information did, “a new aspect of affairs which seemed to
threaten a battle.”

When the project occurred to Sir Charles Napier, the Historian represents him as having
resolved “to seek out and attack” Emaumghur. Of this resolution, so unkindly charged on
him by his brother, it is surprising that, when examining the work before publication, the
General did not exonerate himself. Sir Charles Napier merely proposed to install Ali
Morad’s killadar in the fort,— an act of usurpation certainly, but not necessarily one of
violence; and it was only in the event of the “ garrison” declining to receive him, that he

82 Vide pages 210 and 211.
intended to batter it. Nay, so far from seeking it out with a view to attack it, Sir Charles Napier thus wrote to the Governor-General, on the 27th of December, nine days before he started:—

“As it is not possible to conceal my march, I shall send the Ameers in Emaumghur word that I am not going either to plunder or slay them, if they do not make any resistance; but if they do, then they must abide the results.”

Such an intimation, it would occur to most men, was somewhat superfluous, where the British character was so well known as in Sindh: it may, however, have been rendered necessary, by the peculiar nature of the preceding negotiations; but, at all events, it acquits the General of the heavy accusation brought against him by his brother.

Where, it may be asked, did the Historian procure his muster-rolls of the “many thousands of horsemen” who “were in the sandy skirts of the wilderness, acquainted with the water-pits, able to fill them up, or poison the waters, and ready to fall on the fainting soldiers in their distress?” The presence of even as many hundreds was a danger which no generalship could have averted; yet Sir Charles Napier, in the minute reports which he furnished to the Governor-General of the difficulties against which he had to contend, made no allusion to it. By concealing a circumstance which would have rendered his march into the desert an unpardonable exposure of his army to almost certain destruction, he would have committed a very heinous offence, as well in a moral as in a military point of view. But the charge is groundless,—the horsemen being creations of the Historian’s imagination.

Sir Charles Napier’s “first notion” was not, as the Historian asserts, “to march on Emaumghur by the road of Lalloo;” his first notion was to march direct on it from Mungaree, by way of Khanpoor, “fourteen miles on the road to Emaumghur.” It was not until false reports, propagated by the crafty Ali Morad, reached him of the fifteen thousand men in the vicinity of Larkhana, of the two thousand in Shahghur, and the large forces assembling at Dingee, and not till he was made to believe that the Ameers meant to fight him at that place, that he altered his route. Prior to the “new aspect of affairs” seeming “to threaten a battle,” he had not dreamed of being opposed; but, to quote his own words from the same dispatch, now was “all changed, as if by magic,” and his plans had to conform to the alteration in his circumstances. The change he thus announced on the 29th:—

“I therefore have changed my intention of marching direct on Emaumghur, and will march on Lalloo, about five marches. By the time I get there, my spies will have brought me intelligence of both the intentions of the Ameers, and their strength at Dingee, as well as at Emaumghur; and this intelligence will make me move to either flank, or direct on Hydrabad.”

83 The Historian tells us that they amounted to “not less than twenty or twenty-five thousand fighting men, besides the garrisons of the forts.”
Nor was it Sir Charles Napier’s “first notion” “to march on Emaumghur with his whole force.” He thus wrote on the 27th of December:—

“As I shall have neither carriage, nor forage, nor water, for the whole force now with me, I shall proceed as far as I can with the whole; and when water and forage grow scarce, I mean to push on with the Sindh horse, the camel battery, the Foot Artillery under Captain Hutt, and the 22d Queen’s.”

In General Napier’s map, the position of Dingee is misplaced. However occasioned, the circumstance is unfortunate, as it has led him to say, and perhaps his readers to believe, that by marching on Laloo, his brother would “have turned the Belooches’ position of Dingee.”

It was a strange neglect in Sir Charles Napier not to apprize the Governor-General that his object was to fight a decisive battle at the gates of Emaumghur, “before the Hydrabad army could collect to harass his rear,” or not to communicate his suspicions that such a scheme was likely to be entertained by the Ameers of Lower Sindh. It was more than a neglect—it was a willful concealment of a very important circumstance from his Lordship, while professing to communicate all.

But Sir Charles Napier must be acquitted of having practised, in this instance, either deception or concealment. Even the authoritative dictum of the Historian would be rejected by the General’s denial, and the confirmatory testimony of geography. Let us for a moment suppose, as General William Napier implies, that the Hydra- bad Ameers had ever contemplated collecting an army to harass his brother’s rear, or in any way to oppose him. Sir Charles Napier intimated to Lord Ellenborough, on the 27th of December, that he was about to notify his intention of marching on Emaumghur. Had the Ameers learned it on the 28th, and then issued their summons, their most remote feudatories, the Chandias, could have been at Hydrabad by midnight on the 5th of January,—the day and hour on which Sir Charles Napier marched from Dhejee; and, some days earlier, a harassing number could have been set in motion eastward. Or, on the supposition that they knew not the General’s plan till the eve of its execution, by the 14th of January they could have moved with all their army to intercept his return, should he have escaped destruction by famine, thirst, and the swords of the thousands of imaginary Belooches who wandered in the waste.

Sir Charles Napier, however, well knew that the Lower Sindh Ameers no more contemplated harassing his rear, than those of Khyrpoor dreamt of impeding his advance. But had there been one particle of reality in the plan of campaign given by the Historian, the Princes of both provinces would have united to destroy his brother, when they so easily could. They need not have waited till “the inundations invaded the camp;” the want of water is as effectual to the destruction of a force as its redundancy. As it was, Sir Charles Napier found forage and water so scarce, that on the second day he was obliged
to send back one hundred and fifty of the two hundred horses he took with him. To increase the efficiency of the small body that actually accompanied him, he devoted nearly all the means of conveyance at his disposal; yet he was seven days on the journey, and for double that period at the mercy of any “wild horsemen” who chose to fill up the water-pits. Let the reader, then, imagine the wisdom of a General, who is represented with two thousand infantry, nine hundred cavalry, twelve field-pieces, and a battery of twenty-four pounder howitzers, heavy baggage, a cumbrous commissariat, and twenty thousand camp-followers, to have proposed a journey into this desert, to seek a fortress whose "exact position is not known," "with almost a certainty of being met and fought with, or at the least harassed, by the Belooche cavalry in great numbers," and in the belief that another army was collecting to harass his rear, or oppose his return! Well may the Historian say the enterprise was dangerous, as well as difficult! He might have added insane; for utter destruction must have resulted had it been attempted under such circumstances. Nor would the folly of the project be removed, by the supposition—which may be resorted to—that he meant to leave his heavy baggage and unnecessary followers behind, with a guard for their protection. The march would, even then, have been equally impracticable; and, had an enemy existed, the fate of the army equally certain. In fact, it was only Sir Charles Napier’s full confidence, justified by the result, that no opposition was contemplated by the Ameers, that his march on Emaumghur can be defended; otherwise it would be as indefensible in a military, as it undoubtedly is in a moral point of view.

But I have devoted too much space and time to what Sir Charles Napier did not do,—and, to do him justice, never intended doing: now for his actual performances.

Page 237—"New events became known every hour. The Belooches’ march upon Emaumghur from Dingee had been prematurely reported. * * * * Meanwhile, a native agent, sent by the General to explore the route and note the state of the wells, came back with such a tale of arid sands and dried-up pits, that he resigned all hope of being able to effect his march with the whole army. With surpassing hardihood he then selected two hundred irregular cavalry, put three hundred and fifty of the 22d Queen’s regiment on camels, loaded ten more of these animals with provisions, eighty with water, and resolved, with these five hundred men, to essay that enterprise for which only the day before he had allotted three thousand, thinking it even then most hazardous, as in truth it was.”

Page 449.—” Thus, when Sir Charles Napier marched against Emaumghur, he could not take more than three hundred men after the first two marches. THE ENTERPRISE IN PRUDENCE DEMANDED THREE THOUSAND MEN J BUT HAD HE TAKEN ONLY ONE THOUSAND, HE MUST HAVE FAILED FOR WANT OF WATER.”

But—

“He supplied the want of numbers by courage, hardihood, and perseverance, trusting to the moral effect of these qualities more than to his real force.”
Moral qualities will not bring rain from heaven, nor open choked-up wells; and no amount of hardihood would have enabled the soldiers to bear up against the fatigue of dragging the heavy howitzers by day, (or even of simply marching,) their nights’ rest disturbed by false alarms, the wells closed, and prowling emissaries penetrating the camp; circumstances which must have occurred, had an enemy been near.

On the second day, as I have mentioned, finding forage and water scarce, he sent back one hundred and fifty horsemen, and with the remaining four hundred men pushed on to Emaumghur, which he reached on the 12th of January. Not a well had been filled up by the way—not an enemy had been seen; and when he reached the object of his search, he found that its owner—not wishing to put to the test the sincerity of the promise the General had made, not to slay or plunder if no resistance was offered—had fled with his family and his treasure. Not satisfied with the evidence afforded by his unmolested march, that no probability of future opposition existed,—and in spite of his promise not to plunder, he blew up the fortress with the gunpowder it contained.

Had there been an enemy, Sir Charles Napier could never have reached Emaumghur. We are told at p. 240—

“For eight days those intrepid soldiers traversed this gloomy region, living from hand to mouth, uncertain each morning if water could be found in the evening; and many times it was not found. They were not even sure of their right course; yet with fiery velour, and untiring strength, they continued their dreary, dangerous way. The camels found very little food, and got weak, but the stout infantry helped to drag the heavy howitzers up the sandy steeps; and all the troops, despising the danger of an attack from the Belooches, worked with a power that overcame every obstacle.”

Well might they afford to despise a danger which never threatened them! Had the twenty-five thousand imaginary Belooches appeared and fallen on them, these brave fellows would doubtless have met them as became British soldiers,—as they did, when, at a later date, they so nobly charged them at Meeanee and Dubba,—but, in all human probability, could they have maintained their ground? The world required not to be told by General Napier that the Royal Army contains no finer regiment than the Twenty-second; but not even the gallant Twenty-second can perform impossibilities. General Napier assures us that the Belooches considered themselves safe in the desert. And wherefore? On account of the scarcity of water! And does he think, that if they had really resolved to oppose his brother’s advance, and had not feared thereby to provoke further hostilities, they would have neglected to use the means, familiar to all acquainted with Indian warfare, and have filled up every well on the march? The desert wells are not—as the Historian, with an heroic contempt for fact and geology, describes them—springs, “sometimes bubbling up in one place freely, at another time disappearing, to rise again at a distance;” but, as he elsewhere more accurately characterizes them, “pits.” These, few and far between, are sunk deep in the sand, about two or three feet in diameter, and are only prevented from being choked up, by being lined with hurdles of brushwood! I will assume that the
General’s guides could have pointed out their position, and that his stout infantry, jaded and wearied with dragging “the heavy howitzers up the sandy steeps,” had again opened them. How long must the troops have remained at each halting-place?

The ten camels bearing provisions would soon have been available for any other purpose to which the General chose to apply them, and the eighty pair of leaky water-bags would have speedily ceased to be a burden to the animals that bore them. A few shots fired from time to time at night, would have roused the camp, and rendered sleep impossible; and what would have been the condition of the General and his band on the third or fourth morning,—working hard by day, sleeping none by night? But even the firing a single shot was unnecessary. The command of the wells was a tower of strength to the Belooches, had they dreamed of opposition or even of negative hostility. Nor was filling up the wells the only means at their disposal. “A prowling emissary” not only might, as General Napier suggests, but undoubtedly would, have cut the water-skins in the night, had the Belooches wished to molest his brother. That not even the arrangements of one of “the greatest of England’s captains” can prevent prowling emissaries entering the British camp by night, the Governor of Sindh could probably have informed the Governor of Guernsey. But grant that the stout infantry and weak camels had reached Emaumghur in safety, without having seen an enemy or finding a well filled up; and suppose, further, that relying on Sir Charles Napier’s assurance that no injury should be done if no resistance were offered, its owner had not fled, but, on seeing the paltry force at his gates, had refused to admit the usurper on the mere recommendation of Sir Charles Napier: how was the latter to punish his contumacy? Hear the Historian as to the strength of this Sindhian Gibraltar:

Page 241.—“Emaumghur, which no European had ever before seen, was now found to be a square fortress of considerable size, having in the centre a tower of the same shape, fifty feet high, built of well burned bricks. This was encompassed by walls forty feet high, with eight round towers of defence, constructed of un-burned bricks. Beyond this castle was another strong wall fifteen feet high, recently erected, and also of unburned brick, which possess peculiar strength against artillery, seeing that the shot easily penetrates, but brings nothing down; the howitzers were found ineffectual to break them, and recourse was had to mines.”

British skill and British velour are, I believe, equal to the accomplishment of any feat within the range of possibility; but as all the pools were commanded by the fort, and as, when in possession of the fort, and with the materials left behind by the owner, nearly three days were occupied by the engineers in its demolition, what would have become of the assailants had resistance been offered? The garrison, General Napier assures us, were the flower of the Belooche warriors, and though not deeply versed in the science of war, they were well aware of the device of blowing up gates with bags of gunpowder. They must have known that they were fighting for their lives, and they would have kept a keen look-out lest Colonel Waddington’s “prowling emissaries” approached by day or night. Feigned attacks would have destroyed the nights’ rest of the troops; and, though it was the cold season, a Sindhian sun, never contemptible, aided by a scarcity of water, would
have reduced the little band to such distress, that the General would have been compelled
to beat a retreat, or concede to the garrison their own terms. No army in the world
possesses finer engineer and artillery corps than that of India, nor could the Indian army
have furnished more gallant or scientific officers in these departments than Colonel
Waddington or Major Whitlie; but the one would admittedly have found it difficult to
blow up such a fortress, and the other might have fired from his howitzers till they were
red hot, ere he could have breached it, or shelled out the garrison. Lucky indeed was it
that the possession of the place was not disputed.

Could a more satisfactory exposure be demanded of the purely fictitious nature of the
plans of campaign given by the Historian, than this relinquishment of a fortress which, he
assures us, the Belooches deemed impregnable, which he represents as selected for the
base of their operations during the intended war, which was “well provided and
garrisoned by 2000 of the best Belooche warriors,” “than whom braver barbarians never
gave themselves to slaughter?” Had they dreamed of opposition, they would at least have
waited till their scouts brought them certain intelligence of the number of their assailants,
assuming as possible the approach of assailants whose supply of water was at their
mercy. But no sooner did they hear that the General was marching on their impregnable
base of operations, than these brave warriors—four times as numerous as the band
coming to oppose them—betook themselves to swell the number of armed men and timid
women who occupied the gardens of Koonhera! Neither on the road nor at Emaumghur
were the wells injured: even their grain and gunpowder they thought not of destroying.
The hardihood of the Historian in telling his readers that Emaumghur could ever have
been selected as a base of hostile operations is considerable. False and feeble, indeed, must
have been the operations conducted from such a base. Not a blade of grass grew around
or near it, and by his own account none but the best of the Belooches would encounter the
privations of the desert, unless absolutely compelled! And what were the munitions
found in it? A quantity of gunpowder —much of it, if I recollect aright, so caked and
worthless that the engineers could scarcely use it,—and grain no more than adequate for
the consumption of its limited inhabitants! The grain was served out as rations! Grant,
what was not the case, that each man had been obliged to carry a week’s supply,—that the
ten provision camels had been loaded with the captured grain,—nay, assume that the
eighty pair of water-skins had been filled with it, and that as much as was thus
appropriated had been destroyed,—how well provided must have been this fortress, with
a garrison of 2000 men, to serve as the base of operations during a campaign!

On the 27th of December, Sir Charles thus wrote from Mungaree :

“I have discovered long ago that the Ameers put implicit faith in their deserts, and feel
confident that we cannot there reach them; that therefore, when negotiations, and delays, and
lying, and intrigues of all kinds fail, they can at last declare their full obedience, their
innocence, and their humility, and retire beyond our reach to their deserts; and from thence
launch their wild bands against us, so as to cut off all communication, and render Sindh more hot than nature has already done.

“So circumstanced, and after all the consideration I could give the subject, and after drawing all I could from Ali Morad, whom I saw last night at Khyrpoor, I made up my mind that although war has not been declared, (nor is it necessary to declare it,) I would at once march upon Emaumghur, and prove to the whole Talpoor family of both Khyrpoor and Hydrabad, that neither their deserts nor their negotiations can protect them from the British troops”

To instruct the Ameers, therefore, was the object of the march,—not to defeat any hostile movements; for, when Sir Charles Napier believed that his policy had at length provoked a war, his plans were suddenly altered! As a lesson to the Ameers, the march was not only inoperative, but tended, more than any assurances the General could have given to that effect, to convince them that if at any time a contest arose, they might fly into the desert and baffle pursuit. They beheld an army of three thousand men, crippled of carriage to enable five hundred to go into the waste; and one hundred and fifty of this small band they saw return, compelled to do so by the scarcity of forage and water,—and this in the cold season! The lesson, however, which it taught to the millions of the East, will not probably be soon forgotten. They will know in future—how to value the promises of a British General, that if no resistance be made, no plunder shall take place.

