



THE ~~ARMIES~~
OF
THE NATIVE STATES
OF
INDIA.

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I WOULD inscribe these letters with the
name of the great and accomplished

STATESMAN

whose lot it will be to deal with the political
danger and national evil of which these useless
armies are the cause ; and in dedicating, with all
humility, this imperfect narrative to

THE EARL OF DUFFERIN,

the student of history can hardly fail to recognise
the probability of his having to imitate in more
than one particular the policy of his great pre-
decessor,

LORD DALHOUSIE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE subject discussed in the four articles, which, by the kind permission of *The Times*, are here republished, is one that is certainly not among the least important of Indian problems. The Native States of India represent, in the imperfect form that could alone survive so many rude reversals and discomfitures at the hands of Englishmen, the dynasties and systems of government existing before our time. The greatest of them have vanished. With but few exceptions these are the mushroom states, the patrimonies of unscrupulous adventurers, which came into being and gained a footing during the decline of the Mogul—that great line of brave, wise, and magnificent princes, stretching back to Akbar and Baber on the throne of Delhi, to Timour the arbiter of the world from his palace at Samarcand, and to Genghis issuing from his remote solitudes on the Amoor to bring two continents into terror of his name.

Not to them is the consideration to be paid which is always due to those who are seeking to perpetuate the name that has gained the respect and admiration of its age, and the place that endures in History. With the exception of the Rajpoots and Mysore, both of whom we restored, there is none of the greater families that can claim forbearance on the part of the Supreme Government because they are the natural hereditary rulers of the land. Not one can do so on account of the benefits conferred on its subjects. The restraint which we have placed on our action is caused solely by the treaties and arrangements which we have on our own part concluded with them. But that restraint must obviously be relaxed by every fresh evidence that these chiefs are acting against the interests of India, or that they are rendering the execution of our onerous task more difficult.

Within the limits of the necessary space the question of the armies of the Native States is here as fully investigated as the patience of the English reader would allow. They are the most evident of the evils

accompanying that form of native rule which stands by its own prerogative. Much might be said about the evils accruing from the lavish bestowal of the privilege of adoption, which allows the child of the beggar of to-day to be raised to-morrow to the cushion of authority and the seat of power. Nor are the shortcomings of these administrations restricted to military expenditure. The *régime* is bad and it is costly. The chief thinks only of hoarding up his treasure, and resents as an infraction of his right any request to expend it in the public cause. As a matter of fact, the true state of these feudatories is concealed from outside gaze behind an almost impenetrable veil of official discretion and forbearance.

The armies are the one mark that cannot be completely thrust out of sight. They are kept as much as possible in the background, but they exist; their existence is shown unequivocally by our counter-precautions. It is to these armed forces that the hand of remedial legislation should be applied. The States may remain; the armies in their present size must vanish. No doubt some

will resent the loss, and a few may talk of opposing it ; but the reform is inevitable, and the result assured. The discussion of the subject recalls what was said by one of the chiefs of the North-West when it was debated whether surrender to Runjeet Singh or to the English was the preferable. He exclaimed, " It is death for us in either event. If we are caught in the grip of Runjeet Singh we shall die with the sharp pangs of Asiatic cholera. If we come under the shadow of the British we shall pine away of slow consumption." The prediction, although not realised at the time, may prove true ; but none the less a duty is a duty, and here the path seems to lie straight before us, to abolish these useless armies, to remove possible dangers, and to husband the resources in men and treasure of the great territory of IMPERIAL INDIA.

I.

THE MAHRATTA STATES.

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VARIOUS considerations, such as our increased responsibility towards the people of India, the cry of "justice to India," and the possibility of an external danger from Russia, compel us to recognise the fact that we must most carefully review and, if deemed wise, rearrange the relations of the native States of India with the paramount power of the English Government in that country.

The problem is much more complicated than would be the case had we only to consider whether the existence of these States is compatible—I will not say with the existence

of our authority in Hindostan, for that depends on the will of the English people alone—but with the efficient discharge of the highest obligations we have contracted towards the Indian populations. Nor need we be embarrassed in our survey of that vast dependency, which covers 1,500,000 square miles and contains 250,000,000 of subjects, and which, on the map, still presents the variety of colour derived from every form of grant given by the Sovereign to its feudatories in character of treaty, sunnud, or engagement, by any doubt as to the ease, rapidity, and completeness with which the fiat might go forth that it should become, what Runjeet Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, foresaw in the future, uniform in its subjection—that is to say, in its moral and material advantages.

We have to take into account that the princes of these States and territories have received promises and pledges which can only be ignored on one of two pleas: either that they have not preserved the sense of the

corresponding obligations which they either voluntarily contracted or allowed to be imposed upon them; or, secondly, that their manifest incompetence or want of inclination has caused them to fail in the performance of the first duty of rulers towards those they rule.

The subject covers so wide a field, and involves so many different considerations, that, in order to devote that attention to it which its importance demands, we propose to set forth in full the facts of our relations with the native States, and the reflections to which they give rise, in a series of articles. The subject may be divided most naturally and conveniently into four parts—(1) the Mahratta States, (2) the Mahomedan States, (3) the Hindoo States, and (4) the Frontier States.

I place the Mahrattas first, both because they possess the greatest military power, and also on account of their having been our most formidable opponents in the past.

The Mahratta States are three—Gwalior,

Indore, and Baroda—ruled by chiefs known respectively as Scindiah, Holkar, and the Gaekwar, all of whom possess the right to use the great Hindoo title of Maharajah. Our relations with each of these States go back for more than a hundred years, and they were of great political importance at a time when the English, as a commercial company, could only make a stand against numerous enemies by arraying one Mahratta House against another.

The nominal supremacy of the Peishwa, and the sense of a common peril which occasionally united even the discordant councils of Poonah, never availed to combine in a single league the Mahratta chiefs, who, before they had become rulers, were only the soldiers of the accepted head of their race. The defection of one often served to simplify the discomfiture of them all. This disunion was the more remarkable, as these families produced several men of a high order of ability during the last century—skilful ad-

ministrators, prudent statesmen, and brave soldiers.

In this respect none surpassed the House of Scindiah, which had its founder in the slipper-bearer to Balajee Rao Peishwa, no further back than the commencement of the last century. The position of a menial was to be coveted in the East for the facilities it provided towards gaining the ear of a despot, and Ranajee Scindiah turned his opportunities to excellent account. He led more than one successful expedition against the Mogul Emperor of Delhi, but conferred still better service on his master by the reorganisation of the Mahratta cavalry than by any actual victory in the field. A Jaghir in Malwa was the territorial reward of his services, and formed the nucleus of the possessions of his family.

To him succeeded in due course his youngest son, Mahadaji, who, on the fatal field of Paniput, displayed the greatest valour, and only withdrew after his best men had

fallen in a vain resistance to the Afghans. Wounded by an Afghan horseman in the flight, he was fortunate to escape with a maimed limb, which troubled him through his after life. Mahadaji then devoted himself to the recovery of the power he had lost in a more marked degree than any other Mahratta chief, employed French officers to drill his troops and form his artillery, and strove in every way to place the House of Scindiah at the head of the Mahrattas.

The English found him a useful intermediary in some of their dealings with the Peishwa, and, while he assumed the airs of a sovereign, his neutrality was really paving the way to the gradual weakening of the national confederacy, which union alone was wanting to make powerful. The first English treaty with Scindiah was concluded in 1781, by Colonel Muir, acting on behalf of Warren Hastings ; and it bound him to assist towards the conclusion of peace, or, failing that, to remain neutral during any hostilities that might ensue.

The Treaty of Salbye, in the following year, was negotiated under his auspices ; and the curious will find, on perusing the terms of this convention, that Scindiah held the novel position of guaranteeing the good faith of both the English and the Peishwa. Mahadaji flattered himself that he was thus shaking himself free from the control of the Peishwa, but the overthrow of Hyder Ali, and the general extension of English authority, soon made him perceive that he might in reality be only changing one subjection for another.

For, although the high consideration always expressed by the Company towards his person was flattering to his vanity, the march of Colonel Goddard through his territory, and the capture of his famous fortress of Gwalior, conveyed a warning that his authority had its limits, and that, at the best, his army was not invincible. His closing years witnessed, indeed, the restoration of Shah Alim at Delhi, the assertion at Poonah of his pre-eminence among Mahratta leaders and counsellors, and

tility which cost him the loss of the strong fort of Asirgurh.

In 1827 Dowlut Rao died, and as he left no heir, and had persistently refused to adopt one, the obligation was forced upon the English authorities to interfere for the nomination of a chief. A youth, whose connection with Scindiah, although the nearest that could be found, was remote, was duly installed under the name of Junkaji Rao, and to give him the better claim, they married him to the grand-daughter left by Dowlut Rao. The early years of Junkaji's rule were disturbed by the machinations of Dowlut's widow, Baiza Bai, but at last, in 1833, quiet was restored by her banishment from the State.

Junkaji's rule was unfortunate and discreditable. His death in 1843 was a happy release for himself and his State, though it again revived the danger of there being no legal successor, for he left heir neither of his body nor of his adoption. Recourse had again to be made to the more distant scions

of the family, and by chance the choice fell on a boy eight years old, who became the present Maharajah Jyajee Scindiah.

Disturbances followed, and when an English army entered the State, the two battles of Punniar and Maharajpore were fought before the mutinous army which had repudiated the authority of its chief, as it did again fifteen years later on, was completely cowed. During the Mutiny, the English Resident had to leave Gwalior in June, 1857 ; but the efforts of Jyajee Scindiah, ably supported by his Minister, Dinkur Rao, sufficed to keep the Gwalior forces inactive during the most critical period of the memorable outbreak. In June, 1858, the army broke loose from control, and joined Tantia Topi. It suffered severely in the crowning victories which the present Lord Strathnairn gained round Gwalior.

Various rewards were conferred upon Scindiah for his fidelity to the English cause, but, singularly enough, Dinkur Rao fell imme-

diately afterwards into the greatest disgrace, and became the object of his master's intense dislike. It would almost seem as if the Maharajah had repented of the policy he had pursued, and as if he regretted a lost opportunity. Such is a sketch of the House of Scindiah, which, if neither very ancient nor very remarkable in its performance—excepting always Mahadaji, who was a man of ability—still affords the most favourable specimen of the rulers of a native State. We have now to consider the obligations it has contracted, and the manner in which they have been performed.

The population of Gwalior State exceeds 3,000,000, but although the growth of population has been considerable, due as much to increased accuracy of statistics as to the actual fact, it is admitted that, under an enlightened administration, it would easily support a much larger number of people. The revenue which is ostensibly raised from this population amounts to one and a quarter

million pounds sterling, or more than seven shillings a head. At the same rate our revenue for British India would exceed seventy millions, without the receipts from opium, railways, and other public works.

At the most moderate computation, the rate of taxation in a native State is half again as much per head as it is within our dominions. But it is probably very much higher in the case of merchants, traders, and the wealthier agriculturists, for the returns of the Dewan Treasury exclude many of the privileges retained by a native prince. However, the figures which cannot be challenged make the case sufficiently strong.

What use does the Maharajah Scindiah make of this by no means inconsiderable sum? Does he apply it to the benefit of his State, to the advantage of those three million toilers who accept his decisions with the resignation of an Oriental population? By treaty, injudiciously enlarged by subsequent concessions on our part at the time of the

Mutiny and since, Scindiah has the right to maintain an army of 5,000 drilled infantry, 6,000 horsemen, and 48 guns with 480 gunners.

When his army disappeared with the Mutiny, Scindiah not only got rid of Dinkur Rao's inconvenient counsel and assumed the personal management of his own affairs, but he devoted his main energies to the re-organisation of his army. The work proved to be exactly to his taste, for Jyajee is admitted by all to have the instincts of a soldier, and either he or his lieutenants have displayed no mean powers of organisation. The old Gwalior force possessed little cohesion or discipline. Scindiah's new army possesses both, and is a highly disciplined, and possibly a very efficient body of men. The Maharajah has kept it as much out of sight as possible, but all soldiers who have seen it declare it to be deserving of the name of a regular army. One of the last things done by Lord Napier of Magdala

before leaving India was to review it, and he declared that it would compare in no sense unfavourably with our own native troops.

Scindiah has not laboured for more than twenty years in vain, for whereas by the Treaty of Benares in 1860 he was only to have the number stated of drilled infantry and sowars, he has converted the latter into regular cavalry ; and by passing the former through the ranks with considerable rapidity, and sending the men home as soon as they were efficient, he has certainly quadrupled his foot ; while he possesses six thousand cavalry in addition to the sowars that his vassals are bound by their tenure to provide.

No statistics are available, but there is every reason to say that Scindiah can call upon the services of nearly 30,000 trained soldiers whenever he may be so disposed. There is no question that of all the native States, excepting perhaps Nepaul, the army of Gwalior is the most efficient and the most formidable.

An Oriental Court thinks of nothing if not of show, and it will be easily understood that the cost of creating this army, and of maintaining the display suitable to this prince's tastes and dignity in his palaces at Lushkur and Ujjain, has left but a very slender surplus out of the annual revenue for those administrative purposes which are the taxpayers' return and equivalent. The Maharajah has always pursued as advanced a policy in connection with railways as he has with regard to the formation of an army; but it has required little sacrifice of principle to encourage the construction of a railway which was made for the most part out of other people's money, and which possessed unquestionable strategical and financial recommendations.

Only a small amount beyond the sum paid annually by the Durbar to the English Government is devoted to the maintenance of the highroads; and it is stated in the official reports that very little, if anything at

all, has been done towards the construction of "village roads, bridges, schools, dispensaries, and the other indispensable accessories of even a low civilisation." So much has this been the case that even the bridges, roads, and monuments, which former rulers left to perpetuate their names, have been neglected and have fallen into a state of disrepair and decay.

Gwalior is believed to be rich in mineral resources, but nothing whatever has been done to develop them. The people are officially described as poverty-stricken; and considering that more than half the State revenue is devoted to military expenditure, and that by far the greater portion of the other and smaller half is required for the personal expenses of the prince and his court, it is not surprising to learn that the most necessary works are neglected, and that the condition of things is distinctly retrogressive.

As a simple matter of fact, this is entirely due to Scindiah's heavy military expenditure.

He cannot command the most efficient native force in Hindostan, and at the same time perform all his obligations towards his subjects, who have the good fortune to inhabit a naturally fertile region, but one which requires many irrigation works and greatly improved means of communication, before they can feel sure that drought and the cost of transit will not baffle their most moderate expectations.

It must not be supposed that Scindiah is unsympathetic in these matters when they are brought before him. He is simply ignorant of them and of their significance. His thoughts are engrossed in his army and in military improvements, and when the other wants of his subjects are brought before him by some accidental circumstance, it is an easy matter to grant a donation of a lakh to salve the conscience of the prince, and to allay for the moment, if not popular suffering, at least its expression.

There can be no hesitation in saying that

Scindiah's great military expenditure is both excessive and unnecessary, except on the one supposition, which would at once put him out of court, that it is directed against ourselves. By the nature of our predominance in India, as well as by the terms of the Queen's Proclamation, the issues of peace and war rest with us. The Indian feudatories are forbidden to wage war upon one another, or to embark upon any enterprise of external aggression.