The march to, and the demolition of Emaumghur, were, however, performed in safety,—and then, writes the Historian—

“He resolved to move back as rapidly as possible by the Indus, to rejoin the bulk of his army: but he chose a new route, more to the southward, because one of his objects had been to disperse the Belooche army at Dingee. He had not yet affected that; and he determined to push his menacing movement still further and to go back not as on the return, but pouring upon their flank from the waste with war and terror”

Yet war had not been declared, nor was it necessary to declare it! In what a light is the Conqueror of Sindh presented in the pages of the “Conquest!” No wonder that the Siecle recommended the English press to restrain its indignation at Colonel Pelissier’s doings, till the acts of Sir Charles Napier had been erased from the records of the East! But these imputations, for such they are, of the Historian are as devoid of foundation in truth as are those of the Siecle. Sir Charles Napier, though I believe his ‘measures alone produced it, sought not to effect the shedding of blood, and he may point to the instructions communicated to myself on the 15th—the day before he left Emaumghur—and to his dispatch to Lord Ellenborough of the 17th—the day after,—in refutation of his brother’s calumnies.

I was directed to proceed to Khyrpoor to arrange the details of the new treaty with the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh; nay, so satisfied was the General with the good effects of his policy, that I was authorized to communicate to him any arrangement that occurred
to me, by which “all or any of the parties concerned might be benefited!” And in writing to the Governor-General, Sir Charles Napier thus expressed himself:—

“If, on arrival at Tujjul, I find they have not dispersed as we hear, then I shall have them between us and the river—an awkward position for them, as the river is not fordable. But there is no chance of their fighting now.”

True, he also said what the reader, I think, will agree with me he was not justified in saying—” I have all along seen their determination to procrastinate till the hot weather arrives;” though even then he did not venture to say that the procrastination was resorted to, to enable them to attack us in the hot weather; for had he said so, he would have said what was very silly. The new treaty did not materially interfere with the offensive means at the disposal of the Ameers, and had they wished to attack us, they would have quietly affixed their seals to it, and then treated it as they were afterwards accused of doing in p. 292 of the “Conquest of Sindh.”

“Sir Charles Napier disregarded the signing of the treaty on the 12th. He looked upon it only as a mockery, as indeed the Ameers themselves did.”

Their very reluctance to accept the treaty with its penal clauses sufficiently proved their intention of abiding by it. Had they contemplated aggressions in the hot weather, they would studiously have avoided exciting the General’s suspicions by a manifestation of reluctance; and wherefore should they have been reluctant to sign a paper which, in the course of a few months, they meant to cancel with their swords?

But though reluctant, they were not recusant. They protested against being punished for offences of which they declared their innocence; but no procrastination was attempted, and the details of the treaty could have been easily arranged by me, had Sir Charles Napier’s endeavors to impress them with the sternness of his character, not frustrated all.

In the same dispatch, the General also wrote—

“I hear that our march to Emautghur has, as I expected, dispersed the tribes assembling at Dingee; they saw they were cut off from the desert; while that was behind them, with Emaumghur, full of both gunpowder and grain as it was, they would, I think, have plucked up courage to fight, thinking I should march against them by the usual route through Maneepore.”

The tribes collecting at Dingee had fled84 to join their wives; but so far from being cut off from the desert, they were on its edge; and so far from the General’s march outflanking them, even had they been still at Dingee, it carried him far to the northward of them. That

84 The Intelligence of the 9th January shows, that the hostile tribes “collecting at Dingee,” fled from thence on the night of the 7th January, on the second day after Sir Charles Napier, whose destruction was their object, had placed himself in their power by entering the desert with a handful of men ! and nine days before he commenced his backward movement to disperse the Belooche army, which, according to the Historian, he “had not yet effected” although Sir Charles Napier thus reported on the 17th of January, in a letter marked No. 457, in the Sindh Blue Book (three days before he arrived at Tujjul, from whence the astonishing “fresh sweep” was taken): “I hear that our march to Emaumghur has, as I expected, dispersed the tribes assembling at Dingee.”
they did not fight after the fresh injury inflicted on the family by the demolition of Emaumghur, only shows how hopeless they conceived it to make the attempt.

It would have been well, also, in revising his letter before dispatching it, had he erased the word “full” in reference to the grain contained in Emaumghur, as he had, four days previously, announced that he had distributed it in rations; and the dispatch of the 17th may have induced his Lordship to believe that more grain—a quantity adequate to the sustenance of the tribes—had been discovered. But Sir Charles Napier was perfectly correct in his surmise, that the wretched outcasts at Koonhera had no intention of fighting him, encouraged though they may have been by their belligerent ladies. But to return to the Historian, who thus proceeds:—

“Wherefore, with unmitigated hardiness he made a fresh sweep, and again encountered all the privations and difficulties of a march through an unknown wilderness, still guiding his movement by uncertain tracks, and seeking, as chance guided, the springs of water: when he found them not, he had recourse to his water-skins.”

Had Sir Charles Napier had an enemy to contend with,—had even his unprovoked demolition of Emaumghur induced the unhappy Ameers to think of opposing him,—he would have been compelled to have recourse to his water-skins the first day, and by the morning of the second they would have contained no water, and he would have been denied the means of replenishing them.

If Sir Charles Napier’s unopposed march to Emaumghur demonstrated the pacific disposition of the Ameers, how eloquently did his unmolested return plead in their behalf. The Historian, ignorant as he is of all that concerns the East, can scarcely doubt that the Princes of Sindh had “prowling emissaries” in the desert to apprize them of the movements of the English officer, who, without cause, was invading their country, plundering and destroying their property. Had the Ameers not been conscious of their utter helplessness, that to molest the English was to invoke mischief on themselves, and that the sacrifice of Sir Charles Napier would be fearfully avenged, they would have had every well filled up, every water-skin cut.

The account given by the Historian of his brother’s return from Emaumghur, affords a fair specimen of the veracity of the entire book.

85 The new route into which Sir Charles Napier plunged with such “unmitigated hardiness,” broke off from that by which he had advanced at Tujjul, from whence he marched to Bankia on the 28th January, which march, the first stage of his desperate “sweep” took him clear of the desert. On that day the General wrote—vide letter No. 28, Suppl. Sindh Blue Book—“We have no news here, except that we are glad to get out of the desert: we march to-night to Pir-Abu-Bukkur—a long march.” This, the second march, reunited Sir Charles Napier to his army, at a spot only ten miles from whence he had started on the expedition. His motive for adopting this new route, and the nature of the astonishing enterprise, are thus stated by Sir Charles Napier—vide No. 32, Suppl. Sindh Blue Book:—“I came here because I wanted to get upon the Hydrabad road: and we find (as Ali Morad said) that it is five miles shorter than by Doome, and a capital road.”
“Flushed with success, and contemning obstacles, his gallant soldiers again traversed the waste with equal vigor and fortune, and the, second day reached Tujjul, a point from which two routes led, one to Hydrabad and one to Dingee.”

Tujjul was five marches, not two, from Emaumghur. The numerical error is in itself trifling, but in its application important. Tujjul was the point whence Sir Charles Napier left the road by which he had advanced to Emaumghur, selecting one more to the south; the march itself occupied but seven days, and the inaccuracy alluded to might lead the reader to infer that there was some approach to truth in the statement of the Historian, that on his return from the scene of his predatory exploits, his brother “made a fresh sweep.” As it was, the sweep commencing with the sixth out of seven marches, brought the General within ten miles of the point whence he started, and is described by Sir Charles Napier himself as “a capital road,” and five miles shorter than that by which he had advanced.

The surpassing hardihood of this march is a topic on which General Napier delights to dwell; and “the unknown waste,” “the privations of the wilderness,” and its “unbroken solitude,” are conspicuously paraded in his pages. In England, where the circumstances are unknown, and where the word “desert” conjures up ideas terrible because undefined, the surpassing hardihood of the enter-prize has probably been accepted as a fact: in India, where the thing is understood, like Sir Charles Napier’s rashness in venturing through a peaceful country in an armed steamer with an escort of fifty soldiers, it excites laughter.

Emaumghur is situated in the Thur, or great western desert, which separates India from Sindh. General Napier is, I believe, correct in saying that this fortress had never been seen by Europeans till the “perilous march” made on it by his brother: but if so, it had not been seen for the simple reason that it did not lie in any of the numerous routes by which the Quarter-Master-General had sent troops across the desert, fully equipped, and with all their baggage. I have yet to learn that the Thur is more difficult to traverse in this than by any of the other lines selected. I cannot exactly say how frequently the inarch has been made, but I know that the 3d regiment of light cavalry marched across by Parkur; the 4th troop horse artillery, by Bhooj and Balliaree; the 20th regiment of native infantry took the same route, and the 6th regiment of native infantry crossed by the line of Omercote; the 1st cavalry returned to India from Sukkur by Jeysulmeer, and the third from Hydrabad by Omercote: and besides these, I know that several detachments have crossed the Thur, and traversed the desert at different points. Yet, so far as I am aware, not even the most romantic youth who has penetrated and crossed it was ever startled by its solitude, or ever dreamed of regarding the march as one which stamped his commanding officer “a master spirit in war.” And not a detachment that ever crossed but had as many enemies to oppose it as had Sir Charles Napier,—as much chance of being opposed! The march is a fatiguing one, and every credit is due to Sir Charles Napier for the arrangements made, for few troops that have crossed the Thur can boast of having done so “without even a
sick soldier.” But then, also, be it remembered, most commanding officers would have their indents returned, were they to apply to the commissariat for camels on which to mount their “stout infantry,” even if they proposed placing three instead of “two soldiers on each animal.” In India, the infantry, when stout, are made to walk,—only the weak and the sick are carried.

After all that I have said, it is scarcely necessary further to pursue the subject, yet one passage of surpassing absurdity I cannot pass over unnoticed. The Historian, not satisfied with comparing his brother to Marius, now likens him to—Alexander the Great! And his brother quietly accepts the compliment.

Page 457.—”Here it may be interesting to note a coincidence between the English General’s counteraction of the Ameers’ plan of campaign, and that of Alexander’s, two thousand years before, in the same country, and in similar circumstances. In “Williams’ Life of the Macedonian Hero, a work which, with some errors of conclusion arising from the author’s want of military knowledge, is the most instructive history of this wonderful man, the following passages occur :—

“‘Alexander received information that the Malli and Oxydracae, two powerful and free states, were preparing to give him a hostile reception, and dispute the passage through their territories. The plan agreed upon by the two nations was for the Malli to send their warriors down the river, and make the territories of the Oxydracae the scene of war, for the former looked upon themselves as sufficiently protected by a considerable desert. Alexander marched laterally from the left bank of the Acessines, and encamped near a small stream which skirted the western edge of the desert. There, after a short repose, he ordered them to fill their vessels with water, and, marching the rest of the day and all night, with the dawn appeared before a Mallian city, which had no fear of being attacked thus suddenly from the side of the desert. The Malli fought resolutely, but the passage of the desert had taken them by surprise, and entirely deranged the plans of the chief, who had conducted their warriors down the river.’ Substitute the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh for the Malli and Oxydracse, and the native plan is the same; while the march to Emaumghur is a repetition of Alexander’s operations, WITH ONLY THIS DIFFERENCE THAT HE WAS OUT FIVE DAYS IN THE DESERT, AND THE ENGLISH GENERAL WAS EIGHTEEN.”

There is not one feature in common between the cases thus presented in this pedantic parallel. The Malli and Oxydracse were separated by a desert: Upper and Lower Sindh are not so separated. So far were the modern Malli from sending their families into the country of the modern Oxydracse, that long after Emaumghur had been demolished, and the young Alexander had returned from his bloodless triumphs, they were refused admittance. And then—climax of dissimilarity!—the inhabitants of the Mallian city, whose warriors had departed, “fought resolutely against a formidable foe,” while the garrison of Emaumghur, numbering four to one of their assailants, and the flower of those warriors whom Lord Ellenborough pronounced the bravest enemy in Asia, fled from a fortress which they deemed impregnable, on the approach of the English Alexander!

Another extract I must comment on, ere I leave this budget of inflated nonsense:—
P. 238.—"Now it will be seen why the man who won Assaye— he who commenced the passage of the Douro with a single boat and twenty-five men,—why he, the Duke of Wellington, speaking in the House of Lords with that elevated simplicity, the peculiar characteristic of his mind, thus described the exploit:—‘Sir Charles Napier’s march on Emaumghur is one of the most evrious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary; and he cut off’ the retreat of the enemy, which rendered it impossible, for them ever to regain their position.’ “

On all subjects must The Duke’s opinion be received with reverence—on military matters his words are oracular, and no man may gainsay them. But I may be permitted to think that the Duke would not have so expressed himself, had he known the real circumstances of the case. That he was misinformed as to those circumstances is obvious. Sir Charles Napier did not move against hostile forces. At the very time the Duke supposed that Sir Charles Napier was advancing in the face of an enemy, and even after the violence practised at Emaumghur, did his officers traverse the country with no other escort than two or three “wild Belooche horsemen!”

There certainly was some difficulty in transporting the guns, as there necessarily must be in a desert; but his Grace was evidently unacquainted with the fact, that troops of all arms, artillery included, had crossed this desert long before Sir Charles Napier had been heard of by the Belooches. The Great Captain, moreover, evidently was impressed with the idea that the application of camels to the draught of guns was a new device of Sir Charles Napier’s, else he would not have called it “most extraordinary.” In 1839, Captain Pew’s camel battery moved heavier guns (with occasionally the same assistance from the infantry as Major Whitlie received) the whole way to Cabool! And Major Whitlie himself performed a march with these camels in February 1842, through a desert as difficult to traverse, having six instead of two guns, and while the experiment, so far as the Bombay Presidency was concerned, was yet in its infancy. Major Whitlie, when directed to organize the battery, foresaw that in heavy sands the camels would be inefficient, and the result proved that he was correct. For upwards of a year did that gallant officer bring all the resources of his science and mechanical skill to bear upon the experiment, and he introduced many important improvements, but at length he was obliged to recommend that horses should be again substituted for camels. This was done only a few months after Sir Charles Napier had reported to the Governor-General—” the efficacy of this battery in Sindh is now past dispute!”

The Duke of Wellington was further misinformed as to the objects and results of that march. Sir Charles Napier only undertook it to satisfy the Ameers that he could follow them into the desert. To place Ali Morad’s killadar in it—not to destroy Emaumghur—was his intention when he started. But Emaumghur was not the only desert stronghold, as the Duke seems to have imagined. There were several other forts in the Thur, amongst them Shahghur and Omercote, to which an enemy might retire; and had there been a foe
at Dingee or Koonhera, and had he resolved to go into the desert, his communication with Omercote was not only not cut off, but in no way interfered with by the General’s march into the Thur, or his march out of it.86

Against my inclination, I have been compelled to show what I consider to be the real character of these proceedings. For the pacification of Sindh there was, I maintain, no necessity for the march into the desert, and the destruction of Emaumghur was an unprovoked injury inflicted on its owner. What are the circumstances of the case?

In pursuance of his policy, Sir Charles Napier having recognized as Rais the man who he believed had “bullied his brother” into the resignation of the turban, takes upon himself, in a country where by solemn treaty the British had engaged not to introduce their jurisdiction, to order, that though the Ameers might enjoy their respective territories, no fortress should be held but by Ali Morad’s killadar! One of the fortresses of the country, Emaumghur, belonged to Meer Mahommed Khan, and he, like his brother, frightened at the violence of the English General, fled to his stronghold to look after his family and secure his treasure. Sir Charles Napier sent him an order to receive a killadar, appointed by the Rais,—such, at all events, he intimated it was his intention to do, whether he did it or not; while on his march, he thought it better to proceed in person to introduce the new killadar, as he wished to show that he could cross the desert. Meer Mahommed Khan, well aware of the character of his uncle Ali Morad, not choosing to trust himself, his family, and treasure, in his hands, and not quite confident of the General’s good faith, after seeing his contempt for treaties, abandons his fortress. Sir Charles Napier reaches it, and finding that had opposition been offered, his guns were useless against the place, enacts the farce of obtaining the consent of Ali Morad, to whom it did not belong, for this is conceded, and destroys it. How is this act of spoliation sought to be defended? I leave the inflated reiterations of the Historian, with their disingenuous mystifications, and examine the General’s arguments.

Sir Charles Napier, in his letter to the Governor-General of 31st December 1842,87 founds his right to give the fort of Emaumghur to Ali Morad in consequence of Meer Roostum’s flight. He there says;—“Now that I have had time to reflect upon Meer Roostum’s flight, THE LESS I FEEL ANNOYED. It now appears to enable me to act with more decision regarding Ali Morad. He must be made master of Emaumghur, which still seems to be their Gibraltar.” It was the flight of Roostum which was to enable Sir Charles to act with

86 Let me not be misunderstood. Having taken the very measures likely to provoke opposition, and halting followed these up by farther aggressions, which enhanced the likelihood of war, the General, in destroying Emaumghur, acted wisely in a military point of view. We had commenced with coercion, and as the General was resolved to continue his coercive course, then, in a military point of view, the destruction of Emaumghur was judicious. Though Emaumghur could never have been a base for offensive operations, it might, and probably would, have been occupied as a place of refuge by the Khyrpoor chiefs, and by destroying it, we removed one possible inducement to them to refuse accepting our hard terms. These considerations made me approve of the General’s resolution to destroy it; but I did not then know how he had expressed himself to the Governor-General, nor did I know of his promises to injure neither person nor property, if opposition were not offered.