If they were to break this obligation the offenders would be denounced as the enemies of the State, and summarily dealt with. Not a shot has been fired in India since the Mutiny and the abolition of the Company except by the soldiers of the Queen. The army of Scindiah and those also of the other feudatories are absolutely forbidden and prohibited from attempting the first duty of soldiers.

Scindiah may not turn his highly organised army, as he would like to do, to practical use

for the humiliation of his old rival Holkar or of the Nizam. He can only pass his leisure in reviewing it, and in dreaming of the use to which some of his successors may be able to put it. But for the time its sphere of action is restricted to the parade ground.

I will not stop to consider here whether the possession of so dangerous a weapon is calculated to stimulate ambition and strengthen the treasonable inclination that must be natural to a brave and able chief like Scindiah, who can never wholly forget the traditions of his family. I am content to point out the direct consequences of the maintenance of this utterly useless and quite unnecessary army on which Scindiah lavishes the greater part of the revenue wrung from his poverty-stricken subjects.

Those consequences are not merely the diversion of a large number of men from peaceful pursuits, by service in the Gwalior regiments, but, in a still more striking degree, the encouragement of military habits and

ambitions among the able-bodied population, which completely distract the minds of an Eastern race from peaceful occupation, and unfit them for manual labour. The male population of Gwalior may be divided into two classes : soldiers who after their course of training are loth to be agriculturists, and agriculturists left to the plough because physically incapable of becoming soldiers. It is easy to understand that many of these time-served soldiers prefer the chances and excitement of the dacoit's life to sedentary occupation in their native village ; and we shall hear more of the revival of dacoity and thuggism in Central India, unless sharp measures are taken to remind the Maharajah and his neighbours of the obligations they have accepted in this matter, particularly under the treaty of 1817.

The military system of Scindiah has created a fever of expectancy among his male subjects, and has made civil life distasteful to them. The diversion of his

revenue from legitimate objects to the creation of an army has entailed the decadence of his State in its material possessions, and the people, left to their own limited devices and resources, have failed to hold their ground in face of drought, deficient crops, difficulty of transport, and other natural visitations and essential requirements in which an Oriental population always needs the support and initiative of its rulers.

It is from this cause that there are "the descendants of proud Rajputs and high caste Mahomedans competing to obtain the lowest coolie employment," as Major Keith told us the other day, and that the subjects of Scindiah are described in official reports as "unfortunate" and "poverty-stricken."

Nor does the evil stop with the employment of so many thousands of Scindiah's subjects in a useless and dangerous profession; for nearly 4,000 men of the Indian army, including more than 1,200 Europeans, and three batteries of artillery, with a crack

native cavalry regiment, are permanently stationed in Gwalior, at the fortress itself, and in the Morar cantonment, watching Scindiah's army and acting as a counterpoise to it.

Regarding India as one country under the protection of England, which guarantees the security of all alike, it follows that its people are taxed to pay for Scindiah's army and for the force set to watch and neutralise it ; while, if it did not exist, at least 3,000 more troops would be available for frontier defence, as 1,000 men in Gwalior fort would suffice for all purposes if Scindiah accepted his natural position as a great nobleman under the English Crown.

The second of the principal Mahratta States is that of Indore, ruled by the Maharajah Holkar, who, like Scindiah, traces the origin of his House to a successful leader of cavalry in the service of the Peishwa at the beginning of the 18th century. Mulhar Rao, whose title of Holkar meant nothing

more than "the inhabitant of the village of Hol," was a not less remarkable man than either Ranajee or Mahadaji Scindiah, with both of whose careers his was for a great part contemporaneous.

He attained greater success than the former, and when comparatively a young man received the high office of Commander-in-Chief north of the Nerbudda. In 1753 he occupied Delhi and plundered the Emperor's camp, and in 1759 he took part in the battle of Paniput, which, it has been thought, would have proved a great Indian victory but for his inaction at the very crisis of the day. Mulhar Rao died in 1766 ; but while his own achievements were most remarkable, he was unfortunate in his successors, who gradually lost their fruit, and reduced the position of Holkar to one of distinct inferiority to that of Scindiah.

Mulhar's grandson died insane, and after that young ruler's mother, Ahaliya Bai, with the assistance of a skilful soldier named

Tuckaji Rao, had given the dominions of Indore peace for thirty years, another period of disturbance ensued. Although Tuckaji had acted throughout from disinterested motives, the line of Holkar was destined to be continued in the person of his illegitimate son, Jeswunt Rao, who in 1802 inflicted a defeat upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah, near Poonah. Unfortunately for himself he came into collision with the English power, and after several defeats inflicted upon him by Lord Lake, and an abortive attempt to enlist the support of the Sikhs, he was compelled to sign an ignominious peace on the banks of the Beas, bearing the date of 24th December 1805.

Whether from disappointment or the effects of debauchery, Jeswunt Rao himself went mad, and his death in 1811 paved the way for fresh disturbances in Indore. His favourite widow, Tulsi Bai, ruled for his son, Mulhar Rao, until her mutinous army disobeyed her orders, and connived at her barbarous murder.

Her policy had this element of prudence and stability, that it leant on the English alliance ; but her successors preferred the more adventurous policy of hostility. The troops of Indore shared in the general Mahratta collapse of 1817, and by the Treaty of Mundisore (6th January 1818), Holkar was deprived of his numerous fiefs in Rajputana, and of all his possessions south of the Satpura range. Above all, he accepted the protection of the English.

By almost disbanding the army, and by devoting every attention to the finances, Mulhar Rao and his Ministers succeeded in restoring something like order to the State ; and although there was more than one rebellion on a small scale against Mulhar Rao's authority, things gradually settled down into tranquillity. The relations with Holkar suddenly changed after the Treaty of Mundisore from questions of high policy of peace and war to the regulation of the opium traffic, and to decide whether it should be a monopoly or

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whether its taxation should assume ~~the form~~ of transit dues.

Mulhar Rao died in 1833, and a ~~furth~~ period of disorder ensued until the year 1844, when the present Maharajah Tuckaji Rao was duly installed in power by the direct intervention of the Company. It is a somewhat remarkable fact that the present holders of both of the titles of Holkar and Scindiah owed their elevation to power, when mere boys, to the act of the English authorities.

The population of Indore is now said to exceed one million, and the revenue is rather more than three-quarters of the same number of pounds sterling. The latter has shown of late years a marked increase, and the Maharajah has several times announced his fixed intention to raise it to a million. A large portion of this revenue is derived from his share in the opium production of India; but still, so far as figures go, the subjects of Indore contribute no less than 15s. per head of taxation, or three times as much as they

would do were they British subjects. The Maharajah makes it his boast that before long they will pay £1.

Another significant fact in connection with this growth in the revenue is that most of it is devoted to one of two things—increased military expenditure, or to be hoarded in the State Treasury. In Indore last year not less than 1,000,000 rupees were added to the accumulated savings of a rule of forty years. We shall return to this point in our concluding remarks and suggestions of a remedy.

Three-fifths of the revenue is spent on the Court, the army, and the police, and one-seventh is assigned to public works. Holkar is not such a military enthusiast as Scindiah. He only spends about £170,000 a year on his army, and another £12,000 towards the contingent. By treaty, he may only maintain 3,000 cavalry, some 5,000 infantry, and twenty-four guns. But although he has not followed out the same systematic plan as his neighbour, he can dispose of a larger force

than the above, especially as he has created a police corps of nearly 6,000 men.

In his capital there is also a larger number of Afghan and Hindostani adventurers than at Gwalior, while in munition, and weapons of war he is particularly well provided. Although heavily taxed, the people of Indore are much better able to meet their obligations than in the other Mahratta States, partly on account of the remunerative opium crop, and partly because Holkar has devoted his main attention to business matters.

But even in this his policy has been double-edged, and the advantages derived by some have been qualified by the disadvantages imposed upon others. The wealthy have reason to complain of extreme rigour at all times ; and in cases where they happened to be in litigation with the Chief or the Durbar, it is not unfrequent to meet with cases of absolute injustice ; while the practice of transit dues fills the State coffers in a seemingly easy manner, at the same time

that it provides opportunities for local and subordinate extortion.

In this latter respect Holkar is no worse than his neighbour ; but the two, happening to hold territory which virtually shuts off Bombay from the rest of India on the east, are able by rigorous and frequent transit dues to hamper trade, and in some cases to make it practically impossible. The exactions are made the more severe by the levying of fresh duty whenever any part of the State is entered, and owing to its conformation it not unfrequently happens that the same caravan leaves and re-enters Indore territory several times on its journey.

Quite recently a feeling of great insecurity was described as prevailing in Indore among the merchants, and although this was attributed to the excesses of Holkar's younger son, Bala Sahib, there is no doubt that it had its origin in the pressure of trade and in the dread of exaction on the part of Holkar's Court, aggravated no doubt by the truculence

of the young prince, who is now relegated to temporary obscurity.

Although the Indian Government does not always know of these affairs, and often will not permit them to be published in their official reports, one case leaked out some time ago in connection with the proceedings of Holkar against a member of the Bombay firm of Sassoon. This native gentleman, a British subject, was summarily arrested and his property seized, on the pretence of a debt to the Maharajah incurred many years before. There was probably not the least foundation for the claim, which was strenuously denied by the accused, and certainly the period of limitation had long passed by. The Maharajah had even originally withdrawn his claim when submitted to arbitration. Still, it was only after a very firm and repeated demand for his release and the surrender of his property that the Durbar complied, and that the accused regained his liberty.

This case, it is to be feared, is only excep-

tional in involving the interests of a British subject. Otherwise it was typical of Holkar's justice; and the reader will have little difficulty in believing that "where the claims of the State are concerned, justice is not certain."

The position of Holkar with regard to the Supreme Government is, therefore, slightly different from that of his neighbour. His military expenditure is comparatively great and equally unnecessary; but still it does not wear the same appearance of excess, on account of the care and expenditure he devotes to the other branches of the administration.

Holkar's importance arises from the position of his State and from the fact of his wealth, which has kept him well provided with the sinews of war. Mr. St. George Tucker, an ex-member of the Governor of Bombay's Council, who writes on this subject with knowledge and authority, has recently pointed out how easily communications could be cut

between Bombay and Allahabad by the main line of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway ; and it sometimes happens that this is completely effected by the breaking of bridges or other accidental circumstances.

The construction of an alternative line, by the continuation of one already existing for the greater part of the journey through Nagpur and the Central Provinces, is also recommended, for the purpose of connecting Bombay with Jubbulpore by two distinct lines.

A more direct obligation on the part of Holkar is in the matter of his revenue, and it should be strongly pointed out to him and other native chiefs that they have no right whatever to grind money out of their toiling subjects. The revenue of the year should be spent in the year, or remitted in subsequent taxation. That is a point quite beyond the conception of even the most enlightened native prince, but it is one on which the Supreme Government is bound to speak out strongly.

Holkar's army is much smaller and comparatively less formidable than Scindiah's; but he has better means of raising recruits and of attracting adventurers to his flag than the other Mahratta. Latterly he has devoted much attention to his artillery, and has his steam cannon foundry at Indore. His army, whatever its real value may be, is deemed to require an equipoise of not less than 4,500 of our Anglo-Indian army in the cantonment of Mhow, where one European and one native cavalry regiment, three batteries of artillery, nearly two European foot regiments, and more than two native, are permanently stationed.

One thousand men, English and native, garrison other places in the neighbourhood of Holkar's dominions; and it must be remembered that this army of nearly 10,000 men is permanently occupied in watching and neutralising the armies of the two great Mahratta chiefs.

To this should be added the Bhopal and Malwa Bheel battalions (together 1,500

strong), which at Sehore and Sirdarpur virtually contribute towards the object of maintaining peace and repressing the other armies in the Central India Agency. Large as this force is, there is no doubt that, in an hour of grave external danger, the garrisons at Morar and Mhow would have to be increased.

We can, therefore, only arrive at the conclusion that the existence of the great Mahratta armies, while unjust to the subjects of Scindiah and Holkar, also bears heavily on the Government and taxpayers of British India, by compelling them to keep 10,000 men of their small army and five or six batteries in permanent inaction. For purposes of a trans-frontier war or for frontier defence they may be, practically speaking, eliminated from the numbers of our Anglo-Indian army. These facts are very important, and raise some serious doubts and reflections.

The third and last of the great Mahratta States is that of Baroda, ruled by a chief who

uses the style of the Gaekwar. The Gaekwar family traces its origin to Pilaji Gaekwar and his son Damaji, who were the lieutenants of the Dhabaray family, which held under the Peishwa the office of Senaputti, or Commander-in-Chief, in Guzerat. Damaji Gaekwar made himself supreme in that province before the close of the first half of the 18th century, but his efforts to emancipate himself from the sway of the Peishwa failed.

His subsequent fortunes were checkered, and when he died he left his dynasty subject to the payment of a tribute of £80,000 a year. More than twenty years' confusion followed ; but at last, in 1778, after our Treaty of Poorundur, the Gaekwar Futteh Singh remained in possession, acknowledging his subjection to the Peishwa. The policy of the Company being to break up the Mahratta confederacy and destroy the influence of the Peishwa, several attempts were made to detach the Gaekwar from his allegiance and to strengthen his ideas of independence.

But whether from the turn of events, or from the individual incapacity of the Baroda chiefs, the fact is certain that the Gaekwar never benefited by the numerous conventions he signed with the Company, and never attained the political importance to which he aspired. Various family feuds engrossed his attention, but they do not possess the importance which would warrant preservation. The treaty of 1802 gave the English an almost unlimited power of interference, although specially directed against the importation of Arab mercenaries from Muscat and Yemen.

These fanatical adventurers were eventually reduced to submission by the action of the English authorities ; an annual sum of nearly 800,000 rupees was duly assigned for the maintenance of order, and by several later arrangements this amount was increased by additional subventions. The overthrow of the Peishwa released the Gaekwar from all further engagements to the Court of Poona. His relations with the English became

those of close dependence, with, however, only a small portion of the advantages accruing from English rule.

Latterly the Gaekwar's administration had deteriorated in efficiency, and complaints became frequent. The right of adoption—a great favour and privilege among the effete princes of the East—was conceded in 1862, but under Khundi Rao and his brother and successor, Mulhar Rao, the confusion grew worse, and the gravest consequences ensued.

In 1873 a commission of inquiry was at last appointed, and its report established so serious an indictment against Mulhar Rao that he was warned that immediate improvement afforded the only means of continuing his rule. His marriage with his mistress, and other acts in which it was impossible for us to take any part, led to the breach of all relations between the Court and the Residency, and at last the attempted poisoning of Colonel Phayre resulted in the despatch of a

special officer, Sir Lewis Pelly, to report on the situation.

Mulhar Rao was suspended from power, but in a weak moment his case was submitted to a mixed commission. The English members found him guilty of all the charges, but Scindiah and Sir Dinkur Rao absolved him of the more serious allegations. The Government were, therefore, compelled to act outside of this commission, and by a decree of arbitrary, but undoubtedly just power, to declare that Mulhar Rao was no longer fit to rule, and he was consequently deposed. The widow of his brother, Khundi Rao, was allowed to adopt Gopal Rao, the descendant of Pilaji Gackwar, and, after an eight years' regency, he was intrusted with personal authority two years ago.

Accounts differ as to whether the promises held forth by those who were intrusted with his education will be realised. The atmosphere of Baroda has long been tainted, and the Ministers of Guzerat generally have

shown neither capacity nor public spirit. In no other part of India is the tendency to accumulate useless treasure more marked than it is here.

The population of Baroda is about two millions and a quarter, and the revenue exceeds thirteen million rupees. It follows that the population is taxed at the rate of nearly twelve shillings a head, or more than twice what is paid by English subjects. Much of this revenue is wasted on an utterly useless army of 516 cavalry, 3,000 infantry and 44 guns, while an irregular force is maintained of 5,000 cavalry and 7,000 foot.

With the exception of the mercenaries from Arabia and Scinde, this nondescript force is almost contemptible, except for mischiefs and rapine. It only exists in order that the people of Baroda may be taxed, and that the ruler may wreak his will on wretched sections of the population, such as the Nimas and other inferior races. Perhaps, because it is so utterly without use or value, it affords

stronger proof of the anomaly of these armies, which have no avocation, and which can only be defended on the ground of their providing their masters with the means of playing at soldiers.

A dangerous game, it must be allowed, among a dominant caste whose instincts are martial, and whose rulers possess many proud memories of past greatness, and of a period when, but for us, they would have been the arbiters of India's destiny.

Nor, if we think solely of the useless outlay, of the suffering of the people, ground down to pay the vast cost of maintenance, of the diverted energy, of the embarrassment these armies are accepted in all our calculations as possessing the means of creating, can we arrive less clearly at the one obvious conclusion, that they are completely unable to justify their existence. By none would their disappearance be felt more markedly, or for greater good, than by the peaceful and well-behaved indigenous peoples between the

Chumbul and the Nerbudda, who are now given over by our excessive tolerance to the Mahratta tax-gatherer, to be fleeced and shorn for the purposes of an unnecessary and perilous display of martial power.

II.

THE MAHOMEDAN STATES.

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THERE are twenty-two Mahomedan States within the limits of India proper, but of these not more than three can claim political importance. They are Hyderabad, Bhopal, and Bahawalpur. The other nineteen have armies, revenues, and all the appendages of power, but individually they are insignificant, and even collectively they do not present a very formidable appearance. It is different, however, with the three I have named; but of these only the first has the same kind of power as Scindiah and Holkar possess.

If the old Mogul Emperors could regard the peninsula in its present condition, nothing would strike them as being more strange than that the only relic of any importance

left of the Mahomedan conquest should be the Nizam's dominion in the Deccan. It is certainly singular to find, on a brief investigation, that the Mahomedan States of India now consist only of Hyderabad, two minor Courts, and less than twenty chiefs, who, except in the rights to have armed retainers and to receive salutes, are nothing more than members of a rural aristocracy.

The history of the Nizam only dates from the same period as that of the Houses of Gwalior and Indore. The Emperor Aurungzebe had carried the arms of the Mogul into Southern India, and, by the overthrow of the proud dynasties of Golconda and Bejapore, had established the authority of Delhi throughout the Deccan.

Those campaigns marked the extreme limits of the triumph of the House of Timour, and Aurungzebe's successors, feeling the strain of personal attention too great, appointed a soldier of fortune named Asaf Jah, who had distinguished himself in the

wars of Aurungzebe, to govern this dependency in the South, with the lofty titles of Subahdar of the Deccan, and Nizam-ul-Mulk, which latter title means Regulator of the State.

The family of the Nizam is neither ancient nor exalted in its origin ; and the exceedingly lofty pretensions of this ruler are calculated to raise a smile among those who are aware of the very modern date of his family, of the humbleness of its origin, and, above all, the barrenness of its achievements. Asaf Jah was of Turcoman extraction, and it has been said, with probability at least in its favour, that he was the descendant of one of those Turcoman and Afghan soldiers whom Humayoun, the son of Baber and the father of Akbar, recruited by the bounty of the Shah at Meshed and Herat for the recovery of the Empire of India, from which his brother Kamran had momentarily expelled him.

Be that as it may, Asaf Jah, appointed

lieutenant in the South, showed no scruple or hesitation in throwing off his allegiance to the degenerate Emperors of Delhi, after having allowed the form of dependence to continue during the first ten years of his residence at Hyderabad. In 1723 he declared that he would pay tribute no longer, and that he was henceforth to be treated as an independent prince, although he retained the name of Nizam. Asaf Jah enjoyed power for another quarter of a century after this decided proceeding. Perhaps he owed his long immunity from interference as much to the influence of his eldest son, Ghazi-ud-Din, at Delhi, as to the weakness and hesitation then becoming conspicuous in the councils of that Court.

Asaf's second son, Nasir Jung, became the next Nizam, but his claims were at once disputed by his nephew, Mosaffir Jung, whose pretensions received unexpected importance from the support of Dupleix and the French, at the time firmly established in

the Carnatic. I need not refer in any detail to the events of this period, when for a short time the claims of Mosaffir triumphed, thanks to his powerful supporters. Nasir was assassinated by some of his officers, and Mosaffir's forces were brought into a state of considerable efficiency by the military skill and ability of Bussy.

Mosaffir, like Nasir, was killed by his own troops; and then Salabut Jung, the third son of Asaf, was placed in power. Salabut Jung owed his nomination to the French, but the tide of victory had by this time turned in favour of the English, and one of the chief acts of his short rule was to sign a treaty ceding Masulipatam and other places to the Company, and binding himself, moreover, to exclude the French from his dominions for ever. This treaty, which was the first we made with the Nizam, was dated May 14 1759, and Salabut Jung's only part in it was to append the following sentence, "I swear by God and his prophet, and upon the holy

Alcoran, that I with pleasure agree to the requests specified in this paper, and shall not deviate from it even one hair's breadth."

Salabut Jung was deposed in 1761 by his brother, Nizam Ali, one of the youngest sons of Asaf Jah, and he died in prison two years later. It was suspected that his brother had poisoned him. In 1766 a second treaty was signed, by which, in return for certain districts, a subsidiary force was to be maintained for the Nizam's service. However, the embarrassment of the Madras Government was at the time serious and obvious, owing to the pronounced hostility of Hyder Ali, who had established his authority in Mysore, and threatened to extend it far to the north.

Nizam Ali broke the engagements of his treaty, and invaded the Carnatic in conjunction with Hyder Ali. But good fortune did not attend his share in the enterprise, and in 1768 he signed the third treaty, making further concessions, and abandoning the cause

of Hyder Ali. In 1788 he was compelled to surrender Guntoor to the Company, on the death of his brother, Bazalut Jung; but he did so with reluctance, and only under compulsion. In the same year he sent his first ambassador, Mir Abdul Kasim, the late Sir Salar Jung's great-grandfather, to Calcutta, to plead his cause with reference to the claim of arrears for the contingent, which, either from wilfulness or carelessness, was very irregularly paid up.

In 1790 Nizam Ali accepted the offer made by Lord Cornwallis of an alliance against Tippoo Sahib, then energetically endeavouring to carry out his father's schemes; and although the assistance he rendered was very slight, he received at the close of the war districts yielding a revenue of half a million sterling. It was his misfortune to lose all the advantages of this alliance in a war with the Mahrattas, who, after a brief but decisive campaign, exacted from him in 1795 the disadvantageous condi-

tions contained in the Convention of Kundla. For this discomfiture Nizam Ali threw all the blame on the English, who, he said, had shamefully abandoned him; but as the Peishwa was at the time, equally with himself, in alliance with us, it was out of the question for us to take up arms in his interest. It would have been wiser for him to pay the *chouth*, or tribute, demanded by the Court of Poona, without attempting an ineffectual resistance.

However, he preferred to sulk and to take a high tone; but it says little for the clearness of vision at Hyderabad that he imagined that the troops who could not resist the Mahrattas would be able to withstand the English. His resentment soon showed itself in acts. He dismissed the contingent, called in French officers to drill his army, and began to think of throwing in his lot with Tippoo Sahib, then on the eve of renewing his struggle with us. War seemed imminent, when, with a return of common

sense, the Nizam perceived the hopelessness of his project, reversed all his proceedings, and concluded another treaty of alliance against Tippoo Sahib.

The Nizam's troops took an inglorious part in the final war with that ruler, and the Nizam himself again received as his share of the spoil districts yielding no inconsiderable revenue. The Nizam never had any cause to complain of the results of his periodical alliances with the Company. All these negotiations led up to the important treaty of 1800, by which the subsidiary force was increased, and the provinces detached from Mysore were assigned for its support. During the Mahratta war, the Nizam more than once maintained an ambiguous attitude, but the most favourable construction was placed upon his acts, and in 1804 he received a share of the territory taken from the Peishwa.

Meanwhile, Nizam Ali had died in 1803, and his son, Sikander Jah, had succeeded him ; but the reins of power were held by the

Minister, Chundoo Lall, who was wholly in favour of accord with the English. Sikander Jah is supposed to have been an imbecile, a state of mind often more beneficial to the peoples of these principalities, and more convenient to ourselves, than even the highest order of intelligence, especially if there only happen to be a Minister of some honesty and capacity ; and during his early life Chundoo Lall restored the finances, established discipline in the army, and faithfully adhered to the spirit as well as the letter of his engagements.

In the Pindari and Mahratta wars of 1817-18 the Nizam's troops took a useful part on our side, and in recompense for this a large cession of territory was granted in 1822, while all the claims of the Peishwa to tribute were set aside for ever.

Sikander Jah died in 1829, and Nasir-ud-Dowlah succeeded him ; but by this time Chundoo Lall had acquired the arrogance of success and unlimited authority, and forgetting the care and virtue which had brought him into

high office, neglected the administration that he had at first done so much to promote. The internal mismanagement became at last so marked, that the active intervention of English officers was found to be necessary.

Notwithstanding treaties recognising "the sovereignty" and "the independence" of the Nizam, English officers were employed shortly before Nasir's accession in settling the amount of revenue to be raised in different districts, while it was by means of troops led by English officers that some degree of security was restored to the highroads of this State. Nasir's first request was that this interference might be discontinued, and it was complied with.

Its necessity and value were speedily demonstrated by the revival of disorder, and by a return to a condition of insecurity. In 1843, when things had been brought to their worst, Chundoo Lall was compelled to resign, and the Nizam was informed that if the cost of the contingent were allowed to again fall

into arrear, a territorial guarantee would be demanded from him. After an interval, during which Nasir vainly attempted to govern by himself, Suraj-ul-Mulk, son of a former Minister, and uncle of Salar Jung, was appointed Minister. But either the difficulties of the situation were too many for him, or his capacity was not great, for no attempt was made to pay up the arrears due on the contingent, and the deficit continued to increase.

Two other Ministers were tried, but they effected no real improvement. In 1851 the threatened territorial cession was demanded, when, by a great effort to avert the consequences, the Nizam paid up half the arrears, which amounted to nearly 8,000,000 rupees. This effort exhausted the energies of Hyderabad, and two years later the deficit had again become very considerable, and nothing had been done towards meeting the demand annually as it arose.

In 1853 Lord Dalhousie took the decided

step of sending a Resident to Hyderabad, the late Sir John Low, charged with the special task of exacting the surrender of the province of Berar, to provide for the cost of maintaining the contingent. A treaty was concluded to that effect, and in return for the surrender of this district it was agreed that we should provide a force of 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four batteries.

Moreover, we promised, in the event of a surplus, to hand it over to the Nizam's treasury. At the time it did not seem probable that Berar would suffice to meet even the charges of the contingent, which the Nizam had failed to support with the whole of his exchequer. But the prescience of Lord Dalhousie was justified, and the revenue of Berar has for some years contributed a surplus to the Hyderabad *régime*, while the old cause of dispute has been removed. This signal improvement has been due exclusively to the superior advantages and merit of English administration.

When Nasir-ud-Dowlah died, in 1857, and his son, Afzul, succeeded him, the disorder in the State remained almost as great as it had ever been, notwithstanding that the main element of dispute with the English had been taken out of the hands of the Nizam and his Ministers. Even Salar Jung, who had been intrusted with office in 1853, had done little towards the result he eventually accomplished, when the Indian Mutiny came to create disturbance in the State, and to stir into activity those elements of fanaticism and danger which were never wholly repressed.

In July 1857 the Residency was attacked, but the ill-directed efforts of the mutineers were repulsed ; and Salar Jung, regaining the upper hand in his master's counsels, succeeded in preserving tranquillity during the rest of the crisis. Towards the close of the Sepoy war it was felt safe to employ some regiments of the Hyderabad Contingent against the rebels in Central India. In 1861 Afzul went so far as to remove Salar Jung from

office; but the Government of India very quietly, but none the less peremptorily, refused to allow such an unwarrantable proceeding. Salar Jung remained in office, and Afzul-ud-Dowlah received a plain warning that, after all, his power was limited by considerations of justice and of right.

He survived this check eight years, and when he died, in 1869, his son, Mahbub Ali, born in the year 1866, was proclaimed Nizam, with a council of Regency composed under English auspices of Sir Salar Jung and the Amir-i-Kabir. During the ministry of Salar Jung, Hyderabad enjoyed its period of greatest tranquillity, and although his death threatened to cast things into confusion, the Nizam assumed at the commencement of the present year the personal control of an inheritance the preservation of which was mainly due to that Minister's vigilance and care.

The present Nizam has not been many months in power, but already there are signs

that the old passions are only dormant, and that the tendency to intrigue and to indulge in a love of rapine is far from having been eradicated.

Hyderabad has long been a hot-bed of intrigue and self-seeking machinations, both among natives and non-official Europeans. It is the one place in India where corrupt Englishmen have been found. The snares of the Nizam's court have availed to tarnish the spotless reputation in pecuniary matters which the men of this country have gained in every other State of India. There are many indications that in this respect it is as bad as ever, and it will not be long before the incapacity of a youthful ruler and the over-confidence of an inexperienced Minister will entail those more serious disorders which were gradually mitigated, if their cause was not removed, during Sir Salar Jung's long term of office.*

* Even in the short period since these lines were written, the evidence on this point has accumulated.

Hyderabad is, without exception, the most populous as well as the largest of all the native States. It covers an area of not less than 98,000 square miles, and contains a population not exceeding 11,000,000. The revenue, at the lowest computation, reaches four millions sterling, and is probably more, which shows the taxation to be at a considerably higher rate than is the average per head in British India. The province of Berar contains a population of two millions and a quarter, but at the time of its occupation thirty years ago it did not contain a fourth of this number.