87 Blue Book, p. 493.
“decision,” —that decision was to make Ali Morad “master of Emaumghur.” Ali Morad’s right to it, as belonging to the Turban, was an after-thought; and, as we shall presently see, a very awkward one. He does not refer to the document already quoted at p. 117, by which Roostum was alleged to have resigned the Turban, as giving to Ali Morad any right to the fort of Emaumghur. No; it was not till three days after Roostum’s flight, when he had “had time to reflect upon” it, and saw how he might turn it to account, that he began to “feel less annoyed,” and conceived the idea of establishing power over it, by making Ali Morad “master of Emaumghur”

Sir Charles, however, soon found cause to shift his ground of justification; for in the Intelligence, No. 448, Blue Book, bearing his signature, he writes: — “ On the 4th January, Sir Charles Napier marched to Dhejee-ka-Kote, the fort of Meer Ali Morad Khan, and the next night moved with a small force, lightly equipped, towards Emaumghur, a fort eighty miles in the desert, belonging to Meer Mahommed Khan, but becoming the property of Ali Morad by his election to be chief” Here we find Sir Charles Napier expressly stating that “it belonged to Meer Mahommed Khan;” — and so it did, as legitimately as did the fort of Dhejee-ka-Kote belong to Ali Morad. But we also now find “that it became the property of Ali Morad, by his election to be chief!” How this transference of right was affected, is not explained. Had the fort of Emaumghur been an appendage of sovereignty, and belonged to the chief,—why did it not previously belong to Meer Roostum, who was chief?—how did it, as stated by Sir Charles Napier, “belong to Meer Mahommed Khan,” who never was chief?

On the 3d of July 1843, nearly six months after the occurrence, Sir Charles Napier attempts a more formal justification in a document numbered 143 in the Supplementary Sindh Blue Book. He there tells us in more direct terms, “that Emaumghur, with all the fortresses in Upper Sindh, belonged to the Turban or Rais.” Whence, I ask, did he gather this law of the Talpoors?

If all the fortresses in Upper Sindh belonged to the Turban, how does it happen that in the elaborately prepared deed of resignation written in the Koran, which Ali Morad handed to the General, as having been written by Roostum, that while we find “forts Shahghur, Sirdarghur, and other forts,” no specification is made of all the fortresses in Upper Sindh?88 How does it happen, that if all the fortresses belonged to the Turban, the strong one of Dhejee was in possession of Ali Morad? Nay, so confused was the General, that on the 31st of December 1842, he wrote:—”It (Emaumghur) was Ali Morad’s, but he gave it to one of his relatives three years ago.” I believe the General is wrong and that it was Mahommed Khan’s patrimonial possession; but assuming that Sir Charles Napier is correct, Ali Morad possessed it while Roostum was Rais, not merely as a non-resident Governor holding it of the Turban, but as his own property, which he could alienate, and which, three years previously, he had given away!

88 Supplementary Volume, Blue Book, p. 5.
Again, in the same document, written nearly six months after the occurrence, Sir Charles Napier attempts to justify the destruction of Emaumghur on other grounds; he states — “His Highness Ali Morad was Rais by the law of Sindh, and Meer Mahommed (the owner) was in rebellion against him. * * * He (Ali Morad) consented, &c. * * * His Highness fired some of the guns,” &c.

Here Sir Charles again shifts his defence,—he acknowledges Meer Mahommed Khan to be the owner of the fort, but alleges that he had forfeited his right, because he “was in rebellion against him,” Ali Morad, who “was Rais by the law of Sindh.” But, unfortunately for Sir Charles, Ali Morad was not Rais by the law of Sindh, which no more recognizes the validity of extorted resignations than does the law of England; and Sir Charles Napier suspected the resignation to have been extorted. Nor was Ali Morad Rais by consent of the people or the nobles. He was Rais merely by the will of Sir Charles Napier. Nor, granting that he was Rais, was Meer Mahommed in rebellion against him. Thirteen days prior to Ali Morad’s extortion of the Turban, on the 7th of December, the “Intelligence” acquaints us that he sent men “to seize grain, &c., in Meer Mahommed Khan’s villages, stating, that as the latter had accumulated great riches, and has not any considerable body of men to protect them, he (Ali Morad) will relieve him of them, unless he pays down a large portion; or, in the event of his objecting to this request, he will occupy his lands” But I do not read of Meer Mahommed retaliating on his uncle; and probably for the very reason assigned by Ali Morad for his spoliation—that Meer Mahommed “had not any considerable body of men” Of constructive rebellion, the lord of Emaumghur was doubtless guilty; for Sir Charles Napier had refused to treat with, and thereby branded as rebels, all who acknowledged Roostum as, Rais. Meer Mahommed, as did the entire population of Sindh, considered Meer Roostum Rais, and therefore was a rebel! But he did not refuse to receive Ali Morad’s killadar; he left his fort to be occupied by him till more peaceful days arose. Sir Charles Napier had only expressed his intention of placing a Governor appointed by Ali Morad in the fort; he had not publicly announced the novel theory that all the forts belonged to the Rais: and little did Meer Mahommed imagine, when he vacated Emaumghur, that it was about to be destroyed.

Well might the injured Mahommed ask me, as he did in public Durbar on the 8th of February — up to which date he had been guilty of no act of hostility — “What fault have I committed, and why has my house been destroyed, and my property been plundered?” To this I could return but the evasive reply — “No property was in Emaumghur except some grain, which the General ordered to be paid for.” But to whom, I ask, was the money given? Most probably, if given at all, to Ali Morad; certainly not to the unfortunate owner, whose fort was blown to pieces because Ali Morad—to whom it did not belong—consented to its destruction!

89 Supplementary Volume, Blue Book, p. 103
SECTION IX.

THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED.

I now return to the political proceedings of the General.

My reader is aware, that after I resigned the political control of Sindh into the hands of Sir Charles Napier, I was, at that officer’s request, recalled to the country in the capacity of commissioner, my duty being to arrange the details of the new treaty. On the 4th of January, I joined Sir Charles Napier at Dhejee-ka-Kote, who, having denounced Roostum by proclamation, and declared Ali Morad the legal Rais, intimated his intention of treating with none who refused to acknowledge him as such, and was then preparing for his march into the desert to place Ali Morad’s killadar in Meer Mahommed’s fort of Emaumghur.

On the 15th of January, I was instructed to proceed to Khyrpoor, there to meet the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh, or their vakeels, and arrange with them the details of the new treaty. I was at the same time provided with a circular letter for transmission to the several Ameers, intimating that the General had delegated to me all the powers vested in him by the Governor-General, giving them the alternative of attending personally or by proxy, but requiring that should they send vakeels, these should have full powers to treat with me.

“If,” proceeded the General, “any vakeel shall declare that he has not such powers, I shall exclude him from the meeting, and consider that his master refuses to treat; and I will enter the territories of such Ameer with the troops under my orders, and take possession of them in the name of the British Government. Moreover, I solemnly pledge my word for the perfect security of all the Ameers and their vakeels so assembled to meet my commissioner.”

The duty thus imposed on me was both arduous and painful; but I hoped to effect good, and I proceeded to execute it—not, however, without many misgivings. The amount of power vested in me was far short of that which the General’s letter must have led the Ameers to infer. The great stumbling-block placed in the way of a peaceful adjustment—Ali Morad’s possession of the Turban, and his pecuniary claims—I was precluded from even modifying. I, however, determined to do my utmost; and, accompanied by Ali Morad’s minister from Emaumghur, on the night of the 15th, I made a detour to Roostum’s camp, which I reached next morning, and found it in precisely the spot I had left it on the 6th. The old Prince, and all about him, received me very civilly, and appeared grateful for the trouble I took on their account, but their confidence in me was evidently
much shaken. I subjoin extracts from the letter, written from Dhejee-ka-Kote\(^\text{90}\) next day, in which I reported to Sir Charles Napier my visit to Meer Roostum:

“I found Meer Roostum in his old camp, and with a larger assemblage of followers apparently than he had on the former occasion, which, together with the circumstance which I had observed, of his being guided by the Chiefs who met you at Chowkie, (whom we know to be now in Ali Morad’s interests,) and from what passed, leads me to fear that they have been further deceiving the old man, with a view to cause him to keep out, and so forward Ali Morad’s object, which the long letters he (Ali Morad) wrote you the other day, show that he has not really lost sight of, notwithstanding your repeated assurances that we cannot allow him to rob his brethren, or take from them beyond what rightfully appertains to the Turbanship. The deceiving party will now be further strengthened by the Moonshee whom Meer Roostum sent to our camp at Emaumghur the other day, and whom also we know to have been bought over by Ali Morad, and who will, of course, misrepresent every thing that passed at Emaumghur. Under these circumstances, I think it very probable that Meer Roostum may be dissuaded from meeting me at Khyrpoor, notwithstanding he promised to march to-morrow, and to make that place in three stages, halting one day intermediately, as his strength is not equal to three marches consecutively; this will bring him to Khyrpoor on the 21st. * * * * I am apprehensive that Meer Roostum may now, in consequence, have less confidence in me; and it is possible that the blackguards about him may turn his mistrust to Ali Morad’s advantage, and deter him from coming to Khyrpoor—but I hope not.”

Roostum did not join me as he promised; and on the day succeeding that on which he ought to have reached Khyrpoor, I thus wrote to Sir Charles Napier:

“My misgivings as to Meer Roostum have proved well founded. He has fallen into the snare Ali Morad laid for him, and instead of marching to join me here, has gone off, I am informed, to consult with the other fugitive Ameers, who are somewhere near Kohera,” &c.

The following is the Historian’s version of the matter. I leave it to my reader to determine whether his misstatements could have been accidental:

“Meanwhile the Commissioner., having on the journey discovered Iloostum in his old camp again on the skirts of the desert, proposed they should proceed together to Khyrpoor, and, in concert with the vakeels from the other Ameers, arrange the affair of the treaty. Roostum, who had seven thousand armed followers, and seven guns with him at this time, and was in close communication with his turbulent sons and nephews, whose troops he was going to reinforce with his own, laughed in his sleeve at the Commissioner,

\(^{90}\) Which place I reached on the evening of the 16th, having completed the journey (which, owing to the detour made to Roostum’s camp, was upwards of ninety miles) on one camel. My only escort, in passing through the “hostile” country,—a desert represented to have been swarming with fierce warriors, and in visiting the camp of Roostum with its seven thousand savage and treacherous barbarians,—were two Belooche horsemen. These were taken—not as protectors, but—as guides!
keeping his men out of sight. He pleaded fatigue as before, begged of the Major to go on, and promised to be at Khyrpoor the next day. Having thus a second time duped the man whose superior genius was to control and guide both the General and the Ameers, the old Chief marched to the south.

Yet more incomprehensible is it still, that Sir Charles Napier should, on the 10th of August, have delivered himself much in the same strain. In alluding to Roostum’s flight from Dhejee, he writes:

“He (Roostum) deceived Major Outram twice in the same manner, if not oftener; and at one of these times, viz. when he promised to meet Major Outram next morning at Khyrpoor, but walked off” to the south with a large force and his treasure—this time, I say, it could not have been Ali Morad, who at the time was far off with me in the desert.”

What has the statement that Ali Morad was with himself at the desert when Roostum broke his appointment with me at Khyrpoor, to do with the question? I never hinted that Ali Morad in person had prompted the aged Prince to fly. I expressly told the General that Roostum had “fallen into the snare Ali Morad laid for him;” and that snare I had explained in my previous letter to be the treacherous advice of “the blackguards about him”—operating on the distrust of our intentions, which every act of the General had justified, and the mistrust of me inspired by his corrupted son, nephew, and moonshee—which might, and I feared would, and I knew was intended to, deter him from meeting me at Khyrpoor. Not a doubt was at the time expressed as to the groundlessness of my fears—not a hint given that the Ameer’s movements were not, as I represented, effected by Ali Morad’s agents. Before the General received my letter announcing that the Ameer had fallen “into the snare Ali Morad laid for him,” he announced to me that Roostum had gone to the south:

“I hear this minute that Roostum has gone the wrong way after all you said to him! Why did he doubt you? However, his movements signify nothing. WE WALK OVER HIS FOLLICY, AND ALI MORAD’S INTRIGUES, AND ALL THE OTHERS, GOING OUR OWN ROAD.”

In a subsequent part of his letter, he thus wrote:

“I had just finished this when your second letter arrived [that intimating that Roostum had fallen into the snare laid for him.] * * * Besides, Roostum has a right to go where he likes, and I have none to take offence. My letter gives him his choice of attending personally or sending his vakeels, which he perhaps will do” &c., &c.

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91 Able as the Historian undoubtedly is—fertile of invention and ready in expedients—it would, I think, baffle even him to conceal 7000 men in the desert from a person coming suddenly and unexpectedly in the midst of his camp, when the encampment consisted of one poor tent and some wretched rowtees. But, as I have before shown, this force of Roostum’s is a mere imagination of the Historian’s. When Roostum’s followers had been united to the Koonhera army, the aggregate body amounted to between 4000 and 5000 armed men!
Does this look like the letter of one who disbelieved in the existence of intrigues—who regarded all my “abuse of Ali Morad” as mere “assertion?” To my letter which elicited it, Sir Charles Napier thinks fit, seven months after its receipt, to append a note, to show that Ali Morad could not have laid a snare for Roostum. It is as follows:—

“Meer Roostum had with him two or three members of his own family—sons or nephews, I forget which. Ali Morad was in my camp. Meer Roostum went off with a large body of troops and two pieces of cannon. Such, at least, was the information I received at the time, as nearly as I can recollect.”

And the Historian thus amplifies on his brother’s brief:—

“This deceit, the Commissioner, with an inconceivable logic, ascribed to the evil influence of Ali Morad, who was then many miles distant with Sir Charles Napier in the desert; Roostum being in the midst of his own friends and relations, and guarded by an army of his own Belooches!”

For the Historian’s misrepresentations I was prepared; but Sir Charles Napier’s fallacies surprise me. He well knew, or he ought to have remembered, that these very relations of Meer Roostum’s were the persons whom I represented to him as Ali Morad’s agents in his wicked schemes: they were those who, I had told him, and who he himself believed, were bought over by Ali Morad!

In my letter announcing my interview with Roostum, I thus expressed myself:—

“He (Roostum) then asked me to intercede for the release of Futteh Mahommed; to which I replied, that I had not spoken to you on that subject, which had not been mooted at our interview, but that I well knew he owed all his misfortunes to that person’s evil counsels. However, that I would convey any request he (the Ameer) had to make to you. And if he does make a point of this man’s release, I think you might safely grant it, on the condition that he and his family are banished from Sindh, and return to their native country.”

Roostum, though conscious of the truth of what I said, that his minister had been an evil counselor, still felt kindly to the man who had been his companion in bygone and happy days, and solicited his release, believing that he was reserved for further punishment. My official duties, as Sir Charles Napier’s commissioner, compelled me to assume a tone to the wretched Ameer, which, God knows, was alien to my feelings; and when an opportunity presented itself of gratifying the old man’s wishes, without compromising the interests of my Government, I recommended that it should not be neglected. It was little likely that I, who had so successfully counteracted his intrigues during a most critical

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92 Though, by means of a note, Sir Charles Napier attempted to throw discredit on my statement that Roostum’s Moonshee had been corrupted, he did not venture to do so in reference to the Ameer’s son and nephew, my allusion to whom, as being in Ali Morad’s interests, he allows to pass uncavilled at.

93 In reference, of course, to the intrigues of Futteh Mahommed Ghoree, which led to the imposition of the new treaty, and thereby to all the Ameer’s subsequent disasters.
period, when the safety of our armies and our national honour were alike perilled, would now allow Futteh Mahommed to commit mischief. I proposed that he should be Banished from Sindh; and banishment, in the ordinary English acceptation of the word, I believe, implies the removal of the criminal to the place appointed for his exile, under reasonable security that he shall not return. Months prior to Sir Charles Napier’s arrival in the country, when I, not he, was responsible for its tranquility, in May 1842, which really was the most critical juncture of affairs that ever existed between us and the Ameers, I had recommended that this man and his family should be banished, and the recommendation, of course, inferred that necessary precautions should be taken to bar their return.

As is evident from the context of my letter, I only contemplated the man’s release in the event of Roostum joining me at Khyrpoor. Nor would I have wished him to be removed from Ali Morad’s custody before the treaty was settled, and this consummation it was at any moment in the General’s power to effect by merely receding from his unjust arrangements with that Prince. I recommended it as a graceful act of consideration on the part of the General, likely to gratify Roostum and inspire him with confidence; and I did not doubt that when I next met the persecuted Prince, I should be authorized to communicate to him the General’s acquiescence in his demands, as an evidence of his satisfaction at Roostum’s final and unconditional acceptance of the treaty. In his reply, Sir Charles Napier thus expressed himself:—

“As to Futteh Mahommed Ghoree, the Governor-General has written to me to say he is very glad he is a prisoner, and fears Ali Morad will let him go; it is, as every thing else is, in his Lordship’s hands, and I cannot interfere; but if I could, I would not let him out now till we got a little daylight, and the treaty settled, when I could have no objection to asking the Governor-General to send him about his business.”

Such were Sir Charles Napier’s views and words on the 20th of January, when replying to my letter: his reminiscences on the 10th of August I subjoin:—

“I therefore assumed upon his (Major Outram’s) authority, that Ali Morad was the man to look to, and Futteh Mahommed Ghoree the man to be watched, in any transactions I might have with the Ameers; and it is curious that within a month or six weeks of this time, Ali Morad being Kais, and Futteh Mahommed Ghoree a prisoner, there was no term of abuse too strong in Major Outram’s opinion for Ali Morad; and the Major asked me to let Futteh Mahommed Ghoree loose, having himself told me that this man ruled Roostum; that he was the bitter enemy of the British; the most intriguing and dangerous man to our interests in all Sindh; and this man he would have had me let loose at the most critical juncture of affairs that ever existed between us and the Ameers. If Major Outram wanted to secure our having war, such a step was likely to accomplish it. I positively refused to agree to it, and was in utter astonishment at Outram being so short-sighted as to propose it, which he did at the request of Meer Roostum.”