The Nizam maintains an army of 8,000

The Nizam's Minister, a young man of twenty-one, who has assumed too lightly the honourable title of Salar Jung, has not merely given himself up to a perilous self-indulgence, but has more clearly revealed his inclination to pursue a truculent policy, better suited to a daring prince than a timid minister. His proclivities are well known. His military schemes and political machinations are watched. They will but hasten the inevitable end.

cavalry, 36,000 foot, and 725 guns. Of these, about 6,000 men are Arabs, while it is computed that the chief and his nobles have in their service not fewer than 10,000 other mercenaries, Afghans, Beloochees, and Arabs, either as soldiers or as personal retainers. There is no doubt that the Nizam could raise, at any moment he chose to stake his existence on the result, one hundred thousand men, of whom no inconsiderable number would belong to warlike and fanatical Mahomedan races.

This large army is watched, and supposed to be kept in check, by the force called the Hyderabad Contingent, numbering 8,000 men, and which occupies the cantonment of Secunderabad and eight other places in the province. But there would not be much ground for surprise if the very generally accepted view as to the doubtful fidelity of this force, if turned against the Nizam, were to prove the correct one, for the Hyderabad Contingent is nominally an army of the

Nizam, although paid out of the revenue of the English-governed province of Berar, and notwithstanding that it is officered by Englishmen.

If a Nizam ever could have the courage to unfurl the green flag of the Prophet, which I admit is doubtful, there would be small thought of opposing his decision among the contingent at Secunderabad. In this particular the Nizam enjoys a superiority over his neighbours, the Mahratta chiefs, and possesses a mark of independence which they have not retained, for the garrisons of Mhow and Morar are composed of the regular Anglo-Indian army, with a large proportion of Englishmen, and an exclusively European artillery.

The resources of a fertile province—Berar—are consequently devoted to the maintenance of a force of 8,000 men, which is admitted to be considerably inferior to the ordinary native regiments of the line, while it has to watch and counteract the Nizam's

army, which, if not the most efficient, is the largest of the Peninsula, and which is attached to the wealthiest prince in India. In the case of Hyderabad, not merely is the joint revenue of that State and Berar wasted in this extensive military expenditure, but the forces maintained at great outlay are distinctly inferior to the standard attained in the rest of the country.

The Hyderabad contingent is a survival of a state of things that has long passed away, and it should be reorganised or abolished, and its duties transferred to the Madras or Bombay armies. In Hyderabad we have lavishness of expenditure side by side with inefficiency in the result typified in a more striking form than anywhere else in India; and this criticism applies with equal force to the Nizam's army and that antiquated organisation termed the Hyderabad contingent.

There are several peculiarities in connection with the Nizam's dominion. Nowhere else

is the dominant caste more obtrusive, and nowhere else has it less real hold on the soil. The ruler and the officials are Mahomedans, but the people are Hindoos, speaking in one part Telugu and in another Canarese. The latter have no share whatever in the administration ; the former do not possess the sympathy or attachment of the subjects by whose thrift and labour they enjoy the pleasures of the town and the easy occupations of military life, or the mild excitement of plotting against each other, varied by the discussion of the still more attractive theme of what they will do when the hour of those English has passed away.

But the Mussulman of Hyderabad is altogether too proud and disdainful to have anything to do with agriculture and trade. He will only accept their results, leaving to the Hindoo subject, whom he never really conquered, but who accepted him as a possibly better ruler than the Mahratta, the toil and the burden. He must be a soldier,

an administrator, or one of those idle politicians of native capitals who rearrange the map of India to their fancy, and speculate on the consequences of Russia's advance in Central Asia, and of England's embarrassment in Egypt.

Hyderabad, and the other towns of the Nizam's dominion, swarm with these drones, who flourish on the receipt of some nominal office or of a jaghir, from which the last rupee is wrung by their overseers and managers. It is for such men as these, and for a system of government whose *raison d'être* is simply their existence in a state of opulence and idleness, that the Nizam's authority is maintained as the most intensely fanatical and self-seeking Mahomedan administration in the peninsula over 10,000,000 Hindoo subjects in the uplands of the Deccan.

The people of that portion of India, which is neither rich nor favoured in natural advantages, are taxed every year not less than £5,000,000 sterling to maintain an army

of more than 50,000 men, a court and administration on the most costly scale, and a dominant race which never has conferred, and which never will confer, a single benefit on the population that supplies it with the means of indulgence.

With no exposed frontiers to defend, the Nizam maintains an army for which the equivalent for British India at the same ratio to the population would be more than one million of men. By reversing the comparison, it may be said that the armed forces of Hyderabad are five times too numerous. For a State of its dimensions, 10,000 soldiers, including the contingent, would be amply sufficient.

Although the Nizam has been allowed, by official consent, not merely the premier place among the Indian feudatories, but even a position of *quasi* independence, there is no State in India wherein our interference has been more often rendered necessary by internal discord, and carried into effect in

complete disregard of the Nizam's sovereignty. These proceedings have been always justified by the facts of the case.

The Nizam's sovereignty is a mere fiction, a hollow pretence that, but for us, would never have possessed any meaning. It is true that Asaf Jah emancipated himself from the control of Delhi, but his successors would several times have fallen the easy prey of the Mahrattas on one side, or of Hyder Ali on the other.

They owed their escape from either of those fates solely to our intervention and protection; and although the Nizams never failed to assert their independence and to receive our advice in a half-resentful manner, they were always obliged in the end to recognise the facts of their existence, and to comply with our requests, which have generally been made with hesitation, and only insisted upon when things had been brought to their worst stage.

Our relations with the Nizam prove that

we have repeatedly recognised our obligation to befriend the people against the State, and although our advocacy and assistance have always been tardy and sometimes too long postponed, they have, in the last pass, been exerted to show the Indian world that even the Nizam must be amenable to reason, and that under the present dispensation, the duty of defining what that is rests with English opinion.

In face of what has been done in the Nizam's dominions, it is quite beside the point, and almost absurd to maintain, that our predominance does not carry with it the right as well as the obligation to make any reform we may deem necessary for the benefit of the subject populations.

Few will be so sanguine as to suppose that the Court of Hyderabad can be purified by any process short of abolishing it; but the main points will be attained by a reduction of the Nizam's army, the removal of the 16,000 mercenaries, and the substitution

of an Anglo-Indian garrison for the Hyderabad contingent. When such an alteration has been consummated, more than two millions sterling a year will be left free for employment towards the material welfare of the people, and the elements of combustion will have been removed from the one great powder magazine of Mahomedan fanaticism left in India.

The second Mahomedan State is that of Bhopal, and the name suggests so many memories of loyalty and devotion, that the reader will be prepared to find criticism disarmed, and the strictures passed on more famous and powerful principalities absent from my review of this native territory.

Bhopal was founded as an autonomous State by Dost Mahomed, an Afghan official in the service of the Emperor Aurungzebe. He must have been a fellow-soldier with Asaf Jah, the founder of the Nizams. The peculiarity of Bhopal consisted in the fact that it was virtually an Afghan State, for

the officials and leading men ~~were~~ ^{all} Pathan extraction. Dost Mahomed's ~~successors~~ ^{successors} for the whole of the 18th century ~~were~~ weaklings, unable to make the best of a difficult position in the midst of the stronger and more numerous Pindaris and Mahrattas.

At last, however, at the beginning of the present century, Bhopal found a ruler of more than ordinary energy and capacity in Vizier Mahomed. His successful defence of Bhopal for nine months against the whole force of Scindiah in 1813, was a brilliant achievement, and obtained for him the support and sympathy of the English authorities, whose aid he had openly implored. No formal alliance was concluded, and Vizier Mahomed's death in 1816 might have entailed the collapse of the negotiations.

However, Bhopal was deemed from its position to be of advantage during the operations of the Pindari war in 1817, and the new chief, Nuzzur Mahomed, was taken into our alliance. In January, 1817, Bhopal accepted

the protection of the English, and a formal treaty, concluded in the following year, cemented the new connexion.

The Pindaris, who had made Bhopal one of their head-quarters, were expelled by force, and the principal freebooters of Central India were deprived of their most convenient resting place. Unfortunately, Nuzzur Mahomed, who inherited his father's ability, was accidentally killed by his brother a short time after this treaty. His widow, the Khodsia Begum, displayed great skill and prudence as Regent, and when Nuzzur's successor and nephew, Moneer, attempted to oust her, he was defeated and set on one side.

Another heir was chosen, but the Khodsia Begum desired to retain power herself. Her daughter, the Sikander Begum, also had views of her own. A civil war broke out in 1837, and although a reconciliation was effected under the auspices of the English, by which the Khodsia Begum retired into private life, it was clear that the settlement was only temporary.

The death of the Nawab in 1844 brought the two Begums back to the political arena, and, after nearly three years' confusion, the Sikander Begum was proclaimed Regent. In 1859, as a reward for the conspicuous loyalty which, under arduous circumstances, she displayed during the Mutiny, her long-repeated demands to be recognised as ruler in her own right were complied with.

This favour was rendered the greater by the fact that the Bhopal contingent had mutinied, like its neighbours in Gwalior and Indore, so that the assistance of the ruling family was restricted to expressions of loyalty and the protection of individuals. In the case of Bhopal, the Begum succeeded in keeping her hold over her own troops, who rendered some excellent service in the Central India campaigns. For this she was rewarded with the gift of certain districts, and received the honours that would have been her due if a man.

The extent of Bhopal State is 8,200 square

miles, with a population of more than 800,000. While the ruling family and Ministers and soldiers are Mahomedan, nine-tenths of the people are Hindoo. The revenue is rather less than £140,000 sterling, or about the fifth of that of Holkar, whose subjects are not much more numerous. In Bhopal, the people are less taxed than in British India, as indeed should be the case in all the native States, unless they were obliged to take a larger share in Imperial obligations.

But if Bhopal can meet all its obligations, maintain a small army as it does, and preserve its foreign authority over an alien people on a revenue not exceeding 3s. 6d. a head of population, it will be desirable to ascertain why other States cannot do the same. The Begum also has her army of 2,200 infantry, 700 cavalry, and nearly 60 guns; and she pays £20,000 a year in support of a regiment known as the Bhopal battalion.

This battalion and the ordinary troops of our army have taken the place of the old

contingent. The significance of what is done in Bhopal is increased by reference to the considerable material advantages which the State has derived from the enlightened administration of three successive Begums. Many useful works have been completed and carried out.

Bridges and water-works were constructed by the older Begums, of whom Khodsia died in 1882 ; but the latest reports seem to show that her grand-daughter, the present Begum, does not devote quite the same personal inspection to these matters that her two predecessors did. Still, Bhopal remains a model native State, and one where, generally speaking, it is only necessary to indicate the direction of reform for the subsequent measures to be put into force.

The third of these Mahomedan States is Bahawalpur, which lies south of, but immediately contiguous to, the Punjab, from which it is separated by the Sutlej. In older days it had been included within the Afghan

dominion in Northern India, but after the disruption of the Durani monarchy, its independence was not formally recognised until the treaty of 1833, which regulated the traffic of the Indus.

The Nawab of this State pursued a very generous policy in commercial matters before our conquest of the Punjab, and he naturally felt strengthened in his belief as to its wisdom after that event. In 1850 this Nawab died, and after a younger son had been proclaimed ruler, the eldest succeeded in gaining authority and in exiling his brother. This chief, named Mahomed Futteh Khan, died in 1858, and was duly succeeded by his son.

The exiled uncle, refusing to give up his intrigues, was placed in confinement in the fort at Lahore. The population of Bahawalpur numbers 500,000, with a revenue of almost £200,000. The Nawab maintains an army of 360 cavalry, 2,500 infantry, and not fewer than 80 guns; but, considering his position near the frontier, this force does not

appear excessive. All that we should require in his case would be that his army should be made effective, and that it should take an assigned place in the garrison of our north-western provinces. Its numbers, if not so great as to justify a charge of extravagance, are still too great, however, to allow of efficiency. Bahawalpur might easily supply an efficient and well-trained battalion of infantry, with a troop of cavalry and a few guns, which might thus form a useful part of the Punjab garrison.

The remaining nineteen Mahomedan States do not call for individual description, although it may be desirable that their names should be recorded in order of precedence. They are the Nawabs of Tonk, Rampur, Joura, Junagarh, Radhanpur, Cambay, Baoni, Maler Kotla, Koorwai, Mumdot, Suchin, Dojana, Loharoo, and Patowdi; the Mir of Khairpur, the Dewan of Pahlampur, the Sidi of Janjira, the Jagirdar of Bungun Pulli, and the Babi of Bulsinore.

These nineteen noblemen occupy States scattered over the whole of the peninsula, from the Himalayas to the Deccan. They are the survivors of the wave of Mahomedan violence which at different times broke over the Indian frontier, and penetrated as far south as the river Kistna.

Collectively, these nineteen States have a population of more than 2,000,000, a revenue of £900,000, and armies of about 15,000 men. To the Imperial Exchequer this group of princes contributes no more than £6,600 per annum.

It can hardly be denied that this contribution is much too small from these petty rulers, who, through the instrumentality of our supremacy, which obviates all need for care or vigilance on their part, are able to extract from their subjects a revenue for personal uses of not less than 10s. per head of population. Very possibly the main evil in these miniature courts is self-indulgence, and not military display; but the latter is

more vulnerable to our attack, and once cured, many other evils may also be expected to disappear in its train.

Regarding the Mahomedan States of India as a whole, it may be affirmed that they do not present the same vigorous appearance as the less numerous Mahrattas, who, combined, have not the population of the Nizam's dominions alone. They are all more or less in a state of decay ; and while their population amounts to nearly 15,000,000, less than one-third of them are Mussulmans.

Of the more than 40,000,000 Mahomedans in India not one-eighth live in these native territories ; the vast majority are the immediate subjects of the English Crown. Hyderabad is a focus of intrigue and sinister aspirations, but it may be doubted whether its influence is as great for the purposes of religious propaganda as that of the communities of Patna and other cities in the north.

The larger of these States consist of sub-

jects governed by aliens in race and religion, who make it a boast that their creed forbids them to be anything but soldiers. The appearance of the English insured the continuation of this system long after its vigour had been sapped, for, but for us, the Mahomedan *régimes* would have been swept away by that Hindoo revival, of which the Mahrattas and the Sikhs were the most formidable national development.

The responsibility of having interfered with this natural process of Hindoo deliverance rests upon us, for it was we who saved the Nizam and Bhopal from the Mahrattas, and contributed to make Bahawalpur independent of Runjeet Singh. This responsibility, if not recognised in this sense, has at least been acted upon.

Our interference in Hyderabad, despite the flattering fiction of independence, has been more marked and more inquisitorial than anywhere else; but the results have been spasmodic and irregular, because we have

left the duty of carrying out our suggestions and the requirements of experience and knowledge to the Nizam's own agents. No certain amelioration will be effected until we apply the Berar system to the rest of Hyderabad, and succeed in inducing the Nizam to diminish his army, to banish his mercenaries, and to acquiesce in the substitution of Madras regiments for the Hyderabad contingent. Practically, the question of our relations with the Mahomedan States of India resolves itself into the difficult problem of our relations with the Nizam.

III.

THE HINDOO STATES.

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THERE are ninety-three Hindoo States in India, excluding Cashmere as a frontier State, in addition to the three great Mahratta principalities already described, and they present every degree of size and importance, from wealthy Mysore and the rich Rajpoot princedoms, down to the petty Rajah of Soanth, with his revenue of £3,000 and his salute of nine guns.

They may be conveniently treated in the following groups:—The State of Mysore; the principalities of Rajpootana; the territories dependent on the different Governments in their order; and lastly, the Sikh districts which are in political relationship with the Punjab. It may be observed that under this

class I have to treat of the bulk of the population of what is termed Independent India, as out of a total of 50,000,000 of people coming under that category, this group of States possesses not less than 27,000,000.

Their importance is certainly increased by the fact that for the most part they are the natural rulers of their States, and that the people are at one with their chiefs, in sympathies of race, religion, and caste. It is rather the reform and increased efficiency of their administrations, than the wholesale disappearance of these States, that is in the highest degree desirable; but a little consideration will show that in the majority of cases the abolition of their armies is essential.

The early history of the ancient dynasty of Mysore must here remain untold. Its disappearance for a time from the political management of the State was coeval with the commencement of our interest in its affairs. The first English treaty with Mysore,

in 1763, was in the character of a firman, conceding to the Company certain trade advantages, and signed by Hyder Ali, who had then only recently deposed the Hindoo ruler, Chickna Kristna Raj Wudayer, and established himself in his place.

Three years later this bold adventurer conquered Malabar, and although he confirmed all the privileges possessed by the Company in that territory, he roused the apprehensions of the English by his warlike proceedings and by the display of an ambition and capacity which threatened to interfere with and stop the new career of conquest opened out for the people of this island by the genius of Clive.

A war ensued in 1768-9, when, after some early successes in the field, which frightened the Nizam into making his submission, the Madras authorities were in their turn so much alarmed at the sudden appearance of Hyder Ali before their town that they concluded a treaty of peace, based on terms

equally favourable to both sides. On the conclusion of this war Hyder turned his arms against the Mahrattas, and he demanded the co-operation of the English in his adventure.

The application was naturally rejected, and although the disunion of the Mahrattas prevented their retaining the prizes of victory, Hyder had the mortification of conducting a campaign in which he was uniformly discomfited. It is said that he attributed his reverses to the falseness of the English in not joining him in a hostile undertaking against a people with whom they were then in alliance.

From that time until his death in 1782, Hyder Ali made it his main object to embarrass and humiliate the English ; and his last war in 1780 was sufficiently doubtful in its results to justify a belief that, had his life been prolonged, he would have made a very protracted resistance to the whole of the available power of the Company, if, indeed,

he might not have regained something of what he had lost.

His son, Tippoo Sahib, continued his policy with all his father's energy and ability ; but it is doubtful if he possessed that natural military knowledge and capacity for leading an army in the field which was once common enough among Asiatics, but which, in a high degree, Hyder Ali seems to have been the last of them to reveal.

The expulsion of the French, upon whom the Mysore rulers had counted for considerable assistance, compelled Tippoo to sign the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784; and when, six years later, he had recourse to arms, his failure was so complete that he had to sue for peace, give his sons as hostages of good faith, and acquiesce in the surrender of half his dominions, besides the payment of a large indemnity.

Disaster did not teach him prudence, and three years after the Treaty of Seringapatam he was again intriguing with the French and

the Mahrattas, and preparing his army for a final tussle for power. That struggle was destined to decide his pretensions for ever, for, after a sharply contested but brief campaign in 1799, his stronghold of Seringapatam was captured, and he himself was slain in its defence.

With his death Hyder Ali's dreams of dominion came to an end, and the brief period of Mahomedan sway in Mysore terminated. The grandson of the Hindoo ruler whom Hyder Ali had deposed was placed in power, and during his minority the State was ably governed by a Minister named Poornia ; but this satisfactory condition of things was speedily altered after the assumption of personal power by the Maharajah in 1812.

The misgovernment of this ruler was so great that after he had squandered the large sum saved by Poornia's thrift, and embarrassed the finances of his State in every direction, his conduct provoked a mutiny among his own troops and subjects. The English

Government was at last compelled to interfere, and in 1831 it assumed the practical control of his territory.

More than thirty years later Sir Richard Temple described a visit to the deposed Maharajah at his residence in the city of Mysore, where he lived on a large allowance paid by the English, who administered his State for him, restored order to its affairs, and in a short space of time more than doubled its revenue. Various administrative changes were carried out at different times with a view to give the State the greatest possible advantage from its connexion with English rule, and in 1869 Mysore was made a chief commissionership.

These reforms were completed in 1873; but during these later years the young heir of the family had been carefully educated and trained for the duties of his position, and on arriving at a suitable age he was intrusted with the administration three years ago. After enjoying English government for fifty years,

Mysore again passed into the hands of the head of the old Hindoo family which Hyder Ali had expelled and the English had restored in the last days of the 18th century.

The population of Mysore exceeds five millions, and as the revenue is not more than £1,250,000 it is clear that, thanks to English interference, the Mysoreans are only taxed at the same rate as if they were the immediate subjects of the Queen. A small army alone is maintained, and although the Maharajah has the right to keep up 2,000 cavalry and the same number of infantry, the force actually under arms does not much exceed one fourth of that total.

The British cantonment at Bangalore, towards the maintenance of which the Maharajah contributes by treaty nearly a quarter of a million, effectually and economically provides for the security and tranquillity of the State. In whatever manner the present Maharajah may signalise the return of his family to power, whether the event prove to

his credit or the reverse, the present satisfactory condition of Mysore is due solely to the interference of England and the long assertion of our official authority. Whether as a precedent of intervention, or as an unanswerable proof of the benefits conferred by English rule, there could not by any possibility be a stronger example than Mysore.

The principalities of Rajpootana, ruled by chiefs who represent the most ancient aristocracy of India, and who claim an unbroken descent from the heroes of the Mahabaratha, next demand attention; and the Maharajahs of Oodeypore, Jeypore, Jodhpore, and others, possess a territorial power and exercise a political influence that, if they were only united, would make them as formidable a group of rulers as any to be found from one end of the Peninsula to the other.

Of these, Oodeypore has been allowed precedence on the ground of his lineage, which, it is asserted, descends from Rama,

the mythical King of Ajoudhia, and because he dates as an independent prince from the second century of our era. But, despite this long descent, our relations with the Rajpoots only commenced in the present century, after the close of the last Mahratta war, and for the simple reason that it was we who restored their existence.

The decline of the Mogul power, the growth of that of Scindiah and Holkar, always assisted by the feuds among the Rajpoots themselves, had gradually resulted in the predominance of the Mahrattas in Rajpootana. The Mahrattas plundered and did not govern.

At the period of their decline, which dated from Assaye and Laswari, the Pindaris appeared to supplement and complete the destruction wrought by the armies of Scindiah and Holkar. Rajpootana was desolated by these marauders, and the proudest princes of India were reduced to almost inconceivable indigence and misery.

In this desperate situation, the power and justice of the English Government stepped in to restore to these nobles their lost and sadly diminished possessions. The first treaty with Oodeypore was signed in January 1818, and the Maharana, who had been living in a state of absolute beggary, was sought out and replaced in the seat of his ancestors. The Pindaris and Mahrattas were overthrown and reduced to some sense of order by the exercise of English arms ; but the rulers of Oodeypore affected to have a legitimate grievance against the English because everything they could claim was not restored to them intact.

The conduct of the restored princes of Oodeypore was not calculated to inspire confidence in their fitness to govern ; and the affairs of the administration became so hopelessly involved, that the active interposition of English control was admitted at last to be imperative. As soon as some degree of order was restored, and when the deficit of the

exchequer had been temporarily filled up, English interference ceased; but the evils speedily reappeared after the departure of the English officers.

There have been five Maharanas since the treaty of 1818, and not one of them has shown qualities calculated to inspire respect. Several of them have died prematurely from the consequences of their vicious excesses. The Maharanas have varied their disputes with the English Government by quarrelling with their feudatories, who are members of the same ruling family, and not less proud and incapable of good than their nominal chief.

The population of Oodeypore, or Meywar, as it is also called, is about 1,200,000, and the revenue of the prince is not far short of £650,000. With this revenue he maintains an army of 14,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and 538 guns. In this revenue, and also in the stated strength of his force, are included the contingents and tribute paid by his

feudatories; but as the Choondawut and Sukhtawut chiefs keep up for their own individual grandeur a much larger number of retainers and soldiers than they are liable to provide, it follows that the quoted official figures give an under rather than an over estimate of the facts.

While the Maharana and his chiefs maintain this large military display, and devote the main resources of their State to the support of this very considerable number out of the male population in a condition of absolute idleness and uselessness, it must not be supposed that these men are what by the most lenient construction could be called efficient soldiers. They have no real discipline or organisation, no knowledge of modern warfare, and their arms are antiquated. They simply exist in order to pander to the love of display of an effete and, so far as acts justify blame or praise, discredited administration.

Their capacity for mischief is not to be lightly challenged, however, because they

would make but a sorry show in line of battle. They have numbers, and the inclination as well as the habitude for strife, which would make them capable of accomplishing much mischief even when as a regular force they had been thoroughly vanquished. But there is no doubt that the numbers of the Oodeypore army are greatly in excess of its requirements, and the more pressing interests of the people are sacrificed in order that the Maharana may see the streets and palaces of his capital crowded with so many thousands of buckler bearers and swordsmen.

The family of Jeypore is scarcely less ancient and important than Oodeypore, although it is some seven centuries younger as a self-governing State. It, too, claims the easily made and readily granted descent from Rama. The history of this State in connexion with Delhi, the Mahrattas, and the Company is similar to that of its neighbour in the southern part of the province.

It may be stated here that about half-way

between these two places is the English district and town of Ajmere, with a strong fortress and a large garrison. The Maharajah of Jeypore, with whom we concluded a treaty in 1818, died in the same year, of "the grossest debauchery and regretted by none." The scenes of confusion and disturbance which were witnessed at Oodeypore were also repeated in this State: and English officers had often to repair the blunders and make up the injuries caused by native incompetence and neglect.

In one respect Jeypore proved more fortunate than Oodeypore, for it produced a ruler of some capacity and honesty in Ram Singh, who followed the example of the English as far as he could, was true to his engagements during the Mutiny, and left his successors an example of public zeal and private morality, which, it may be stated, the present Maharajah has hitherto shown every desire to follow.*

* I have reason to modify this favourable opinion.

Jeypore, with a population of 2,000,000 and a revenue of about £500,000, is certainly one of the least heavily taxed and the best administered of the States of Rajpootana. But even it maintains an absurdly large force of 15,000 foot, 3,500 horse, and 300 guns. This is done, no doubt, mainly with the idea of not being behind Oodeypore. The army has no duties to perform, and is maintained simply from love of display. While these armies of the head chief are thus unnecessary, it will be understood that the forces of the minor chiefs, who depend upon and imitate him, require also to be reduced to the dimensions of a personal retinue.

The third of the great Rajpoot families is

The Maharajah of Jeypore has shown a certain astuteness in manifesting interest in exhibitions and similar supposed tokens of civilisation ; but his real character is more truly revealed by his violation of the sanctity usually allowed to the harem left by his predecessor. His excesses have been notorious, and fatal to his character and capacity.

that of Jodhpore, the origin of which does not go further back than the fifteenth century. When the Mogul power began to decline, Jodhpore suffered greatly at the hands of Scindiah, who wrested from it the strong town of Ajmere; and none of the Rajpoot States suffered more during the critical period of 1804-18, when peace was finally given to Central India.

In the latter of these years the Maharajah agreed to pay to the English the old tribute which had been demanded by the Mahrattas; and at a slightly later time he entreated their aid to reduce the turbulent Mhairs and Minas to order. The contingent known as the Jodhpore legion mutinied in 1857, and was abolished. Its duties were transferred to the Erinpoora force, towards the maintenance of which the Maharajah pays about *£10,000 a year.

His total tribute reaches double that sum. He, too, keeps up another excessive army of 3,500 cavalry, 5,000 infantry, and 270 guns.

The population of Jodhpore is 2,000,000, and the revenue about £250,000, but the tribute of the dependent chiefs or barons would swell it to twice that sum.

The three principal Rajpoot States, with a population of 5,200,000, maintain armed forces amounting to 13,000 horsemen, 34,000 footmen, and 1,108 pieces of artillery. The significance of these numbers is greatly increased when it is remembered that their total revenue is no more than £1,400,000 per annum.

When to these totals are added the forces of the minor States of Rajpootana, it will be perceived that the Rajpoot princes alone maintain a far greater number of armed men than compose the English garrison for the whole of India.

The smaller States of Rajpootana, impelled by a spirit of jealousy and emulation, are quite as great sinners in military extravagance as the larger princes I have named. There are fourteen other States included in the

Rajpootana Agency, besides that of Tonk, already described as a Mahomedan one.

To take these in their order of official precedence, Kotah, whose present chief is called Maharao, has a population of half a million and a revenue of a quarter of a million sterling. The first charge on this income is the support of 700 cavalry, 4,600 infantry, with 109 guns.

The history of this State is of a similar character to that of Jeypore and Jodhpore. During the Mutiny the troops broke loose from control, and murdered the Political Agent and his two sons.

Bhurtapore, under a Maharajah, has a population of 725,000 and a revenue of £325,000. A cavalry force of 3,000 men, 8,500 infantry, and 38 guns, serve to swell this chief's sense of his own importance.

- This State was founded by a Jat freebooter about 150 years ago, but its place in history is permanently assured from several valiant but unsuccessful defences of its strong capital

against English armies. While Kotah pays a tribute of nearly £40,000, Bhurtpore, it may be added, contributes nothing whatever to the Supreme Government.

Bickaneer, governed by a Maharajah, has a population of 350,000 and a revenue of about £100,000. Its army is of smaller dimensions, 750 horse, 1,300 foot, and 95 guns, due as much to English remonstrance and interference as to the chief's natural inclination.

The importance of Bickaneer chiefly arose from its lying on the most used route between India and Cabul, but since the consolidation of English power it has lost this artificial value.

Bundi, ruled by another chief called Maharao Rajah, comes next, with a population of 225,000 and a revenue of £80,000. It has 700 cavalry, 1,375 infantry, and 88 guns.

Kerowli, under a Maharajah, has 140,000 subjects and an income of £45,000. Even this ruler must command 400 horse, 3,200

foot, and 40 guns. He was honourably distinguished in the Mutiny by his fidelity.

Ulwar has a population of nearly 800,000 and a revenue of £250,000. Its ruler is styled Maharao Rajah, and he has an army of 2,250 cavalry, 5,750 infantry, and 350 guns.

Kishengarh, with a population of 105,000 and a revenue of £130,000, is remarkable as the most heavily taxed Rajpoot State, and maintains an army of 4,000 men and thirty guns.

Jhallawar, with 225,000 subjects and a revenue of £175,000, has 5,000 men and ninety guns.

Dholpore, with a population of 228,000 and £100,000 a year, has 3,250 men and thirty-two guns.

Jaisalmir, whose subjects number 75,000, and whose receipts are only £10,000, has still his 1,000 soldiers and twelve pieces of artillery.