94 Had the Ameer not met me, it is very evident he could not have made a point of his minister’s release.
This letter, enclosing these reminiscences, bears date the 10th August: my letter proposing the liberation of Mahommed Ghoree from Ali Morad’s custody, and his banishment from Sindh, with Sir Charles Napier’s reply, were not transmitted till the 12th. Two entire days were allowed to the Governor-General to meditate on my madness in recommending that Mahommed Ghoree should be let loose on the country to “secure war,” and it is scarcely to be wondered at that his Lordship misconstrued, if indeed he condescended to read, my application for the man’s release, and his General’s real answer. Had he perused the documents in their chronological order, he would have found that I specially guarded against the prisoner’s being let loose, and that Sir Charles Napier’s astonishment was but a theatrical display indulged in seven months after the occurrence.

But in refuting the calumnious fictions of the Historian, and rectifying the strangely erroneous impressions and reminiscences of his brother, I have been compelled to digress, and in some degree to anticipate.

Before leaving Dhejee-ka-Kote for Khyrpoor, I addressed Sir Charles Napier on the 18th of January, drawing his attention to two of the arrangements contemplated by the new treaty which I deemed objectionable, and to the negligent wording of one of the articles, which might, I feared, lead to future embarrassments. The first was the occupation of Tatta, to which I furnished six strong objections. In his reply Sir Charles Napier wrote, “I long ago took upon myself to tell the vakeel of Hoossein Ali that I would not take Tatta from him; and I did so precisely for the same reasons as those stated by you. I consider that this draft treaty gives me authority to do this.”

I had pointed out that—

“Should the Governor-General relinquish Tatta, or, indeed, whether he does or not, I think it would be advisable to alter the following words in Art. VII. of the treaty with the Ameers of Hyderabad;— ‘And moreover, the right of free passage over the territories of the Ameers between Kurrachee and Tatta,’ to ‘between Kurrachee and the Indus,’ or ‘between Kurrachee and such point of the Indus as may hereafter be decided on,’ otherwise we may have difficulty hereafter, should you think it necessary to alter the route of communication.”

To this suggestion Sir Charles Napier replied—

“I also entirely concur with you as to the alteration of the wording relative to the route of communication between Kurrachee and the Indus. I consider that all these points depending on local knowledge are left to my decision; of course subject to the Governor-General’s approval or rejection.”

95 Sir Charles Napier did not at the same time inform me, as he might have done, that the secret instructions of the Governor-General sent with the draft treaty distinctly gave him such authority (vide B. Book, No. 388, paragraphs 13 and 14.) That document empowered Sir Charles Napier to modify every thing, or at least, to refer all doubtful points before carrying them into execution, and he had more than double the time required to do so, as he retained the draft treaties twenty-two days before he presented them.
With regard to the article of the treaty, stipulating that the coinage of Sindh should bear the Queen’s image on one side, I observed, that as the Mahommedan religion prohibited the use of such emblems, the proposal was tantamount to withholding from the Ameers the right of coining; and I suggested that the article should either be so worded as honestly to express its real import, or modified so as to permit of the substitution of an English inscription for her Majesty’s effigy. The following was Sir Charles Napier’s reply:

“With regard to what you say about the coining, it is clear that he (the Governor-General) does so peremptorily and advisedly, not accidentally. As I recollect the draft treaty, the upshot is this:—’You shall not coin; but whatever you choose to give me, I will coin for you, and you shall use my money, receiving it from me in return for bullion, without any charge for coinage, or any deduction from its value in weight or fineness.’ Now, as this is a decided measure adopted by the Governor-General, I should not like to say any thing upon the subject;— nor do I think it necessary, because the coinage will not be the coinage of the Ameers but of the Queen,”

Where we were likely to suffer by the wording of an article, it was right and proper that it should be modified: where the Ameers were alone concerned, it was otherwise. If the “upshot” of the article was, as the General believed, would it not have been well to explain honestly and intelligibly to the Ameers that such was the case; that the coinage of their country was in future to proclaim aloud their abasement? But the General was wrong; one face of the coins was intended to be given to the Ameers; but as the article then stood, it was impossible for them to accept it. Had the subject been brought under Lord Ellenborough’s notice, I am confident, from the readiness with which he remitted the mulct imposed by mistake the instant it was pointed out, that his Lordship would either have sanctioned the substitution of an inscription for the Queen’s image, or have authorized the fair purchase from the Ameers of the entire privilege of coinage, by the remission of certain of the penal clauses, or by a pecuniary compensation.

But these considerations are foreign to my present purpose. Of the three alterations I had suggested, two were most cordially concurred in by Sir Charles Napier, and the third was only rejected on the score of its being inconsistent with the Governor-General’s plans. I leave the reader to form his own estimate of the generosity and justice of the following tirade by General William Napier:

Page 261.—” But a new and strange course of diplomacy was now commenced by Major Outram, whose conduct from the moment he separated from Sir Charles Napier at Emaumghur, and thus obtained a species of independence, until he again quitted Sindh after the battle of Meaneee, creates astonishment. His first measure had been to propose the release of the mischievous Ghoree, accompanied with the language of passion against Ali Morad; as if that Ameer’s adherence to the British alliance was in his eyes a heinous

96 Vide No. 467 of the Sindh Blue Book.
offence. His next step was to grant the Ameers a longer day for treating than had been proclaimed.\footnote{97} this was approved of indeed, and was proper, but he forgot to fix a day, which gave an opening for indefinite procrastination until the General amended the error. Then he proposed to alter one of the principal articles of the draft treaty which had been deliberately drawn up by Lord Ellenborough; thus stepping beyond his mission, which was to arrange the details, not to reform the treaty.\footnote{98}

According to promise, I repaired to Khyrpoor, where I was authorized to wait for the Ameers or their vakeels till the 25th of January.

While waiting at Khyrpoor, I endeavored to ascertain the actual value, not only of the territory of the Upper Sindh Ameers which was confiscated, but that also of the estates left to each Ameer, and that of the possessions appertaining to the Turban. This was no easy task. Not only were the shares of the Princes of Upper Sindh strangely intermixed, but, as my reader knows, some of the Ameers of the Lower Province had an interest in the territory appropriated, while some of the Khyrpoor chiefs, whose property lay in the ceded districts, it was not in contemplation to visit with any penalty whatever. The adjustment of the treaty was altogether, therefore, a most intricate process of additions and subtractions.

When we first became connected with Sindh, the revenues of the Ameers of the Upper Province amounted to £203,950, which were thus divided:—\footnote{99}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Meer Roostum Khan, & £111,300 \\
Meer All Morad, & £29,550 \\
Sons of Meer Gholam Hyder, grandsons of Roostum, & 15,450 \\
\end{tabular}

\footnote{97} This is a subject to which I meant to call my reader’s attention in the text, but as it is of little importance, beyond illustrating the vindictive spirit “of the Historian, I may here dispose of it. On the 17th of January, the day after my arrival at Dhejee, on my return from Emaumghur, I thus wrote to the General:—"I find that Mahommed Hoossein, Nussee Khan, and Mahommed Khan, cannot receive the circular under three days, —not before the day specified for the meeting; so I have written to them to say that I shall make due allowance for the distance they have to come after that date; otherwise they would suppose that we had purposely required of them to perform an impossibility, on failure of which to ground a quarrel.” To the Ameers themselves I wrote:—“Today is the 17th of January, and this cossid will occupy three days beyond that time on his journey; and you can not, therefore, I am aware, arrive at Khyrpoor by the 20th instant, but you must make the utmost dispatch you can.” The General in his reply thus expressed himself:—"You were very right to give them a longer day; but I think you had better name a particular day, or we shall open the door to procrastination,” There was certainly little in this reply that inferred censure, or could have led the most sensitive man to believe that his conduct had created astonishment!

\footnote{98} Sir Charles Napier intimated to the Ameers (though such was not exactly the case,) that he had invested me with all his own powers ; and as he thought himself at liberty to reject one of Lord Ellenborough’s deliberately formed propositions,—the acquisition of a town, because it would have been a bad bargain to ourselves, and as he approved of my materially altering the wording of another article, so as to ensure for us what we might afterwards have required to negotiate in a new treaty,—my presumption in recommending that we should deal honestly with the already heavily punished Ameers, may not be obvious to the reader. It did not occur to the General.

\footnote{99} In framing this statement, which I submitted to the General on the 24th of January, and the substance of which is here given, I availed myself of a schedule drawn up by my predecessor, Mr. Bell.
As Roostum retained the Lordship of the estates, they were in the return whence this abstract is taken, placed to his name; but the greater portion of them were given away as jagheers to his sons, grandsons, nephews, and feudatory chiefs. Thus to Ali Morad pertained territory, the value of which was £29,550 per annum, while his brother, nephews, and grandsons had between them £174,400 a year. Subsequent to the date on which this abstract was framed, Ali Morad extorted a treaty from Meers Roostum and Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, by which he became the possessor of certain villages situated in the territory to be assigned to Bhawul Khan, estimated by him at the value of £15,000 per annum. Thus his personal estates at the period for adjusting the terms of the new treaty amounted to £44,550, while those of his brethren, including what appertained to the Turban, had become reduced to £159,400. Ali Morad had been guaranteed by the General, against any loss by the proposed transfer to Bhawul Khan, or by any of the other penal clauses of the new treaty; therefore, from the estates of his brethren alone, was to be deducted the property to be confiscated, of the value of £61,050 per annum.

Thus territory of the annual value of £98,350 was all that the treaty left to them. Even this, however, they were not to be permitted to enjoy. The aggregate annual value of the property left to the Upper Sindh Ameers, including Ali Morad’s share, was £142,900, and one-fourth of this was to be assigned to the latter, as Rais, that is, the territory of his brethren was to be reduced by £35,725, leaving them but an annual income of £62,625. This sum was all that remained for the support of eighteen Ameers then in possession of estates, their thirty sons, I know not how many daughters, and the feudatory Belooche chiefs, with their followers, who had up to that period divided amongst them £174,400 annually.

In submitting these calculations to Sir Charles Napier on the 24th of January, I thus emphatically expressed myself, “a Satisfactory Arrangement is Impossible, or any which we could expect the other parties willingly if at all to accede to.” The chiefs and their dependents, thus deprived of the means of honorable subsistence, I observed,—

“Cannot and will not starve. **** They may be forced by dread of our power to succumb for a time, but they can never become reconciled to the degradation and privation they suffer at our hands, and will only be deterred from any organized outbreak by the presence of a very large body of troops.”

In his reply, Sir Charles Napier did not question the correctness of my data or my conclusions, but thus sought to justify the exactions:—

“He (the Governor-General) considered that the conduct of the Ameers deserved signal punishment, and decided on the draft being sent down; and as it leaves about £100,000 (as you tell me) a year for the punished chiefs, I think that you will agree with me they are not left to starve; the details of which (treaties) we have to arrange, viz., so to apply its provisions that the
forfeit is paid by the opposed Ameers, and not by the friendly Ameers; but whether such arrangement leaves the former one rupee or one million, does not, in my view of the case, come within our competence to consider.”

The fallacy of this reasoning is apparent; Lord Ellenborough’s draft treaty had nothing whatever to do with the exactions intended to be made on behalf of the Turban. The General’s statement, moreover, strangely misrepresented what I had actually said. In reply I observed:—

“You mistake in saying we leave £100,000 to the punished chiefs. I showed that all the chiefs, exclusive of Ali Morad, had (previously) seventeen lacs, and that now they will have little more than six lacs, or £60,000.”

In the same letter I added:—

“We must look [as a consequence of depriving the chiefs of their estates] to be disturbed by forays of plunderers beyond the frontiers of Sindh, led on by the more enterprising of the disaffected [Chiefs of Sindh] who will prefer exile and revenge to the pittance and degradation they are now condemned to. * * * So long as the chiefs retain their possessions by birth-right, they would never desert them to turn freebooters, and prey on their own land; but, being deprived of their just rights, not only will they have the will, but vast power to do mischief, in their knowledge of the country, aided by the sympathy of the people.”

The plea, on which the extra territory was assigned to Ali Morad as Rais, was that Meer Sohrab, in dividing his property, had assigned one-fourth of the whole to Roostum, whom he appointed chief over his brothers. Thus in notes appended on the 12th of August, to letters written on the 24th of January, and answered the next day with no apparent reservations, Sir Charles Napier wrote:—

“1st, The giving of the lands to the Turban was an act of the Talpoor family’s own doing.

“2d, I was pledged to nothing save the rights of the Turban, whatever these rights might be.

“3d, I was so pledged, because I was bound by the existing treaties, and had therefore no choice. The law of Sindh gave the Turban to Ali Morad after Meer Roostum’s death, and as he was eighty-five, all these horrors must take place in a few years, in course of nature.”

And, on the 29th of September, eight months after he had answered my letter, he indulges in the following remarks, which, for the convenience of reference, I shall call No. 4:—

“What has been pledged to Meer Ali Morad? By law Meer Ali Morad became Rais. By law certain revenues are attached to the Turban. The laws of his family and country are pledged to

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100 Sir Charles Napier’s secret instructions (B. Book, No. 388) clearly showed that the Governor-General intended that all the Ameers, except Meer Nusseer Khan were to be fully compensated for any loss they might suffer in the lands which were to be transferred.
him, and he is pledged to them to perform the duties of chieftainship. I know of no other pledges.”

In these four reiterations, there is more implied than at first meets the eye: much confusion is introduced, I will not say designedly, but confusion which might have been easily avoided. I shall, therefore, take the liberty of re-arranging the propositions stated and implied, and enunciate them in less vague terms.

First,—To quote the General’s words, what was pledged to Ali Morad? I answer, it was pledged to him that he should be indemnified out of the possessions of his kinsmen, for the territory belonging to him which was included in the confiscated districts: Secondly, it was pledged to him that one-fourth of the total revenues of Upper Sindh should be given to him as Rais, and that this fourth should be deducted, not as in equity it ought to have been, from the aggregate revenues of all the Ameers—himself included, but only from those of his kinsmen who were thus called on to furnish to him, not £24,000, (the fourth of their own possessions,) but £35,000, as the perquisites of the Turban. Those pledges I clearly and explicitly indicated in my letter of the 24th of January. In his reply of the next day, Sir Charles Napier seemed to forget the deduction of £35,000 which, I alleged, he was pledged to make from the £98,000 belonging to the other Ameers, in behalf of Ali Morad; but I called his attention to it, and he sought not to disavow it. To these arrangements I spoke to him as if he were absolutely pledged. The words employed by me admit of no double meaning; they clearly alluded to previous conversations we had had on the subject, and unmistakably prove, as they must at the time have conveyed to him the impression that I was satisfied that he himself understood his pledges in the meaning I adhibited to them. I unequivocally implied, moreover, that this was the meaning in which they were understood by the Ameers. Not only so, but I emphatically announced that in consequence of these pledges a satisfactory arrangement was out of the question; that these pledges bore so oppressively on the other Princes of Upper Sindh and their feudatories, that the latter would be driven, not perhaps to immediate opposition, but to a life of marauding for the future. I was at Khyrpoor to arrange the details of the treaty, and had I in aught misunderstood the nature or extent of his pledges, did not every principle of honour, benevolence, and justice, imperatively demand, that, without the loss of a single moment, I should be disabused of errors which threatened the most dreadful calamities? Subsequently, at Hydrabad, I informed him that these engagements to Ali Morad alone prevented an immediate and amicable arrangement; that if the pecuniary claims on the Upper Sindh Ameers, on the plea of the Turban, were remitted, Roostum would consent to the usurpation of his dignity, and war would be averted! Will any man believe that had I in the slightest erred, I would not, on the instant, have been set right by Sir Charles Napier?

But the door was closed against further discussion of the matter: whether the arrangement left to the Ameers one rupee or a million, did not, the General affirmed, come within our competence to consider. This was to assume what was as remote from the truth as is right
from wrong,—that the treaty, or Lord Ellenborough’s instructions, rendered the arrangements imperative. At the time, I took for granted that such was the case: further examination, and enlarged means of forming a judgment, prove that I was in error. And this brings me to the second proposition, that Sir Charles Napier’s engagements to Ali Morad, regarding the perquisites of the Turban, were unavoidable.