Pertubgarh, with 150,000 people and

£30,000 a year, counts its 1,200 warriors in name and twelve guns.

Banswarra, with 150,000 population and £30,000 revenue, has 600 men and three guns.

Serohi (150,000 population and £12,000 revenue) is content with 700 men, all told; while Dongarpore, which closes the list, has a population of 100,000, a revenue of £20,000, and a standing army of 500 cavalry, 1,000 infantry, and four guns.

These fourteen States, with an aggregate population of 3,923,000 and a revenue of £1,555,000, think it expedient to maintain a total armed force of 45,775, with a large proportion of mounted men, and an artillery, more or less inefficient of course, of 907 guns.

I have therefore arrived at the sufficiently startling result that the States of Rajpootana alone support armies numbering nearly 93,000 men and an artillery of 2,000 guns. The largeness of these figures, coupled with the fact that no attempt has ever been made

to employ these armies against us, is the strongest testimony as to their efficiency.

But can a greater waste of treasure and resources be conceived, than for a population of nine millions to be saddled with the maintenance of this army of more than 90,000 men? At the same rate British India would have to bear the cost of an army of not less than two million men. Are these facts realised by English readers? I trow not.

In addition to Mysore, the Government of the Madras Presidency has the control of our relations with three Hindoo States, viz., Travancore, Cochin, and Pudukottah. These are now comparatively unimportant, and require only brief description.

The Rajah of Travancore, who established his authority over the petty rulers of that province before the middle of the last century, was remarkable for the fidelity with which he adhered to the side of the English during the struggle with Hyder Ali. But

his successor proved a far less capable prince, and the administration had to be conducted for him.

The peculiarity of this State is that the descent of the reigning family is in the female line. The privilege of adoption has been conceded, but it is employed not for the choice of sons, but of females, through whom the line may be continued.

The administration of Travancore was raised to a high point of efficiency by Madhava Rao, one of the most intelligent native Ministers of our time. With a population of 2,300,000, a revenue is easily raised of £600,000; and an army of 1,700 men and four guns does not present an appearance of being excessive.

The same may be said of Cochin and Pudukottah, which, with a joint population of 900,000 persons and a revenue of £180,000, are content with 450 soldiers and no artillery. If they were Mahrattas or Rajpoots, we should be asked to admit that they required,

and had a right to raise, a force of not less than 10,000 men.

The Government of Bombay conducts our relations with not fewer than thirty-one feudatories, in addition to several of those included under the head of Mahomedan States. Many of these have disbanded their armies and accepted their natural position as nobles of the Indian Empire; but others, again, have not evinced the same good sense, and still squander their treasure on a useless military organisation.

Of these, Kolapore, which is, strictly speaking, Mahratta, and might indeed claim, as the descendant of Sivaji, the titular chiefship of that race, is perhaps the most important, although the incapacity of its rulers has been the most conspicuous, and the late Maharajah, who was insane, was killed in a struggle with his keeper. It contains a population of 800,000, can boast of a revenue of £300,000, and has an armed force of 1,700 men and 67 guns.

The nine chiefs included in the South Mahratta district maintain a combined force of 5,000 men and 18 guns.

The Maharajah of Edar and Ahmednugger, another of the Bombay feudatories, has an army of 2,000 horse and foot, equally divided, and 17 guns. The number of his subjects exceeds 200,000, and the amount of his revenue is £70,000.

Six of the chiefs comprising the Rewakanta Agency employ forces amounting to 1,800 men and 39 cannon.

The Kattywar Agency includes a number of chiefs, divided into four classes. The two principal are Bhownugger (with a population of 403,000 and a revenue of £256,000), who has an armed force of nearly 3,000 men and 17 guns, and Nawanagger (population 290,000 and revenue £150,000), which maintains the exceedingly large army of 1,000 horse, 4,000 foot, and 85 guns.

The remaining States of Kattywar produce a total of 4,500 men and 83 guns.

The Maharana of Cutch, who is the second in importance to Kolapore, and who governs 500,000 people, with a revenue of a quarter of a million sterling, disposes of a force of 4,000 men and 111 guns.

If these totals are added together, it will be found that the garrison of Bombay has to neutralise, in the first place and before its other duties commence, these local armies, which amount, in addition to the army of Baroda and a few Mahomedan chiefs like Junagarh, to not fewer than 27,000 men and 437 guns.

The resources, attention, and surplus wealth of a great part of Western India are devoted to the maintenance of these utterly useless and wasteful armies.

The Central India Agency includes a number of States of less magnitude beside the great Mahratta territories and Bhopal, which have been already described. The principal of these is Rewah, which, owing to the infancy of the present Maharajah, enjoys

the advantage of being governed by an English officer.

The population of this State is apparently not less than two millions, with a revenue of £250,000; but much of this is outside the control of the Maharajah, and belongs to his vassals, the chief of Nayagarhi and the Rajah of Singroli. The army, hitherto maintained by the chief of this State, has amounted to nearly 1,000 cavalry, 1,300 infantry, and 56 guns.

Some steps towards a reform and reduction of this force have been taken by the Political Agent, who is acting as superintendent of the State; but these measures have been carried out with so tender a regard for vested interests, that, when the Maharajah assumes personal authority, he will find that no perceptible diminution in his standing army will have been effected, while its efficiency will have been not inconsiderably enhanced.

Our relations with this State have been fairly satisfactory; and as its inhabitants are

officially described by Sir Lepel Griffin, agent to the Governor-General for Central India, as "a singularly simple, pleasant, and well-disposed race," and as, moreover, Rewah is a very fertile tract—possessing, it is believed, very considerable mineral wealth in coal and iron—it may be anticipated that the people will derive many advantages and an increased prosperity from their temporary connexion with English government.

But no advantage will prove more durable, or entail more beneficial consequences, than the reduction of the Rewah army to the modest proportions that its security under the British protection which covers all the races and States of India justifies, and, indeed, imperatively demands.

Several petty States included with Rewah in what is termed the Bagelkhund Agency also maintain 300 men and 11 guns, out of a total income of no more than £35,000 a year.

Those of Western Malwa, excluding the

Mahomedan Joura, possess their 750 soldiers and their 14 cannon. Their population is 164,000, and their revenue about £170,000. This greater wealth is probably due to the opium crop; but its significance is heightened when it is remembered that none of these last-named States contribute the least sum to the Imperial Exchequer.

The chiefs in the Bheel Agency have 800 men and eight guns; and Dewas, with a population of 25,000 and a revenue of £42,500, or more than 30s. a head of population, has its 750 so-called soldiers.

In the Bundelcund Agency, of which the six principal States are Tehri, Datia, Samthar, Panna, Charkari, and Chatarpur, there is a total native-led and independent armed force of 2,180 cavalry, 18,420 infantry, and 345 guns. The combined revenue of these States, which number thirty, does not reach £390,000.

Cases of dacoity, robbing of Government mails, and other crimes of violence are not

unfrequent ; and the vigorous assertion of authority becomes necessary, not by the employment of these forces, but with our own troops.

The condition of things in times of peace would, however, convey but an erroneous impression of what would occur during a period of disorder ; and the more than 20,000 men whom the chiefs of Bundelcund could bring into the field would, I fear, be found a cause of increased disturbance and not of greater security. Our garrison in the Central India Agency has consequently to deal with Hindoo armies of not fewer than 3,180 cavalry, 34,000 infantry, and 434 guns, in addition to the forces of Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal.

There now only remain the States dependent on the Punjab Government. These number ten of some importance, and five small territories which need not be discussed. Some of them represent the administration established by the Sikhs in the Punjab after

the expulsion of the Afghans, and which continued to exist until the English conquest in 1849; while the more important were saved from sharing this destiny by the intervention of the Company in 1809 for the protection of the States lying on the eastern side or left bank of the Sutlej.

The principal of these States, by that best of all rights, a long alliance, is Puttiala, which served us well in the war with Nepaul in 1814-15, attached itself to our cause in both the struggles in the Punjab, and stood by our side in the most valiant and noble-minded manner in the darkest hours of 1857.

It has been said, with too much haste in expressing an opinion of such importance, that it was Salar Jung's fidelity that most simplified the suppression of the historic rising. The statement has been made still more emphatically; but if the late Lord Lawrence had been asked, he would have expressed the unqualified opinion that the

staunchness, and the promptitude with which their course of policy was decided and proclaimed, of Puttiala and his neighbours contributed more than any other act of a native State towards the gradual recovery of our position and the restoration of order.

The Maharajah of Puttiala cannot boast a very ancient descent, but some of the rulers of this State have possessed the physique and vigorous mind denied to the Rajpoots, with whom they can claim an almost common origin.

In these Punjab States I have to deal with the most favourable specimens, from every aspect, of Hindoo rule to be found in the country. They possess much of the dignity of the higher Hindoo Courts, with a strength and self-reliance that are almost European. It is matter of real regret that there should already be indications of family and executive decay.

The territory of Puttiala covers 5,419 square miles, much of it the direct grant of

the English Government in acknowledgment of faithful service, and contains a population exceeding 1,500,000. From this territory the ruler derives a revenue of less than half a million sterling, although its natural advantages would, in the eyes of a Mahratta or a Mahomedan, necessitate the extraction of a much larger amount.

His army consists of 2,750 cavalry, 4,600 infantry, and 109 guns; and its efficiency as an irregular force is not inconsiderable.

The relations with Jhind, which is ruled by a Rajah, who is a member of the same family as Puttiala, have been equally cordial, while they go back to a still earlier period, viz., Lord Lake's campaign against Holkar. In 1857 the Rajah of Jhind was not less prompt than Puttiala in proclaiming for the English, and while the latter placed 5,000 men at different points for the protection of the Grand Trunk road, the former had the personal satisfaction of being the first to march against the mutineers at Delhi.

Jhind covers 1,295 square miles, with a population of 190,000 persons, and a State revenue of £40,000. Its chief has an armed force of 200 horse, 1,600 foot, and ten guns. The Rajah of Jhind who fought during the Mutiny is described by Sir Richard Temple as "the handsomest native prince I ever saw. His height was much above six feet, and he had the flowing grey beard which Sikhs regard as the best of manly ornaments."

Nabha ranks third among these States, but its record is not so unblemished. In the first Sikh war it proved hostile, but on the removal of the chief and the elevation of his son, friendly relations were restored. During the Mutiny the Rajah was not less active in our cause than those we have named. Nabha has 226,000 people and a revenue of £65,000. Its force consists of 560 horse, 1,250 foot, and 22 guns.

Kapurthala, Mundi, and Chamba are smaller in extent, and have a more recent history; but while the last-named is content

with 160 men and four guns, Kapurthala employs 200 horse, 1,200 foot, and 15 guns, and Mundi 1,650 foot and three guns.

Suket, Faridkot, Sirmur, and Bilaspur maintain 2,850 men and 33 guns, while the last five, which are insignificant, support 1,350 men and 10 guns. The total, therefore, of the Punjab States amounts to an army of the respectable size of 18,370 men and an artillery of 206 guns.

In considering the armies of the native States up to this point I have dwelt on the absolute necessity of their reduction, and I have ventured to hint at the desirability of their complete abolition.

But with these Sikh armies an exception might be made with justice, and on political grounds also. In the first place, they do not detract to any appreciable extent from the material resources of their States. In the second, they are not the means of supporting an alien domination, and they do in some small way contribute to the preservation

of Sikh vitality, which is much to be desired.

In the third, they might become an important auxiliary to our regular garrison in the Punjab, where we have an exposed and extensive frontier to defend. Reasons which no other rulers in India could advance can be produced in favour of these long-attached and well-proved allies of the English Raj.

The point to be attained is that these Sikh armies should be rendered as efficient as possible, and that their chiefs should be assigned some definite part in the defence of the Punjab whenever an external danger may compel us to move the larger part of our forces to or beyond the frontier.

At present the Maharajah of Puttiala and his smaller neighbours and kinsmen command troops who, although brave and of a martial spirit, could not, out of sheer humanity, be placed in the field against a well-armed and disciplined enemy. At the time of the second advance into Afghanistan after the Cabul

massacre, Puttiala, Jhind, Nabba, and Kapurthala volunteered their services, which were accepted. Contingents from the armies of those States were usefully employed in maintaining communications beyond Peshawur and Kohat, and the aid they rendered was cordially recognised by the different commanders.

But it must be stated that, while it was most pleasing to the Government to receive such spontaneous proof of devotion and attachment, the service these contingents rendered was very far short of what it might have been, and of what it should be our very first object to make these Sikh auxiliaries capable of doing. The rulers of these principalities have only to realise our purpose, and to be acquainted with our plans for attaining it, to heartily combine in a scheme of military preparation which would give them an assigned and honourable place, and while it gratified their pride, it might also contribute much towards reviving Sikh energy and vitality.

The Hindoo armies of India described in this article, which excludes the Mahratta States and Cashmere, amount to the formidable total of 188,475 men and 3,096 guns, while the Maharajah of Mysore has the right, if he were so imprudent as to use it, of increasing them by 3,000 fresh troops.

The importance of this vast array is not to be dismissed by considerations of its almost general inefficiency, while it must be remembered that it is not so exposed to sweeping condemnation as are the Mahratta and Mahomedan armies, on the ground of excessive expenditure, and the maintenance of a foreign, and always imperfect and sometimes oppressive rule.

We have to recognise that, whatever their imperfections, and however enfeebled and contemptible many of them may be as specimens of humanity from the consequences of long generations given over to vicious excesses that are well-nigh incredible, they are the rulers of the soil, that their

faults, as well as their virtues, have not merely the toleration of their subjects, but their sanction, as implied by their faithful imitation.

It is the rare exception among these systems of government where a reasonable hope exists of executing reform, and imparting vigour and strength that have been long absent. The ruling houses are effete and incapable on their own initiative of improvement. The worst examples of executive incapacity and administrative incompetency are to be found in Central India, in Rajpootana and Bundelcund. There also are the armed forces most excessive.

The most favourable conditions prevail in the territories dependent on Madras, and in the Sikh States of the Punjab. There the native armies, too, are least excessive and obtrusive. The proportion of soldiers to population seems to vary with the character of the administration for efficiency. In Kathiawar or Guzerat the same evils are

almost as apparent as in Rajpootana and Central India.

The treasure of the State is devoted to the maintenance of the largest possible number of armed men in a state of idleness. Military critics may tell us that these armies are little better than a flock of sheep, and probably not one of them would avail to defend the territory of its master should any enemy have the inclination or the opportunity to assail it. Therefore they cannot be justified even on the narrow ground of a claim to existence in self-defence. They are simply the creation of the bad passions, and of the state of disorder and strife that prevailed before our appearance in India, while they are the only mark of that time which has survived the consolidation of our authority.

They have, however, a worse and a more dangerous character. They serve as the chief means of keeping those passions alive, and they provide the instrument of blood-

shed and plundering whenever the strong grasp of English authority may have to be relaxed. It may be true that an English division would put them all to the rout on the field of battle, but, as the supreme power in India, we are bound to ask by what right or warrant do the rulers of twenty-seven million Hindoo people maintain these 188,000 men in arms, when we, who are responsible for nearly ten times that number of subjects and vassals, only require a force that falls short of the same numerical strength.

IV.
THE FRONTIER STATES, AND
CONCLUSION.

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THE Government of India has to conduct relations with a considerable number of self-governing States on, and sometimes within, its natural frontier, from Burmah to Beloochistan. Although these are all in a certain sense dependent on English power and forbearance, their relation with the Indian Foreign Department is slightly different from that of the other States I have described, with the exception of Cashmere and the petty territories on the southern borders of Assam.

- These latter principalities can also advance, in support of their standing armies, an excuse which is not available to the other Indian feudatories. They are frontier States, which implies that on one side they are exposed to

the possibility of an external danger, which only the difficult barriers of nature render remote and conjectural; and due allowance must be made for this circumstance in considering this group of territories.

Cashmere may be taken first, as representing the ruler who is most dependent on English authority, and also the one in the condition of whose territory it is most important that a salutary reform should be instituted. Our relations with this State have been somewhat peculiar, and differ from those with the rest of the Indian princes, both in their origin and in their progress.

At the beginning of the present century Cashmere was still subject to Afghanistan. It remained dependent on Cabul longer than any other of the conquests of Ahmed Shah, and the Sikhs did not acquire possession of it until they had wrested the Peshawur Valley from the Duranis, and cut off communications between Afghanistan and the valley of Cashmere.

The importance of this loss was keenly felt by the more enlightened Afghans, and Dost Mahomed, long before he became ruler of the country, had given expression to the remarkable sentiment that "without the possession of the rich valley of Cashmere no king of Afghanistan has been, or ever will be, able to maintain a large army and the royal dignity."

In the campaigns which gradually resulted in the extension of Sikh authority to the crest of the Himalaya and the sources of the Indus, a soldier of fortune, named Golab Singh, played a prominent part, and his services were ultimately rewarded with the grant of the territory of Jummoo. After the death of Runjeet Singh, Golab devoted his efforts to obtain the recognition and consolidation of his authority in Cashmere ; and in the decline of the Kalsa he saw an opportunity of obtaining his wish by attaching himself to the English.

During the negotiations that brought the first Sikh war to a conclusion with the Treaty

of Lahore (9th March, 1846), Golab Singh rendered the English negotiators some assistance, and as a reward a separate treaty was concluded with him a week later at Umritsur, by which "all the hilly or mountainous territory situated eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravee, including Chumba and excluding Lahul," was made over to Golab Singh, with the style of Maharajah.

In return for this concession he paid us the sum of 75 lakhs, or about three-quarters of a million sterling ; so that, practically speaking, Golab Singh purchased Cashmere from us. He did not accept any obligation with regard to his own subjects, but he bound himself to refer all disputes with his neighbours to our arbitration, to assist with the whole of his forces our troops when employed in the hills, and not to employ any European or American without the consent of the British Government.

He also acknowledged the supremacy of the English, and agreed to pay an annual

tribute of "one horse, 12 perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female), and three pairs of Cashmere shawls"; and, on the other hand, the British Government promised to aid him in protecting his territories from external enemies. The relations of our authorities with the Cashmere Durbar are still regulated in accordance with this treaty.

Golab Singh lived on till the year 1857, when his son Runbir succeeded him. Only a few months after his accession the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny necessitated a declaration of policy on the part of the young ruler of Jummoo, and, in common with the other Sikh rulers, he arrayed himself on the side of the British.

A contingent of the Maharajah's army marched on Delhi, where it was employed in the siege operations. In 1862 his services were recompensed with the privilege of adoption, and Runbir has ruled ever since, without any great interference on our part in his

affairs. His management of his State has latterly been marked by less regard for the opinion of the Indian Government than formerly.

A few years ago, on the occasion of a severe famine, nothing but the strenuous remonstrances of the English Resident availed to counteract, and eventually to put a stop to, the tyrannical proceedings of the Maharajah and his Ministers with regard to the Mahomedan inhabitants of the country. There is reason to believe that an investigation would bring to light a state of affairs quite incompatible with all ideas of good government.

The population of Cashmere, which is assumed to cover an area of 64,000 square miles, exceeds a million and a half, while the revenue amounts to rather more than £600,000. The majority of the inhabitants are Mahomedans of the Sunni sect, while the ruling classes are Hindoo, principally Dogra Sikhs. The territory of Cashmere

is fairly fertile, and the inhabitants pursue many profitable industries besides the celebrated shawl weaving, now but a shadow of its former self, which should supply the ready means of no ordinary prosperity.

The workmen of Cashmere have a wide reputation for artistic excellence as well as skill in mechanical execution; but the oppression or exactions of the officials have availed to stultify their efforts and to limit their success. The one essential requirement in this region is roads, and plenty of them. Beyond the main trunk road to Srinagar, which is excellent, owing to English initiative and direction, it may be said that no roads worthy of the name exist. Many of the valleys are isolated from each other, and during a winter of four months some of the more remote districts are cut off from all communication with the large towns.

The ravages of the famine were increased by the absence of the essential means of transporting supplies; and the Durbar has

done nothing whatever to provide what is required whenever want makes its reappearance. This omission should suffice to convict the Maharajah's administration of apathy and incapacity, for it has entailed much human loss and suffering ; but there is good reason to say that an investigation would reveal much worse, despite the recent exoneration of the Cashmerian Government of all complicity in the death of Mr. Johnson.

The Maharajah of Cashmere maintains an army of the nominal strength of 25,600 infantry, 1,400 cavalry, and 160 guns. With this force he has preserved his authority in his father's conquest of Ladakh, and extended the limits of his own territory in the Gilgit Valley towards the Hindoo Koosh ; while it has served as the buttress of the Dogra power over the Moslem population. The efficiency of this army is about the same as that of the Sikh principalities in the Punjab, for while the Dogra or hillman of the mixed races is

scarcely as good a fighting man as the Sikh of the plains, he is probably better armed, and the artillery consists, for a great part, of excellently made native weapons.

The Cashmerian army also derived much advantage from the control of Colonel Gardiner, whose long career represents him as having been one of the most adventurous soldiers of fortune of the present century, and of a school that has passed away. It must, therefore, be regarded as being, for a native led and trained army, in a fairly efficient state.

No doubt it could be shown to swallow up an excessive share of the Maharajah's revenue, and, perhaps, to be the principal cause of that neglect in the construction of high-roads and by-roads from which the people have suffered so much, and will yet suffer more. But the army of Cashmere is to be considered rather from a high political standpoint than from one of finance.

No portion of the Anglo-Indian garrison on the North-West is intrusted with a task of

greater importance, from a military point of view, than is this Cashmerian army, for it holds the salient angle of our position with regard to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Of course, it may be argued that Cashmere is practically inaccessible from the north-west, that the passes of the Hindo Koosh and its spurs are impassable, and that any army coming from Badakshan or across the Pamir would only march to self-destruction.

It is true that the difficulties to be encountered would be enormous, and perhaps insuperable ; but, on the other hand, it should not be lost sight of that the advantages of success would be correspondingly great. An enemy in possession of Srinagar would have turned the whole of our defences on the Indus and along the Afghan frontier, and would have gained the rear of by far the greater portion of the garrison of 50,000 men, which we now maintain in the Punjab.

He would also be able to strike his blow where he chose, at the most vulnerable point

of the Punjab borders. If we consider the quality of the force to which this onerous and responsible duty is intrusted, we must pronounce it to be quite unequal to the work. At present our share in the administration is practically none at all, and we have neither control of the executive nor as much acquaintance with the State as is needful.

We only know the natural importance Cashmere derives from its position, the almost boundless possibilities offered by its soil and natural advantages to the inhabitants, and the proved incapacity of the Government in several particulars, which may be a fair indication of its general shortcomings. The *minimum* of reform with which we should rest content in the case of Cashmere would be the acceptance by its ruler of a position similar to that I have proposed for Puttiala and the other Sikh chiefs.

The arrangement in his case would have to be more definite and binding, because we have less guarantee of his fidelity to our

interests. It would also have to cover and provide for the construction of roads and other necessary reforms for an amelioration in the material condition of the Cashmerian people. The duty inefficiently performed by 27,000 Cashmerian troops and 160 guns might be accomplished by a properly disciplined force of half that strength; and no one who knows the Indian borders will dispute the fact that a strong Anglo-Indian garrison in Cashmere would produce a most salutary impression along the whole of our north-west frontier.

It is unnecessary to consider here the armed and independent Pathan and other tribes who hold the Suleiman range from Abbotabad to Kachhi, and who possess a nominal force of 150,000 fighting men. Nor does it enter into my province to describe either the Afghan army or the followings of the larger chiefs who pay allegiance to the Ameer.

But the state of Khelat or Beloochistan is

in closer and more formal dependence on our Government, and must be included among the feudatories of the Indian Empire. Khelat is accepted as embracing an area of 80,000 square miles, with an approximate population of only 350,000. The bulk of the people live in the plain of Kachhi, which is on the eastern side of the Brahuik range. The present revenue is computed at £50,000 (five lakhs); but it is steadily increasing through British protection, and may be expected to reach in a short time double that amount.

With this income the Khan maintains 3,000 armed men, while his principal dependent, the Jam of Las, has about 1,000 more. The Beloochees make fine soldiers, and the two regiments raised from that nationality have earned a good name in several of our wars. It is desirable that these regiments should be increased, when Beloochistan will be undergoing that process of development towards providing an efficient and auxiliary

force which I have ventured to indicate for the Sikh principalities.

In Khelat, under our guidance, the revenue has increased, tranquillity has been restored to the State as far as the desert of Mekran and the Persian frontier, at the same time that something has been done towards promoting the efficiency and good conduct of the Khan's army.

On the eastern frontier there are several small States in somewhat similar relationship with us, but of these Munipore is the only one that needs description. Munipore is a hill State lying to the south of our province of Assam, and touching on the further side territory which, although nominally Burmese, is really inhabited by independent tribes. It is a State of considerable natural resources, including minerals and salt, and has long been in the closest alliance with our Government.

The Maharajah rules from his capital of Imphal 125,000 subjects, who occupy territory

described as being 125 miles in length and 100 miles in breadth. His revenue does not exceed £6,000 a year, but his followers in addition owe him military service. The army of this little State is computed at 500 artillery, 400 cavalry, and 4,400 infantry. On several occasions a detachment of this force has co-operated with our troops in inflicting chastisement on the turbulent tribes to the south ; and the conduct of the Maharajah has been uniformly guided by a desire to show his gratitude for our having obtained his independence of Burmah in 1826 by the Treaty of Yandaboo.

I have now only to consider those States on the northern frontier of India and within its geographical limits, as Burmah must be held excluded from this survey for the same reason as Afghanistan.

Of these there are only two, Bhutan and Nepaul. With regard to the former, which is an exceedingly little known and difficult country, it need only be said that we have

been twice compelled, in 1772 and 1866, to engage in hostilities with its ruler, who is known as the Deb Rajah. On the first occasion Warren Hastings successfully defended the plains of Kuch Behar against the marauding attacks of its inhabitants, and on the second, after an arduous little campaign, the fertile districts known as the Duars were ceded to us in return for a small annual payment.

The mountaineers who inhabit this territory are now restricted to its more remote recesses, where their immoral system, based on the practice of polyandry, effectually prevents all prosperity or natural development. Bhutan is described as a fertile region in one half, and as containing some of the grandest scenery along the Himalaya in the other half. But there is too much of greater importance and of a more pressing character to be done elsewhere, to justify us in applying the remedy of annexation, although there is no doubt that the result would well repay the toil.

Nepaul is a State which, were it on the northern instead of the southern side of the Himalaya, would deserve the position of an independent kingdom quite as much as Burmah or Afghanistan. But as it happens to lie within the geographical limits of Hindostan, and more especially as being contiguous to the very weakest point on the whole of our borders, and as a paramount Power cannot admit the pretension of equality within its jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that Nepaul must be considered among those great feudatories which are dependent upon our sway.

Our relations with Nepaul go back to the period when British influence had first become supreme in Bengal. In 1767, only ten years after Plassey, the Rajah of Khatmandhu, who was one of the Newar kings, applied to us for assistance against the Goorkha chief Prithi Narayan, who then held him hard pressed, and Captain Kinloch was sent with a small force to help him.

The difficulties of the Terai, the thick belt of jungle which separates Nepaul from Behar, proved too much for the English troops, and the force was compelled to retreat without having come into collision with the Goorkhas. The Newar king, being thus left to his fate, was soon vanquished, and Prithi Narayan was in due course recognised as Rajah of Nepaul.

The invasion of Tibet by the Goorkhas, and the counter-attack on Nepaul, by the Chinese in 1791-2, produced a disposition at Khatmandhu to conclude a closer connection with the English, and, as the first preliminary towards the attainment of this object, Major Kirkpatrick was sent to Khatmandhu for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of commerce.

Before he reached the Nepaulese capital the Chinese had completely triumphed, and the Goorkhas had been compelled to sign an ignominious treaty. Under these altered circumstances the English alliance lost its attractiveness, and Major Kirkpatrick, after

several months' abortive discussion, was compelled to return without his commercial treaty.

During the nine years following these events Nepaul was a prey to internal strife and confusion, and the frontier was disturbed by frequent raids. In 1801, however, a treaty was negotiated by Captain Knox, who took up his abode at Khatmandhu as our first Resident. His residence did not prove very protracted, for in 1803, after several dynastical changes and scenes of bloodshed in the capital, accompanied by a persistent disregard of the obligations contracted by treaty, Captain Knox was withdrawn, and the treaty was declared to be no longer binding.

After this our relations with Nepaul consisted of sustained but unavailing remonstrances at the continued acts of hostility committed along our borders, and on more than one occasion the encroachment of the Goorkhas threatened to entail an open rupture. In 1814, after repeated but always futile efforts to settle the points in dispute,

war was formally declared upon Nepaul, and the year 1815 witnessed the most doubtful campaign in which Englishmen had been engaged in India since the death of Hyder Ali.

It was not until the following year that Sir David Ochterlony retrieved the credit of our arms and obtained the ratification of the Treaty of Segowli, by which most of the Goorkha conquests, including the greater portion of the Terai, were ceded to us. After this war the governing power gradually passed from the hands of the Maharajah into those of his Prime Minister, and Bhim Sen Tappa, the great uncle of the late Jung Bahadur, attained and employed the influence of a *maire du palais*.

The policy of the Minister was even more unfriendly and exclusive than that of his master had been ; and the relations between Calcutta and Khatmandhu could only be styled satisfactory on the assumption that there was no necessity for any to exist at all.

The internal disturbances were several times renewed, while the success and arrogance of the Tappa family raised up the jealousy and hostility of the other chiefs.

Bhim Sen Tappa was at last deposed from his place of power, and several members of his family were banished, while he himself, after two years' fancied security, was brutally tortured and killed. The Goorkha Durbar still clung tenaciously to the possibility of recovering what it had lost at the hands of the English, and during the Afghan war of 1839-42 it intrigued in several directions for the purpose of forming a league against us. Emissaries from Khatmandhu were discovered, not only in Rajpootana, Hyderabad, and Gwalior, but even in Burmah and Bhutan.