Meer Sohrab, the father of Meers Roostum, Ali Morad, and Mobarick, Khans, assigned an extra fourth of his territory to the eldest son, whom he placed over, and constituted the protector of, his two brothers, to enable him to maintain an army adequate to the defence of the family possessions against foreign aggression, when Sindh was an independent State, and a British connexion had not been dreamed of. That this arrangement, made in the second generation of the Talpoor dynasty, could not long exist, and was incapable of transmission beyond one or at most two descents, is a self-evident proposition; that, for all practical purposes, it was at an end before our connexion with Sindh, is notorious. Roostum, though nominally maintaining the Lordship of his territory, had granted, and could scarcely have avoided granting, the greater portion of it as jagheers to his sons, grandsons, nephews, and feudatories. Thus (as I have before said) eighteen Ameers, with their families and Belooche dependents and retainers, were supported on the estates assigned to Roostum and his brother Mobarick Khan. Had we been unconnected with the country, these settlements could not have been set aside; and any claim to a fourth of the territory, by Ali Morad or any one else, on the plea of wearing the Turban, would have been resisted by arms, or, had the absence of alleged misconduct on the part of the Ameers not led to a modification of the treaties of 1839, I feel confident that neither Lord Ellenborough, nor any other Governor-General, would, under the altered circumstances of the province, have sanctioned, on Roostum’s death, the assumption by his successor of the extra fourth given to the former by Meer Sohrab. When that fourth was granted, there were but three Ameers; the number, exclusive of Ali Morad and his family, were now six times that number; then, a State army was required to guard against foreign invasion; now, adequate protection was guaranteed by the British; then, the warriors of the country and the holders of jagheers were Belooches—at Roostum’s death these would have been dispossessed by Ali Morad, to make room for foreign mercenaries. I reiterate my firm conviction, that under these circumstances, the claim to a fourth of the territory, on the plea of the Turban, would have been set aside by the English Government. To seek to enforce it under the altered state of affairs which the new treaty brought about was a

101 It cannot be too often repeated, that it was not Lord Ellenborough’s treaty that led to the disastrous termination of Sir Charles Napier’s negotiations. But for the unauthorized exactions in behalf of Ali Morad, the treaty could have been easily settled, AND IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BEFORE THESE EXACTIONS WERE MADE. On sealing the treaty at Hydrabad, when I told them their importunities were in vain, that I had no power to alter any of the new arrangements, the Khyrpoor Ameers said—(I quote from my dispatch of the 13th February)—“We now possess nothing; we make no demur to giving over what has been demanded of us by the treaty, but we complain that you deprive us of what should afterwards remain to us.” At the conference of the 13th, the deputies complained, in reference to the Khyrpoor Ameers—“Every thing that the British Government wanted from them they had given and agreed to; why oppress them any further? Promise to restore the lands Ali Morad has taken; they hare given you all you wanted for yourself and Bhawal Khan without a murmur.” They left me saying they had no hope of allaying the excitement of the Belooches, unless I could give assurance of some redress to the Khyrpoor Ameers.
violation of every principle of policy, of justice, and of common sense. Its necessity had ceased, and its acknowledgment, apart from the extensive misery inflicted, and the direct calamities to be thence apprehended, frustrated one of the benevolent objects of the Governor-General—the improvement of the condition of the country. The chiefs holding jagheers were no longer required to perform military service; and though little could have been done to enlighten and civilize them, even they would have been gradually weaned from their wild habits, and their children would have learned to cultivate the arts of peace. The lapse of one or two generations, and the consequent increase of population, would have reduced the descendants of the largest jagheerdars to the condition of small landholders; and as British example and British enterprise aroused their energies, and developed the resources of their country, these would have settled down into an industrious yeomanry. At once to dispossess them of their jagheers, was to do what in us lay to convert a soldiery occasionally turbulent, but by no means invariably so, or at any time more turbulent than were the feudal chiefs of my own country, into the reckless Ishmaelites of a cultivated and open province. The strong arm of military law doubtless could and would have crushed them, but not without much bloodshed.

And this brings me to the third proposition urged by Sir Charles Napier, in support, or rather in justification, of his pledges to Ali Morad, viz. that as that Ameer was next in succession to Roostum, and as the latter was now eighty-five years old, “all these horrors must take place in a few years in course of nature” A novel mode of reasoning, surely, for an English gentleman in the nineteenth century; one on a par with the General’s ideas regarding abstract rights!

But with all due deference to Sir Charles Napier, I reiterate the conviction before expressed, that the altered circumstances of the country would have prevented any Governor-General yielding to the claim which, granted, would have developed “all these horrors;” and, in spite of the sneering manner of the General, I maintain that “horrors” is not too strong a word for the misfortunes I indicated. Or, assuming that, as was once the case during Mr. Bell’s incumbency of the Political Agency of Upper Sindh, the parties had preferred settling the dispute by an appeal to arms to the milder mode of arbitration, fighting, as the chiefs would have fought, for their very means of subsistence, and with the advantage of numbers and justice on their side, the result must have been favorable to those resisting Ali Morad’s claims. Allow that the fortune of battle had gone against them, and that “all these horrors” had fallen on the afflicted land, would it not have been very sad—a consummation deeply to be deplored?

But throughout the vicious chain of reasoning adopted by Sir Charles Napier, there is a hidden fallacy which would have neutralized a sounder logic, and which the reader has doubtless detected. Ali Morad was not, as he is assumed to have been, legally Rais. But as no concession or submission could reinstate Roostum in the sovereignty, the legality of

102 Scotland.
the transfer of the Turban, and the consequent exactions, was a closed question. Yet the Ameers still hoped that they might, by an appeal to the justice of Sir Charles Napier, obtain a revocation of this act of usurpation, for which, as I have shown in a former chapter, the British General was alone responsible. At the conference at Hydrabad, on the 13th of February, the deputies exclaimed—“At least, give us some pledge that justice shall be done.” I could only say that the General would doubtless give their case the most favorable consideration, but that I could pledge myself to nothing. “In that case,” they added, “will not the Khyrpoor Ameers be allowed to settle their own affairs with Ali Morad, without your interference?” “Certainly not,” was the reply I was constrained to make; “any attack on Ali Morad will be a breach of the treaty, and treated as an act of hostility to the British.” Painfully did I feel the truth of their rejoinder—“This is very hard: you will neither promise restoration of what has been taken from them by Ali Morad, nor will you allow them to right themselves. Every thing that the British Government wanted from them, they have given and agreed to—why oppress them any further?”

I have delayed, perhaps, too long on this subject: its importance, however, must be my excuse. It is right the reader should understand that, though undoubtedly oppressive as it then stood, the treaty need not have been a source of overwhelming embarrassment in our negotiations. To the flagitious engagements to Ali Morad—engagements of which Lord Ellenborough knew nothing, and which there is little doubt he would have rescinded had he known—engagements, moreover, which inflicted a widely-spread misery—were all our difficulties to be attributed.

Roostum, I have said, did not come to Khyrpoor. I had told him honestly that the arrangements with Ali Morad, and the terms of the new treaty, I had no power to rescind or even to modify; that my sole duty was to settle the details of the latter in the most equitable manner. It was not, therefore, wonderful that the old man fell into the snare laid for him by his brother. He proceeded to join his sons and nephews at Koonhera. These, too, had been invited to meet me at Khyrpoor, personally or by proxy, but they came not. Nor is it difficult to assign a reason for their non- appearance.

Look to the occurrences of the last few months. Prior to Sir Charles Napier’s arrival, the Princes of Sindh had been treated with the consideration due to their rank, and that demanded by their own ideas of propriety. No sooner did that officer arrive amongst them than all was changed. They were addressed in a tone of arrogant contempt, which was as offensive as it was new and unexpected, and the conventional courtesies to which they had been accustomed were suddenly dispensed with. Rumor told them that we contemplated the seizure of their country; and the sudden dismissal from office of the diplomatic body, to which they had been accustomed, the imperious tones of the dictator who succeeded, and the extensive military preparations they beheld, all tended to convince them that such was really our intention. For two months were they kept in the most painful suspense, and then a treaty was presented to them, by which more than a fourth of their possessions was confiscated, as a penalty for alleged offences, of which they asserted their innocence, and which they were denied all opportunity of disproving.
Ere yet they had time to recover their self-possession, the treaty was, in a public proclamation, declared to be Concluded, and the territory demanded by that treaty was authoritatively alienated. Insulting and menacing communications continued to be addressed to them. After we had ourselves enforced the penal clauses of the treaty, an unequivocal acceptance of it was demanded; this was readily yielded: but the submissiveness of the Ameers availed them not, for, at the same time, the British army proceeded to take up an offensive position in their country. We next issued an order to those whom, by solemn treaty we had pledged ourselves to regard as independent rulers of their own country, requiring them to disband the undisciplined rabble which they maintained as guards. With this demand, one of the most offensive that could be addressed to Eastern Princes, and one which we had no right, moral or legal, to enforce, the submissive Ameers promised to comply; and they invited the General to satisfy himself that obedience was rendered to his behest, by deputing officers to their capital.

Yet, in spite of this, Sir Charles Napier resolved on marching in military array on Khyrpoor. By his instrumentality the venerable Sovereign of the country was inveigled from his home, decoyed into the stronghold of his enemy, subjected to violence, his birthright extorted from him, dishonored in the face of his family, kindred, and clan; and, finally, expelled into the desert a houseless wanderer; whilst his brother—the chosen ally of the British General—gloated with exultation over the deceit and fraud he had perpetrated. His sons and nephews, dismayed at the threatened advance of the General, finding submission fail, satisfied that some treachery had been practised on Roostum, and expecting destruction to themselves, fled from their capital, which was immediately taken possession of, and their property plundered, by the ally of the English. Their aged relation told them of the usage he had received, and they beheld him spurned as a Liar by the British General; and all redress of, nay, any inquiry into, his wrongs, peremptorily denied. The fort of an unoffending member of their family was next assailed, and in spite of the solemn assurance of the General, it was plundered of all it contained, and then razed to the ground. They beheld the usurper of their father’s dignity, the despoiler of their own property, high in the favour of the British, recognized as Rais, claiming the most exorbitant pecuniary demands in virtue of his usurped dignity, and having these claims allowed; and they were now ordered by the very General who had told them he would not treat with them, to meet his commissioner to negotiate the details of the new spoliative arrangements, which, they were informed, could not possibly be departed from. Was it to be wondered at that they did not attend? Our honour! In which of our recent transactions had it been displayed? To talk of our justice was but to enhance their sense of injury, by adding to it that of insult. Our promises could not be relied on; and even had the Ameers been inclined to trust us, what had we promised? Spoliation and impoverishment to themselves,—ruin to their feudatories! We have seen how exaggerated were the rumors brought into the British camp: are we not bound to suppose that the terrible realities of this melancholy period assumed unreal horrors when viewed through the distorting medium of that mental anguish which their griefs, their fears, and the sedulous reports of Ali Morad’s tools, must have developed? And what were they to gain by meeting the British Commissioner appointed to hear, but unempowered to redress, their wrongs? Let Roostum’s exclamation, when I parted from him in the desert, supply
the answer. I told him that though I had it not in my power to alter the treaty, or modify
Sir Charles Napier’s engagements to Ali Morad, yet that in arranging the details I should
act towards all parties with all possible fairness. “Then what remains to settle?” exclaimed
the Prince. “Our means of livelihood are taken, and why am not I to continue Rais for the
short time that I have to live?”

On hearing that Roostum had joined his relations, I despaired of the latter meeting me at
Khrupoor, and therefore proposed to the General—

“If none of the parties attend at the specified time, I can only proceed to detail what I can
ascertain to be the fairest arrangement for all parties, and submit the same to you to be
enforced or otherwise modified as you see proper. My idea is, that having defined the
respective shares of the remaining property, and such portion of the territory of the Lower
Sindh Ameers as it may be just to transfer to Upper Sindh, in lieu of the larger slice of the latter
which has been made over to Bhawulpore, the parties concerned should be left to take
possession or not as they please, proclamation being made that if they do not do so by a certain
period, the territory so unclaimed will be attached by the British Government, or made over to
the Rais, as you think best, but the former should positively be resorted to; under any
circumstances, however, I should not wish Ali Morad to expect to appropriate the estates
forfeited, the hope of which induces his villany.

“I do not advocate the above arrangement as just on our part, but as the only one that appears to me
practicable under the circumstances in which the Ameers have been placed, should they neither yield to
the conditions nor fight, merely contenting themselves by keeping aloof, and protesting against our
proceedings, which I think probable some of them will do.”

Such, I am certain, would have been the Ameers’ line of conduct, and my
recommendation was approved by the General—at least so he gave me to understand. On
the 23d of January he wrote:—

“I entirely concur in your view of proceeding, in case the parties do not attend on the 25th
instant; indeed, I see no other left to us. I have clearly told Ali Morad, in my letter, that if any of
the Ameers fight, or refuse to join you personally or by vakeels, their lands shall be forfeited to
Government.”

But Ali Morad and his minister were too politic to allow of such a proceeding; and it
doubtless required but little persuasion to convince the General that his policy would
expose him to ridicule, did it leave these persecuted Princes in a moody state of recusancy,
neither acquiescing in nor opposing his demands. Sir Charles Napier had, therefore,
recourse to his favorite mode of transacting business—a threatening proclamation. On the
27th, he issued the following:—

To the Ameers of Upper Sindh.

“I was ordered to make a new treaty with you. Your Highnesses agreed to the draft of that
treaty in words, while you Raised troops to oppose it in deeds. You were ordered to disperse
your troops—you did not disperse them: you hoped to deceive me by a pretended agreement
to the Draft Treaty. You thought you could procrastinate, till the hot weather should prevent any military operation by the British troops; then, you imagined, you could assail us on all sides with impunity. If we marched against you before the heat came, you thought our march would be late, and you resolved to resist with arms; if worsted in fight, you looked to the desert as a certain refuge. You were right, had we abided your time, and marched by the road you expected; but we preferred our own time and our own road. We marched into your desert, we destroyed your magazine of powder and of grain; we destroyed also the fortress in which they were (as you vainly supposed) safely lodged; we have returned out of the desert, and we have yet three months of weather fit for war. But I want to prevent war. I, therefore, wrote to you to meet Major Outram at Khyrpoor, on the 25th instant, there to discuss and arrange the details of the Draft Treaty; to accept or reject them, as seemed best to your Highnesses. What is the result? Your Highnesses have neither replied to my letter, nor sent delegates invested with authority to meet my Commissioner. This conduct is insulting to the Government which I serve. I told you, if you so acted, I would take possession of your territories; but my object is to avoid hostilities, while I obey the orders of the Governor-General. I, therefore, will still give you till the 1st of February to send your vakeels to my headquarters, in hope that you may correct the imprudence with which you have hitherto acted, and which I deeply regret. My military operations must, however, go forward, but your persons shall be respected. You shall be considered as friends up to the 1st day of February; after that day, I shall treat all as enemies who have not sent vakeels to meet me.

“Ameers—

“You imagine that you can procrastinate till your fierce sun drives the British troops out of the field, and forces them to seek shelter in Sukkur. You trusted to your desert, and were deceived; you trust to your deadly sun, and may again be deceived. I will not write a second letter to you, nor a second time expose the authority which I represent to indignity; but this proclamation will, I hope, induce you to adopt a manly instead of an insidious course.”

To the reader of the foregoing pages, I need hardly observe, that the narrative portion of this proclamation was, to quote an expression of Sir Charles Napier’s, a mere “picture of the imagination.” Like the announcement contained in the proclamation of the 8th of December, that the new treaty was “concluded;” like the intimation made to Roostum, on the 2d of January, that he was a liar, for merely saying that which the General believed to be true; and like many similar averments, the statements of this proclamation were but figures of speech, which Sir Charles Napier deemed allowable, and indeed necessary, in dealing with barbarians. A moment’s reflection might have reminded the General that the collection of troops by the Ameers had been solely suggested by his own violent conduct, confirming as it did their fears, and giving weight to the rumors afloat of intended aggression. He ought to have remembered, that when the terms of the new treaty were known, half their followers had been disbanded, and that their re-collection was only caused by the suspicions naturally engendered by his proclamation, of what was notoriously not the case. Nor should he have forgotten, that when he ordered the Ameers to disband their rabble, they promised compliance; that his own measures alone prevented them evincing their sincerity; that when the Princes of Upper Sindh fled in terror from their capital, they took with them but their own bodyguards—their Belooche retainers separating to return to their homes. All this the General ought to have called to
mind, and it should have occurred to him, that had the wretched fugitives, whom he now
menaced, contemplated resistance, they would have summoned their feudatories around
them; nay, a calm consideration of the subject would have shown him, that had any
opposition to the English in the hot weather been dreamed of, the Ameers would have
accepted the treaty with alacrity, and with every demonstration of cordial satisfaction,
complying with all his most oppressive demands, fawning on him and flattering him till
his suspicions had been lulled, a false sense of security engendered, the hot weather set in,
the communications with India closed, and the time ripe for their outbreak. Gratitude,
moreover, for having been allowed to traverse the desert with safety, ought to have
softened Sir Charles Napier’s prejudices, and to have opened his eyes to the fact, that but
for a forbearance unparalleled in the history of invasion, and but little justifying his
accusations of hostility, he and his little band must have perished miserably in the
wilderness. In proclaiming that the Princes of Upper Sindh had insulted the British
Government, by not attending at, or sending their vakeels to Khyrpoor, it must have
escaped his recollection that less than a month had elapsed since he had notified to them
that he would not treat with any one who acknowledged Roostum as Rais; and he well knew that
the Ameers he now addressed, acknowledged none but Roostum. The General might have made
some allowance for the conduct of men who were sorely puzzled to reconcile his
conflicting missives of the 2d and 15th of January; and his allusion to Emaumghur was
peculiarly unfortunate, for the contrast between his promises and his performances, in
reference to that castle, was well calculated to create misgivings as to the personal safety
promised to the Ameers who should meet me at Khyrpoor. Conscious as the Ameers were
that there was no foundation for any of the General’s assertions, and that every advance
made by them had been repelled; calling to mind our numerous gross violations of treaty,
our flagrant breaches of promise, and the fictions we had promulgated by
proclamation,—and finding themselves now denounced as insulters of the British
Government, as Roostum had a week before been denounced for doing that to which he
was driven,—must not these unhappy Princes have concluded that we sought but a
pretext to fall upon them?