In 1841 a corps of observation was despatched to the frontier, and was only removed on the Nepaulese chiefs signing an engagement to be well behaved and to maintain the peace. At this conjuncture the

state of renewed disturbance throughout the country, and the return of the Tappas to power, left the Goorkhas less attention to devote to marauding expeditions on the Behar frontier.

Matabar Singh, the nephew of Bhim Sen Tappa, was recalled from exile in 1843, and intrusted with power; but his rejoicing proved of short duration, for within the space of two years he was murdered by order of a rival, who rejoiced in the favour of the Maharanee. This act was the signal for increased confusion, out of which Matabar's successor, Jung Bahadur, managed to extract for himself personal fame and advantage.

The Maharanee was banished and a new Maharajah was proclaimed; and it was said with some truth that Jung Bahadur waded through blood to the power he attained. It should only be stated, in fairness to him, that had he not struck boldly at his enemies, he would have shared Matabar's fate.

One of Jung Bahadur's first acts, was to pay a visit to England, which may in a certain sense be termed memorable, and which certainly produced a different impression on his mind from that made by a similar tour on the agent of the notorious Nana Sahib.

One anecdote will serve the place of a paragraph of description. Nothing in London impressed the Goorkha chief like the vastness of the extent of the streets, and it is recorded how on one occasion he ordered his coachman to drive him from the extreme point of Notting Hill to the place where the houses stop on the eastern side of London. Long before he reached his destination he repented of his purpose, exclaiming, "Enough! the Queen has no more faithful subject than I." That he was as good as his word the history of the Mutiny clearly showed; and, indeed, the whole of his subsequent life proved him to be staunch in his belief in English power.

The population of Nepaul is uncertain, but it is generally accepted as being about three millions, while the State revenue may be set down as not less than half a million sterling. Our knowledge of Nepaul is practically *nil* outside the capital and the road thither, despite the efforts of the earlier Residents and, in more recent times, of Mr. Brian Hodgson, Dr. Oldfield, Colonel Ramsay, and Mr. Girdlestone to add to our information ; for the policy of the Durbar has been rigidly exclusive and marked by great suspicion.

Neither official survey nor unofficial travel has been permitted outside the beaten track to Khatmandhu, although the policy of the Durbar has been framed on more friendly lines than was the case in the earlier years of the century. Yet it has been during this very period of alliance that the present army of Nepaul, with its regular and well-armed regiments, has been created, and this army musters little, if anything, short of 100,000 fighting men. A cannon foundry

and arms factory exist at Khatmandhu, and many of the officers and drill-sergeants have gained their military skill and experience in those brave Goorkha regiments which are the pride of our native army.

When the Nepaulese Durbar entertained ambitious schemes during the first Afghan war it possessed no regular army to give practical effect to its wishes, and the followers of the chiefs afforded but an uncertain force to enable the Maharajah or his Minister to execute a policy that required great resources and a large army. Mr. Brian Hodgson had before that perceived the opportunity of recruiting a large number of these hardy hill-men for our own service.

As far back as 1833, this gentleman, who is still living, had written that "the Goorkha sees in foreign service nothing but the prospect of glory and spoil." It was in the execution of this design that the first Goorkha regiment was raised before the advance into Afghanistan ; and it may be stated that it was

virtually annihilated in the defence of Carikar in 1841.

The recruiting of Goorkha sepoy was checked principally by the resolve to increase the army of Nepaul, and once the Indian Government refused to avail itself of the opportunity afforded by the existence of 30,000 Dakreeahs, or soldiers off the roll, the occasion did not recur, for the Durbar absorbed them in the ranks of its own army.

Only the more adventurous were left to escape from their own recruiting agents to those of the English, posted at convenient places near the frontier. The important fact is that in the last forty years a Goorkha brigade of nearly 5,000 men has been formed in our army, and at the same time a Nepaul-ese army of 100,000 men has come into existence.

The question with regard to Nepaul is not one, therefore, of moral responsibility as to the manner in which the administration is carried on; nor can it be said, seeing that

Nepaul has been successfully invaded by the Chinese on one occasion, and that it was engaged with that State in a second war of doubtful result thirty years ago, that an army of even 100,000 men is excessive for the requirements of the country.

We have not the official information to justify our making any decided statement as to the shortcomings of the executive or the condition of the people, and besides official information there is no other.

In Nepaul we have to deal with a revealed political danger. It forms an *imperium in imperio* which cannot be despised, and must not be disregarded. Its soldiers, we know to our own satisfaction, are brave and daring. They have the military instinct which, however we may affect to regard it, is the thing that our traditions and our education teach us to believe most admirable. They are the more formidable because they require less of European leading than any other Asiatic race with whom we have come into contact.

In Nepaul we have to deal with a potential danger of more than ordinary significance. In some respects it may be compared to Afghanistan ; but both in position as regards our own territory and in union among themselves the Nepaulese must be considered as being more formidable than the Afghans.

While our whole military system has been adapted to insure the security of the north-west frontier, very slight preparations have been made towards repelling attack from Nepaul. Should the Goorkhas ever produce a great leader without the prudence or the other distractions of Jung Bahadur, the peril would assume a more tangible form than, fortunately, it can be said to possess at present.

Then it would be recalled that the Khatmandhu Court had striven to form and head a league of the princes of India against us in 1839.

I am only stating facts when I say that the army of Nepaul is the most formidable native force in Hindostan ; that the position of that

State is strategically dangerous on our most exposed flank ; and that, despite the loyalty and devotion of Goorkha sepoy, the policy of Khatmandhu is neither as frank nor as friendly as is desirable, and, indeed, necessary. No occasion should be lost of inducing the Nepaulese to pursue a less Chinese form of policy towards our Government.

I will now summarise the results which I have been allowed to place before your readers in these articles. In Feudatory India, excluding all the frontier States except Cashmere, there are the following independent armies :—The Mahrattas, with a population of 6,250,000 and a State revenue of £3,300,000, maintain standing armies of a total of 59,600 men and 116 guns ; and it is well known that they could place a still larger number of trained men in the field if they felt disposed to do so.

The Hindoo States, with a population of 27,000,000 and a revenue of £8,000,000, keep up armies of 188,475 men and an artillery force of 3,096 guns.

Cashmere, with a population of 1,500,000 and a revenue of £600,000, adds 27,000 men and 160 guns to the list.

Now, all these States are, strictly speaking, Hindoo, and grouping them together we have a combined population of 34,750,000, a revenue of £11,900,000, and armies of 275,075 men, with 3,372 guns.

The Mahomedan States have a population of 14,300,000, a revenue of £5,240,000, and standing armies of 74,760 men, with 865 pieces of artillery.

The result of this survey of Feudatory India is to show that a total population of 49,050,000 (there are another million in petty States which do not keep up armies), with a revenue of £17,140,000, maintain armies amounting to 349,835 men, and an artillery composed of 4,237 guns.

There are several standpoints from which it is necessary to regard these gigantic totals. In the first place, it is clear that if these armies are necessary to provide the men of

the native States with an occupation, as is alleged by those who desire to find arguments for their existence, our native army is only one-tenth of what it ought to be.

If less than fifty millions of people require 350,000 soldiers not only to defend, but to provide them with a career, it necessarily follows that 200 millions of precisely the same people must require four times that number.

But instead of 350,000 men we have little more than 100,000 natives. Moreover, it must be remembered that our army of these modest dimensions not merely protects these fifty millions of people, in common with the direct subjects of the English Crown, against foreign attack, but it prevents them from engaging in internecine strife.

It suffices to discharge a double task, but there is no question that the burden of its duty is very much increased by having to meet the domestic obligation of watching these armies at the same time as it has to be so distributed that it may best defend an

extensive frontier, and repel a possible external danger.

At the most moderate computation it follows that these forces are seven times too numerous ; but as they vary in efficiency, and as the most numerous and excessive are not the most formidable, a reduction to one-fifth of their present strength would meet all the exigencies of the case.

This reduction would have to be carried out in a gradual and delicate manner ; and the strongest reason against delay is, that if the solution of the question be put off it will have to be applied in a more violent manner and under a sense of emergency.

Of course, proud princes like the Nizam, Scindiah, Holkar, and others may prefer extinction to the deprivation of the right to keep up the military display to which they have gradually accustomed themselves ; although, this is to my mind doubtful.

They will in turn receive, of course, certain concessions that may flatter their vanity, and

render palatable a change that will, a short time after it has been effected, be admitted to be salutary. A small minority may chafe at the assertion of our moral right to provide for the effectual defence of the whole of the peninsula in the least costly manner to its inhabitants and in the most satisfactory way to ourselves ; but the majority will acquiesce in whatever we may decide and whatever we may take the trouble to see carried out.

If there are a few who will resist a salutary change, it is better that their ill-will and the scope of their ambition should be revealed early than late, and that we should fully realise at what they are aiming.

We should be asking of these feudatories a concession, and we should be willing to make them a return. If their forces were reduced in the first place by one-half, and on the • assumption that all recruiting was stopped for a stated period, and then only recommenced for an army on a reduced basis, we should be able to reduce our garrisons of vigilance, and

perhaps even to withdraw some of them altogether.

The advantage to the people of India would be immense, as the forces maintained at great cost in Southern and Central India would be available for duty on the frontier.

The people of India have as direct an interest in this question as we have ourselves, for it is their money that is being squandered in the maintenance of these intolerably large armies. The principle of mutual disarmament is not applicable to this matter, because it is already becoming very plain that our own Anglo-Indian army is too small for the extensive duties which it has to perform, and that if no change is made in these independent armies, it will have to be increased.

But we can and we should diminish our garrisons in native cantonments. Of course, as a guarantee of good faith, it would be necessary to procure the surrender of arms and the closing of all rifle factories and cannon foundries.

The question is of hardly less importance if regarded by the light of the financial considerations involved. I have endeavoured to show throughout that the maintenance of these forces carries with it a high rate of taxation ; and the total result will bring this fact still more clearly before the reader.

Feudatory India, with a population of less than fifty millions, produces a revenue of seventeen millions sterling, while British India, with four times that population, is considered over-taxed when it raises fifty millions ; for opium and railways do not come under the head of taxation from the people.

But the real difference is still greater, for the sixty millions of Bengal produce the larger proportion of our revenue, with the consequence that the bulk of our Indian subjects are still less highly taxed than those in native States.

The inhabitants of these native States are not merely heavily taxed. They are taxed for only one of two objects : the maintenance

of a standing army, or for the sake of enabling the chief or prince to make a display suitable to his Oriental fancy.

Of the seventeen millions raised, more than twelve are devoted to these purposes. I believe this to be under, rather than over the mark ; and consequently the cost of these native States to their subjects, with hardly any return at all, does not fall much short of the maintenance of the whole of our garrison, both English and Indian. The cost of the armies alone very far exceeds that spent on our native army.

Now we are told that India is a poor country ; and the statement is true to a certain extent. It is certainly much too poor to bear the weight of these useless armies in addition to its regular and necessary army. It has to pay the cost of a European administration, which is by necessity expensive ; and it is due to it in return that it should receive the fullest benefits in our power to bestow.

We have done two things which no one

can deny. We have established justice and the power of the law ; and we have preserved peace in a country which before our time had always been a prey to war. We have not done these things in only a limited portion of the country. The *Pax Britannica* is complete and unqualified, from the Himalayas to Adam's Bridge.

But there is no certainty of our being able to continue this good work if we allow new hostile conditions to come into force, and make no effort to adjust or alter those that have hitherto existed. The native armies might have been tolerated if they had not acquired increased efficiency, improved arms, and a greater perception of the advantages of union.

- These forces are no longer what they were, and they are steadily improving. They have a tendency to become more popular with the people themselves, just as the difficulty of attracting Sepoys into our own regiments increases.

The significance of their existence is certainly not diminished by the consideration that they are supported by a group of princes who often succeed in increasing their revenue, while ours remains practically stationary.

The threatened gradual decline of the receipts from opium—which was pointed out in *The Times* before the reports from our Consuls in China as to the increased growth in that country of native opium furnished proof on the subject—menaces it in so vital a part that less attention is not likely to be attracted to the large revenues raised by our feudatories for selfish purposes, and, in most cases, without conferring any solid benefit on the States it is their privilege and good fortune to rule.

For Imperial purposes, for the advantage of India as a single State, their revenues are not merely wasted. They even necessitate an expenditure on our part in placing corps at places where otherwise they would not be wanted.

Were these territories the centres of an expanding trade, the seat of marked prosperity, we should retire abashed from the task of criticising, and admit the immeasurable superiority of native rule. But such is not the case. Without exception, trade is stagnant, hampered by excessive transit dues and by the want of roads.

The people are over-taxed, disheartened, and, in their misery, anxious to accept any employment, however averse they may be to these new occupations on the ground of caste scruples or pride of race.

This lamentable condition of things is nowhere more conspicuous than in the larger and more influential States.

It is rendered more grave, and approaches more nearly to overt oppression where differences of religion between ruler and ruled create antipathy and cover tyranny with a cloak of religious zeal.

There are two causes common to them all : heavy taxation for the purpose of maintaining

an army, and the excessive employment of the able-bodied men in a service where it behoves their dignity to do no menial labour. Remove them, or even mitigate them, and the official reports from our Indian Agents and Residents will not require that copious excision and revision to which they are now subjected before publication.

For all these reasons the subject of the native armies of Feudatory India is one that presses itself on the attention of those who are responsible for the welfare and tranquillity of that country.

Whether they are considered from the point of view of a political danger to ourselves, of the waste of vast sums of Indian treasure, or as distracting the attention of their rulers to vain dreams of pomp and ambition from necessary duties of administration and provident legislation, there can be but the one verdict, that they have no right to continued existence.

Their present excessive dimensions have

been attained through the apathy of the English Government, and the difficulty of dealing with them has been increased in proportion to their growth in numbers and efficiency.

But the facts are, I think, sufficiently startling to remove the scales from the eyes of persons more blind to the state of the case than our officials can be said to have ever been; and the realities of our position in India are never likely to leave us the opportunity of even seeming to be blind to the magnitude of the evil of which these armies are the cause.

We defend India for the benefit of all its inhabitants, and, moreover, we defend it in Europe quite as efficiently as we do in Asia. We garrison it, not merely against external aggression, but in order to put an end to Mahomedan insolence, Mahratta oppression, and Pindari turbulence.

We are there on behalf of the toiling ryot, of the thrifty trader, of the millions who are sick of the law of violence, and of the

endless appeal to arms that characterised every rule before our own.

These Feudatory States are not only the representatives of every form of outrage and superior strength wreaked in the past on these people, but they have also acquired by our toleration, by the opportunities that increased wealth and continued peace have placed in their hands of purchasing weapons, a power of engaging in warfare, and a capacity of inflicting mischief on each other, and on the inhabitants of the rest of India, far in excess of anything possessed by their predecessors. In India we are responsible for the consequences of our acts as well as for the acts themselves.