Vakeels from Hydrabad, who must have left the capital before Sir Charles Napier’s
proclamation of the 15th reached the Ameers of Lower Sindh, attended at Khyrpoor: only
those, however, of Sobdar and Hoossein Ali had full powers to treat. At Khyrpoor I could
do little more, therefore, as regarded the Ameers of Lower Sindh, than arrange the details
connected with the transfer of their share of the Upper Province to their cousins. All
arrangements between them and us, it would have been easier and more satisfactory to all
parties to settle at their own capital. When, therefore, I learned that Roostum had joined
his kinsmen, and consequently despair of seeing him or them at Khyrpoor, I thus wrote
to the General:—

“I almost despair of saving these misguided chiefs from destruction now; but, so far from
feeling any irritation towards them for baulking all my earnest endeavors to avert their fate, I
only experience deep regret that they should thus be sacrificed to the arts of their unprincipled
relation. I am not the less desirous, therefore, to follow any course you may deem proper with a
view to rescue them, and am ready to proceed to them once more on my camel, and without escort, if you please. Pray, recollect that they were misled into flight; that they had agreed to subscribe to the treaty, and would have done so, had it not been Ali Morad’s policy utterly to sever them from us, that he might obtain their confiscated estates; that they were innocent of the acts laid to their charge (robbing dawks, &c.) which led them to fly, and you to pursue; that they had not armed to the extent that was represented, and that whatever rabble soldiery they had assembled, was solely with a view to self-defence, in misapprehension of our real objects, misrepresented as they were to them by Ali Morad; and much more that may be urged in excuse for such suspicious people, who have had little reason heretofore to estimate our good faith very highly. At least, if you are not satisfied on these points, as I hope you are, I shall not fail to prove them to you, opposed though I am by the bribed tools of Ali Morad who surround me.

“Should you, however, consider that enough has been done to prevent these people breaking their own heads, perhaps you will deem it but fair to make some attempt to save the Ameers of Hyderabad from a similar fate, if it can be done by fair means; and as I am confident I can prevent the latter from committing themselves, by my personal appearance among them before they are too far pledged to the runaways, I deem it my duty to offer to go down to Hyderabad for that purpose; AND, SHOULD I DO SO WITHOUT MUCH DELAY, and by the river, so as to enable me to shake off the creatures of Ali Morad by whom I am beleaguered, I have no doubt that not only shall I prevent the Lower Sindh Chiefs from giving aid or refuge to the fugitives of Upper Sindh, but possibly, through the means of the Hyderabad Ameers, (with the exception of the traitor Nusseer Khan,) may cause their submission or capture.”

The General’s reply was as follows:—

“It will be impossible for you to leave Khypoor; we must open our treaty on the 25th, or we should give just cause of complaint of our vacillation, and Lord Ellenborough would have occasion to find fault with me. BESIDES, ROOSTUM HAS A RIGHT TO GO WHERE HE LIKES, AND I HAVE NONE TO TAKE OFFENCE.”

The Ameers of Upper Sindh were, I saw, devoted to utter ruin. The laws of hospitality in the East are very stringent, and I dreaded lest the Princes of the Lower Province should become bound by these laws (whose breach is infamy) to identify their interests with those of their pre- doomed cousins. Hence my anxiety to reach Hyderabad ere the Khypoor fugitives could arrive. The General’s intimation that Roostum had a right to go where he chose merely meant that he had a right to involve others in his own ruin. On the 24th of January, the last day but one left for the Ameers to meet me at Khypoor, I again preferred my request to be permitted to proceed to Hyderabad:—

“By going to Hyderabad, I should afford one more chance to the fugitive Ameers, for, doubtless, the Ameers of Hyderabad will intercede for them; and, perhaps, should the latter promptly accede to your terms, you might then, without any compromise to your dignity, receive their overtures on behalf of their relations.”

Four days after I dispatched this letter, Sir Charles Napier wrote to authorize me to go to Hyderabad; but the communication never reached me—it was intercepted by Ali Morad’s
minister. In ignorance of my request having been acceded to, I had no alternative but to remain at Khyrpoor, and deplore the frustration of all my endeavors to save the Ameers of either province. I felt deeply, and I expressed myself strongly. On the 26th I wrote:—

“It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical, positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence, will be a Murder.”

The General, we have seen, approved of my suggestion as to the course to be adopted towards the Upper Sindh Ameers, should they not attend at Khyrpoor, viz. to arrange the divisions and shares of the territory still left to them as equitably as possible, to apprize them of the arrangements, and to intimate that if, after a reasonable time, they did not occupy the allotted lands, these should be attached by the British. Had that plan been followed, and had I been allowed to settle the details of the treaty with the Hydrabad Ameers, before they became involved with their cousins, the latter would probably have remained out for some time, but would gradually have betaken themselves to the possessions still left to them; for the cessation from further insult and persecution on our part would ere long have given them confidence; the adjustment of Lower Sindh affairs, and our apparent neglect of their own recusancy, would have speedily taught them that, concession being now impossible, it was wiser to take what they could get, than to refuse all. But once thrown upon their hospitality, the Princes of Lower Sindh were bound, by Asiatic ideas of honour, to make the cause of their persecuted relatives and guests their own. Those became confederated, in whose division was our strength; and our difficulties became multiplied. This, my letters to Sir Charles Napier clearly enough indicated; yet he adopted the very measure which I so much deprecated, and the results of which I so greatly dreaded.

Vakeels from the Hydrabad Ameers, having not only the fullest powers to treat, but actually bearing their masters’ seals, which they were authorized to affix to the treaty, arrived in Sir Charles Napier’s camp on the 30th of January. I unhesitatingly affirm, and I appeal for confirmation of what I say to every one who has gained the least reputation in Oriental diplomacy, that the proper, the only honest and merciful line of conduct, under the circumstances of the case, would have been at once to have received the signature of the vakeels to an unconditional acceptance of the terms dictated to them, and then to send the latter back to their masters, charged with strong expressions of the Generals satisfaction, and warm assurances of British friendship and protection ; intimating, at the same time, that the Commissioner would follow in a few days, to arrange the details of the accepted treaty.

As regards the Khyrpoor Chiefs, the course which I had recommended, and of which the General had approved, was, I maintain, the best, the only rational, and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the most merciful and the least oblique, that could be adopted. The details of the treaty settled with the Lower Sindh Ameers, and a stipulation made against the admission into their territory of their fugitive cousins, two-thirds of the Upper Province in the hands of Ali Morad, and the resources at the disposal of his brethren, little
more than one-third of what they were when the treaty was first tendered to them, no danger, and but little inconvenience could have resulted, had the recusants had recourse to actual hostilities; and the probability of that was so remote, as to verge on the confines of the impossible. Even had Lord Ellenborough refused to remit the additional exactions, no danger to us was to be apprehended; but his Lordship lost not a moment in authorizing their remission when the General’s letter informed him that they “pressed heavily” on the Ameers, and had “thrown them into consternation.”

This happy consummation, which any “Indian diplomatist” could have easily brought about, Sir Charles Napier frustrated. He did so, I believe, with no view to precipitate hostilities, by rendering a settlement impossible, but through that fatal ignorance of Oriental feelings and customs, that willfulness which hurried him from one indiscreet act to another, and that mistaken idea of what constituted a firm and dignified policy, which prompted him to menace and command, instead of conciliating the subjects of his diplomacy. He doubtless imagined, and was taught by Ali Morad to believe, that if he could implicate the Ameers of Lower Sindh in the concerns of their cousins, the presence of his army, and the heavy punishment inflicted on the Khyrpoor Princes, would compel those of Hyderabad, from fear of a like fate, to coax or intimidate the fugitives into a compliance with his demands. Like the theory regarding the obedience paid by the Belooches to the Turban, whoever might be its wearer, or howsoever it were obtained, this creation of his fancy was accepted by him as an axiom, and acted on as such. The carnage of Meeanee demonstrated its fallacy. But Sir Charles Napier would “consult no one.” Instead of permitting the vakeels from Hyderabad to sign an unconditional acceptance of the treaty, and then sending them back to arrange with me the minor details, he furnished them with the following memorandum:

January 31, 1843.

“I have received the deputies of the Ameers of Hyderabad, and have desired them to meet Major Outram, at Hyderabad, on the 6th of February. They have promised to take with them the Ameers of Khyrpoor, and I will not commit any act of hostility against those Ameers till I hear from Major Outram; but I shall march more near to Koonhera, in case the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not proceed to Hyderabad, where they must be on the 6th February; and if the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not dismiss their soldiers, I will attack them. This is an extension of the time given by the proclamation, viz. the 1st day of February. If I do not receive a letter from the deputies of Hyderabad on the 5th of February, I will march against Meer Roostum on the 6th.”

In a letter to the Lower Sindh Ameers, Sir Charles Napier had written the previous day:

“I am glad that you have at last sent your deputies, because I was marching fast upon Hyderabad. Now I am your friend; and I have desired your deputies to return to Hyderabad, and I will order Major Outram to meet you there, that the treaty may be arranged quickly. I hope the Ameers of Khyrpoor, Meer Roostum Khan, Nusseer Khan, and Meer Mahommed Khan, will go with your deputies to meet Major Outram at Hyderabad; IF THEY DO NOT, I WILL TREAT THEM AS ENEMIES.”
And to myself on the same day, he wrote:—

“Beerjee, January 30, 1843.

“My Dear Outram,—I have seen the Hydrabad deputies. I have ordered them to meet you there on the 6th of February; and you are to tell me directly whether or not they have brought the deputies of Meer Roostum, and the others, with the prescribed powers. If they have, I wait the result of negotiations. If not, I march against them as an enemy on the 6th. I by no means feel authorized in granting this delay; but I am willing to do all I can, to save the mischief that will fall upon these Ameers if they will not meet you.”

The intimation given to the Ameers of Sindh themselves, through their cousins of Hydrabad, was that if they did not personally attend at the capital of Lower Sindh, they would be treated as enemies; to me it was communicated, that only their deputies were required to attend, as the alternative of an attack! I presume not to make comments; but I would ask the reader to contrast the General’s approval of my recommendation regarding the conduct to be pursued towards the Khyrpoor Princes, his intimation that Roostum had a right to go where he liked, and that he himself had no right to take offence, the urgency of my request to be allowed to proceed to Hydrabad, before the Ameers of that place could be involved by their cousins, and the explicit statements which I gave of my reasons for preferring that request, with Sir Charles Napier’s communication to the vakeels and Ameers. To the result of the comparison, I would have him add the discrepancy between the announcement made to me, and that given to the parties most interested, and I would then ask if the transaction be intelligible? Its results, alas! Were traced in characters of blood; and, it may be, that only blood can efface them.

To this gratuitous entanglement of the affairs of the Hydrabad Ameers with those of their cousins of Khyrpoor, all the subsequent disasters are to be traced. Sir Charles Napier himself admits that, prior to his ordering the Princes of Lower Sindh to receive those of the Upper Province, they had refused to do so. Thus, only two days before he wrote the letters above quoted, he informed the Governor-General that—

“The Southern Ameers have all refused to join those of Khyrpoor in measures of opposition. * * * The Ameers of Hydrabad refused them entrance into Lower Sindh.”

They had specially avoided becoming implicated with their cousins, whose utter ruin they saw was unavoidable and irremediable: Sir Charles Napier had decided that nothing should induce him to modify the arrangements with Ali Morad, and while these arrangements remained in force, the treaty with the Khyrpoor Chiefs, I had shown to him, could not be satisfactorily settled. The arrangement of the treaty with the Hydrabad Ameers was simple; a few unimportant, though somewhat intricate, details connected with the transfer of portions of their territory to the Upper Sindh Ameers, and to Bhawul Khan, were all that remained to be settled; the substance of the treaty, with all its penalties, had been agreed to, and vakeels had been sent to ratify it by affixing the Ameers’ seals. Yet these vakeels are sent back, Roostum is sent with them, and the Princes...
of Lower Sindh are ordered to receive him; in other words, to make his hopeless cause their own — for such are the laws of hospitality in the East, and which are more influential over Oriental minds than even the love of life. I beg the reader to peruse the following

EXTRACTS FROM THE PETITIONS OF THE AMEERS OF HYDRABAD.

From Meer Nusseer Khan.—Dated 28th April, 1843, No. 102, Second Sindh B. Book.

“Meer Roostum Khan was sent to Hydrabad without asking us or our agents, and the Belooches, and the consequence was the slaughter and bloodshed”

From Meer Shahdad Khan.—Dated 2d May 1843, No. 107, Second Sindh B. Book.

“Accordingly we deputed our agent with our seals to the dignified General (Napier) in the Pergunnah of Nowsharee, when he (the General) desired them to return to Hydrabad with Meer Roostum Khan.” *** “But the Belooches, who had collected themselves at Hydrabad, created disturbances on account of the arrival of the said Ameer” (Meer Roostum Khan.)

From Meer Roostum Khan (no date.)—No. 221, Second Sindh B. Book.

“Subsequently the General Sahib Bahadoor sent a letter to me from Nowsharee, directing me to repair to Hydrabad, when the Major (Outram) Sahib would settle my affairs; accordingly I went to Hydrabad.”

From Meer Nusseer Khan to the Court of Directors, (no date.) No. 132, Second Sindh B. Book.

“When they (the deputies) arrived at Nowsharee, the General declined having my seal affixed to the treaty, but delivered a letter for me to the vakeels, in which he ordered me to send for Meer Roostum of Khirpoor to Hydrabad. *** According to his desire, Meer Roostum and the vakeels came to Hydrabad. *** I was averse to Meer Roostum coming to Hydrabad, because I dreaded a commotion on his account.”

While waiting for permission to proceed to Hydrabad, I received letters from Roostum and his fugitive companions. The old Ameer excused his non-appearance at Khyrpooor on the plea of thinking it necessary to keep his sons and nephews quiet. This could have been but a slender motive compared to the one he afterwards assigned, — the perfect inutility of coming to me, denied, as I was, the power of bettering his condition. I subjoin the letter sent to me by his relations, each of whom expressed himself in the same words:—

“I received your letter with enclosures, [viz., the circular from Major-General Sir Charles Napier, and the copy of his letter to Meer Ali Morad Khan,] and I fully understand the contents therein you have mentioned. Sir, it is evident, like the light of the sun, that we most humbly and faithfully discharged our duties to the British Government from the commencement of the British arrival in Sindh (i.e. for five years ago.) In the treaty which the British Government...
granted to us, it has been confidentially written that the British Government will not interfere
with our country; and we having understood that the Government’s writing is as permanent as
if engraved on stone, therefore with great pleasure spent our days; through the kindness of the
British Government, and ever since we did not draw our leg from the British service, and
now of our territories and household property have we been deprived; and, therefore, in a distressed state
we came on this side of the world, and our intention is to cultivate the ground for our livelihood; and
with hearing your coming to Khyrpoor we are much overjoyed, for you are a very good
gentleman, and so you will act according to the treaty, and having considered our services, you
will not fail to do good. In your letters to me, do you not mention about the treaty and our
consequences? And therefore we are greatly disappointed; and having no power to move from
one side to another, although we have full confidence in your doing good for us.”

I have mentioned that Sir Charles Napier authorized me to proceed to Hydrabad, in a
letter dated the 28th of January; it never came to hand, and on the 31st I wrote, that as Mr.
Brown, who was with me, had received a letter dated the 29th, in which the General
expressed himself as if he expected we were on our way to Hydrabad, I should take for
granted that such was his intention to proceed thither. A succession of unfortunate
mishaps with the steamers prevented my leaving Sukkur till the 4th of February, and
reaching Hydrabad before the 8th. Roostum had preceded me by four days, so the object
of my visit was frustrated.103 The events which took place subsequent to my arrival, I
derfer to another Section. Before, however, concluding the present one, there is one point I
wish to bring to the notice of my reader.

In reference to the letter granting me permission to proceed to Hydrabad, which was
intercepted, the General thus wrote on the 4th of February:—

“The miscarriage of the mail is a strange affair: I am very suspicious of this matter; I think Ali
Morad may have stopped it; but who could have read my letters to you? Only the person
whom you suspect of being in his pay! I have sent to Ali Hoossein to insist on its being
found.”104

103 Yet conscious though he must have been that the very element of success—preceding the Khyrpoor Chiefs to
Hydrabad, and, therefore, closing Lower Scinde against them—was denied me, Sir Charles Napier, in annotating my
letter of the 22d January (on the 12th of August,) remarks in reference to my anticipation of success if allowed to do as I
wished: “The attack on the Residency is sufficient comment on all this.” The attack on the Residency is no comment
whatever. Roostum and his brethren were cast on the Ameers of Hydrabad by the General himself: whatever might
have been the private wishes of the latter, they were, under the circumstances in which Sir Charles Napier placed them,
compelled to espouse the cause of their cousins, and hence they were sacrificed. And because I had not sufficient
influence with them to make them break through those sacred laics, whose observance by a Belooche of character, is
regarded beyond life itself; the attack on the Residency, after ice had broken every stipulated and moral obligation
towards them, is seized on as a justification of our aggressions, and a proof that, if not implicated with their cousins,
they could not have been saved!

104 And yet, the Historian adduces this interception of his brother’s dispatch as an illustration of the hostility and
intrigues of the victims of Ali Morad’s perfidy. At page 263 he writes:—”All the Ameers’ proceedings were deceitful.
They had no thought save to gain time for the assembling of their whole army, which they calculated could not be
before the middle of February, and to delay the war till that period, no falsehood or intrigue, no fraud or daring violence
was spared. Sir Charles Napier’s correspondence with Major Outram was stolen!” Sc. Sir Charles Napier’s intercepted
letter was written on the 28th of January; the Hydrabad vakeels were still in his camp on the 31st, and it was not till their
return to Hydrabad that the collection of troops commenced. The parties, to compass whose destruction Sir Charles
Napier’s letter was intercepted, are accused of having intercepted it!
The mail enclosing the missing letter was entrusted to this Ali Hoossein, Ali Morad’s minister. The suspicion of Ali Morad which occurred to the General arose spontaneously in his mind, from his knowledge of the man; I had no part in its production: yet this was the Ameer whom the General delighted to honour, and who he has declared never acted treacherously towards his relatives! That Ali Hoossein intercepted the letter, there cannot be a doubt; his own horseman always bore the General’s dispatches to me, and had he been stopped on the way, the circumstance would, of course, have been reported. No living being but Ali Morad and his minister had any interest in the interception of the document, and they well knew that had I reached Hydrabad before they had persuaded the General to send Meer Roostum thither, Lower Sindh would have been closed against the fugitives. They naturally dreaded lest Roostum and his companions, having no other resource left to them, should throw themselves unconditionally on Sir Charles Napier’s mercy, for this was an event which must have led to a personal interview between the General and their victim, resulting in an exposure of their own nefarious practices. It required not that the letter should be read,—its import was readily comprehended: every act of Sir Charles Napier was well known to Ali Morad’s minister, and my anxiety to reach Hydrabad could have been no secret. It would be interesting to learn the result of Sir Charles Napier’s insisting on the letter being found. It is due alike to the exiled Ameers, to the Prince who was suspected of the treachery, to the Governor-General, and to Sir Charles Napier himself, that the mystery should be cleared up.
APPENDIX.

LETTER FROM LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OUTRAM TO SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

Khyrpoor, 27th January 1843.

My Dear Sir Charles,—I have today received your letter, forwarding that from Government, fixing my salary at 1500 rupees per mensem. So far from murmuring at the amount, (although less by 200 rupees than I received years ago as Political Agent in Guzerat, and less than my previous salary in this country by 1750 rupees,) I really do not consider that I deserve so much, for in fact I have been unable to effect any thing as Commissioner as yet, and see little prospect of doing so. Whatever may be my private objections to receiving what possibly might be construed a pecuniary favour, I must, without reference to any personal feelings whatever, abstain from accepting public money which I have not earned ; I beg you will not be annoyed with me, therefore, declining to take advantage of the authority to draw salary as “Commissioner.” Pray do not suppose that I purpose officially objecting to receive the money, or that I purpose taking any notice whatever of the matter. I merely intend allowing the half-sheet of Government foolscap paper to remain a dead letter,—or rather, I have destroyed it, that I might not be tempted hereafter to make use of it. I shall simply draw my captain’s pay in the field, to which I have an undoubted right. * * * * I am too glad of the honour of serving under you, and proud of your friendship and confidence, to require or wish for further advantage, so long as I continue with you.

I shall defer sending this letter, however, till you dispense with my services, lest it should induce you to do so one day sooner than you otherwise intended.—I am, &c.,

(Signed) J. Outram.

Written and sealed in the presence of Captain Brown and Dr. Gibbon, on the 27th January, and delivered to Sir Charles Napier on 20th February 1843.

LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM NAPIER TO THE EDITOR OF THE “Sun.”

Guernsey, August 5, 1843.

Sir,—The Bombay Times, brought by the last Indian mail, contains a Memoir of the services of Major James Outram, in which insolent falsehoods in disparagement of Sir Charles Napier, which have often appeared in that paper before, are repeated, and with such an air of authority, that it is necessary to give them a formal contradiction.

That Major Outram should have so long suffered in silence the inflated commendations of himself, lavished by the Bombay Times at the expense of his General,—that General for whom he professes, in private, the warmest regard, and whose incomparable kindness
and frankness towards him he admits,—that he should suffer this is a matter of taste; for me to suffer it in silence would be weakness.

In the Memoir alluded to, the following passages occur; something to the same effect having appeared in almost every Number of the Bombay Times for several months back.

“No sooner had Sir Charles Napier taken in hand to unravel the tangled skein of Sindhian politics, than he found a task had been imposed upon him which he was totally unable to execute” “He applied to the Supreme Government for assistance, and was permitted to request the services of Major Outram.” “His (Outram’s) appearance on the 4th of January in Sir Charles Napier’s camp, and subsequent interview with the Ameers, made almost an instantaneous change in the aspect of affairs.”

Now, Sir, I distinctly and emphatically assert, that with the exception of his application to have Major Outram placed under him, of which I know nothing, the above passages are shamefully false.

Sir Charles Napier never for a moment felt himself unequal to the task assigned him, and he never expressed himself to that effect: never gave the slightest grounds for the assumption. He saw his way clearly, from the moment he arrived in Sindh; he never varied in his general view of what ought to be done, nor hesitated a moment in doing it; and his great, his complete success, is the measure of his sagacity, his judgment and resolution.

That this is true, I can prove; for in his letters he informed me, month by month, of all his intended proceedings, political and military. He explained his views, and the grounds of his determination beforehand, and, in every instance, the actions which followed were in strict conformity with what he had forewarned me would happen. Thus, on the 18th March, he wrote: —“In six days I shall fight another battle;” and on the 24th, the battle of Dubba was fought and won, as that of Meeanee had been won before, without Major Outram’s aid,—for he was engaged in neither of them.

But it is in the political proceeding we are to look for Major Outram’s guiding genius. Sir, Major Outram’s views were diametrically opposed to Sir Charles Napier’s; but Major Outram was no match for the Ameers in diplomacy. Had Sir Charles Napier yielded to his imprudent and pertinaciously urged advice, the army would have been cut to pieces.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

“W. Napier, Major-General.”
LETTER FROM LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OUTRAM TO MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM NAPIER.

Oriental Club, Aug. 8, 1843.

Sir,—I have not thought it incumbent on me to notice any thing said in newspapers regarding my official character, which is under the protection of the Government I serve, otherwise I should have had no difficulty in refuting an anonymous statement, which appeared in a former paper, of a very opposite tendency to the commendation of the Bombay Times, which you remark upon in your letter addressed to the Sun newspaper.

In the position in which I am placed, as having been employed in Sindh in an official capacity, I am unfortunately deprived of the means of defending myself against either the public attack to which yon have now had recourse, or the previous anonymous one to which I allude. Neither am I at liberty, with that view, to make public my proceedings during the period I was connected with your distinguished brother; nor can I enter into any discussion as to whether the course which has been pursued in Sindh could or should have been avoided, and a peaceable settlement effected.

I must trust to time to show whether the advice I thought it my duty to offer to Sir Charles Napier was such as to expose the army to be “cut to pieces,” as stated in the last paragraph of your letter; I can only say, that during my previous charge both of Sindh and Belochistan, a much smaller force than Sir Charles had under his command in Sindh alone, isolated from support, and scattered over a far greater extent of country, in the midst of a bigoted and exasperated population, stimulated by the continued solicitations of our enemies, was exposed to no such calamity during the dangerous crisis of our disasters in Affghanistan.

In conclusion, I must beg to disclaim any responsibility for newspaper opinions. I am the last person in the world to doubt Sir Charles Napier’s ability to execute the task imposed upon him, or to deny that he carried into complete effect the plan which he originally laid down, and fought his battles at the time he thought most conducive to his military objects.

I am most reluctant, in the position in which I am placed, to enter into newspaper controversy; but I cannot, without risk of misconstruction, allow reflections on my character, published under the signature of an officer of your reputation, to pass without the notice I have taken of it.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

J. Outram, Lieutenant-Colonel.

LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM NAPIER TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OUTRAM.

Guernsey, August 10, 1843.

Sir,—In the position in which I am placed, as having been employed in Sindh in an official capacity, I am unfortunately deprived of the means of defending myself against either the public attack to which yon have now had recourse, or the previous anonymous one to which I allude. Neither am I at liberty, with that view, to make public my proceedings during the period I was connected with your distinguished brother; nor can I enter into any discussion as to whether the course which has been pursued in Sindh could or should have been avoided, and a peaceable settlement effected.

I must trust to time to show whether the advice I thought it my duty to offer to Sir Charles Napier was such as to expose the army to be “cut to pieces,” as stated in the last paragraph of your letter; I can only say, that during my previous charge both of Sindh and Belochistan, a much smaller force than Sir Charles had under his command in Sindh alone, isolated from support, and scattered over a far greater extent of country, in the midst of a bigoted and exasperated population, stimulated by the continued solicitations of our enemies, was exposed to no such calamity during the dangerous crisis of our disasters in Affghanistan.

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J. Outram, Lieutenant-Colonel.
Sir,—I make no anonymous, no private attacks.

The Bombay Times has systematically endeavored to Raise your reputation at the expense of my brother’s. The aspersions of that paper have been repeated by almost every newspaper in England except the Sun, and in some of the leading ones with sneering additions. They have now been reasserted by the Bombay Times, in the form of an elaborate memoir of your military career, embodied in what professes to be a grave and authentic history of the recent wars in Affghanistan and Sindh, having copious references to authorities.

It is, I repeat, a matter of taste on your part to contradict or leave unnoticed these aspersions on my brother; but when you, who could most effectually check them, do not do so, it becomes necessary for me to defend my brother’s reputation.

I have as much reluctance as yourself to a newspaper controversy on this subject, and I shall be happy when the moment arrives in which you shall feel yourself at liberty to give a full explanation of the affairs of Sindh.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. Napier, Major-General.

REPORT FROM MAJOR OUTRAM TO GENERAL NOTT.

Quetta, 10th July 1842.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that Lieutenant Ham- mersley having received such information as satisfied him that Syud Mahomed Shureef might be surprised by the sudden march of a detachment, I addressed Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall late on the evening of the 8th instant, (copy enclosed,) recommending that a party should be detached for the purpose that night, under Lieutenant Hammersley’s guidance, and I have now the satisfaction to report the result—in the capture of the Syud at the cost of only one horseman, and two horses slightly wounded, which fortunate event I attribute, in the first place, to Lieutenant Hammersley’s zeal and intelligence, and in the next, to the exertions of the small party of the Poonah Horse, which (in consequence of the detachment of infantry being delayed in the Koochlack Pass, by an accident in its artillery-wagon, till daybreak) had to push on the remaining ten miles to Killa Bostan, without drawing bridle,—where they arrived just in time to cut off the flight of Mahomed Shureef. At first, the few Beloche followers the Syud had with him opened a matchlock fire on the horsemen; but Bostan, (the chief,) on hearing that infantry and guns were coming up, restrained his own people, and surrendered his guest, on the sole condition of his life being spared; fortunately just before the followers, whom the Syud had been engaging during the last two or three days, had time to turn out from the neighbouring villages to
his rescue, for the purpose of effecting which they were rapidly assembling, some having already approached sufficiently near to fire on the party; but on seeing their leader a prisoner, no further opposition was attempted. Intimation was sent back, therefore, to halt the infantry detachment, which was thus saved eight miles. After bivouacing for a few hours, the whole returned to camp by the evening of yesterday.

I need not point out the importance of the capture of this person, of whose objects you are aware;—had he not been thus arrested ere the neighbouring tribes had committed themselves, the most serious consequences would have followed. As it is, I believe the intended rising has been quashed by this event, and that Mahomed Sadig, on hearing it, will fly without further attempting to disturb us; also, that the Brohooes, who had been seduced from their duty, will now execute their Khan’s orders to compel the Shorawuk tribes to restore the Kaffillah plunder, &c. I hope I may be allowed, therefore, to express that public interests of great magnitude have been secured by Lieutenant Hammersley’s vigilance and zeal on this occasion, to whom the success of the enterprize is to be attributed, (I having merely accompanied that officer, to afford the weight of my authority for any ulterior measures that might have been necessary,) aided by the ample means so promptly placed at his disposal by Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall, and the alacrity displayed by Captain Shirt of the 20th regiment, N. I., who commanded the party.
**TABLE, No. I.**

**Comparative Statement of the Exactions by the New Treaty with the Ameers of Scinde.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Territories to be appropriated by the British Government.</th>
<th>Territory to be made over to Bhawul Khan.</th>
<th>Privileges to be assumed.</th>
<th>Alterations in the Governments of Scinde.</th>
<th>Pecuniary value of the Territories confiscated and privileges assumed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Major Outram.</td>
<td>Sukkur Bukkur and Islets, Rs. 6,500</td>
<td>* Subrubkote, Rs. 10,000</td>
<td>The right of cutting wood for the distance of 100 yards on both banks of the River.</td>
<td>... Upper Scinde.</td>
<td>Value in Land, Rs. 946,000; Compensation for wood cutting Upper Scinde, Rs. 75,000; Do. do. Lower, Rs. 225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rs. 116,500</td>
<td>* Bhongbarras, 30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Rs. 446,000</td>
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<td>Do. do. 116,500</td>
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<td>Rs. 446,000</td>
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<td>357,250</td>
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<td>Rs. 563,500</td>
<td>Rs. 983,500</td>
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<td>Rs. 983,500</td>
<td>Rs. 983,500</td>
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<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>By the Governor-General.</th>
<th>Do. do. 200,500</th>
<th>Do. do. 200,500</th>
<th>Do. do. 200,500</th>
<th>Additional from</th>
<th>Total amount of exaction, Rs. 1,347,750</th>
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<tr>
<td>Do. do. 200,500</td>
<td>Do. do. 200,500</td>
<td>Do. do. 200,500</td>
<td>Do. do. 200,500</td>
<td>Do. do. 200,500</td>
<td>Sir Charles Napier's arrangement confirmed by the Governor-General.</td>
<td>Rs. 840,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>357,250</td>
<td>357,250</td>
<td>357,250</td>
<td>357,250</td>
<td>357,250</td>
<td>Upper Scinde as per B. Rs. 357,250; Do. Compensation to All Morad, Rs. 150,000</td>
<td>Rs. 1,347,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 640,000</td>
<td>Rs. 640,000</td>
<td>Rs. 640,000</td>
<td>Rs. 640,000</td>
<td>Rs. 640,000</td>
<td>Total amount of exaction, Rs. 1,347,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These districts were not originally proposed to be given by Major Outram, but on the Governor-General directing the arrangement, it was considered by that office advisable, should the transfer of Shikarpur be relinquished.
†Without any territory beyond what he was otherwise heir to.

Note.—Value of remissions to the Ameers, relinquished by the British Government. Lower Scinde, 3,500,000 claimed from Upper Scinde by Lord Auckland's Government, 100,000 annual tribute, and 700,000 due to Shah Soojah.
TABLE, No. II.

A List of Purgunnahs and Villages lately belonging to the Ameers of Upper Sindh now made over to Bhawul Khan, and appropriated by the British Government; also, Memo, of Ditto Lower Ditto.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES OF PURGUNNAHS</th>
<th>Amount of Revenue</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boree belonging to Meer Roostum Khan</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>British (vide page 13*. )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghotokee of Meer Moolarkh Khan with the following villages belonging to Meer Roostum Khan, &amp;c.</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 16.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Ghotokee or Shabbeela</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 15.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Syudpoor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tamsharah,</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 17.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jeetaya,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mahasheer, &amp;c. &amp;c.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mathala,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Meepoor,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Maharee,</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 16.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obawrah and Khyroo Dar, belonging to Meer Roostum Khan,</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 19.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emamwah of ditto,</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 18.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A part of Shulculot of ditto,</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>(Vide page 20.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bhong Bhars of ditto,</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>(Vide page .)</td>
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<td>Sukhkur,</td>
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Total Revenue, (vide page), 610,500

ABSTRACT.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Amount of Revenue</th>
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<tr>
<td>Boree,</td>
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<td>Ghotokee,</td>
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<td>Syudpoor,</td>
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<td>Juttaye and Mahasheer,</td>
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<td>Jumsharah, Mahakalla, and Meepoor,</td>
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<td>Maharee,</td>
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<td>Obaree and Khyroo Tuloona,</td>
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<td>Subrukoto,</td>
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Total, 610,500

N.B.—The above Memorandum was furnished to Sir Charles Napier.

* The references are to accompanying papers.
THE POLITICAL AGENT IN SINDH TO THE SECRETARY WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Sukkur, May 24, 1842.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated the 6th instant, with accompaniments, and beg respectfully to submit, for the consideration of the Governor-General, the following reasons for delaying to deliver his Lordship’s letters to the parties indicated, until I shall have been honored by further instructions.

2. I await the reply of Mr. Clerk to a reference I made to that gentleman regarding certain treasonable letters, one addressed by Meer Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad to Sawun Mull of Mooltan, intercepted by Lieutenant Postans upwards of three months ago; and another addressed by Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpoor to Maharajah Shere Sing of Lahore, obtained by me about twenty days ago, on reporting the extent to which intrigues against the British Government had been engaged in by the Ameers of Sindh and Chiefs of Beloochistan; and the ultimate result will be, I believe, the conviction, beyond a doubt, of one or more of the parties, on which I shall solicit the orders of his Lordship as to my consequent proceedings.

3. In the meantime, however, I consider that delivering the Governor-General’s letters to the suspected parties might not be attended with beneficial consequences, because, although expressing his Lordship’s confidence in the integrity of the Ameers, they at the same time denounce the extremist penalties to all who may hereafter be found to have deviated from their engagements; consequently, if, as I have reason to believe, almost every individual chief throughout these countries has been more or less concerned, directly or indirectly, in treasonable plottings, all would consider themselves compromised, and, in mere dread of the consequences, might be driven to commit themselves openly, and together, who otherwise never would unite, or be induced to engage in any overt act of hostility; while, not being openly committed, they would hope that their having listened to our enemies had escaped detection.

4. All such intrigues are suspended for the present, in consequence of our late successes and the expected re-establishment of our power, and they are not likely to renew them so long as we are in such power beyond the Indus. No object would, I think, therefore, be gained by now denouncing such proceedings, which not only might, I fear, precipitate what we wish to prevent, but would render those who are most deeply implicated the more eager to unite the more lukewarm or timorous in the common cause for mutual protection.

5. On the above consideration, I propose deferring to make use of the letters referred to, until I receive further instructions; which, I hope, may meet his Lordship’s approbation.—I have, &c.,

J. Outram.
INSTRUCTIONS BY SIR JOHN MALCOLM TO HIS ASSISTANTS IN INDIA.

No Government in the world has such an amount of diplomatic and administrative talent at its disposal as that of India. Its civil servants, as a body, stand unique, alike in the importance of the trust reposed in them, and in the ability and zeal with which that is fulfilled. To quote the words of the late Chairman of the Court of Directors, Captain Shepherd, in a speech delivered at the entertainment given to Sir Henry Hardinge on his departure for India, which deserves to be treasured as one of the most lucid expositions of our Anglo-Indian policy on record, “the members of the Civil Service are educated, not only with particular care, but with a special view to the important duties of civil administration.”

Certain political appointments it is customary to entrust to military men, and in the “Notes of Instructions” communicated by Sir J. Malcolm to his assistants, they possess an invaluable code of diplomatic ethics. To enable the reader, unacquainted with these matters, to form an idea of the principles and conduct in vogue among “old Indian politicians,” and to contrast with it the extraordinary diplomatic behavior of Sir Charles Napier, I subjoin a few extracts from these “Notes,” merely premising that such is the value and importance attached to them in India, that a copy is, I understand, presented to every civil servant on his arrival in the country.

British “power in India rests on the general opinion of the natives of our comparative superiority in good faith, wisdom, and strength, to their own rulers. This important impression will be improved by the consideration we show to their habits, institutions, and religion, and by the moderation, temper, and kindness with which we conduct ourselves towards them; and INJURED BY EVERY ACT THAT SHOWS DISREGARD OR NEGLECT OF INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES, OR THAT EVINCES OUR HAVING WITH THE ARROGANCE OF CONQUERORS FORGOTTEN THOSE MAXIMS BY WHICH THIS GREAT EMPIRE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, AND BY WHICH ALONE IT CAN BE PRESERVED.”

“IT WOULD BE QUITE OUT OF PLACE IN THIS PAPER, TO SPEAK OF THE NECESSITY OF KINDNESS, AND OF AN ABSENCE OF ALL VIOLENCE; THIS MUST BE A MATTER OF COURSE WITH THOSE TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED.”—When these words were penned, the amiable and accomplished writer did not contemplate the possibility of political power being wielded in India by one who, when strong enough to cut it, scorned to unravel a tangled skein. His soul was little “prescient of the carnage of Meeanee and Dubba,” and that prophet would have been deemed a worthless vaticinator who had foretold the combination of circumstances under which it occurred. “It,” the habit of kindness by which we can alone hope to secure the confidence and esteem of the natives, must be “GROUND ON A FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION OF THE Qualities and Merits of those to Whom It Extends; and this Impression, I am satisfied every Person will have who, After Attaining a Thorough Knowledge of the Real Character of those with Whom he has Intercourse, Shall Judge them, Without Prejudice.
“I must here, however, remark, that I have invariably found, unless in a few cases where knowledge had not overcome self-sufficiency and arrogance, that in proportion as European officers, civil and military, advanced in their acquaintance with the language and customs of the natives of India, they become more sincerely kind to them; and, on the contrary, IGNORANCE ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED THAT SELFISH PRIDE AND WANT OF CONSIDERATION WHICH HELD THEM LIGHT OR TREATED THEM WITH HARSHNESS.” ***

“I am quite satisfied in my own mind that, if there is one cause more than another that will impede our progress to the general improvement of India, it is a belief formed by its population, from the manner of their English superiors, that they are regarded by them as an inferior and degraded race; but, on the contrary, if the persons employed in every branch of the administration of this great country, *** comport themselves towards the people whom it is their duty to make happy, with THAT SINCERE HUMILITY OF HEART WHICH ALWAYS BELONGS TO REAL KNOWLEDGE, AND WHICH ATTACHES WHILE IT ELEVATES, THEY WILL CONTRIBUTE BY SUCH MANNER, MORE THAN ANY MEASURES OF BOASTF.D WISDOM EVER CAN, TO THE STRENGTH AND DURATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENT.”

*** “In all official intercourse with the natives, one of the first points of importance is, that these, whatever be their rank, or class, or business, SHOULD HAVE COMPLETE AND EASY ACCESS TO PERSONAL COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR EUROPEAN SUPERIOR. *** The public officer *** must be always vigilant and watchful of events likely to affect the peace of the country under his charge: but no part of his duty requires such care and wisdom in its performance. He cannot rest in blind confidence, nor refuse attention to obvious and well-authenticated facts: BUT HE MUST BE SLOW IN GIVING HIS EAR, OR IN ADMITTING TO PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL INTERCOURSE SECRET AGENTS AND INFORMERS; *** for there is no failing of human nature to which the worst part of the natives of India have learned so well to address themselves, as any disposition to suspicion in their superiors. *** One of my chief objects has been to impress in the most forcible manner the great benefits which are to be expected from a kind and conciliating manner, and a constant friendly intercourse with those under your direction and control. IT IS THE FEELINGS AND KNOWLEDGE WHICH SUCH HABITS ON YOUR PART WILL INSPIRE, THAT CAN ALONE GIVE EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION THAT HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR YOUR OBSERVANCE. You are called on to perform no easy task; to possess power, but seldom to exercise it; to witness abuses which you think you could correct; to see the errors, if not crimes of superstitious bigotry, and the miseries of misrule, and yet forbear, lest you injure interests far greater than any within the sphere of your limited duties, and impede
and embarrass by a rash change and innovation that may bring local benefit, the slow but certain march of general improvement. Nothing can keep you right on all these points, but constant efforts to add to your Knowledge, and accustoming your mind to dwell upon the character of the British power in India, and that of the empire over which it is established. The latter, comprehending numerous tribes and nations, with all their various institutions and governments, may truly, though metaphorically, be viewed as a vast and ancient fabric, neither without shape nor beauty, but of which many parts are in a dilapidated state, and all more or less soiled or decayed. Still it is a whole, and connected in all its parts, the foundations are deep laid, and to the very summit, arch rests upon arch. We are now its possessors, and if we desire to preserve, while we improve it, we must make ourselves completely masters of the frame of the structure to its minutest ornaments and defects; NOR MUST WE REMOVE THE SMALLEST STONE TILL ANOTHER IS READY, SUITED TO FILL THE VACANT NICHE, OTHERWISE WE MAY INADVERTENTLY BRING A RUIN ON OUR OWN HEADS AND THOSE OF OTHERS, ON THE SPOT WHERE WE TOO EAGERLY SOUGHT TO ERECT A MONUMENT OP GLORY.” I make no apology for tendering these copious extracts, but, on the contrary, regret that my space precludes me from extending them. Well would it have been for our national honour, had Sir C. Napier perused, or perusing had he treasured up, these admirable maxims! Let the reader bear in mind the spirit of Sir J. Malcolm’s instructions as he proceeds to examine the acts of Sir C. Napier. The latter seemed to regard them, not as a light to guide, but a beacon to be shunned, and different truly were the results of the diplomatic labours of the two men! As different as their dispositions—as widely dissimilar as the honors which posterity will severally accord to them!

REPORTS ON ARMAMENTS BY THE AMEERS, CONTAINED IN THE FIRST SINDH BLUE BOOK.

Lover Sindh, Nov. 2. — Wullee Mahommed Chandia commanding the Ameers’ (of Lower Sindh) forces at Larkhana, said to have 5000 men, these can, it is affirmed, be increased to 12,000; reported to have said, that he had received orders to resist the entry of the British into Lower Sindh.

Nov. 13th. — Meer Shere Mahommed made Commander-in-Chief of the Hydrabad forces, and said to have announced his intention to Raise 16,000 men. This is the gossip at Sukkur, in Upper Sindh; on the same day, Captain Mylne, stationed at Hydrabad, where the levies were said to be proceeding, reports that he cannot learn that any such levies are in contemplation.

Dec. 12th. — Ahmed Khan Luggarree sent from Hydrabad to Raise 10,000 men at Larkhana; not, however, in augmentation of those of Wullee Mahommed Chandia; he is only reported to have left Hydrabad to see that the latter did as he was directed; this collection of troops was afterwards proved to be a false report. Shere Mahommed is on
this day reported to have been solicited to take up a position with 10,000 or 15,000 of the 16,000 he had announced his intention of rising, it having been intimated to the Ameers “that the English contemplate the seizure of Tatta and Kurrachee.” This, it is unnecessary to say, was another false rumor, proceeding from the same source as the rest. Shere Mahommed did not occupy any such position, nor was he or his force ever heard of. Our communication between Tatta and Kurrachee remained uninterrupted, as it did throughout Sindh, till the attack on the Hydrabad Residency on the 15th of February—women and children passing up and down unmolested in any way.

Upper Sindh, Nov. 5th.—Reported that “service has been offered to most of the ‘Patans’ who came down with General England’s army; numbers have crossed the river and accepted it under Meer Roostum.” The only Patans who accompanied General England’s army were camel-drivers and other camp followers!

Nov. 12th.—Meer Nusseer Khan has taken into his service 70 horsemen.

Meer Ali Akbar on his way from Oobawurra with about 1000 men.

Nov. 15th.—Meer Roostum said to have a force of 2500 men with him at Abad. “Noor Mahommed states that Patan horsemen cross the river in small bodies daily, and obtain immediate service with the Ameers.”

Nov. 16th.—Meer Mahommed Hossein has sent 700 men to join Meer Roostum’s escort at Abad, now amounting to 3200 men. The Ameers of Hydrabad reported to have “promised to send from the neighbourhood of Hydrabad 15,000 to join at Khyrpoor;” none such were ever sent; and that the promise was made, we have no reason to believe; like the other warlike reports, a mere fiction of Ali Morad’s agents, to forward their master’s views.

Nov. 20th.—400 additional men said to have been sent to Meer Roostum by his son.

Nov. 22d.—One Hindoostanee artillery man!

Nov. 24th.—Meer Mahommed Hoossein joined his father with 1000 men and 2 guns; left him and proceeded with his men and guns to Mungulwallee.

Dec. 1st.—He returned to his father with the 2 guns and his escort, now augmented to 2000 men.

Dec. 3d.—”A number of Sikh and Patan horse” taken into Mahommed Hoossein’s and Meer Nusseer’s service. “Meer Mahomed Khan and Meer Chakur Khan arrived yesterday in Khyrpoor with 100 horses, to make their salaams to Meer Mahommed Hoossein, and also to consult and advise with him. Jumaul Khan Chandia, brother of Wullee Mahommed Khan, arrived with 2000 horse, and the force in Khyrpoor is augmenting
daily; no armed man or Beloochee who arrives in Khyrpoor now, is allowed to leave without taking service, except in peculiar cases.” The total untrustworthiness of all these reports is sufficiently evident from what follows:—“Meer Mahommed Hoossein is collecting a very large force, and he declares, if the English force approaches Khyrpoor, that he will decidedly give it battle; and perwannas directing the Belooche tribes to plunder and slay all British soldiers, sepoys, and stragglers, have been issued by Mahommed Hoossein and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor. * * The Beloochees are expected to harass our forces in such a way that we shall exclaim, ‘what infernal devils these are! What have we done to bring upon us such a nest of hornets?’ “So far from Mahommed Hoossein ever contemplating to fight, in the event of our advance on Khyrpoor, he dismissed the Beloochees “to their own homes,” and fled with his own followers before the General inarched from Roree. So far from any such orders having been given, British subjects of all classes went to and fro, throughout the length and breadth of the province, without molestation, receiving every civility from the people of the country, and every assistance they stood in need of!

Dec. 5th.—A magician who has promised to “cast such a charm over the guns and muskets of the English that their discharge shall be like so much water!”

Dec. 7th.—Son of Meer Mahomed Khan arrives at Khyrpoor with 50 horsemen, and two Jukranee Beloochees bring 60 horsemen more.

On the 8th of December the forces available for the defence of Upper Sindh are estimated at 5000, of which 1000 were stationed at Mungaree, situated between Roree and Khyrpoor, “to keep a vigilant look-out towards the Roree direction,” and “4000 are kept at Khyrpoor;” “men, we are told, are arriving daily,” and as an illustration, we are informed that a Belooche Chief arrived on the 7th with twelve men, and the rest of his horsemen are on the road. On the 10th, when the Ameers had, and for the first time since Sir Charles Napier’s arrival amongst them, reason to believe the English well disposed towards them, Meer Roostum paid up and discharged half the followers. So, 2500 men, “barbarians” whom three days’ absence from their houses and short commons would disperse,” creep on that date out, a ridiculous mus, from the mighty mountain of hostility prepense, whose parturient throes the historian so grandiloquently describes!

The subsequent violent conduct of his brother, compelled the Ameers, as a defensive precaution, to increase the number of their followers; the amount, nature, and necessity of these levies, will be discussed hereafter.

ON THE REPORT BY THE DOCTORS OF THE MAHOMMEDAN COLLEGE AT CALCUTTA, ON THE TRANSFER OF THE TURBAN BY MEER ROOSTUM TO HIS BROTHER.

The question of the validity of the transfer alleged to have been made by Roostum to his brother was afterwards referred to the Doctors of the Mahommedan College at Calcutta.
“By referring to the College,” writes Mr. Thomason, Secretary to the Government of India, whose ‘note forms No. 164 of the Second Sindh Blue Book, “the unanimous opinion of ten Doctors has been obtained; some of them are very able men, and all of them are well informed on the subject.” The question was thus proposed, (B. B. No. 165,) “The ruler of a country died, and left his country and forts to his sons. They divided the country and forts amongst them, and each obtained full possession of his own portion. After a time, one of the sons gave, and made over to his brother, his country, forts, and power. In this case can the donor recall his gift of country, forts, and power?” Their answer was in the negative. In perfect ignorance apparently that Roostum had already given over his forts and country to his son, Mr. Thomason observes, (B. B. No. 164,) “It had been represented to Sir Charles Napier, that every chief is master of his own property, none of which can be entailed; and that the will of the possessor decides who is to have the land; that if he gives it to his children, he may, in virtue of paternal power, revoke that gift; but that if he gives it to a chief who is Ins equal, and over whom he has no paternal power, the deed is final.” And he thus comments on Sir Charles Napier’s view of the matter:—”It is quite correct that every person is master of his own property, and that there can be no entail—he may give it to whom he chooses. The gift, when possession has been obtained by the donor, is complete. It can, however, be cancelled under certain circumstances; but one of the barriers to cancelling a gift is relationship within the prohibited degrees. A GIFT, THEREFORE, TO A SON CANNOT BE CANCELLED ANY MORE THAN TO A BROTHER.” Had Mr. Thomason been aware, as Sir Charles Napier was, that Hoossein had been invested by his father with his rights and dignity, he never would have thought it necessary to consult the Mahommedan Doctors, and had they been apprised of the circumstance, there can be no doubt what their answer would have been.

NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS BY SIR CHARLES NAPIER, TOUCHING CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND MAJOR OUTRAM.

Major Oulram.—”Ali Morad is by far the best of the Ameers. I wish you knew him. He is good-looking, a frank, open manner that you cannot help liking. I wish you could see him, you would be pleased with him. At first he was quite opposed to us, and would have made war against us, if the other Ameers had joined him; however, seeing it was of no use to oppose us, he joined the alliance with us, and is the only one who has never given us cause of complaint. I am sure you will like him.”

Sir Charles Napier.—”I believed all that Major Outram said as far as a certain point—that is to say, that Ali Morad was a superior description of barbarian; but I had had too much experience of barbarian chiefs to have much confidence in the best of them. They may be naturally very superior men, but the best of them is, and must be, under control of the petty chiefs who surround them, and however strong their own minds may be, the physical force which these petty chiefs command, is too powerful to be resisted, and consequently, however naturally honest the great chief may be, you can never be sure of any engagement you enter into with him being fulfilled, unless that engagement involves the good wishes of the minor chiefs, or that you have power to force both him and them to
a steady line of conduct. I, therefore, could not altogether confide in Major Outram’s admiration of Ali Morad; but it so far influenced me as to make me believe that he was the best among the Ameers of Khyrpoor to hold the rule in Upper Sindh.”

Major Outram.—”The great agitator and cause of all opposition to the English is a scoundrel named Futteh Mohammed Ghoree. I have tried to catch this old villain, but he is such a cunning fox that there is no discovering any fact which I can lay hold of. But allow me to put you on your guard against him, for he is the secret mover of all the breaches of treaty and insults that we have received from the northern Ameers; the Syud Mahommed Shurreef, whom I caught with so much trouble, was merely one of this old villain’s emissaries.”

Sir Charles Napier.—”These observations of Major Outram I considered as the result of long experience in the petty politics of Sindh.”

END OF PART I.